CN104821880B - One kind is without certificate broad sense agent signcryption method - Google Patents
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- CN104821880B CN104821880B CN201510222252.3A CN201510222252A CN104821880B CN 104821880 B CN104821880 B CN 104821880B CN 201510222252 A CN201510222252 A CN 201510222252A CN 104821880 B CN104821880 B CN 104821880B
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Abstract
The invention discloses one kind without certificate broad sense agent signcryption method, belongs to secret communication field, including：Key generation centre initialization system parameter；Key generation centre generating portion private key；User is based on systematic parameter and generates a secret value and part private keyComplete private key is set togetherAnd calculate public key；Original signature or the close people of label utilize private key and public key the generation agent authorization of oneself；It is rear that allograph or the close people of label verify that agent authorization passes through, broad sense agent signcryption processing is carried out to the message that needs are sent using agent authorization, the private key of oneself, the public key of recipient and systematic parameter, recipient's progress broad sense agency's solution is sent result to and signs close processing.The present invention can realize that allograph or the close people of label need to only use a pair of secret keys and an algorithm achieve that two functions of allograph and agent signcryption, provide the user confidentiality and（Or）Authentication property；And realized based on certificateless cryptosystem and solve key escrow and reduce the high expense of public key management.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to field of information security technology, and in particular to one kind is without certificate broad sense agent signcryption method.
Background technology
In traditional public-key cryptosystem, public key is a pile mess code, so needing a trusted third party -- in certification
The heart (Certificate Authority, hereinafter referred to as CA) issues a certificate the public key of user and its identity information are entered
Row binding.And the administration fee of certificate is high, which prevent widely using for conventional public-key cipher system.
Identity- based cryptography can reduce high certificate management expense, it be Shamir in 1984
The concept proposed in CRYPTO ' 84.Identity- based cryptography is the public key for first determining user, then calculates corresponding private key.
Thus public key can be taken as the identity information of user, so as to eliminate public key certificate, reduce the expense of public key management.But it is based on
The private key of the cipher system of identity must be generated by trusted third party-private key center (Private Key Generator, below
Abbreviation PKG) produce, inevitably cause key escrow, i.e. PKG knows the private key of all users.
The administration fee that certificateless cryptosystem both can reduce public key also solves the problem that key escrow, and it is Al-
Riyami and Paterson was in the concept proposed in ASIACRYPT ' 2003 in 2003.The private key of certificateless cryptosystem is by two
Part forms.A part is that the part of key generation centre (Key Generation Center, hereinafter referred to as KGC) generation is private
Key；Another part is the secret value that user oneself chooses.Public key is also made up of two parts.A part is the identity letter of user
Breath；Another part is public key corresponding to secret value.Because KGC does not know the complete private key of user, thus solves key escrow
Problem.And the public key of user does not need certificate, thus reduces the administration fee of public key.
Confidentiality and authentication property are two basic demands for security in information security field.Confidentiality can be by encrypting skill
Art is realized；And authentication property can be realized by digital signature.As us while need for confidentiality and authentication property, tradition is done
Method is " first signature re-encrypts ".Sign it is close can realize in a logic step and meanwhile realize encryption and signature two functions, and
And its calculation cost and communications cost realized than two steps of traditional " first signature re-encrypts " it is much smaller, it be Zheng in
The concept proposed in CRYPTO ' 97 in 1997.
Confidentiality and the occasion of authentication property are needed at the same time, are signed close really very efficient.But when system only needs confidentiality
Or during authentication property, label will be close to be no longer appropriate for.Then system must use other AES or Digital Signature Algorithm to expire
Foot requires that this certainly will will increase the expense of system and realize complexity.To overcome this deficiency, Han Yiliang et al. in 2006
Propose the concept of Generalized Signcryption.Generalized Signcryption only can be realized or encrypted or signed simultaneously with an algorithm and a pair of secret keys
And/or close three functions of label.
