CN111781615A - GNSS anti-deception system and method based on low-earth-orbit communication satellite - Google Patents

GNSS anti-deception system and method based on low-earth-orbit communication satellite Download PDF

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CN111781615A
CN111781615A CN202010561684.8A CN202010561684A CN111781615A CN 111781615 A CN111781615 A CN 111781615A CN 202010561684 A CN202010561684 A CN 202010561684A CN 111781615 A CN111781615 A CN 111781615A
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CN111781615B (en
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严涛
蒙艳松
王瑛
边朗
雷文英
田野
李天�
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Xian Institute of Space Radio Technology
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
    • G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/35—Constructional details or hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
    • G01S19/37—Hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Abstract

A GNSS anti-spoofing system and method based on low earth orbit communication satellite includes: a plurality of GNSS satellites, a low-orbit communication satellite constellation and a GNSS anti-cheating terminal. The GNSS satellite is used for broadcasting a real GNSS satellite navigation signal; the low-orbit communication satellite constellation consists of a plurality of low-orbit communication satellites; the low-orbit communication satellite is used for broadcasting low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals; the GNSS anti-deception terminal receives the GNSS satellite navigation signals and also receives low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals, and is used for providing real positioning information and time service information for a user. The method utilizes the characteristic of high movement speed of the low-orbit satellite, takes the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite as the credible ranging signal source, is used for detecting the GNSS deception signal, and has the real-time GNSS anti-deception capability.

Description

GNSS anti-deception system and method based on low-earth-orbit communication satellite
Technical Field
The invention relates to a GNSS anti-deception system and method based on a low-orbit communication satellite, and belongs to the technical field of satellite navigation.
Background
In order to improve the service performance of the basic satellite navigation system, various navigation enhancement means have been developed so far to enhance the integrity, accuracy and usability of satellite navigation. In recent years, with the widespread adoption of GPS and other GNSS technologies in the fields of mobile positioning service, road transportation, aviation, marine transportation, time service, geodetic science, atmospheric perception, and the like, the problem of vulnerability of GNSS civil signals has attracted much attention. Most of these emerging applications are safety-or liability-related, i.e., the user's location or velocity information can be used to perform life safety-related, or legal/economic decisions. Therefore, enhancing the safety of satellite navigation is becoming an important requirement for emerging users.
GNSS civilian signals are extremely fragile. On one hand, the signal intensity emitted by the navigation satellite is very low, usually only about-158 dBW, so that the navigation satellite is easily interfered, and enemies can easily interfere and suppress the satellite signal; on the other hand, all open civilian GNSS signal interface specifications are open, and the receiver can receive any input that is in compliance with the specifications and treat it as coming from a GNSS satellite, which results in a very simple spoofing of a GNSS receiver. Thus, the threat of deceptive interference is more severe for the security of GNSS civilian signals.
In order to enhance the safety of satellite navigation, one direction is to improve the robustness of the satellite navigation system and improve the anti-cheating capability of civil signals. The general method is to improve the GNSS civil open signal system, provide the authentication capability to the navigation signal on the premise of keeping backward compatibility with the current signal, perform anti-deception design, and meet the purpose of enhancing safety. Currently, Galileo, GPS and QZSS teams have conducted research on a civil anti-spoofing signal system, and Galileo plans to provide Navigation Message (NMA) authentication functionality on its E1 OS signal, us research is employing the Chimera authentication scheme on the GPS L1C signal, and is seeking to test on GPS III satellites. The invention discloses a method and a system for optimizing the authentication of radio navigation signals (CN 1061716A) and a satellite radio navigation signal with a digital signature (CN 105492926A), which can realize the authentication of the navigation signals by encrypting and digitally signing navigation messages and delaying the transmission of an encryption key, so that an attacker cannot impersonate the navigation messages.
