CN104301108B - It is a kind of from identity-based environment to the label decryption method without certificate environment - Google Patents
It is a kind of from identity-based environment to the label decryption method without certificate environment Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of from identity-based environment to the label decryption method without certificate environment.Belong to secret communication field.In order that the transmitting terminal of identity-based environment can be using the receiving terminal that decryption method sends messages to no certificate environment be signed, method of the invention is included after initialization systematic parameter, and private key generation is centrally generated private key SAAnd it is sent to transmitting terminal；Key generation centre generating portion private key DBAnd it is sent to receiving terminal；Receiving terminal is based on systematic parameter one secret value of generation and part private key D at randomBComplete private key S is setBWith public key PKB；Transmitting terminal is according to systematic parameter, the identity of transmitting terminal and private key SA, receiving terminal identity and public key PKBAnd message m, generation label ciphertext, and the ciphertext and transmitting terminal identity are sent to the close processing of receiving terminal progress solution label.The present invention is used for the close communication of label of heterogeneous network, and the user for identity-based environment and the user without certificate environment provide confidentiality, integrality, certification and undeniable sex service end to end.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to private communication technology field, more particularly to a kind of transmitting terminal belongs to identity-based environment, reception
End belongs to the isomery label decryption method of no certificate environment.
Background technology
Cipher system is to realize the important tool of secret communication.The basic security service that cipher system is provided has confidentiality
(confidentiality), integrality (integrity), certification (authentication) and non-repudiation (non-
repudiation).Confidentiality refers to that information only uses for authorized user, it is impossible to be leaked to the user of unauthorized.Integrality refers to
Information is in transmission or storing process, it is impossible to by accidentally or in cold blood deletion, modification, forgery, playback, insertion etc. are destroyed and loss
Characteristic.Certification is to ensure that position that really it is claimed of communication party.Confirm that the identity of an entity is referred to as entity authentication, really
Recognize the source referred to as message authentication of an information.Non-repudiation is to prevent communication party to the no of former promise or behavior
Recognize.In cipher system, confidentiality can be referred to as encryption (encryption) to obtain by a kind of basic cryptographic primitives.Plus
Close to regard a kind of conversion as, this change readable cleartext information of changing commanders is transformed into unreadable cipher-text information.Digital signature
(digital signature) is also a kind of basic cryptographic primitives, and it can obtain integrality, certification and non-repudiation.
Digital signature can regard a kind of cryptographic transformation done to data as, and this cryptographic transformation can confirm the receiving terminal of data
The identity of signer and the integrality of data.If we need simultaneously obtain confidentiality, integrality, certification and undeniably
Property, a traditional method is that first message is signed, and is then encrypted again, is referred to as " first sign and encrypt afterwards " method.This
The amount of calculation and communications cost of the method for kind are encryption and cost sum of signing, less efficient.1997, Zheng proposed one kind
New cryptographic primitives to obtain these four security properties simultaneously, and his this cryptographic primitives are called Signcryption.Compared with traditional " elder generation
Encrypted after signature " method, sign close with advantages below：
(1) label are close will be less than traditional " first sign and encrypt afterwards " method in amount of calculation and communications cost.
(2) close some expensive Password Operations of permission parallel computation are signed.
(3) label rationally designed close can obtain higher level of security.
(4) design of the close cipher protocol that can simplify need for confidentiality simultaneously and certification is signed.
1976, Diffie and Hellman proposed the concept of public-key cryptosystem, solve in DSE arithmetic most
Scabrous two problems：Encryption key distribution and digital signature.In public-key cryptosystem, each user possesses two keys：It is private
Key and public key, wherein only private key is preserved by user's secret, public key can be by a CA (certificate
Authority, CA) it is stored in a public key catalogue.However, public-key cryptosystem is vulnerable to " public key replacement " attack, that is, attack
The person of hitting replaces real public key in a public key catalogue with the false public key oneself selected.When a user is with this false public key encryption
During one message, this attacker just can correctly decrypt.In order to resist public key substitution attack, it is necessary to allow user public key with
A kind of can verify that associates with believable mode with the identity information of user.At present, the public key of certification user has three kinds of methods：
Method, identity-based (identity- based on PKIX (public key infrastructure, PKI)
Based method) and without certificate (certificateless) method.It is in fact possible to according to the difference of authentication public key method,
Public-key cryptosystem is divided into the cipher system based on PKIX, Identity- based cryptography and without cryptographic certificate body
System.The characteristics of these three cipher systems of explained later.
