CN108268779B - Processing method and system for carrying out short ciphertext signature on invoice - Google Patents
Processing method and system for carrying out short ciphertext signature on invoice Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a processing method for carrying out short ciphertext signature on an invoice, which comprises the following steps: generating a public key and a private key for a user through tax control equipment, and storing the private key in the tax control equipment; the public key is sent to a tax invoice management system through a secure channel and is stored in the tax invoice management system, so that the tax invoice management system performs verification operation on invoice information; the tax control equipment signs the invoice information by using the private key and based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the national secret of a BN curve of not more than 256 bits; and the invoice verifier downloads the public key through the tax invoice management system and verifies the invoice data information by using the public key. The short signature method of the invention can meet the requirement of the printing length of the current invoice code area.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of encryption, in particular to a processing method and a processing system for carrying out short ciphertext signature on an invoice.
Background
The invoice encryption is a key technology for invoice anti-counterfeiting, the value-added tax invoice face anti-counterfeiting mainly depends on a password area, and the basic principle of the password area is that the data of the invoice is seven key elements: the invoice code, the invoice number, the seller tax identification number, the buyer tax identification number, the invoicing date, the amount and the tax amount are signed to obtain a group of data, and the data are printed on the password area of the invoice. And when the invoice is verified, the characters in the signature area are decrypted and then compared with the invoice plaintext information, and the comparison shows that the invoice is a true invoice, otherwise, the invoice is a false invoice.
The signature of the invoice is currently displayed in character form, and there are currently two major versions of the signature displayed in character form. The first version is to print 21 x 4-84 characters, each representing a half byte, representing 42 bytes of cryptographic content; the second version is printed with 27 x 4-108 characters representing 54 bytes of signature content, as shown in fig. 1.
The existing invoice encryption needs to be realized through a certificate, the authenticity of the certificate needs to be guaranteed by a third party, and the encryption operation is complex. Up to now, the national crypto authority has issued two major public key cryptographic algorithms. 12, 17.2010, an SM2 elliptic curve cryptography algorithm is released; year 2016, month 3, day 28, an SM9 identification cipher algorithm was issued. The SM2 algorithm and the SM9 algorithm both have a digital signature length for message messages that exceeds 54 bytes and cannot print normally in the signature area.
Therefore, a signature technology of short ciphertext with simpler operation is needed to solve the problem of complicated invoice signature processing.
Disclosure of Invention
According to one aspect of the invention, a processing method for signing an invoice with a short ciphertext is provided, and the method comprises the following steps:
generating a public key and a private key for a user through tax control equipment, and storing the private key in the tax control equipment;
the public key is sent to a tax invoice management system through a secure channel and is stored in the tax invoice management system, so that the tax invoice management system performs verification operation on invoice information;
the tax control equipment signs the invoice information by using the private key and based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the national secret of a BN curve of not more than 256 bits; and
and the invoice verifier downloads the public key through the tax invoice management system and verifies the invoice data information by using the public key.
Preferably, the generating, by the fiscal device, the public key and the private key for the user includes: the tax control equipment enables the random number x to be in the [1, n-1 ]]As a private key, and the tax control device calculates the public key R ═ x × P based on the private key2∈G2Wherein n is a natural number, G2Is an elliptic curve over an extended field and P2Is G2The generator of (1).
Preferably, the signature processing of the invoice information by the tax control device by using the private key and based on the cryptographic SM9 algorithm parameter of the BN curve of not more than 256 bits comprises:
taking the hash value of the invoice information M as an abscissa x, and obtaining P by using an SM2 elliptic curve cryptography algorithmM:M→PM∈G1(ii) a Wherein P isMTo map invoice information M to points on an elliptic curve;
S←x*PMthe abscissa of S is δ, and S is the point P on the elliptic curveMAnd performing title multiplication operation of an elliptic curve with a user private key x, wherein delta is a signature numerical value aiming at the invoice information.
Preferably, the invoice verifier downloads the public key through a tax invoice management system, and verifying invoice data information using the public key includes:
and (3) verifying by using the public key R:
determining a point S' on the abscissa δ on G1;
calculating u ← E (S', P)2) U is the pair S' and P2Performing pairing operation; according to M → PM∈G1Calculating v ← E (P)MR), v are PMAnd R, performing pairing operation;
if u-v or u-v-1If the invoice is verified to be true, determining that the invoice is a true invoice; otherwise, the verification fails, and the invoice is determined to be a false invoice.
