CN110361761A - A kind of production GNSS cheating interference method - Google Patents
A kind of production GNSS cheating interference method Download PDFInfo
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
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- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of production GNSS cheating interference methods, method includes the following steps: step 1: real satellite signal being transmitted to GNSS receiver, obtains real satellite signal；Step 2: deception control being carried out to real satellite signal according to real satellite signal, is generated with real satellite signal with frequency, same to phase, and level is higher than the cheating interference signal of real satellite signal；Step 3: the cheating interference signal of high level being inputted into satellite navigation receiver, automatic growth control AGC reduces gain, satellite navigation receiver and real satellite signal losing lock after reducing gain；Step 4: if the satellite navigation receiver of losing lock and cheating interference semaphore lock, enabled cheat continues to repeat step 2-4, until enabled cheat if the satellite navigation receiver of losing lock and cheating interference signal are unlocked.The method realizes applicable Global Satellite Navigation System receiver satellite-signal deception measures, quickly accesses satellite navigation receiver, realizes navigation deception.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of satellite navigation deception, in particular to a generating type GNSS deception jamming method.
Background
The GNSS has the characteristics of all weather, all Time and all direction, and can provide Position, speed and Time information for a user. The GNSS system plays a vital role in the aspects of production and life of people. Currently, GNSS systems mainly include four major satellite navigation systems of us GPS, chinese BDS, russian GLONASS, and european GALILEO. The GNSS system modulates carrier waves and pseudo codes twice in a data form by broadcasting navigation signals and satellite messages to form radio waves and then continuously radiates the radio waves to the ground. The receiver obtains satellite positions and pseudo-range information through the received satellite signals to perform positioning calculation.
With the gradual expansion of satellite navigation applications, satellite navigation spoofing technology is increasingly widely applied. The deception jamming source can emit jamming signals similar to the real navigation signal structure, the receiver captures and tracks the deception signals under the condition that the receiver is unconscious, and the navigation information carried by the deception signals is decoded to conduct positioning calculation, so that deception effects are generated. With the development of Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology, the flexibility of implementing the deceptive jamming attack is greater and the implementation cost is lower. This undoubtedly makes the threat facing civilian receivers even more significant.
According to different generation modes of the deception jamming signals, the method can be divided into forwarding deception jamming and generating deception jamming:
(1) the repeater deception jamming means that a deception party only receives real satellite navigation signals through a receiver antenna, then performs appropriate power amplification, and then aims at a target receiver through a corresponding transmitting antenna to perform signal transmission. It can be seen that the spoofing process generates a signal delay, and the controllable delay is a control quantity when the spoofing interference is formed by the forwarding spoofing interference. The repeater type deception process is simple, the navigation message transmitted by the satellite signal does not need to be changed, but the deception process of the repeater type interference is simple, and the receiver can detect the existence of the deception signal by carrying out some simple anti-deception measures.
(2) And (3) generating deception jamming, namely directly copying a radio frequency carrier, a spreading code and a navigation data bit, because the information is public and transparent corresponding to the GNSS civil signal. By changing the values of the parameters to make them different from the real signals, the receiver can generate wrong navigation positioning results after acquiring and tracking deceptive signals.
The existing generative deception jamming can be divided into primary, intermediate and high-level generative deception jamming according to the complexity of realization and the difficulty of detecting the deception jamming.
Primary generation spoofing: the system mainly comprises a GNSS signal simulator, a radio frequency transmitting antenna and a signal power amplifier. Due to the lack of relevant a priori information, the satellite signals generated by the simulator are difficult to keep in synchronization with the real satellite signals. Such spoofed signals thus appear to the GNSS receiver to be noise to some extent. However, such spoofed signals can seriously affect the acquisition procedure of the receiver, resulting in a degradation of the acquisition performance, thereby forcing the receiver to lose lock or reacquire.
Medium level generative jamming: the system adopts a working mode of firstly receiving GNSS information, then generating a deception signal and then transmitting the deception signal, so that the interference system has three modules of receiving, deception and transmitting. Firstly, a built-in receiving module receives a real satellite navigation signal to obtain information such as a code phase, carrier Doppler, satellite ephemeris and the like, then a deception signal synchronous with the real signal is constructed by the information, and finally the constructed deception signal is transmitted to a receiving antenna of a target receiver.