Allograph can allow an original signer when oneself is inconvenient, the agency's label trusty of commission one
Famous person signs instead of oneself, and it is Mambo et al. in the concept proposed in 1996.From after concept proposition, allograph obtains
It is widely applied.1999, the close concept of the concept of allograph and label was combined by Gamage et al., it is proposed that agency's label
Close concept.
In existing realization, allograph and agent signcryption are separated.If someone occasionally wants to use allograph
Function, want to use agent signcryption function again when other, then he must preserve two pairs of keys and use two algorithms.Agency
Signature one algorithm and a pair of secret keys；Agent signcryption uses another algorithm and another pair key.It certainly will so increase
The space of adding system storage key, manage the cost of key, authentication secret time and realize what two algorithms were brought to system
Realize complexity.
The content of the invention
The defects of it is an object of the invention to overcome above-mentioned prior art, the concept of Generalized Signcryption is used for reference, with reference to without certificate
The superiority of cipher system, there is provided a kind of only to use an algorithm and a pair of secret keys to achieve that allograph and agent signcryption
For one kind of two functions without certification agency label decryption method, we are called broad sense agent signcryption method.
The present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions：
It is a kind of only to use a pair of secret keys and an algorithm to achieve that generation without certificate broad sense agent signcryption method, agent
Signature and two functions of agent signcryption are managed, the allograph or the close people of label of original signature or close one his trust of people's mandate of label represent
He is signed or signed close；For sensitive data, agent can use agent signcryption method；For other information, he can be with
Use allograph method；Including step in detail below：
Step 1, system initialization：Initialization system parameter, for generate user private key and public key, agent authorization generation,
Broad sense agent signcryption and broad sense agency's solution label are close.
Step 2, the generation of part private key：User submits the identity information ID of oneselfiGive key generation centre KGC, KGC according to
Systematic parameter and subscriber identity information IDiGenerate the part private key D of useriAnd user is sent in confidence.
Step 3, user key generation：User is based on systematic parameter one secret value x of generation at randomi, calculate to correspond to and be somebody's turn to do
The public key of secret value and the complete private key that oneself is set；
Step 4, agent authorization generation：Original signature or the close people of label produce a certificate of authority mw, then joined according to system
Number, the complete private key of oneself, the identity of oneself and public key carry out signature to the certificate of authority and produce agent authorization σ and open transmission σ
To allograph or the close people of label.Allograph or the close people of label are according to systematic parameter, original signature or the identity and public key of signing close people
And mwσ is verified, is verified and is followed by by agent authorization σ, otherwise requires that original signature or the close people of label regenerate agency
Authorize σ.
Step 5, broad sense agent signcryption：Allograph or the close people of label are according to systematic parameter, oneself complete private key, Dai Lishou
Weigh σ, certificate of authority mw, message M, the identity and public key of the identity of oneself and public key and recipient generate broad sense agent signcryption text σP。
The step includes both of which：Allograph pattern and agent signcryption pattern.It works in generation if recipient's identity is sky
Manage signature scheme；It works in agent signcryption pattern if recipient's identity is not empty.
Step 6, broad sense agency's solution label are close：The step also includes both of which：Allograph Validation Mode and agency's solution label
Close pattern.If the identity of recipient is sky, it works in allograph Validation Mode, and anyone can join according to system
The identity and the identity and public key and certificate of authority m of public key, allograph or the close people of label of number, original signature or the close people of labelwChecking
Allograph σPCorrectness, then receive allograph σ if the verification passesP, otherwise refuse；If the identity of recipient is not
Sky, then it work in agency's solution and sign close pattern, recipient can according to systematic parameter, the identity of original signature or the close people of label with it is public
The identity and public key, the identity of oneself and public key and certificate of authority m of key, allograph or the close people of labelwVerify agent signcryption text σP's
Correctness, then receive agent signcryption text σ if the verification passesP, the complete private key decryption outbound message M of oneself is then reused,
Otherwise refuse.
