EP0700021A1 - Verfahren zum Übertragen von Informationen zwischen einem rechnergesteuerten Kontrollzentrum und einer Vielzahl von elektronischen Frankiermaschinen - Google Patents

Verfahren zum Übertragen von Informationen zwischen einem rechnergesteuerten Kontrollzentrum und einer Vielzahl von elektronischen Frankiermaschinen Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0700021A1
EP0700021A1 EP95401980A EP95401980A EP0700021A1 EP 0700021 A1 EP0700021 A1 EP 0700021A1 EP 95401980 A EP95401980 A EP 95401980A EP 95401980 A EP95401980 A EP 95401980A EP 0700021 A1 EP0700021 A1 EP 0700021A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
machine
data
center
memory
cryptogram
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP95401980A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP0700021B1 (de
Inventor
Jean-Philippe Bailleux
Claude Martin
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
SECAP Groupe Pitney Bowes SAS
Original Assignee
Secap SA
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Secap SA filed Critical Secap SA
Publication of EP0700021A1 publication Critical patent/EP0700021A1/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0700021B1 publication Critical patent/EP0700021B1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
    • G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
    • G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
    • G07B2017/00153—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information
    • G07B2017/00161—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information from a central, non-user location, e.g. for updating rates or software, or for refilling funds
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
    • G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
    • G07B2017/00153—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information
    • G07B2017/00177—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information from a portable device, e.g. a card or a PCMCIA
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00822—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system including unique details

