CN112327330A - Immittance platform equipment, satellite navigation countermeasure system and method - Google Patents
Immittance platform equipment, satellite navigation countermeasure system and method Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention relates to immittance station equipment which comprises a receiving antenna array, a radio frequency front end, a digital signal processor and a transmitting antenna array, wherein the receiving antenna array, the radio frequency front end, the digital signal processor and the transmitting antenna array are sequentially connected; the digital processor comprises a signal receiver connected with the radio frequency front end, a signal buffer connected with the signal receiver, a signal enhancement processing module bidirectionally connected with the signal buffer, and a time frequency adjustment processing module connected with the signal buffer, wherein the signal buffer is connected with the transmitting antenna array; the receiving antenna array is used for receiving navigation satellite signals, the time-frequency adjusting processing module is used for applying time delay to data signals to obtain inducing signals, and the transmitting antenna array is used for sending the inducing signals to the GNSS receiver. The invention relates to a satellite navigation countermeasure system, which comprises at least 4 pieces of immittance station equipment. The invention relates to a satellite navigation countermeasure method, which utilizes a satellite navigation countermeasure system to achieve the purpose of outputting disguised position information by a GNSS receiver through suppression and induction strategies.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of radio satellite navigation, in particular to immittance station equipment, a satellite navigation countermeasure system and a satellite navigation countermeasure method.
Background
The satellite navigation positioning technology is an important technical means for providing accurate positioning in the current economic, social and military fields. Within the military field, several local war practices of recent decades have shown that satellite navigation systems (GNSS) are an important means of support and key technology to achieve accurate combat. Meanwhile, the competition and control for the navigation system and the radio signal frequency spectrum thereof are becoming more and more intense, and with the continuous development of the related technology, the navigation war is very likely to become a new fighting model in the modern electronic war. The purpose of navigation battle is to prevent enemies from utilizing GNSS in battle, protect own party from normal use and simultaneously avoid navigation service outside a target area from being influenced.
GNSS navigation has many advantages, but also has significant vulnerability to implementation interference. First, the signal emission frequency, modulation characteristics, and navigation message of GNSS are public information. Secondly, the GNSS frequency is fixed, the signal is extremely weak, the signal power reaching the ground is generally only about-160 dBW, which is 10-7～10-16And (4) tile. Therefore, the GNSS receiver which is dozens of kilometers or even hundreds of kilometers round can be threatened by using the electromagnetic wave with very small interference power. Research shows that a GPS jammer with the transmitting power of only 1 watt can completely fail a civil GPS receiver within the range of 100 kilometers, and a GPS jammer with the transmitting power of 10 watts can completely fail a military receiver within the range of 10 kilometers. For example, in the early stages of the iraq war, the united states forces frequently encountered GPS guided bomb misfiring events that later proved to encounter the signal interference of the GPS system of iraq: iraq used a powerful GPS signal jammer purchased from russia and successfully implemented GPS jamming on the ground.
The countermeasure technology for the GNSS receiver mainly has two aspects of attack and defense. The main means of the attack technology for the GNSS receiver is electromagnetic interference, which is divided into suppression type interference and deception type interference.
The pressing type interference is to press the satellite signal at the front end of the GNSS receiver by emitting an interference signal, so that the GNSS receiver cannot correctly demodulate the satellite signal, thereby achieving the purpose of interference. The method has the advantages of simple realization principle, no dependence of an interference mechanism on a GNSS system and good operability. Suppressed interference can disable receivers in certain areas, but cannot achieve decoy of target location.
Deceptive jamming induces the GNSS receiver to resolve erroneous position and time information mainly by emitting false signals with the same parameters as the GNSS system. There are two solutions to spoofing, including autonomous spoofing and forward spoofing.
In autonomous spoofing, jammers autonomously generate and transmit high fidelity GNSS signals to the target area, causing the target receiver to lock onto the spoofed signal, thereby obtaining erroneous pseudorange and position information. However, this method must fully know the GNSS signal parameters, including the code structure, the navigation information structure, and the encryption method. For example, to encourage the use of GNSS systems, including the us GPS system, the european galileo navigation system and the chinese beidou navigation system, system parameters for civilian codes are disclosed. This makes civilian GNSS systems vulnerable to deceptive jamming.
