EP0423638B1 - Safety circuit for motor-driven and electrical brake- or arrestable oscillating weights or machine parts - Google Patents

Safety circuit for motor-driven and electrical brake- or arrestable oscillating weights or machine parts Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0423638B1
EP0423638B1 EP19900119589 EP90119589A EP0423638B1 EP 0423638 B1 EP0423638 B1 EP 0423638B1 EP 19900119589 EP19900119589 EP 19900119589 EP 90119589 A EP90119589 A EP 90119589A EP 0423638 B1 EP0423638 B1 EP 0423638B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
relay
safety
switch
circuit
contact
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Expired - Lifetime
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EP19900119589
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German (de)
French (fr)
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EP0423638A3 (en
EP0423638A2 (en
Inventor
Thomas Gallenschütz
Gerhard Oberle
Roland Ebert
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Gallenschuetz Metallbau GmbH
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Gallenschuetz Metallbau GmbH
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Publication of EP0423638A3 publication Critical patent/EP0423638A3/en
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H01ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01HELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
    • H01H47/00Circuit arrangements not adapted to a particular application of the relay and designed to obtain desired operating characteristics or to provide energising current
    • H01H47/002Monitoring or fail-safe circuits
    • H01H47/004Monitoring or fail-safe circuits using plural redundant serial connected relay operated contacts in controlled circuit
    • H01H47/005Safety control circuits therefor, e.g. chain of relays mutually monitoring each other

