CN111781615B - GNSS anti-deception system and method based on low-earth-orbit communication satellite - Google Patents

GNSS anti-deception system and method based on low-earth-orbit communication satellite Download PDF

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CN111781615B
CN111781615B CN202010561684.8A CN202010561684A CN111781615B CN 111781615 B CN111781615 B CN 111781615B CN 202010561684 A CN202010561684 A CN 202010561684A CN 111781615 B CN111781615 B CN 111781615B
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CN111781615A (en
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严涛
蒙艳松
王瑛
边朗
雷文英
田野
李天�
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Xian Institute of Space Radio Technology
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
    • G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/35—Constructional details or hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
    • G01S19/37—Hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Abstract

A GNSS anti-spoofing system and method based on low earth orbit communication satellite includes: a plurality of GNSS satellites, a low-orbit communication satellite constellation and a GNSS anti-cheating terminal. The GNSS satellite is used for broadcasting a real GNSS satellite navigation signal; the low-orbit communication satellite constellation consists of a plurality of low-orbit communication satellites; the low-orbit communication satellite is used for broadcasting low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals; the GNSS anti-deception terminal receives the GNSS satellite navigation signals and also receives low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals, and is used for providing real positioning information and time service information for a user. The method utilizes the characteristic of high movement speed of the low-orbit satellite, takes the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite as the credible ranging signal source, is used for detecting the GNSS deception signal, and has the real-time GNSS anti-deception capability.

Description

GNSS anti-spoofing system and method based on low-earth-orbit communication satellite
Technical Field
The invention relates to a GNSS anti-spoofing system and a GNSS anti-spoofing method based on a low-orbit communication satellite, and belongs to the technical field of satellite navigation.
Background
In order to improve the service performance of the basic satellite navigation system, various navigation enhancement means have been developed so far to enhance the integrity, accuracy and usability of satellite navigation. In recent years, with the widespread adoption of GPS and other GNSS technologies in the fields of mobile positioning service, road transportation, aviation, marine transportation, time service, geodetic science, atmospheric perception, and the like, the problem of vulnerability of GNSS civil signals has attracted much attention. Most of these emerging applications are safety-or liability-related, i.e., the user's location or velocity information can be used to perform life safety-related, or legal/economic decisions. Therefore, enhancing the safety of satellite navigation is becoming an important requirement for emerging users.
GNSS civilian signals are extremely fragile. On one hand, the signal strength emitted by the navigation satellite is very low, usually only about-158 dBW, so that the navigation satellite is easily interfered, and enemies can easily interfere and suppress satellite signals; on the other hand, all open civilian GNSS signal interface specifications are open, and the receiver can receive any input that is in compliance with the specifications and treat it as coming from a GNSS satellite, which results in a very simple spoofing of a GNSS receiver. Thus, the threat of deceptive interference is more severe for the security of GNSS civilian signals.
In order to enhance the safety of satellite navigation, one direction is to improve the robustness of the satellite navigation system and improve the anti-cheating capability of civil signals. The general method is to improve the GNSS civil open signal system, provide the authentication capability to the navigation signal on the premise of keeping backward compatibility with the current signal, perform anti-deception design, and meet the purpose of enhancing safety. Currently, galileo, GPS and QZSS teams have studied civil anti-spoofing signal regimes and Galileo plans to provide Navigation Message (NMA) authentication functionality on its E1 OS signal, american studies adopt the Chimera authentication scheme on GPS L1C signals and are seeking to test on GPS III satellites. The invention discloses a method and a system for optimizing the authentication of radio navigation signals (CN 1061716A) and a satellite radio navigation signal with a digital signature (CN 105492926A), which can not enable an attacker to impersonate a navigation message by encrypting and digitally signing the navigation message and delaying the transmission of an encryption key so as to realize the authentication of the navigation signal.