In the repeater spoofing, the jammer firstly receives satellite navigation signals, then delays and retransmits with high fidelity, so that a spoofed receiver generates wrong pseudo-range measurement values in an unconscious state, and finally the receiver resolves wrong positioning information.
This approach does not require knowledge of the information and is somewhat covert, primarily to non-public GNSS signals. Besides public civil codes, each GNSS system also has a special military code navigation mode, and system parameters of the mode are core technical parameters of the system, are strictly secret to the outside, and are difficult to obtain corresponding technical data. Autonomous spoofing interference to military GNSS receivers is not a condition for implementation. Taking the P code of GPS as an example, the P code is encrypted, and the period is as long as 267 days, and the period of the P code is divided into 38 parts, each of which is 7 days in actual application. Each satellite uses a different part of the P-code, all having the same code length and period, but different structure. The difficulty of cracking the P code is extremely high, and the method has no realizability. Therefore, the forward spoofing interference is the main technical means for dealing with the P code.
Russia has long developed jamming devices for GPS receivers and has been used in local thermal warfare including irak, cosowo, etc. In order to cope with the situation, the united states has made a great modernization improvement on the GPS, and the current new generation of GPS 3 series satellites has added several characteristics of navigation operations, mainly including the following points. First, a fourth civil signal is added. Advanced coding technologies such as low density compressed coding (LDPC) are used, and the anti-interference and error correction capabilities are stronger under the same transmitting power, which means that the positioning capability and the availability under weak signal conditions such as tree shadow, indoor space and the like are greatly enhanced. Secondly, the signal transmitting power is improved, and especially, the signal transmitting power is obviously improved for the second civil signal and the third civil signal. Third, higher positioning accuracy is provided. The GPS 3 satellite has higher orbit maintaining precision, and can provide a positioning signal with higher stability through technical upgrading in aspects of satellite-borne atomic clock, thermal control, full digital navigation signal generation and the like, and the user ranging error is improved by more than 3 times compared with the prior satellite. Fourthly, the spot beam capability is improved, the transmitting power of military codes can be improved by more than 100 times in an area of hundreds of kilometers, the anti-interference capability of a local area is greatly enhanced, and the fighting capability of the area is improved qualitatively.
At present, for various interference strategies, new GNSS receivers continuously develop corresponding anti-interference countermeasures, that is, defense strategies of GNSS receivers, such as an antenna direction enhancement technology, radio frequency interference detection and suppression, power anomaly detection and consistency detection, and the like. With the development of the anti-interference technologies, the original interference technology means is either ineffective or the effect is greatly reduced, and the anti-interference technologies cannot play a role. Therefore, new navigational countermeasure technical means need to be developed. Meanwhile, in the navigation battle, all the attacking and defending parties need to play games continuously so as to achieve certain balance. With the improvement of the anti-interference capability of each satellite navigation system, it is necessary to develop corresponding countermeasure.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is to provide immittance platform equipment, a satellite navigation countermeasure system and a satellite navigation countermeasure method, wherein the immittance platform equipment is utilized to achieve the purpose of outputting disguised position information by a GNSS receiver through suppression and induction strategies.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problems is as follows: the immittance station equipment comprises a receiving antenna array, a radio frequency front end, a digital signal processor and a transmitting antenna array which are sequentially connected; the digital processor comprises a signal receiver connected with the radio frequency front end, a signal buffer connected with the signal receiver, a signal enhancement processing module bidirectionally connected with the signal buffer, and a time frequency adjustment processing module connected with the signal buffer, wherein the signal buffer is connected with the transmitting antenna array;
the technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problems is as follows: there is provided a satellite navigation countermeasure system comprising at least 4 of the aforementioned immittance station apparatus deployed in the air.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problems is as follows: the satellite navigation countermeasure method is provided, the satellite navigation countermeasure system comprises:
step (1): transmitting an interference signal to a target area through the immittance platform equipment to suppress a navigation satellite signal, so that a GNSS receiver and a navigation satellite in the target area are unlocked;
step (2): each of the immittance station devices directionally receives signals of a single navigation satellite through the receiving antenna array;
and (3): filtering and enhancing the navigation satellite signals received by each piece of immittance station equipment through the signal enhancement processing module, and applying a preset time delay to the filtered and enhanced signals through the time-frequency adjustment processing module to obtain induced signals;
and (4): each of the admittance station devices sends the induction signal to a GNSS receiver through the transmit antenna array to change an output position of the GNSS receiver.
