CN111308514A - Satellite navigation deception detection method in wireless synchronous communication network - Google Patents
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- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
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- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
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Abstract
The invention provides a satellite navigation deception detection method in a wireless synchronous communication network, wherein each node in the communication network is provided with a GNSS receiver, which is characterized by comprising the following steps: s1) each node in the communication network completes GNSS positioning navigation time service and utilizes GNSS to synchronize the communication working clock; s2) measuring by adopting an RTT function to obtain a space distance D between the nodes A and B and a clock difference delta t between respective clocks of the nodes A and B; s3) the nodes A and B get their coordinates by receiving GNSS signals and the clock difference dt of their clocksAAnd dtBAnd then calculating the space distance between the nodes A and B according to respective coordinates
And is provided with
S4), setting thresholds delta and delta t respectively, and judging whether the GNSS signal is a deception signal. The method combines the communication capability of the communication network with the GNSS navigation positioning function of each node, thereby judging whether the GNSS receiver is deceived.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of wireless communication and satellite navigation, in particular to a method for detecting satellite navigation deception jamming in a wireless synchronous communication network.
Background
The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) has the advantages of high precision, all weather, all time, wide coverage and the like, and is widely applied to various fields of national economy and national defense construction. Current GNSS systems include the us GPS system, the chinese beidou No. three system, the russian GLONASS system and the european Galileo system. With the expansion of the application range, the security problem of the GNSS gradually appears. For military users, a satellite navigation system generally adopts a special military encrypted signal to resist cheating, and a widely applied GNSS civil signal has a completely open signal structure and is easy to generate false signals, so that a GNSS receiver generates wrong positioning navigation results. With the development of software radio technology, the cost of implementing accurate spoofing and even trap jamming was greatly reduced, for example, in 2013, university of texas researchers in the united states, have three thousand dollars of GPS spoofing jammers successfully controlling one super yacht navigation system worth eight million dollars in the mediterranean. The deception jamming threatens various mass applications of navigation, positioning and time service depending on GNSS increasingly.
Existing GNSS anti-spoofing methods generally perform identification of GNSS spoofing signals only by improving the software and physical characteristics of the receiver. The main anti-cheating methods comprise signal encryption authentication, signal statistical characteristic analysis, external navigation sensor reference and the like. The signal encryption authentication method needs to modify the satellite navigation system, and cannot be put into practical use and popularized in a short period of time because the satellite navigation system is difficult to modify after being built. The signal statistical characteristic analysis is to analyze the reasonability of pseudo-range, Doppler, carrier phase and the like observed by a single machine, the method is based on internal coincidence analysis, the stability and reliability are poor, and false alarms are easily generated particularly in the environment with serious multipath, such as a method for identifying deceived unmanned aerial vehicle navigation data based on satellite communication in Chinese patent 201510666815.8 and a method and a system for identifying satellite navigation deceived signals based on maximum likelihood estimation in CN 201510090053.1; the external navigation sensor reference generally refers to that an Inertial Navigation System (INS) and the like are utilized to check a satellite navigation system result, but the INS has the problems of error drift, accumulation and the like, the high-precision INS is high in price, and the application range is limited, for example, a satellite navigation anti-deception jamming method based on INS assistance in chinese patent 201310631277.
With the wide coverage of wireless communication networks in China and the application of temporary communication networks of various systems, the position judgment by adopting the communication network becomes possible. The wireless communication network comprises various typical 2G/3G/4G/5G mobile communication networks, satellite communication networks, centerless ad hoc network communication networks, various data link special communication networks and the like, and most of the wireless communication networks belong to synchronous communication networks. A wireless synchronous communication network generally has a Round Trip Time (RTT) function, and realizes networked time synchronization and ranging capabilities. The detection of deception jamming by singly depending on GNSS self signals and a system has great limitation, but if the communication capability of a communication network is utilized and the GNSS navigation positioning function of each node is combined, the judgment on whether the GNSS receiver is deceived or not can be simply and accurately carried out.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a satellite navigation deception detection method in a wireless synchronous communication network, which combines the communication capacity of the communication network, combines the ranging/time synchronization function of RTT and the GNSS navigation positioning function of each node to form multi-node networked verification, can greatly improve the performance of deception interference detection, and further judges whether a GNSS receiver is deceived or not.