Another anti-spoofing direction is to develop an auxiliary technology or a backup system, in U.S. patent "geotargeting spot beam overlap" (US 9625573B 2), by means of the low-orbit satellite multi-beam characteristics and the characteristics of low-orbit satellite signal encryption, rapid doppler change and difficulty in spoofing, iraterox next proposes a scheme for anti-spoofing of low-orbit multi-beam overlap pattern, so as to enhance the security of positioning service. The third anti-spoofing direction is to identify and detect spoofing signals by a receiving processing method, as described in the patents "a GNSS anti-spoofing method based on spatial correlation identification" (CN 109143265a) and "a combined anti-spoofing method for GNSS receiver authorization signals and public signals" (CN 107367740 a).
However, in the method of introducing the security authentication feature into the GNSS civil signal, in order to ensure security, the secret key is usually broadcast with delay, which causes delay in security authentication; the position authentication method based on the low-orbit satellite multi-beam characteristics has high real-time performance, but the precision is limited by the beam pattern and is difficult to improve; processing at the receiver end to identify detection spoofed signals increases the complexity of the implementation of the receiver hardware and software.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to realize the anti-cheating function by the user terminal by finding out the existence of the GNSS cheating signal in real time when the deviation between the false position and the real position caused by cheating exceeds a certain threshold under the condition that the GNSS cheating signal exists.
According to the method, the ranging signal with the ranging function is broadcasted on the low-orbit communication satellite by utilizing the characteristics that the low-orbit satellite has high movement speed and large signal dynamic and is difficult to cheat, and the ranging signal is used as a trusted ranging signal source for detecting the GNSS cheating signal, so that real-time GNSS cheating resistance is realized; meanwhile, bidirectional authentication can be performed by using a bidirectional communication link and a wireless resource management function of the low-earth-orbit communication satellite, and the authenticity of a ranging signal broadcast by the low-earth-orbit communication satellite is further determined by the user terminal through the bidirectional link authentication, so that the anti-cheating capability is improved.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows:
a low earth orbit communication satellite based GNSS anti-spoofing system comprising: a plurality of GNSS satellites, a low-orbit communication satellite constellation and a GNSS anti-cheating terminal;
the low-orbit communication satellite constellation consists of a plurality of low-orbit communication satellites;
the low-orbit communication satellite is used for broadcasting low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals;
the GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for providing real positioning information and time service information for a user;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal receives the GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receives a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal carries out positioning calculation according to the received n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals to obtain signal receiving time t0Position coordinate P of GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemGSum clock difference Δ TG(ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is not less than 4;
the GNSS anti-cheating terminal performs bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of the low-orbit communication satellite through bidirectional communication link signals, determines whether the received low-orbit broadcast signals or the received low-orbit communication signals are from the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, and obtains ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite;
GNSS anti-cheating terminal according to t0Constantly receiving the ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, demodulating the low-orbit satellite telegraph text, and calculating the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system according to the low-orbit satellite telegraph textL；
The GNSS anti-cheating terminal measures and obtains the distance from the low-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-cheating terminal as a trusted distance rho by using the ranging signal of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite;
the GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for resisting cheating according to the position coordinate PGPosition coordinate PLAnd a threshold value, judging whether a deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, and if the deception signal does not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, resisting the position coordinate P of the deception-resisting terminal of the GNSS in the geocentric coordinate systemGSum clock difference Δ TGAnd sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service.
The GNSS satellite comprises: one or more of a GPS satellite, a BDS satellite, a Gelileo satellite, a GLONASS satellite and a QZSS satellite.
The GNSS satellite signals include: one or more of GPS signals, BDS signals, Gelileo signals, GLONASS signals and QZSS signals.
The GNSS deception signal is one or more deception signals of a GPS signal, a BDS signal, a Gelileo signal, a GLONASS signal and a QZSS signal.
The GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for resisting cheating according to the position coordinate PGPosition coordinate PLAnd a threshold value, which is used for judging whether a deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, and specifically comprises the following steps:
obtaining position coordinates PGAnd position coordinates PLThe distance between them;
if Δ ρ>ΔρTHIf so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals;
Figure BDA0002546477050000041
Figure BDA0002546477050000042
Figure BDA0002546477050000043
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000044
Figure BDA0002546477050000045
when r-ar < h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000046
Figure BDA0002546477050000047
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is the elevation angle of the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, (x)G,yG,zG) Position coordinates P of the GNSS anti-cheating terminal in a geocentric/geostationary coordinate systemG，(xL,yL,zL) Position coordinate P of true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemL。
A GNSS anti-spoofing method based on low earth orbit communication satellites comprises the following steps:
1) GNSS positioning solution
Receiving n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals by using a GNSS anti-deception terminal, and performing positioning calculation to obtain a signal receiving moment t0Position coordinate P of GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemGSum clock difference Δ TG(ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is not less than 4;
2) two-way authentication
Using a GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to receive a GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receive a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal, performing bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of a low-orbit communication satellite through a bidirectional communication link signal, determining whether the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from a truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, if the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, obtaining a ranging signal broadcast by the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3), otherwise, continuing to search the low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal until the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3);
3) LEO signal ranging
Anti-spoofing terminal using GNSS according to t0Constantly receiving the ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, demodulating the low-orbit satellite telegraph text, and calculating the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system according to the low-orbit satellite telegraph textLMeanwhile, measuring to obtain the distance from the low-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-deception terminal as a trusted distance;
4) location authentication
Obtaining a position coordinate P according to the position coordinate PG in the step 1) and the position coordinate PL in the step 3)GAnd position coordinates PLAs the distance to be authenticated
Figure BDA0002546477050000051
Obtaining a trusted distance rho and a distance to be authenticated
Figure BDA0002546477050000052
If Δ ρ is different from (d) in the case of>ΔρTHIf so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals; if no deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, the position coordinate P of the GNSS anti-deception terminal in the geocentric and geostationary coordinate system is determinedGSum clock difference Δ TGAnd sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service. .
Step 4) the threshold value Δ ρTHThe determination method specifically comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002546477050000061
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000062
Figure BDA0002546477050000063
when r-ar < h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000064
Figure BDA0002546477050000065
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is an elevation angle from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite;
Figure BDA0002546477050000066
(xG,yG,zG) Position coordinates P of the GNSS anti-cheating terminal in a geocentric/geostationary coordinate systemG，(xL,yL,zL) Position coordinate P of true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemL。
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
1) the existing GNSS signal authentication method needs to change the navigation signal, and the signal authentication has delay, but the GNSS signal does not need to be changed, and deception signals can be identified in real time;
2) the existing low-orbit multi-beam overlapping pattern-based low-orbit satellite requires a multi-beam system, the anti-deception capability is limited by the beam size and the position estimation precision, and the position estimation precision is usually tens of kilometers; the invention does not need to adopt a multi-beam system, only needs the low-orbit signal broadcast by the low-orbit satellite to have the distance measuring capability, and has high precision.
3) The invention can fully utilize the bidirectional link of the low-orbit communication satellite to carry out bidirectional authentication, and the low-orbit communication satellite is used as a credible ranging source.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a GNSS anti-spoofing system solution based on low earth orbit communication satellites according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a GNSS anti-spoofing method based on low earth orbit communication satellites according to the disclosure;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a geometric relationship between a terminal and a LEO satellite;
FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating threshold values as a function of elevation.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in further detail below with reference to the figures and the detailed description.
The invention discloses a GNSS anti-spoofing system based on a low-orbit communication satellite, which is shown in figure 1 and comprises the following components: a plurality of GNSS satellites, a low-orbit communication satellite constellation and a GNSS anti-cheating terminal;
the GNSS satellite is used for broadcasting a real GNSS satellite navigation signal; the GNSS satellites broadcast real GNSS signals, which may be BDS signals.
The low-orbit communication satellite constellation consists of a plurality of low-orbit communication satellites;
the low-orbit communication satellite is used for broadcasting low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals; the LEO signal is a broadcast signal with ranging capability, broadcasts a low-orbit satellite message and supports unidirectional ranging; the LEO signal may employ a multi-beam system; the LEO signal may be a pulsed signal or a continuous signal; the LEO signal is a communication signal with a bidirectional link and supports bidirectional authentication; the LEO signal is a signal with bidirectional ranging capability and supports bidirectional ranging.
The GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for providing real positioning information and time service information for a user; the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal is a GNSS/LEO converged terminal.
At the same time, the GNSS anti-cheating terminal can at least receive one low-orbit communication satellite;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal receives the GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receives a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal carries out positioning calculation according to the received n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals to obtain signal receiving time t0Position coordinate P of GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemGSum clock difference Δ TG(ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is not less than 4; the GNSS deception signal may exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals received by the GNSS anti-deception terminal, and may be a BDS deception signal.
The low earth orbit communication satellite has a bidirectional communication link and a bidirectional authentication function. The GNSS anti-cheating terminal performs bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of the low-orbit communication satellite through bidirectional communication link signals, determines whether the received low-orbit broadcast signals or the received low-orbit communication signals are from the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, and obtains ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite;
GNSS anti-cheating terminal according to t0Constantly receiving the ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, demodulating the low-orbit satellite telegraph text, and calculating the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system according to the low-orbit satellite telegraph textL；
The GNSS anti-deception terminal measures and obtains t by using the ranging signal of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite0The distance from the low-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal at the moment is used as a trusted distance rho;
the GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for resisting cheating according to the position coordinate PGPosition coordinate PLAnd a threshold value, judging whether a deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, if the deception signal does not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, judging whether the deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals or not, and if the deception signal does not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, judging whether thePosition coordinate P of GNSS anti-deception terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemGSum clock difference Δ TGAnd sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service.
The GNSS/LEO fusion terminal can receive the LEO signal, perform bidirectional authentication according to the LEO signal, determine the authenticity of the LEO signal and improve the anti-cheating capability;
the GNSS/LEO fusion terminal can receive LEO signals, carries out two-way ranging and improves ranging precision.
The GNSS satellite comprises: one or more of a GPS satellite, a BDS satellite, a Gelileo satellite, a GLONASS satellite and a QZSS satellite.
The GNSS satellite signals include: one or more of GPS signals, BDS signals, Gelileo signals, GLONASS signals and QZSS signals.
The GNSS deception signal is one or more deception signals of a GPS signal, a BDS signal, a Gelileo signal, a GLONASS signal and a QZSS signal.
The GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for resisting cheating according to the position coordinate PGPosition coordinate PLAnd a threshold value, which is used for judging whether a deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, and specifically comprises the following steps:
obtaining position coordinates PGAnd position coordinates PLThe distance between them;
if Δ ρ>ΔρTHIf so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals;
Figure BDA0002546477050000091
Figure BDA0002546477050000092
Figure BDA0002546477050000093
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000094
Figure BDA0002546477050000095
when r-ar < h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000096
Figure BDA0002546477050000097
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is an elevation angle from the GNSS anti-cheating terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and the value range of the elevation angle theta is 0-90 degrees; (x)G,yG,zG) Position coordinates P of the GNSS anti-cheating terminal in a geocentric/geostationary coordinate systemG，(xL,yL,zL) Position coordinate P of true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemL。
The steps of the GNSS anti-spoofing method based on the low earth orbit communication satellite disclosed by the invention are shown in fig. 2. The method comprises the following steps:
1) GNSS positioning solution
Receiving n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals by using a GNSS anti-deception terminal, and performing positioning calculation to obtain a signal receiving moment t0Position coordinate P of GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemGSum clock difference Δ TG(ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is not less than 4; position coordinates P due to possible presence of GNSS spoofing signalsG(xG,yG,zG) Sum clock difference Δ TGMay be a spurious value.