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a safety circuit for electromotively driven and electrically switchable braking or locking devices for flywheels or machine parts, in particular a revolving door, in which at least one of two converging edges is provided with a touch-sensitive or pressure-sensitive electrical switching element or the like malfunctions occurring malfunctions of an electronic control unit, in particular a programmable microprocessor, and are used by the latter by means of an electronic switch to switch off the drive motor and / or to switch on the braking or locking device.
  • an electronic control unit in particular a programmable microprocessor
  • Such safety circuits are generally used to ensure that people or objects between the both come together and are caught by these, cannot be injured or damaged, the main task being to stop the part on which the moving edge is located as soon as the touch or pressure-sensitive switching element emits a corresponding fault signal. See, for example, DE-A-3 444 213.
  • This stopping of the motor-driven part can take place in two ways, namely by switching off the drive motor and simultaneously switching on a braking or locking device or only by switching on the electrical braking or locking device . In the latter case, however, this must be able to apply such a strong braking torque that cannot be overcome by the driving torque of the motor and the moment of inertia of the moving mass. However, this condition is also important in the event that the motor drive is not switched off by any switching disturbances.
  • the invention is therefore based on the object to improve a safety circuit of the type mentioned in such a way that the movement of the movable edge provided part, in particular a machine part or the revolving door is also stopped if the electronic switch of the control unit or the microprocessor does not interrupt the circuit of the drive motor when an interference signal is present and / or the control unit or the microprocessor does not switch on the braking or locking device .
  • the reliability of the improved safety circuit should be continuously checked by the microprocessor.
  • the electronic control unit is preceded by an electronic switching unit which receives the pending fault signals of the switching element and forwards it to the control unit, which, in accordance with the length of the fault signals, independently of the control unit, the continuous excitation of a safety relay, which is at least three, only jointly operated, positively driven or partially positively driven relay contact switches has at least one normally open contact, interrupts, one normally open contact in series with the electronic switch of the control unit in the circuit of the drive motor, one of the two other relay contact switches in a secondary circuit of the braking or locking device provided with a timing element lies and wherein the third relay contact switch is in a control circuit of the control unit to this in the form of a confirmation signal di e to confirm the correct functioning of the safety relay or the switching unit.
  • a safety relay which is at least three, only jointly operated, positively driven or partially positively driven relay contact switches has at least one normally open contact, interrupts, one normally open contact in series with the electronic switch of the control unit in the circuit of the drive motor, one of the two other relay contact switches in
  • the additional relay contact switches in the circuit of the drive motor and in a secondary circuit of the braking or locking device and their control by a switching unit independent of the control unit or the microprocessor ensures that even in the event of a partial or total failure of the electronic switch of the motor circuit and switching on the brake or locking device-related control part of the control unit or the microprocessor, the moving flywheel mass is stopped as soon as a fault signal is present at the switching unit.
  • the selected operating mode of the safety relay namely by the constant current supply, also ensures that the motor circuit is also interrupted and the braking or locking device is switched on if the switching unit fails. So a certain self-control is already created.
  • the correct operation of the safety relay is reported to the control unit or the microprocessor by the additional relay contact switch located in the control circuit, so that the functionality of the safety relay and its two working contacts are subject to continuous monitoring.
  • the configuration according to claim 6 provides an additional safety factor insofar as a check of the functionality of the safety relay if no fault signal occurs over a long period of time and its contacts can be carried out at shorter intervals.
  • Revolving door systems generally consist of a cylindrical stand body 20 with two shell-like, fixed sectors 21 and 23, between which an access opening 26 or an exit opening is provided on the outside and inside, through which people can enter or exit.
  • So-called safety strips 27 are arranged on the vertical delimitation bars 22 and 24 of these access and exit openings 26, which are provided with electrical switching elements 3 that react to pressure.
  • These switching elements 3 generate a fault signal if, for example, during the rotation of the three-leaf rotating door 25, which is rotatably mounted in the center and which is driven by a motor 10, an object gets between the outer edge of a door leaf and one of the delimitation bars 22, 24 and is clamped there.
  • the braking or locking force of the braking or locking device must be so great that the drive torque of the drive motor 10 cannot overcome it.
  • the braking or locking device must therefore be able to stop the revolving door even if the drive motor is not or not immediately switched off in the event of a fault in the control system despite the fault signal.
  • Such a braking or locking device 7 is shown schematically in FIGS. 2 to 4.
  • a microprocessor 1 is generally provided which opens and closes the circuit 9 of the electric motor 10 with the aid of an electronic switch 8 and which also controls the electrical braking or locking device 7 via a control line 12.
  • the electric braking or locking device 7 So after the drive motor 10 has been switched off and stopped the revolving door 25 by the electric braking or locking device 7 a jammed between a door leaf and a limiting member 22 or 24 object can be released again, the electric braking or locking device 7 after a short, z. B. lasting two seconds, delay time can be switched off again so that the revolving door 25 can be rotated again in the opposite direction.
  • the microprocessor 1 in its circuit of the electrical braking or locking device 7 is equipped with a timer which fulfills this task.
  • the microprocessor 1 While in the previously known switching devices of the generic type, the fault signals of the switching elements 3 are fed directly to the microprocessor 1 and therefore malfunctions in the microprocessor 1 when such a fault occurs can result in the drive motor 10 not being switched off and / or the electrical braking and locking device 2 to 4, the microprocessor 1 is preceded by a control unit 2 which on the one hand forwards the malfunction signals of the switching element 3 to the microprocessor 1 and causes the latter to switch on the electrical braking or locking device and through it electronic switch 8 to interrupt the motor circuit 9 and which on the other hand controls a safety relay 4.
  • This safety relay 4 is provided with at least three relays contact switches, a , b , c or a , b , d , which can only be actuated together, positively driven or partly forced guided relay switches or a , d , e are provided, of which at least one is a normally open contact a and is used to additionally switch off or interrupt the motor circuit 9. For this purpose, it is connected in series with the electronic switch 8 of the microprocessor 1 in the motor circuit 9.
  • the second relay contact switch b or e is located in a secondary circuit 6 of the electrical braking or locking device 7, which is additionally equipped with a timer 5 because it takes over the function of the aforementioned timer in the microprocessor 1 in the event of a fault.
  • the third relay contact switch c or d is located in a control circuit 11 and is used to report the correct functioning of the safety relay 4 or the switching unit 2 to the microprocessor each time a fault signal occurs in the form of a confirmation signal.
  • the safety relay 4 is operated in continuous excitation, so that it is switched off and drops when a fault signal arrives in the switching unit 2. This operating mode also ensures that a malfunction in the switching unit 2 or a malfunction in the safety relay 4 itself is reported to the microprocessor 1 if this leads to the safety relay 4 dropping out without a fault signal being present.
  • the safety strips 27 and their switching elements 3 are constructed in such a way that they act similarly to an NC contact when the described fault occurs, that is to say that a continuous current is interrupted or reduced.
  • Safety relays with positively driven or partially positively driven relay contact switches have the property that their contact switches can only be brought together into the other switching position by means of an actuating web 28.
  • Forced operation means that as long as a contact is closed at a certain switching position, no contacts in the opposite switching position may be closed.
  • Full force guidance is the state that when a contact is welded (not opened) within a spring set, the welded contact defines the switching state in the entire spring set. Since this fully synchronized state is only guaranteed with 100% contact reliability, it cannot be guaranteed in practice.
  • Partial forced operation means that a normally closed contact cannot be closed when a normally closed contact is welded and that no normally closed contact can be closed when a normally closed contact is welded.
  • the safety circuits shown schematically in FIGS. 2 to 4 operate as follows: As soon as a fault signal is received in the switching unit 2 by the switching element 3, this is passed on to the microprocessor 1, and this interrupts the motor circuit 9 through its electronic switch 8. At the same time, the switching unit 2 also switches off the safety relay 4, so that all the relay contact switches a , b , c and d and e each jump in their opposite switching position, ie open the relay contact switches a , b and c , while the relay contact switches d and e close at the same time. The opening of the relay contact switch a takes place in the normal case, i.e. if the electronic switch 8 is functioning properly, without power, because the mechanical relay contact switches are slower than the electronic switch 8.
  • the electrical braking or locking device 7 is switched off again after approximately two seconds by the timer 5 located in the microprocessor 1 or in the secondary circuit 6.
  • the dropout of the safety relay 4 is reported to the microprocessor 1 by the relay contact switches c and d .
  • a corresponding test circuit or a corresponding test program can prevent the microprocessor 1 from restarting the drive motor 10 in the absence of this confirmation signal or block the use of the revolving door by switching on the electrical braking or locking device.
  • the control circuit with the contact switch c or d thus serves to monitor the functionality of the so-called safety line, which represents the relay 4 with its relay contact switches a to e .
  • the safety relay 4 in the embodiment of FIG. 2 is equipped with three normally open contacts a , b , c
  • the safety relay 4 in the embodiment according to FIG. Fig. 3 equipped with two normally open contacts a and b and with a normally closed contact d
  • the safety relay 4 is only equipped with one normally open contact a and with two normally closed contacts d and e . In all cases, however, the normally open contact a is arranged in series with the electronic switch 8 of the motor circuit 9.
  • the so-called safety line can be used in this embodiment do not offer 100% security on their own.
  • the relay contact switch d located in the control circuit is designed as a break contact and takes the opposite switching position with respect to the make contact a
  • the partial positive guidance provided can guarantee that when the welded part is welded, i.e. it does not open incorrectly Relay contact switch a the relay contact switch d does not close and therefore cannot give a confirmation signal for the correct functioning to the microprocessor 1.
  • the embodiment of FIG. 4 which also the relay contact switch e located in the secondary circuit 6 of the electrical braking and locking device is designed as a break contact.
  • the two embodiments of FIGS. 2 and 4 can in principle also be used, however, because the contact reliability is never 100%, even with fully forced operation of the relay contact switch, the optimal functional reliability is not guaranteed, as in the embodiment of FIG. 3.
  • the safety circuit not only has the operational safety of the revolving door system been improved to a high degree of reliability by simple means, but it also has ensures that the additional so-called safety line can be continuously monitored for its functionality.
  • This safety switching device can be used wherever motorized flywheels have to be stopped immediately when an interference signal occurs. Their application is therefore not only limited to revolving doors and automatic door and gate systems in general, but can also be used with machines and machine parts.

Abstract

In safety circuits for braking or arresting devices (7) of flywheel masses or machine parts, especially a revolving door, which are driven by electric motor and can be switched on electrically, in which at least one of two edges moving toward each other is provided with a pressure-sensitive electrical switching member (3) for generating interference signals. Interference signals generated during a disturbance are sent to an electronic control unit (1) and are used, by an electronic switch (8), to switch off the drive motor (10) and/or to switch on a braking or arresting device (7). The movement of the part provided with the movable edge or element is stopped even when the electrical switch (8) of the control unit (1) does not respond correctly in the presence of an interference signal. The reliability of the safety circuit is continuously checked. An electronic switching unit (2), which interrupts the continuous excitation of a safety relay (4) having at least three relay contact switches (a, b, c) and at least one closing contact (a, b, or c), is connected before the electronic control unit (1). The relay contact switches (a, b, c) switch the circuits (9, 6) of the drive motor (10) and of the braking or arresting device (7), as well as a control circuit (11).