Another anti-spoofing direction is to develop an auxiliary technology or a backup system, in U.S. patent "Geolocation Leveraging spot beam overlap" (US 9625573 B2), by means of the multi-beam feature of the low-orbit satellite, and the characteristics of encryption of the low-orbit satellite signal, rapid doppler change and difficulty in spoofing, iratsnext proposes a scheme for anti-spoofing of the low-orbit multi-beam overlap pattern, so as to enhance the security of positioning service. The third anti-spoofing direction is to identify and detect spoofing signals by a receiving processing method, such as the patent "a GNSS anti-spoofing method based on spatial correlation identification" (CN 109143265 a) and "a combined anti-spoofing method of an authorization signal and a public signal for a GNSS receiver" (CN 107367740 a).
However, in the method of introducing the security authentication feature into the GNSS civil signal, in order to ensure security, the secret key is usually broadcast with delay, which causes delay in security authentication; the position authentication method based on the low-orbit satellite multi-beam characteristics has high real-time performance, but the precision is limited by the beam pattern and is difficult to improve; processing at the receiver end to identify detection spoofed signals increases the complexity of the implementation of the receiver hardware and software.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to realize the anti-cheating function by the user terminal by finding out the existence of the GNSS cheating signal in real time when the deviation between the false position and the real position caused by cheating exceeds a certain threshold under the condition that the GNSS cheating signal exists.
According to the method, the ranging signal with the ranging function is broadcasted on the low-orbit communication satellite by utilizing the characteristics that the low-orbit satellite has high movement speed and large signal dynamic and is difficult to cheat, and the ranging signal is used as a trusted ranging signal source for detecting the GNSS cheating signal, so that real-time GNSS cheating resistance is realized; meanwhile, bidirectional authentication can be performed by using a bidirectional communication link and a wireless resource management function of the low-earth-orbit communication satellite, and the authenticity of a ranging signal broadcast by the low-earth-orbit communication satellite is further determined by the user terminal through the bidirectional link authentication, so that the anti-cheating capability is improved.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows:
a low earth orbit communication satellite based GNSS anti-spoofing system comprising: a plurality of GNSS satellites, a low-orbit communication satellite constellation and a GNSS anti-cheating terminal;
the low-orbit communication satellite constellation consists of a plurality of low-orbit communication satellites;
the low-orbit communication satellite is used for broadcasting low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals;
the GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for providing real positioning information and time service information for a user;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal receives the GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receives a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal carries out positioning calculation according to the received n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals to obtain signal receiving time t 0 GNSS anti-spoofingPosition coordinate P of terminal in geocentric coordinate system G Sum clock difference Δ T G (ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is more than or equal to 4;
the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal performs bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of the low-orbit communication satellite through a bidirectional communication link signal, determines whether the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the received low-orbit communication signal is from a real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, and obtains a ranging signal broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite;
GNSS anti-spoofing terminal according to t 0 The ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite are received constantly, the messages of the low-orbit satellite are demodulated, and the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system is calculated according to the messages of the low-orbit satellite L ；
The GNSS anti-spoofing terminal measures and obtains the distance from the low-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal as a trusted distance rho by using the ranging signal of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite;
the GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for resisting cheating according to the position coordinate P G Position coordinate P L And a threshold value, judging whether a deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, and if the deception signal does not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, resisting the position coordinate P of the deception-resisting terminal of the GNSS in the geocentric coordinate system G Sum clock difference Δ T G And sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service.
The GNSS satellite comprises: one or more of GPS satellite, BDS satellite, gelileo satellite, GLONASS satellite and QZSS satellite.
The GNSS satellite signals include: one or more of GPS signal, BDS signal, gelileo signal, GLONASS signal and QZSS signal.
The GNSS deception signal is one or more deception signals of a GPS signal, a BDS signal, a Gelileo signal, a GLONASS signal and a QZSS signal.
The GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for resisting cheating according to the position coordinate P G Position coordinate P L And a threshold value, which is used for judging whether the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals areWhether a deception signal exists is specifically as follows:
obtaining position coordinates P G And position coordinates P L The distance between them;
if Δ ρ>Δρ TH If so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals;
Figure BDA0002546477050000041
Figure BDA0002546477050000042
Figure BDA0002546477050000043
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000044
Figure BDA0002546477050000045
when r-ar < h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000046
Figure BDA0002546477050000047
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellationA difference; theta is the elevation angle of the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, (x) G ,y G ,z G ) Position coordinates P of the GNSS anti-cheating terminal in a geocentric/geostationary coordinate system G ，(x L ,y L ,z L ) For the position coordinate P of the true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system L 。
A GNSS anti-spoofing method based on low earth orbit communication satellites comprises the following steps:
1) GNSS positioning solution
Receiving n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals by using a GNSS anti-deception terminal, and performing positioning calculation to obtain a signal receiving moment t 0 Position coordinate P of GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate system G Sum clock difference Δ T G (ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is not less than 4;
2) Two-way authentication
Using a GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to receive a GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receive a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal, performing bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of a low-orbit communication satellite through a bidirectional communication link signal, determining whether the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from a truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, if the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, obtaining a ranging signal broadcast by the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3), otherwise, continuing to search the low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal until the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3);
3) LEO signal ranging
Anti-spoofing terminal using GNSS according to t 0 Constantly receiving the ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, demodulating the low-orbit satellite telegraph text, and calculating the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system according to the low-orbit satellite telegraph text L Meanwhile, the distance from the low-earth-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-deception terminal is measured and obtained as a trusted distance；
4) Location authentication
Obtaining a position coordinate P according to the position coordinate PG in the step 1) and the position coordinate PL in the step 3) G And position coordinates P L As the distance to be authenticated
Figure BDA0002546477050000051
Obtaining a trusted distance ρ and a distance to be authenticated>
Figure BDA0002546477050000052
If Δ ρ is different from (d) in the case of>Δρ TH If so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals; if no deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, the position coordinate P of the GNSS anti-deception terminal in the geocentric and geostationary coordinate system is determined G Sum clock difference Δ T G And sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service. .
Step 4) the threshold value Δ ρ TH The determination method specifically comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002546477050000061
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000062
Figure BDA0002546477050000063
when r-ar < h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000064
Figure BDA0002546477050000065
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is an elevation angle from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite;
Figure BDA0002546477050000066
(x G ,y G ,z G ) Position coordinates P of the GNSS anti-cheating terminal in a geocentric/geostationary coordinate system G ，(x L ,y L ,z L ) Position coordinate P of true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in geocentric geostationary coordinate system L 。
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
1) The existing GNSS signal authentication method needs to change the navigation signal, and the signal authentication has delay, but the GNSS signal does not need to be changed, and deception signals can be identified in real time;
2) The existing low-orbit satellite based on a low-orbit multi-beam overlapping pattern requires a low-orbit satellite to adopt a multi-beam system, and the anti-deception capability is limited by the beam size and the position estimation precision, usually the position estimation precision is tens of kilometers; the invention does not need to adopt multi-beam systems, only needs the low-orbit signals broadcast by the low-orbit satellite to have the distance measuring capability, and has high precision.
3) The invention can fully utilize the bidirectional link of the low-orbit communication satellite to carry out bidirectional authentication, and the low-orbit communication satellite is used as a credible ranging source.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a GNSS anti-spoofing system solution based on low earth orbit communication satellites according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a GNSS anti-spoofing method based on low earth orbit communication satellites according to the disclosure;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a geometric relationship between a terminal and a LEO satellite;
FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating threshold values as a function of elevation.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in further detail below with reference to the figures and the detailed description.
