EP0881136B1 - Verfahren zum Bilden des sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalls einer Ortungslösung - Google Patents
Verfahren zum Bilden des sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalls einer Ortungslösung Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP0881136B1 EP0881136B1 EP98105117A EP98105117A EP0881136B1 EP 0881136 B1 EP0881136 B1 EP 0881136B1 EP 98105117 A EP98105117 A EP 98105117A EP 98105117 A EP98105117 A EP 98105117A EP 0881136 B1 EP0881136 B1 EP 0881136B1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- location
- confidence interval
- determining
- individual
- safety
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Lifetime
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 23
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 44
- 101000953492 Homo sapiens Inositol hexakisphosphate and diphosphoinositol-pentakisphosphate kinase 1 Proteins 0.000 claims abstract description 5
- 101000953488 Homo sapiens Inositol hexakisphosphate and diphosphoinositol-pentakisphosphate kinase 2 Proteins 0.000 claims abstract description 5
- 102100037739 Inositol hexakisphosphate and diphosphoinositol-pentakisphosphate kinase 1 Human genes 0.000 claims abstract description 5
- 102100037736 Inositol hexakisphosphate and diphosphoinositol-pentakisphosphate kinase 2 Human genes 0.000 claims abstract description 5
- 230000015572 biosynthetic process Effects 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000010200 validation analysis Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000012937 correction Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 abstract description 12
- 238000006073 displacement reaction Methods 0.000 abstract description 6
- 230000004807 localization Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000001133 acceleration Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000001360 synchronised effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000004020 conductor Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
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- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000018109 developmental process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
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Images
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
- B61L15/0092—Memory means reproducing during the running of the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. smart cards
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
- B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
- B61L25/025—Absolute localisation, e.g. providing geodetic coordinates
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
- B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
- B61L25/026—Relative localisation, e.g. using odometer
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L2205/00—Communication or navigation systems for railway traffic
- B61L2205/04—Satellite based navigation systems, e.g. global positioning system [GPS]
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method according to the preamble of claim 1.
- Such a method is from the document Safe error limits for the detection of the movement states of railways; "Progress Reports VDI, Row 8, No. 583 known.
- pages 225 to 232 is a Procedure for self-locating a track-bound vehicle in the Route network of a railway system known with facilities is equipped for linear train control.
- the Self-location there are two independent location devices, namely one by wheel impulses of a vehicle wheel indexable path counter and a device for Detection of line crossing points.
- the outward and return conductors of the line manager are at regular intervals of z. B, 100 m crossed and allow one with knowledge of the location an absolute location on the relevant first intersection Track of the route.
- the actual driving location between neighboring intersections are operated by the wheel Path pulse generator determined, its location indicated by Sliding and skidding is more or less faulty.
- the evaluation of the displacement encoder can therefore be done at Passed a line crossing point postponed are, so that the unavoidable measuring deviations of the displacement measuring devices each on a single line section are limited and in successive Sections not becoming one that may no longer be acceptable Add value.
- the only exception is the case that a line crossing point is not recognized; in this Trap the vehicle accepts that from the displacement encoder updated vehicle position until a subsequent synchronization through a line crossing point. Become neither do the two following line crossing points recognized, the location is lost and the vehicle is forced to a standstill.
- the present invention is based on such a method to locate a track-guided vehicle on which a first vehicle position that can be determined by any means is updated depending on the route until it is dependent on the route updated position finally through a then determined more current information is replaced.
- a track-guided vehicle on which a first vehicle position that can be determined by any means is updated depending on the route until it is dependent on the route updated position finally through a then determined more current information is replaced.
- a first vehicle position that can be determined by any means is updated depending on the route until it is dependent on the route updated position finally through a then determined more current information is replaced.
- the satellite location results are system-specific with different cases Tolerances afflicted, so that at most determined can be that a vehicle is in a confidence interval between an upper and a lower limit, that can be reflected on the route traveled. in the the rest must also be assumed that the for the Locating used electronics works incorrectly and so incorrect location results, d. H. not properly placed trust intervals of the vehicle position leads.
- the object of the present invention is to follow the method the preamble of claim 1 to design and to further develop that despite the use of signal technology non-secure facilities for absolute location and relative distance measurement to location results with safety-relevant Confidence intervals leads.
- the invention solves these problems by Features of claim 1.
- the provided according to the invention Update of the confidence intervals, the multiple Typically unsynchronized single location results are assignable, it makes this possible based on consistency to check and from this a security-relevant trust interval to form the location; this security relevant Confidence interval may be earlier, so far At this point in time, a security-relevant trust interval was created - the provision of a derived when updating due to unavoidable measurement errors Relative distance measurement to broaden the confidence interval.
