Classifications

• • G—PHYSICS
  • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
  • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
  • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
  • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
  • G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
  • G07D7/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
  • G07D7/004—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using digital security elements, e.g. information coded on a magnetic thread or strip
  • G07D7/0047—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using digital security elements, e.g. information coded on a magnetic thread or strip using checkcodes, e.g. coded numbers derived from serial number and denomination
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
  • G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
  • G07D7/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
  • G07D7/004—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using digital security elements, e.g. information coded on a magnetic thread or strip
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
  • G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
  • G07D7/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
  • G07D7/004—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using digital security elements, e.g. information coded on a magnetic thread or strip
  • G07D7/0043—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using digital security elements, e.g. information coded on a magnetic thread or strip using barcodes
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
  • G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
  • G07D7/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
  • G07D7/06—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using wave or particle radiation
  • G07D7/12—Visible light, infrared or ultraviolet radiation

Definitions

• the invention disclosed herein relates to counterfeit detection methods.
• a partial listing of products susceptible to being counterfeited includes: airplane parts; art; auto parts; baby products — formula, diapers, clothing; books; computers; computer peripherals; cosmetics; designer goods — clothing, shoes, eye glasses; electronics; entertainment recordings — CDs, records, audio and video cassettes; games — board, firmware, handheld; military parts; optics — binoculars, cameras; pharmaceuticals; software; tools; toys; watches.
• Documents susceptible to fraud include: betting tickets (lottery, sports, etc); bonds (Treasury, commercial, etc); certificates (birth, gift, warranty, etc); checks (personal, commercial, travelers, etc); coupons; credit cards; currency; licenses (driver, business, import/export, etc); passports; scrip (store, amusement park, etc); stamps (postage, food, etc); stocks; tickets (concerts, sports, theater, etc); travel tickets (airline, commuter, etc), and so forth.
• Intellectual counterfeit detection and/or authentication techniques may include signatures, numbers and/or other indicia for coding each genuine object differently.
• the underlying principle here is uniqueness.
• Each genuine object is individually signed, or assigned individual identifying information.
• Traditional ways to individually authenticate objects are: sign or assign.
• Blank checks available at stationery stores, for example, may be authorized by John Smith's signature if he is known, or if that signature is verifiable, perhaps by comparison to other signed doc ⁇ uments.
• Signatures for example, bridge mechanical and intellectual techni ⁇ ques, involving examination-by-eye.
• Applicants' anti-counterfeit techniques address mass produced objects, unsigned products and documents, manufactured to be essentially identical to each other — the only convenient and distinguishable difference among such essentially identical objects being the presence of associated identifying information, such as serial numbers.
• Mr. S nith's signed check may involve other variable information.
• the dollar amount, the transaction date, payee information, Mr. Smith's address and bank account number, information about his bank, and so forth are examples of other articles with variable parameters.
• other articles with variable parameters are: birth certificates, credit cards, lottery tickets, passports, etc.
• serial numbers Another traditional way to uniquely identify objects is to assign serial numbers, by counting, in a most convenient and orderly fashion.
• serial numbers offer little obstacle to a counterfeiter because he can, for example, assign matching ascending and descending numbers given one correct serial number as a start, thereby duplicating authorized numbers only once. Even if two objects with matching serial numbers were found, thereby finding at least one counterfeit, mechanical techniques may still be required to tell which is counterfeit.
• counterfeiters could avoid following a pattern that may be helpful to pursuing authorities if the pattern were discovered. For example, rather than serially numbering their fakes, counterfeiters may randomly select numbering witliin a wide range of known-to-be valid numbers, so that the possibility of a particular consecutive narrow range of serial numbers being discovered by authorities as having been counterfeited is avoided, making the job most difficult for the authorities (albeit more difficult, but safer, for the counterfeiters as well).
• intellectual coding techniques may also offer "self-checking" counterfeit detection schemes (self-checking is a term used with error control coding, adopted for use by applicants when referring to certain intellectual anti-counterfeit coding tecnniques).
• self-checking is a term used with error control coding, adopted for use by applicants when referring to certain intellectual anti-counterfeit coding tecnniques.
• Applicants define self-checking as follows: if a single read identifying number does not conform to a secret code, or match up in a database, i. must be counterfeit.
• McNeight et al. provides objects with authorized ID numbers that conform to an algorithm or code, so that these ID numbers may be verified or tested for apparent authenticity using the same algorithm.
• the algorithm is cautiously deployed in locations where it is desirable to detect counterfeit by determining if an object's ID number conforms to the secret algorithm. Caution is required in order to prevent theft or discovery of the algorithm.
• Authorized ID numbers conform to the algorithm, but the algorithm itself is selected and/or used so that it does not readily allow easy discovery or reverse engineering of the originating algorithm.
• the algorithm must be kept secret so that it is not also used by unauthorized personnel.
• White's invention concerns security for checks and other transactions involving money.
• White uses a table of random numbers. The same table of random numbers is associated both with a portable transaction device and with a bank's central processor.
• a random number is selected from the table in the transaction device and used to encode the dollar amount of the particular check using an encryption algorithm.
• the calculated result, a security code is then put on the check.