The invention relates to a satellite navigation deception detection method in a wireless synchronous communication network, wherein each node in the communication network is provided with a GNSS receiver, which is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1) each node in the communication network completes GNSS positioning navigation time service and utilizes GNSS to synchronize the communication working clock;
s2) selecting two nodes A and B from the nodes, and measuring by adopting an RTT function to obtain a spatial distance D between the nodes A and B and a clock difference delta t between respective clocks of the nodes A and B;
s3) for the nodes A and B to be detected, adopting GNSS measurement to obtain the space distance between the nodes A and B
And the clock difference between the respective clocks of nodes A and B is
S4) setting thresholds δ and δ t as
And
and judging the GNSS deception signal by the compared threshold value.
Further, in step S4), the threshold δ is 3 times the sum of the standard deviation of error of the distance measurement using RTT function and the standard deviation of error of the distance measurement using GNSS, the threshold δ t is 3 times the sum of the standard deviation of error of clock difference between nodes a and B calculated using RTT function and the standard deviation of error of clock difference between nodes a and B calculated using GNS, and the specific method for determining whether the GNSS signal is a spoofing signal is:
if it is not
Or
And is
Then a decision A, B is made that both stations are interfered by the same interferer;
if it is not
Or
And is
Then a decision A, B is made that either two stations are interfered by different interferers or one of the stations is interfered by a single interferer;
otherwise, it is determined that there is no spoofing interference.
Further, in step S2), the calculation method of D and Δ t is specifically as follows (I) and (II),
wherein, TB1For the time, T, recorded by the node B when the node B transmits an RTT signal to the node AB2The time, T, recorded by the node B when the node B receives the RTT signal returned by the node AdFor transmission delay, c is the speed of light, TAFor the time, T, recorded by the node A when the node A receives the RTT signal transmitted by the node BpIs the signal transmission time between nodes a and B.
Further, in the step S3), the step
The calculation method of (A) is specifically as shown in the following formula (III),
wherein (x)A,yA,zA)、(xB,yB,zB) Coordinates of nodes a and B, respectively, obtained from receiving GNSS signals.
Furthermore, the GNSS receiver is a GPS, beidou, GLONASS, Galileo single-mode receiver or a multi-system receiver compatible with multiple systems, and the communication network is a TDMA-based ad hoc network or a tactical communication network, a point-to-point or point-to-multipoint-based mobile communication network, or a satellite communication network.
The method has the advantages that 1) the communication and RTT ranging/time synchronizing functions of the wireless communication network are fully utilized, networked verification is formed with positioning/time service of GNSS, information dimensionality is increased, and the problem of difficulty in detecting deception jamming when a single node has no external reference is solved; 2) the adopted judgment rule is simple and clear, and whether the satellite navigation deception signal exists can be quickly obtained by comparing the clock difference and the distance of the two systems; 3) the method only needs to modify the transmission protocol of the communication network, does not need to add an additional auxiliary device, fully exerts the characteristics and advantages of the communication network and the navigation system, and has the advantages of low false alarm probability, high detection probability, simple and reliable realization and the like.
The satellite navigation deception detection method in the wireless synchronous communication network has the advantages of clear principle, simple realization, stable and reliable detection result and the like, and can accurately detect deception interference in multi-node application with wireless communication functions, such as cluster, fleet and the like.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method of satellite navigation spoofing detection in a wireless synchronous communication network of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method for detecting satellite navigation spoofing in a wireless synchronous communication network according to the present invention, in which RTT function measurement is adopted to obtain a node distance and a node clock error;
FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration of two communication network nodes being spoofed by the same spoofed interfering station;
fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of two communication network nodes being spoofed by two independent spoofing interfering stations, respectively;
fig. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of an implementation apparatus of the satellite navigation spoofing detection method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following structural description and the accompanying drawings further describe the specific technical scheme of the invention.
Referring to fig. 1, a method for detecting satellite navigation spoofing in a wireless synchronous communication network according to the present invention is shown, wherein each node in the communication network is equipped with a GNSS receiver. The GNSS receiver is a GPS, Beidou, GLONASS, Galileo single-mode receiver or a multi-system receiver compatible with multiple systems, the communication network is an ad hoc network or a tactical communication network based on TDMA, a mobile communication network based on point-to-point or point-to-multipoint, a satellite communication network and the like, and the communication network is characterized by having RTT ranging and timing functions.
The method specifically comprises the following steps:
s1), each node in the communication network completes GNSS positioning navigation time service and utilizes the working clock with the GNSS synchronous communication function. The GNSS receiver is normally turned on, receives at least 4 satellite signals, and completes Position, speed, and time (Timing) solution. The communication function working clock of each node and the GNSS receiver adopt 1PPS hardware for synchronization, so that the communication and the GNSS of each node are based on the same clock source and have the basis of comparison.
S2) for the nodes a and B to be detected, measuring the spatial distance D between the nodes a and B and the clock difference Δ t between the respective clocks of the nodes a and B by using RTT.