Definitions

  • the invention relates to electronic franking machines which are part of a computerized control center.
  • franking machines have different counters, in general at least one so-called ascending counter whose value, on each impression of a franking, is increased by the amount thereof, and a so-called descending counter whose value is decreased of the postage amount, the value of the ascending counter representing the total sum of postage printed by the machine since it was put into service while the value of the descending counter indicates the credit not yet consumed since the last reloading of the machine in monetary units .
  • the invention aims to allow the transmission of information with the same degree of security, but in a more economical manner.
  • a method of transmitting information between a computerized control center and a plurality of electronic franking machines at least so that the center can transmit to each said machine a counter reloading instruction, a method in which write or read the data to be transmitted and received respectively in a memory of a portable object which is transported between a means of recording the data to be transmitted and a means of reading the data to be received, with a said means of inscription ordered by the center and a said reading means provided in each postage meter; characterized in that portable objects are used in which the writing and reading of the data in the memory are free, providing, if information is transmitted to be protected from fraud such as said recharging instruction, to issue data comprising an authentication means, and to take into account the data received only after verification of the authentication means, the latter being adapted to be able to be prepared and verified only if there is known secret information stored at the times in a secure memory of the center and in a memory secure machine with which transmission takes place.
  • the invention takes advantage of the fact that computerized control centers and electronic franking machines are already provided with means of protection against fraud, and in particular secure memories, that is to say with protected access, in a way that allows the transmission to benefit from these already existing access security, instead of providing additional security specific to the transmission as in the aforementioned prior systems.
  • the invention therefore makes it possible to avoid the costs associated with these additional securities.
  • portable objects are used and means of writing and reading their memory which are particularly simple and economical since writing and reading from the memory are entirely free.
  • the authentication means that comprise the transmitted data is the secret number, that is to say an element of the secret information stored in secure memory.
  • the machine is assigned a unique counter reload value, which it takes into account each time it reloads its counter.
  • the authentication means of the transmitted data that the cryptogram forms here is not directly an element of the secret information, but it can only be obtained by access to the appropriate secret digital key.
  • Such an authentication means is particularly suitable for example for authenticating meter readings of a machine, on the basis of which its user will be billed.
  • the data with which the cryptogram is calculated may be characters appearing in the information transmitted, or else, in particular in the case where the information transmitted comprises relatively few characters, the data with which the cryptogram is calculated are randomly generated characters, which are also written to the memory of the portable object.
  • the center 1 shown in this last figure comprises a computer assembly composed of a server computer 2 to which three management computers 3 are connected to each of which is connected a reader / encoder 4 of smart card as well as a printer 5 of labels, a modem 6 directly connected to the computer 2 being connected to a telephone line 7 which is dedicated to it.
  • the franking machine 8 shown in particular in FIGS. 2 and 4 conventionally comprises a plate 9 for guiding the object on which the franking must be printed by a head 10 situated above the plate 9, and various other usual elements not shown, in particular a keyboard and a balance, as well as internal control and management circuits controlled by a microcontroller provided with postage management software of known type, corresponding for example to that described in the application for French patent 93-04694 belonging to the Applicant.
  • the machine 8 comprises a connector 11 through which one has access to its internal circuits, in order to carry out an initialization operation by connecting these circuits to the computers of the center 1 by means of the cable 12 whose one end has a connector 13 adapted to cooperate with the connector 11, the other end of the cable 12 being directly connected to one of the computers in the center 1, when the initiation operation is carried out on site, or by the via a secure data transmission line when the operation is carried out remotely.
  • the connector 11 is hidden by a tamper-proof protective envelope.
  • the machine 8 also has other elements, described below, which allow it to cooperate with the smart card 14 shown in FIG. 3.
  • this card its connector 15 as well as its location comply with those standardized by ISO. It is fitted with a microcircuit (not shown) of the non-volatile, rewritable RAM type, of the EEPROM type, or equivalent. This microcircuit has no logic input protection, which means that reading and writing of data is entirely free on the card 14.
  • the card 14 In line with the connector 15, the card 14 has a hole 16 made in its thickness, this hole being covered in certain cases, mentioned below, by a label printed with one of the printers 5 in the center 1, which is glued at the location shown in Figure 3 by the frame 17 in broken lines.
  • the franking machine 8 comprises an element 18 for housing the card 14, which opens outwards through a slot 19, the housing 18 being associated, as shown in FIG. 5 , to a connector 20 in two parts which comes into action when the card is pushed all the way, and an electromagnet 21 provided with a plunger 22 ending in a point (see FIG. 6), the plunger 22 being provided, when activated, to pass through the hole 16 of the card 14, and therefore to perforate at the level of the hole 16 the label 23 possibly stuck on the card 14 at the location 17.
  • the microcontroller controlling the management and control circuits of the machine 8 is also provided with additional software which allows this same microcontroller to manage the various operations in relationship with the transmission of information carried out via the card 14, operations which will now be described.
  • a file is opened in the computers of center 1 which contains the references of a user duly listed and authorized to use the machine, and the procedure is carried out as previously indicated to connect a computer of center 1 to the connector 11.
  • Machine 8 is secretly assigned a set of different random numbers, for example 250 numbers of ten decimal digits, the machine number and the series of 250 numbers are saved in the center folder, and these same data to machine 8, which automatically saves them to permanent (non-volatile) memories, each number being associated, whether in the center folder or in machine memories, with an index which can take at least the states zero and one, and which is set to zero at this point.
  • the file part of the 250 secret random numbers is stored securely in center 1, so that even during maintenance operations, unauthorized persons cannot access it.
  • the machine 8 When the initialization operation is finished, the machine 8 is enclosed in its security envelope, which is itself sealed with a tamper-proof seal, and the machine is ready to be put into service.
