CN111476470A - Multi-main-body investment cost allocation method based on asymmetric Nash negotiation model - Google Patents

Multi-main-body investment cost allocation method based on asymmetric Nash negotiation model Download PDF

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CN111476470A
CN111476470A CN202010235765.9A CN202010235765A CN111476470A CN 111476470 A CN111476470 A CN 111476470A CN 202010235765 A CN202010235765 A CN 202010235765A CN 111476470 A CN111476470 A CN 111476470A
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唐毓广
樊高松
黄重阳
李化林
戴承承
廖敏乐
韦丹静
陆军
周利强
周文杰
梅明顺
陈志君
梁婷婷
郭小璇
韩帅
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Chongzuo Power Supply Bureau of Guangxi Power Grid Co Ltd
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Abstract

The invention discloses a multi-subject investment cost allocation method based on an asymmetric Nash negotiation model, and belongs to the technical field of calculation, calculation or counting. The invention establishes an investment cost calculation model in a cooperative game mode, and calculates the investment cost through an energy concentrator; an investment cost sharing model is established, the cost sharing proportion is calculated by utilizing an asymmetric Nash negotiation model, the cost sharing calculation under the cooperative game mode is realized, and the cost sharing is carried out by considering various influence factors including the investment proportion, so that the stability of the cooperative alliance is facilitated. And under the environment that incremental power distribution is released, beneficial inspiration is provided for cost sharing of the multi-main-body investment incremental power distribution network.

Description

Multi-main-body investment cost allocation method based on asymmetric Nash negotiation model
Technical Field
The invention discloses a multi-subject investment cost allocation method based on an asymmetric Nash negotiation model, and belongs to the technical field of calculation, calculation or counting.
Background
For a long time, power distribution networks have been invested, built and operated by power grid enterprises. With continuous deepening of the reform of the Chinese electric power system, the national development and improvement committee and the national energy source bureau release an ordered release power distribution network service management method, so that the ordered investment and operation of social capital are encouraged, the construction and development of a power distribution network are promoted, the operation efficiency of the power distribution network is improved, three batches of 291 incremental power distribution projects are successively developed, and more investment subjects are introduced into the field of incremental power distribution.
In a collaboration, the stability of a federation depends on whether the revenue or cost of the federation is reasonably distributed, but little research has been done on the problem of cost sharing in the field of incremental power distribution. Under the environment is let go on in increment distribution, each investment main part adopts different modes investment increment distribution network, and the factor that influences cost sharing has a lot, like investment proportion, risk sharing proportion, enterprise's core ability etc. simple carry out cost sharing according to the investment proportion is one-sidedly, consequently, need to provide a more fair sharing method urgently, the influence factor of the different cost sharing of full consideration for cost sharing is more reasonable and fair, ensures the stability of alliance.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a multi-subject investment cost allocation method based on an asymmetric Nash negotiation model aiming at the defects of the background technology, realizes the calculation of cost allocation under a cooperative game mode by considering a plurality of influence factors including investment proportion, and solves the technical problem of one-sided investment cost allocation scheme under the environment of releasing the existing incremental power distribution discharge service.
The invention adopts the following technical scheme for realizing the aim of the invention:
a multi-subject investment cost allocation method based on an asymmetric Nash negotiation model adopts an energy concentrator topology which converts electric energy into heat energy to carry out internal optimization on the required capacity, the electric quantity purchased and the gas quantity purchased of each energy conversion device, calculating the total construction cost and the total operation cost according to the required capacity, the electricity purchasing amount and the gas purchasing amount of each energy conversion device, optimizing the investment proportion of each investment subject according to the total construction cost, determining the weight of each investment subject according to the investment proportion, risk sharing coefficient and core capacity coefficient of each investment subject, and establishing an asymmetric Nash negotiation model according to the difference between the final cost sharing coefficient of each investment subject and the respective least ideal sharing coefficient and the weight of each investment subject, and solving the asymmetric Nash negotiation model from a negotiation base point determined by the ratio of the most ideal sharing coefficient to the least ideal sharing coefficient of each investment subject to obtain the final sharing coefficient meeting the satisfaction degree of each investment subject.