• the authenticity of the security code on such a check may be verified, by recalculating the security code again, in the same manner, in the bank's central processor, and comparing the two security codes for a match.
• each genuine object is assigned a different authorized identifying code.
• Counter ⁇ feit is detected when incorrect, repeated or out-of-place ID numbers are found on objects.
• ID numbers which are associated with objects may be represented in normal alphanumeric characters or otherwise, such as OCR or MICR fonts of alphanumeric characters, decimal characters, or bar coded characters, etc., which are designed to be machine read, and may be visible or substantially transparent.
• an object's identifying serial number may be appended with one or more distinct random portions, positioned to the right of the serial portion, for example, with or without a decimal point (or binary point if binary were being used) or positioned preceding the serial number, or the serial portion may be understood as including one or more random portions, etc.
• a truncated security ID number comprised of a distinct serial number portion and a first random portion, may be used, for example, on the outside of a product package, and a complete security ID number, with a second random portion along with the serial number and said first random portion, used inside a product's packaging (concealing the complete ID number from casual perusal) such as on a product's enclosed return warranty registration card.
• Each distinct random portion may include one or more randomly selected digits.
• Objects of the invention disclosed herein are to protect proprietary product and document integrity, quality, reliability, safety, authenticity and the like, by creating hurdles for would-be counterfeiters, and thereby reducing or eliminating such illegal, dangerous and/or economically devas ⁇ tating activity.
• Other objects of the invention are to improve counterfeit detection and/or deterrence, to apprehend and/or track criminals and/or deter crime.
• a method for identifying unauthorized objects comprising: associating with each authorized object identifying information of which at least one portion has been randomly selected; storing said information aside from said association with said authorized objects; reading said information from an object being checked for authenticity; and, comparing said read information with said stored information to detect discrepancy therebetween, whereby an unauthorized object is identified.
• a method for identifying unauthorized objects comprising: associating identify ⁇ ing coded indicia with each authorized object, a portion of said code having been selected from a detectable series and at least one other portion having been randomly selected; storing said identifying code aside from said association with said authorized objects; reading said coded indicia from an object being checked for authenticity; and, comparing said read coded indicia with said stored identifying code to detect discrepancy therebetween, whereby an unauthorized object is identified.
• a method for identifying unauthorized objects comprising: on at least one less accessible location of each authorized object, associating identifying informa ⁇ tion therewith which includes at least two distinct randomly selected portions; on at least one other more accessible location of each authorized object, associating said identifying information therewith but omitting at least one said distinct portion; storing said identifying information with said at least two distinct portions aside from said associations with said authorized objects; reading identifying information from at least one of said locations associated with an object being checked for authenticity; and, comparing said read information with corresponding said stored information to detect one or more discrepancies therebetween, whereby an unauthorized object is identified.
• said identifying information may be read from both said locations associated with an object being checked for authenticity; and, said read information from both said locations may be compared with corresponding portions of said stored information to detect one or more discrepancies therebetween, whereby an unauthorized object is identified.
• a method for identifying unauthorized objects with outer covering comprising: on at least one location inside said covering of each authorized object, associating identifying information therewith which includes at least two distinct randomly selected portions; on at least one location on the outside of said covering of each authorized object, associating said identifying information therewith but omitting at least one said distinct portion; storing said information with said at least two distinct portions aside from said associations with said authorized objects; reading identifying information from at least one of said locations associated with an object being checked for authenticity; and, comparing said read information with corresponding said stored information to detect one or more discrepancies therebetween, whereby an unauthorized object is identi ⁇ fied.
• said identifying information may be read from both said locations associated with an object being checked for authenticity; and, said read information from both said locations may be compared with corresponding portions of said stored information to detect one or more discrepancies therebetween, whereby an unauthorized object is identified.
• a method of designating an object as authorized comprising: randomly selecting at least one digit; storing said digit with a serial number for said object; and, associating said serial number and digit with said object.
• a method of designating an object as authorized comprising: providing at least one digit that cannot be anticipated; storing said digit with a serial number for said object; and, associating said serial number and digit with said object.
• a method of designating an object as authorized comprising: randomly selecting at least two distinct digits; storing said two distinct digits with said authorized object's serial number; and, associating said serial number and one distinct digit of said two distinct digits with said object on the outer surface thereof; and, associating said serial number and said two distinct digits with said object inside the outer surface thereof.
• a method of designating an object as authorized comprising: randomly selecting at least two distinct digits; storing said two distinct digits with said authorized object's serial number; and, associating said serial number and one distinct digit of said two distinct digits with said object on the outer surface thereof.
• said serial number and said two distinct digits may be located inside said object's outer surface. Also in accordance with this aspect of the invention, said serial number and said two distinct digits located inside said object's outer surface may be associated with a return card for said object.
• said identifying information may include a plurality of randomly selected portions, and at least one said randomly selected portion may be concealed in a given condition of said object, e.g., when wrapped in its original packaging.
• said identifying information may be: machine readable, represented at least once in machine readable code elements, and/or, represented at least once in a bar code symbol.