The invention discloses a GNSS anti-spoofing system based on a low-orbit communication satellite, which is shown in figure 1 and comprises the following components: a plurality of GNSS satellites, a low-orbit communication satellite constellation and a GNSS anti-deception terminal;
the GNSS satellite is used for broadcasting a real GNSS satellite navigation signal; the GNSS satellites broadcast real GNSS signals, which may be BDS signals.
The low-orbit communication satellite constellation consists of a plurality of low-orbit communication satellites;
the low-orbit communication satellite is used for broadcasting low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals; the LEO signal is a broadcast signal with ranging capability, broadcasts a low-orbit satellite message and supports unidirectional ranging; the LEO signal may employ a multi-beam system; the LEO signal may be a pulsed signal or a continuous signal; the LEO signal is a communication signal with a bidirectional link and supports bidirectional authentication; the LEO signal is a signal with bidirectional ranging capability and supports bidirectional ranging.
The GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for providing real positioning information and time service information for a user; the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal is a GNSS/LEO converged terminal.
At the same time, the GNSS anti-cheating terminal can at least receive one low-orbit communication satellite;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal receives the GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receives a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal carries out positioning calculation according to the received n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals to obtain signal receiving time t 0 Position coordinate P of GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate system G Sum clock difference Δ T G (ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is more than or equal to 4; the possibility of the GNSS anti-deception terminal receiving n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signalsThere is a GNSS spoofing signal, which may be a BDS spoofing signal.
The low orbit communication satellite has a bidirectional communication link and a bidirectional authentication function. The GNSS anti-spoofing terminal performs bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of the low-orbit communication satellite through a bidirectional communication link signal, determines whether the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the received low-orbit communication signal is from a real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, and obtains a ranging signal broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite;
GNSS anti-cheating terminal according to t 0 The ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite are received constantly, the messages of the low-orbit satellite are demodulated, and the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system is calculated according to the messages of the low-orbit satellite L ；
The GNSS anti-deception terminal measures and obtains t by using the ranging signal of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite 0 The distance from the low-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal at the moment is used as a trusted distance rho;
the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal is used for resisting the position coordinate P G Position coordinate P L And a threshold value, judging whether a deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, and if the deception signal does not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, resisting the position coordinate P of the deception-resisting terminal of the GNSS in the geocentric coordinate system G Sum clock difference Δ T G And sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service.
The GNSS/LEO fusion terminal can receive LEO signals, perform bidirectional authentication according to the LEO signals, determine the authenticity of the LEO signals and improve the anti-cheating capability;
the GNSS/LEO fusion terminal can receive LEO signals, perform two-way ranging and improve ranging accuracy.
The GNSS satellite comprises: one or more of a GPS satellite, a BDS satellite, a Gelileo satellite, a GLONASS satellite and a QZSS satellite.
The GNSS satellite signals include: one or more of GPS signal, BDS signal, gelileo signal, GLONASS signal and QZSS signal.
The GNSS deception signal is one or more deception signals of a GPS signal, a BDS signal, a Gelileo signal, a GLONASS signal and a QZSS signal.
The GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for resisting cheating according to the position coordinate P G Position coordinate P L And a threshold value, which is used for judging whether a deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, and specifically comprises the following steps:
obtaining position coordinates P G And position coordinates P L The distance between them;
if Δ ρ>Δρ TH If so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals;
Figure BDA0002546477050000091
Figure BDA0002546477050000092
Figure BDA0002546477050000093
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000094
Figure BDA0002546477050000095
when the r-deltar < h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000096
Figure BDA0002546477050000097
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is an elevation angle from the GNSS anti-cheating terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and the value range of the elevation angle theta is 0-90 degrees; (x) G ,y G ,z G ) For the position coordinate P of the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system G ，(x L ,y L ,z L ) Position coordinate P of true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in geocentric geostationary coordinate system L 。
The steps of the GNSS anti-spoofing method based on the low earth orbit communication satellite disclosed by the invention are shown in fig. 2. The method comprises the following steps:
1) GNSS positioning solution
Receiving n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals by using a GNSS anti-deception terminal, and performing positioning calculation to obtain a signal receiving moment t 0 Position coordinate P of GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate system G Sum clock difference Δ T G (ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is more than or equal to 4; position coordinates P due to possible presence of GNSS spoofing signals G (x G ,y G ,z G ) Sum clock difference Δ T G May be a spurious value.
