CN117310755B - Satellite navigation signal credible authentication protocol and terminal credible positioning method and device - Google Patents
Satellite navigation signal credible authentication protocol and terminal credible positioning method and device Download PDFInfo
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/20—Integrity monitoring, fault detection or fault isolation of space segment
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/40—Correcting position, velocity or attitude
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/42—Determining position
- G01S19/421—Determining position by combining or switching between position solutions or signals derived from different satellite radio beacon positioning systems; by combining or switching between position solutions or signals derived from different modes of operation in a single system
- G01S19/423—Determining position by combining or switching between position solutions or signals derived from different satellite radio beacon positioning systems; by combining or switching between position solutions or signals derived from different modes of operation in a single system by combining or switching between position solutions derived from different satellite radio beacon positioning systems
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
- H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/40—Network security protocols
Abstract
The application relates to a satellite navigation signal credible authentication protocol and a terminal credible positioning method and device. The method comprises the following steps: constructing a navigation information authentication protocol; receiving satellite navigation signals of all visible satellites; the satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites are authenticated by adopting a navigation information authentication protocol, and deception detection and correction are carried out on the satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites after the authentication is passed, so that a reliable low-orbit satellite observation result is obtained; and carrying out joint positioning according to the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result and the satellite navigation signals of the medium-high orbit satellite to obtain a joint positioning result, and confirming the reliability of the joint positioning result according to the joint positioning result and the pseudo-range residual error of the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result. By adopting the method, the credible detection of the positioning result can be realized on the premise of authentication calculation of the primary secret key, and the user can finally obtain the credible positioning result.
Description
Technical Field
The present invention relates to the field of satellite positioning technologies, and in particular, to a satellite navigation signal trusted authentication protocol and a method and apparatus for trusted positioning of a terminal.
Background
At present, the Beidou satellite navigation system can provide public navigation positioning time service for global users, and the system adopts a broadcasting mode to broadcast navigation signals to users, and the risk of being deceptively counterfeited exists due to the fact that the signal formats are completely disclosed. Along with the development of a low-orbit satellite navigation system, the low-orbit satellite broadcasts a trusted satellite navigation signal, so that the trusted enhancement of the Beidou satellite navigation system is realized, and the method is an important development trend.
In the aspect of the research of trusted satellite navigation signals, the method mainly comprises two main methods of trusted enhancement based on text information authentication and trusted enhancement based on signal spread spectrum code and text joint authentication. In both methods, a certain cryptographic algorithm is required to be used for realizing anti-counterfeiting authentication on the navigation signal text information. The key chain based on TESLA, namely a lost fault-tolerant authentication mechanism (TESLA: timed Efficient Loss Tolerant Authentication) is mainly adopted in the current navigation message information anti-counterfeiting authentication protocol, the key chain is connected by a one-way function, the main thought is that reverse sequences are used in the key chain generation and use processes, and the trusted authentication capability of a public key is realized through key use and public time difference. When the TESLA technology is adopted for authentication, the key authentication is required to be carried out step by step, and the calculation cost is relatively high.
Disclosure of Invention
Accordingly, there is a need for providing a method and apparatus for trusted authentication protocol of satellite navigation signals and trusted positioning of terminals.
A satellite navigation signal trusted authentication protocol and a method for trusted positioning of a terminal, the method comprising:
constructing a navigation information authentication protocol; the navigation information authentication protocol includes: the authentication period of the navigation information comprises a fast authentication period and a slow authentication period, wherein the slow authentication period consists of a plurality of fast authentication periods, in one slow authentication period, a plurality of fast authentication periods are contained, keys of each fast authentication period are mutually independent, keys of the fast authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the message information, and signatures of the slow authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the keys of all the fast authentication periods; the keys of the multiple fast authentication periods are generated by expanding respective root keys of the fast authentication periods through a key chain, the keys of the fast authentication periods on the same structure position during the adjacent slow authentication periods are keys on the same key chain, and the keys of the fast authentication periods on the same structure position during the slow authentication periods represent a chained structure;
receiving satellite navigation signals of all visible satellites; visible satellites include low-orbit satellites and medium-high-orbit satellites;
the navigation information authentication protocol is adopted to authenticate satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites, and deception detection and correction are carried out on the satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites after authentication is passed, so that a reliable low-orbit satellite observation result is obtained;
and carrying out joint positioning according to the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result and the satellite navigation signals of the medium-high orbit satellite to obtain a joint positioning result, and confirming the credibility of the joint positioning result according to the pseudo-range residual error of the joint positioning result and the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result.