(1) cipher system based on PKIX：The public key of each user is with a public key certificate, and this is public
Key certificate is signed and issued by CA.Public key certificate is the data record of a structuring, and it includes the identity information of user, public key parameter
With CA signature etc..Anyone can be by verifying the legitimacy (CA signature) of certificate come certification public key.This method has
Following two shortcomings：1. using the legitimacy for being required for first verifying public key certificate before any public key, the amount of calculation of user is added；
2. CA needs to manage substantial amounts of certificate, including certificate is issued, stored, cancelling.
(2) Identity- based cryptography：In order to simplify key management, Shamir was proposed based on body first in 1984
Concept [the Shamir A.Identity-based cryptosystems and signature of the cipher system of part
schemes.Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’84,LNCS 196,1985:47-53.].In the close of identity-based
In code system, the public key of user can be according to the identity information of user (such as name, ID card No., telephone number, E-mail
Location etc.) directly calculate, the private key of user be then be referred to as by one private key generation center (private key generator,
PKG trusted party generation).Identity- based cryptography eliminates public key certificate, reduces the storage of public key certificate and legal
Property checking.But, Identity- based cryptography have the shortcomings that one it is fatal：The private key of all users is all generated by PKG.PKG
Know that the private key of all users inevitably causes key escrow.
(3) certificateless cryptosystem：In order to overcome the key escrow in Identity- based cryptography, Al-
Riyami and Paterson propose certificateless cryptosystem (certificateless cryptography) concept [Al-
Riyami S S,Paterson K G.Certificateless public key cryptography.Advances in
Cryptology-ASIACRYPT 2003,LNCS2894,2003:452-473.].In this cipher system, the private key of user
Come from two parts, a part is the secret value of user oneself selection, and a part is by key generation centre (key
Generating centre, KGC) according to the part private key of the identity information of user calculating.Public key generally utilizes secret value next life
Into, but public key here is not necessarily with the public key certificate of independent certification.That is, the part that user needs joint KGC to generate is private
Key and the secret value of oneself generate complete private key.KGC is not aware that the complete private key of user, is asked so as to eliminate key escrow
Topic.
In past research process, people generally assume that participant belongs to identical authentication public key environment, i.e. two sides
Or either belong to PKIX environment in many ways, either belong in identity-based environment or belong to no certificate
Environment.However, the computer and communication system in the interconnection whole world that modern society is formed are very inhomogeneous.Internet of Things, cloud meter
The appearance for calculating these new technologies has aggravated the isomery degree of network.Different country, area and enterprises may use different nets
Network technology and different safe practices (difference for referring mainly to authentication public key technology here).
Currently, mainly there are following several schemes in the stopover sites for network isomery：
2010, the side that Sun and Li are proposed belonged to PKIX environment, the opposing party and belongs to identity-based environment
Isomery stopover sites [Sun Y, Li H.Efficient signcryption between TPKC and IDPKC and its
multi-receiver construction.SCIENCE CHINA Information Sciences,2010,53(3):
557-566.], but the program only meets External security (i.e. attacker can not be transmitting terminal or receiving terminal), such side
Case can not provide the property denied.Simultaneously also there is internal security sex chromosome mosaicism in the program, if the private key of i.e. transmitting terminal lost, attack
Person can not recover outbound message from ciphertext；If the private key of receiving terminal lost, attacker can not forge a ciphertext.
2011, Huang, Wong and Yang proposed two transmitting terminals and belong to PKIX environment, receiving terminal category
In isomery stopover sites [Huang Q, Wong D S, the Yang G.Heterogeneous of identity-based environment
signcryption with key privacy.The Computer Journal,2011,54(4):525-536.], the party
Case meets IGP.