Description

Die Erfindung betrifft eine Sicherheitsschaltung für elektromotorisch angetriebene und elektrisch einschaltbare Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtungen von Schwungmassen oder Maschinenteilen, insbesondere einer Drehtüre, bei der wenigstens eine von zwei aufeinander zulaufenden Kanten mit einem berührungs- oder druckempfindlichen elektrischen Schaltelement od. dgl. versehen ist, dessen bei einer Betriebsstörung auftretenden Störsignale einer elektronischen Steuereinheit, insbesondere einem programmierbaren Mikroprozessor zugeführt werden und von dieser bzw. diesem mittels eines elektronischen Schalters zum Abschalten des Antriebsmotors und/oder zum Einschalten der Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung benutzt werden.The invention relates to a safety circuit for electromotively driven and electrically switchable braking or locking devices for flywheels or machine parts, in particular a revolving door, in which at least one of two converging edges is provided with a touch-sensitive or pressure-sensitive electrical switching element or the like malfunctions occurring malfunctions of an electronic control unit, in particular a programmable microprocessor, and are used by the latter by means of an electronic switch to switch off the drive motor and / or to switch on the braking or locking device.

Derartige Sicherheitsschaltungen dienen im allgemeinen dazu, sicherzustellen, daß Menschen oder Gegenstände, welche zwischen die beiden aufeinanderzulaufenden Kanten geraten und von diesen erfaßt werden, nicht verletzt bzw. beschädigt werden können, wobei die Hauptaufgabe darin besteht, den Teil, an dem sich die bewegte Kante befindet, zu stoppen, sobald das berührungs- oder druckempfindliche Schaltelement ein entsprechendes Störungssignal abgibt. Siehe hierzu zum Beispiel DE-A-3 444 213. Dabei kann dieses Stoppen des motorisch angetriebenen Teils auf zwei Arten erfolgen, nämlich durch Abschalten des Antriebsmotors und gleichzeitiges Einschalten einer Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung oder aber nur durch das Einschalten der elektrischen Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung. Im letzten Falle muß diese allerdings ein so starkes Bremsmoment aufbringen können, das vom Antriebsmoment des Motors und vom Schwungmoment der bewegten Masse nicht überwunden werden kann. Diese Bedingung ist aber auch für den Fall wichtig, daß das Abschalten des motorischen Antriebs durch irgendwelche Schaltstörungen unterbleibt.Such safety circuits are generally used to ensure that people or objects between the both come together and are caught by these, cannot be injured or damaged, the main task being to stop the part on which the moving edge is located as soon as the touch or pressure-sensitive switching element emits a corresponding fault signal. See, for example, DE-A-3 444 213. This stopping of the motor-driven part can take place in two ways, namely by switching off the drive motor and simultaneously switching on a braking or locking device or only by switching on the electrical braking or locking device . In the latter case, however, this must be able to apply such a strong braking torque that cannot be overcome by the driving torque of the motor and the moment of inertia of the moving mass. However, this condition is also important in the event that the motor drive is not switched off by any switching disturbances.

Da für Personen eine erhöhte Sicherheit gegen Verletzungsgefahr gefordert wird, reichen die herkömmlichen jeweils nur einfach gesicherten Sicherheitsschaltungen für derartige Fälle nicht aus, denn es kann ja nie ausgeschlossen werden, daß gleichzeitig mit einem Ausfall der Abschaltsteuerung des Antriebsmotors auch ein Ausfall der Einschaltsteuerung der Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung auftreten kann.Since increased security against the risk of injury is required for people, the conventional safety circuits, which are simply secured in each case, are not sufficient for such cases, because it can never be ruled out that a failure of the switch-on control of the drive motor also leads to a failure of the switch-on control of the brake or locking device can occur.

Der Erfindung liegt deshalb die Aufgabe zu Grunde, eine Sicherheitsschaltung der eingangs genannten Art derart zu verbessern, daß die Bewegung des mit der beweglichen Kante versehenen Teils, insbesondere eines Maschinenteils oder der Drehtür auch dann gestoppt wird, wenn beim Anliegen eines Störsignals der elektronische Schalter der Steuereinheit bzw. des Mikroprozessors den Stromkreis des Antriebsmotors nicht unterbricht und/oder die Steuereinheit bzw. der Mikroprozessor die Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung nicht einschaltet. Außerdem soll die verbesserte Sicherheitsschaltung durch den Mikroprozessor laufend auf ihre Zuverlässigkeit überprüft werden können.The invention is therefore based on the object to improve a safety circuit of the type mentioned in such a way that the movement of the movable edge provided part, in particular a machine part or the revolving door is also stopped if the electronic switch of the control unit or the microprocessor does not interrupt the circuit of the drive motor when an interference signal is present and / or the control unit or the microprocessor does not switch on the braking or locking device . In addition, the reliability of the improved safety circuit should be continuously checked by the microprocessor.

Gelöst wird diese Aufgabe erfindungsgemäß dadurch, daß der elektronischen Steuereinheit eine die jeweils anstehenden Störungssignale des Schaltelements empfangende und an die Steuereinheit weitergebende elektronische Schalteinheit vorgeschaltet ist, welche in zeitlicher Übereinstimmung mit der Länge der Störungssignale unabhängig von der Steuereinheit die Dauererregung eines Sicherheitsrelais, das unter wenigstens drei nur gemeinsam betätigbaren, zwangsgeführten oder teilzwangsgeführten Relaiskontaktschaltern wenigstens einen Schließerkontakt aufweist, unterbricht, wobei ein Schließerkontakt in Reihe mit dem elektronischen Schalter der Steuereinheit im Stromkreis des Antriebsmotors liegt, einer der beiden anderen Relaiskontaktschalter in einem mit einem Zeitglied versehenen Nebenstromkreis der Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung liegt und wobei der dritte Relaiskontaktschalter in einem Kontrollstromkreis der Steuereinheit liegt, um dieser in Form eines Bestätigungssignals die ordnungsgemäße Arbeitsweise des Sicherheitsrelais bzw. der Schalteinheit zu bestätigen.This object is achieved according to the invention in that the electronic control unit is preceded by an electronic switching unit which receives the pending fault signals of the switching element and forwards it to the control unit, which, in accordance with the length of the fault signals, independently of the control unit, the continuous excitation of a safety relay, which is at least three, only jointly operated, positively driven or partially positively driven relay contact switches has at least one normally open contact, interrupts, one normally open contact in series with the electronic switch of the control unit in the circuit of the drive motor, one of the two other relay contact switches in a secondary circuit of the braking or locking device provided with a timing element lies and wherein the third relay contact switch is in a control circuit of the control unit to this in the form of a confirmation signal di e to confirm the correct functioning of the safety relay or the switching unit.