RTT is a time synchronization method widely used in various wired and wireless communication networks. In wireless communications, RTT is typically used for initial synchronization, such as in the aircraft TCAS airborne collision avoidance system, Link-16 tactical data chain system, and a number of TDMA synchronous ad hoc network communication systems, all supporting RTT-based inter-node ranging and synchronization.
As shown in FIG. 2, the calculation methods of D and Δ t are specifically shown in the following formulas (I) and (II),
wherein, TB1For the time, T, recorded by the node B when the node B transmits an RTT signal to the node AB2The time, T, recorded by the node B when the node B receives the RTT signal returned by the node AdFor transmission delay, c is the speed of light, TAFor the time, T, recorded by the node A when the node A receives the RTT signal transmitted by the node BpIs the signal transmission time between nodes a and B;
s3) for the nodes A and B to be detected, adopting GNSS measurement to obtain that the space distance between the nodes A and B is D, and the clock difference between the respective clocks of the nodes A and B is D
The nodes A and B obtain respective coordinates through GNSS positioning, and clock difference dt between respective clocks of the nodes A and B and standard time of a satellite navigation systemAAnd dtBAnd then calculating the space distance between the nodes A and B according to respective coordinates
And calculating clock error between nodes
Said
The calculation method of (A) is specifically as shown in the following formula (III),
wherein (x)A,yA,zA)、(xB,yB,zB) Coordinates of nodes a and B, respectively, obtained from receiving GNSS signals.
And the nodes A and B package and send data such as PVT calculation values of the GNSS receiver through a communication network according to a communication protocol. A solution value format of the GNSS receiver, including but not limited to a standard RINEX format, an RTCM format, an NMEA format, a CMR format, or a custom data format; the data application layer protocol of the communication network can be an IP data packet or a self-defined synchronous communication data packet. Depending on the architecture of the communication network, the transmission may be in a point-to-point manner or may be broadcast within the network. Each node receives the PVT of the sender using the communication function of the communication network. According to the architecture of the communication network, the receiving can be in a point-to-point mode or a broadcast channel in the communication network;
s4) setting thresholds δ and δ t as
And
and judging the GNSS deception signal by the compared threshold value.
The value of the threshold delta is 3 times of the sum of the error standard deviation of RTT ranging and the error standard deviation of GNSS ranging. For a typical communication data chain, frequency bandwidth of more than 1MHz is adopted, the corresponding distance of a single code element of a baseband is better than 300 meters, and the standard deviation of the ranging error obtained by baseband processing is about 1/10 code element width and is better than 30 meters; the GNSS ranging adopts navigation signals of four navigation systems, including L1C, C/A, L5 and L2C of GPS, B1C, B3, B2a and B2B of Beidou, E1, E6 and E5 of Galileo and the like, and the standard deviation of typical ranging errors is within 10 meters. The value of the threshold delta t is 3 times of the sum of the standard deviation of the error of the clock difference between the nodes A and B calculated by RTT and the standard deviation of the error of the clock difference between the nodes A and B calculated by GNSS. For a typical communication data link, the conversion time of the RTT clock error standard deviation and the ranging error standard deviation is consistent and is better than 100 nanoseconds (30 meters); the typical GNSS single station time service error is 50 nanoseconds, and the standard deviation of the clock error among the GNSS stations is twice the typical GNSS single station time service error, which is taken as 100 nanoseconds.
The spoofing interference can be classified into a forwarding mode or a generating mode, but the forwarding and generating principles are basically consistent with the spoofing interference which can cause the GNSS receiver to generate wrong positioning.
The forwarding type deception jamming equipment receives signals of at least 4 GNSS satellites, adds different time delay, carrier phase and Doppler to the signals of each satellite, and then emits the signals after amplification. The spoofed nodes a and B receive the forwarded GNSS signal and perform normal demodulation reception, and the positioning result of the node A, B is located in a false position because the forwarded signal equivalent pseudorange measurement is different from the real direct signal. As shown in fig. 3, if nodes a and B are interfered by the same spoofed interferer, the delay difference of their received signals reflects the difference between the distances from nodes a and B to the interferer, which is reflected in the clock offset of node A, B, but the spoofed mis-location locations are the same. Therefore, in the spoof interference detection, if
Node A, B may be considered to be located at the same location, then node A, B is spoofed by the same spoofing interferer.
As shown in fig. 4, when the node A, B is far away, there may be two spoofing jamming devices respectively performing spoofing jamming on the node A, B, so that the nodes A, B are respectively positioned at the wrong false locations. At this time, the distance and the clock error between the nodes based on the GNSS measurement are difficult to be equal to those measured in the RTT mode, and can be used as a basis for detecting the deception jamming.