In one embodiment, the method further comprises: and generating the key of the fast authentication period of the multi-chain mixed structure by adopting a one-way function according to the root keys of the plurality of independent fast authentication periods.
In one embodiment, the method further comprises: receiving satellite navigation signals formed by pseudo-range observational quantity and position information of a low-orbit satellite; and receiving satellite navigation signals consisting of observed quantity and position information of the middle and high orbit satellites.
In one embodiment, the method further comprises: generating locally replicated authentication spreading code sequences from authentication information obtained by authenticationThe method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Wherein (1)>Indicate->Authentication satellite->Indicate->Segment authentication spreading code,>，/>for the number of authentication spreading code segments in a fast authentication period, <>，/>Authenticating the length of the spreading code for each segment;
acquiring the stored low-rail baseband sampling signal asThe total length of the signal is +.>Wherein->The 1 st segment authentication spread spectrum code initial position of the satellite signal is +.>Each section of authentication spread spectrum code length is +.>First->Section and->The section authentication spread spectrum code interval is +.>Sampling points->，/>；
From the firstStarting at the sampling point +.>According to the pattern of the authentication spread spectrum code in the sampling signal, calculating the correlation result of the M sections of authentication spread spectrum codes and the low-rail baseband sampling signal as follows:
；
wherein,representing the correlation result;
from the slaveInitially, the correlation results are compared in turn with a threshold value, finding the smallest +.>So that the correlation result is not less than the threshold value and recording the current sampling point position +.>If the current sampling point position is smaller than the +.>The sampling point is determinediThe low-orbit satellite signals are deceptively interfered;
when the first isWhen the low orbit satellite signal is deceptively interfered, the measured value is corrected>Sampling points and adjusting the signal tracking loop forward +.>The positions of the sampling points;
if it isDescription of the first embodimentiThe low-orbit satellite signals are not deceptively disturbed.
In one embodiment, the method further comprises: received reliable low-orbit satellite observation result by adopting least square or Kalman filtering methodAnd the observed quantity of the medium-high orbit satellite +.>Performing joint positioning to obtain a resolving result asWherein->，/>，/>User terminals are respectively +.>Direction (S)>Direction and->Coordinates of direction, +.>Representing the clock skew of the user terminal.
In one embodiment, the method further comprises: and according to the combined positioning result and the trusted low-orbit satellite observation result, pseudo-range residual error is as follows:
；
wherein,representing pseudo-range residual,/->，/>，/>Respectively represent +.>The position of a trusted low-orbit satellite is +.>Direction (S)>Direction and->Coordinates of direction, +.>Indicate->Clock error of low orbit satellite +.>Indicating the number of low-orbit satellites.
In one embodiment, the method further comprises: and if the pseudo-range residual error is smaller than the threshold value, the combined positioning result is trusted, and if the pseudo-range residual error is not smaller than the threshold value, the combined positioning result is not trusted.
A device for trusted authentication protocol of satellite navigation signals and trusted positioning of a terminal, the device comprising:
the authentication protocol construction module is used for constructing a navigation information authentication protocol; the navigation information authentication protocol includes: the authentication period of the navigation information comprises a fast authentication period and a slow authentication period, wherein the slow authentication period consists of a plurality of fast authentication periods, in one slow authentication period, a plurality of fast authentication periods are contained, keys of each fast authentication period are mutually independent, keys of the fast authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the message information, and signatures of the slow authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the keys of all the fast authentication periods; the keys of the multiple fast authentication periods are respectively generated by the root keys of the respective fast authentication periods through key chain expansion, the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the adjacent slow authentication periods are keys on the same key chain, and the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the slow authentication periods represent a chain structure;
the signal receiving module is used for receiving satellite navigation signals of all visible satellites; visible satellites include low-orbit satellites and medium-high-orbit satellites;
the authentication module is used for authenticating satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites by adopting the navigation information authentication protocol, and performing deception detection and correction on the satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites after passing the authentication to obtain a trusted low-orbit satellite observation result;
and the combined positioning module is used for carrying out combined positioning according to the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result and the satellite navigation signals of the medium-high orbit satellite to obtain a combined positioning result, and confirming the credibility of the combined positioning result according to the combined positioning result and the pseudo-range residual error of the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result.