As a preference of the present invention, further, the system parameter setting of the step 1 is specially：The step 1 is
System parameter setting be specially：
Security parameter k is positive integer；One circled addition group G1With a circulation multiplicative group G2, two orders of a group are all element
Number q；One random G1Generation member P；One bilinear map e:G1×G1→G2；The hash function of four safetyWithWherein { 0,1 }*Represent the binary system sequence of any bit long
The set of composition is arranged,Represent to remove the module obtained by identical element,It is to be more than or equal to 1 and the positive integer less than q by all
The finite field of composition, { 0,1 }mThe set of a length of m of bit binary sequence composition is represented, m is parameter preset, represents message
Bit length；One special function f (ID), wherein ID ∈ { 0,1 }*For user identity；If identity is sky, f (ID)=0 is made,
Otherwise f (ID)=1 is made；One random numberAs main private key, P is calculatedpub=sP is as Your Majesty's key；Disclosing systematic parameter is
{e,G1,G2,P,Ppub,m,H1,H2,H3,H4, f (ID) }, secrecy master key s；
Step 2 part private key generation specifically includes：
Key generation centre calculates the part private key D of useri=sQi, wherein Qi=H1(IDi)；Then identity is IDAIt is original
The part private key for signing or signing close people is DA, identity IDPAllograph or the part private key of the close people of label be DP, identity IDB
The part private key of recipient be DB；
The step 3 user key generation specifically includes：
User randomly selects secret valueCalculate public key PKi=xiP, and it is SK to set complete private keyi=(Di,xi)；
Then identity is IDAOriginal signature or the secret value of the close people of label be xA, public key PKA, complete private key is SKA=(DA,xA)；Identity
For IDPAllograph or the secret value of the close people of label be xP, public key PKP, complete private key is SKP=(DP,xP)；Identity is IDB
The secret value of recipient be xB, public key PKB, complete private key is SKB=(DB,xB)；
The step 4 agent authorization generation specifically includes：
Original signature or the close people A of label are randomly selectedCalculate U=rP, h2=H2(mw,U,IDA,PKA), h3=H3(mw,
U,IDA,PKA), V=(r+h2xA)QA+h3DA, wherein mwTo allograph or awarding for close people is signed for the original signature or the close people of label
Warrant book, mwIn clearly state the identity of original signature or the close people of label and allograph or the close people of label, public key, type of message and have
The information such as effect phase；Original signature or the close people A of label are agent authorization σ=(mw, U, V) by overt channel send to allograph or
Close people P is signed, P can be by verifying e (V, P)=e (QA,U+h2PKA+h3Ppub) whether equation carry out surveying agent and authorize σ effective, such as
Fruit is invalid, then requires that original signature or the close people of label regenerate agent authorization；
The step 5 broad sense agent signcryption specifically includes：
Assuming that allograph or the close people P of label desire to recipient B and send broad sense agent signcryption message；If message M ∈ { 0,1
}m, tag ∈ { 0,1 }；Allograph or the close people P of label calculate f (ID firstB), as f (IDBThe seasonal tag=0 in)=0, otherwise makes tag
=1；Randomly selectCalculate R=tP, T=e (Ppub,QB)t·tag, h4=tagH4(R,T,tPKB,IDP,PKP,IDB,
PKB),h5=H2(mw,S,R,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB), h6=H3(mw,S,R,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB), X=V+ (t
+h5xP)QP+h6DP, export σP=(mw, U, R, S, X, tag) and as broad sense agent signcryption text, whereinRepresent XOR；
(1) allograph pattern：If tag=0, σP=(mw, U, R, S=M, X, tag=0) and it is allograph；
(2) agent signcryption pattern：If tag=1, σP=(mw, U, R, S, X, tag) and it is agent signcryption；
The step 6 broad sense agency solution label are close to be specifically included：
Recipient B calculates h2=H2(mw,U,IDA,PKA), h3=H3(mw,U,IDA,PKA), h5=H2(mw,S,R,IDP,
PKP,IDB,PKB), h6=H3(mw,S,R,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB)；
(1) tag=0；Recipient B checking e (X, P)=e (QA,U+h2PKA+h3Ppub)e(QP,R+h5PKP+h6Ppub) whether
Set up, the invalid ⊥ that then returns represents refusal；Otherwise allograph σ is receivedP=(mw,U,R,S,X,tag)；