- claim 2 proposes to the Formation of the security-relevant trust intervals of one Localization solution to include trust intervals of the individual location solutions Validate retrospectively using correction data and verify, again referring to the path-dependent confidence interval of the relative path measurement to fall back on.
- those for updating the individual trust intervals trust intervals to be taken into account the relative path measurement are stored depending on the path or can be determined on the vehicles by estimation his; the predicted measurement errors can e.g. B. dependent be of the track inclination as well as the acceleration or deceleration of vehicles.
- those involved in education of a security-relevant trust interval involved Single location solutions for consistency with the space curve traveled being checked. This ensures that single location solutions, that are not track-selective, on routes with Then branches are not included in the formation of the safety-relevant Confidence intervals are included when the There is a possibility that the location solution may be different refers to a track other than the one under consideration.
- the individual location solutions should be advantageous according to claim 9 through transit time measurements to terrestrial or extraterrestrial Location transmitters are formed. Stand for it z. B. the Loran C and the GPS system are available.
- the location receivers should be as possible different technical characteristics used become. This creates the guarantee that any wrongdoing the location receiver to the location receiver concerned remain limited and have no effect on the location results of other location recipients; this expression increases the security relevance of the determined Confidence interval.
- the individual Location solutions also advantageous by correlating current ones Route data obtained with corresponding reference data , for example by correlating radar signals via the route profile or the correlation of acceleration signals.
- the single-location solutions can according to claim 12 by a certain number of preferably not synchronized Location recipients are formed, their confidence intervals are updated depending on the route. But it is the same possible according to the teaching of claim 13, only one To use the location receiver, which then at several times provides different single location solutions that are in turn updated depending on the path; the latter solution, however, requires a highly reliable, monitorable location receiver because of any misconduct can affect all single location results.
- Locating receivers arranged on a track-guided vehicle Individual location results at different times t1 to tn have delivered, each of which has a confidence interval VIP1 to VIPn has that due to the respective location accuracy is defined.
- a confidence interval is called Route areas on both sides of a specific location solution, within which the actual location of a vehicle with is based on a defined high probability; the Confidence interval can be symmetrical or asymmetrical extend to the location solution and be of different widths.
- the location solutions can be one or more Location recipients come who have their location results to different Deliver times, or from just one only location receiver that at different times different location results and their assigned confidence intervals provides.
- the confidence intervals in their chronological sequence are shown hatched in FIG.
- the trust interval VIP1 applies to the point in time t1, the confidence interval VIP2 for the time t2 and that Trust interval VIPn for the time tn. None of these Single location solutions should be viewed as security-relevant, because every single location solution z. B. by a device defect can be totally wrong. Leaves through consistency checks but from several individual location results a location result with a security-relevant trust interval, by these single location results and their individual Confidence intervals checked for consistency become.
- a security-relevant trust interval (also one of zero size) was determined recognize the route-related confidence interval of the location, as in Figure 2 by the two thickly drawn upper and lower limits are defined as t0 * and su, t0 *; t0 denotes the past reset time, for the last time an absolute location result has been recognized as safety-relevant.
- This can e.g. B. that Passing a fixed influencing device be or the recognition of one determined by runtime measurements
- the position of the Trust interval limits assigned to the vehicle at time t0 are based on worst-case assumptions by a Vehicle-side distance measurement has been updated, with increasing route the worst case scenario Measuring errors for a constant increase in the confidence interval the location leads.
- a full compensation of the Influence of measuring errors on the confidence interval of the Localization would be possible if the current new confidence interval can be found without using the relative distance measurement could, e.g. if several location results at the same time would exist for the same location.
- the limits of the confidence interval VIP1 of the individual location result determined at time t1 P1, t1 taking into account the maximum possible deviation the vehicle-side distance measurement up to Reference time tb updated, the confidence interval this location result by those to be considered Measurement error of vehicle-side distance measurement increased; the broadening of the confidence interval is in figure 1 indicated by dashed lines.
- the measurement errors can be assumed to be constant along the way or as shown in Embodiment assumed location-related vary. Updating the individual trust interval can z. B. bring about that in a route Atlas the parameters for forming the confidence interval the vehicle-side distance measurement depending on the location are. The measurement errors possible on one side or the other can be different for the individual locations; so arise z. B.