Preferably, when the tax control equipment signs the invoice information by using the private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the 256-bit BN curve theory, the signed invoice information is 32 bytes; or
When the tax control equipment signs the invoice information by using the private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the BN curve theory with 192 bits, the signed invoice information is 24 bytes.
Preferably, the invoice information includes: invoice code, invoice number, seller tax identification number, buyer tax identification number, billing date, amount and tax amount.
According to another aspect of the invention, a processing system for short ciphertext signing an invoice, the system comprising:
the generating module is used for generating a public key and a private key for a user through tax control equipment and storing the private key in the tax control equipment;
the sending module is used for sending the public key to the tax invoice management system through a secure channel and storing the public key in the tax invoice management system so as to verify the invoice information by the tax invoice management system;
the tax control equipment carries out signature processing on invoice data information by using the private key and based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the national secret of BN curve theory of not more than 256 bits; and
and the verification module is used for downloading the public key by the invoice verifier through the tax invoice management system and verifying the invoice data information by using the public key.
Preferably, the generating, by the fiscal device, the public key and the private key for the user includes: the tax control equipment enables the random number x to be in the [1, n-1 ]]As a private key, and the tax control device calculates the public key R ═ x × P based on the private key2∈G2Wherein n is a natural number, G2Is an elliptic curve over an extended field and P2Is G2The generator of (1).
Preferably, the signature module is further configured to:
taking the hash value of the invoice data information M as an abscissa x, and obtaining P by using a text B.3.2.1 method of SM2 elliptic curve cryptography algorithmM:M→PM∈G1(ii) a Wherein P isMMapping the invoice data information M to a point on an elliptic curve;
S←x*PMthe abscissa of S is δ, and S is the point P on the elliptic curveMAnd performing title multiplication operation of an elliptic curve with a user private key x, wherein delta is a signature numerical value aiming at the invoice information.
Preferably, the verification module is further configured to:
and (3) verifying by using the public key R:
determining a point S' on the abscissa δ on G1;
calculating u ← E (S', P)2) U is the pair S' and P2Performing pairing operation; according to M → PM∈G1Calculating v ← E (P)MR), v are PMAnd R, performing pairing operation;
if u-v or u-v-1If the invoice is verified to be true, determining that the invoice is a true invoice; otherwise, the verification fails, and the invoice is determined to be a false invoice.
Preferably, when the tax control equipment signs invoice data information by using the private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the 256-bit BN curve theory, the signed invoice data information is 32 bytes; or
When the tax control equipment signs the invoice data information by using the private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the BN curve theory with 192 bits, the signed invoice data information is 24 bytes.
Preferably, the invoice data information includes: invoice code, invoice number, seller tax identification number, buyer tax identification number, invoicing date, amount and tax amount.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
the short-signature invoice processing method provided by the invention utilizes SM9 identification cryptographic algorithm parameters issued by the national cryptographic administration, can achieve the purposes of autonomy, controllability, safety and high efficiency, and can be reused with the existing key generation center KGC to the maximum extent;
the user private key is secretly generated and stored in the local tax control equipment of the user, so that the safety of the user private key is greatly ensured, and the identity authentication effect is strong;
the short signature method designed by the invention can meet the requirement of the printing length of the current invoice code area.
Drawings
A more complete understanding of exemplary embodiments of the present invention may be had by reference to the following drawings in which:
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a processing method for short ciphertext signature of an invoice according to an embodiment of the invention; and
fig. 2 is a block diagram of a processing system for short ciphertext signature of an invoice according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The exemplary embodiments of the present invention will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, however, the present invention may be embodied in many different forms and is not limited to the embodiments described herein, which are provided for complete and complete disclosure of the present invention and to fully convey the scope of the present invention to those skilled in the art. The terminology used in the exemplary embodiments illustrated in the accompanying drawings is not intended to be limiting of the invention. In the drawings, the same units/elements are denoted by the same reference numerals.