2) Two-way authentication
Using a GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to receive a GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receive a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal, performing bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of a low-orbit communication satellite through a bidirectional communication link signal, determining whether the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from a truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, if the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, obtaining a ranging signal broadcast by the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3), otherwise, continuing to search the low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal until the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3);
3) LEO signal ranging
Anti-spoofing terminal using GNSS according to t0Constantly receiving the ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, demodulating the low-orbit satellite telegraph text, and calculating the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system according to the low-orbit satellite telegraph textLMeanwhile, the distance from the low-earth-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal at the time t0 is measured and obtained as a trusted distance; the LEO signal ranging can be obtained by bidirectional ranging through bidirectional link signals of a low-orbit satellite.
4) Location authentication
Obtaining a position coordinate P according to the position coordinate PG in the step 1) and the position coordinate PL in the step 3)GAnd position coordinates PLAs the distance to be authenticated
Figure BDA0002546477050000101
Obtaining a trusted distance rho and a distance to be authenticated
Figure BDA0002546477050000102
If Δ ρ is different from (d) in the case of>ΔρTHIf so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals; if the navigation signals of the n-path GNSS satellite are notIf the deception signal exists, the position coordinate P of the GNSS anti-deception terminal in the geocentric and geostationary coordinate system is determinedGSum clock difference Δ TGAnd sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service. .
Step 4) the threshold value Δ ρTHThe determination method specifically comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002546477050000111
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000112
Figure BDA0002546477050000113
when r-ar < h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000114
Figure BDA0002546477050000115
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is an elevation angle from the GNSS anti-deception terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and the value range of the elevation angle theta is 0-90 degrees.
Figure BDA0002546477050000116
(xG,yG,zG) Position coordinates P of the GNSS anti-cheating terminal in a geocentric/geostationary coordinate systemG，(xL,yL,zL) For the position coordinates of the true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate systemPL。
Examples
1) And (4) GNSS positioning resolving.
The GNSS/LEO fusion terminal receives more than four GNSS signals or GNSS deception signals and calculates the position PG and clock error of the terminal. At the terminal signal reception time t0The coordinate of the terminal in an earth-centered earth-fixed (ECEF) coordinate system is PG(xG,yG,zG) And receiver clock difference Δ TG. Position coordinates P due to possible presence of GNSS spoofing signalsG(xG,yG,zG) Sum clock difference Δ TGMay be a spurious value.
2) And (6) performing bidirectional authentication.
When the low earth orbit communication satellite has a bidirectional communication link and a bidirectional authentication function, the GNSS/LEO fusion terminal simultaneously receives LEO signals, and performs bidirectional authentication through the bidirectional communication link signals by utilizing the bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of the low earth orbit communication satellite to determine the authenticity of the LEO satellite and the LEO signals.
3) And (4) LEO signal ranging.
The GNSS/LEO fusion terminal receives the ranging signals broadcast by the LEO, demodulates the low-orbit satellite telegraph text and calculates t0The time of transmission of the ranging signal received at the moment, the ECEF coordinate P of the low-orbit satelliteL(xL,yL,zL). The terminal receives LEO signal with distance measuring ability and measures t0The trusted distance p from the time of day low earth orbit satellite to the terminal. The LEO signal ranging can be obtained by bidirectional ranging through bidirectional link signals of a low-orbit satellite.
4) And (5) location authentication.
By t0Time GNSS positioning resolving result PGWith trusted LEO satellite position PLCalculating the distance to be authenticated from the terminal to the LEO satellite
Figure BDA0002546477050000121
Calculating the distance to be authenticated
Figure BDA0002546477050000122
And can be trustedDifference of distance ρ of
Figure BDA0002546477050000123
And threshold value Δ ρTHBy comparison, if Δ ρ>ΔρTHAnd the existence of the GNSS deception signal can be judged.
Threshold value Deltarho for use in the present disclosureTHIt can be set up that the geometry of the terminal and LEO satellite is as shown in fig. 3, the earth is assumed to be a standard sphere, S represents the position of LEO satellite, O represents the earth center, S' represents the subsatellite point, P represents the true position of the terminal, P1 and P2 represent the farthest position of the terminal under the measured pseudorange error Δ r, the terminal is on the ground.