The transmission power of the interference signal in the step (1) meets the following requirements: pJ＞Lpath+Lf+JGNSS+Jth-GJ-GrWherein, JthFor a margin against interference, and Jth＜JSIR，JSIRIs the interference signal ratio into the receiver, and JSIR＝Jeff-JGNSS，JeffIs effective interference power, and Jeff＝PJ+GJ+Gr-Lpath-Lf，JGNSSFor useful signal power, PJFor transmitting power for interfering signals, GJFor jammers transmitting antenna gain, GrFor the antenna gain of the receiver, LfFor receiver front-end filter loss, LpathIs the path propagation loss.
In the step (3), a preset time delay is applied to the filtered and enhanced signal through the time-frequency adjustment processing module, and a calculation formula of the preset time delay is as follows:
wherein, delta1For receiver V1The clock skew of (a) is determined,
measured for the receiver at the current position a and navigation satellite SiThe pseudo-range between the two,
measured for receiver at induced position B and navigation satellite SiThe pseudoranges between, c represents the speed of light in vacuum.
In the step (3), applying a preset time delay to the filtered and enhanced signal through the time-frequency adjustment processing module, further includes: progressively increasing the amount of delay by the formula:
wherein,
(t) is the amount of time delay which is increased stepwise, t is the time, Δ t is for the receiver V1The duration of the induction signal sent by point B.
The step (4) is followed by a step (5): and (4) circulating the processes from the step (1) to the step (4) according to the current position and the new induced position of the GNSS receiver.
And (2) the transmitting frequency of the interference signal in the step (1) is consistent with the central frequency of the navigation satellite signal.
The type of the interference signal in the step (1) is broadband Gaussian noise, a broadband phase frequency modulation signal or a narrowband continuous wave interference signal.
Advantageous effects
Due to the adoption of the technical scheme, compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and positive effects: the immittance platform equipment provided by the invention not only can effectively receive and transmit signals, but also has stronger anti-interference performance; the satellite navigation countermeasure system constructed by a plurality of pieces of immittance station equipment truly simulates the arrival direction of navigation satellite signals, and prevents the induction signals from being detected and inhibited by the receiver side signal arrival angle abnormity detection module, thereby ensuring the induction effect; according to the invention, through accurate transmission power control of the reactance platform equipment in the pressing stage and the inducing stage, a receiver side signal power abnormity detection mechanism is avoided, so that the inducing effect is ensured; according to the method, the device of the immittance platform estimates the time delay amount to be applied according to the current position and the expected position of the target, and adopts a gradual adjustment method of induced time delay to gradually induce the target to deviate from the track, so that sudden jump of positioning of the target receiver is avoided, and the induction effect is guaranteed; according to the invention, through the receiving and transmitting antenna arrays configured for the immittance station equipment, the narrow beam tracking lock satellite is realized to receive the satellite navigation signals provided by the navigation satellite in a specific direction, and the suppression and induction to a specific area are realized; the induction effect is continuously consolidated and ensured through the alternate circulation of the impedance guide platform equipment in the two processes of signal pressing and induction.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the construction of an immittance table apparatus of an embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 3 is a method flow diagram of an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the suppression and induction process cycle of the immittance platform apparatus in an embodiment of the invention.
Detailed Description
The invention will be further illustrated with reference to the following specific examples. It should be understood that these examples are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. Further, it should be understood that various changes or modifications of the present invention may be made by those skilled in the art after reading the teaching of the present invention, and such equivalents may fall within the scope of the present invention as defined in the appended claims.