2) Two-way authentication
Using a GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to receive a GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receive a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal, performing bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of a low-orbit communication satellite through a bidirectional communication link signal, determining whether the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from a truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, if the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, obtaining a ranging signal broadcast by the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3), otherwise, continuing to search the low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal until the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3);
3) LEO signal ranging
Anti-spoofing terminal using GNSS according to t 0 Constantly receiving the ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, demodulating the low-orbit satellite telegraph text, and calculating the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system according to the low-orbit satellite telegraph text L Meanwhile, measuring and obtaining the distance from the low-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal at the time t0 as a trusted distance; the LEO signal ranging can be obtained by bidirectional ranging through bidirectional link signals of a low-orbit satellite.
4) Location authentication
Obtaining a position coordinate P according to the position coordinate PG in the step 1) and the position coordinate PL in the step 3) G And position coordinates P L As the distance to be authenticated
Figure BDA0002546477050000101
Obtaining a trusted distance ρ and a distance to be authenticated +>
Figure BDA0002546477050000102
If Δ ρ is different from (d) in the case of>Δρ TH If yes, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals; if no deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, the position coordinate P of the GNSS anti-deception terminal in the geocentric and geostationary coordinate system is determined G Sum clock difference Δ T G And sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service. .
Step 4) the threshold value Δ ρ TH The determination method specifically comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002546477050000111
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000112
Figure BDA0002546477050000113
when r-ar < h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000114
/>
Figure BDA0002546477050000115
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is an elevation angle from the GNSS anti-deception terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and the value range of the elevation angle theta is 0-90 degrees.
Figure BDA0002546477050000116
(x G ,y G ,z G ) Position coordinates P of the GNSS anti-cheating terminal in a geocentric/geostationary coordinate system G ，(x L ,y L ,z L ) Position coordinate P of true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in geocentric geostationary coordinate system L 。
Examples
1) And (4) GNSS positioning resolving.
The GNSS/LEO fusion terminal receives more than four GNSS signals or GNSS deception signals and calculates the position PG and clock error of the terminal. At the terminal signal reception time t 0 The coordinate of the terminal in an earth-centered earth-fixed (ECEF) coordinate system is P G (x G ,y G ,z G ) And receiver clock difference Δ T G . ByPosition coordinates P in the possible presence of GNSS spoofing signals G (x G ,y G ,z G ) Sum clock difference Δ T G May be a false value.
2) And (6) performing bidirectional authentication.
When the low earth orbit communication satellite has a bidirectional communication link and a bidirectional authentication function, the GNSS/LEO fusion terminal simultaneously receives LEO signals, and performs bidirectional authentication through the bidirectional communication link signals by utilizing the bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of the low earth orbit communication satellite to determine the authenticity of the LEO satellite and the LEO signals.
3) And (4) LEO signal ranging.
The GNSS/LEO fusion terminal receives the ranging signals broadcast by the LEO, demodulates the low-orbit satellite telegraph text and calculates t 0 The time of transmission of the ranging signal received at the moment, the ECEF coordinate P of the low-orbit satellite L (x L ,y L ,z L ). The terminal receives LEO signal with distance measuring ability and measures t 0 The trusted distance p from the time of day low earth orbit satellite to the terminal. The LEO signal distance measurement can be obtained by bidirectional distance measurement through bidirectional link signals of low-orbit satellites.
4) And (5) location authentication.