A computer device comprising a memory storing a computer program and a processor which when executing the computer program performs the steps of:
constructing a navigation information authentication protocol; the navigation information authentication protocol includes: the authentication period of the navigation information comprises a fast authentication period and a slow authentication period, wherein the slow authentication period consists of a plurality of fast authentication periods, in one slow authentication period, a plurality of fast authentication periods are contained, keys of each fast authentication period are mutually independent, keys of the fast authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the message information, and signatures of the slow authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the keys of all the fast authentication periods; the keys of the multiple fast authentication periods are respectively generated by the root keys of the respective fast authentication periods through key chain expansion, the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the adjacent slow authentication periods are keys on the same key chain, and the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the slow authentication periods represent a chain structure;
receiving satellite navigation signals of all visible satellites; visible satellites include low-orbit satellites and medium-high-orbit satellites;
the navigation information authentication protocol is adopted to authenticate satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites, and deception detection and correction are carried out on the satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites after authentication is passed, so that a reliable low-orbit satellite observation result is obtained;
and carrying out joint positioning according to the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result and the satellite navigation signals of the medium-high orbit satellite to obtain a joint positioning result, and confirming the credibility of the joint positioning result according to the pseudo-range residual error of the joint positioning result and the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result.
A computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which when executed by a processor performs the steps of:
constructing a navigation information authentication protocol; the navigation information authentication protocol includes: the authentication period of the navigation information comprises a fast authentication period and a slow authentication period, wherein the slow authentication period consists of a plurality of fast authentication periods, in one slow authentication period, a plurality of fast authentication periods are contained, keys of each fast authentication period are mutually independent, keys of the fast authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the message information, and signatures of the slow authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the keys of all the fast authentication periods; the keys of the multiple fast authentication periods are respectively generated by the root keys of the respective fast authentication periods through key chain expansion, the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the adjacent slow authentication periods are keys on the same key chain, and the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the slow authentication periods represent a chain structure; receiving satellite navigation signals of all visible satellites; visible satellites include low-orbit satellites and medium-high-orbit satellites;
the navigation information authentication protocol is adopted to authenticate satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites, and deception detection and correction are carried out on the satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites after authentication is passed, so that a reliable low-orbit satellite observation result is obtained;
and carrying out joint positioning according to the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result and the satellite navigation signals of the medium-high orbit satellite to obtain a joint positioning result, and confirming the credibility of the joint positioning result according to the pseudo-range residual error of the joint positioning result and the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result.
According to the satellite navigation signal trusted authentication protocol and the terminal trusted positioning method and device, the navigation information authentication protocol is constructed, the protocol comprises the fast authentication period and the slow authentication period, the keys of the plurality of the fast authentication periods are generated by expanding root keys of the respective fast authentication periods through a key chain, the fast authentication period keys on the same structural position during the adjacent slow authentication period are keys on the same key chain, the fast authentication period keys on the same structural position during the slow authentication period are in a chained structure, the terminal can realize confirmation of validity of all message authentication keys in the authentication period only through authentication calculation of one key, so that a trusted low-orbit satellite observation result is activated, detection of a spoofing signal is realized by utilizing the characteristic that an authentication spread spectrum code cannot be generated in advance when combined positioning is performed, trusted detection of a positioning result is realized by utilizing the trusted low-orbit satellite observation result, and finally a user can obtain a trusted positioning result is ensured.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for trusted authentication protocol and trusted location of a terminal for satellite navigation signals in one embodiment;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a multi-chain message authentication topology in one embodiment;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a detection principle and method of spoofing interference signals based on an authentication spreading code;
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a trusted authentication protocol for satellite navigation signals and a trusted location device for a terminal in one embodiment;
fig. 5 is an internal structural diagram of a computer device in one embodiment.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more apparent, the present application will be further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the present application.
In one embodiment, as shown in fig. 1, a method for trusted authentication protocol of satellite navigation signals and trusted positioning of a terminal is provided, which includes the following steps:
and 102, constructing a navigation information authentication protocol.