The embodiment of the present invention relates to an immittance station device, and a satellite navigation countermeasure system is composed of at least 4 pieces of navigation countermeasure devices (immittance station devices) deployed in the air, as shown in fig. 1, which is a schematic view of an application scenario of the embodiment of the present invention, and the scenario is composed of three parts, respectively: the system comprises a navigation satellite positioned in the space, an aerial platform (a satellite navigation countermeasure system is the aerial platform) formed by an unmanned aerial vehicle which is deployed in the air and carries immittance station equipment, and a GNSS receiver positioned in a ground or near-ground navigation countermeasure area. The navigation satellite can be a GPS satellite, a Beidou navigation satellite or a Galileo navigation satellite and the like. Under normal circumstances, they provide navigation signals for terrestrial or near-earth GNSS receivers.
Further, the satellite navigation countermeasure system (aerial platform) mainly comprises a pilot station device installed on a platform such as an unmanned aerial vehicle, an airplane, an airship or a hot air balloon. The main functions of the impedance guiding platform device comprise: first, a navigation signal of a specific navigation satellite is received in an upward direction. And secondly, processing the received signals, including improving the signal quality, adjusting the time frequency, and generating a high-fidelity induction signal with controllable time delay. Third, the inducement signal is transmitted to the designated area by the directional beam. Meanwhile, the immittance platform equipment can complete high-precision positioning of the immittance platform equipment in real time by means of a plurality of navigation satellites, and a combined navigation system formed by combining inertial navigation and satellite navigation is provided for the immittance platform equipment to provide high-precision positioning for the immittance platform equipment.
As shown in fig. 2, which is a schematic structural diagram of immittance station equipment according to an embodiment of the present invention, the immittance station equipment includes a receiving antenna array, a radio frequency front end for performing radio frequency signal processing, a digital signal processor, and a transmitting antenna array, which are connected in sequence; the two antenna arrays of the reactance platform are respectively provided with two layers of beam structures facing to the direction of an overhead navigation satellite and the direction of a downward interference area, firstly, the receiving beam from the navigation satellite signal facing to the air direction can realize the high-gain receiving of the satellite signal in a specific direction and can isolate the interference from other directions, particularly the interference from the ground or a parallel airspace, so that the reactance platform has strong anti-interference capability. Secondly, the transmitting beam towards the direction of the ground interference area is mainly used for sending the inducing signal to the GNSS receiver of the target area.
Furthermore, the digital processor comprises a signal receiver connected with the radio frequency front end, a signal buffer connected with the signal receiver, a signal enhancement processing module bidirectionally connected with the signal buffer, and a time-frequency adjustment processing module connected with the signal buffer, wherein the time-frequency adjustment processing module is connected with the transmitting antenna array. The signal receiver processes a signal from the radio frequency front end and stores the signal into a signal buffer; the signal enhancement processing module carries out operations such as filtering and enhancement processing on data in the signal buffer; the time-frequency adjusting processing module calculates the time delay applied when the signal is forwarded according to the information such as the position of the target, and the like, controls the signal forwarding time according to the time delay, takes out the data from the signal buffer and sends the data to the transmitting antenna array, and completes the sending of the induction signal.
Specifically, the immittance table apparatus in this embodiment has several features as follows:
first, the immittance table apparatus is capable of motorized deployment. The impedance guiding platform equipment is installed in platforms such as an unmanned aerial vehicle in the air near the ground. The aerial platform where the plurality of reactance platform devices are located can be flexibly deployed above and at the edge of an interference area, and stable suppressing signals and inducing signals are provided in the interference area. The flexibly deployed immittance table apparatus provides a number of technical advantages: the position of the aerial platform can be flexibly adjusted according to the position of the induced target, so that the optimal coverage of the target area is realized; and the optimal positioning layout can be formed by adjusting the spatial position of the immittance platform equipment, so that the positioning precision is improved.
