CN115561784A - High-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on homologous signals - Google Patents
High-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on homologous signals Download PDFInfo
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- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
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Abstract
A high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on homologous signals comprises the following steps: the time service receiver normally receives GNSS satellite signals and obtains observation data and telegraph text of each satellite according to the GNSS signals; step 2: according to the received satellite observation data and the telegraph text, the time service receiver carries out PVT calculation; and step 3: after the PVT is calculated, the time service receiver enters an automatic position keeping mode according to a calculation result; and 4, step 4: the time service receiver carries out periodic inner circle tracking on the PVT satellite, homologous single-satellite clock error calculation is carried out by combining the PVT satellite, and whether interference deception exists or not is judged by judging a detection threshold of a difference value. The invention has obvious interference detection capability improvement compared with the deception interference of the multi-array antenna and the carrier-to-noise ratio change and the PVT clock difference integrity algorithm detection interference, and greatly reduces the equipment cost of the receiver while not improving the internal operation complexity of the receiver.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of satellite navigation positioning, in particular to a high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection research method based on homologous signals.
Background
With the development of the GNSS satellite navigation technology of the global navigation satellite system, the application in various industries is more and more extensive. The GNSS signal credible application method can provide accurate position application information, time service and the like, and shows the application value of a satellite system GNSS from subway traffic, financial transactions to military systems and aerospace applications, so that the GNSS signal credible application is more and more concerned by the industry. However, with the rapid development of technology, the phenomena of interference and spoofing on satellite system signals become more and more serious. On one hand, due to the propagation of satellite signals in space, the signal strength is weak when the satellite signals reach a receiver, and the satellite signals are easily influenced by interference signals in a frequency band; on the other hand, the ICD is disclosed externally, so that some lawless persons can utilize the ICD to generate data falsification in a text format, and a receiver is attacked by man-made interference.
In recent years, various research institutes have proposed different methods for the research of GNSS spoofing interference detection. In the prior art, a doppler shift carrier-to-noise ratio detection method is usually adopted, and existence of a spoofed signal is discovered by detecting abnormal changes of signal power. However, when the power of the interference deception signal is equivalent to that of the real satellite signal, the detection method is usually adopted to easily cause misjudgment.
The prior art also provides a technology for identifying a pseudo satellite navigation signal based on ephemeris, which deceives a receiver to track and slowly bias a signal track so as to deceive a receiver of a true received signal. However, the method has limited application scenarios mainly aiming at the repeater type deception jamming, has little effect on the generated deception signal, and even can eliminate the real signal and reserve the deception signal. The deception jamming detection method based on the multi-array antenna, the inertial navigation system and the multi-frequency point has good comprehensive detection effect, but has large and complex hardware structure and relatively high cost-price ratio, and is not suitable for low-cost application in the civil field.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is as follows: the squeezing interference and the forwarding interference are easy to detect through a signal carrier-to-noise ratio, but the generated interference is difficult to be found by a receiver, so that the problem that the existing generated deception signal interference is interfered is effectively solved, high requirements are provided for the receiver, and particularly, low-cost, high-reliability, high-stability and high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on the homologous signal are difficult to achieve on the aspects of receiver internal algorithm design and cost maintenance.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows:
a high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on homologous signals comprises the following steps:
step 1: the time service receiver normally receives GNSS satellite signals and obtains observation data and telegraph text of each satellite according to the GNSS signals;
step 2: according to the received satellite observation data and the telegraph text, the time service receiver carries out PVT calculation;
and step 3: after the PVT is calculated, the time service receiver enters an automatic position keeping mode according to a calculation result;
and 4, step 4: the time service receiver carries out periodic inner circle tracking on the PVT satellite, homologous single-satellite clock error calculation is carried out by combining the PVT satellite, and whether interference deception exists or not is judged by judging a detection threshold of a difference value.
Further, in the step 1, the time service receiver separates a redundant channel from a capture channel, wherein the capture channel is used for capturing and tracking a normal GNSS signal and performing PVT (global navigation satellite system) calculation on the time service receiver; the redundant channel is used as a detection channel and is used for detecting interference and deception of the GNSS signals and tracking the interference and deception signals.