- a locating device on the vehicle should have determined a second individual location result P2, t2, the the trust interval must be assigned to VIP2.
- This trust interval too becomes path-dependent according to the confidence interval the relative displacement measurement, whereby the confidence interval is increasing.
- the individual updated confidence intervals equal measurement deviations for use; the updated interval limits run parallel to each other.
- a security-relevant confidence interval SVIPb the absolute location can be formed.
- This trust interval is advantageous to refer to the time tn where the last required single location result is available, can, however, in principle on any other Time tb can be obtained.
- the current driving location of the vehicle is then obtained by updating the confidence interval SVIPb, which has been reset to the reference time tb, in accordance with the upper and lower limits of the travel distance Lu, ta or Lo, ta taking into account the possible errors in the distance measurement between the reference time and the current time ta at which the validation and verification of the individual position solutions is completed.
- the update of the reset confidence interval limits can also be determined from the advancing speed of the vehicle between the reference time and the current time and the travel time defined thereby, any measurement errors to be taken into account thereby broadening the confidence interval limits.
- Figure 2 are those related to the times t1, t2 and tn verified single location results in the form of positions P1, P2 and Pn on the leveled space curve RK one Track applied and together with that for them applicable confidence interval. It can be seen that on projected the reference point in time tb as security-relevant confidence interval SVIPb to be viewed is greater than that Trust interval VIPn of the individual trust interval at Time tn; the newly determined security-relevant trust interval SVIPb is definitely smaller than the path-dependent, security-relevant trust interval SVIPo * of the location at time t0.
- the single location solutions, their individual trust intervals in the formation of a security-relevant confidence interval should be involved before the consistency check checked their confidence intervals to determine whether them with the space curve and its physically possible the history of the specified travel paths are consistent. there it is checked whether the single location solutions are all on the same Space curve, making sure that between successive single location solutions no at least trivalent track node exists. Then namely can Single location solutions can be ambiguous and affect multiple ones Get space curves; their confidence intervals are therefore allowed in determining what is considered to be safety-relevant track-selective confidence intervals do not have to participate from the range of available, in the formation of a security-relevant trust intervals flowing into individual trust intervals to be sorted out, unless they are Tracking over this track node is clearly fixed and z. B. guaranteed by an interlocking.
- the facilities for self-tracking of guided vehicles in a route network can include the terms of terrestrial or extraterrestrial location transmitters to a location receiver determine from this the respective vehicle position to calculate; the use is advantageous of location receivers in different technical configurations, because this makes the danger not recognizable location and measurement errors based on the same interference is reduced.
- the vehicle-side location devices can the respective Vehicle position but also e.g. by correlating current sensor signals relating to the route with corresponding reference signals stored in a memory determine.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
- Navigation (AREA)
- Measurement Of Distances Traversed On The Ground (AREA)
- Traffic Control Systems (AREA)
- Alarm Systems (AREA)
- Time Recorders, Dirve Recorders, Access Control (AREA)
Description
- Figur 1
- ein Diagramm, aus dem sich das Zurückstellen eines wegabhängig fortgeschriebenen sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalles auf ein dann aktuelles Vertrauensintervall ergibt und in
- Figur 2
- die Spiegelung der einzelnen Vertrauensintervalle auf eine Raumkurve.
Lo, ta unter Berücksichtigung der möglichen Mißweisungen der Wegmessung zwischen dem Bezugszeitpunkt und dem aktuellen Zeitpunkt ta, an dem die Validierung und Verifizierung der Einzelpositionslösungen abgeschlossen ist. Das Fortschreiben der rückgesetzten Vertrauensintervallgrenzen läßt sich auch aus der Vorrückgeschwindigkeit des Fahrzeugs zwischen dem Bezugszeitpunkt und dem aktuellen Zeitpunkt und der dadurch definierten Fahrzeit ermitteln, wobei etwaige zu berücksichtigende Meßfehler dabei die Vertrauensintervallgrenzen aufweiten.
