CN115694792B - Method and device capable of detecting strong pulse light-induced blind attack and receiving end - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method, a device and a receiving end capable of detecting strong pulse light-induced blind attack. On the basis of the original measuring light path of the receiving end, a beam splitter is arranged at the input end to introduce a detection branch, and the attack light is detected by means of an avalanche photodiode in a linear mode, so that various loopholes existing in an attack detection mode realized based on an APD working current detection principle can be completely avoided, and various strong pulse light-induced blind attack schemes can be perfectly detected, including but not limited to the currently proposed strong pulse light-induced blind attack schemes. Meanwhile, the whole light path of the detection device realized based on the detection principle provided by the invention is simple and reliable, the original measuring light path is not required to be changed, and the detection device is easy to realize and maintain.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of quantum communication, in particular to a method, a device and a receiving end for detecting strong pulse light-induced blind attack.
Background
In the strong light blind attack of the quantum key distribution system, the control of the single photon detector output 0 and 1 is usually realized by utilizing the detection characteristic that a linear mode possibly exists due to strong light in the actual work of the single photon detector, so that key stealing is implemented. An attacker can change a geiger mode of single photon detection into a linear mode of non-single photon detection by injecting blinding strong light, and a time interval where the linear mode is located is called a blinding interval. By using the linear mode, the eavesdropper Eve can use the pulse trigger light, so that the detection part adopted by the attack and different from the base vector used by the measurement of the receiving end is not found by the receiving end, thereby eliminating the attack influence.
In order to change the geiger mode of single photon detection into a linear mode of non-single photon detection, an attacker injects intense light for blinding into the detector to enable an APD (avalanche photodiode) to output larger current, so that larger voltage drop can be formed on a resistor connected in series with the APD, and the voltage across the APD is reduced, so that the working voltage is lower than the breakdown voltage, and the APD exits from the geiger mode and enters into the linear mode.
As the receiving end, external light injection cannot be prevented, and the detector cannot be prevented from being blinded, the strong light blinding attack can be prevented only by ensuring that the blinding state can be effectively found, which is strictly to ensure that the blinding state of the detector at the arrival time of the signal light is effectively found. Because only when the photocurrent output by the APD is large enough, the voltage at two ends of the APD is reduced and then the Geiger mode is exited, the existing defending measures are to judge whether strong light attack exists or not by detecting the working current of the APD, for example, the output current of a boost chip for providing bias voltage for the APD is monitored on hardware, when the working current of the APD exceeds a normal threshold value, an alarm is sent, the system stops working, and relevant data are screened out.
Based on this attack detection principle, the prior art proposes a number of specific defense schemes, see for example literature "Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination"、"Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD", etc. Fig. 1 shows a strong light attack defending scheme based on an APD working current detection principle in the prior art, wherein a sampling resistor is used for sampling a current I APD flowing through an APD and outputting a voltage signal, and the voltage signal is acquired through an ADC and converted into the current of the APD, so that the current of the APD is monitored.
However, in the research, the defense scheme based on detecting the working current of the APD can effectively detect continuous photo-induced blind attack, but is limited by the bandwidth of a current detection circuit, and the improved strong pulse photo-induced blind attack cannot be effectively screened. For example, in document "HACKING SINGLE-photon avalanche detectors in quantum key distribution via pulse illumination," an improved strong pulse photo-induced blind attack scheme is proposed that can effectively avoid APD operating current detection and manipulate the output state of the detector. Wherein the change in APD operating current caused by the intense pulsed light is filtered out by a low pass filter for filtering out high frequency noise.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the invention discloses a method, a device and a receiving end capable of detecting strong pulse photoinduced blind attack. The method is characterized in that on the basis of an original measuring light path of a receiving end, a beam splitter is arranged at an input end to introduce a detection branch, and an avalanche photodiode in a linear mode is used for detecting attack light, so that various loopholes existing in an attack detection mode realized based on an APD working current detection principle can be completely avoided, and various strong pulse photoinduced blind attack schemes can be perfectly detected, wherein the attack detection scheme comprises but is not limited to the currently proposed strong pulse photoinduced blind attack schemes. Meanwhile, the whole light path of the detection device realized based on the detection principle provided by the invention is simple and reliable, the original measuring light path is not required to be changed, and the detection device is easy to realize and maintain.
Specifically, a first aspect of the present invention relates to a detection device for a strong pulse photo-induced blind attack, which comprises a beam splitter, an avalanche photodiode and an attack detection unit; wherein,
The beam splitter is configured to split the signal light entering the receiving end into a first component and a second component, and to transmit the first component to the signal light detection module and the second component to the avalanche photodiode;
the avalanche photodiode is configured to detect the second component at an operating voltage lower than an avalanche voltage;
The attack detection unit is configured to detect a count signal of the avalanche photodiode and determine whether a strong pulse photo-induced blind attack exists according to the count signal.