Durch die zusätzlichen Relaiskontaktschalter im Stromkreis des Antriebsmotors und in einem Nebenstromkreis der Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung und durch deren Steuerung durch eine von der Steuereinheit bzw. vom Mikroprozessor unabhängigen Schalteinheit ist sichergestellt, daß auch bei einem teilweisen oder totalen Ausfall des den elektronischen Schalter des Motorstromkreises und das Einschalten der Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung betreffenden Steuerteils der Steuereinheit bzw. des Mikroprozessors die bewegte Schwungmasse gestoppt wird, sobald ein Störungssignal an der Schalteinheit anliegt. Durch die gewählte Betriebsart des Sicherheitsrelais, nämlich durch die Dauerbestromung, ist darüber hinaus sichergestellt, daß bei einem Ausfall der Schalteinheit der Motorstromkreis ebenfalls unterbrochen und die Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung eingeschaltet werden. Es ist also bereits dadurch eine gewisse Selbstkontrolle geschaffen. Darüber hinaus wird aber der Steuereinheit bzw. dem Mikroprozessor die ordnungsgemäße Arbeitsweise des Sicherheitsrelais durch den zusätzlichen, im Kontrollstromkreis liegenden Relaiskontaktschalter gemeldet, so daß die Funktionstüchtigkeit des Sicherheitsrelais und seiner beiden Arbeitskontakte einer dauernden Überwachung unterliegen.The additional relay contact switches in the circuit of the drive motor and in a secondary circuit of the braking or locking device and their control by a switching unit independent of the control unit or the microprocessor ensures that even in the event of a partial or total failure of the electronic switch of the motor circuit and switching on the brake or locking device-related control part of the control unit or the microprocessor, the moving flywheel mass is stopped as soon as a fault signal is present at the switching unit. The selected operating mode of the safety relay, namely by the constant current supply, also ensures that the motor circuit is also interrupted and the braking or locking device is switched on if the switching unit fails. So a certain self-control is already created. In addition, the correct operation of the safety relay is reported to the control unit or the microprocessor by the additional relay contact switch located in the control circuit, so that the functionality of the safety relay and its two working contacts are subject to continuous monitoring.

Während die Ansprüche 2 bis 5 unterschiedliche Relaiskontaktschalter-Kombinationen betreffen, ist durch die Ausgestaltung nach Anspruch 6 ein zusätzlicher Sicherheitsfaktor insofern gegeben, als auch dann, wenn über längere Zeiträume hinweg kein Störungssignal auftritt, eine Überprüfung der Funktionstüchtigkeit des Sicherheitsrelais und seiner Kontakte in kürzeren Zeitabständen durchgeführt werden kann.While the claims 2 to 5 relate to different relay contact switch combinations, the configuration according to claim 6 provides an additional safety factor insofar as a check of the functionality of the safety relay if no fault signal occurs over a long period of time and its contacts can be carried out at shorter intervals.

Anhand der Zeichnung wird die Erfindung nachstehend näher erläutert. Es zeigt:

Fig. 1
in vereinfachter perspektivischer Frontansicht einen Personendurchgang mit Drehtüre;
Fig. 2, 3 und 4
jeweils ein vereinfachtes Blockschaltbild der Sicherheitsschaltung mit drei unterschiedlichen Relaiskontaktschalter-Kombinationen.
The invention is explained in more detail below with the aid of the drawing. It shows:
Fig. 1
in a simplified perspective front view a pedestrian passage with revolving door;
2, 3 and 4
each a simplified block diagram of the safety circuit with three different relay contact switch combinations.

Drehtüranlagen bestehen in der Regel aus einem zylindrischen Standkörper 20 mit zwei schalenartigen, feststehenden Sektoren 21 und 23, zwischen denen auf der Außen- und Innenseite jeweils eine Zutrittsöffnung 26 bzw. eine Austrittsöffnung vorgesehen ist, durch welche Personen eintreten bzw. heraustreten können. An den vertikalen Begrenzungsholmen 22 und 24 dieser Zutritts- bzw. Austrittsöffnungen 26 sind jeweils sog. Sicherheitsleisten 27 angeordnet, welche mit elektrischen, auf Druck reagierenden Schaltelementen 3 versehen sind. Diese Schaltelemente 3 erzeugen ein Strörungssignal, wenn beispielsweise während der Drehung der im Zentrum drehbar gelagerten dreiflügligen Drehtür 25, die von einem Motor 10 angetrieben wird, ein Gegenstand zwischen die Außenkante eines Türflügels und einen der Begrenzungsholme 22, 24 gelangt und dort festgeklemmt wird. Damit an diesem eingeklemmten Gegenstand oder Körperteil kein Schaden entsteht, muß dafür gesorgt werden, daß das von einem der Schaltelemente 3 erzeugte Störungssignal unmittelbar zum Anhalten der Drehtür führt. Da solche Drehtüren in der Regel eine nicht unbeträchtliche träge Masse haben, die während der Drehbewegung mit einer erheblichen kinetischen Energie ausgestattet sein kann, reicht es in der Regel nicht aus, in einem solchen Fall nur den Antriebsmotor abzuschalten. Vielmehr ist es erforderlich eine elektrisch ansteuerbare, unverzögert wirksam werdende Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung vorzusehen, welche in der Lage ist, die der drehenden Drehtür innewohnende kinetiscche Energie (Schwungenergie) vollständig aufzunehmen, d.h. die Drehtür augenblicklich zum Stillstand zu bringen. Dabei muß aus Sicherheitsgründen die Brems- bzw. Arretierkraft der Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung so groß sein, daß das Antriebsdrehmoment des Antriebsmotors 10 sie nicht überwinden kann. Die Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung muß also in der Lage sein, die Drehtür auch dann noch anzuhalten, wenn der Antriebsmotor im Falle einer Störung in der Steuerung trotz des Störsignals nicht oder nicht sofort abgeschaltet wird.
Eine solche Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung 7 ist in den Fig. 2 bis 4 schematisch dargestellt.
Revolving door systems generally consist of a cylindrical stand body 20 with two shell-like, fixed sectors 21 and 23, between which an access opening 26 or an exit opening is provided on the outside and inside, through which people can enter or exit. So-called safety strips 27 are arranged on the vertical delimitation bars 22 and 24 of these access and exit openings 26, which are provided with electrical switching elements 3 that react to pressure. These switching elements 3 generate a fault signal if, for example, during the rotation of the three-leaf rotating door 25, which is rotatably mounted in the center and which is driven by a motor 10, an object gets between the outer edge of a door leaf and one of the delimitation bars 22, 24 and is clamped there. So that no damage occurs to this pinched object or body part, care must be taken to ensure that the interference signal generated by one of the switching elements 3 immediately stops the revolving door. Since such revolving doors generally have a not inconsiderable inert mass, which can be equipped with considerable kinetic energy during the rotary movement, it is generally not sufficient to switch off the drive motor in such a case. Rather, it is necessary to provide an electrically controllable, instantaneous braking or locking device which is able to completely absorb the kinetic energy (swing energy) inherent in the rotating revolving door, ie to bring the revolving door to a standstill immediately. For safety reasons, the braking or locking force of the braking or locking device must be so great that the drive torque of the drive motor 10 cannot overcome it. The braking or locking device must therefore be able to stop the revolving door even if the drive motor is not or not immediately switched off in the event of a fault in the control system despite the fault signal.
Such a braking or locking device 7 is shown schematically in FIGS. 2 to 4.