Further, based on the multi-subject investment cost apportionment method of the asymmetric Nash negotiation model, the energy hub topology comprises: power transformers, micro gas turbines, gas boilers, electric boilers; after the purchased electric energy passes through the power transformer, one part of the electric energy is input into the electric boiler to be converted into heat energy and then is supplied to a cold and hot load, and the other part of the electric energy and the electric energy supplied by the stored energy are summarized and then are supplied to a pure electric load; one part of the purchased natural gas is input into the micro gas turbine to be converted into electric energy for supplying a pure electric load and heat energy for supplying a cold and heat load, and the other part of the purchased natural gas is input into the gas boiler to be converted into heat energy for supplying the cold and heat load.
Furthermore, based on the multi-subject investment cost allocation method of the asymmetric Nash negotiation model, the expression for carrying out internal optimization on the required capacity, the electricity purchasing quantity and the gas purchasing quantity of each energy conversion device is as follows:
Figure BDA0002430910610000021
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002430910610000022
for the pure thermal energy load at time t,
Figure BDA0002430910610000023
is the cold and hot load at time t,
Figure BDA0002430910610000024
for power transformer efficiency, αEBCoefficient of distribution of electric energy to electric boilers from purchased electric energy, αMTTo distribute the coefficients of natural gas from the purchased natural gas to the micro gas turbines,
Figure BDA0002430910610000025
for the efficiency of converting natural gas into electric energy through the micro gas turbine,
Figure BDA0002430910610000026
for the efficiency of converting natural gas into heat energy through the micro gas turbine,
Figure BDA0002430910610000027
in order to be able to store the energy capacity,
Figure BDA0002430910610000028
in order to purchase the capacity of the natural gas,
Figure BDA0002430910610000029
is the amount of power purchased.
Furthermore, the multi-main-body investment cost allocation method based on the asymmetric Nash negotiation model comprises the following steps of total construction cost including power distribution network construction cost, energy conversion equipment construction cost and energy storage construction cost:
Figure BDA00024309106100000210
the energy storage construction cost is as follows:
Figure BDA00024309106100000211
for the construction cost of energy conversion equipment, SMT、SEB、SGBRespectively, equipment capacity of micro gas turbine, electric boiler, gas boiler, ξMT、ξEB、ξGBThe capacities of the micro gas turbine, the electric boiler and the gas boiler are respectively the unit price,
Figure BDA00024309106100000212
in order to save the energy and build the cost,
Figure BDA00024309106100000213
capacity for energy storage, pesFor the unit price per capacity of stored energy,es1for the purpose of energy storage and annual investment coefficient,es2energy storage operation maintenance cost coefficient.
Furthermore, the total operation cost of the multi-subject investment cost allocation method based on the asymmetric Nash negotiation model is as follows:
Figure BDA0002430910610000031
in order to account for the total cost of operation,
Figure BDA0002430910610000032
in order to increase the cost of purchasing natural gas,
Figure BDA0002430910610000033
in order to purchase the cost of the electrical energy to the grid,
Figure BDA0002430910610000034
in order to purchase the cost of the electrical energy to the stored energy,
Figure BDA0002430910610000035
Figure BDA0002430910610000036
for purchased natural gas capacity, ξbgtThe unit price of the natural gas purchased for the t-th time period,
Figure BDA0002430910610000037
for the amount of power purchased ξbetFor the unit price of purchasing power in the t-th time period,
Figure BDA0002430910610000038
capacity for energy storage, ξvetThe unit price of the electricity price at the bottom time in the t-th time period.