The specific method for judging whether the GNSS signal is the deception signal comprises the following steps:
if it is not
Or
And is
Then a decision A, B is made that both stations are interfered by the same interferer;
if it is not
Or
And is
Then a decision A, B is made that either two stations are interfered by different interferers or one of the stations is interfered by a single interferer;
otherwise, it is determined that there is no spoofing interference.
As shown in fig. 5, the apparatus for implementing the satellite navigation spoofing detection method of the present invention includes a wireless communication unit, a GNSS receiver unit, a spoofing detection unit, a display control unit, and a storage unit, which are provided in each node.
Although the present invention has been described in terms of the preferred embodiment, it is not intended that the invention be limited to the embodiment. Any equivalent changes or modifications made without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention also belong to the protection scope of the present invention. The scope of the invention should therefore be determined with reference to the appended claims.
Claims (5)
1. A satellite navigation deception detection method in a wireless synchronous communication network is provided, wherein each node in the communication network is provided with a GNSS receiver, and the method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1) each node in the communication network completes GNSS positioning navigation time service and utilizes GNSS to synchronize the communication working clock;
s2) selecting two nodes A and B from the nodes, and measuring by adopting an RTT function to obtain a spatial distance D between the nodes A and B and a clock difference delta t between respective clocks of the nodes A and B;
s3) for the nodes A and B to be detected, adopting GNSS measurement to obtain the space distance between the nodes A and B
And the clock difference between the respective clocks of nodes A and B is
S4) setting thresholds δ and δ t as
And
and judging the GNSS deception signal by the compared threshold value.
2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein in step S4), the threshold δ is 3 times the sum of the standard deviation of error of ranging using RTT function and the standard deviation of error of ranging using GNSS, the threshold δ t is 3 times the sum of the standard deviation of error of clock difference between nodes A and B calculated using RTT function and the standard deviation of error of clock difference between nodes A and B calculated using GNS,
the specific method for judging whether the GNSS signal is the deception signal comprises the following steps:
if it is not
Or
And is
Then a decision A, B is made that both stations are interfered by the same interferer;
if it is not
Or
And is
Then a decision A, B is made that either two stations are interfered by different interferers or one of the stations is interfered by a single interferer;
otherwise, it is determined that there is no spoofing interference.
3. The method as claimed in claim 2, wherein in step S2), the D and Δ t are calculated according to the following formulas (I) and (II),
wherein, TB1For the time, T, recorded by the node B when the node B transmits an RTT signal to the node AB2The time, T, recorded by the node B when the node B receives the RTT signal returned by the node AdFor transmission delay, c is the speed of light, TAFor the time, T, recorded by the node A when the node A receives the RTT signal transmitted by the node BpIs the signal transmission time between nodes a and B.
4. The method as claimed in claim 3, wherein in step S3), the satellite navigation spoofing is detected
The calculation method of (A) is specifically as shown in the following formula (III),
wherein (x)A,yA,zA)、(xB,yB,zB) Coordinates of nodes a and B, respectively, obtained from receiving GNSS signals.
5. The method according to any of claims 1-4, wherein the GNSS receiver is a GPS, Beidou, GLONASS, Galileo single mode receiver or a multisystem compatible multisystem receiver, and the communication network is a TDMA based ad hoc or tactical communication network, a point-to-point or point-to-multipoint based mobile communication network, a satellite communication network.
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Cited By (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN113376659A (en) * | 2021-06-15 | 2021-09-10 | 东南大学 | GNSS (Global navigation satellite System) generated deception jamming detection method based on BP (Back propagation) neural network |
| CN114428261A (en) * | 2022-01-26 | 2022-05-03 | 沈阳安信合科技有限公司 | Detection method and detection device for satellite time synchronization device cheating attack |
| CN115166785A (en) * | 2022-09-07 | 2022-10-11 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队航天工程大学 | Navigation deception jamming detection method based on three-receiver clock error single difference |
| CN115561784A (en) * | 2022-10-09 | 2023-01-03 | 郑州威科姆华大北斗导航科技有限公司 | High-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on homologous signals |
| CN117055071A (en) * | 2023-10-08 | 2023-11-14 | 北京神导科技股份有限公司 | Satellite navigation deception jamming detection system based on multi-source information and detection method thereof |
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| CN117055071A (en) * | 2023-10-08 | 2023-11-14 | 北京神导科技股份有限公司 | Satellite navigation deception jamming detection system based on multi-source information and detection method thereof |
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