• said identifying information in a bar code symbol and said UPC symbol may be located near each other, and/or a reading from one of said symbols near each other is automatically delayed until said other symbol is also read in the same reading operation, and/or one bar code symbol is associated with said object, another possible bar code symbol not being near to said one, and said one bar code symbol is automatically read without undue delay in the reading operation due to anticipation of said another possible bar code symbol being near to said one, and/or said identifying information in a bar code symbol located near said UPC symbol may be substantially transparent, and/or said substantially transparent identifying information in a bar code symbol may be placed right over said UPC symbol.
• said read information may be checked to determine if the same identifying information was previously read from another similar object, whereby at least one of the objects with said same identifying information may be identified as an unauthorized object, and/or said same identifying information may be flagged or stored in a list to facilitate identification of additional possible unauthorized objects with said same identifying information, and/or a said object's read identify ⁇ ing information may be checked to see whether it has been previously flag ⁇ ged or stored in a list, whereby an unauthorized object may be identified.
• each said object may have associated therewith an other object which may be separated from said object and with which corresponding respective said identifying information having at least one randomly selected portion may be associated.
• Said other object may be a return card.
• Said corresponding identifying information may be read from a said return card and compared to said stored information to detect discrepancy, whereby an unauthorized return card may be identified.
• said identifying information associated with an authorized object may also include at least one other portion which has been selected in accord with a secret algorithm.
• a system for automatically detecting an unauthorized object, each authentic object having associated therewith authorized information of which at least one portion has been randomly selected, the system also comprising: means for storing said authorized information; means for reading information from an object; and, means for automatically detecting when said read informa ⁇ tion does not match up to said stored authorized information, whereby an unauthorize d object is detected.
• a system for identifying an unauthorized object from a set of authorized objects, each authorized object of said set having identifying information associated therewith of which a portion has been calculated using an algorithm dependent on a randomly selected number, the system comprising: means for _ecurely storing said randomly-selected numbers at a single location only; means for reading identifying information from an object; means coupled to receive said information read from said object for at least temporarily storing that information; and means for automatically detecting when information read from any object includes a different said portion than that calculated using said algorithm, whereby an unauthorized object is identified.
• a system for identifying an unauthorized object from a set of authorized objects, each authorized object of said set having identifying information associated therewith of which a portion has been calculated using an algorithm dependent on a randomly selected number, the system comprising: means for securely storing said identifying information, including said calculated portion, aside from said authorized object; means for reading identifying information from an object; means coupled to receive said information read from said object for at least temporarily storing that information; and means for automatically detecting when information read from any object includes a different said portion from said securely stored identifying information, whereby an unauthorized object is identified.
• means may be provided for automatically erasing randomly selected numbers for security purposes, and/or means may be provided for securely storing identifying information only at a single location aside from authorized objects, and/or means may be provided for automatically erasing a portion calculated using said algorithm after associa ⁇ tion with authorized objects.
• a plurality of genuine essentially identical objects are provided, each having authorized identifying information associated therewith, the associated information being useful for indicating authenticity of each object, this information including a distinct serial number portion comprised of at least enough digits to uniquely identify each said object, and a second portion that cannot be anticipated, this second portion having at least one digit.
• This one digit may be randomly selected or result from a calculation using at least one randomly selected digit. Aside from association with said objects said information may be stored along with respective randomly selected digit(s) or second portions.
• a sys.em for indicating authenticity of such objects includes such objects and means for storing information aside from the association with objects, means for reading information from an object, means for comparing read information with stored information and finding a match therebetween, a match between read information and stored informa ⁇ tion indicating that the object with such read information is authentic.
• a method of designating at least one of many essentially identical and identifiable objects as authorized comprising: providing a serial number for one such object; and, providing a randomly selected number for this one object; using at least one digit of said serial number and at least one digit of said randomly selected number with an algorithm to calculate another number that cannot be anticipated for said object; and, associating at least one digit of said number that cannot be anticipated with said object.
• a plurality of genuine essentially identical objects are provided, each having authorized identifying information associated therewith, this associated information being useful for indicating authenticity of each said object, and this information includes at least one digit that cannot be anticipated.
• a system for indicating authenticity of such objects includes such objects and means for storing said information aside from said association with said objects; and, means for retrieving said stored information; and, means for reading information from an object; and, means for comparing said read information with said retrieved information and finding a match therebetween, a match indicating that said object with said read information is authentic.
• Another system for indicating authenticity of such objects includes such, objects and means for storing said identifying information aside from said association with said objects; and, means for storing other information related to said identifying information; and, means for retrieving said stored identifying information; and, means for retrieving said stored related information; and, means for reading information from an object; and, means for comparing said read information with a result of a calculation using said retrieved related information, and finding a match therebetween, a said match indicating that said object with said read information is authentic.
• FIG. 1 is ' a plan view of a product return card with ID number indicia in decimal digits and in bar code.
• the product return card may be found inside a product package.
• the ID number indicia include two random portions, shown as 23 and 17.
• FIG. 2 is a side view of the outside of a product package with ID number indicia thereon corresponding in part to the ID number indicia on the product return card of Fig. 1.
• FIG. 3 is a side view of the outside of a product package with ID number indicia thereon corresponding in part to the ID number indicia on the product return card of Fig. 1. Also located on this same outside side near said ID number indicia is a standard UPC bar code symbol.
• Counterfeit products may be detected by looking for duplicate registra ⁇ tion of normal serial numbers.