Further, the multi-subject investment cost allocation method based on the asymmetric Nash negotiation model is as follows:
Figure BDA0002430910610000039
v is the sum of the final cost allocation coefficients of all investment bodies and the difference of the respective least ideal allocation coefficients,
Figure BDA00024309106100000310
the result is shared between the optimal and the optimal cost of the ith investment entity,
Figure BDA00024309106100000311
Figure BDA00024309106100000312
d1iproposing a cost allocation proportion to be borne by the 1 st investment entity in the allocation plan for the ith investment entity, d2iProposing a cost allocation proportion to be borne by the 2 nd investment entity in the allocation plan for the ith investment entity, dniProposing a cost sharing proportion, y, to be borne by the nth investment entity in the sharing scheme for the ith investment entityiAddition made to the ith investment entity, xiIs the weight of the ith investment entity,
Figure BDA00024309106100000313
and the final cost sharing coefficient is the ith investment subject, and n is the total number of the investment subjects.
Further, the multi-main-body investment cost allocation method based on the asymmetric Nash negotiation model has the following satisfaction degrees of all investment main bodies:
Figure BDA00024309106100000314
λito the satisfaction of the ith investment entity,
Figure BDA00024309106100000315
the optimal cost apportionment result for the ith investment entity,
Figure BDA0002430910610000041
and (4) the final cost sharing coefficient of the ith investment entity.
By adopting the technical scheme, the invention has the following beneficial effects: the invention provides a multi-main-body investment cost allocation method based on an asymmetric Nash negotiation model, which adopts an energy concentrator topology considering the path of converting electric energy into heat energy to optimize the required capacity, the electric power purchasing amount and the gas purchasing amount of each energy conversion device, optimizes the construction total cost and the operation total cost according to the optimization results of the required capacity, the electric power purchasing amount and the gas purchasing amount of each energy conversion device, determines the weight of each investment main body according to the optimized investment proportion, the risk allocation coefficient and the core capacity coefficient, establishes the Nash asymmetric negotiation model according to the weight of each investment main body and the difference between the final cost allocation coefficient and the respective least ideal allocation coefficient, reasonably optimizes the capacity, the electric power purchasing amount and the gas purchasing amount of the energy conversion device by taking the actual electric load and cold and heat load requirements as targets, and further, the investment cost sharing under the environment of releasing the incremental power distribution discharge service is realized, so that the sharing result has higher alliance acceptance, and the overall stability of the cooperative alliance is favorably maintained.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a topology of an energy hub.
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a multi-subject investment cost apportionment method based on an asymmetric Nash negotiation model.
Fig. 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), and 3(d) are schematic diagrams of social risk sharing proportion, construction risk sharing proportion, operation risk sharing proportion, and policy risk sharing proportion of each investment entity, respectively.
Fig. 4(a), fig. 4(b), fig. 4(c), and fig. 4(d) are schematic diagrams of the weight occupied by the investment proportion, risk share coefficient, core ability coefficient, and integrated weight of each type of investment entity, respectively.
FIG. 5 is a comparison graph of negotiation base points and post-negotiation satisfaction.
Detailed Description
The technical scheme of the invention is explained in detail in the following with reference to the attached drawings.
The multi-subject investment cost allocation method based on the asymmetric Nash negotiation model, as shown in FIG. 2, includes the following two steps.
The method comprises the following steps: establishing an investment cost calculation model in a cooperative game mode, and calculating the investment cost through an energy concentrator
(1) Establishment of energy hub model
With the gradual release of the incremental power distribution business, more and more investment subjects are involved in the incremental power distribution project, and the mutual cooperation among the investment subjects can reduce the total investment cost and promote the efficient utilization of resources. The investment main bodies can be divided into three types, wherein the first type is the investment main body which can realize independent operation, entrusted operation and leasing operation and is represented by a power grid company; the second type is an investment body which can realize lease operation and is represented by power generation enterprises, local governments, social capital and energy storage enterprises; the third category is an investment entity that can realize direct operation and rental operation, represented by cooling, heating, and gas supply enterprises. Specifically, it can be expressed as:
Figure BDA0002430910610000051
under the cooperative game mode of the incremental distribution network environment, A, B, C investment subjects have a cooperative relationship, cooperation is realized through an energy conversion device on the basis of mutual conversion among electricity, heat and gas, on the basis of certain load, the price of electricity, heat and gas at different time intervals is taken as guidance, and energy conversion is carried out through the energy conversion device, so that the overall investment cost of the alliance is minimized. To calculate the investment cost, an energy hub model is introduced. Under the given or known conditions of load and energy price, the required capacity, the electricity and gas purchasing quantity of each energy conversion device are obtained through internal optimization of the energy concentrator, and therefore investment cost is calculated. The typical energy hub model is composed of a power transformer, a micro turbine mt (micro turbine), and a gas boiler (gas boiler), but the typical energy hub does not involve energy conversion from electricity to heat. Therefore, the topological structure of the energy concentrator is designed by considering the additional arrangement of a heat boiler and the conversion of electric energy into heat energy, wherein the input link comprises the purchased electric energy
Figure BDA0002430910610000052
And purchased natural gas
Figure BDA0002430910610000053
The part of electric energy is supplied to pure electric load through a distribution network transformer
Figure BDA0002430910610000054
And the electric boiler EB into heat energy. Natural gas is simultaneously input into a micro gas turbine and a gas boiler(ii) a The output link consists of two parts of electric energy and cold and heat energy, wherein the electric distribution network transformer, the energy storage device and the micro gas turbine supply the output electric energy, the GB, the MT and the electric boiler jointly generate the cold and heat energy for output, and the topological structure of the energy concentrator is designed as shown in figure 1.