Further, the avalanche photodiode is set to have an operating voltage 1 to 3V lower than the avalanche voltage; and/or the ratio of the light intensities of the first and second components is between 9:1 and 99:1.
Further, the attack detection unit comprises a sampling resistor, a counting signal discrimination part and a judgment part;
The sampling resistor is used for converting a photocurrent signal output by the avalanche photodiode into a voltage signal;
The count signal discrimination section is configured to compare the voltage signal with a discrimination threshold to generate the count signal;
the judging part is configured to judge whether a strong pulse light-induced blind attack exists by detecting the count signal.
Further, the voltage signal is input to the count signal discrimination section by means of ac coupling.
Still further, the discrimination threshold is set higher than the electronic noise of the avalanche photodiode.
Further, the judging part comprises a pulse widening device and an FPGA device; the pulse stretching device is used for stretching the pulses of the counting signal; the FPGA device is arranged to detect the count signal. Wherein the pulse stretching device may preferably comprise a D flip-flop.
The second aspect of the present invention relates to a receiving end capable of detecting a strong pulse light-induced blind attack, which comprises a signal light detection module for detecting signal light, and a detection device for the strong pulse light-induced blind attack.
The third aspect of the present invention relates to a detection method of a strong pulse light-induced blind attack, which includes a spectroscopic step and a detection step;
in the light splitting step, a path of light is split from the input signal light and is introduced into an avalanche photodiode, wherein the working voltage of the avalanche photodiode is lower than the avalanche voltage;
In the detecting step, by detecting the count signal of the avalanche photodiode, it is judged whether or not a strong pulse photo-induced blind attack exists.
Further, the detecting step further includes the step of discriminating the count signal based on the output signal of the avalanche photodiode.
Further, at least one of the splitting ratio of the signal light and the operating voltage is determined according to the detection range of the intense pulse light-induced blind attack.
Further, the difference between the avalanche voltage and the operating voltage is greater than the maximum fluctuation value of the operating voltage.
Preferably, the detection method of the present invention can be implemented by means of the detection device described above.
Drawings
The following describes the embodiments of the present invention in further detail with reference to the drawings.
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings that are required in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly described, it being obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and that other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
FIG. 1 shows a prior art strong light blinding attack detection scheme based on the principle of detecting the working current of an APD;
FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of a method, apparatus and receiving end for detecting a strong pulse photo-induced blind attack according to the present invention;
Fig. 3 shows an example of an attack detection unit according to the invention.
Detailed Description
Hereinafter, exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are provided by way of illustration to fully convey the spirit of the invention to those skilled in the art to which the invention pertains. Thus, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments disclosed herein.
Fig. 2 shows a schematic diagram of a method, an apparatus and a receiving end for detecting a strong pulse photo-induced blind attack according to the present invention.
As shown in fig. 2, the detection device for a strong pulse photo-induced blind attack according to the present invention may include a beam splitter, an avalanche photodiode, and an attack detection unit.
The beam splitter is disposed at a signal light input end (e.g., a signal light input end of a receiving end for quantum key distribution) for splitting input signal light into two paths, i.e., a first component and a second component.
The first component is output from the beam splitter and then continuously input into the signal light detection module along the original light path, and the signal light detection module detects the first component so as to be used for a quantum key distribution process.
The second component, after output from the beam splitter, will be introduced into the avalanche photodiode for detection. According to the present invention, the operating voltage (e.g., bias voltage V b in fig. 3) applied across the avalanche photodiode is slightly lower than its avalanche (breakdown) voltage, so that the avalanche photodiode operates in a linear mode instead of a geiger mode while having a high gain.
Since the avalanche photodiode does not have dark counts in geiger mode in the linear mode, the avalanche photodiode in the detection apparatus of the present invention will not generate counts, i.e. will not output count signals, in a normal operating environment (no signal input at the receiving end or signal light input at e.g. single photon level) where no strong pulse light-induced blind attack is received. When strong pulse light is injected from the input end of the receiving end, namely, strong pulse light blind attack occurs, a part of the strong pulse light is led into the avalanche photodiode by the beam splitter in the detection device, and the avalanche photodiode generates counting, namely, outputs counting signals by virtue of high gain in a linear mode due to the fact that the part of the strong pulse light is higher than normal signal light (such as single photon level) in intensity.