Second, immittance station devices have the ability to adaptively receive a particular satellite signal. The immittance station equipment is provided with a large-scale antenna array facing the sky, and forms a receiving beam facing a specific direction by adaptively adjusting the beam forming of a weight coefficient vector of an antenna element, so that the receiving of a radio signal in the specific direction is realized. By adopting the method, the receiving antenna of the immittance station equipment can be pointed to a specific navigation satellite, so that not only can a high-gain satellite signal be obtained, but also radio interference from other directions can be isolated, and the capability of the immittance station for receiving high-fidelity navigation satellite signals is greatly enhanced.
Thirdly, the immittance platform equipment has self-positioning capability. To realize the positioning induction of the target receiver, the immittance station equipment needs to accurately determine the position of the immittance station equipment in real time. By adopting the large-scale antenna array beamforming receiving technology, the immittance station equipment can calculate high-precision position information from navigation satellite signals. Meanwhile, the method assists in inertial navigation, performs combined navigation on the inertial navigation and satellite navigation, and can provide positioning information with high precision and high output frequency.
The present embodiment also relates to a satellite navigation countermeasure method, as shown in fig. 3, which is a method flowchart of the embodiment of the present invention, and specifically includes:
step (1): and (5) signal suppression. And transmitting an interference signal with preset frequency and power to a specific area through the immittance station equipment to suppress a navigation satellite signal, so that the GNSS receiver and the navigation satellite in the specific area are unlocked, and the GNSS receiver starts to search the satellite signal again. Generally, the signal hold-down duration may be 1 to 5 minutes.
The step (1) is specifically described below:
the type of the interference signal can be broadband Gaussian noise, or a broadband phase frequency modulation signal, or a narrow-band continuous wave interference signal. When the frequency of the strong interference signal is the same as the center frequency of the GNSS signal, the pulse signal is jumped, so that the receiver cannot identify the satellite signal, and the phenomena that the receiver cannot capture, track and lock the satellite signal and the like occur; when the frequency of the interference signal is different from the frequency of the GNSS signal, only the interference signal close to the center frequency of the GNSS signal can enter the receiver due to the frequency selectivity of the receiver front end circuit, generating in-band and out-of-band interference. In this case, the effect of interference on GNSS signals is related not only to the frequency and pulse width of the interfering signal, but also to the initial phase angle.
Preferably, the transmission frequency of the interference signal coincides with the center frequency of the GNSS signal.
The interference signal emission power should be determined in such a way that the interference signal ratio J entering the GNSS receiver is based onSIR(ratio of interference power to signal power) is greater than the interference tolerance Jth(maximum value of interference tolerable by the receiver), i.e.:
JSIR＞Jth
wherein, the anti-interference margin JthDifferent values are obtained according to the characteristics of different signals of different systems. For example, for GPS civil code (C/A code), the interference rejection margin is below 30dB, generally considered to be 25dB, and is denoted as Jth,CA25. For the P-code of GPS, the interference rejection margin is about 43dB, which is expressed as Jth,P＝25。
For the interference signal ratio, the effective interference power J can be calculated by calculating the effective interference power J respectivelyeffAnd useful GNSS signal power JGNSSThus obtaining the product. In the log domain, there are:
JSIR＝Jeff-JGNSS
the useful GNSS signal power has different values according to different systems and different signals. For example, for the GPS system, the ground received power level of L1C is approximately-155.5 dBW and the power level of the C/A code is approximately-158.5 dBW.
For effective interference power, it can be determined by:
Jeff＝PJ+GJ+Gr-Lpath-Lf
wherein, PJFor the transmission power of interfering signals, GJFor a immittance benchGain of the standby transmitting antenna, GrFor the antenna gain of the receiver, LfFor receiver front-end filter loss, LpathIs the path propagation loss.
According to the formula JSIR＞Jth、JSIR＝Jeff-JGNSSAnd Jeff＝PJ+GJ+Gr-Lpath-LfThe transmission power P of the interference signal can be obtainedJ：
PJ＞Lpath+Lf+JGNSS+Jth-GJ-Gr
Further, when an interference signal is transmitted to the same area by a plurality of reactive station apparatuses, the transmission power of a single reactive station apparatus may be reduced accordingly.