Thus, the output and input quantities may be represented in a matrix, introducing a distribution coefficient αMT、αEBThe distribution coefficient determines the distribution ratio of electrical energy to thermal energy, which varies with load, and the coupling coefficient of the matrix is determined by the efficiency of the device, 0 ≦ α, by definitionMT≤1，
Figure BDA0002430910610000055
Representing the amount of natural gas consumed to the micro gas turbine,
Figure BDA0002430910610000056
representing the amount of natural gas consumed in the gas boiler, 0- αEB≤1，
Figure BDA0002430910610000057
Which represents the electric energy consumed when the electric boiler converts electric energy into heat energy.
Figure BDA0002430910610000061
In the formula (2), the reaction mixture is,
Figure BDA0002430910610000062
and
Figure BDA0002430910610000063
the conversion efficiency of converting natural gas into electric energy and heat energy through MT respectively;
Figure BDA0002430910610000064
the transformer efficiency;
Figure BDA0002430910610000065
for cooling and heating gas-fired boilersEnergy efficiency ratio of (d);
Figure BDA0002430910610000066
is the energy of stored energy.
(2) Multi-subject investment cost calculation
1) Total cost of construction
Under the condition that all investment main bodies cooperate, the construction cost around the energy concentrator mainly comprises the construction cost of a power distribution network, the construction cost of energy conversion equipment in the energy concentrator and the construction cost of energy storage.
Figure BDA0002430910610000067
In the formula (3), the reaction mixture is,
Figure BDA0002430910610000068
represents the total cost of the construction,
Figure BDA0002430910610000069
the construction cost of the power distribution network is shown,
Figure BDA00024309106100000610
represents the construction cost of the energy conversion equipment in the energy hub,
Figure BDA00024309106100000611
and the construction cost for energy storage is saved.
1-1) construction cost of distribution network
The construction cost of the distribution network can be calculated according to equation (4):
Figure BDA00024309106100000612
in the formula (4), C0tConverting fixed construction costs for distribution networks to annual values, including substation investment CtranAnd new line cost Cline，0tThe annual coefficient of the construction cost is fixed for the power distribution network; c1tFor the operation and maintenance cost, including material cost, repair cost and compensation,1tfor operation and maintenanceThe cost rate; c2tFor loss cost, βtThe comprehensive network loss rate, Q, of the incremental distribution network in the t yeartThe power is predicted for the delta distribution network of the t year,
Figure BDA00024309106100000613
and the average power price of the incremental distribution network in the t year is shown. C3tFor the cost of power failure loss, M is the load point number of the power distribution network; rovenThe electricity generation ratio is expressed in yuan/kWh; EENSmThe Expected power shortage value (Expected Energy Not Supplied) of the load node m in the research period (kWh/period) can be obtained by calculating the reliability of the system. For CtranAnd ClineThe calculation can be made according to the following formula:
Figure BDA0002430910610000071
in the formula (5), atranThe part is a fixed part, which is a part irrelevant to the capacity of the transformer substation in investment; btranIs a variable part and refers to a coefficient which is in linear relation with the capacity of the transformer substation in investment, S is the capacity of the transformer substation, LlineThe length of the line to be built is taken as the length of the line to be built; a islineThe fixed part is the coefficient of the part which is irrelevant to the sectional area of the lead in investment; blineThe variable part is a coefficient which has a linear relation with the sectional area of the wire in investment; a. thelineIs the cross-sectional area of the wire.