It follows that by arranging the detection device of the present invention as above, detection of strong pulse light at the input receiving end is allowed to be achieved by detecting only the count signal of the avalanche photodiode in the linear mode, that is: when detecting that the avalanche photodiode in the detection device outputs a counting signal, the detection device indicates that strong pulse light-induced blind attack behavior occurs at the moment. Obviously, the strong pulse photo-induced blind attack detection device abandons the existing strong light-induced blind attack detection mode based on the APD working current detection, and firstly proposes that on the basis of the original measuring light path of the receiving end, a detection branch is introduced by arranging a beam splitter at the input end, the attack light is detected by means of an avalanche photodiode in a linear mode, various loopholes in the attack detection mode realized based on the APD working current detection principle are completely avoided, and various strong pulse photo-induced blind attack schemes including but not limited to the existing strong pulse photo-induced blind attack schemes can be perfectly detected. Meanwhile, the whole light path of the detection device realized based on the detection principle provided by the invention is simple and reliable, the original measuring light path is not required to be changed, and the detection device is easy to realize and maintain.
Further, in the detection device of the present invention, the splitting ratio (first component: second component) of the beam splitter and the operating voltage of the avalanche photodiode (which determines the gain of the APD) will affect the response of the avalanche photodiode to the strong pulse attack light. Where a higher gain of the APD in linear mode is advantageous for such a response, the operating voltage should therefore take as high a value as possible below the avalanche voltage, e.g. the operating voltage may be set to be only below the difference between the avalanche voltage and the maximum fluctuation value of the operating voltage. At this time, the lower the beam splitting ratio (first component: second component) of the beam splitter, the better this response, but too low a beam splitting ratio may have some influence on the normal measurement of the signal light, and therefore, the beam splitting ratio may be preferably selected to be between 9:1 and 99:1.
In a more preferred example, the splitting ratio may be selected to be around 9:1, while the operating voltage is set to be between 1V and 3V below the avalanche voltage. Therefore, the avalanche photodiode has high gain on the basis of ensuring that the normal measurement of the signal light by the receiving end is not influenced, and a larger detection range for strong pulse light-induced blind attack is obtained.
Fig. 3 shows an example of an attack detection unit for detecting avalanche photodiode count signals according to the present invention.
As shown in fig. 3, the attack detection unit may include a sampling resistor, a count signal discrimination section, and a judgment section.
The sampling resistor is connected in series with the avalanche photodiode and is used for converting a photocurrent signal output by the avalanche photodiode into a voltage signal. The voltage signal can be input to the counting signal discrimination unit by means of ac coupling.
As a preferred example, the sampling resistor may take a resistance value of 1K ohms.
The count signal discrimination section discriminates whether or not the avalanche photodiode currently outputs a count signal based on the voltage signal.
As a preferred example, the count signal discrimination section may include a high-speed discriminator for comparing the voltage signal with a preset discrimination threshold V th and outputting the count signal when the voltage signal is higher than the discrimination threshold.
In this case, since the avalanche photodiode in the linear mode has only dark current noise, and there is no dark count in the geiger mode, the discrimination threshold can be set to be slightly higher than the electronic noise (including dark current noise) of the avalanche photodiode. It follows that the setting of the screening threshold is very simple and reliable.
The judging part is used for detecting the counting signal to judge whether the strong pulse light-induced blind attack exists or not. For example, when the judgment section detects that the count signal discrimination section outputs the count signal, it can be judged that there is one strong pulse for performing the blinding attack corresponding to the count signal.
As a preferred example, detection of the count signal may be implemented using an FPGA device. In order to ensure reliable detection of high-frequency (narrow pulse width) attack light, a pulse widening device can be further arranged in the judging part for widening the pulse width of the counting signal so as to ensure that the FPGA device can effectively detect the counting signal.
Preferably, the pulse stretching device may be implemented using a high-speed D flip-flop.
In summary, with the preferred structure of the attack detection unit shown in fig. 3, detection of strong pulses can be reliably and effectively achieved with a simple circuit structure.
Further, fig. 2 also shows the structure of the receiving end which can detect the strong pulse photo-induced blind attack according to the present invention.
As shown in fig. 2, the receiving end may include a signal light detection module and the detection device for strong pulse light-induced blind attack.
The signal light detection module is used for detecting a first component output by a beam splitter in the detection device to realize single photon detection of signal light for quantum key distribution.
Based on the above, the receiving end of the invention can effectively detect the strong pulse light-induced blind attack behavior injected from the input end, thereby stopping work properly, screening out related data and preventing the secret key from being stolen.
The invention further discloses a detection method of the strong pulse photoinduced blind attack, which mainly comprises a light splitting step and a detection step.