The navigation information authentication protocol includes: the authentication period of the navigation information comprises a fast authentication period and a slow authentication period, wherein the slow authentication period is composed of a plurality of fast authentication periods, in one slow authentication period, a plurality of fast authentication periods are contained, keys of each fast authentication period are mutually independent, keys of the fast authentication period are responsible for verifying the legality of the message information, and signatures of the slow authentication period are responsible for verifying the legality of the keys of the fast authentication period; the keys of the multiple fast authentication periods are generated by expanding root keys of the respective fast authentication periods through a key chain, the keys of the fast authentication periods on the same structural position during the adjacent slow authentication periods are keys on the same key chain, and the keys of the fast authentication periods on the same structural position during the slow authentication periods represent a chained structure.
Specifically, the authentication period of the satellite navigation signal is divided into a fast authentication periodAnd slow authentication period->Wherein one slow authentication period is defined bySThe fast authentication period consists of:
；
for the firstThe message information in the fast authentication period can pass through the next fast authentication period, namely the firstjAuthentication key in a fast authentication period +.>Finish authentication, wherein->；
；
For different navigation satellites, the starting moments of the fast authentication periods of the navigation signals of the navigation satellites are respectively staggeredRecording；
Then in a slow authentication period, correspond toDifferent fast authentication moments are selected; assume that the system is common->At the same time, the satellites are at most +.>The satellites can be authenticated simultaneously, but the authentication interval of the user on the satellite signals is from +.>Can be shortened to->I.e. every +.>One of the satellites may be authenticated.
In one slow authentication period, a total of S keys of fast authentication periods are includedAnd a digital signature of 1 slow authentication period +.>Fast authentication period key->Authenticating the validity of the text information in the fast authentication period, signature +.>Keys for all fast authentication periods therein +.>The legitimacy is authenticated.
Using respective fast authentication period root keysGenerating fast authentication cycle keys by keychain expansionThe method is as follows
；
；
；
Wherein the method comprises the steps ofRepresenting the length of a key chain. Common one-way functions include, but are not limited to, e.g. +.>Algorithm, use->The algorithm carries out the cryptographic hash operation on the fast authentication period key to realize the expansion of the fast authentication period key chain, namely
；
Wherein the method comprises the steps ofAuthenticating the periodic key for the fast>Is a length of (c). The key chain expansion can be realized by parallel computation, the key chains are mutually independent and the fast authentication period key between the same slow authentication periods is +.>Independent of each other. Signature of slow authentication period in each slow authentication period +.>Key for all fast authentication periods +.>Legitimacy is authenticated using +.>The digital signature algorithm signs all the fast authentication keys, i.e
；
Fast authentication period keyAnd signature->Adopting a multi-chain message authentication topological structure shown in figure 2, and fast authentication period key in the same slow authentication period>The fast authentication periodic keys from different key chains are mutually independent, and the fast authentication periodic keys at the same structural position during the adjacent slow authentication period are keys on the same key chain, and the fast authentication periodic keys at the same structural position during the slow authentication period are in a chained structure.
Step 104, receiving satellite navigation signals of all visible satellites.
Visible satellites include low-orbit satellites and medium-high-orbit satellites.
And 106, authenticating satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites by adopting a navigation information authentication protocol, and performing deception detection and correction on the satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites after passing the authentication to obtain a trusted low-orbit satellite observation result.
And step 108, performing joint positioning according to the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result and the satellite navigation signals of the medium-high orbit satellite to obtain a joint positioning result, and confirming the reliability of the joint positioning result according to the joint positioning result and the pseudo-range residual error of the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result.
According to the satellite navigation signal trusted authentication protocol and the terminal trusted positioning method, the navigation information authentication protocol is constructed, the protocol comprises a fast authentication period and a slow authentication period, the key of the fast authentication period is generated by expanding the root key of each fast authentication period through a key chain, the key of the fast authentication period on the same structure position in the period of adjacent slow authentication period is the key on the same key chain, the key of the fast authentication period on the same structure position in the period of slow authentication period is in a chain structure, the terminal can realize the confirmation of the validity of all message authentication keys in the authentication period through the authentication calculation of the key only once, so that the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result is activated, the detection of a deception signal is realized by utilizing the characteristic that an authentication spreading code cannot be generated in advance when joint positioning is performed, the reliable detection of a positioning result is realized by utilizing the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result, and the final trusted positioning result can be obtained by a user.
In one embodiment, satellite navigation signals composed of pseudorange observations and position information of low orbit satellites are received, and satellite navigation signals composed of observations and position information of medium and high orbit satellites are received.
