CN112327330A - Immittance platform equipment, satellite navigation countermeasure system and method - Google Patents

Immittance platform equipment, satellite navigation countermeasure system and method Download PDF

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CN112327330A
CN112327330A CN202011202593.1A CN202011202593A CN112327330A CN 112327330 A CN112327330 A CN 112327330A CN 202011202593 A CN202011202593 A CN 202011202593A CN 112327330 A CN112327330 A CN 112327330A
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receiver
satellite
navigation
immittance
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赵宇
刘立刚
周斌
卜智勇
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JUSHRI TECHNOLOGIES Inc
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/015Arrangements for jamming, spoofing or other methods of denial of service of such systems

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Abstract

The invention relates to immittance station equipment which comprises a receiving antenna array, a radio frequency front end, a digital signal processor and a transmitting antenna array, wherein the receiving antenna array, the radio frequency front end, the digital signal processor and the transmitting antenna array are sequentially connected; the digital processor comprises a signal receiver connected with the radio frequency front end, a signal buffer connected with the signal receiver, a signal enhancement processing module bidirectionally connected with the signal buffer, and a time frequency adjustment processing module connected with the signal buffer, wherein the signal buffer is connected with the transmitting antenna array; the receiving antenna array is used for receiving navigation satellite signals, the time-frequency adjusting processing module is used for applying time delay to data signals to obtain inducing signals, and the transmitting antenna array is used for sending the inducing signals to the GNSS receiver. The invention relates to a satellite navigation countermeasure system, which comprises at least 4 pieces of immittance station equipment. The invention relates to a satellite navigation countermeasure method, which utilizes a satellite navigation countermeasure system to achieve the purpose of outputting disguised position information by a GNSS receiver through suppression and induction strategies.

Description

一种导抗台设备、卫星导航对抗系统和方法Immittance station equipment, satellite navigation countermeasure system and method

技术领域technical field

本发明涉及无线电卫星导航技术领域,特别是涉及一种导抗台设备、卫星导航对抗系统和方法。The present invention relates to the technical field of radio satellite navigation, in particular to an immittance station device, a satellite navigation countermeasure system and a method.

背景技术Background technique

卫星导航定位技术是当前经济、社会和军事领域提供精确定位的重要技术手段。在军事领域内,近几十年的几次局部战争的实践表明,卫星导航系统(GNSS)是实现精确打击的重要依托手段和关键技术。同时,针对导航系统及其无线电信号频谱的争夺和控制正越来越激烈,随着相关技术的不断发展,导航战极有可能成为现代电子战中新的作战样式。导航战的目的,即要防止敌人在作战中利用GNSS,又要保护己方正常使用,同时还要避免目标区域以外的导航服务受到影响。Satellite navigation and positioning technology is an important technical means to provide precise positioning in the current economic, social and military fields. In the military field, the practice of several local wars in recent decades has shown that satellite navigation system (GNSS) is an important means and key technology to achieve precision strike. At the same time, the competition and control of the navigation system and its radio signal spectrum are becoming more and more intense. With the continuous development of related technologies, navigation warfare is likely to become a new combat style in modern electronic warfare. The purpose of navigation warfare is to prevent the enemy from using GNSS in combat, and to protect the normal use of one's own side, and at the same time to prevent the navigation services outside the target area from being affected.

GNSS导航有诸多的优势,但也存在显著的漏洞,易于实施干扰。首先,GNSS的信号发射频率、调制特性和导航电文是公开信息。其次,GNSS频率固定,信号极其微弱,到达地面的信号功率一般只有-160dBW左右,为10-7~10-16瓦。因而,使用很小的干扰功率电磁波即可对方圆几十公里甚至上百公里的GNSS接收机构成威胁。研究表明,一台发射功率仅为1瓦的GPS干扰机,就能使100公里范围内民用GPS接收机全部失灵,一台发射功率10瓦的GPS干扰机则能使10公里范围内的军用接收机全部失灵。例如,在伊拉克战争初期,美军频繁发生GPS制导炸弹误炸事件,事后证明是遭遇了伊拉克的GPS系统信号干扰:伊拉克使用了从俄罗斯购买的大功率GPS信号干扰机,在地面成功实施了GPS干扰。GNSS navigation has many advantages, but it also has significant loopholes and is prone to jamming. First, the GNSS signal transmission frequency, modulation characteristics and navigation messages are public information. Secondly, the GNSS frequency is fixed, the signal is extremely weak, and the signal power reaching the ground is generally only about -160dBW, which is 10 -7 to 10 -16 watts. Therefore, the use of electromagnetic waves with very small interference power can pose a threat to GNSS receivers with a radius of tens of kilometers or even hundreds of kilometers. Studies have shown that a GPS jammer with a transmit power of only 1 watt can make all civilian GPS receivers fail within a range of 100 kilometers, and a GPS jammer with a transmit power of 10 watts can make military receivers within a range of 10 kilometers. All machines fail. For example, in the early days of the Iraq War, GPS-guided bombs were frequently accidentally bombed by the US military, which later proved to be jammed by Iraqi GPS system signals: Iraq used a high-power GPS signal jammer purchased from Russia to successfully implement GPS jamming on the ground. .

针对GNSS接收机的对抗技术,主要有攻、防两个方面。对GNSS接收机的攻击技术主要手段是电磁干扰,分为压制式干扰和欺骗式干扰两类。The confrontation technology for GNSS receivers mainly includes two aspects: offense and defense. The main means of attacking GNSS receivers is electromagnetic interference, which is divided into two categories: suppressive interference and deceptive interference.

压制式干扰就是通过发射干扰信号以压制在GNSS接收机前端的卫星信号,使GNSS接收机无法正确解调卫星信号,从而达到干扰的目的。这种方法的优点在于,实现原理简单,干扰机理不依赖GNSS系统,具有良好的可操作性。压制式干扰能使特定区域接收机失效,但是无法实现对目标定位的诱骗。Suppressing jamming is to suppress the satellite signal at the front end of the GNSS receiver by transmitting the jamming signal, so that the GNSS receiver cannot correctly demodulate the satellite signal, so as to achieve the purpose of jamming. The advantage of this method is that the implementation principle is simple, the interference mechanism does not depend on the GNSS system, and it has good operability. Suppressing jamming can disable receivers in specific areas, but cannot achieve decoy of target location.