The step 4 comprises the following steps:
4.1, sequencing the serial numbers of the positioned satellites from small to large;
step 4.2, tracking the satellites corresponding to the code initial phases in a multi-path manner in a redundant channel according to the code initial phases corresponding to the sequenced satellite numbers, and outputting observation data and telegraph text;
4.3, performing periodic inner wheel tracking, and calculating local clock difference under single-satellite time service; wherein, the round-robin tracking in the period refers to: after the position of the time service receiver is kept, the code initial phase of the satellite participating in PVT calculation is applied at intervals, and the corresponding satellite is tracked in a redundant acquisition tracking channel in a multi-channel mode so as to realize multi-channel tracking of the homologous signal satellite; the local clock error is calculated as: in the observation quantity output by the redundant channel, according to the positioning result, the single-satellite homologous multipath local clock error is calculated in PVT;
step 4.4, the detection threshold value judgment means that: sorting the local clock differences under the homologous multipath tracking again, calculating the difference value between the maximum value and the minimum value after sorting, if the difference value is within the threshold range, belonging to normal tracking, then increasing the number of the positioned satellite, and continuing to perform the operation of the 4.5 th step; if the difference value is out of the threshold range, a high hidden induced deception signal exists;
and 4.5, performing next traversal after the positioning satellite is traversed once in the period.
In step 4.4, when the difference is outside the threshold range, the statistics of the difference from the threshold are continued, if the difference belongs to the multipath effect in the multipath range, otherwise, the difference belongs to the deceptive interference.
In step 4, the time service receiver performs cyclic tracking on the satellites of the PVT in the redundant channels.
In step 3, the time position is stable after the time service receiver PVT is solved, and the position is automatically maintained after the time service receiver interior is subjected to long-time position accuracy evaluation.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the method obtains observation data and telegraph text of each satellite according to GNSS signals; carrying out normal positioning time service and entering automatic position maintenance; according to the satellite number sequencing corresponding to the positioning satellite, a redundant channel is started to track multiple paths of homologous signals, multiple paths of single satellite time service is carried out on the redundant channel to calculate local clock errors, effective detection is carried out on high hidden induction type signals according to the local clock errors of the redundant channel, deception interference of multi-array antennas and carrier-to-noise ratio changes is compared, and interference detection capability is obviously improved compared with PVT clock error integrity algorithm detection interference.
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FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only some of the novel embodiments, not all of the novel embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
In the description of the present invention, it is to be understood that the terms "upper", "lower", "front", "rear", "left", "right", "top", "bottom", "inner", "outer", and the like, indicate orientations or positional relationships based on the orientations or positional relationships shown in the drawings, are merely for convenience in describing the present invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element being referred to must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and thus, should not be construed as limiting the present invention.
As shown in fig. 1, a high-concealment induction type time service spoofing real-time detection method based on homologous signals is easy to implement, has a good detection effect, and is suitable for detecting spoofing interference signals sent by the same spoofing signals, especially current gradual-change generated interference. The method specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1: the time service receiver normally receives GNSS satellite signals and obtains observation data and telegraph text of each satellite according to the GNSS signals;
step 2: according to the received satellite observation data and the telegraph text, the time service receiver carries out PVT calculation;
and step 3: after the PVT is calculated, the time service receiver enters an automatic position keeping mode according to a calculation result;
and 4, step 4: the time service receiver carries out periodic inner circle tracking on the PVT satellite, homologous single-satellite clock error calculation is carried out by combining the PVT satellite, and whether interference deception exists or not is judged by judging a detection threshold of a difference value.
Further, in the step 1, the time service receiver separates a redundant channel from a capture channel, wherein the capture channel is used for capturing and tracking a normal GNSS signal and performing PVT (global navigation satellite system) calculation on the time service receiver; the redundant channel is used as a detection channel and is used for detecting interference and deception of the GNSS signals and tracking the interference and deception signals. The redundant channels refer to capturing channels with limited channel resources, wherein the capturing channels are used for enabling the time service receiver to normally track the GNSS satellite and meet the requirement of time service positioning accuracy, and the redundant channels are defined as the last fixed channels of all tracking channels in the time service receiver.
Further, in step 3, the time position is stable after the time service receiver PVT is calculated, and the position is automatically maintained after the time service receiver interior is evaluated for long-time position accuracy.
Further, in step 4, the time service receiver performs cyclic tracking on the satellites of the PVT in the redundant channels.
Further, step 4 comprises the following steps:
4.1, sequencing the serial numbers of the positioned satellites from small to large;
step 4.2, tracking the satellites corresponding to the code initial phases in a multi-path manner in a redundant channel according to the code initial phases corresponding to the sequenced satellite numbers, and outputting observation data and telegraph text;
4.3, performing periodic inner wheel tracking, and calculating local clock difference under single-satellite time service; wherein, the round-robin tracking in the period refers to: after the position of the time service receiver is kept, the code initial phase of the satellite participating in PVT calculation is applied at intervals, and the corresponding satellite is tracked in a redundant acquisition tracking channel in a multi-channel mode so as to realize multi-channel tracking of the homologous signal satellite; the local clock error is calculated as: in the observation quantity output by the redundant channel, according to the positioning result, the single-satellite homologous multipath local clock error is calculated in PVT;
step 4.4, the detection threshold value judgment means that: sorting the local clock differences under the homologous multipath tracking again, calculating the difference value between the maximum value and the minimum value after sorting, if the difference value is within the threshold range, belonging to normal tracking, then increasing the number of the positioned satellite, and continuing to perform the operation of the 4.5 th step; if the difference value is outside the threshold range, a high hidden induction type deception signal exists, the difference value with the threshold value is counted, if the difference value belongs to the multipath effect in the multipath range, otherwise, the difference value belongs to deception interference; it should be noted that: the threshold range is a long-term statistical mean value, and the floating value is very small;
and 4.5, performing next traversal after the positioning satellite is traversed once in the period.