(2) tag=1；Recipient B checking e (X, P)=e (QA,U+h2PKA+h3Ppub)e(QP,R+h5PKP+h6Ppub) whether
Set up, the invalid ⊥ that then returns represents refusal；Otherwise agent signcryption σ is receivedP=(mw, U, R, S, X, tag), calculate h4=H4
(R,e(R,DB),xBR,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB), recover message
By adopting the above-described technical solution, the beneficial effects of the invention are as follows：
1st, allograph or the close people of label need to only use an algorithm and a pair of secret keys to achieve that allograph and agency's label
Close two functions；
2nd, realized based on certificateless cryptosystem, not only in the absence of key escrow but also reduced the high expense of public key management
With；
3rd, realize the authentication property of sharable content object, verify all parameters in equation be all it is known or computable,
Anyone can carry out validation verification in the case where not revealing any secret information to Generalized Signcryption text during generation dispute；
4th, safe lane is not needed between original signature or the close people of label and allograph or the close people of label, reduces system realization
Complexity.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the flow chart of the invention without certificate broad sense agent signcryption method；
Fig. 2 is the handling process schematic diagram of the invention without certificate broad sense agent signcryption method.
Embodiment
The present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
As shown in Figure 1, 2, the invention provides based on the broad sense agent signcryption method without certificate, act on behalf of and sign in the broad sense
In the application scenarios of decryption method, the allograph or the close people of label of original signature or close one his trust of people's mandate of label represent his and carried out
Sign or sign and be close.For sensitive data, allograph or the close people of label can use agent signcryption method；For other information, he
Allograph method can be used.Allograph or the close people of label need to only preserve a pair of secret keys and only use an algorithm, reduce
The complexity that the administration fee and system of key are realized.The detailed process of the present invention is as follows：
Step 1, system initialization.
Security parameter k is integer, the addition cyclic group G that generation member is P1With a multiplicative cyclic group G2, two groups'
Rank is all prime number q.e:G1×G1→G2For a bilinear map.Define the Hash functions of four safety Wherein { 0,1 }*Represent the binary sequence group of any bit long
Into set,Represent to remove the module obtained by identical element,It is to be more than or equal to 1 and the positive integer group less than q by all
Into finite field, { 0,1 }mThe set of a length of m of bit binary sequence composition is represented, m is parameter preset, represents the ratio of message
Bit length.One special function f (ID), wherein ID ∈ { 0,1 }*For user identity；If identity is sky, f (ID)=0 is made, it is no
Then make f (ID)=1.Key generation centre KGC is randomly selectedAs main private key, P is calculatedpub=sP is as Your Majesty's key.It is open
Systematic parameter is { e, G1,G2,P,Ppub,m,H1,H2,H3,H4, f (ID) }, secrecy master key s.
Step 2, the generation of part private key.
KGC is original signature or the close people's calculating section private key D of labelA=sQA, wherein QA=H1(IDA)；For allograph or label
Close people's calculating section private key DP=sQP, wherein QP=H1(IDP)；For recipient's calculating section private key DB=sQB, wherein QB=H1
(IDB)。
Step 3, user key generation.
User randomly selects secret valueCalculate public key PKi=xiP, and it is SK to set complete private keyi=(Di,xi).Then
Original signature or the secret value of the close people of label are xA, public key PKA, complete private key is SKA=(DA,xA)；Identity is IDPAgency label
Name or the secret value of the close people of label are xP, public key PKP, complete private key is SKP=(DP,xP)；Identity is IDBRecipient secret
It is worth for xB, public key PKB, complete private key is SKB=(DB,xB)。
Step 4, agent authorization generation.