欺骗式干扰,主要通过发射与GNSS系统参数相同的虚假信号,诱导GNSS接收机解算出错误的位置和时间信息。欺骗式干扰又有两种技术方案,包括自主式欺骗和转发式欺骗。Deceptive jamming mainly induces the GNSS receiver to solve the wrong position and time information by transmitting false signals with the same parameters as the GNSS system. There are two technical schemes for deceptive jamming, including autonomous deception and relay deception.

在自主式欺骗中,干扰机自主产生高保真GNSS信号并发射到目标区域,致使目标接收机锁定在欺骗信号上,从而得到错误的伪距和定位信息。但是这种方式必须完全掌握GNSS信号参数,包括码结构、导航信息结构和加密方式等。例如,为了鼓励GNSS系统的使用,包括美国GPS系统、欧洲伽利略导航系统和中国北斗导航系统,都公开了民用码的系统参数。这就使得民用GNSS系统易于受到欺骗式干扰的影响。In autonomous spoofing, the jammer autonomously generates a high-fidelity GNSS signal and transmits it to the target area, causing the target receiver to lock on the spoofed signal, thereby obtaining false pseudorange and positioning information. However, this method must fully grasp the GNSS signal parameters, including code structure, navigation information structure and encryption method. For example, in order to encourage the use of GNSS systems, including the American GPS system, the European Galileo navigation system, and the Chinese Beidou navigation system, the system parameters of the civil code are disclosed. This makes civilian GNSS systems vulnerable to deceptive jamming.

在转发式欺骗中,干扰机首先接收卫星导航信号,然后高保真地延迟转发,使被欺骗接收机在无意识状态下产生错误的伪距测量值,最终使得接收机解算出错误的定位信息。In forwarding spoofing, the jammer first receives the satellite navigation signal, and then delays the forwarding with high fidelity, so that the spoofed receiver generates wrong pseudorange measurement values unconsciously, and finally makes the receiver solve the wrong positioning information.

这种方式无需了解码信息,且具有一定的隐蔽性,主要是针对非公开的GNSS信号。各GNSS系统除了公开的民用码之外,还有专用的军用码导航方式,这种方式的系统参数是系统的核心技术参数,对外严格保密,难以得到相应的技术资料。所以对军用GNSS接收机的自主欺骗干扰则不具备实现条件。以GPS的P码为例,P码经过加密,周期长达267天,实际应用时P码的周期被分成38部分,每部分为7天。每颗卫星使用P码的不同部分,都具有相同的码长和周期,但结构不同。破解P码的难度极高,不具有实现性。因此,转发式欺骗干扰是应对P码的主要技术手段。This method does not need to decode information, and has a certain concealment, mainly for non-public GNSS signals. In addition to the public code for civil use, each GNSS system also has a dedicated military code navigation method. The system parameters of this method are the core technical parameters of the system, which are strictly confidential to the outside world, and it is difficult to obtain the corresponding technical information. Therefore, the autonomous spoofing jamming of military GNSS receivers does not have the conditions for realization. Taking the P code of GPS as an example, the P code is encrypted and has a period of up to 267 days. In practical application, the period of the P code is divided into 38 parts, and each part is 7 days. Each satellite uses a different part of the P-code, all with the same code length and period, but with a different structure. Cracking the P-code is extremely difficult and unrealistic. Therefore, forwarding spoofing jamming is the main technical means to deal with P codes.

俄罗斯很早就研发了针对GPS接收机的干扰设备,并在包括伊拉克、科索沃等局部热战中有过使用。为了应对这种形势,美国对GPS进行了大幅度的现代化改进,当前新一代GPS 3系列卫星新添了若干导航战特性,主要有以下几点。首先,增加了第四民用信号。使用了低密度压缩编码(LDPC)等先进编码技术,同等发射功率下具有更强的抗干扰、纠错能力,意味着在树荫遮蔽、车内室内等微弱信号条件下的定位能力和可用性将大大加强。其次,提高了信号发射功率,尤其是对于第二民用信号和第三民用信号有较明显的提升。第三,提供更高的定位精度。GPS 3卫星具备更高的轨道保持精度,并通过在星载原子钟、热控、全数字导航信号生成等方面的技术升级,使其可提供更高稳定度的定位信号,用户测距误差较之前卫星提升3倍以上。第四,提升点波束能力,可以在几百公里的区域内提升军码的发射功率100倍以上,极大加强局部区域的抗干扰能力,区域战斗能力有质的提升。Russia has developed jamming equipment for GPS receivers very early, and has used it in local hot wars including Iraq and Kosovo. In order to cope with this situation, the United States has carried out a substantial modernization and improvement of GPS. The current generation of GPS 3 series satellites has added a number of new navigation warfare features, mainly in the following points. First, a fourth civilian signal was added. Using advanced coding technologies such as Low Density Compression Coding (LDPC), it has stronger anti-interference and error correction capabilities under the same transmit power, which means that the positioning capability and availability under weak signal conditions such as shaded trees and indoors will be improved. greatly enhanced. Secondly, the signal transmission power is improved, especially for the second civil signal and the third civil signal. Third, provide higher positioning accuracy. GPS 3 satellites have higher orbit-keeping accuracy, and through technical upgrades in on-board atomic clocks, thermal control, and fully digital navigation signal generation, they can provide higher-stability positioning signals, and the user's ranging error is higher than before. The satellite has increased by more than 3 times. Fourth, improving the spot beam capability can increase the transmission power of the military code by more than 100 times in an area of several hundred kilometers, greatly enhancing the anti-jamming capability of local areas, and improving the regional combat capability qualitatively.

目前,针对各种干扰策略,新的GNSS接收机不断发展出了相应的抗干扰对策,也就是GNSS接收机的防守策略,比如天向增强技术、射频干扰检测和抑制、功率异常检测和一致性检测等。随着这些抗干扰技术的发展,原有的干扰技术手段要么失效,要么效果大打折扣,不能发挥作用。因此,需要发展新的导航对抗技术手段。与此同时,在导航战中,攻防各方需不断博弈,以达成一定程度的均衡。随着各卫星导航系统抗干扰能力的提升,有必要发展相应的对抗手段。At present, for various interference strategies, new GNSS receivers have continuously developed corresponding anti-jamming countermeasures, that is, defense strategies of GNSS receivers, such as antenna enhancement technology, radio frequency interference detection and suppression, power anomaly detection and consistency detection, etc. With the development of these anti-jamming technologies, the original jamming technologies either fail, or their effects are greatly reduced and cannot function. Therefore, it is necessary to develop new means of navigation countermeasures. At the same time, in the navigation war, the offensive and defensive parties need to constantly play games to achieve a certain degree of equilibrium. With the improvement of the anti-jamming capability of each satellite navigation system, it is necessary to develop corresponding countermeasures.