Step (2): narrow beam reception of a particular navigation satellite signal. Each of the immittance station devices directionally receives a signal of a single particular navigation satellite through the receive antenna array.
The pilot station device uses a directional receiving antenna to aim at a specific navigation satellite and receives the navigation signal of a single navigation satellite.
The immittance station equipment acquires the position of the navigation satellite by using the unencrypted ephemeris, and distributes the navigation satellite to be received to the immittance station equipment according to the target position and the layout of each immittance station equipment.
Immittance station equipment in the airborne platform uses narrow beams to aim at the satellites and receive and separate out the specific signals of the individual navigation satellites.
In principle, only more than 4 pieces of immittance station equipment are needed to separate out signals of more than 4 satellites, and the ambiguous arrival angle can be eliminated through directional filtering.
And (3): and (5) adjusting time frequency. And filtering and enhancing the navigation satellite signals received by each piece of reactance station equipment through the signal enhancement processing module, and applying a preset time delay to the filtered and enhanced signals through the time-frequency adjustment processing module to obtain the induced signals.
The step (3) is specifically described below:
and filtering and enhancing the navigation satellite signals, wherein the purpose is to filter out other signals except the selected satellite signals as much as possible and enhance the selected satellite signals.
The embodiment is particularly critical for determining the amount of delay to be applied, and 4 immittance platform devices are provided, namely Q devices1、Q2、Q3And Q4Respectively correspond to 4 satellites S1、S2、S3And S4，
Indicating the satellite S measured by the receiver at point Ai(i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 4),
indicating the satellite S measured by the receiver at point Ai(1. ltoreq. i.ltoreq.4),
indicating the receiver V1At point B with satellite Si(i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 4),
indicating that the receiver is at point B and satellite Si(1. ltoreq. i.ltoreq.4).
According to the GNSS positioning principle, in order to change the output positioning of the receiver at point a to point B, the amount of time delay that needs to be applied to the satellite signal is determined by the following equation:
wherein, delta1For receiver V1The clock deviation of (2) has the same influence on each satellite, and does not influence the positioning result in positioning, delta1Can be fixed to a small constant in the calculation.
Furthermore, in order to avoid sudden and large jump of the navigation positioning result of the GNSS receiver, the time-frequency parameters need to be adjusted progressively in a manner that is not easy to be perceived, and the target is induced to deviate from the track step by step. In order to progressively implement the induction, it is not possible to apply such a large amount of delay to the satellite signals to be retransmitted at once, and assuming that the receiver is to be induced to point B after Δ t seconds, the amount of retransmission delay can be progressively increased step by step after the induction phase begins, the formula being:
and (4): inducing signal transmission. Each of the admittance station devices sends the induction signal to a GNSS receiver through the transmit antenna array to change an output position of the GNSS receiver.
After said step (1) is performed for a period of time, typically 1 to 5 minutes, the target in the target area may lose lock with the GNSS satellite signals and enter a phase of re-searching for satellite models.
At this time, the data processed in the step (2) and the step (3) are sent to the target area in the form of a narrow beam with a certain power, and the induction signal is downwards transmitted in a region suppression or precise alignment manner, so as to achieve the purpose of inducing the target to deviate from the real track.
The step (2), the step (3) and the step (4) form an induction process. In general, the duration of induction can be from 5 to 10 minutes.
As shown in fig. 4, which is a schematic view of a suppression and induction process cycle of immittance station devices in an embodiment of the present invention, in order to consolidate and guarantee induction of target receivers in an area, when it is necessary to start interference on the target receivers in the area, an aerial platform is deployed to be above a designated area, then each immittance station device enters a suppression and induction cycle, after the induction process lasts for a period of time, signal suppression may be performed again in order to consolidate the induction result, and then an induction delay amount is recalculated according to the target current position and a new induction position, and induction is performed again. The steps are circularly alternated until the navigation countermeasure task is completed.
Therefore, the immittance platform equipment provided by the invention not only can effectively receive and transmit signals, but also has stronger anti-interference performance; the satellite navigation countermeasure system and the satellite navigation countermeasure method provided by the invention can achieve the purpose of enabling the GNSS receiver to output the disguised position information through the strategy of suppression and induction, and can effectively counteract the anti-interference strategy of the GNSS receiver in the fields of military affairs and aerospace.