Claims (13)
- Verfahren zum Bilden des sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalls einer fahrzeugseitig ermittelten Position eines spurgebundenen Fahrzeugs auf einer Raumkurve, wobei ein als sicherheitsrelevant anerkanntes und durch Anwendung eines Vertrauensintervalls der relativen Wegmessung fortgeschriebenes absolutes Vertrauensintervall (SVIPo) der Ortung gebildet und durch einaktuelles sicherheitsrelevantes Vertrauensintervall zurückgestellt wird
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß zeitlich und/oder örtlich versetzt mehrere Einzelortungsmessungen durchgeführt werden und daß die den Einzelortungsergebnissen zugeordneten Vertrauensintervalle (VIP1, VIP2, VIPn) der Ortung ebenfalls durch Anwendung des Vertrauensintervalls der relativen Wegmessung wegabhängig bis hin zu einem Bezugszeitpunkt(tb) fortgeschrieben werden, zu dem eine vorgegebene Mindestanzahl (n) von Einzelvertrauensintervallen vorliegt und daß die maximalen oberen und unteren Grenzen aller auf den Bezugszeitpunkt (tb) fortgeschriebenen Einzelvertrauensintervalle die Grenzen des zu bildenden sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalls (SVIPb) bilden und daß - sofern vorhanden - das zuletzt als sicherheitsrelevant anerkannte, absolute Vertranensintervall (SVIPo) durch das gebildete sicherheitsrelevante Vertrauensintervall (SVIPb) zurückgestellt wird. - Verfahren nach Anspruch 1,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die an der Bildung des sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalls (SVIPb) beteiligten Vertrauensintervalle der Einzelortungslösungen durch rückwirkendes Anwenden differenzieller Korrekturdaten für das verwendete Satellitenortungssystem auf die gefundenen Einzelortungsergebnisse, jeweils unter Berücksichtigung des Vertrauensintervalls der relativen Wegmessung für die zwischen dem Bezugszeitpunkt und dem Validierungszeitpunkt der betreffenden Einzelortungslösung zurückgelegte Wegstrecke, gebildet werden. - Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 2,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Bezugszeitpunkt (tb) auf den Zeitpunkt (tn) des jeweils zuletzt ermittelten Einzelortungsergebnisses gelegt wird. - Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 3,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß für das wegabhängige Fortschreiben von Einzel-Vertrauensintervallen fahrortbezogen hinterlegte oder fahrortbezogen berechnete und/oder geschätzte Parameter zur Vertrauensintervallbildung der Wegmessung berücksichtigt werden. - Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 4,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die an der Bildung des sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalls (SVIPb) beteiligten Einzelortungslösungen (P1,t1; P2,t2, Pn,tn) zuvor auf Konsistenz mit einer Raumkurve (RK) und deren physikalisch möglichen, durch die Historie vorgegebenen Verfahrwegen geprüft werden. - Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 5,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das Vertrauensintervall einer Einzelortungslösung, die nicht in das aktuelle als sicherheitsrelevant anerkannte, durch Anwendung des Vertrauensintervalls der relativen Wegmessung fortgeschriebene Vertrauensintervall fällt, an der Bildung des aktuellen sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalls (SVIPb) nicht beteiligt wird. - Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 6,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Rückstellung des zuletzt als sicherheitsrelevant anerkannten Vertrauensintervalls (SVIPo*) durch das aktuelle Vertrauensintervall (SVIPb) erst nach Abschluß der Validierung der Einzelortungsergebnisse und ihrer Vertrauensintervalle zu einem dann in der Vergangenheit liegenden Bezugszeitpunkt (tb) erfolgt. - Verfahren nach Anspruch 7,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß für die Bestimmung des Vertrauensintervalls der augenblicklichen Position eines Fahrzeugs die Grenzen des sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalls (SVIPb) zum Zeitpunkt (tb) ihrer Ermittlung nach Maßgabe der Fahrgeschwindigkeit und der Fahrzeit zwischen Bezugszeitpunkt (tb) und Validierungszeitpunkt (ta) oder der seither zurückgelegten Fahrstrecke (Lu, ta; Lo, ta), jeweils unter zusätzlicher Anwendung des Vertrauensintervalls der relativen Wegmessung, fortgeschrieben werden oder daß die Rücksetzung des Vertrauensintervalls (SVIPo*) des zuvor als sicherheitsrelevant anerkannten, durch Anwendung des Vertrauensintervalls der relativen Wegmessung fortgeschriebenen Vertrauensintervalls erst zum Validierungszeitpunkt geschieht. - Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 8,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Einzelortungslösungen jeweils durch Laufzeitmessungen zu terrestrischen oder extraterrestrischen Ortungssendern