• this procedure leaves something to be desired, because counterfeit cannot be detected via the serial number until two (or more) of the same serial numbers are eventually registered, and even so, when two of the same serial numbers do turn up, an investigation must first be made to determine if one is genuine (as both may be fake) and if so, which one.
• a counterfeit product is positively detected and the vendor who sold the counterfeit product is identified by the product registrant, it may still be impossible, or cumber ⁇ some at best, to determine if other products in the vendor's stock are also counterfeit.
• physical examination procedures would likely be "intrusive" and may render examined products unfit for retail sale.
• ID numbers include a serial portion and one or more random portions appended to, or associated with, the serial portion.
• Such ED numbers have the serial portion in predefined digit positions, so that ID numbers may be used just as orderly and conveniently as traditional serial numbers.
• the serial number portion (which may be called the serial field) of the ID number is appended with one or more random portions (each random portion may be called a random field).
• Each random portion may contain one or more randomly selected digits.
• a random number generator may be used which may, e.g., randomly select digits based on cosmic noise.
• Required randomly selected numbers may be provided on-the-fly, as needed, and then stored if required or erased if not required. Or, required randomly selected numbers may be generated and stored in a list and the list then referred to as required. It may be useful for random portions to be separated from the serial portion by a decimal point, for example.
• serial random number (SRN) shown on the Product Return Card in Fig. 1 is:
• this ID number, 123456 23 17, is associated with a genuine product.
• the first six digits of the ID number, 123456, comprise a traditional sequential serial number with sufficient range to uniquely identify one million genuine products, from 000000 to 999999.
• the next four digits, in this example 23 and 17 are randomly selected, and stored in a file, such as a computer file, perhaps a file associated with a database system, along with the traditional serial number portion, to form a file listing of complete authorized ID numbers.
• authorized ID numbers are also stored separately, e.g., on a list stored in a computer file. Because of the serial portion, the list of complete authorized ID numbers is as orderly as can be, and because of the randomly selected parts, it is also unpredictable as described.
• a product's ID number e.g., 123456 23 17
• the random digits can be checked automatically — if they do not all match those which were originally stored, a counterfeit product's unauthorized ID number is positive ⁇ ly and immediately detected.
• the product registration system computer may also be used by investigators looking for counterfeit, without need for registration and/or return cards, as described below.
• ID numbers may also be put on the outside of product packaging.
• SRN serial random number
• Fig. 2 The truncated serial random number (SRN), which corresponds in part to the ID number indicia shown in Fig. 1, is shown in Fig. 2 on the Product Package as:
• ID numbers 123456 23 The reason for truncation is described below.
• Use of such ID numbers on the outside of product packaging makes them readily accessible, and allows a "shopping" service contracted by the product's manufacturer, or an investigator, to read and store bar coded ID numbers from products, e.g., on store shelves, and then send them, for example using a modem, to the manufacturer's system registration computer where the randomly selected portion of the ID numbers read from products can be checked against the stored list of complete authorized ID numbers, so that unauthorized ID numbers from counterfeit products may be detected.
• counterfeit products may be identified even before customer purchase, and authorities may be put on the trail of the perpetrators sooner. In enforcement proceedings, even good leads can get cold.
• applicants' counterfeit product detection system could be set up to include handheld devices that combine radio communication capability with bar code reading (e.g., the LRT 3800, which also includes portable computer terminal capabilities, in a handheld unit, a product of Symbol Technologies Inc., of Bohemia, New York) so that counterfeit could be detected at about the speed of light while an investigator points the device at a product being checked for authenticity.
• the LRT 3800 device* reads and interprets the ID number bar code on a product that may be counterfeit, radio communicates this information to the product registration system computer to automatically check the ID number's random digit(s) to see if they match what was originally stored, and then receives back from the computer an indication if the ID number is unauthorized, thereby detecting counterfeit.
• Federal Express delivery service may be adapted for appUcants' counterfeit detection system.
• Federal Express uses bar code reading and communication devices, and sometimes a communica ⁇ tion satellite, in a package tracking system (see Automatic ID News Vol. 7, #2, 2/91, pg. 16). With such devices working with a central anti-counterfeit computer system, for example, counterfeit could be detected quickly, on a shelf in a location being checked for having counterfeit product, at a U.S. border in a routine or special Customs inspection, and so forth.
• ID numbers located on the outside of packaging are more accessible than ID numbers located inside the packaging, and may therefore more readily allow the possibility of a counterfeiter acquiring authorized ID numbers from the outside of genuine product packaging than from the inside (this may not be a significant risk in all cases).
• a counterfeiter might bribe someone in a distributor's shipping/receiving department to accumulate "outside" authorized ID numbers with a concealable bar code reader so that they could be used later on counterfeit products. If this happened, the manufacturer could be back where he started, looking for duplicates, suffering the shortcomings mentioned above, or perhaps even being worse off because of a false sense of security.
• the complete authorized ID number, 123456 23 17, is printed on the return registration card (as shown in Fig. 1) which isJocated inside the package and is therefore less accessible than the ID number located on the outside of packaging, thus concealing the complete authorized ID number from casual perusal. For example, if a product is in its original packaged condition, uncomfortablen ID number with associated random portions located inside the packaging would be concealed.