  • the machine 8 Once the machine 8 has been installed in the site where it is to be used, it must, in order to function, receive via the card 14 an instruction to reload its descending counter, which is at zero.
  • This instruction is in fact given by the reception of one of the 250 numbers contained in the memory registers of the machine 8, provided that it has not already been used.
  • the center when asked for an authorization, by post or by telephone, the center, after checking that the required conditions are met (payment of funds made, or any other condition), uses one of the readers / encoders 4 to write in the memory of a card 14 a certain amount of information intended to designate the machine for which it is intended, in particular the number of this machine, as well as one of the secret numbers, not yet used (index at zero) , among the 250 that are assigned to this machine, the index of the transmitted number is then set to one to show that it has been used.
  • a self-adhesive label 23 is printed in clear with identification data of the machine for which the authorization is intended, and this label, when the card 14 has been coded, is stuck to the 'location 17 where it closes the opening 16, this label being made with a background printing which allows to recognize the origin and limits the risks of having it replaced with fraudulent intent.
  • the center 1 sends it, for example by a carrier or by post, to the site where the machine 8 is located, and when it reaches this site, the card 14 is introduced.
  • the connectors 20 are put into action when the card is fully inserted, the data present on the card are read and communicated to the internal circuits of the machine, these check whether the identification number appearing in the data which have just been received correspond to the identification number which has been assigned to it in the initialization phase, if this is the case, the circuits control the electromagnet 21 so that the plunger 22 descends and then rises , that is to say to move it from its rest position where it is outside the space for receiving the card 14 which opens outwards through the slot 19, to an actuated position where it crosses this space, then to the rest position, so that it perforates the label 23 at the level of the hole 16, the circuits seek whether the number appearing in the data which has just been read is one of the secret numbers kept in its memory registers, and whether the machine finds there this number associated with an
  • the reloading value can naturally vary from one machine to another, having regard to foreseeable consumption or any other consideration, but for a given machine, it cannot be modified remotely.
  • counter reloading can only take place, after initialization, a number of times corresponding to the quantity of secret numbers allocated during the phase of initialization, which is 250 in this example. If the machine is still to be used, a new initialization operation should be carried out.
  • the data read in the center 1 are indeed those which have been recorded by the desired machine 8, to also provide a means of authenticating the data.
  • One of the secret keys being chosen, the machine calculates at from the data it transmits the cryptogram, and writes it on the card at the same time as the data, center 1, after reading the data, redoing the same calculation and checking that the cryptogram it obtains corresponds well to the one on the map.
  • the authentication cryptogram is calculated by the internal electronic circuits of the machine 8, the algorithm being contained in the additional software with which the microcontroller is provided, this algorithm being for example of the DES type.
  • the ability to make the machine 8 send data back to the center 1 can in particular be used to proceed, on command, as indicated above, to the ascending meter reading, in order to invoice the machines according to their actual consumption.
  • a card is issued by the center and sent to the organization responsible for maintenance. This card bears the number of the machine to be verified, and a deadline for carrying out the verification. A technician must then go to the machine, insert the card into it, which will record the information requested on the state of said machine. The proof of the intervention will be given by the return of the card in center 1.
  • the transmitter to be authenticated is the center 1. In this case, if it has no data to transmit or if it is insufficient, it generates a series of characters randomly, it calculates on the basis of these is the cryptogram, and it registers both the series of characters and the cryptogram, the latter being checked on arrival by the machine 8.
  • the terminal 24 comprises in a single housing at least one reader / encoder 25 of smart card, of the same kind as the reader / encoder 4 of the center 1 or that which is provided in the machines 8 and which comprises a slot 18 for the card.
  • the terminal 24 includes logic control circuits and a modem, and possibly, as in the example shown in FIG. 7, a keyboard 26 and a screen 27.
  • the logic control circuits are sensitive to the introduction of a card into the reader / encoder 25, recognize the type of card introduced and verify that the card contains the appropriate identification information. According to the information read on the card (see below), the control circuits can initiate the execution of a card reading operation, a writing operation, or even automatically call center 1 at means of the modem to request a transaction, transmit information to or receive it from the center.
  • a card 14 is provided per machine, the memory of which includes the identification number of this machine thanks to an initialization carried out by the center 1, without the latter producing a label with the printer 5 or sticking to the location 17, and more generally in the variant using the terminal 24, no label is affixed to the cards 14 used.
  • the transmission of information is similar to that of the first embodiment except that the reader / encoder 25 is connected to the computer 2 not by means of a management computer 3, but via the public telephone network 7 and the modem 6.
  • the card specific to the machine which needs it is inserted into the latter, the card being recognized, the machine 8 will record on its own card 14 its state, and in particular the value of some of its counters, as well as the usage cryptogram.
  • the user then removes the card from the machine, and introduces it into the terminal.
  • the latter recognizes the card, and calls the center using its modem, the communication passing through the public telephone network 7 and the modem 6 of the center 1, the data transmitted being that which is recorded in the memory of the card 14.
  • the center 1 After receiving the data, the center 1 verifies their authenticity using the cryptogram, and if all the conditions are met, it sends a return message containing the data to be entered on the card for constitute a counter reload instruction, and in particular one of the 250 numbers still valid.
  • the user collects the card from the terminal and inserts it again into the machine, which performs the same operations as described above until reloading its counter, certain data can then be written on the card so that the process can be repeated when it will again be necessary to request a new meter reload instruction.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
EP95401980A 1994-09-01 1995-08-31 Verfahren zum Übertragen von Informationen zwischen einem rechnergesteuerten Kontrollzentrum und einer Vielzahl von elektronischen Frankiermaschinen Expired - Lifetime EP0700021B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR9410530 1994-09-01
FR9410530A FR2724244A1 (fr) 1994-09-01 1994-09-01 Procede de transmission d'informations entre un centre de controle informatise et une pluralite de machines a affranchir electroniques