Advanced generative jamming: compared with the medium-level generated deception jamming, the high-level generated deception jamming overcomes the defect of a single transmitting antenna, and joint deception is performed by using a plurality of medium-level generated jamming sources, so that the deception jamming resisting technology based on DOA detection can be defeated. However, in order to realize the spoofing interference, the precise coordinate point of the target receiver antenna needs to be known, and the complexity for realizing the spoofing interference is much larger than that of the primary and the intermediate level, because based on the complexity of the intermediate level generation formula, the pseudo range spoofing values of a plurality of intermediate level spoofing interference sources are converged to one point, so that the clock synchronization between the pseudo range spoofing values is very important. It can therefore be seen that the effective range of such spoofing interference is limited. Accurate phase estimation also requires that the distance of the interferer from the target receiver not be too large, which is also a physical limitation of such spoofing interference.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a generating GNSS deception jamming method. The method does not need the accurate target position of the target receiver, is suitable for the satellite signal deception method of the global satellite navigation system receiver, can be quickly accessed into the satellite navigation receiver, and realizes navigation deception.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a method for generating GNSS spoofing interference, comprising the following steps: step 1: receiving a real satellite signal transmitted by a real satellite navigation system into a GNSS receiver to obtain a real satellite signal; step 2: in the GNSS receiver, deception control is carried out on a real satellite signal according to the real satellite signal, and a deception interference signal which has the same frequency and phase with the real satellite signal and the level higher than the real satellite signal is generated; and step 3: inputting a high-level deception jamming signal into a satellite navigation receiver, controlling AGC (automatic gain control) in the satellite navigation receiver to reduce gain, and unlocking the satellite navigation receiver after the gain is reduced from a real satellite signal; and 4, step 4: and if the unlocked satellite navigation receiver is locked with the deception jamming signal, the deception is successful, and if the unlocked satellite navigation receiver is not locked with the deception jamming signal, the step 2-4 is continuously repeated until the deception is successful.
Most preferably, the method of spoofing control comprises the steps of: step 2.1: copying a local copy signal which has the same frequency and phase as the real satellite signal according to the real satellite signal; step 2.2: simultaneously inputting the local copy signal and the real satellite signal into a GNSS receiver to generate an input signal of the antenna aperture of the GNSS receiver; step 2.3: carrying out intermediate frequency sampling on an input signal to generate an intermediate frequency sampling signal; step 2.4: carrying out coherent demodulation processing on the intermediate frequency sampling signal and the input signal, and outputting a coherent output signal; step 2.5: and adjusting the signal information of the coherent output signal to obtain a deception jamming signal with the level higher than that of a real satellite signal.
Most preferably, the real satellite signals are calculated from the position of the target receiver; the real satellite signal comprises ephemeris information and time information transmitted by a real satellite navigation system; the time information is accurate second pulse of the whole second; the real satellite signal is ST(t) and satisfies:
wherein t is an accurate whole second pulse; pTThe true satellite signal power of the antenna aperture is received; dk(t) ephemeris information for a kth satellite; c. Ck(t) represents a spreading code of the kth satellite; omega is the angular frequency of the GNSS satellite signal frequency point; phi is akIndicating the initial phase of the k-th satellite GNSS frequency carrier.
Most preferably, the local replica signal is SS(t) and satisfies:
wherein, PSSpoofing the interference signal power for the receiving antenna aperture; delta tau is the time delay of the deception signal relative to the real signal; dsk(t) ephemeris information contained in the false signal of the kth satellite; the local replica signal is identical to the ephemeris information of the real satellite signal.
Most preferably, the input signal is r (t); a part of the noise signals in the input signal R (t) are n (t), and R (t) satisfies:
R(t)＝ST(t)+SS(t)+n(t)
most preferably, the intermediate frequency sampled signal is R [ nT ]s]And satisfies the following conditions:
wherein i is a sampling point on the ith pseudo code sequence, and the superscripts T and S respectively correspond to real and copied GNSS satellite signals. PiAnd diRespectively corresponding to the signal power and data bits on the ith pseudo code sequence; the signal information of the coherent output signal comprises signal power, Doppler frequency and pseudo range; tau isi、fdiAndrespectively the code delay, doppler frequency and initial phase of the ith pseudo-code sequence of the signal. T issIs the sampling interval, η (nT)s) Is sampled zero mean white gaussian noise.
Most preferably, after the coherent demodulation processing, the coherent demodulation processing also needs to output a coherent output signal after low-pass filtering; coherent output signal is Yi(NTs) And satisfies the following conditions:
wherein,code delay, Doppler frequency and initial phase difference between the ith pseudo-code sequence of the real signal and the pseudo-code sequence of the local replica signal respectively;code delay, doppler frequency and initial phase difference between the spoofed signal and the locally replicated pseudo-code sequence, respectively; eta (NT)s) Is the low pass filtered thermal noise component of the correlator.