• a list (e.g., a partial listing limited to specific ranges of serial numbers, and/or selected geographical and/or chronological parameters, etc.) of authorized outside ID numbers (in the above example, 123456 23) might be supplied in a portable, non- communicating unit to investigators for use in the field as described below.
• authorized outside ID numbers in the above example, 123456 23
• portable, non- communicating unit might be supplied in a portable, non- communicating unit to investigators for use in the field as described below.
• specially trusted investigators only would be supplied with such "portable" lists, and/or such lists may only be supplied just prior to an investigation at a given location, and/or such lists may only be supplied in units that automatically erase the list after a given amount of time has elapsed and/or at a specified time, etc.
• this embodiment is less of a security exposure than supplying complete ID numbers for use in the field, especially if only a limited, partial listing is provided. For example, even if a portable list was acquired and used by counterfeiters, more complete ID numbers, such as those from a return card, would still expose the crime.
• counterfeit objects may be detected immediately, in the field, by comparing ID numbers read from a product's packaging directly against the list to determine if the correct random field for a respective serial number field is present on a product's package, without checking with the central computer where the master list of complete ID numbers is stored, on-site so to speak, no communications required, using a portable unit (much as checking a hot list, described below).
• ID numbers read from a product's packaging directly against the list to determine if the correct random field for a respective serial number field is present on a product's package, without checking with the central computer where the master list of complete ID numbers is stored, on-site so to speak, no communications required, using a portable unit (much as checking a hot list, described below).
• a return card's complete ID number, or just the random security part(s) may also be concealed, e.g., with latex covering, like the VIRN number (Void If Removed Number) on an instant lottery game ticket, or the ID number may only be represented on the card in a customized "secret" bar code format.
• VIRN number Void If Removed Number
• outside ID numbers can be put on such cartons, and latex- covered return from the retail vendor cards can be put in the carton (but not inside individual product packaging).
• 123456 23 may be put on the outside of a shipping carton containing ten products. 123456 23 17 may be latex-covered and put on a return from the retail vendor card and located inside the carton, but not inside individual product packaging.
• Ten ID numbers using 123456_ 23 17 79 may be used as foUows, one on the outside ' of each product package:
• Each may be appUed to ten respective product package's outside.
• the additional digit in each of these ID numbers (in the seventh position from the left, shown underUned) uniquely identifies each of the ten products, for the batch serial number 123456, and may conveniently be considered as part of the serial number portion of the ID number for individual products.
• Each product may also have a return card inside its packaging, each with one of the foUowing ID numbers:
• ID numbers Because of the difference in the number of digits in ID numbers for respective locations, when ID numbers are read it may readily be automati ⁇ cally determined by apparatus where that ID number was read from, whether from the outside of the carton of ten products, from inside the carton on the carton's return card, from on the outside of an individual product or from the return card inside the individual product package.
• 123456 23 may be used on the outside of the carton of ten products, only 123456 17 may be used on the carton's return card (instead of 123456 23 17).
• 1234560 79 (the first of ten similar ID numbers corresponding to the above) may be used on the outside of sn individual product, and 1234560 10 (again, the first of ten) used on the return card inside an individual product package.
• foUowing ID number (with a sixteen digit serial field and five fields of two randomly selected digits each):
• a file with the serial number portions and only the associated first random field, shown with 23 in this example, may be provided by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing to commercial banks for their general use in detecting counterfeit, a file of the random fields 23 17 provided to Federal Reserve Banks for then- use, a file of the random fields 23 17 79 to the Treasury, FBI, CIA, etc., a file of the random fields 23 17 79 10 may be used exclusively by those most trusted in the Secret Service, and a file of all five random fields, 23 17 79 10 55 may be stored for safe keeping and used with extreme caution only if ever needed. In this manner, if sophisticated counterfeiting were to occur, authorities would know exactly where to start looking for culprits.
• ID numbers may be useful in some counterfeit detection applications to provide ID numbers verifiable in some fashion in accord with a secret algorithm. For example, this may be accomplished according to applicants' invention as described above, i.e., to append to a serial number one or more distinct portions that conform to one or more respective secret codes. Such portions may be called secret code fields. In addition, random fields may or may not also be appended to the ID number.
• one secret code field is appended to the serial number (random fields are not used in this first example).
• the secret code field is represented by the ?? (the appended secret code field being undetermined thus far).
• the second example uses two appended random fields (each random field has two randomly selected digits in these examples) and one appended secret code field (containing two digits that result from calculating a code in these exan ples) all three of which (fields) are used in a manner indepen ⁇ dent of each other.
• the secret code field is represented by the ?? (the appended secret code field being undetermined thus far).
• serial number and the random number may be employed to calculate the secret code field for the third example as foUows:
• the random digits used for calculating the secret algorithm need not be disseminated at all.
• the random digits used for calculating need not be put on the authorized objects themselves. Only some result of the secret algorithm _alculation may be put on the authorized object and, according to the invention, the random digits required for the algorithm calculation stored only in the central computer, ie., the random digits are stored in one location only. The advantage of this is reduced exposure of the random numbers, and increasing security for the secret code.
• the fourth example following uses the same secret code algorithm as the third example, but the random field represented by 17 in the third example is not used at all, and the random field represented by the 23 in the third example is used in calculating the algorithm in the central computer but it (23) is not put on the authorized object.