Unless otherwise defined, terms (including technical and scientific terms) used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. Further, it will be understood that terms, such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries, should be interpreted as having a meaning that is consistent with their meaning in the context of the relevant art and will not be interpreted in an idealized or overly formal sense.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a processing method for signing an invoice with a short ciphertext according to an embodiment of the present invention. The method of the invention generates the public key and the private key for the user through the tax control equipment, so that the user can get rid of the certificate. Storing the private key in the tax control equipment; the public key is sent through a secure channel and stored in a tax invoice management system for the verification operation of invoice information. The tax control equipment signs the invoice data information by using a private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the national secret of the BN curve theory of not more than 256 bits. The invoice verifier downloads the public key through the tax invoice management system and is used for verifying invoice data information. As shown in fig. 1, method 100 begins at step 101.
Preferably, in step 101: and generating a public key and a private key for the user through the tax control equipment, and storing the private key in the tax control equipment. The user applies the private key and the public key of the user to the tax control equipment, and the tax control equipment generates the public key and the private key for the user. The generating a public key and a private key for a user through the tax control device comprises: the tax control equipment enables the random number x to be in the [1, n-1 ]]As a private key, and the tax control device calculates the public key R ═ x × P based on the private key2∈G2Wherein n is a natural number, G2Is an elliptic curve over an extended field and P2Is G2The generator of (1). The tax control equipment of the embodiment of the invention comprises a gold tax disk, a tax control disk and the likeThe embodiment of the invention is illustrated by a gold tax disk, but the tax control device of the invention is not limited to a gold tax disk.
Preferably, at step 102: the public key is sent through a secure channel and stored in a tax invoice management system for the verification operation of invoice information.
Preferably, in step 103: the tax control equipment signs the invoice data information by using a private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the national secret of the BN curve theory of not more than 256 bits. In the implementation mode of the invention, the tax administration department issues the gold tax disk to the taxpayer, and the taxpayer generates the private key through the gold tax disk before issuing the invoice.
In the embodiment of the invention, tax control equipment signs invoice data information by using a private key based on an SM9 algorithm of a BN curve theory with less than 256 bits, and a processing method for short signature of the invoice data information by using the BN curve theory based on SM9 is as follows:
the main parameters of the BN curve are as follows: curve equation E: y is2=x3+ b (mod q), the base domain of the curve being characterized by q, the order of the curve being r, r comprising a large prime factor n, a cyclic group of order n (G)1And c (+) of the generator P1N order of circulation group (G)2And c (+) of the generator P2Double-linear pair e: g1×G2→GT。G1Similar to the elliptic curve described in the SM2 algorithm, the coordinates contain two large numbers, G, of length O (n)2It is an elliptic curve over an extended field with coordinates comprising four large numbers of length o (n), x being the abscissa and y being the ordinate. (G)1,+)、(G2B, +) and (GT●) are three cyclic groups, G1、G2And GTAll are prime numbers n, P1Is G1Is generated from P2Is G2Is a generator of G2To G1Homomorphism mapping psi such that psi (P)2)=P1(ii) a Bilinear Pair E1×G2→GTSatisfies the following conditions:
bilinear pairings: for any P e G1,Q∈G2,a,b∈ZnEquipped with [ e (aP, bQ) ═ e (P, Q)ab(ii) a P is G1The above elements; q is G2The above elements; a is a group of [1, n-1 ]]A positive integer of (d); and b is a group [1, n-1 ]]Is a positive integer of (1).
Non-degradability: presence of P1∈G1,P2∈G2E is intended to be used to enable E (P)1,P2)≠1;
Calculability for arbitrary P ∈ G1,Q∈G2The effective algorithm calculation is present.
The bilinear pairs used are defined on the elliptic curve group, and are mainly Weil pairs, Tate pairs, Ate pairs, R-Ate pairs and the like.
The user public and private key pair is: x is an element of [1, n-1 ]]For the private key of the user, R ═ x P2∈G2Is the user public key.
The embodiment of the invention encrypts the seven-element plaintext information of the invoice data, wherein the seven-element plaintext information is as follows: invoice code, invoice number, seller tax identification number, buyer tax identification number, invoicing date, amount and tax amount.
Encryption step 1: the clear text information of the seven elements of the invoice data is M, the hash value of M can be used as an abscissa x, and then the method of SM2 elliptic curve cryptography algorithm text B.3.2.1 is adopted to obtain PM:M→PM∈G1;PMTo map the plaintext information M to a point on the elliptic curve.
And (2) encryption: s ← x PMδ is the abscissa of S, S is the point P on the elliptic curveMAnd (4) performing title multiplication operation of an elliptic curve with a user private key x, wherein the abscissa delta of the S is a signature value aiming at the invoice information.