The user machine receives all visible satellite navigation signals, wherein the satellite navigation signals are sharedLow orbit satellite->Pseudo-range observables of low-orbit satellite signals of the middle-orbit satellite and the high-orbit satellite are respectively +.>Low orbit satellite position information ∈>The observed quantity of the Beidou middle and high orbit satellite signals is +.>Position information of Beidou middle and high orbit satellite>The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Taking a low-orbit satellite as an example, satellite informationWherein->Respectively represent the firstiThe low orbit satellite is->Under the coordinate system->Direction (S)>Direction and directionzCoordinates of direction, +.>Indicate->Clock differences for the low orbit satellites.
In one embodiment, fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of a fraud detection principle and method based on an authentication spreading code, and a locally copied authentication spreading code sequence is generated according to authentication information obtained by authenticationThe method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Wherein (1)>Indicate->Authentication satellite->Indicate->Segment authentication spreading code,>，/>for the number of authenticated spreading code segments in a fast authentication period,，/>authenticating the length of the spreading code for each segment; acquiring a stored low-rail baseband sampling signal as +.>The total length of the signal is +.>Wherein->The 1 st segment authentication spread spectrum code initial position of the satellite signal is +.>Each section of authentication spread spectrum code length is +.>First->Section and->The section authentication spread spectrum code interval is +.>Sampling points->，/>The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the From->Starting at the sampling point +.>Calculating +.>The correlation result of the segment authentication spread spectrum code and the low-rail baseband sampling signal is as follows:
；
wherein,representing the correlation result; from->Initially, the correlation result is compared in turn with a threshold value, and the smallest +.>So that the correlation result is not smaller than the threshold value and recording the current sampling point position +.>If the current sampling point position is less than +.>The sampling point is then determined +>The low-orbit satellite signals are deceptively interfered; when->When the low orbit satellite signal is deceptively interfered, the measured value is corrected>Sampling points and adjusting the signal tracking loop forward +.>The positions of the sampling points; if->Description of the first embodimentiThe low-orbit satellite signals are not deceptively disturbed.
In one embodiment, least squares or Kalman filtering is used to obtain received trusted low orbit satellite observationsAnd the observed quantity of the medium-high orbit satellite +.>Performing joint positioning to obtain a resolving result asWherein->Respectively user terminals are +.>Under the coordinate system->Direction (S)>Direction and->Coordinates of direction, +.>Representing the clock skew of the user terminal.
In one embodiment, the pseudorange residuals from the joint positioning result and the trusted low-orbit satellite observations are:
；
wherein,representing pseudo-range residual,/->，/>，/>Respectively represent +.>The position of a trusted low-orbit satellite is +.>Direction (S)>Direction and->Coordinates of direction, +.>Indicate->Clock error of low orbit satellite +.>Indicating the number of low-orbit satellites.
In one embodiment, if the pseudo-range residual is less than a threshold, the result of the joint positioning is trusted, and if not less than the threshold, the result of the joint positioning is not trusted. The threshold determination may be performed using a threshold determination method in the conventional RAIM method.
It should be understood that, although the steps in the flowchart of fig. 1 are shown in sequence as indicated by the arrows, the steps are not necessarily performed in sequence as indicated by the arrows. The steps are not strictly limited to the order of execution unless explicitly recited herein, and the steps may be executed in other orders. Moreover, at least some of the steps in fig. 1 may include multiple sub-steps or stages that are not necessarily performed at the same time, but may be performed at different times, nor do the order in which the sub-steps or stages are performed necessarily performed in sequence, but may be performed alternately or alternately with at least a portion of other steps or sub-steps of other steps.