• serial numbers have only one respective random field which is only stored in the central computer and is not put on the object.
• the algorithm may be calculated for authorization and the result put on the object being authorized, and calculated again for verification.
• the random numbers need to be kept in storage to be used again in the calculation.
• the secret code field result of the calculation is put on the authorized object but need not be stored aside from the object. Therefore, in order to lessen exposure of sensitive information, means may be provided for automaticaUy erasing the calculated secret code field results after being put on the authorized objects.
• the result could also be stored in the central computer, in association with the serial number, until needed again for verification of the authenticity of the object.
• verification then would work as follows: the serial number including the secret code field would be read from an object having its authenticity checked, and the reading compared in the central computer against the result that was previously calculated and stored for this serial number. A match indicates genuine.
• the random numbers are not needed again for calculating in this second embodiment of the fourth example, the random numbers need not be kept in storage after the authorization process. If the secret code field result of the calculation is stored, random numbers need not be. The random numbers may be erased after the calculation. Advantage: risk of exposure of the random numbers is then eliniinated and this would tend to increase the difficulty in breaking the code, as mentioned above. Also, if the random numbers required for this second embodiment of the fourth example were only provided on-the-fly, as needed for the calculation, and erased immedia ⁇ tely after the required calculation is completed, security would be increased. For example, means may be provided to automaticahy erase the random numbers after the calculation.
• the secret field is calculated, and verification may be accomplished, just as described for the fourth example, storing the required random digits safely in one location (according to the first embodiment) or storing the secret code field in one location (according to the second embodiment).
• the random digits, 17, are put on the object and stored in the central computer as described previously.
• the fifth example's ID number is completed as follows:
• the secret code is independent and random is not used at aU.
• the secret code is used independently, and two random fields are used.
• the secret code is dependent on one random field (which is also put on the object) and one random field is independent of the secret code.
• the secret code is dependent on one random field but this random field is not put on the object; this random, or the secret code field, is stored in only one computer, in the fifth example, 123456 17 ??, the secret code is dependent on one random field but this random is not put on the object; the random, or the secret code field, is stored in only one computer, and one random field is independent of the secret code.
• the use of a secret code may add significant difficulty for counterfeiters, i.e., in addition to other requirements, a counterfeiter would require knowledge of the secret code and he would be required to operate this code in order to provide correct ED numbers for his fakes. Some counterfeiting may therefore be deterred.
• the serial number portion is 123456.
• the digit that cannot be anticipated is represented by the ? as this digit is so far unknown but it wiU be calculated below.
• the foUowing algorithm may be employed to calculate the digit that cannot be anticipated for this example. Referring to the serial number portion, 123456, from left to right, add the fourth digit (4) to the product of the fifth digit (5) times three, and to this sum add the product of the sixth digit (6) times seven. Divide this sum by a randomly selected number. For this example a one digit number is randomly selected: 9. The calculation as described is shown as foUows:
• the serial number 123456 and the respective digit 6 may be used to designate one object among as many as 999,999 other essentiaUy identical and identifiable objects in this example as authorized.
• each such object may be identified by a respective ID number which includes a six digit serial number portion.
• the resulting digit (6 in this example) cannot be anticipated.
• the randomly selected digit for serial number 123456, 9, which i ⁇ used in the calculation may be stored and retrieved and used to recalculate the digit that cannot be anticipated (6) for verification.
• the digit that cannot be anticipated, 6, can be stored (aside from being associated with the object) and retrieved for verification purposes without recalculating the algorithm.
• a secret algorithm may also be used to provide a correspond ⁇ ing inside ID number, shown as, 123456 ??, which may be used, e.g., on a return card.
• the serial number, 123456, and the random number, 23 may be used to calculate the secret code field for a corresponding inside ID number as shown for this example:
• multiple secret code fields each using a different secret code convention, in various combinations with one or more random fields, may also be used to provide different levels of counterfeit resistant ID numbers.
• Applicants' preferred anti-counterfeit system also checks for repeated ID numbers (inside, outside, etc) as described in appUcants' copending appUcation, Serial No. omitted fUed October //, 1989. This prevents the possibility of one or a few authorized ID numbers used over and over going undetected. Repeated authorized ID numbers may be found, as well as repeated incorrect ID numbers. For example, two or more similar objects may be located with the same correct (or the same incorrect) ID numbers.
• Repeated ID numbers could be flagged in the system computer and put out on "hot” lists and automaticaUy circulated to authorized investigators to aUow "immediate" detection of each subsequent use, as described below. Or, for possible security reasons, it may be preferred to maintain hot Usts only in the system computer. For example, a hot list of repeated vaUd ID numbers in New York may be useful to a counterfeiter in California, if, for example, California investigators did not have the hot Ust of repeated vaUd numbers that had been circulated to investigators in New York.
• Complete product distribution and shipment history may also be associated with applicants' anti-counterfeit system computer, and augmented with the registration process, so that, for example, any products reported stolen (prior to being sold to the public) may be flagged and backtracked to apprehend the culprits when the stolen products are ultimately registered.
• Product distribution information, along with registration information, may also be useful for marketing, accounting, inventory, automation control, quality control, and other purposes.