1-2) construction cost of energy conversion equipment
For equipment such as gas turbines, gas boilers and heat boilers in energy converters, the estimation can be performed according to the capacity and unit price of the equipment, as shown in the following formula:
Figure BDA0002430910610000072
in the formula (6), SMT、SEB、SGBPlant capacities of gas turbine, thermal boiler, gas boiler, respectively, ξMT、ξEB、ξGBRespectively, the volumes of gas turbine, heat boiler and gas boilerThe amount is monovalent.
1-3) energy storage construction cost
The energy storage construction cost can be calculated according to the following formula:
Figure BDA0002430910610000073
in the formula (7), the reaction mixture is,
Figure BDA0002430910610000074
investment capacity for energy storage, pesThe unit price per capacity is the unit price,es1for the purpose of energy storage and annual investment coefficient,es2energy storage operation maintenance cost coefficient.
2) Total cost of operation
The operating costs include the cost of purchasing electrical energy from the grid, the cost of purchasing natural gas, and the cost of storing energy, which can be calculated according to the following equation:
Figure BDA0002430910610000081
in the formula (8), the reaction mixture is,
Figure BDA0002430910610000082
which represents the total cost of the operation,in order to obtain the total cost of electricity,
Figure BDA0002430910610000084
in order to purchase the cost of the electrical energy to the grid,
Figure BDA0002430910610000085
for the purchase cost of the stored energy, T is unit time, generally one hour, 8760, ξbetUnit price for purchasing electric energy in the t-th time period, ξvetThe unit price of the electricity price at the bottom time in the t-th time period,
Figure BDA0002430910610000086
indicating the natural gas composition of the input systemThis, ξbgtThe unit price of purchasing natural gas for the t-th time period.
Step two: establishing an investment cost allocation model, and calculating a cost allocation proportion by using an asymmetric Nash negotiation model
1) Determining cost-sharing impact factor ratios
1-1) proportion of investment
The investment proportion is a major factor affecting the cost split. The investment degree of each investment subject to the incremental power distribution project is different. Under fairness principles, more investors should incur more cost, while less investors incur less cost. And (3) obtaining investment values of all investment subjects according to the steps 1-1) to 1-3) of the optimization of the energy concentrator, and calculating the investment proportion according to the investment values. Setting the investment proportion of each investment subject as IiThe method comprises the following steps:
∑Ii＝1 (9)。
1-2) Risk-Allocation coefficient
In the process from incremental power distribution project construction to operation, each investment subject needs to bear various risks, such as social risk, construction risk, operation risk and policy risk, the proportion of the various risks borne by each investment subject is different, and in the process of cost allocation, the condition that the investment subject bears the risks needs to be considered as an important basis for cost allocationlThe coefficient of the ith participant sharing the ith risk is RilThe method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002430910610000091
the risk sharing coefficient of each investment subject is as follows:
Figure BDA0002430910610000092
1-3) core Capacity coefficient
Innovation capability, core technology and collaborationThese three aspects of capability constitute the core capabilities of an enterprise. In incremental power distribution business, innovation capability means that each investment subject represents the value of the alliance according to the personal talent reserve, information acquisition and the like. The core technology mainly refers to unique technologies and management capabilities of all investment subjects, such as power distribution network management operation experience of power grid enterprises. If the core technology of an investment entity is stronger, its core capability factor is also larger. Synergy refers to the ability of each investor to ensure that the project proceeds smoothly during the project investment, construction and operation processes. The stronger the synergy, the greater the core competition coefficient. The core ability coefficient is obtained by scoring by experts, and the core ability coefficient of each investment subject is set as EiThen, there are:
∑Ei＝1 (12)。
1-4) weight occupied by investment entity