In one embodiment, as shown in fig. 4, there is provided a device for trusted authentication protocol of satellite navigation signals and trusted positioning of a terminal, including: an authentication protocol construction module 402, a signal reception module 404, an authentication module 406, and a joint location module 408, wherein:
an authentication protocol construction module 402, configured to construct a navigation information authentication protocol; the navigation information authentication protocol includes: the authentication period of the navigation information comprises a fast authentication period and a slow authentication period, wherein the slow authentication period consists of a plurality of fast authentication periods, in one slow authentication period, a plurality of fast authentication periods are contained, keys of each fast authentication period are mutually independent, keys of the fast authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the message information, and signatures of the slow authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the keys of all the fast authentication periods; the keys of the multiple fast authentication periods are respectively generated by the root keys of the respective fast authentication periods through key chain expansion, the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the adjacent slow authentication periods are keys on the same key chain, and the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the slow authentication periods represent a chain structure;
a signal receiving module 404, configured to receive satellite navigation signals of all visible satellites; visible satellites include low-orbit satellites and medium-high-orbit satellites;
the authentication module 406 is configured to authenticate a satellite navigation signal of the low-orbit satellite by using the navigation information authentication protocol, and perform spoofing detection and correction on the satellite navigation signal of the low-orbit satellite after passing the authentication, so as to obtain a trusted low-orbit satellite observation result;
and the joint positioning module 408 is configured to perform joint positioning according to the trusted low-orbit satellite observation result and the satellite navigation signal of the medium-high orbit satellite, obtain a joint positioning result, and confirm the credibility of the joint positioning result according to the pseudo-range residual error of the joint positioning result and the trusted low-orbit satellite observation result.
In one embodiment, the authentication protocol construction module 402 is further configured to generate, according to root keys of the multiple independent fast authentication periods, a key of a fast authentication period of a multi-chain hybrid structure by using a one-way function, where the fast authentication period key at the same structure location during an adjacent slow authentication period is a key of the same key chain, and the fast authentication period key at the same structure location during the slow authentication period represents a chained structure.
In one embodiment, the signal receiving module 404 is further configured to receive satellite navigation signals composed of pseudo-range observables and position information of the low-orbit satellites; and receiving satellite navigation signals consisting of observed quantity and position information of the middle and high orbit satellites.
In one embodiment, the authentication module 406 is further configured to generate a locally replicated authentication spreading code sequence based on the authenticated authentication informationThe method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Wherein (1)>Indicate->Authentication satellite->Indicate->Segment authentication spreading code,>，for the number of authentication spreading code segments in a fast authentication period, <>，/>Authenticating the length of the spreading code for each segment;
acquiring the stored low-rail baseband sampling signal asThe total length of the signal is +.>Wherein->The 1 st segment authentication spread spectrum code initial position of the satellite signal is +.>Each section of authentication spread spectrum code length is +.>First->Section and->The section authentication spread spectrum code interval is +.>Sampling points->，/>；
From the firstStarting at the sampling point +.>Calculating based on the pattern of the authentication spreading code present in the sampled signalThe correlation result of the segment authentication spread spectrum code and the low-rail baseband sampling signal is as follows:
；
wherein,representing the correlation result;
from the slaveInitially, the correlation results are compared in turn with a threshold value, finding the smallest +.>So that the correlation result is not less than the threshold value and recording the current sampling point position +.>If the current sampling point position is smaller than the +.>The sampling point is then determined +>The low-orbit satellite signals are deceptively interfered;
when the first isWhen the low orbit satellite signal is deceptively interfered, the measured value is corrected>Sampling points and adjusting the signal tracking loop forward +.>The positions of the sampling points;
if it isDescription of the first embodimentiThe low-orbit satellite signals are not deceptively disturbed.
In one embodiment, the joint location module 408 is further configured to use least squares or Kalman filtering methods to obtain received trusted low-earth satellite observations ’ And the observed quantity of the medium-high orbit satellite +.>Performing joint positioning to obtain a solution result of +.>Wherein->，/>，/>User terminals are respectively +.>Direction (S)>Direction and->Coordinates of direction, +.>Representing the clock skew of the user terminal.
In one embodiment, the joint positioning module 408 is further configured to, according to the joint positioning result and the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result, determine that the pseudo-range residuals are:
；
wherein,representing pseudo-range residual,/->，/>，/>Respectively representing the position of the ith trusted low earth orbit satellite in ECEF coordinate systemxThe direction of the light beam is changed,ydirection and directionzCoordinates of direction, +.>Indicating the clock difference of the ith low orbit satellite, +.>Indicating the number of low-orbit satellites.
In one embodiment, the joint location module 408 is further configured to indicate that the joint location result is trusted if the pseudo-range residual is less than a threshold, and to indicate that the joint location result is not trusted if the pseudo-range residual is not less than the threshold.