• Applicants' anti-counterfeit systems may be augmented and/or adapted for use to also detect product diversion, or gray marketing, as well as control problems with returns and seasonally packaged goods, product recalls for defects or tampered-with goods, etc.
• G 110 User defined.
• a "Seal of Authenticity" and/or the addition of a product return card to confirm authenticity might become part of a product's enhanced, and thus more desirable, image, as well as an integral part of a product's marketing strategy.
• visible or invisible security ID number indicia may have, in possible association with a "Seal of Authenticity," on a would-be counterfeiter.
• the UPC symbol shown to the right of the security ID number in Fig. 3 is a photo reproduction of an actual UPC symbol from a product called Vistatector, which is a pen-like device that can detect counterfeit currency or other counterfeit documents, a product of a New York City company, Vistatech Enterprises, Limited.
• this may aUow smaUer ID number indicia on packaging to be sufficient, since general product identification may be made via the UPC symbol, and/or this may be helpful by automaticaUy informing a ⁇ thenticity apparatus what kind of product is being scrutinized.
• ID number indicia such as shown in Fig. 2, or perhaps only the bar coded indicium of Fig. 2, substantiaUy transparent, effectively invisible.
• Dolash et al.'s U.S. Pat. No. 4,983,817 describes how substantiaUy transparent bar codes may be accurately read even though placed on top of visible printed text or even placed on top of a visible bar code symbol.
• a bar coded ID number may be printed in invisible ink directly over a standard UPC symbol on a product's packaging, or in convenient proximity therewith.
• one mode of operation (referred to as a "dual mode setting") of bar code scanning apparatus may require that two different bar code symbols (i.e., each individual symbol is complete unto itself and each can be read separately) such as a visible UPC symbol and an invisible ID number (either superimposed over the visible UPC symbol or just placed near the visible UPC symbol) or a visible UPC symbol and a visible ID number (as shown in Fig. 3) be successfully read before indicating a reading operation has been completed.
• two different bar code symbols i.e., each individual symbol is complete unto itself and each can be read separately
• two different bar code symbols i.e., each individual symbol is complete unto itself and each can be read separately
• a visible UPC symbol and an invisible ID number either superimposed over the visible UPC symbol or just placed near the visible UPC symbol
• a visible UPC symbol and a visible ID number (as shown in Fig. 3) be successfully read before indicating a reading operation has been completed.
• an audible beep and/or the Ughting of an indicator light are often generated at the end of each bar code reading operation in order to indicate completion thereof.
• a signal indicating completion of the bar code reading operation would not be provided until both a visible UPC symbol and an invisible ID number (in one example) have been successfully read, ie., a reading from one bar code symbol located near a second symbol is automatically delayed until the second is also read in the same reading operation or cycle (e.g., as ended with an associated beep).
• the dual mode setting for reading bar codes may operate as foUows: when a mode selector switch is set to the dual mode position, the switch could clamp the signal that would normally indicate the completion of one bar code reading until a second signal indicates the completion of a second reading of another bar code symbol. Then, with both signals present, each indicating a completed reading of a respective bar code symbol, the clamp may be lifted (undamped) allowing the beep to sound and/or the indicator light to be iighted, thus indicating that both bar code symbols had been read in this dual mode setting.
• Other operations could also be accompUshed before an indication of the end of a reading operation, e.g., price look-up, inventory list augmentation, authenticity check, date check, comparison to lists of ID numbers being sought by enforcement authorities, etc.
• the dual mode setting operation may be used with bar code reading apparatus even if human operators are not involved in the bar code reading operation. For example, a signal indicating completion would not be provided to associated circuits (as would normaUy be done after one bar code symbol was read) until two symbols were read.
• the mode setting switch on bar code reading apparatus may select applicants' dual mode setting, and perhaps other settings as weU, such as a single mode setting that anticipates a reading where only one bar code symbol per reading operation is present. For example, a setting where only the one UPC symbol wiU be read even if an invisible bar code is on top of it.
• an invisible ID number symbol placed over a product's UPC symbol can be used for detecting expired product.
• the date of the last-day-of-sale for Umited shelf-life products may be stored in a supermarket's computer in association with ID numbers.
• the expiration date for ID number bearing Baby Safe Formula product, 3/21/91 may be stored in the computer along with the information that the 3/21/91 expiration date appUes to Baby Safe Formula with ID numbers (serial portion only) 1,000,000 to 1,001,000.
• ID numbers from Baby Safe Formula are read at a check out counter and sent to the supermarket's computer, their expiration dates may be looked up, and/or authenticity may be checked (in real time or in a nocturnal batch processing operation, using the common communication and counterfeit product computer system facilities mentioned above) and/or various lists may be checked (price, inventory, stolen goods, counterfeit with repeated ID numbers, contaminated goods, etc.) etc.
• An automatic dual mode setting on bar code scanning apparatus is first described for one visible and one invisible bar code symbol, using a visible UPC symbol and an invisible ID number.
• a bar code reading device could also sense for other bar code structure, as it senses for the UPC symbol. Sensing for this other bar code structure, of say, just a few bars and spaces, couid be performed in a second invisible lun inescent frequency band — that reflected by an invisible bar code.