31) According to the GNSS positioning resolving result PG and the ECEF coordinates PL (x) of the low orbit satelliteL,yL,zL) Calculating to obtain t0The elevation angle theta of the time low-orbit satellite is between 0 and 90 degrees.
32) The radius of the earth is represented by R, the orbit height of a low orbit satellite is represented by h, R is the geometric distance from a terminal to an LEO satellite, Δ R is the maximum measurement error between a pseudo-range measurement value and the geometric distance R, Δ R is obtained by statistical feature prior, and the geometric distance R is calculated by using an elevation angle theta as follows:
Figure BDA0002546477050000124
33) threshold value Δ ρTHDetermined according to the following formula:
Figure BDA0002546477050000125
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000131
Figure BDA0002546477050000132
when r-ar < h,
Figure BDA0002546477050000133
Figure BDA0002546477050000134
when the radius of the earth R is 6378km, the altitude h of the low-orbit satellite is 1100km, and the maximum range error Δ R is equal to 3m and 30m, respectively, the threshold value Δ ρTHThe curve with the elevation angle theta is shown in fig. 4.
It can be seen that when LEO pseudorange measurement error is 3m, spoofing interference can be identified as long as positioning bias caused by GNSS spoofing signals exceeds 2.373km, mostly exceeds 33.73m (elevation angle less than 85 °). When the LEO pseudorange measurement error is 30m, spoofing interference can be identified as long as the positioning deviation caused by GNSS spoofing signals exceeds 7.357km, mostly exceeds 352.3m (the elevation angle is less than 85 °). And the anti-spoofing method based on the multi-point beam overlapping can identify the spoofed signal only when the positioning deviation caused by the spoofed signal exceeds the magnitude of dozens of kilometers.
Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the details of the invention not described in detail in the specification are within the skill of those skilled in the art.

Claims (7)

1. A GNSS anti-spoofing system based on low earth orbit communication satellites, comprising: a plurality of GNSS satellites, a low-orbit communication satellite constellation and a GNSS anti-cheating terminal;
the low-orbit communication satellite constellation consists of a plurality of low-orbit communication satellites;
the low-orbit communication satellite is used for broadcasting low-orbit broadcast signals or low-orbit communication signals;
the GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for providing real positioning information and time service information for a user;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal receives the GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receives a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal;
the GNSS anti-deception terminal carries out positioning calculation according to the received n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals to obtain signal receiving time t0GNSS anti-cheating terminal in geocentric groundPosition coordinate P in a fixed coordinate systemGSum clock difference Δ TG(ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is not less than 4;
the GNSS anti-cheating terminal performs bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of the low-orbit communication satellite through bidirectional communication link signals, determines whether the received low-orbit broadcast signals or the received low-orbit communication signals are from the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, and obtains ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite;
GNSS anti-cheating terminal according to t0Constantly receiving the ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, demodulating the low-orbit satellite telegraph text, and calculating the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system according to the low-orbit satellite telegraph textL；
The GNSS anti-cheating terminal measures and obtains the distance from the low-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-cheating terminal as a trusted distance rho by using the ranging signal of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite;
the GNSS anti-cheating terminal is used for resisting cheating according to the position coordinate PGPosition coordinate PLAnd a threshold value, judging whether a deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, and if the deception signal does not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, resisting the position coordinate P of the deception-resisting terminal of the GNSS in the geocentric coordinate systemGSum clock difference Δ TGAnd sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the GNSS satellite comprises: one or more of a GPS satellite, a BDS satellite, a Gelileo satellite, a GLONASS satellite and a QZSS satellite.
3. The low earth orbit communication satellite-based GNSS anti-spoofing system of claim 1, wherein the GNSS satellite signals comprise: one or more of GPS signals, BDS signals, Gelileo signals, GLONASS signals and QZSS signals.
4. The GNSS anti-spoofing system based on low earth orbit communication satellites as claimed in claim 1, wherein the GNSS spoofing signal is one or more spoofing signals of GPS signal, BDS signal, Gelileo signal, GLONASS signal and QZSS signal.