The weight of the investment subject is determined by the investment proportion, the risk sharing coefficient and the core capability coefficient. Weight x occupied by investment entityiAs follows:
Figure BDA0002430910610000093
2) cost allocation based on asymmetric Nash negotiation model
We can consider all participating investment entities as a federation, and we have established an index system for the federation, with each investment entity offering its own cost allocation scheme according to the index system established by the federation. Assuming that there are n investment bodies in the coalition and each investment body proposes a contribution scheme based on the initial investment, djiRepresenting the proportion of the cost contribution that the jth investment entity should bear in the proposed allocation scheme of the ith investment entity. The apportionment scheme proposed by the ith investment entity is therefore:
Di＝{d1i,d2i,…,dji,…,dni} (14)。
then, the cost allocation scheme proposed by all investment bodies forms a coefficient matrix as:
Figure BDA0002430910610000101
Figure BDA0002430910610000102
in equation (16), the optimal and the optimal cost sharing results of the ith investment entity are respectively:
Figure BDA0002430910610000103
thus, the set of individually most desirable and least desirable cost sharing schemes for each investment entity in the federation is:
Figure BDA0002430910610000104
from the above formula, although the optimal solution set can satisfy the wishes of each investment entity, it does not satisfy the constraint condition of distribution coefficient sum being 1, so it needs to negotiate in the alliance, each investment entity needs to accept an increased coefficient, and the actual cost of the investment entity is properly increased on the original basis, and the final cost share of the ith investment entity can be expressed as:
Figure BDA0002430910610000105
in the formula (19), yiRepresents the increase made by the ith investment entity and satisfies the condition:
Figure BDA0002430910610000106
thus, negotiation of a league is essentially an ideal allocation scheme through investment bodies
Figure BDA0002430910610000107
Seeking the optimal coefficient of increase y1,y2,…,ynThe process of (c).
Thus, the satisfaction of each party can be defined as:
Figure BDA0002430910610000108
in the formula (21), λ is 0. ltoreqiLess than or equal to 1, and the satisfaction is lambdai，λiLarger indicates higher satisfaction. The base points of negotiation are:
Figure BDA0002430910610000111
negotiation is carried out according to the negotiation base point until a satisfactory result is reached, and simultaneously, the negotiation base point must be provided with
Figure BDA0002430910610000112
Otherwise, negotiation fails. The asymmetric Nash negotiation model for the alliance cost apportionment is as follows:
Figure BDA0002430910610000113
wherein in the objective function
Figure BDA0002430910610000114
Represents the final cost share coefficient of the ith investment entity, and
Figure BDA0002430910610000115
representing the difference, x, between the final cost contribution factor and the least desirable factor for the ith investment entityiAnd the weight of the investment entity. Obviously, the larger the difference, the better. And solving the formula to obtain a final cost apportionment coefficient.
The investment cost of various investment subjects calculated according to the energy hub is assumed as follows: the percentage of investment of main investment in class A is 55.14%, the percentage of investment of main investment in class B is 14.34%, and the percentage of investment of main investment in class C is 30.52%. Each main body provides an initial cost apportionment proportion according to the proportion:
Figure BDA0002430910610000116
the incremental power distribution project mainly has social risks, construction risks, operation risks and policy risks. According to the evaluation of the experts on the above 4 types of risks, the risk sharing conditions of various investment subjects are shown in fig. 3(a), fig. 3(b), fig. 3(c) and fig. 3 (d). The weight of each investment entity is determined according to the investment proportion, the risk sharing coefficient and the core capacity, as shown in fig. 4(a), fig. 4(b), fig. 4(c) and fig. 4 (d). The three investment subjects negotiate by the formula (23) to obtain the final profit sharing coefficient as follows:
Figure BDA0002430910610000117
after determining the final cost split ratio, the stable situation of the federation is analyzed. The negotiation base point and the final satisfaction degree of each type of investment entity can be obtained according to the formula (21) and the formula (22), as shown in fig. 5.