Most preferably, the satellite navigation receiver locks on the ith real satellite signal at the Doppler frequencySum code delayCoherent output signal Yi(NTs) Satisfies the following conditions:
most preferably, the satellite navigation receiver locks on the ith deception jamming signal, and the Doppler frequency of the deception jamming signal isSum code delayCoherent output signal Yi(NTs) Satisfies the following conditions:
most preferably, the jamming signal is spoofed into a tracking loop of the GNSS receiver and then locked to the reduced-gain satellite navigation receiver.
By applying the invention, the accurate target position of the target receiver is not needed, the satellite signal deception method is suitable for the global satellite navigation system receiver, the satellite navigation receiver is quickly accessed, and the navigation deception is realized.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the method of the invention realizes the target position without the need of a target receiver, and is suitable for a deception method of a satellite signal of a global satellite navigation system receiver.
2. The method can also be applied to moving carrier platforms such as vehicles, unmanned planes and the like.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for generating GNSS spoofing interference in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram of a spoofed signal and a true signal captured by a generated GNSS spoofed interference method of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a diagram illustrating an actual test result of the generated GNSS spoofing interference method for the drone.
Detailed Description
The invention will be further described by the following specific examples in conjunction with the drawings, which are provided for illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention.
The invention relates to a method for generating GNSS deception jamming, which comprises the following steps as shown in figure 1:
step 1: transmitting a real satellite signal transmitted by a real satellite navigation system to a GNSS receiver to acquire the real satellite signal; the real satellite signals acquired by the GNSS receiver comprise ephemeris information and time information transmitted by a real satellite navigation system, and the real satellite signals are calculated according to the approximate position (x, y, z) of the target receiver; the time information is accurate second pulse of the whole second; wherein, the GNSS receiver receives the real satellite signal ST(t) and satisfies:
wherein t is an accurate whole second pulse; pTThe true satellite signal power of the antenna aperture is received; dk(t) ephemeris information for a kth satellite; c. Ck(t) represents a spreading code of the kth satellite; omega is the angular frequency of the GNSS satellite signal frequency point; phi is akIndicating the initial phase of the k-th satellite GNSS frequency carrier. And acquiring the accurate whole second time t of the target receiver and ephemeris information broadcast by a real satellite navigation system to regenerate the navigation message.
Step 2: in the GNSS receiver, deception control is carried out on a real satellite signal according to the real satellite signal, and a deception interference signal which has the same frequency and phase with the real satellite signal and the level higher than the real satellite signal is generated; the cheat control method comprises the following steps:
step 2.1: calculating the accurate second pulse t of the whole second and the ephemeris information transmitted by the real satellite navigation system according to the target position information (x, y, z) of the real satellite signal, and copying a local copy signal S with the same frequency and phase as the real satellite signal according to the accurate second pulse t of the whole second and the ephemeris informationS(t) and satisfies:
wherein, PSSpoofing the interference signal power for the receiving antenna aperture; delta tau is the time delay of the deception signal relative to the real signal; dsk(t) ephemeris information contained in the false signal of the kth satellite; the local replica signal is identical to the ephemeris information of the real satellite signal.
Step 2.2: local replica signal SS(t) and the real satellite signal ST(t) simultaneously inputting into a GNSS receiver, and generating an input signal of the antenna aperture of the GNSS receiver as R (t); a part of the noise signals in the input signal R (t) are n (t), and R (t) satisfies:
R(t)＝ST(t)+SS(t)+n(t)
step 2.3: intermediate frequency sampling is carried out on the input signal R (t) to generate an intermediate frequency sampling signal R [ nTs]And satisfies the following conditions:
wherein i is a sampling point on the ith pseudo code sequence, and the superscripts T and S respectively correspond to real and copied GNSS satellite signals. PiAnd diRespectively corresponding to the signal power and data bits on the ith pseudo code sequence; tau isi、fdiAndrespectively the code delay, doppler frequency and initial phase of the ith pseudo-code sequence of the signal. T issIs the sampling interval, η (nT)s) Is sampled zero mean white gaussian noise.