2013, Li Fagen, Zhang Hui and Takagi proposed two isomery stopover sites [Li F, Zhang H, Takagi
T.Efficient signcryption for heterogeneous systems.IEEE Systems Journal,2013,
7(3):420-429.], the first string allows the transmitting terminal belonged in PKIX environment to send messages to belong to and be based on
Receiving terminal in identity environment, second scheme allows the transmitting terminal belonged in identity-based environment to send messages to and belongs to public key
Receiving terminal in infrastructure environment, the two schemes have all reached IGP.
2013, close signed with on-line/off-line of isomery label was combined by Li Fagen and Xiong Pan, devises a transmitting terminal category
Belong to on-line/off-line stopover sites [the Li F, Xiong of PKIX environment in identity-based environment, receiving terminal
P.Practical secure communication for integrating wireless sensor networks
into the Internet of things.IEEE Sensors Journal,2013,13(10):3677-3684.], the party
Case is applied to solve the safety problem in Internet of Things, and its transmitting terminal is a sensor node, and receiving terminal is one
Internet main frames.In order to reduce the calculating cost of sensor node, the program, which will be signed, close is divided into two stages：Off-line phase and
On-line stage.Off-line phase completes most of evaluation work in the case where not knowing message.When message can be used, online
Stage, which only need to be performed seldom calculating and just complete, entirely signs close process.
In addition, Chinese patent application CN103746811A, which discloses a kind of transmitting terminal, belongs to identity-based environment, receiving terminal
Belong to the anonymous label decryption method of PKIX environment, Chinese patent application 103746810A discloses a kind of transmitting terminal and belonged to
PKIX environment, receiving terminal belong to the anonymous label decryption method of identity-based environment.
But, above-mentioned label decryption method, which can not all be applicable transmitting terminal and belong to identity-based environment, receiving terminal, belongs to no certificate ring
The communication issue in border.
The content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to：Realize from identity-based environment to the close communication of the label without certificate environment, be identity-based
The user of environment and user's offer end-by-end security guarantee without certificate environment.
Disclosure of the invention is a kind of from identity-based environment to the label decryption method without certificate environment, including：
System initialization：Initialization system parameter, the private key S for generating transmitting terminalA, receiving terminal part private key DB, and
The label of transmitting terminal are close and receiving terminal solution label are close；
The transmitting terminal of identity-based environment submits identity information IDAPrivate key generation center is given, private key generates center according to being
Parameter of uniting and identity information IDAGenerate private key SAAnd it is sent to transmitting terminal；
Receiving terminal without certificate environment submits identity information IDBTo key generation centre, key generation centre is according to system
Parameter and identity information IDBGenerating portion private key DBAnd it is sent to receiving terminal；Receiving terminal is based on systematic parameter, and generation one is secret at random
Close value xB, according to secret value xBWith part private key DBComplete private key S is setBWith public key PKB, wherein complete private key SBIt may be configured as SB
=xB||DB, wherein symbol " | | " represents bit cascade；
Transmitting terminal is according to systematic parameter, the identity ID of transmitting terminalAWith private key SA, receiving terminal identity IDBWith public key PKBWith
Message m, generation label ciphertext σ, and ciphertext σ and identity ID will be signedAIt is sent to receiving terminal；
Receiving terminal is according to systematic parameter, the identity ID of transmitting terminalA, receiving terminal identity IDBWith public key PKB, receiving terminal it is complete
Full private key SBThe close processing of solution label is carried out to ciphertext σ.
By adopting the above-described technical solution, the beneficial effects of the invention are as follows：User for identity-based environment and without card
The user of book environment provides confidentiality, integrality, certification and undeniable sex service end to end.
Brief description of the drawings
Examples of the present invention will be described by way of reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein：
Fig. 1 is the close operational flowchart of label of the specific embodiment of the invention；
Fig. 2 is the close operational flowchart of solution label of the specific embodiment of the invention；
Fig. 3 is the system architecture signal of embodiments of the invention 1；
Fig. 4 is the system architecture signal of embodiments of the invention 2.
Embodiment
To make the object, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, with reference to embodiment and accompanying drawing, to this hair
It is bright to be described in further detail.