As can be seen from fig. 5, the final satisfaction degrees of all the investment subjects are greater than the respective negotiation base points, which shows that all parties can accept the negotiation results by adopting the technical scheme, and meanwhile, the final cost sharing proportion is lower than the highest distribution proportion of each investment subject in the initial distribution matrix, and the negotiation results take the benefits of each individual into consideration. Under the condition of ensuring the maximization of the benefits of the alliances, the cost of each investment subject in the alliances is correspondingly shared through negotiation. By the technical scheme, the satisfaction degree of each main body of the alliance can be improved, and the equilibrium effect of the alliance can be maintained.
In conclusion, the energy hub topology optimization investment proportion is adopted, and a Nash asymmetric negotiation model is established by combining the weight occupied by each investment subject and the difference between the final cost sharing coefficient of each investment subject and the respectively least ideal sharing coefficient, so that the cost sharing calculation considering various factors including the investment proportion and the like under the cooperative game mode is realized, the obtained sharing scheme is fairer and more reasonable, and the method is suitable for investment cost sharing under the environment of incremental power distribution discharge service release.

Claims (7)

1. A multi-main-body investment cost allocation method based on an asymmetric Nash negotiation model is characterized in that energy hub topology which converts electric energy into heat energy is adopted to carry out internal optimization on the required capacity, the electricity purchasing quantity and the gas purchasing quantity of each energy conversion device, construction total cost and operation total cost are calculated according to the required capacity, the electricity purchasing quantity and the gas purchasing quantity of each energy conversion device, the investment proportion of each investment main body is optimized according to the construction total cost, the weight of each investment main body is determined according to the investment proportion, the risk allocation coefficient and the core capacity coefficient of each investment main body, the asymmetric Nash negotiation model is established according to the difference between the final cost allocation coefficient of each investment main body and the respective least ideal allocation coefficient and the weight of each investment main body, the asymmetric Nash negotiation model is solved from a negotiation base point determined by the ratio of the most ideal allocation coefficient and the least ideal allocation coefficient of each investment main body, and the most satisfactory degree of each investment main body is And (4) final partition coefficient.
2. The asymmetric Nash negotiation model-based multi-subject investment cost apportionment method of claim 1, wherein the energy hub topology comprises: power transformers, micro gas turbines, gas boilers, electric boilers; after the purchased electric energy passes through the power transformer, one part of the electric energy is input into the electric boiler to be converted into heat energy and then is supplied to a cold and hot load, and the other part of the electric energy and the electric energy supplied by the stored energy are summarized and then are supplied to a pure electric load; one part of the purchased natural gas is input into the micro gas turbine to be converted into electric energy for supplying a pure electric load and heat energy for supplying a cold and heat load, and the other part of the purchased natural gas is input into the gas boiler to be converted into heat energy for supplying the cold and heat load.
3. The multi-subject investment cost sharing method based on the asymmetric Nash negotiation model as claimed in claim 2, wherein the expression for internally optimizing the required capacity, the power purchase amount and the gas purchase amount of each energy conversion device is as follows:
Figure FDA0002430910600000011
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0002430910600000012
for the pure thermal energy load at time t,
Figure FDA0002430910600000013
is the cold and hot load at time t,
Figure FDA0002430910600000014
for power transformer efficiency, αEBCoefficient of distribution of electric energy to electric boilers from purchased electric energy, αMTTo distribute the coefficients of natural gas from the purchased natural gas to the micro gas turbines,
Figure FDA0002430910600000015
for the efficiency of converting natural gas into electric energy through the micro gas turbine,
Figure FDA0002430910600000016
for the efficiency of converting natural gas into heat energy through the micro gas turbine,
Figure FDA0002430910600000017
in order to be able to store the energy capacity,
Figure FDA0002430910600000018
for the purchased natural gas capacity, Pe SIs the amount of power purchased.