In the embodiment of the invention, if a 192-bit BN curve is selected, the signature length is 192 bits, namely 24 bytes; if a BN curve of 256 bits is chosen, the signature length is 256 bits, i.e. 32 bytes. The invoice data encryption data generated by the two bit positions are both less than 54 bytes, and the requirement of the printing length of the current invoice code area can be completely met.
According to the embodiment of the invention, the invoice data information is signed by the private key of the tax control equipment. The invoice data signature processing is simpler and easier to operate.
Preferably, at step 104: the invoice verifier downloads the public key through the tax invoice management system and is used for verifying invoice data information.
In the embodiment of the invention, the public key generated by the tax control device for the user is R,
verification step 1 with public key R: finding a point S' with the abscissa delta on G1;
and 2, a verification step: calculating u ← E (S', P)2) Is a pair of S' and P2And carrying out pairing operation to obtain a result u.
A verification step 3: obtaining M → P according to the signature process stepM∈G1And calculates v ← E (P)MR) is PMAnd performing pairing operation on the R to obtain a result v.
And 4, a verification step: if u-v or u-v-1If the verification is passed, the ticket is a true invoice.
And (3) proving that: the point with the coordinate δ S' is S or-S.
If S '═ S, u ═ e (S', P)2)=ê(S,P2)=ê(x*PM,P2)=ê(PM,x*P2)=ê(PMR) ═ v; conversely, if S' ═ S, it is easy to deduce that u ═ v-1。
The method of the invention utilizes the tax control equipment to generate a public key and a private key for a user. The user side stores a user private key through the tax control equipment, signature processing is carried out on the invoice data information by using a national secret SM9 algorithm parameter of a BN curve theory with 256 bits or less, the signed invoice data information is guaranteed to be not more than 54 bytes, and the signed invoice data ciphertext information can be printed in an invoice password area. And the public key generated by the tax control equipment is stored in the tax invoice management system and is used for verifying the signed invoice data information.
The short-signature invoice processing method provided by the invention utilizes SM9 identification cryptographic algorithm parameters issued by the national cryptographic administration, can achieve the purposes of autonomy, controllability, safety and high efficiency, and can be reused with the existing key generation center KGC to the maximum extent; the designed short signature method can meet the requirement of the printing length of the current invoice code area.
Fig. 2 is a block diagram of a processing system for short ciphertext signature of an invoice according to an embodiment of the present invention. The system of the invention generates the private key and the public key of the user through the tax control equipment. The user side stores a user private key through the tax control equipment, signature processing is carried out on the invoice data information by using SM9 algorithm parameters of a BN curve theory with the bit number not exceeding 256, the signed invoice data information is guaranteed not to exceed 54 bytes, and the signed invoice data ciphertext information can be printed in an invoice password area. And the public key generated by the tax control equipment is stored in the tax invoice management system and is used for decrypting the signed invoice data information.
As shown in fig. 2, the system 200 includes:
the generating module 201 is configured to generate a public key and a private key for a user through the tax control device, and store the private key in the tax control device. The generating a public key and a private key for a user through the tax control device comprises: the tax control equipment enables the random number x to be in the [1, n-1 ]]As a private key, and the tax control device calculates the public key R ═ x × P based on the private key2∈G2Wherein n is a natural number, G2Is an elliptic curve over an extended field and P2Is G2The generator of (1).
And the sending module 202 is configured to send the public key through a secure channel and store the public key in the tax invoice management system, so as to be used for the verification operation of the invoice information.
And the signing module 202, the tax control equipment signs the invoice data information by using a private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the national secret of the BN curve theory of not more than 256 bits.
Preferably, the invoice data information comprises: invoice code, invoice number, seller tax identification number, buyer tax identification number, invoicing date, amount and tax amount.
Preferably, the signed invoice data information does not exceed 54 bytes.
And the verification module 203 is used for downloading the public key by the invoice verifier through the tax invoice management system and verifying the invoice data information.