Zur Steuerung solcher Drehtüren 25 ist in der Regel ein Mikroprozessor 1 vorgesehen der mit Hilfe eines elektronischen Schalters 8 den Stromkreis 9 des Elektromotors 10 öffnet und schließt und der über eine Steuerleitung 12 auch die elektrische Brems- bzw. Arretiervorrichtung 7 ansteuert.To control such revolving doors 25, a microprocessor 1 is generally provided which opens and closes the circuit 9 of the electric motor 10 with the aid of an electronic switch 8 and which also controls the electrical braking or locking device 7 via a control line 12.

Damit nach dem Abschalten des Antriebsmotors 10 und dem Anhalten der Drehtüre 25 durch die elektrische Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung 7 ein zwischen einem Türflügel und einem Begrenzungsholm 22 oder 24 eingeklemmter Gegenstand wieder befreit werden kann, muß die elektrische Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung 7 nach einer kurzen, z. B. zwei Sekunden dauernden, Verzögerungszeit wieder abgeschaltet werden, damit die Drehtüre 25 wieder in entgegengesetzter Richtung verdreht werden kann. Zu diesem Zweck ist der Mikroprozessor 1 in seinem Schaltkreis der elektrischen Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung 7 mit einem Zeitschaltglied ausgerüstet, welches diese Aufgabe erfüllt.So after the drive motor 10 has been switched off and stopped the revolving door 25 by the electric braking or locking device 7 a jammed between a door leaf and a limiting member 22 or 24 object can be released again, the electric braking or locking device 7 after a short, z. B. lasting two seconds, delay time can be switched off again so that the revolving door 25 can be rotated again in the opposite direction. For this purpose, the microprocessor 1 in its circuit of the electrical braking or locking device 7 is equipped with a timer which fulfills this task.

Während bei den bisher bekannten Schaltvorrichtungen der gattungsgemäßen Art die Störungssignale der Schaltelemente 3 unmittelbar dem Mikroprozessor 1 zugeführt werden und deshalb Funktionsstörungen im Mikroprozessor 1 beim Auftreten eines solchen Störungsfalles dazu führen können, daß der Antriebsmotor 10 nicht abgeschaltet und/oder die elektrische Brems- und Arretiervorrichtung nicht eingeschaltet wird, ist bei der in den Fig. 2 bis 4 dargestellten Sicherheitsschaltung dem Mikroprozessor 1 eine Steuereinheit 2 vorgeschaltet, welche die Störungssignale des Schaltelements 3 einerseits an den Mikroprozessor 1 weitergibt und diesen veranlaßt, die elektrische Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung einzuschalten und durch seinen elektronischen Schalter 8 den Motorstromkreis 9 zu unterbrechen und die andererseits ein Sicherheitsrelais 4 steuert. Dieses Sicherheitsrelais 4 ist mit wenigstens drei nur gemeinsam betätigbaren, zwangsgeführten oder teilzwangsgeführten Relaiskontaktschaltern, a, b, c bzw. a, b, d bzw. a, d, e versehen, von denen mindestens einer ein Schließerkontakt a ist und zum zusätzlichen Abschalten bzw. Unterbrechen des Motorstromkreises 9 dient. Er ist zu diesem Zweck mit dem elektronischen Schalter 8 des Mikroprozessors 1 im Motorstromkreis 9 in Reihe geschaltet. Der zweite Relaiskontaktschalter b oder e liegt in einem Nebenstromkreis 6 der elektrischen Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung 7, der zusätzlich mit einem Zeitschaltglied 5 ausgerüstet ist, weil er im Störungsfall die Funktion des vorstehend erwähnten Zeitschaltgliedes im Mikroprozessor 1 übernimmt.While in the previously known switching devices of the generic type, the fault signals of the switching elements 3 are fed directly to the microprocessor 1 and therefore malfunctions in the microprocessor 1 when such a fault occurs can result in the drive motor 10 not being switched off and / or the electrical braking and locking device 2 to 4, the microprocessor 1 is preceded by a control unit 2 which on the one hand forwards the malfunction signals of the switching element 3 to the microprocessor 1 and causes the latter to switch on the electrical braking or locking device and through it electronic switch 8 to interrupt the motor circuit 9 and which on the other hand controls a safety relay 4. This safety relay 4 is provided with at least three relays contact switches, a , b , c or a , b , d , which can only be actuated together, positively driven or partly forced guided relay switches or a , d , e are provided, of which at least one is a normally open contact a and is used to additionally switch off or interrupt the motor circuit 9. For this purpose, it is connected in series with the electronic switch 8 of the microprocessor 1 in the motor circuit 9. The second relay contact switch b or e is located in a secondary circuit 6 of the electrical braking or locking device 7, which is additionally equipped with a timer 5 because it takes over the function of the aforementioned timer in the microprocessor 1 in the event of a fault.

Der dritte Relaiskontaktschalter c oder d liegt in einem Kontrollstromkreis 11 und dient dazu, dem Mikroprozessor jeweils beim Auftreten eines Störungssignales in Form eines Bestätigungssignals die ordnungsgemäße Arbeitsweise des Sicherheitsrelais 4 bzw. der Schalteinheit 2 zu melden.The third relay contact switch c or d is located in a control circuit 11 and is used to report the correct functioning of the safety relay 4 or the switching unit 2 to the microprocessor each time a fault signal occurs in the form of a confirmation signal.