5. The GNSS anti-spoofing system based on the low earth orbit communication satellite according to any of the claims 1 to 4, characterized in that the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal is based on the position coordinate PGPosition coordinate PLAnd a threshold value, which is used for judging whether a deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, and specifically comprises the following steps:
obtaining position coordinates PGAnd position coordinates PLThe distance between them;
if Δ ρ>ΔρTHIf so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals;
Figure FDA0002546477040000021
Figure FDA0002546477040000022
Figure FDA0002546477040000023
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure FDA0002546477040000024
Figure FDA0002546477040000025
when r-ar < h,
Figure FDA0002546477040000026
Figure FDA0002546477040000027
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is the elevation angle of the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, (x)G,yG,zG) Position coordinates P of the GNSS anti-cheating terminal in a geocentric/geostationary coordinate systemG，(xL,yL,zL) Position coordinate P of true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemL。
6. A GNSS anti-deception method based on low-earth-orbit communication satellites is characterized by comprising the following steps:
1) GNSS positioning solution
Receiving n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals by using a GNSS anti-deception terminal, and performing positioning calculation to obtain a signal receiving moment t0Position coordinate P of GNSS anti-spoofing terminal in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemGSum clock difference Δ TG(ii) a Wherein n is a positive integer and is not less than 4;
2) two-way authentication
Using a GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to receive a GNSS satellite navigation signal and also receive a low-orbit broadcast signal or a low-orbit communication signal, performing bidirectional authentication by using a bidirectional authentication function of wireless resource management of a low-orbit communication satellite through a bidirectional communication link signal, determining whether the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from a truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, if the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, obtaining a ranging signal broadcast by the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3), otherwise, continuing to search the low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal until the received low-orbit broadcast signal or the low-orbit communication signal is from the truly corresponding low-orbit communication satellite and entering step 3);
3) LEO signal ranging
Anti-spoofing terminal using GNSS according to t0Constantly receiving the ranging signals broadcast by the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite, demodulating the low-orbit satellite telegraph text, and calculating the position coordinate P of the real corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in the geocentric geostationary coordinate system according to the low-orbit satellite telegraph textLMeanwhile, measuring to obtain the distance from the low-orbit communication satellite to the GNSS anti-deception terminal as a trusted distance;
4) location authentication
Obtaining a position coordinate P according to the position coordinate PG in the step 1) and the position coordinate PL in the step 3)GAnd position coordinates PLAs the distance to be authenticated
Figure FDA0002546477040000041
Obtaining a trusted distance rho and a distance to be authenticated
Figure FDA0002546477040000042
If Δ ρ is different from (d) in the case of>ΔρTHIf so, determining that deception signals exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, otherwise, determining that deception signals do not exist in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals; if no deception signal exists in the n paths of GNSS satellite navigation signals, the position coordinate P of the GNSS anti-deception terminal in the geocentric and geostationary coordinate system is determinedGSum clock difference Δ TGAnd sending the information to a user for positioning navigation and time service. .
7. The GNSS anti-spoofing system based on low earth orbit communication satellites of claim 6, wherein the threshold value Δ ρ of step 4) isTHThe determination method specifically comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002546477040000043
when r-delta r is more than or equal to h,
Figure FDA0002546477040000044
Figure FDA0002546477040000045
when r-ar < h,
Figure FDA0002546477040000046
Figure FDA0002546477040000047
wherein R represents the earth radius, h represents the orbit height of the low-orbit satellite, R is the geometric distance from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite, and delta R is the maximum pseudo-range measurement error of the ranging signal broadcast by the low-orbit communication satellite in the low-orbit communication satellite constellation; theta is an elevation angle from the GNSS anti-spoofing terminal to the low-orbit communication satellite;
Figure FDA0002546477040000048
(xG,yG,zG) Position coordinates P of the GNSS anti-cheating terminal in a geocentric/geostationary coordinate systemG，(xL,yL,zL) Position coordinate P of true corresponding low-orbit communication satellite in geocentric geostationary coordinate systemL。
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