Step 2.3: in the receiver de-spread process, the intermediate frequency sampling signal R [ nTs]And carrying out coherent demodulation processing on the input signal R (t), wherein after coherent demodulation processing, a coherent output signal is output after low-pass filtering, and the output coherent output signal is Yi(NTs) And satisfies the following conditions:
wherein,code delay, Doppler frequency and initial phase difference between the ith pseudo-code sequence of the real signal and the pseudo-code sequence of the local replica signal respectively;code delay, doppler frequency and initial phase difference between the spoofed signal and the locally replicated pseudo-code sequence, respectively; eta (NT)s) Is the low pass filtered thermal noise component of the correlator.
Step 2.4: adjusting signal information of coherent output signals, including signal power, Doppler frequency and pseudo range, and deceiving that the receiver is locked on the ith real signal before the interference signal attack, and the Doppler frequency thereofSum code delayAt this time, the coherent output signals Yi (NTs) satisfy:
a spoofed interference signal is obtained with a level above 20dB above the true satellite signal.
And step 3: inputting a high-level deception jamming signal into the satellite navigation receiver, wherein the deception jamming signal level is more than 20dB greater than the true satellite signal level, after reaching the antenna aperture, the automatic gain control AGC gain in the satellite navigation receiver is dynamically adjusted, and the satellite navigation receiver after the gain is reduced is unlocked from the true satellite signal.
And 4, step 4: if the unlocked satellite navigation receiver enters a tracking loop of the GNSS receiver, a deception jamming signal which has the same frequency and the same direction as the real satellite signal and is matched with the gain direction is tracked, the deception jamming signal is locked, and at the moment, the Doppler frequency of the deception jamming signalSum code delayAt this time coherent output signal Yi(NTs) Satisfies the following conditions:
the spoofing is successful, if the unlocked satellite navigation receiver is not locked with the spoofing interference signal, the steps 2-4 are continuously repeated until the spoofing is successful.
Fig. 2 shows the situation that the level of the spoofed interference signal reaches the antenna aperture plane at-90 dBm, and at this time, due to the dynamic adjustment of the AGC gain, the receiver can lock the spoofed interference signal with the same frequency and phase as the real satellite signal after losing lock and being re-compensated. The navigation guidance result for a certain model of unmanned aerial vehicle is shown in fig. 3, wherein point a is the unmanned aerial vehicle takeoff point; b is the onset trapping point; point C is the stop trap point; and the point D is a signal closing point, so that the visible regenerative deception GNSS satellite signal can be quickly accessed into the unmanned aerial vehicle GNSS satellite navigation system to realize navigation induction deception.
The working principle of the invention is as follows:
receiving a real satellite signal into a GNSS receiver to obtain the real satellite signal; carrying out deception control on a real satellite signal according to the real satellite signal to generate a deception interference signal which has the same frequency and phase with the real satellite signal and the level of which is higher than the real satellite signal; inputting a high-level deception jamming signal into a satellite navigation receiver, controlling AGC (automatic gain control) to reduce the gain, and unlocking the satellite navigation receiver after the gain is reduced and a real satellite signal; and if the unlocked satellite navigation receiver is locked with the deception jamming signal, the deception is successful, and if the unlocked satellite navigation receiver is not locked with the deception jamming signal, the step 2-4 is continuously repeated until the deception is successful.
In conclusion, the method for generating GNSS deception jamming realizes the satellite signal deception method applicable to the global satellite navigation system receiver, quickly accesses the satellite navigation receiver and realizes navigation deception.
While the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, it should be understood that the above description should not be taken as limiting the invention. Various modifications and alterations to this invention will become apparent to those skilled in the art upon reading the foregoing description. Accordingly, the scope of the invention should be determined from the following claims.
Claims (10)
1. A method for generating GNSS deception jamming, comprising the steps of:
step 1: transmitting a real satellite signal transmitted by a real satellite navigation system to a GNSS receiver to obtain a real satellite signal;
step 2: in the GNSS receiver, deception control is carried out on a real satellite signal according to the real satellite signal, and a deception interference signal which has the same frequency and phase with the real satellite signal and the level higher than the real satellite signal is generated;
and step 3: inputting a high-level deception jamming signal into a satellite navigation receiver, controlling AGC (automatic gain control) in the satellite navigation receiver to reduce gain, and unlocking the satellite navigation receiver after the gain is reduced from a real satellite signal;
and 4, step 4: and if the unlocked satellite navigation receiver is locked with the deception jamming signal, the deception is successful, and if the unlocked satellite navigation receiver is not locked with the deception jamming signal, the step 2-4 is continuously repeated until the deception is successful.