发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

本发明所要解决的技术问题是提供一种导抗台设备、卫星导航对抗系统和方法,利用导抗台设备,通过压制和诱导的策略达到使GNSS接收机输出伪装位置信息的目的。The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide an immittance station device, a satellite navigation countermeasure system and a method, and the purpose of making the GNSS receiver output camouflaged position information is achieved through suppressing and inducing strategies by using the immittance station device.

本发明解决其技术问题所采用的技术方案是:提供一种导抗台设备,包括依次连接的接收天线阵列、射频前端、数字信号处理器和发射天线阵列;所述数字处理器包括与所述射频前端连接的信号接收机、与所述信号接收机连接的信号缓存器、与所述信号缓存器双向连接的信号增强处理模块,以及与所述信号缓存器连接的时频调整处理模块,所述信号缓存器与所述发射天线阵列连接;The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the technical problem is: to provide an immittance station device, including a receiving antenna array, a radio frequency front end, a digital signal processor and a transmitting antenna array connected in sequence; A signal receiver connected to the radio frequency front end, a signal buffer connected to the signal receiver, a signal enhancement processing module bidirectionally connected to the signal buffer, and a time-frequency adjustment processing module connected to the signal buffer, so the signal buffer is connected to the transmit antenna array;

本发明解决其技术问题所采用的技术方案是:提供一种卫星导航对抗系统,包括至少4台部署于空中的上述的导抗台设备。The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the technical problem is to provide a satellite navigation countermeasure system, which includes at least 4 sets of the above-mentioned immittance station devices deployed in the air.

本发明解决其技术问题所采用的技术方案是:提供一种卫星导航对抗方法,采用上述的卫星导航对抗系统,包括:The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the technical problem is to provide a satellite navigation countermeasure method, which adopts the above-mentioned satellite navigation countermeasure system, including:

步骤(1):通过所述导抗台设备向目标区域发射干扰信号来压制导航卫星信号,使所述目标区域内的GNSS接收机与导航卫星失锁;Step (1): transmitting interference signals to the target area through the immittance station equipment to suppress the navigation satellite signals, so that the GNSS receiver and the navigation satellites in the target area lose lock;

步骤(2):每个所述导抗台设备通过所述接收天线阵列定向接收单个导航卫星的信号;Step (2): each of the immittance station equipment is directed to receive the signal of a single navigation satellite through the receiving antenna array;

步骤(3):通过所述信号增强处理模块将每个所述导抗台设备接收到的导航卫星信号进行滤波和增强,并通过所述时频调整处理模块对滤波和增强后的信号施加预设时延,得到诱导信号;Step (3): filter and enhance the navigation satellite signal received by each of the immittance station equipment through the signal enhancement processing module, and apply a pre-filter to the filtered and enhanced signal through the time-frequency adjustment processing module. Set the time delay to get the induced signal;

步骤(4):每个所述导抗台设备通过所述发射天线阵列向GNSS接收机发送所述诱导信号,来改变所述GNSS接收机的输出定位。Step (4): each of the impedance station equipment sends the induced signal to the GNSS receiver through the transmit antenna array to change the output positioning of the GNSS receiver.

所述步骤(1)中干扰信号的发射功率满足:PJ>Lpath+Lf+JGNSS+Jth-GJ-Gr,其中,Jth为抗干扰裕度,且Jth<JSIR,JSIR为进入接收机的干扰信号比,且JSIR=Jeff-JGNSS,Jeff为有效干扰功率,且Jeff=PJ+GJ+Gr-Lpath-Lf,JGNSS为有用信号功率,PJ为干扰信号发射功率,GJ为干扰机发射天线增益,Gr为接收机的天线增益,Lf为接收机前端滤波损耗,Lpath为路径传播损耗。The transmit power of the interference signal in the step (1) satisfies: P J >L path +L f +J GNSS +J th -G J -G r , where J th is an anti-interference margin, and J th <J SIR , J SIR is the interfering signal ratio entering the receiver, and J SIR =J eff -J GNSS , J eff is the effective interference power, and J eff =P J +G J +G r -L path -L f ,J GNSS is the useful signal power, P J is the transmission power of the jamming signal, G J is the transmit antenna gain of the jammer, G r is the antenna gain of the receiver, L f is the front-end filter loss of the receiver, and L path is the path propagation loss.

所述步骤(3)中通过所述时频调整处理模块对滤波和增强后的信号施加预设时延,所述预设时延的计算公式为:

Figure BDA0002755860860000041
其中,δ1为接收机V1的时钟偏差,
Figure BDA0002755860860000042
为接收机在当前位置A点测量到的与导航卫星Si间的伪距,
Figure BDA0002755860860000043
为接收机在诱导位置B点测量到的与导航卫星Si间的伪距,c表示真空中光速。In the step (3), a preset time delay is applied to the filtered and enhanced signal by the time-frequency adjustment processing module, and the calculation formula of the preset time delay is:
Figure BDA0002755860860000041
where δ 1 is the clock offset of receiver V 1 ,
Figure BDA0002755860860000042
is the pseudorange between the receiver and the navigation satellite Si measured by the receiver at the current position A,
Figure BDA0002755860860000043
is the pseudorange between the receiver and the navigation satellite Si measured by the receiver at the induced position B point, and c represents the speed of light in vacuum.

所述步骤(3)中通过所述时频调整处理模块对滤波和增强后的信号施加预设时延,还包括:渐进地逐步增加延时量,公式为:

Figure BDA0002755860860000044
其中,
Figure BDA0002755860860000045
(t)为逐步增加时延量,t为时间,Δt是为了将接收机V1诱导至B点发送诱导信号的持续时间。In the step (3), applying a preset time delay to the filtered and enhanced signal by the time-frequency adjustment processing module, further comprising: gradually increasing the delay amount gradually, the formula is:
Figure BDA0002755860860000044
in,
Figure BDA0002755860860000045
(t) is the gradual increase of the delay amount, t is the time, and Δt is the duration for inducing the receiver V 1 to point B to send the induced signal.