4. The multi-subject investment cost sharing method based on the asymmetric Nash negotiation model as claimed in claim 2, wherein the total construction cost comprises power distribution network construction cost, energy conversion equipment construction cost and energy storage construction cost, and the energy conversion equipment construction cost is as follows:
Figure FDA0002430910600000021
the energy storage construction cost is as follows:
Figure FDA0002430910600000022
Figure FDA0002430910600000023
for the construction cost of energy conversion equipment, SMT、SEB、SGBRespectively, equipment capacity of micro gas turbine, electric boiler, gas boiler, ξMT、ξEB、ξGBThe capacities of the micro gas turbine, the electric boiler and the gas boiler are respectively the unit price,
Figure FDA0002430910600000024
in order to save the energy and build the cost,
Figure FDA0002430910600000025
capacity for energy storage, pesFor the unit price per capacity of stored energy,es1for the purpose of energy storage and annual investment coefficient,es2energy storage operation maintenance cost coefficient.
5. The multi-subject investment cost sharing method based on the asymmetric Nash negotiation model as claimed in claim 2, wherein the total operation cost is:
Figure FDA0002430910600000026
Figure FDA0002430910600000027
in order to account for the total cost of operation,
Figure FDA0002430910600000028
in order to increase the cost of purchasing natural gas,
Figure FDA0002430910600000029
in order to purchase the cost of the electrical energy to the grid,
Figure FDA00024309106000000210
in order to purchase the cost of the electrical energy to the stored energy,
Figure FDA00024309106000000211
Figure FDA00024309106000000212
for purchased natural gas capacity, ξbgtUnit price, P, for purchasing natural gas in the t-th time periode SFor the amount of power purchased ξbetFor the unit price of purchasing power in the t-th time period,
Figure FDA00024309106000000213
capacity for energy storage, ξvetThe unit price of the electricity price at the bottom time in the t-th time period.
6. The multi-subject investment cost apportionment method based on the asymmetric Nash negotiation model according to claim 1, wherein the asymmetric Nash negotiation model is:
Figure FDA00024309106000000214
v is the sum of the final cost allocation coefficients of all investment bodies and the difference of the respective least ideal allocation coefficients,
Figure FDA00024309106000000215
the result is shared between the optimal and the optimal cost of the ith investment entity,
Figure FDA00024309106000000216
d1iproposing a cost allocation proportion to be borne by the 1 st investment entity in the allocation plan for the ith investment entity, d2iProposing a cost allocation proportion to be borne by the 2 nd investment entity in the allocation plan for the ith investment entity, dniProposing a cost sharing proportion, y, to be borne by the nth investment entity in the sharing scheme for the ith investment entityiAddition made to the ith investment entity, xiIs the weight of the ith investment entity,
Figure FDA0002430910600000031
and the final cost sharing coefficient is the ith investment subject, and n is the total number of the investment subjects.
7. The method according to claim 1, wherein the satisfaction degrees of the investment subjects are:
Figure FDA0002430910600000032
λito the satisfaction of the ith investment entity,
Figure FDA0002430910600000033
the optimal cost apportionment result for the ith investment entity,
Figure FDA0002430910600000034
and (4) the final cost sharing coefficient of the ith investment entity.
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Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN112182913A (en) * 2020-10-27 2021-01-05 国网江苏省电力有限公司经济技术研究院 Energy hub profit optimization method
CN112348343A (en) * 2020-10-30 2021-02-09 杭州意能电力技术有限公司 Uncertainty-considered multi-energy flow distribution network operation cost evaluation method
WO2022011968A1 (en) * 2020-07-17 2022-01-20 广西电网有限责任公司电力科学研究院 Multi-agent investment proportion optimization method and system based on cooperative game

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2022011968A1 (en) * 2020-07-17 2022-01-20 广西电网有限责任公司电力科学研究院 Multi-agent investment proportion optimization method and system based on cooperative game
CN112182913A (en) * 2020-10-27 2021-01-05 国网江苏省电力有限公司经济技术研究院 Energy hub profit optimization method
CN112348343A (en) * 2020-10-30 2021-02-09 杭州意能电力技术有限公司 Uncertainty-considered multi-energy flow distribution network operation cost evaluation method

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