Original signature or the close people A of label are randomly selectedCalculate U=rP, h2=H2(mw,U,IDA,PKA), h3=H3(mw,
U,IDA,PKA), V=(r+h2xA)QA+h3DA, wherein mwTo allograph or awarding for close people is signed for the original signature or the close people of label
Warrant book, mwIn clearly state the identity of original signature or the close people of label and allograph or the close people of label, public key, type of message and have
The information such as effect phase；Original signature or the close people A of label are agent authorization σ=(mw, U, V) by overt channel send to allograph or
Sign close people P.P can be by verifying e (V, P)=e (QA,U+h2PKA+h3Ppub) whether equation carry out surveying agent and authorize σ effective, such as
Fruit is invalid, then requires that original signature or the close people of label regenerate agent authorization.
Step 5, broad sense agent signcryption.
Assuming that allograph or the close people P of label desire to recipient B and send broad sense agent signcryption message；If message M ∈ { 0,1
}m, tag ∈ { 0,1 }；Allograph or the close people P of label calculate f (ID firstB), as f (IDBThe seasonal tag=0 in)=0, otherwise makes tag
=1；Randomly selectCalculate R=tP, T=e (Ppub,QB)t·tag, h4=tagH4(R,T,tPKB,IDP,PKP,IDB,
PKB),h5=H2(mw,S,R,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB), h6=H3(mw,S,R,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB), X=V+ (t+
h5xP)QP+h6DP, export σP=(mw, U, R, S, X, tag) and as broad sense agent signcryption text, whereinRepresent XOR.
Allograph pattern：If tag=0, σP=(mw, U, R, S=M, X, tag=0) and it is allograph.
Agent signcryption pattern：If tag=1, σP=(mw, U, R, S, X, tag) and it is agent signcryption.
Step 6, broad sense agency's solution label are close.
Recipient B calculates h2=H2(mw,U,IDA,PKA), h3=H3(mw,U,IDA,PKA), h5=H2(mw,S,R,IDP,
PKP,IDB,PKB), h6=H3(mw,S,R,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB)；
(1) tag=0；Recipient B checking e (X, P)=e (QA,U+h2PKA+h3Ppub)e(QP,R+h5PKP+h6Ppub) whether
Set up, the invalid ⊥ that then returns represents refusal；Otherwise allograph σ is receivedP=(mw,U,R,S,X,tag)；
(2) tag=1；Recipient B checking e (X, P)=e (QA,U+h2PKA+h3Ppub)e(QP,R+h5PKP+h6Ppub) whether
Set up, the invalid ⊥ that then returns represents refusal；Otherwise agent signcryption σ is receivedP=(mw, U, R, S, X, tag), calculate h4=H4
(R,e(R,DB),xBR,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB), recover message
The invention enables allograph or the close people of label need to only use an algorithm and a pair of secret keys to achieve that allograph
With two functions of agent signcryption；Realize solve key escrow and reduce certificate pipe based on certificateless cryptosystem
The high expense of reason；The authentication property of sharable content object is realized, anyone can not reveal any secret letter when dispute occurs
Validation verification is carried out to Generalized Signcryption text in the case of breath；Between original signature or the close people of label and allograph or the close people of label not
Safe lane is needed, reduces the complexity of system realization.