所述步骤(4)之后还包括步骤(5):根据所述GNSS接收机的当前位置和新的诱导位置,循环所述步骤(1)至步骤(4)的过程。Step (5) is further included after the step (4): according to the current position and the new induced position of the GNSS receiver, the process of the step (1) to the step (4) is repeated.

所述步骤(1)中干扰信号的发射频率与导航卫星信号的中心频率一致。In the step (1), the transmission frequency of the interference signal is consistent with the center frequency of the navigation satellite signal.

所述步骤(1)中干扰信号的类型为宽带高斯噪声、宽带相位频率调制信号或窄带连续波干扰信号。The type of the interference signal in the step (1) is wideband Gaussian noise, wideband phase frequency modulation signal or narrowband continuous wave interference signal.

有益效果beneficial effect

由于采用了上述的技术方案,本发明与现有技术相比,具有以下的优点和积极效果:本发明提供的导抗台设备不仅能够有效接收和发射信号,还具备较强的抗干扰性能;本发明通过多台导抗台设备构建的卫星导航对抗系统,真实模拟导航卫星信号抵达方向,避免诱导信号被接收机侧信号到达角异常检测模块检测到并抑制,从而保障了诱导效果;本发明通过导抗台设备在压制阶段和诱导阶段的精确的发射功率控制,规避接收机侧信号功率异常检测机制,从而保障诱导效果;本发明通过导抗台设备根据目标的当前位置和期望位置,估计出要施加的时延量,并采用渐进的诱导时延的调整方法,循序渐进地诱导目标偏离轨迹,避免目标接收机定位的突然跳变,从而保障诱导效果;本发明通过为导抗台设备配置的接收和发射天线阵列,即实现窄波束跟踪锁星接收特定方向的导航卫星提供的卫星导航信号,又实现了向特定区域实施压制和诱导;本发明通过导抗台设备在信号压制和诱导两个过程的交替循环,不断巩固和保障诱导效果。Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages and positive effects due to the adoption of the above-mentioned technical solution: the immittance station equipment provided by the present invention can not only effectively receive and transmit signals, but also has strong anti-interference performance; The present invention uses a satellite navigation countermeasure system constructed by multiple immittance station equipment to truly simulate the arrival direction of the navigation satellite signal, so as to prevent the induced signal from being detected and suppressed by the abnormal signal arrival angle detection module on the receiver side, thereby ensuring the induced effect; the present invention Through the precise transmission power control of the immittance station equipment in the suppression phase and the induction phase, the abnormal detection mechanism of the signal power on the receiver side is avoided, so as to ensure the induction effect; the present invention estimates the current position and the expected position of the target through the immittance station equipment. The delay amount to be applied is calculated, and the adjustment method of the gradual induction delay is adopted to gradually induce the target to deviate from the trajectory, avoiding the sudden jump of the positioning of the target receiver, so as to ensure the induction effect; Receive and transmit antenna arrays, that is, to achieve narrow beam tracking to lock the satellite to receive satellite navigation signals provided by navigation satellites in a specific direction, and to implement suppression and induction to specific areas; The alternating cycle of this process continuously consolidates and guarantees the induction effect.

附图说明Description of drawings

图1是本发明实施方式的应用场景示意图;1 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of an embodiment of the present invention;

图2是本发明实施方式的导抗台设备的结构原理图;FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of an immittance table device according to an embodiment of the present invention;

图3是本发明实施方式的方法流程图;Fig. 3 is the method flow chart of the embodiment of the present invention;

图4是本发明实施方式中导抗台设备压制与和诱导过程循环示意图。FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the cycle of the pressing and inducing process of the immittance stage equipment in the embodiment of the present invention.

具体实施方式Detailed ways

下面结合具体实施例,进一步阐述本发明。应理解,这些实施例仅用于说明本发明而不用于限制本发明的范围。此外应理解,在阅读了本发明讲授的内容之后,本领域技术人员可以对本发明作各种改动或修改,这些等价形式同样落于本申请所附权利要求书所限定的范围。The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with specific embodiments. It should be understood that these examples are only used to illustrate the present invention and not to limit the scope of the present invention. In addition, it should be understood that after reading the content taught by the present invention, those skilled in the art can make various changes or modifications to the present invention, and these equivalent forms also fall within the scope defined by the appended claims of the present application.

本发明的实施方式涉及一种导抗台设备,并且通过至少4台部署于空中的导航对抗设备(导抗台设备)组成卫星导航对抗系统,如图1所示,为本发明实施方式的应用场景示意图,场景由三部分组成,分别是:位于空间的导航卫星、部署于空中且搭载导抗台设备的无人机构成的空中平台(卫星导航对抗系统即为空中平台),以及位于地面或近地面的导航对抗区域的GNSS接收机。所述导航卫星可以是GPS卫星、北斗导航卫星或伽利略导航卫星等。在正常情况下,它们为地面或近地GNSS接收机提供导航信号。The embodiment of the present invention relates to an immittance station device, and a satellite navigation countermeasure system is composed of at least four navigation countermeasure devices (immittance station devices) deployed in the air, as shown in FIG. 1 , which is an application of the embodiment of the present invention Schematic diagram of the scene, the scene consists of three parts, namely: the navigation satellite located in space, the aerial platform composed of the UAV deployed in the air and equipped with the anti-missile equipment (the satellite navigation countermeasure system is the aerial platform), and the air platform located on the ground or GNSS receivers for navigating near-ground countermeasure areas. The navigation satellites may be GPS satellites, Beidou navigation satellites or Galileo navigation satellites. Under normal conditions, they provide navigation signals to terrestrial or near-earth GNSS receivers.