The specific limitation of the device for the trusted authentication protocol of the satellite navigation signal and the trusted positioning of the terminal can be referred to as the limitation of the method for the trusted authentication protocol of the satellite navigation signal and the trusted positioning of the terminal hereinabove, and the description thereof is omitted here. All or part of the modules in the satellite navigation signal credible authentication protocol and terminal credible positioning device can be realized by software, hardware and combination thereof. The above modules may be embedded in hardware or may be independent of a processor in the computer device, or may be stored in software in a memory in the computer device, so that the processor may call and execute operations corresponding to the above modules.
In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, which may be a terminal, and the internal structure of which may be as shown in fig. 5. The computer device includes a processor, a memory, a network interface, a display screen, and an input device connected by a system bus. Wherein the processor of the computer device is configured to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage media. The network interface of the computer device is used for communicating with an external terminal through a network connection. The computer program is executed by a processor to realize a satellite navigation signal credible authentication protocol and a terminal credible positioning method. The display screen of the computer equipment can be a liquid crystal display screen or an electronic ink display screen, and the input device of the computer equipment can be a touch layer covered on the display screen, can also be keys, a track ball or a touch pad arranged on the shell of the computer equipment, and can also be an external keyboard, a touch pad or a mouse and the like.
It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the structure shown in fig. 5 is merely a block diagram of some of the structures associated with the present application and is not limiting of the computer device to which the present application may be applied, and that a particular computer device may include more or fewer components than shown, or may combine certain components, or have a different arrangement of components.
In an embodiment a computer device is provided comprising a memory storing a computer program and a processor implementing the steps of the method of the above embodiments when the computer program is executed.
In one embodiment, a computer readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method of the above embodiments.
Those skilled in the art will appreciate that implementing all or part of the above described methods may be accomplished by way of a computer program stored on a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, which when executed, may comprise the steps of the embodiments of the methods described above. Any reference to memory, storage, database, or other medium used in the various embodiments provided herein may include non-volatile and/or volatile memory. The nonvolatile memory can include Read Only Memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically Programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can include Random Access Memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in a variety of forms such as Static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double Data Rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous Link DRAM (SLDRAM), memory bus direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM), among others.
The technical features of the above embodiments may be arbitrarily combined, and all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are not described for brevity of description, however, as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features, they should be considered as the scope of the description.
The above examples merely represent a few embodiments of the present application, which are described in more detail and are not to be construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that it would be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and improvements could be made without departing from the spirit of the present application, which would be within the scope of the present application. Accordingly, the scope of protection of the present application is to be determined by the claims appended hereto.
Claims (8)
1. A satellite navigation signal trusted authentication protocol and a method for trusted positioning of a terminal, the method comprising:
constructing a navigation information authentication protocol; the navigation information authentication protocol includes: the authentication period of the navigation information comprises a fast authentication period and a slow authentication period, wherein the slow authentication period consists of a plurality of fast authentication periods, in one slow authentication period, a plurality of fast authentication periods are contained, keys of each fast authentication period are mutually independent, keys of the fast authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the message information, and signatures of the slow authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the keys of all the fast authentication periods; the keys of the multiple fast authentication periods are respectively generated by the root keys of the respective fast authentication periods through key chain expansion, the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the adjacent slow authentication periods are keys on the same key chain, and the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the slow authentication periods represent a chain structure;
receiving satellite navigation signals of all visible satellites; visible satellites include low-orbit satellites and medium-high-orbit satellites;
the navigation information authentication protocol is adopted to authenticate satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites, and deception detection and correction are carried out on the satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites after authentication is passed, so that a reliable low-orbit satellite observation result is obtained;
and carrying out joint positioning according to the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result and the satellite navigation signals of the medium-high orbit satellite to obtain a joint positioning result, and confirming the credibility of the joint positioning result according to the pseudo-range residual error of the joint positioning result and the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the keys of the plurality of fast authentication periods are generated by a key chain extension from the root key of the respective fast authentication period, respectively, comprising:
and generating the key of the fast authentication period of the multi-chain mixed structure by adopting one-way function expansion according to the root keys of the plurality of independent fast authentication periods.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein receiving satellite navigation signals for all visible satellites comprises:
receiving satellite navigation signals formed by pseudo-range observational quantity and position information of a low-orbit satellite;
and receiving satellite navigation signals consisting of observed quantity and position information of the middle and high orbit satellites.