Preferably, the parameters of the BN curve include:
curve equation E: y is2=x3+ b (mod q), the base domain of the curve being characterized by q, the order of the curve being r, r comprising a large prime factor n, a cyclic group of order n (G)1And c (+) of the generator P1N order of circulation group (G)2And c (+) of the generator P2;
Bilinear pair e: g1×G2→GT,G1Is an elliptic curve, G1Contains two large numbers of length O (n), G2Is an elliptic curve over an extended field, G2Contains four large numbers of length o (n), with x as the abscissa and y as the ordinate; (G)1,+)、(G2B, +) and (GT●) are three cyclic groups, G1、G2And GTAll are prime numbers n, P1Is G1Is generated from P2Is G2Is a generator of G2To G1Homomorphism of so that psi (P)2)=P1;
Bilinear Pair E1×G2→GTFor any P ∈ G1,Q∈G2Satisfy the condition of e (aP, bQ) ═ e (P, Q)abP is G1Q is G2A is an element belonging to the set [1, n-1 ]]And b is a positive integer belonging to the set [1, n-1 ]]A positive integer of (d);
and in the presence of P1∈G1,P2∈G2E is intended to be used to enable E (P)1,P2)≠1;
And, for any P ∈ G1,Q∈G2Presence of valid algorithmic calculation [ e (P, Q);
wherein bilinear pairs are defined on the elliptic curve group;
wherein x is equal to [1, n-1 ]]For the private key of the user, R ═ x P2∈G2Is the user public key.
Preferably, the tax control device signing the invoice information by using a private key and based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the national secret of the BN curve of not more than 256 bits comprises the following steps:
taking the hash value of the invoice information M as an abscissa x, and obtaining P by using an SM2 elliptic curve cryptography algorithmM:M→PM∈G1(ii) a Wherein P isMTo map invoice information M to points on an elliptic curve;
S←x*PMthe abscissa of S is delta, delta is the signature value aiming at the invoice information, and S ← x × PMIs to connect a point P on the elliptic curveMAnd performing title multiplication operation of an elliptic curve with a user private key x.
Preferably, the invoice verifier downloads the public key through the tax invoice management system, and verifying the invoice data information using the public key comprises:
verification is performed by using a public key R:
determining a point S' on the abscissa δ on G1;
calculating u ← E (S', P)2) U is the pair S' and P2Performing pairing operation; according to M → PM∈G1Calculating v ← E (P)MR), v are PMAnd R, performing pairing operation;
if u-v or u-v-1If the invoice is verified to be true, determining that the invoice is a true invoice; otherwise, the verification fails, and the invoice is determined to be a false invoice.
Preferably, when the tax control equipment signs the invoice information by using the private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the 256-bit BN curve theory, the signed invoice information is 32 bytes; or
When the tax control equipment signs the invoice information by using the private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the BN curve theory with 192 bits, the signed invoice information is 24 bytes.
The processing system for performing short ciphertext signature on an invoice according to an embodiment of the present invention corresponds to the processing method 100 for performing short ciphertext signature on an invoice according to another embodiment of the present invention, and will not be described herein again.
The invention has been described with reference to a few embodiments. However, other embodiments of the invention than the one disclosed above are equally possible within the scope of the invention, as would be apparent to a person skilled in the art from the appended patent claims.
Generally, all terms used in the claims are to be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning in the technical field, unless explicitly defined otherwise herein. All references to "a/an/the [ device, component, etc ]" are to be interpreted openly as referring to at least one instance of said device, component, etc., unless explicitly stated otherwise. The steps of any method disclosed herein do not have to be performed in the exact order disclosed, unless explicitly stated.
Claims (8)
1. A processing method for short ciphertext signature of an invoice, the method comprising:
generating a public key and a private key for a user through tax control equipment, and storing the private key in the tax control equipment; the generating a public key and a private key for a user through the tax control device comprises: the tax control equipment enables the random number x to be in the [1, n-1 ]]As a private key, and the tax control device calculates the public key R ═ x × P based on the private key2∈G2Wherein n is a natural number, G2Is an elliptic curve over an extended field and P2Is G2A generator of (2); the public key is sent to a tax invoice management system through a secure channel and is stored in the tax invoice management system, so that the tax invoice management system performs verification operation on invoice information;
the tax control device signs the invoice information by using the private key and based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the national secret of a BN curve of not more than 256 bits, and comprises the following steps: taking the hash value of the invoice information M as an abscissa x, and obtaining P by using an SM2 elliptic curve cryptography algorithmM:M→PM∈G1(ii) a Wherein P isMTo map invoice information M to points on an elliptic curve; g1Elliptic curves described in the SM2 algorithm;
S←x*PMthe abscissa of S is δ, and S is the point P on the elliptic curveMPerforming title multiplication operation of an elliptic curve with a user private key x, wherein delta is a signature numerical value aiming at invoice information; and
and the invoice verifier downloads the public key through the tax invoice management system and verifies the invoice data information by using the public key.