进一步地,所述卫星导航对抗系统(空中平台)主要包括安装于无人机、飞机、飞艇或热气球等平台的导抗台设备。导抗台设备主要功能包括:首先,向上定向接收特定导航卫星的导航信号。其次,对接收信号进行处理,包括提升信号质量、时频调整,生成高保真的、时延可控的诱导信号。第三,将诱导信号通过定向波束发射到指定区域。同时,导抗台设备可借助多座导航卫星,实时完成自己的高精度定位,必要时结合惯性导航与卫星导航构成的组合导航系统,为自身提供高精度定位。Further, the satellite navigation countermeasure system (air platform) mainly includes the immittance platform equipment installed on platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles, aircraft, airships or hot air balloons. The main functions of the Immittance Station equipment include: First, orient upward to receive the navigation signal of a specific navigation satellite. Second, the received signal is processed, including signal quality improvement and time-frequency adjustment, to generate a high-fidelity induced signal with controllable delay. Third, the induced signal is transmitted to the designated area through a directional beam. At the same time, the immittance station equipment can complete its own high-precision positioning in real time with the help of multiple navigation satellites, and if necessary, combine the integrated navigation system composed of inertial navigation and satellite navigation to provide itself with high-precision positioning.

如图2所示,为本发明实施方式的导抗台设备的结构原理图,所述导抗台设备包括依次连接的接收天线阵列、用于进行射频信号处理的射频前端、数字信号处理器和发射天线阵列;导抗台的两个天线阵列分别具有朝向上空导航卫星方向和向下朝向干扰区域方向的两层波束结构,首先,朝向空中方向的接收来自导航卫星信号的接收波束,既可以实现特定方向的卫星信号的高增益接收,又可以隔离来自其他方向的干扰,特别是来自地面或平行空域的干扰,使得导抗台具有很强的抗干扰能力。其次,朝向地面干扰区域方向的发射波束,主要用来向目标区域的GNSS接收机发送诱导信号。As shown in FIG. 2 , it is a schematic structural diagram of an immittance stage device according to an embodiment of the present invention. The immittance stage device includes a receiving antenna array connected in sequence, a radio frequency front end for performing radio frequency signal processing, a digital signal processor, and a digital signal processor. Transmitting antenna array; the two antenna arrays of the immittance station respectively have a two-layer beam structure facing the direction of the navigation satellite in the sky and the direction of the interference area downward. First, the receiving beam from the navigation satellite signal in the direction of the air can be realized The high-gain reception of satellite signals in a specific direction can isolate the interference from other directions, especially the interference from the ground or parallel airspace, so that the immittance station has a strong anti-interference ability. Secondly, the transmit beam directed towards the ground interference area is mainly used to send the induced signal to the GNSS receiver in the target area.

进一步地,所述数字处理器包括与所述射频前端连接的信号接收机、与所述信号接收机连接的信号缓存器、与所述信号缓存器双向连接的信号增强处理模块,以及与所述信号缓存器连接的时频调整处理模块,所述时频调整处理模块与所述发射天线阵列连接。所述信号接收机处理来自射频前端的信号,并将信号存储到信号缓存器中;所述信号增强处理模块对信号缓存器中的数据进行滤波和增强处理等操作;所述时频调整处理模块根据目标的位置等信息,计算信号转发时施加的时延,并据此控制信号转发的时机,从信号缓存器中取出数据并送到所述发射天线阵列,完成诱导信号的发送。Further, the digital processor includes a signal receiver connected with the radio frequency front end, a signal buffer connected with the signal receiver, a signal enhancement processing module bidirectionally connected with the signal buffer, and a signal enhancement processing module connected with the signal buffer. A time-frequency adjustment processing module connected to the signal buffer, the time-frequency adjustment processing module is connected with the transmitting antenna array. The signal receiver processes the signal from the radio frequency front end and stores the signal in the signal buffer; the signal enhancement processing module performs operations such as filtering and enhancement processing on the data in the signal buffer; the time-frequency adjustment processing module According to the information such as the position of the target, the time delay applied when the signal is forwarded is calculated, and the timing of signal forwarding is controlled accordingly, and the data is taken out from the signal buffer and sent to the transmitting antenna array to complete the transmission of the induced signal.

具体地,本实施方式中的导抗台设备具有如下几个特征:Specifically, the immittance table device in this embodiment has the following features:

首先,导抗台设备具备机动部署的能力。导抗台设备安装于近地空中的无人机等平台中。多个导抗台设备所处的空中平台,可机动部署于干扰区域的上空与边缘,对干扰区域内提供稳定的压制信号和诱导信号。机动部署的导抗台设备,提供多方面的技术优势:即可以根据诱导目标的位置机动调整空中平台的位置,实现对目标区域的最佳覆盖;又可以通过调整导抗台设备的空间位置,形成最优的定位布局,提高定位精度。First of all, the Immittance Station equipment has the capability of mobile deployment. Immittance table equipment is installed in platforms such as UAVs in the near-Earth air. The aerial platforms where multiple immittance station devices are located can be maneuvered over and at the edge of the interference area to provide stable suppressing and inducing signals in the interference area. The maneuverably deployed immittance platform equipment provides many technical advantages: that is, the position of the aerial platform can be adjusted according to the position of the induced target, so as to achieve the best coverage of the target area; The optimal positioning layout is formed to improve the positioning accuracy.

其次,导抗台设备具备自适应接收特定卫星信号的能力。导抗台设备配备朝向天空的大规模天线阵列,通过自适应地调整天线振子的权系数矢量的波束赋形,形成朝向特定方向的接收波束,实现特定方向的无线电信号的接收。通过采用该方法,可使导抗台设备的接收天线指向特定的导航卫星,不但可以获得高增益的卫星信号,而且可以隔离来自其他方向的无线电干扰,极大地增强导抗台接收高保真导航卫星信号的能力。Second, the immittance station equipment has the ability to adaptively receive specific satellite signals. Immittance station equipment is equipped with a large-scale antenna array facing the sky. By adaptively adjusting the beamforming of the weight coefficient vector of the antenna element, a receiving beam facing a specific direction is formed to realize the reception of radio signals in a specific direction. By using this method, the receiving antenna of the immittance station equipment can be directed to a specific navigation satellite, not only high-gain satellite signals can be obtained, but also radio interference from other directions can be isolated, which greatly enhances the immittance station to receive high-fidelity navigation satellites signal capability.