In the light splitting step, by providing a beam splitter at the signal light input end, one light is split from the input signal light and introduced into one avalanche photodiode. As previously mentioned, the avalanche photodiode should be set to have an operating voltage lower than the avalanche voltage to ensure that it is in a linear mode (and has a high gain).
Wherein, because the beam splitting ratio of the signal light and the working voltage of the avalanche photodiode can influence the detection response of the avalanche photodiode to the input signal light, the beam splitting ratio of the signal light and the working voltage of the avalanche photodiode can be determined according to the strong pulse light range (namely, the detection range of the strong pulse light blinding attack) which is detected as required and is used for blinding attack. For example, to ensure that the avalanche photodiode is in a linear mode, the difference between the avalanche voltage and the operating voltage may be set to be greater than the maximum fluctuation value of the operating voltage.
In the detection step, whether or not strong pulse light is injected at the signal light input end, namely, whether or not strong pulse light blinding attack behavior exists is judged by detecting whether or not the avalanche photodiode outputs a counting signal.
In this detection step, a step of discriminating whether the signal output from the avalanche photodiode is a count signal may be further included to allow correct detection of the count signal. For example, the photocurrent signal output from the avalanche photodiode may be converted into a voltage signal, and the voltage signal may be compared with a preset discrimination threshold to determine whether the avalanche photodiode has output a count signal.
Further, in the detecting step, an FPGA device may be used to detect the count signal. The counting signals output through screening can be subjected to pulse broadening, so that the FPGA device can detect strong pulse light with narrow pulses.
Preferably, the detection method of the present invention can be implemented in the detection device and the receiving end described with respect to fig. 2 and 3.
While the invention has been described in connection with the specific embodiments illustrated in the drawings, it will be readily appreciated by those skilled in the art that the above embodiments are merely illustrative of the principles of the invention, which are not intended to limit the scope of the invention, and various combinations, modifications and equivalents of the above embodiments may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.
Claims (13)
1. A detection device for strong pulse photo-induced blind attack comprises a beam splitter, an avalanche photodiode and an attack detection unit; wherein,
The beam splitter is configured to split the signal light entering the receiving end into a first component and a second component, and to transmit the first component to the signal light detection module and the second component to the avalanche photodiode;
the avalanche photodiode is configured to detect the second component at an operating voltage lower than an avalanche voltage;
The attack detection unit is configured to detect a count signal of the avalanche photodiode and determine whether a strong pulse photo-induced blind attack exists according to the count signal.
2. The detection apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein the avalanche photodiode is arranged to have an operating voltage 1 to 3V lower than the avalanche voltage; and/or the ratio of the light intensities of the first and second components is between 9:1 and 99:1.
3. The detection device according to claim 1, wherein the attack detection unit includes a sampling resistor, a count signal discrimination section, and a judgment section;
The sampling resistor is used for converting a photocurrent signal output by the avalanche photodiode into a voltage signal;
The count signal discrimination section is configured to compare the voltage signal with a discrimination threshold to generate the count signal;
the judging part is configured to judge whether a strong pulse light-induced blind attack exists by detecting the count signal.
4. The detection device according to claim 3, wherein the voltage signal is input to the count signal discrimination section by way of ac coupling.
5. The detection apparatus of claim 3, wherein the discrimination threshold is set higher than an electronic noise of the avalanche photodiode.
6. The detecting apparatus according to claim 3, wherein the judging section includes a pulse widening device and an FPGA device;
the pulse stretching device is used for stretching the pulses of the counting signal;
The FPGA device is arranged to detect the count signal.
7. The detection apparatus of claim 6, wherein the pulse stretching device comprises a D flip-flop.
8. A receiving end capable of detecting a strong pulse light-induced blind attack, comprising a signal light detection module for detecting signal light, and the strong pulse light-induced blind attack detection device according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
9. A detection method of strong pulse photoinduced blind attack comprises a light splitting step and a detection step;
in the light splitting step, a path of light is split from the input signal light and is introduced into an avalanche photodiode, wherein the working voltage of the avalanche photodiode is lower than the avalanche voltage;
In the detecting step, by detecting the count signal of the avalanche photodiode, it is judged whether or not a strong pulse photo-induced blind attack exists.
10. The detection method as claimed in claim 9, wherein the detection step further comprises the step of discriminating the count signal from the output signal of the avalanche photodiode.
11. The detection method according to claim 9, wherein at least one of the splitting ratio of the signal light and the operating voltage is determined according to a detection range of the intense pulsed light-induced blind attack.
12. The detection method as claimed in claim 11, wherein a difference between the avalanche voltage and the operating voltage is greater than a maximum fluctuation value of the operating voltage.
13. The detection method according to claim 9, which is implemented by means of a detection device according to any one of claims 1-7.
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