In step 4.4, the threshold is actually measured in the homologous signal for 10ns, and in engineering practice, the multipath range is actually measured for 500ns to 600ns according to 20 ns.
The invention relates to a research method for high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection based on homologous signals, which obtains observation data and telegraph text of each satellite according to GNSS signals; carrying out normal positioning time service and entering automatic position maintenance; according to the satellite number sequencing corresponding to the positioning satellite, a redundant channel is started to track multiple paths of homologous signals, multiple paths of single satellite time service is carried out on the redundant channel to calculate local clock errors, effective detection is carried out on high hidden induction type signals according to the local clock errors of the redundant channel, deception interference of multi-array antennas and carrier-to-noise ratio changes is compared, and interference detection capability is obviously improved compared with PVT clock error integrity algorithm detection interference.
The foregoing is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, various changes and modifications can be made without departing from the overall concept of the present invention, and these should also be considered as the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. A high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on homologous signals is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: the time service receiver normally receives GNSS satellite signals and obtains observation data and telegraph text of each satellite according to the GNSS signals;
step 2: according to the received satellite observation data and the telegraph text, the time service receiver carries out PVT calculation;
and step 3: after the PVT is calculated, the time service receiver enters an automatic position keeping mode according to a calculation result;
and 4, step 4: the time service receiver carries out periodic inner circle tracking on the PVT satellite, homologous single-satellite clock error calculation is carried out by combining the PVT satellite, and whether interference deception exists or not is judged by judging a detection threshold of a difference value.
2. The high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on the homologous signal according to claim 1, characterized in that: further, in the step 1, the time service receiver separates a redundant channel from a capture channel, wherein the capture channel is used for capturing and tracking a normal GNSS signal and performing PVT (global navigation satellite system) calculation on the time service receiver; the redundant channel is used as a detection channel and used for detecting interference and deception of the GNSS signals and tracking the interference deception signals.
3. The high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on the homologous signal according to claim 1, characterized in that: the step 4 comprises the following steps:
4.1, sequencing the serial numbers of the positioned satellites from small to large;
step 4.2, tracking the satellites corresponding to the code initial phases in a multi-path manner in a redundant channel according to the code initial phases corresponding to the sequenced satellite numbers, and outputting observation data and telegraph text;
4.3, performing periodic inner wheel tracking, and calculating local clock difference under single-satellite time service; wherein, the round-robin tracking in the period refers to: after the position of the time service receiver is kept, the code initial phase of the satellite participating in PVT calculation is applied at intervals, and the corresponding satellite is tracked in a redundant acquisition tracking channel in a multi-channel mode so as to realize multi-channel tracking of the homologous signal satellite; the local clock error is calculated as: in the observation quantity output by the redundant channel, according to the positioning result, the single-satellite homologous multipath local clock error is calculated in PVT;
step 4.4, the detection threshold value judgment means that: sorting the local clock differences under the homologous multipath tracking again, calculating the difference value between the maximum value and the minimum value after sorting, if the difference value is within the threshold range, belonging to normal tracking, then increasing the number of the positioned satellite, and continuing to perform the operation of the 4.5 th step; if the difference value is out of the threshold range, a high hidden induced deception signal exists;
and 4.5, performing next traversal after the positioning satellite is traversed once in the period.
4. The high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on the homologous signal according to claim 3, characterized in that: in step 4.4, when the difference is outside the threshold range, the statistics of the difference from the threshold are continued, if the difference belongs to the multipath effect in the multipath range, otherwise, the difference belongs to the deceptive interference.
5. The high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on homologous signals according to claim 1 or 3, characterized in that: in step 4, the time service receiver performs cyclic tracking on the satellites of the PVT in the redundant channels.
6. The high-concealment induction type time service deception real-time detection method based on the homologous signal according to claim 1, characterized in that: in step 3, the time position is stable after the time service receiver PVT is solved, and the position is automatically maintained after the time service receiver interior is subjected to long-time position accuracy evaluation.
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