第三,导抗台设备具备自身定位能力。导抗台设备要实现对目标接收机的定位诱导,需要实时准确地确定自己的位置。采用上述的大规模天线阵列波束赋形接收技术,导抗台设备可以从导航卫星信号解算出高精度的位置信息。同时,辅助以惯性导航,将惯性导航与卫星导航进行组合导航,更可以提供高精度、高输出频率的定位信息。Third, the immittance station equipment has its own positioning ability. Immittance station equipment needs to accurately determine its own position in real time in order to realize the positioning and induction of the target receiver. Using the above-mentioned large-scale antenna array beamforming receiving technology, the immittance station equipment can calculate high-precision position information from the navigation satellite signals. At the same time, the combined navigation of inertial navigation and satellite navigation can also provide high-precision, high-output frequency positioning information.

本实施方式还涉及一种卫星导航对抗方法,如图3所示,为本发明实施方式的方法流程图,具体包括:This embodiment also relates to a satellite navigation countermeasure method, as shown in FIG. 3 , which is a flowchart of the method according to the embodiment of the present invention, which specifically includes:

步骤(1):信号压制。通过所述导抗台设备向特定区域发射预设频率和功率的干扰信号,来压制导航卫星信号,使所述特定区域内的GNSS接收机与导航卫星失锁,GNSS接收机开始重新搜索卫星信号。一般地,信号压制持续时间可为1至5分钟。Step (1): Signal suppression. The GNSS receiver in the specific area loses lock with the navigation satellite by transmitting the jamming signal of preset frequency and power to the specific area, and the GNSS receiver starts to search for the satellite signal again. . Typically, the signal suppression duration may be 1 to 5 minutes.

以下对所述步骤(1)进行具体说明:Described step (1) is described in detail below:

所述干扰信号的类型可以是宽带高斯噪声,或宽带相位频率调制信号,或窄带连续波干扰信号。当强干扰信号频率与GNSS信号中心频率相同时,会引起脉冲信号的跳动,造成接收机无法识别卫星信号,出现接收机不能捕获、跟踪、锁定卫星信号等现象;当干扰信号的频率与GNSS信号频率不相同时,由于接收机前端电路的频率选择性,只有靠近GNSS信号中心频率的干扰信号才能进入接收机,产生带内和带外的干扰。这时,对GNSS信号干扰的效果不仅与干扰信号的频率和脉冲宽度有关,而且和初相角有关。The type of the interference signal may be broadband Gaussian noise, or a broadband phase frequency modulated signal, or a narrowband continuous wave interference signal. When the frequency of the strong interference signal is the same as the center frequency of the GNSS signal, it will cause the pulse signal to jump, causing the receiver to fail to identify the satellite signal, and the receiver cannot capture, track, or lock the satellite signal. When the frequencies are not the same, due to the frequency selectivity of the front-end circuit of the receiver, only the interference signal close to the center frequency of the GNSS signal can enter the receiver, resulting in in-band and out-of-band interference. At this time, the effect of interference to the GNSS signal is not only related to the frequency and pulse width of the interfering signal, but also to the initial phase angle.

优选地,所述干扰信号的发射频率与GNSS信号的中心频率一致。Preferably, the transmission frequency of the interference signal is consistent with the center frequency of the GNSS signal.

所述干扰信号发射功率应该按下述方法确定,其基本原则是,使得进入GNSS接收机的干扰信号比JSIR(干扰功率与信号功率的比值)大于抗干扰裕度Jth(接收机可容忍的干扰的最大值),即:The transmission power of the interference signal should be determined according to the following method. the maximum value of the interference), namely:

JSIR>Jth J SIR > J th

其中,抗干扰裕度Jth根据不同的系统的不同信号的特征具有不同的取值。例如,对GPS的民码(C/A码)来说,抗干扰裕度在30dB以下,一般认为是25dB,表示为Jth,CA=25。对于GPS的P码来说,抗干扰裕度约43dB左右,表示为Jth,P=25。The anti-interference margin J th has different values according to the characteristics of different signals of different systems. For example, for the civil code (C/A code) of GPS, the anti-interference margin is below 30dB, which is generally considered to be 25dB, which is expressed as J th,CA =25. For the P code of GPS, the anti-jamming margin is about 43dB, which is expressed as J th,P =25.

对于所述干扰信号比,可通过分别计算有效干扰功率Jeff和有用GNSS信号功率JGNSS得到。在对数域,有:The interference signal ratio can be obtained by calculating the effective interference power Jeff and the useful GNSS signal power J GNSS respectively. In the logarithmic domain, there are:

JSIR=Jeff-JGNSS J SIR = J eff - J GNSS

所述有用GNSS信号功率根据不同的系统和不同的信号,有不同的取值。例如,对于GPS系统,L1C的地面接收功率电平约为-155.5dBW,C/A码的功率电平约为-158.5dBW。The useful GNSS signal power has different values according to different systems and different signals. For example, for a GPS system, the ground received power level of L1C is about -155.5dBW, and the power level of C/A code is about -158.5dBW.

对于有效干扰功率,可由下式确定:For the effective interference power, it can be determined by the following formula:

Jeff=PJ+GJ+Gr-Lpath-Lf J eff =P J +G J +G r -L path -L f

其中,PJ为干扰信号的发射功率,GJ为导抗台设备发射天线增益,Gr为接收机的天线增益,Lf为接收机前端滤波损耗,Lpath为路径传播损耗。Among them, P J is the transmit power of the interfering signal, G J is the transmit antenna gain of the impedance station equipment, Gr is the antenna gain of the receiver, L f is the front-end filter loss of the receiver, and L path is the path propagation loss.

根据公式JSIR>Jth、JSIR=Jeff-JGNSS和Jeff=PJ+GJ+Gr-Lpath-Lf,可得到干扰信号的发射功率PJAccording to the formula J SIR >J th , J SIR =J eff -J GNSS and J eff =P J +G J +G r -L path -L f , the transmit power P J of the interference signal can be obtained:

PJ>Lpath+Lf+JGNSS+Jth-GJ-Gr P J >L path +L f +J GNSS +J th -G J -G r

进一步地,当由多个导抗台设备向同一区域发射干扰信号时,单个导抗台设备的发射功率可相应降低。Further, when the interference signal is transmitted to the same area by a plurality of immittance station devices, the transmit power of a single immittance station device can be correspondingly reduced.