Claims (9)
1. A immittance platform device is characterized by comprising a receiving antenna array, a radio frequency front end, a digital signal processor and a transmitting antenna array which are sequentially connected; the digital processor comprises a signal receiver connected with the radio frequency front end, a signal buffer connected with the signal receiver, a signal enhancement processing module bidirectionally connected with the signal buffer, and a time frequency adjustment processing module connected with the signal buffer, wherein the signal buffer is connected with the transmitting antenna array;
the receiving antenna array is used for receiving navigation satellite signals, the signal receiver is used for processing data signals from a radio frequency front end and storing the processed data signals into the signal buffer, the signal enhancement processing module is used for filtering and enhancing the data signals in the signal buffer, the time-frequency adjustment processing module is used for applying time delay to the filtered and enhanced data signals to obtain induced signals, and the transmitting antenna array is used for transmitting the induced signals to a GNSS receiver in a target area.
2. A satellite navigation countermeasure system comprising at least 4 immittance station apparatus as claimed in claim 1 deployed in the air.
3. A satellite navigation countermeasure method, characterized in that the satellite navigation countermeasure system of claim 2 is employed, comprising:
step (1): transmitting an interference signal to a target area through the immittance platform equipment to suppress a navigation satellite signal, so that a GNSS receiver and a navigation satellite in the target area are unlocked;
step (2): each of the immittance station devices directionally receives signals of a single navigation satellite through the receiving antenna array;
and (3): filtering and enhancing the navigation satellite signals received by each piece of immittance station equipment through the signal enhancement processing module, and applying a preset time delay to the filtered and enhanced signals through the time-frequency adjustment processing module to obtain induced signals;
and (4): each of the admittance station devices sends the induction signal to a GNSS receiver through the transmit antenna array to change an output position of the GNSS receiver.
4. The satellite navigation countermeasure method of claim 3, wherein the transmission power of the interference signal in step (1) satisfies: pJ＞Lpath+Lf+JGNSS+Jth-GJ-GrWherein, JthFor a margin against interference, and Jth＜JSIR，JSIRIs the interference signal ratio into the receiver, and JSIR＝Jeff-JGNSS，JeffIs effective interference power, and Jeff＝PJ+GJ+Gr-Lpath-Lf，JGNSSFor useful signal power, PJFor transmitting power for interfering signals, GJFor jammers transmitting antenna gain, GrFor the antenna gain of the receiver, LfFor receiver front-end filter loss, LpathIs the path propagation loss.
5. The satellite navigation countermeasure method according to claim 3, wherein in step (3), the filtered and enhanced signal is subjected to a preset time delay by the time-frequency adjustment processing module, and the preset time delay is calculated by:
wherein, delta1For receiver V1The clock skew of (a) is determined,
measured for the receiver at the current position a and navigation satellite SiThe pseudo-range between the two,
measured for receiver at induced position B and navigation satellite SiThe pseudoranges between, c represents the speed of light in vacuum.
6. The satellite navigation countermeasure method of claim 5, wherein the step (3) of applying a preset time delay to the filtered and enhanced signal by the time-frequency adjustment processing module further comprises: progressively increasing the amount of delay by the formula:
wherein,
to increase the amount of delay step by step, t is the time, Δ t is for the receiver V1The duration of the induction signal sent by point B.
7. The satellite navigation countermeasure method of claim 3, characterized in that the step (4) is followed by a step (5): and (4) circulating the processes from the step (1) to the step (4) according to the current position and the new induced position of the GNSS receiver.
8. The satellite navigation countermeasure method of claim 3, wherein the transmission frequency of the interference signal in step (1) coincides with the center frequency of the navigation satellite signal.
9. The satellite navigation countermeasure method of claim 3, wherein the type of the interference signal in step (1) is a wideband Gaussian noise, a wideband phase frequency modulation signal or a narrowband continuous wave interference signal.
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