2. The method of claim 1, the invoice validator downloads the public key through a tax invoice management system, and validating invoice data information using the public key comprises:
and (3) verifying by using the public key R:
determining a point S' on the abscissa δ on G1;
computingu is the pair S' and P2Performing pairing operation; according to M → PM∈G1Calculatingv is to PMAnd R, performing pairing operation;
if u-v or u-v-1If the invoice is verified to be true, determining that the invoice is a true invoice; otherwise, the verification fails, and the invoice is determined to be a false invoice.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the first and second light sources are selected from the group consisting of,
when the tax control equipment signs the invoice information by using the private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the 256-bit BN curve theory, the signed invoice information is 32 bytes; or
When the tax control equipment signs the invoice information by using the private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the BN curve theory with 192 bits, the signed invoice information is 24 bytes.
4. The method of claim 1, the invoice information comprising:
invoice code, invoice number, seller tax identification number, buyer tax identification number, billing date, amount and tax amount.
5. A processing system for short ciphertext signing of an invoice, the system comprising:
the generating module is used for generating a public key and a private key for a user through tax control equipment and storing the private key in the tax control equipment; the generating a public key and a private key for a user through the tax control device comprises: the tax control equipment enables the random number x to be in the [1, n-1 ]]As a private key, and the tax control device calculates the public key R ═ x × P based on the private key2∈G2Wherein n is a natural number, G2Is an elliptic curve over an extended field and P2Is G2A generator of (2); a sending module for sending the public key to the tax invoice management system through a secure channel and
the tax invoice information is stored in the tax invoice management system so as to be verified by the tax invoice management system;
the signature module is used for carrying out signature processing on invoice data information by the tax control equipment by using the private key and based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the national secret of BN curve theory of not more than 256 bits, and comprises the following steps: taking the hash value of the invoice information M as an abscissa x, and obtaining P by using an SM2 elliptic curve cryptography algorithmM:M→PM∈G1(ii) a Wherein P isMTo map invoice information M to points on an elliptic curve; g1Elliptic curves described in the SM2 algorithm;
S←x*PMthe abscissa of S is δ, and S is the point P on the elliptic curveMPerforming title multiplication operation of an elliptic curve with a user private key x, wherein delta is a signature numerical value aiming at invoice information; and
and the verification module is used for downloading the public key by the invoice verifier through the tax invoice management system and verifying the invoice data information by using the public key.
6. The system of claim 5, the verification module further to:
and (3) verifying by using the public key R:
determining a point S' on the abscissa δ on G1;
computingu is the pair S' and P2Performing pairing operation; according to M → PM∈G1Calculatingv is to PMAnd R, performing pairing operation; if u-v or u-v-1If the invoice is verified to be true, determining that the invoice is a true invoice; otherwise the authentication fails and the authentication is failed,
the invoice is determined to be a false invoice.
7. The system of claim 5, wherein the first and second sensors are arranged in a single unit,
when the tax control equipment signs invoice data information by using the private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the 256-bit BN curve theory, the signed invoice data information is 32 bytes; or
When the tax control equipment signs the invoice data information by using the private key based on the SM9 algorithm parameter of the BN curve theory with 192 bits, the signed invoice data information is 24 bytes.
8. The system of claim 5, the invoice data information comprising:
invoice code, invoice number, seller tax identification number, buyer tax identification number, invoicing date, amount and tax amount.
Priority Applications (1)
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CN109857683A (en) * | 2018-12-29 | 2019-06-07 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | A kind of management system and method for value-added tax tax controlling equipment |
CN109981276B (en) * | 2019-01-21 | 2021-01-19 | 北京交通大学 | National cipher substitution realization method for zk-snark bottom layer bilinear pairs |
CN110086632A (en) * | 2019-05-07 | 2019-08-02 | 山东浪潮商用系统有限公司 | A kind of tax signature device, method and system |
CN112700292B (en) * | 2020-12-24 | 2024-03-12 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | Method and system for electronic invoice issuing through automatic dispatching tax control equipment |
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