2. A generative GNSS spoofing interference method as recited in claim 1, wherein said spoofing controlled method comprises the steps of:
step 2.1: copying a local copy signal which has the same frequency and phase as the real satellite signal according to the real satellite signal;
step 2.2: simultaneously inputting the local copy signal and the real satellite signal into a GNSS receiver to generate an input signal of the antenna aperture of the GNSS receiver;
step 2.3: carrying out intermediate frequency sampling on an input signal to generate an intermediate frequency sampling signal;
step 2.4: carrying out coherent demodulation processing on the intermediate frequency sampling signal and the input signal, and outputting a coherent output signal;
step 2.5: and adjusting the signal information of the coherent output signal to obtain a deception jamming signal with the level higher than that of a real satellite signal.
3. The method of generative GNSS spoofing interference of claim 2 wherein said real satellite signals are calculated from the position of a target receiver; the real satellite signals comprise ephemeris information and time information transmitted by a real satellite navigation system; the time information is accurate second pulse of the whole second; the real satellite signal is ST(t) and satisfies:
wherein t is an accurate whole second pulse; pTThe true satellite signal power of the antenna aperture is received; dk(t) ephemeris information for a kth satellite; c. Ck(t) represents a spreading code of the kth satellite; omega is the angular frequency of the GNSS satellite signal frequency point; phi is akIndicating the initial phase of the k-th satellite GNSS frequency carrier.
4. The generative GNSS spoofing interference method of claim 3, wherein the local replica signal is SS(t) and satisfies:
wherein, PSSpoofing the interference signal power for the receiving antenna aperture; delta tau is the time delay of the deception signal relative to the real signal; dsk(t) ephemeris information contained in the false signal of the kth satellite; the local replica signal is identical to ephemeris information of the real satellite signal.
5. The generative GNSS spoofing interference method of claim 4, wherein said input signal is r (t); a part of the noise signals in the input signal R (t) are n (t), and R (t) satisfies:
R(t)＝ST(t)+SS(t)+n(t)
6. the method of jamming of generative GNSS spoofing of claim 5, wherein the intermediate frequency sampled signal is R [ nT [ ]s]And satisfies the following conditions:
wherein i is a sampling point on the ith pseudo code sequence, and the superscripts T and S respectively correspond to real and copied GNSS satellite signals. PiAnd diRespectively corresponding to the signal power and data bits on the ith pseudo code sequence;
the signal information of the coherent output signal comprises signal power, Doppler frequency and pseudo range; tau isi、fdiAndrespectively the code delay, doppler frequency and initial phase of the ith pseudo-code sequence of the signal. T issIs the sampling interval, η (nT)s) Is sampled zero mean white gaussian noise.
7. Generated GNSS as defined in claim 6The deception jamming method is characterized in that after the coherent demodulation processing, a coherent output signal is output after low-pass filtering; the coherent output signal is Yi(NTs) And satisfies the following conditions:
wherein,code delay, Doppler frequency and initial phase difference between the ith pseudo-code sequence of the real signal and the pseudo-code sequence of the local replica signal respectively; code delay, doppler frequency and initial phase difference between the spoofed signal and the locally replicated pseudo-code sequence, respectively; eta (NT)s) Is the low pass filtered thermal noise component of the correlator.
8. The method of jamming of generative GNSS spoofing of claim 7 wherein said satellite navigation receiver locks onto the ith said real satellite signal at a doppler frequencySum code delayThe coherent output signal Yi(NTs) Satisfies the following conditions:
9. such as rightThe method of jamming in GNSS deception of claim 7, wherein the Doppler frequency of the deception signal of the satellite navigation receiver is locked on the ith deception jamming signalSum code delayThe coherent output signal Yi(NTs) Satisfies the following conditions:
10. the method of jamming of generative GNSS spoofing of claim 1, wherein the spoofed jamming signal is locked into the satellite navigation receiver after gain reduction by entering a tracking loop of the GNSS receiver.
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| CN110954925A (en) * | 2019-12-16 | 2020-04-03 | 深圳市儒科电子有限公司 | Beidou deception interference resisting method and GNSS time service type receiving device |
| CN111142076A (en) * | 2020-01-06 | 2020-05-12 | 西南电子技术研究所（中国电子科技集团公司第十研究所） | Power control method for improving low interception performance of radar |
| CN112068160A (en) * | 2020-04-30 | 2020-12-11 | 东华大学 | Unmanned aerial vehicle signal interference method based on navigation positioning system |
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