By t 0 Time GNSS positioning resolving result P G With trusted LEO satellite position P L Calculating the distance to be authenticated from the terminal to the LEO satellite
Figure BDA0002546477050000121
Calculating a distance to be authenticated pick>
Figure BDA0002546477050000122
Difference from trusted distance ρ
Figure BDA0002546477050000123
And threshold value Δ ρ TH By comparison, if Δ ρ>Δρ TH And the existence of the GNSS deception signal can be judged.
Threshold value Deltarho for use in the present disclosure TH It can be set up in such a way that the terminal and LEO satellite geometry is as shown in fig. 3, the earth being assumed to beThe standard sphere, S denotes the position of the LEO satellite, O denotes the earth 'S center, S' denotes the sub-satellite point, P is the true position of the terminal, P1 and P2 denote the farthest position of the terminal under the measured pseudorange error Δ r, and the terminal is on the ground.
31 According to the GNSS positioning solution PG and the ECEF coordinates PL (x) of the low orbit satellite L ,y L ,z L ) Calculating to obtain t 0 The elevation angle theta of the time low-orbit satellite is between 0 and 90 degrees.
32 R for the radius of the earth, h for the orbital altitude of the low orbit satellite, R for the geometric distance from the terminal to the LEO satellite, Δ R for the maximum measurement error between the pseudorange measurement and the geometric distance R, Δ R being obtained a priori by statistical features, and the geometric distance R being calculated by using the elevation angle θ as:
Figure BDA0002546477050000124
/>
33 ) threshold value Δ ρ TH Determined according to the following formula:
Figure BDA0002546477050000125
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000131
Figure BDA0002546477050000132
when r-ar < h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000133
Figure BDA0002546477050000134
the threshold value delta rho is obtained when the earth radius R =6378km, the low-orbit satellite height h =1100km and the maximum range error delta R are respectively equal to 3m and 30m TH The curve with the elevation angle theta is shown in fig. 4.
It can be seen that when LEO pseudorange measurement error is 3m, spoofing interference can be identified as long as positioning deviation caused by GNSS spoofing signals exceeds 2.373km, mostly exceeds 33.73m (elevation angle less than 85 °). When the LEO pseudo range measurement error is 30m, as long as the positioning deviation caused by the GNSS deception signal exceeds 7.357km, and most exceeds 352.3m (the elevation angle is less than 85 degrees), deception interference can be identified. And the anti-spoofing method based on the multi-point beam overlapping can identify the spoofed signal only when the positioning deviation caused by the spoofed signal exceeds the magnitude of dozens of kilometers.
Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the details of the invention not described in detail in the specification are within the skill of those skilled in the art.

Claims (7)

1. A GNSS anti-spoofing system based on low earth orbit communication satellites, comprising: a plurality of GNSS satellites, a low-orbit communication satellite constellation and a GNSS anti-cheating terminal;
the low-orbit communication satellite constellation consists of a plurality of low-orbit communication satellites;
the low-orbit communication satellite is used for broadcasting low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals;
the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal is used for providing real positioning information and time service information for a user;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal receives the GNSS satellite navigation signals and also receives low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal performs positioning calculation according to the received n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals to obtain a signal receiving moment t 0 Position coordinate P of GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate system G Sum clock difference Δ T G (ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is not less than 4;
the GNSS anti-cheating terminal performs bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of the low-orbit communication satellite through bidirectional communication link signals, determines whether the received low-orbit broadcast signals or the received low-orbit communication signals are from the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, and obtains ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite;
GNSS anti-cheating terminal according to t 0 The ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite are received constantly, the messages of the low-orbit satellite are demodulated, and the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system is calculated according to the messages of the low-orbit satellite L ；
The GNSS anti-cheating terminal measures and obtains the distance from the low-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-cheating terminal as a trusted distance rho by using the ranging signal of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite;
the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal is used for resisting the position coordinate P G Position coordinate P L And a threshold value Δ ρ TH Judging whether deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals or not, and if the deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, resisting the position coordinate P of the deception-resisting terminal of the GNSS in the geocentric and geostationary coordinate system G Sum clock difference Δ T G And sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the GNSS satellite comprises: one or more of a GPS satellite, a BDS satellite, a Gelileo satellite, a GLONASS satellite and a QZSS satellite.