Das Sicherheitsrelais 4 wird in Dauererregung betrieben, so daß es beim Eintreffen eines Störungssignals in der Schalteinheit 2 abgeschaltet wird und abfällt. Durch diese Betriebsart ist auch sichergestellt, daß eine Störung in der Schalteinheit 2 bzw. eine Funktionsstörung im Sicherheitsrelais 4 selbst dem Mikroprozessor 1 gemeldet wird, wenn diese zum Abfallen des Sicherheitsrelais 4 führt, ohne daß ein Störungssignal vorliegt.
Aus demselben Grunde sind auch die Sicherheitsleisten 27 bzw. deren Schaltelemente 3 so aufgebaut, daß sie beim Auftreten der geschilderten Störung ähnlich wirken wie ein Öffnerkontakt, daß also ein Dauerstrom unterbrochen oder reduziert wird.
The safety relay 4 is operated in continuous excitation, so that it is switched off and drops when a fault signal arrives in the switching unit 2. This operating mode also ensures that a malfunction in the switching unit 2 or a malfunction in the safety relay 4 itself is reported to the microprocessor 1 if this leads to the safety relay 4 dropping out without a fault signal being present.
For the same reason, the safety strips 27 and their switching elements 3 are constructed in such a way that they act similarly to an NC contact when the described fault occurs, that is to say that a continuous current is interrupted or reduced.

Sicherheitsrelais mit zwangsgeführten oder teilzwangsgeführten Relaiskontaktschaltern haben die Eigenschaft, daß ihre Kontaktschalter mittels eines Betätigungssteges 28 nur gemeinsam in die jeweils andere Schaltstellung gebracht werden können. Zwangsführung bedeutet, so lange ein Kontakt bei einer bestimmten Schaltstellung geschlossen ist, dürfen keine Kontakte der entgegengesetzten Schaltlage geschlossen sein.
Dabei unterscheidet man zwischen Vollzwangsführung und Teilzwangsführung.
Vollzwangsführung nennt man den Zustand, daß beim Verschweißen (Nichtöffnen) eines beliebigen Kontaktes innerhalb eines Federsatzes der verschweißte Kontakt den Schaltzustand im gesamten Federsatz festlegt. Da dieser vollsynchrone Zustand nur bei 100 %iger Kontaktsicherheit gewährleistet ist, ist er in der Praxis nicht zu garantieren.
Teilzwangsführung heißt, daß bei einem verschweißten Öffnerkontakt kein Schließerkontakt geschlossen sein darf und daß bei einem verschweißten Schließerkontakt kein Öffnerkontakt geschlossen sein darf.
Safety relays with positively driven or partially positively driven relay contact switches have the property that their contact switches can only be brought together into the other switching position by means of an actuating web 28. Forced operation means that as long as a contact is closed at a certain switching position, no contacts in the opposite switching position may be closed.
A distinction is made between full restraint and partial restraint.
Full force guidance is the state that when a contact is welded (not opened) within a spring set, the welded contact defines the switching state in the entire spring set. Since this fully synchronized state is only guaranteed with 100% contact reliability, it cannot be guaranteed in practice.
Partial forced operation means that a normally closed contact cannot be closed when a normally closed contact is welded and that no normally closed contact can be closed when a normally closed contact is welded.

Wegen der in der Praxis wohl nie zu erreichenden 100 %igen Kontaktsicherheit, kann es bei der Teilzwangsführung vorkommen, daß zwar bei einem verschweißten Öffnerkontakt kein Schließer geschlossen ist und umgekehrt, daß aber bei einem verschweißten Schließerkontakt ein anderer Schließerkontakt öffnet bzw. bei einem verschweißten Öffnerkontakt ein anderer Öffnerkontakt öffnet. Solche Zustände sind aber nicht sicher beherrschbar und deshalb im Rahmen einer Sicherheitsschaltung nicht zuverlässig einsetzbar.Because of the 100% contact reliability that can never be achieved in practice, it can happen with the partial forced operation that although a normally open contact is not closed with a welded normally closed contact and vice versa, but with a welded normally open contact another normally open contact opens or with a welded normally closed contact another break contact opens. Such However, states cannot be safely controlled and therefore cannot be used reliably in the context of a safety circuit.

Die in den Fig. 2 bis 4 schematisch dargestellten Sicherheitsschaltungen arbeiten wie folgt:
Sobald in der Schalteinheit 2 vom Schaltelement 3 ein Störungssignal empfangen wird, wird dieses an den Mikroprozessor 1 weitergegeben, und dieser unterbricht durch seinen elektronischen Schalter 8 den Motorstromkreis 9. Zugleich wird von der Schalteinheit 2 auch das Sicherheitsrelais 4 abgeschaltet, so daß sämtliche Relaiskontaktschalter a, b, c bzw. d und e jeweils in ihrer entgegengesetzte Schaltstellung springen, d.h. die Relaiskontaktschalter a, b und c öffnen, während die Relaiskontaktschalter d und e jeweils gleichzeitig schließen. Das Öffnen der Relaiskontaktschalter a erfolgt im Normalfall, also wenn der elektronische Schalter 8 ordnungsgemäß funktioniert, leistungslos, weil die mechanischen Relaiskontaktschalter langsamer sind als der elektronische Schalter 8. Sowohl vom Mikroprozessor 1 als auch durch die Relaiskontaktschalter b bzw. e wird jeweils etwa gleichzeitig die elektrische Brems- und Arretiervorrichtung 7 eingeschaltet, damit sie die zuvor vom Motor angetriebene Drehtür 25 augenblicklich anhält.
Durch das im Mikroprozessor 1 bzw. im Nebenstromkreis 6 befindliche Zeitschaltglied 5 wird die elektrische Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung 7 nach etwa zwei Sekunden wieder abgeschaltet.
The safety circuits shown schematically in FIGS. 2 to 4 operate as follows:
As soon as a fault signal is received in the switching unit 2 by the switching element 3, this is passed on to the microprocessor 1, and this interrupts the motor circuit 9 through its electronic switch 8. At the same time, the switching unit 2 also switches off the safety relay 4, so that all the relay contact switches a , b , c and d and e each jump in their opposite switching position, ie open the relay contact switches a , b and c , while the relay contact switches d and e close at the same time. The opening of the relay contact switch a takes place in the normal case, i.e. if the electronic switch 8 is functioning properly, without power, because the mechanical relay contact switches are slower than the electronic switch 8. Both from the microprocessor 1 and through the relay contact switches b and e , respectively, is at about the same time electric braking and locking device 7 turned on so that it stops the revolving door 25 previously driven by the motor instantaneously.
The electrical braking or locking device 7 is switched off again after approximately two seconds by the timer 5 located in the microprocessor 1 or in the secondary circuit 6.

Durch die Relaiskontaktschalter c bzw. d wird das Abfallen des Sicherheitsrelais 4 jeweils an den Mikroprozessor 1 gemeldet. Durch eine entsprechende Prüfschaltung bzw. ein entsprechendes Prüfprogramm kann der Mikroprozessor 1 im Falle des Ausbleibens dieses Bestätigungssignals das Wiedereinschalten des Antriebsmotors 10 verhindern bzw. die Benutzung der Drehtür durch Einschalten der elektrischen Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung blockieren.The dropout of the safety relay 4 is reported to the microprocessor 1 by the relay contact switches c and d . By a corresponding test circuit or a corresponding test program can prevent the microprocessor 1 from restarting the drive motor 10 in the absence of this confirmation signal or block the use of the revolving door by switching on the electrical braking or locking device.