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0700021A1 true EP0700021A1 (de) 1996-03-06
EP0700021B1 EP0700021B1 (de) 2005-03-16

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ID=9466636

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP95401980A Expired - Lifetime EP0700021B1 (de) 1994-09-01 1995-08-31 Verfahren zum Übertragen von Informationen zwischen einem rechnergesteuerten Kontrollzentrum und einer Vielzahl von elektronischen Frankiermaschinen

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US5675651A (de)
EP (1) EP0700021B1 (de)
CA (1) CA2156791C (de)
DE (1) DE69534073T2 (de)
FR (1) FR2724244A1 (de)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2011073527A1 (en) 2009-12-18 2011-06-23 Itella Oyj System, method and service for adding funds into a pre-paid service

Families Citing this family (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2793332B1 (fr) 1999-05-05 2001-08-10 Secap Machine a affranchir et son procede de fonctionnement
DE10023145A1 (de) * 2000-05-12 2001-11-15 Francotyp Postalia Gmbh Frankiermaschine und Verfahren zur Freigabe einer Frankiermaschine
US20030097337A1 (en) * 2001-11-16 2003-05-22 George Brookner Secure data capture apparatus and method
AU2002359279A1 (en) * 2001-11-16 2003-06-10 Neopost Group Secure data capture apparatus and method

Citations (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE2916207A1 (de) * 1979-04-21 1980-11-13 Hess Richard Vorrichtung und ein mit dieser vorrichtung codierter wertcoupon zum vorbestellen von menues o.dgl. in dieser vorrichtung
US4436992A (en) * 1981-01-08 1984-03-13 Simjian Luther G Check controlled metering device
EP0151874A1 (de) * 1984-01-12 1985-08-21 The De La Rue Company Plc Selbstverkaufsystem gegen Vorausbezahlung
GB2173738A (en) * 1985-04-19 1986-10-22 Roneo Alcatel Ltd Secure transport of information between electronic stations
EP0328057A2 (de) * 1988-02-08 1989-08-16 Pitney Bowes, Inc. Frankiermaschinennachladesystem
EP0390731A2 (de) * 1989-03-29 1990-10-03 Frama Ag Verfahren zum Auffüllen des Wertvorgabespeichers einer Frankiermaschine und Frankiermaschine zur Ausführung des Verfahrens
GB2251210A (en) * 1990-12-31 1992-07-01 Alcatel Business Systems Unlocking operation of a "locked-out" post-payment postage meter

Patent Citations (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE2916207A1 (de) * 1979-04-21 1980-11-13 Hess Richard Vorrichtung und ein mit dieser vorrichtung codierter wertcoupon zum vorbestellen von menues o.dgl. in dieser vorrichtung
US4436992A (en) * 1981-01-08 1984-03-13 Simjian Luther G Check controlled metering device
EP0151874A1 (de) * 1984-01-12 1985-08-21 The De La Rue Company Plc Selbstverkaufsystem gegen Vorausbezahlung
GB2173738A (en) * 1985-04-19 1986-10-22 Roneo Alcatel Ltd Secure transport of information between electronic stations
EP0328057A2 (de) * 1988-02-08 1989-08-16 Pitney Bowes, Inc. Frankiermaschinennachladesystem
EP0390731A2 (de) * 1989-03-29 1990-10-03 Frama Ag Verfahren zum Auffüllen des Wertvorgabespeichers einer Frankiermaschine und Frankiermaschine zur Ausführung des Verfahrens
GB2251210A (en) * 1990-12-31 1992-07-01 Alcatel Business Systems Unlocking operation of a "locked-out" post-payment postage meter

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2011073527A1 (en) 2009-12-18 2011-06-23 Itella Oyj System, method and service for adding funds into a pre-paid service

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CA2156791A1 (fr) 1996-03-02
DE69534073T2 (de) 2006-02-09
DE69534073D1 (de) 2005-04-21
EP0700021B1 (de) 2005-03-16
FR2724244A1 (fr) 1996-03-08
CA2156791C (fr) 2002-10-22
FR2724244B1 (de) 1997-02-21
US5675651A (en) 1997-10-07

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