步骤(2):特定导航卫星信号的窄波束接收。每个所述导抗台设备通过所述接收天线阵列定向接收单个特定的导航卫星的信号。Step (2): Narrow beam reception of specific navigation satellite signals. Each of the immittance station devices is directed to receive the signal of a single specific navigation satellite through the receiving antenna array.

导抗台设备使用方向性接收天线对准特定的导航卫星,接收单个导航卫星的导航信号。Immittance station equipment uses a directional receiving antenna to aim at a specific navigation satellite and receive the navigation signal of a single navigation satellite.

导抗台设备利用不加密的星历获取导航卫星位置,根据目标位置及各个导抗台设备的布局,为其分配要接收的导航卫星。The immittance station equipment uses the unencrypted ephemeris to obtain the position of the navigation satellites, and allocates the navigation satellites to be received according to the target position and the layout of each immittance station equipment.

空中平台中的导抗台设备利用窄波束对准卫星,接收并分离出单个导航卫星的特定信号。Immittance station equipment in the air platform uses narrow beams to align satellites to receive and separate out specific signals from individual navigation satellites.

原则上,只需要大于4台导抗台设备,分离出大于4颗卫星的信号,到达角模糊的可通过方向性滤波剔除。In principle, only more than 4 sets of immittance station equipment are needed to separate the signals of more than 4 satellites, and the ambiguity of the angle of arrival can be eliminated by directional filtering.

步骤(3):时频调整。通过所述信号增强处理模块将每个所述导抗台设备接收到的导航卫星信号进行滤波和增强,并通过所述时频调整处理模块对滤波和增强后的信号施加预设的时延,得到诱导信号。Step (3): time-frequency adjustment. The signal enhancement processing module filters and enhances the navigation satellite signals received by each immittance station device, and applies a preset time delay to the filtered and enhanced signals through the time-frequency adjustment processing module, get the induction signal.

以下对所述步骤(3)进行具体说明:Described step (3) is described in detail below:

对导航卫星信号的滤波和增强,目的是尽量滤除选定卫星信号之外的其他信号,增强选定的卫星信号。The purpose of filtering and enhancing the navigation satellite signal is to filter out other signals other than the selected satellite signal as much as possible and enhance the selected satellite signal.

本实施方式对于确定所需要施加的时延的量尤为关键,设有4个导抗台设备,分别为Q1、Q2、Q3和Q4,分别对应4颗卫星S1、S2、S3和S4

Figure BDA0002755860860000081
表示接收机在A点测量到的与卫星Si(1≤i≤4)间的信号传播时长,
Figure BDA0002755860860000082
表示接收机在A点测量到的与卫星Si(1≤i≤4)间的伪距,
Figure BDA0002755860860000083
表示接收机V1在B点时与卫星Si(1≤i≤4)间的信号传播时长,
Figure BDA0002755860860000084
表示接收机在B点时与卫星Si(1≤i≤4)间的伪距。This embodiment is particularly critical for determining the amount of time delay that needs to be applied. There are four immittance station devices, namely Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 and Q 4 , corresponding to four satellites S 1 , S 2 , and Q 4 , respectively. S3 and S4 ,
Figure BDA0002755860860000081
represents the signal propagation time between the receiver and the satellite Si ( 1≤i≤4 ) measured by the receiver at point A,
Figure BDA0002755860860000082
represents the pseudorange between the receiver and the satellite Si ( 1≤i≤4 ) measured by the receiver at point A,
Figure BDA0002755860860000083
represents the signal propagation time between the receiver V 1 at point B and the satellite Si ( 1≤i≤4 ),
Figure BDA0002755860860000084
Indicates the pseudorange between the receiver and the satellite Si ( 1≤i≤4 ) when the receiver is at point B.

根据GNSS定位原理,要使得在A点的接收机的输出定位变成为B点,需要对卫星信号施加的时延量由下式确定:According to the GNSS positioning principle, in order to make the output positioning of the receiver at point A become point B, the delay amount that needs to be applied to the satellite signal is determined by the following formula:

Figure BDA0002755860860000085
Figure BDA0002755860860000085

其中,δ1为接收机V1的时钟偏差,对每颗卫星的影响都相同,在定位时不影响定位结果,δ1可在计算中固定为一个很小的常数。Among them, δ 1 is the clock deviation of the receiver V 1 , which has the same effect on each satellite and does not affect the positioning result during positioning. δ 1 can be fixed as a small constant in the calculation.

进一步地,为了避免GNSS接收机的导航定位结果发生突然大幅度的跳变,需渐进地、用不易被察觉的方式调整时频参数,逐步诱导目标偏离轨迹。为了渐进地实施诱导,不能一次性地为待转发的卫星信号施加这么大的延时量,假定要在Δt秒之后将接收机诱导至B点,可在诱导阶段开始后,渐进地逐步增加转发延时量,公式为:Further, in order to avoid sudden and large jumps in the navigation and positioning results of the GNSS receiver, it is necessary to gradually adjust the time-frequency parameters in an imperceptible way to gradually induce the target to deviate from the trajectory. In order to implement the induction gradually, it is not possible to apply such a large amount of delay to the satellite signal to be retransmitted at one time. Assuming that the receiver is to be induced to point B after Δt seconds, the retransmission can be gradually increased after the induction phase starts. Delay amount, the formula is:

Figure BDA0002755860860000091
Figure BDA0002755860860000091

步骤(4):诱导信号发送。每个所述导抗台设备通过所述发射天线阵列向GNSS接收机发送所述诱导信号,来改变所述GNSS接收机的输出定位。Step (4): Inducing signal transmission. Each of the immittance station devices transmits the induced signal to the GNSS receiver through the transmit antenna array to change the output positioning of the GNSS receiver.

在所述步骤(1)实施一段时间之后,典型地如1至5分钟,目标区域的目标会与GNSS卫星信号失锁,进入重新搜索卫星型号的阶段。After the step (1) is carried out for a period of time, typically such as 1 to 5 minutes, the target in the target area will lose lock with the GNSS satellite signal, and enter the stage of re-searching for the satellite model.

此时,将所述步骤(2)和步骤(3)中处理过的数据,以一定的功率,用具有很窄的波束的形式,发送诱导信号到目标区域,以区域压制或精确对准的方式,向下发射诱导信号,以达到诱导目标偏离真实轨迹的目的。At this time, the data processed in the steps (2) and (3) are sent to the target area with a certain power in the form of a very narrow beam to suppress or precisely align the area. In this way, the inducing signal is emitted downward to achieve the purpose of inducing the target to deviate from the true trajectory.