Der Kontrollschaltkreis mit dem Kontaktschalter c bzw. d dient also zur Überwachung der Funktionstüchtigkeit der sog. Sicherheitslinie, welche das Relais 4 mit seinen Relaiskontaktschaltern a bis e darstellt.The control circuit with the contact switch c or d thus serves to monitor the functionality of the so-called safety line, which represents the relay 4 with its relay contact switches a to e .

Weil es aber vorkommen kann, daß bei normalem Betrieb einer Drehtür Störfälle, die ein Störungssignal durch die Sicherheitsleisten 27 auslösen, nur in langen Zeitabständen erfolgen und in diesen Zeitabständen normalerweise keine Überprüfung der Funktionstüchtigkeit dieser sog. Sicherheitslinie erfolgt, ist vorgesehen, daß der Mikroprozessor 1 in gewissen überschaubaren Zeitabständen regelmäßig Prüfimpulse an die Schalteinheit 2 gibt, welche ebenfalls ein Abfallen des Sicherheitsrelais 4 bewirken, um festzustellen, ob die Funktionstüchtigkeit des Sicherheitsrelais 4 noch vorliegt. Wenn in einem solchen Fall der Relaiskontaktschalter c bzw. d anspricht erhält der Mikroprozessor 1 wieder das Bestätigungssignal. Nur dann, wenn einer der drei Relaiskontaktschalter a, b, c bzw. a, b, d bzw. a, d, e am Umspringen in die entgegengesetzte Schaltlage gehindert ist, wird dieses Bestätigungssignal ausbleiben mit der Folge, daß der Mikroprozessor 1 die Anlage außer Betrieb setzt.However, because it can happen that during normal operation of a revolving door, malfunctions that trigger a fault signal by the safety strips 27 only occur at long intervals and normally no check of the functionality of this so-called safety line takes place at these intervals, so that the microprocessor 1 at certain manageable time intervals, there are regular test pulses to the switching unit 2, which likewise cause the safety relay 4 to drop to determine whether the safety relay 4 is still functional. If the relay contact switch c or d responds in such a case, the microprocessor 1 again receives the confirmation signal. Only if one of the three relay contact switches a , b , c or a , b , d or a , d , e is prevented from jumping into the opposite switching position, this confirmation signal will not appear, with the result that the microprocessor 1 the system decommissioning.

Während das Sicherheitsrelais 4 bei der Ausführungsform der Fig. 2 mit drei Schließerkontakten a, b, c ausgerüstet ist, ist das Sicherheitsrelais 4 bei der Ausführungsform gem. Fig. 3 mit zwei Schließerkontakten a und b und mit einem Öffnerkontakt d ausgerüstet, und bei der Ausführungsform der Fig. 4 ist das Sicherheitsrelais 4 nur mit einem Schließerkontakt a und mit zwei Öffnerkontakten d und e ausgerüstet. In allen Fällen ist aber der Schließerkontakt a in Reihe mit dem elektronischen Schalter 8 des Motorstromkreises 9 angeordnet.While the safety relay 4 in the embodiment of FIG. 2 is equipped with three normally open contacts a , b , c , the safety relay 4 in the embodiment according to FIG. Fig. 3 equipped with two normally open contacts a and b and with a normally closed contact d , and in the embodiment of Fig. 4, the safety relay 4 is only equipped with one normally open contact a and with two normally closed contacts d and e . In all cases, however, the normally open contact a is arranged in series with the electronic switch 8 of the motor circuit 9.

Weil bei drei gleichartigen Relaiskontaktschaltern a, b, c wegen der nie 100 %ig vorhandenen Kontaktsicherheit trotz Vollzwangführung oder Teilzwangsführung nicht garantiert werden kann, daß z.B. der Relaiskontaktschalter c nicht öffnet, wenn der Relaiskontaktschalter a verschweißt ist, kann bei dieser Ausführungsform die sog. Sicherheitslinie für sich genommen keine 100 %ige Sicherheit bieten.Because with three identical relay contact switches a , b , c, because of the contact safety that is never 100% guaranteed, despite full forced or partial forced operation, it cannot be guaranteed that, for example, the relay contact switch c will not open when the relay contact switch a is welded, the so-called safety line can be used in this embodiment do not offer 100% security on their own.

Bei den Ausführungsformen der Fig. 3 und 4 hingegen, bei denen der im Kontrollstromkreis liegende Relaiskontaktschalter d als Öffnerkontakt ausgebildet ist und gegenüber dem Schließerkontakt a jeweils die entgegengesetzte Schaltlage einnimmt, kann durch die vorgesehene Teilzwangsführung garantiert werden, daß bei verschweißtem, also fehlerhaft nicht öffnenden Relaiskontaktschalter a der Relaiskontaktschalter d nicht schließt und somit kein Bestätigungssignal für die ordnungsgemäße Funktionsweise an den Mikroprozessor 1 abgeben kann.
Dasselbe trifft auch für die Ausführungsform der Fig. 4 zu, bei welcher auch der im Nebenstromkreis 6 der elektrischen Brems- und Arretiervorrichtung liegende Relaiskontaktschalter e als Öffnerkontakt ausgebildet ist.
In the embodiments of FIGS. 3 and 4, on the other hand, in which the relay contact switch d located in the control circuit is designed as a break contact and takes the opposite switching position with respect to the make contact a , the partial positive guidance provided can guarantee that when the welded part is welded, i.e. it does not open incorrectly Relay contact switch a the relay contact switch d does not close and therefore cannot give a confirmation signal for the correct functioning to the microprocessor 1.
The same also applies to the embodiment of FIG. 4 which also the relay contact switch e located in the secondary circuit 6 of the electrical braking and locking device is designed as a break contact.

Während bei der Ausführungsform der Fig. 3 zumindest nicht völlig ausgeschlossen werden kann, daß bei verschweißtem Schließerkontakt a der Schließerkontakt b des Nebenstromkreises 6 der elektrischen Brems- und Arretiervorrichtung öffnet, wenn das Sicherheitsrelais 4 abfällt, ist bei einer Teilzwangsführung im Falle der Fig. 4 diese Möglichkeit mit Sicherheit ausgeschlossen, d.h. wenn a nicht öffnet, kann e nicht schließen.While it cannot at least be completely ruled out in the embodiment of FIG. 3 that, when the normally open contact a is welded , the normally open contact b of the secondary circuit 6 of the electrical braking and locking device opens when the safety relay 4 drops out. In the case of FIG this possibility is definitely excluded, ie if a does not open, e cannot close.