Claims (1)
1. one kind is without certificate broad sense agent signcryption method, it is characterised in that allograph or the close people of label need to only preserve a pair of secret keys
An algorithm is only used, specifically includes the following steps：
Step 1：System initialization：
Security parameter k is positive integer；One circled addition group G1With a circulation multiplicative group G2, two orders of a group are all prime number q；
One random G1Generation member P；One bilinear map e:G1×G1→G2；The hash function of four safety And H4:{0,1}*→{0,1}m, wherein { 0,1 }*Represent the binary system of any bit long
The set of sequence composition,Represent to remove the module obtained by identical element,It is to be more than or equal to 1 and just whole less than q by all
Array into finite field, { 0,1 }mThe set of a length of m of bit binary sequence composition is represented, m is parameter preset, represents message
Bit length；One special function f (ID), wherein ID ∈ { 0,1 }*For user identity；If identity for sky, make f (ID)=
0, otherwise make f (ID)=1；One random numberAs main private key, P is calculatedpub=sP is as Your Majesty's key；Open systematic parameter
For { e, G1,G2,P,Ppub,m,H1,H2,H3,H4, f (ID) }, maintain secrecy main private key s；
Step 2：Part private key generation：Key generation centre calculates the part private key D of useri=sQi, wherein Qi=H1(IDi)；Then
Identity is IDAOriginal signature or the part private key of the close people of label be DA, identity IDPAllograph or the close people of label part it is private
Key is DP, identity IDBThe part private key of recipient be DB；
Step 3：User key generates：User randomly selects secret valueCalculate public key PKi=xiP, and complete private key is set
For SKi=(Di,xi)；Then identity is IDAOriginal signature or the secret value of the close people of label be xA, public key PKA, complete private key is
SKA=(DA,xA)；Identity is IDPAllograph or the secret value of the close people of label be xP, public key PKP, complete private key is SKP=
(DP,xP)；Identity is IDBThe secret value of recipient be xB, public key PKB, complete private key is SKB=(DB,xB)；
Step 4：Agent authorization generates：Original signature or the close people A of label are randomly selectedCalculate U=rP, h2=H2(mw,U,
IDA,PKA), h3=H3(mw,U,IDA,PKA), V=(r+h2xA)QA+h3DA, wherein mwIt is the original signature or signs close people to generation
Reason signature or the certificate of authority for signing close people, mwIn clearly state original signature or the close people of label and allograph or the body of the close people of label
Part, public key, type of message and term of validity information；Original signature or the close people A of label are agent authorization σ=(mw, U, V) and pass through open letter
Road sends allograph or the close people P of label to, and P can be by verifying e (V, P)=e (QA,U+h2PKA+h3Ppub) equation examines generation
Whether reason authorizes σ effective, if invalid, it is required that original signature or the close people of label regenerate agent authorization；
Step 5：Broad sense agent signcryption：Disappear assuming that allograph or the close people P of label desire to recipient B transmission broad sense agent signcryptions
Breath；If message M ∈ { 0,1 }m, tag ∈ { 0,1 }；Allograph or the close people P of label calculate f (ID firstB), as f (IDBThe season of)=0
Tag=0, otherwise make tag=1；Randomly selectCalculate R=tP, T=e (Ppub,QB)t·tag, h4=tagH4(R,T,
tPKB,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB),h5=H2(mw,S,R,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB), h6=H3(mw,S,R,IDP,
PKP,IDB,PKB), X=V+ (t+h5xP)QP+h6DP, export σP=(mw, U, R, S, X, tag) and it is literary as broad sense agent signcryption, its
InRepresent XOR；
(1) allograph pattern：If tag=0, σP=(mw, U, R, S=M, X, tag=0) and it is allograph；
(2) agent signcryption pattern：If tag=1, σP=(mw, U, R, S, X, tag) and it is agent signcryption；
Step 6：Broad sense agency's solution label are close：Recipient B calculates h2=H2(mw,U,IDA,PKA), h3=H3(mw,U,IDA,PKA), h5
=H2(mw,S,R,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB), h6=H3(mw,S,R,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB)；
(1) tag=0；Recipient B checking e (X, P)=e (QA,U+h2PKA+h3Ppub)e(QP,R+h5PKP+h6Ppub) whether set up,
The invalid ⊥ that then returns represents refusal；Otherwise allograph σ is receivedP=(mw,U,R,S,X,tag)；
(2) tag=1；Recipient B checking e (X, P)=e (QA,U+h2PKA+h3Ppub)e(QP,R+h5PKP+h6Ppub) whether set up,
The invalid ⊥ that then returns represents refusal；Otherwise agent signcryption σ is receivedP=(mw, U, R, S, X, tag), calculate h4=H4(R,e
(R,DB),xBR,IDP,PKP,IDB,PKB), recover message
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| CN105553664B (en) * | 2015-12-10 | 2018-09-28 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | A kind of label decryption method with the undeniable property of non-interactive type |
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| CN107017993B (en) * | 2017-04-01 | 2020-05-05 | 北京江南天安科技有限公司 | Multi-party combined key generation and digital signature method and system |
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