gebildet werden. - Verfahren nach Anspruch 9,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß für die Bestimmung der Einzelortungslösungen jeweils Ortungsempfänger in möglichst diversitärer technischer Ausprägung verwendet werden. - Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 10,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Einzelortungslösungen jeweils durch Korrelation aktueller Streckendaten auf zuvor in einem Streckenatlas hinterlegte entsprechende Referenzdaten gebildet werden. - Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 11,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Einzelortungslösungen unter Verwendung mehrerer Ortungsempfänger auf einem oder mehreren Fahrzeugen eines Zugverbandes ermittelt und über mindestens ein Ortungsmodul der Streckenkilometrierung zuordnet werden, die den Bezug zur relativen Wegmessung und dem fahrortbezogenen Vertrauensintervall der relativen Wegmessung herstellt. - Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 11,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Einzelortungslösungen unter Verwendung mindestens eines Ortungsempfängers auf einem Fahrzeug ermittelt werden, der mehrere Einzelortungslösungen zu aufeinander folgenden Zeitpunkten erstellt, und daß diese Einzelortungslösungen über ein Ortungsmodul der Streckenkilometrierung zugeordnet werden, die den Bezug zur relativen Wegmessung und dem fahrortbezogenen Vertrauensintervall der relativen Wegmessung herstellt.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE19722899A DE19722899A1 (de) | 1997-05-29 | 1997-05-29 | Verfahren zum Bilden des sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalls einer Ortungslösung |
DE19722899 | 1997-05-29 |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP0881136A2 EP0881136A2 (de) | 1998-12-02 |
EP0881136A3 EP0881136A3 (de) | 2000-09-27 |
EP0881136B1 true EP0881136B1 (de) | 2003-01-02 |
Family
ID=7831072
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP98105117A Expired - Lifetime EP0881136B1 (de) | 1997-05-29 | 1998-03-20 | Verfahren zum Bilden des sicherheitsrelevanten Vertrauensintervalls einer Ortungslösung |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP0881136B1 (de) |
AT (1) | ATE230360T1 (de) |
DE (2) | DE19722899A1 (de) |
ES (1) | ES2189999T3 (de) |
Families Citing this family (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE10355860A1 (de) * | 2003-11-25 | 2005-06-30 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Verfahren zur Orts-Zeit-Bestätigung |
EP1642800A1 (de) * | 2004-09-29 | 2006-04-05 | Alstom Belgium S.A. | Methode und System zur Positionsbestimmung eines sich entlang eines Pfades bewegenden Objektes |
EP1720754B1 (de) | 2004-03-05 | 2009-02-25 | Alstom Belgium S.A. | Verfahren und einrichtung zur sicheren bestimmung der position eines objekts |
SI1788461T1 (sl) | 2005-11-22 | 2009-12-31 | Multitel Asbl | Naprava in postopek za zasnovo sklopa senzorjev za varen avtomatiziran sistem, avtomatizirani sistem, programski element in računalniško berljiv medij |
FR3019676B1 (fr) * | 2014-04-02 | 2017-09-01 | Alstom Transp Tech | Procede de calcul d'un intervalle de positions d'un vehicule ferroviaire sur une voie ferree et dispositif associe |
FR3029674A1 (fr) * | 2014-12-03 | 2016-06-10 | Alstom Transp Tech | Procede de discrimination de la presence d'un vehicule ferroviaire sur un canton, procede de calcul d'un intervalle de securite et dispositif associe |
DE102017205456A1 (de) * | 2017-03-30 | 2018-10-04 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Vorrichtung zur Bestimmung zumindest eines auf einen Ort und/oder zumindest eine Bewegungsgröße eines spurgebundenen Fahrzeugs bezogenen Messwertes sowie Verfahren zum Betreiben einer solchen Vorrichtung |
Family Cites Families (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2536190B2 (ja) * | 1989-10-24 | 1996-09-18 | 三菱電機株式会社 | 移動体用ナビゲ―ション装置 |
JP3267310B2 (ja) * | 1991-07-10 | 2002-03-18 | パイオニア株式会社 | Gpsナビゲーション装置 |
JPH0579846A (ja) * | 1991-09-19 | 1993-03-30 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | 車両位置算出装置 |
-
1997
- 1997-05-29 DE DE19722899A patent/DE19722899A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
1998
- 1998-03-20 ES ES98105117T patent/ES2189999T3/es not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1998-03-20 AT AT98105117T patent/ATE230360T1/de not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1998-03-20 DE DE59806784T patent/DE59806784D1/de not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1998-03-20 EP EP98105117A patent/EP0881136B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP0881136A2 (de) | 1998-12-02 |
DE59806784D1 (de) | 2003-02-06 |
ES2189999T3 (es) | 2003-07-16 |
ATE230360T1 (de) | 2003-01-15 |
EP0881136A3 (de) | 2000-09-27 |
DE19722899A1 (de) | 1998-12-03 |
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