Aus den dargelegten Gründen ist die in Fig. 3 dargestellte Ausführungsform der Sicherheitsschaltung, bei der das Sicherheitsrelais 4 mit zwei Schließerkontakten a und b und einem Öffnerkontakt d versehen ist, vorzuziehen, wenn der Öffnerkontakt in den Kontrollstromkreis 11 und der zweite Schließerkontakt b in den Nebenstromkreis der elektrischen Brems- oder Arretiervorrichtung 7 gelegt wird. Die beiden Ausführungsformen der Fig. 2 und 4 sind zwar grundsätzlich auch verwendbar, allerdings ist wegen der nie 100 %ig vorhandenen Kontaktsicherheit auch bei Vollzwangsführung der Relaiskontaktschalter nicht die optimale Funktionssicherheit gewährleistet, wie bei der Ausführungsform der Fig. 3.For the reasons set out, the embodiment of the safety circuit shown in FIG. 3, in which the safety relay 4 is provided with two normally open contacts a and b and one normally closed contact d , is preferable if the normally closed contact is in the control circuit 11 and the second normally open contact b is in the secondary circuit the electric braking or locking device 7 is placed. The two embodiments of FIGS. 2 and 4 can in principle also be used, however, because the contact reliability is never 100%, even with fully forced operation of the relay contact switch, the optimal functional reliability is not guaranteed, as in the embodiment of FIG. 3.

Durch die erfindungsgemäße Sicherheitsschaltung ist mit einfachen Mitteln nicht nur die Betriebssicherheit der Drehtüranlage auf einen hohen Zuverlässigkeitsgrad verbessert worden, sondern es ist auch sichergestellt, daß die zusätzliche sog. Sicherheitslinie selbst laufend auf ihre Funktionstüchtigkeit überwacht werden kann.By means of the safety circuit according to the invention, not only has the operational safety of the revolving door system been improved to a high degree of reliability by simple means, but it also has ensures that the additional so-called safety line can be continuously monitored for its functionality.

Diese Sicherheitsschalteinrichtung ist überall dort anwendbar, wo motorbetriebene Schwungmassen bei Auftreten eines Störsignals augenblicklich gestoppt werden müssen. Ihre Anwendung ist also nicht nur auf Drehtüren und automatische Tür- und Toranlagen allgemein beschränkt, sondern auch bei Maschinen und Maschinenteilen verwendbar.This safety switching device can be used wherever motorized flywheels have to be stopped immediately when an interference signal occurs. Their application is therefore not only limited to revolving doors and automatic door and gate systems in general, but can also be used with machines and machine parts.

Claims (6)

  1. Safety circuit for electrically selectable braking and locking devices (7) driven by electric motor in flywheels or machine parts, in particular of a revolving door, in which at least one of two edges extending towards one another is provided with an electrical circuit element (3) or similar, which is sensitive to touch or pressure, and from which the signals generated in the case of an operational fault are fed to an electronic control unit, in particular a programmable microprocessor (1), and are used by this or these to switch off the drive motor (10) and/or to switch on the braking or locking device (7) by means of an electronic switch (8), characterised in that connected in series to the electronic control unit (1), an electronic switching unit (2) is provided, which receives the respective fault signals generated by the circuit element (3) and passes them on to the control unit (1) and interrupts the permanent excitation of a safety relay (4), which among at least three only jointly operable, guided or partially guided relay contacts switches (a, b, c; or a, b, d; or a, d, e) has at least one normally-open contact (a, b or c), wherein a normally-open contact (a) is connected in series with the electronic switch (8) of the control unit (1) in the power circuit (9) of the drive motor (10), one of the two other relay contact switches (b or e) is located in a secondary circuit (6) of the braking or locking device (7) provided with a time switch element (5), and wherein the third relay contact switch (c or d) is located in a test circuit (11) of the control unit (1) in order to confirm the orderly operation of the safety relay (4) or the switching unit (2) in the form of an acknowledgment signal.
  2. Safety circuit according to Claim 1, characterised in that all three relay contacts (a, b, c) are normally-open contacts.
  3. Safety circuit according to Claim 1, characterised in that at least the relay contact (d) located in the test circuit (11) is a break contact.
  4. Safety circuit according to Claim 1, characterised in that the relay contact (d) located in the test circuit (11) is a break contact, and that the relay contact (b) located in the secondary circuit (6) of the braking and locking device (7) is a normally-open contact.
  5. Safety circuit according to Claim 3, characterised in that the relay contact (e) located in the secondary circuit (6) of the braking and locking device (7) is a break contact.
  6. Safety circuit according to one of Claims 1 to 5, characterised in that when idle, the microprocessor (1) passes test signals corresponding to the fault signals of the circuit element (3) to the electronic switching unit (2) to interrupt the permanent excitation of the relay (4) for test purposes at specific time intervals; and that in the case of correct operation, the relay contact (c, d) located in the test circuit (11) passes the acknowledgment signal to the microprocessor (1).
EP19900119589 1989-10-18 1990-10-12 Safety circuit for motor-driven and electrical brake- or arrestable oscillating weights or machine parts Expired - Lifetime EP0423638B1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE3934662 1989-10-18
DE3934662A DE3934662A1 (en) 1989-10-18 1989-10-18 SAFETY CIRCUIT FOR ELECTRICALLY DRIVEN AND ELECTRICALLY BRAKE OR LOCKABLE FLYING MACHINES OR MACHINE PARTS

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0423638A2 EP0423638A2 (en) 1991-04-24
EP0423638A3 EP0423638A3 (en) 1992-04-22
EP0423638B1 true EP0423638B1 (en) 1995-01-11

Family

ID=6391661

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP19900119589 Expired - Lifetime EP0423638B1 (en) 1989-10-18 1990-10-12 Safety circuit for motor-driven and electrical brake- or arrestable oscillating weights or machine parts

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US (1) US5159203A (en)
EP (1) EP0423638B1 (en)
AT (1) ATE117126T1 (en)
DE (1) DE3934662A1 (en)
DK (1) DK0423638T3 (en)
ES (1) ES2069648T3 (en)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US5159203A (en) 1992-10-27
EP0423638A3 (en) 1992-04-22
DK0423638T3 (en) 1995-06-19
EP0423638A2 (en) 1991-04-24
ATE117126T1 (en) 1995-01-15
DE3934662C2 (en) 1991-08-01
DE3934662A1 (en) 1991-04-25
ES2069648T3 (en) 1995-05-16

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