• Dolash et al.'s U.S. Pat. No. 4,983,817 describes dual bar code detection means for reading two differing frequency bands, comprising optical filters, coUection optics, light detectors, etc.
• Fig. 3 where one visible bar code symbol is located next to another as shown: if during a reading operation with scanning apparatus set in automatic dual mode setting, scan Unes came from the right and encountered the complete UPC symbol of Fig. 3 without going sufficiently past to also encounter part of the ID number symbol to the left (the normal required quiet zone for the bar code symbols described in these examples is understood to be 1/4 inch or less) a reading of only the UPC symbol may be provided along with a beep indicating completion of the reading operation even though two symbols are present next to each other and should be read together.
• Scanning apparatus with automatic dual mode setting may be adjusted to work as follows: in automatic dual mode position the scan lines always go past the first bar code symbol encountered at least a fixed amount of, say effectively, 1/2 inch distance (this 1/2 inch being greater than what would otherwise be required for the quiet zone, as described). For example, referring back to Fig. 3, if during an automatic dual mode setting reading operation, scan lines came from the right and encountered the complete UPC symbol, the scan Unes would continue at least 1/2 inch past the left end of the UPC symbol, traversing past the complete 3/8 inch space shown in Fig. 3, so that at least 1/8 inch part of the ID number symbol to the left of the UPC symbol is also encountered.
• apparatus proceeds on the basis that only the one UPC bar code symbol is present. For example, if scanning apparatus finds 1/2 inch of white space blank, the UPC code reading is provided and a beep would sound (once) and/or the indicator light would light (without blinking) a. ter only one UPC symbol has been read, without undue pause.
• printing specifications are made for putting two bar code symbols near each other as follows: the distance between two such symbols may be between 1/4 to 3/8 inch (3/8 inch is shown in Fig. 3) thereby insuring that the scan lines wiU always see at least 1/8 inch part of a second bar code symbol if present.
• the automatic dual mode setting of scanning apparatus when two symbols are near each other as specified, both will be read.
• care may also be taken when printing single bar code symbols (that may be read singly in an automatic dual mode setting) to either use a quiet zone of 1/2 inch minimum or not to use printing text or other material within 1/2 inch that might be interpreted as a few bars and spaces. If, for example, text were printed 1/4 inch from one UPC symbol, and this text were interpreted to be a few bars and spaces in automatic dual mode setting, delay may result from looking for another symbol (which is not present).
• a scan line skewing effect is possible, similar to what may cause a short read [short reads may occur when a skewed scan line leaves or enters a symbol other than at the end(s) of the symbol] so that, still referring to Fig. 3, the ID number symbol may be missed by skewed scan Unes reading the UPC symbol, or, in the example shown in Fig. 3, missed by high or low sufficiently horizontal scan Unes because the ID number symbol is shown shorter (smaller) than the UPC symbol on both top and bottom.
• the ID number symbol may be made taUer than shown in Fig. 3, tall enough to extend above and below the UPC symbol, tall enough so that at least part of the top or bottom of the taU ID number symbol "catches" these skewed scan Unes, to avoid the ID number symbol being missed altogether (only the part of the ID number symbol closest to the UPC symbol actuaUy need be so tall).
• the two symbols of Fig. 3 could be made the same height and placed in vertical aUgnment next to each other (i.e., both sitting on the same horizontal Une and both rising to the same height therefrom) and bearer bars used across their tops and bottoms spanning the 1/4 inch to the 3/8 inch space in-between. As may be understood, the space between the two symbols cannot be too wide,4.e., greater than 3/8 inch in the above example (bearer bars are described in the applicants' copending application, Serial No. omitted).
• the 1/2 inch distance that the scan lines go past the first bar code symbol encountered may need to be increased, perhaps to 3/4 or 1 inch, depending on other specifications, angles, etc. And, if the in-between space were 1/4 inch, not 3/8, the 1/2 inch distance may suffice.
• another method may be used to automatically determine whether only one bar code symbol was present in a relevant area being scanned, or whether two bar code symbols located near each other were present.
• a relevant area being scanned or whether two bar code symbols located near each other were present.
• bar code scanning apparatus could always sense for the presence of a UPC symbol, and when a UPC symbol is read, look up this particular UPC symbol in a computer Usting (the price associated with each UPC symbol, for example, for milk, medicine and paper products, is looked up in a computer) to check the "invisible bar code also?" flag which, depending if this flag is on or off, automaticaUy informs apparatus whether or not another bar code should also be read along with this UPC symbol.
• the computer stores the information for each UPC code that may be read, as to whether or not another bar code symbol should be present and should also be read.
• more than one flag could be used, in order to inform, e.g. r which other particular bar code symbol(s) should be present and should be read, or, if more than one, which one(s) should be read, etc.
• UPC Number System Charac ⁇ ters e.g., 1. 6, 7, 8 or 9, which were "Reserved for uses unidentified at this time," ie., reserved when UPC conventions were adopted, to inform whether one UPC symbol or one UPC symbol and at least another bar code symbol should also be read in a given reading operation.

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• 1992
  • 1992-05-06 EP EP92911723A patent/EP0647342B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
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  • 1992-05-06 AU AU18959/92A patent/AU1895992A/en not_active Abandoned
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