4. A method according to claim 3, wherein the spoofing detection and correction of the authenticated satellite navigation signal of the low orbit satellite results in a trusted low orbit satellite observation, comprising:
generating locally replicated authentication spreading code sequences from authentication information obtained by authenticationThe method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Wherein (1)>Indicate->Authentication satellite->Indicate->Segment authentication spreading code,>，/>for the number of authenticated spreading code segments in a fast authentication period,，/>authenticating the length of the spreading code for each segment;
acquiring the stored low-rail baseband sampling signal asThe total length of the signal is +.>Wherein the firstiThe 1 st segment authentication spread spectrum code initial position of the satellite signal is +.>Each section of authentication spread spectrum code length is +.>First->Section and->The section authentication spread spectrum code interval is +.>Sampling points->，/>；
From the firstnThe start of a sampling point is indicated by the number of samples,according to the pattern of the authentication spread spectrum code in the sampling signal, calculating the correlation result of the M sections of authentication spread spectrum codes and the low-rail baseband sampling signal as follows:
；
wherein,representing the correlation result;
from the slaveInitially, the correlation results are compared in turn with a threshold value, finding the smallest +.>So that the correlation result is not less than the threshold value and recording the current sampling point position +.>If the current sampling point position is smaller than the +.>The sampling point is then determined +>The low-orbit satellite signals are deceptively interfered;
when the first isWhen the low orbit satellite signal is deceptively interfered, the measured value is corrected>Sampling points and adjusting the signal tracking loop forward +.>The positions of the sampling points;
if it isDescription of the first embodimentiThe low-orbit satellite signals are not deceptively disturbed.
5. The method according to claim 3 or 4, wherein performing joint positioning according to the trusted low-orbit satellite observation result and the satellite navigation signal of the medium-high-orbit satellite to obtain a joint positioning result comprises:
received reliable low-orbit satellite observation result by adopting least square or Kalman filtering method ’ And the observed quantity of the medium-high orbit satellite +.>Performing joint positioning to obtain a solution result of +.>Wherein->，/>，/>User terminals are respectively +.>Direction (S)>Direction and->Coordinates of direction, +.>Representing the clock skew of the user terminal.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the pseudorange residuals from the joint position fix result and the trusted low orbit satellite observations comprise:
and according to the combined positioning result and the trusted low-orbit satellite observation result, pseudo-range residual error is as follows:
；
wherein,representing pseudo-range residual,/->，/>，/>Respectively represent +.>The position of a trusted low-orbit satellite is +.>Direction (S)>Direction and->Coordinates of direction, +.>Indicate->Clock error of low orbit satellite +.>Indicating the number of low-orbit satellites.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein confirming the trustworthiness of the joint location results comprises:
and if the pseudo-range residual error is smaller than the threshold value, the combined positioning result is trusted, and if the pseudo-range residual error is not smaller than the threshold value, the combined positioning result is not trusted.
8. A device for trusted authentication protocol and trusted positioning of a terminal for satellite navigation signals, the device comprising:
the authentication protocol construction module is used for constructing a navigation information authentication protocol; the navigation information authentication protocol includes: the authentication period of the navigation information comprises a fast authentication period and a slow authentication period, wherein the slow authentication period consists of a plurality of fast authentication periods, in one slow authentication period, a plurality of fast authentication periods are contained, keys of each fast authentication period are mutually independent, keys of the fast authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the message information, and signatures of the slow authentication period are responsible for verifying the validity of the keys of all the fast authentication periods; the keys of the multiple fast authentication periods are respectively generated by the root keys of the respective fast authentication periods through key chain expansion, the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the adjacent slow authentication periods are keys on the same key chain, and the keys of the fast authentication periods at the same structural position during the slow authentication periods represent a chain structure;
the signal receiving module is used for receiving satellite navigation signals of all visible satellites; visible satellites include low-orbit satellites and medium-high-orbit satellites;
the authentication module is used for authenticating satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites by adopting the navigation information authentication protocol, and performing deception detection and correction on the satellite navigation signals of the low-orbit satellites after passing the authentication to obtain a trusted low-orbit satellite observation result;
and the combined positioning module is used for carrying out combined positioning according to the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result and the satellite navigation signals of the medium-high orbit satellite to obtain a combined positioning result, and confirming the credibility of the combined positioning result according to the combined positioning result and the pseudo-range residual error of the reliable low-orbit satellite observation result.
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