3. The low earth orbit communication satellite-based GNSS anti-spoofing system of claim 1, wherein the GNSS satellite signals comprise: one or more of GPS signals, BDS signals, gelileo signals, GLONASS signals and QZSS signals.
4. The GNSS anti-spoofing system based on low earth orbit communication satellites as claimed in claim 1, wherein the spoofing signal is one or more spoofing signals selected from GPS signals, BDS signals, gelileo signals, GLONASS signals and QZSS signals.
5. The GNSS anti-spoofing system based on low earth orbit communication satellites as claimed in any of claims 1 to 4, wherein the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal is based on the position coordinates P G Position coordinate P L And a threshold value, which is used for judging whether a deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, and specifically comprises the following steps:
obtaining position coordinates P G And position coordinates P L The distance between them;
if Δ ρ>Δρ TH If so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals;
Figure FDA0004045704860000021
Δρ TH ＝max{PP 1 ,P 2 P}
Figure FDA0004045704860000022
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure FDA0004045704860000023
Figure FDA0004045704860000024
when the r-deltar < h,
Figure FDA0004045704860000025
Figure FDA0004045704860000026
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is the elevation angle of the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, (x) G ,y G ,z G ) For the position coordinate P of the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system G ，(x L ,y L ,z L ) For the position coordinate P of the true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system L 。
6. A GNSS anti-spoofing method based on low earth orbit communication satellite is characterized by comprising the following steps:
1) GNSS positioning solution
Receiving n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals by using a GNSS anti-deception terminal, and performing positioning calculation to obtain a signal receiving moment t 0 Position coordinate P of GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate system G Sum clock difference Δ T G (ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is not less than 4;
2) Two-way authentication
Using a GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to receive a GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receive a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal, performing bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of a low-orbit communication satellite through a bidirectional communication link signal, determining whether the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from a truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, if the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, obtaining a ranging signal broadcast by the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3), otherwise, continuing to search the low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal until the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3);
3) LEO signal ranging
Anti-spoofing terminal using GNSS according to t 0 The ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite are received constantly, the messages of the low-orbit satellite are demodulated, and the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system is calculated according to the messages of the low-orbit satellite L Meanwhile, measuring to obtain the distance from the low-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-deception terminal as a trusted distance;
4) Location authentication
Obtaining a position coordinate P according to the position coordinate PG in the step 1) and the position coordinate PL in the step 3) G And position coordinates P L As the distance to be authenticated
Figure FDA0004045704860000041
Obtaining a trusted distance ρ and a distance to be authenticated>
Figure FDA0004045704860000042
If Δ ρ is different from (d) in the case of>Δρ TH If so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals; if no deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, the position coordinate P of the GNSS anti-deception terminal in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system is determined G Sum clock difference Δ T G Sending the position information to a user for positioning navigation and time service, wherein the position information is Delta rho TH Is a threshold value.
7. The GNSS anti-spoofing method based on low earth orbit communication satellites as in claim 6, wherein the threshold value Δ ρ in step 4) is TH The determination method specifically comprises the following steps:
Δρ TH ＝max{PP 1 ,P 2 P}
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure FDA0004045704860000043
Figure FDA0004045704860000044
when r-ar < h,
Figure FDA0004045704860000045
Figure FDA0004045704860000046
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is an elevation angle from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite;
Figure FDA0004045704860000047
(x G ,y G ,z G ) Position coordinates P of the GNSS anti-cheating terminal in a geocentric/geostationary coordinate system G ，(x L ,y L ,z L ) Position coordinate P of true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in geocentric geostationary coordinate system L 。
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