所述步骤(2)、步骤(3)和步骤(4)组成诱导过程。一般地,诱导的持续时间,可为5至10分钟。The step (2), step (3) and step (4) constitute an induction process. Generally, the duration of induction can be 5 to 10 minutes.

如图4所示,为本发明实施方式中导抗台设备的压制与和诱导过程循环示意图,为了巩固和保障对区域内目标接收机的诱导,当需要启动对区域内目标接收机实施干扰时,部署空中平台到指定区域上空,然后每个导抗台设备进入压制与诱导循环,当诱导过程持续一段时间之后,为了巩固诱导的成果,可再次实施信号压制,之后再根据目标当前位置和新的诱导位置,重新计算诱导时延量,再次进行诱导。如此循环交替,直到完成导航对抗任务。As shown in FIG. 4, it is a schematic diagram of the suppression and induction process cycle of the immittance station equipment in the embodiment of the present invention. In order to consolidate and guarantee the induction of the target receiver in the area, when it is necessary to start the interference to the target receiver in the area , deploy the aerial platform over the designated area, and then each device enters the suppression and induction cycle. When the induction process lasts for a period of time, in order to consolidate the results of the induction, signal suppression can be implemented again, and then based on the current position of the target and the new the induction position, recalculate the induction time delay, and conduct induction again. This cycle alternates until the navigation confrontation task is completed.

由此可见,本发明提供的导抗台设备不仅能够有效接收和发射信号,还具备较强的抗干扰性能;本发明提供的卫星导航对抗系统和卫星导航对抗方法,通过压制和诱导的策略能达到使GNSS接收机输出伪装位置信息的目的,能够在军事和航空航天领域有效对抗GNSS接收机的抗干扰策略。It can be seen that the immittance station equipment provided by the present invention can not only effectively receive and transmit signals, but also have strong anti-jamming performance; the satellite navigation countermeasure system and the satellite navigation countermeasure method provided by the present invention can suppress and induce the strategy. To achieve the purpose of making the GNSS receiver output camouflaged position information, it can effectively counter the anti-jamming strategy of the GNSS receiver in the military and aerospace fields.

Claims (9)

1. A immittance platform device is characterized by comprising a receiving antenna array, a radio frequency front end, a digital signal processor and a transmitting antenna array which are sequentially connected; the digital processor comprises a signal receiver connected with the radio frequency front end, a signal buffer connected with the signal receiver, a signal enhancement processing module bidirectionally connected with the signal buffer, and a time frequency adjustment processing module connected with the signal buffer, wherein the signal buffer is connected with the transmitting antenna array;
the receiving antenna array is used for receiving navigation satellite signals, the signal receiver is used for processing data signals from a radio frequency front end and storing the processed data signals into the signal buffer, the signal enhancement processing module is used for filtering and enhancing the data signals in the signal buffer, the time-frequency adjustment processing module is used for applying time delay to the filtered and enhanced data signals to obtain induced signals, and the transmitting antenna array is used for transmitting the induced signals to a GNSS receiver in a target area.
2. A satellite navigation countermeasure system comprising at least 4 immittance station apparatus as claimed in claim 1 deployed in the air.
3. A satellite navigation countermeasure method, characterized in that the satellite navigation countermeasure system of claim 2 is employed, comprising:
step (1): transmitting an interference signal to a target area through the immittance platform equipment to suppress a navigation satellite signal, so that a GNSS receiver and a navigation satellite in the target area are unlocked;
step (2): each of the immittance station devices directionally receives signals of a single navigation satellite through the receiving antenna array;
and (3): filtering and enhancing the navigation satellite signals received by each piece of immittance station equipment through the signal enhancement processing module, and applying a preset time delay to the filtered and enhanced signals through the time-frequency adjustment processing module to obtain induced signals;
and (4): each of the admittance station devices sends the induction signal to a GNSS receiver through the transmit antenna array to change an output position of the GNSS receiver.
4. The satellite navigation countermeasure method of claim 3, wherein the transmission power of the interference signal in step (1) satisfies: pJ>Lpath+Lf+JGNSS+Jth-GJ-GrWherein, JthFor a margin against interference, and Jth<JSIR,JSIRIs the interference signal ratio into the receiver, and JSIR=Jeff-JGNSS,JeffIs effective interference power, and Jeff=PJ+GJ+Gr-Lpath-Lf,JGNSSFor useful signal power, PJFor transmitting power for interfering signals, GJFor jammers transmitting antenna gain, GrFor the antenna gain of the receiver, LfFor receiver front-end filter loss, LpathIs the path propagation loss.
5. The satellite navigation countermeasure method according to claim 3, wherein in step (3), the filtered and enhanced signal is subjected to a preset time delay by the time-frequency adjustment processing module, and the preset time delay is calculated by:
Figure FDA0002755860850000021
wherein, delta1For receiver V1The clock skew of (a) is determined,
Figure FDA0002755860850000022
measured for the receiver at the current position a and navigation satellite SiThe pseudo-range between the two,
Figure FDA0002755860850000023
measured for receiver at induced position B and navigation satellite SiThe pseudoranges between, c represents the speed of light in vacuum.
6. The satellite navigation countermeasure method of claim 5, wherein the step (3) of applying a preset time delay to the filtered and enhanced signal by the time-frequency adjustment processing module further comprises: progressively increasing the amount of delay by the formula:
Figure FDA0002755860850000024
wherein,
Figure FDA0002755860850000025
to increase the amount of delay step by step, t is the time, Δ t is for the receiver V1The duration of the induction signal sent by point B.
7. The satellite navigation countermeasure method of claim 3, characterized in that the step (4) is followed by a step (5): and (4) circulating the processes from the step (1) to the step (4) according to the current position and the new induced position of the GNSS receiver.
8. The satellite navigation countermeasure method of claim 3, wherein the transmission frequency of the interference signal in step (1) coincides with the center frequency of the navigation satellite signal.
9. The satellite navigation countermeasure method of claim 3, wherein the type of the interference signal in step (1) is a wideband Gaussian noise, a wideband phase frequency modulation signal or a narrowband continuous wave interference signal.
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