Embodiment 1
Referring to Fig. 3, the specific step that performs includes initialization system parameter, the key for generating identity-based environment, generated without card
The close label of conciliating of key, label of book environment are close, are described in detail below：
(1) initialization system parameter
(1.1) G is set1For the circled addition group generated by P, rank is p, G2For the circulation multiplicative group with phase same order p,For a bilinear map.Define four safe Hash functions H1,H2,H3And H4。H1、H3All it is from { 0,1 }*
It is mapped toH2From { 0,1 }*It is mapped to { 0,1 }t, H4It is from { 0,1 }*It is mapped toWherein { 0,1 }*Represent any bit long
The set of binary sequence composition,Represent G1Remove the module obtained by identical element, { 0,1 }tExpression bit length is t (t
For parameter preset, value is set as the bit length l of message m in the present embodimentm) binary sequence composition set,Table
It is shown with confinement ZpRemove the finite field obtained by element zero in={ 0,1 ..., p-1 }.
Based on above-mentioned setting, obtained systematic parameter is：
(1.2) private key generation center randomly chooses a private keyCalculate corresponding public key Ppub1=s1P。
(1.3) key generation centre randomly chooses a private keyCalculate corresponding public key Ppub2=s2P。
(2) key of identity-based environment is generated
Transmitting terminal submits identity information IDACenter, private key generation center calculation private key S are generated to private keyA=s1QA, its
Middle QA=H1(IDA), private key generates center by SASafe is sent to transmitting terminal.
(3) key without certificate environment is generated
(3.1) receiving terminal submits identity information IDBTo key generation centre, key generation centre calculating section private key DB=
s2QB, wherein QB=H1(IDB), key generation centre is by part private key DBIt is sent to receiving terminal.
(3.2) receiving terminal is randomly choosedIt is used as secret value.
(3.3) receiving terminal sets complete private key SB=(DB,xB), i.e. SB=xB||DB。
(3.4) receiving terminal calculates public key PKB=xBP。
(4) sign close
Transmitting terminal is getting the identity ID of receiving terminalBWith public key PKBAfterwards, it is possible to use identity IDAWith private key SATo message
It is close that m carries out label.Referring to Fig. 1, comprise the following steps that：
(4.1) randomly selectCalculate and promise to undertake V, T, U：V=rP,And U=rPKB。
(4.2) according to hash function H2, calculate cryptographic Hash h=H2(V,T,U,IDB,PKB)。
(4.3) calculateSymbolRepresent XOR.
(4.4) signature W=rH is calculated3(V,c,IDA)+H4(V,c,IDA)SA。
(4.5) label ciphertext σ=(V, c, the W) of message m and the identity ID of transmitting terminal are sentATo receiving terminal.
(5) solution label are close
Receiving terminal is receiving ciphertext σ=(V, c, W) and transmitting terminal identity IDAWhen, referring to Fig. 2, specifically perform following steps：
(5.1) checking signature W legitimacy
Check equationWhether set up, if above formula not into
It is vertical, then it is assumed that current ciphertext is invalid, refuses the ciphertext；Otherwise following step 5.2 is continued executing with.
(5.2) it is based on complete private key SBRecover to promise to undertake T, U, that is, calculateAnd U=xBV。
(5.3) obtained T, U value is calculated based on step (5.2), according to hash function H2Calculate cryptographic Hash h=H2(V,T,
U,IDB,PKB), wherein V=rP.
(5.4) the h values calculated further according to step (5.3), recover and output message
Embodiment 2
Referring to Fig. 4, the specific step that performs includes initialization system parameter, the key for generating identity-based environment, generated without card
Close conciliate of key, the label of book environment signs close.The main distinction of embodiment 2 and embodiment 1 is identity-based environment and without certificate
The generation member of environmental selection is different.
(1) initialization system parameter
(1.1) it is identical with the setting means of embodiment 1, initialization system parameter
(1.2) private key generation center selection group G1A generation member P1With a main private keyCalculate corresponding public
Key Ppub1=s1P1。
(1.3) key generation centre selection group G1A generation member P2With a main private keyCalculate corresponding public
Key Ppub2=s2P2。
(2) key of identity-based environment is generated
Transmitting terminal submits identity information IDACenter, private key generation center calculation private key S are generated to private keyA=s1QA, its
Middle QA=H1(IDA), private key generates center by SASafe is sent to transmitting terminal.
(3) key without certificate environment is generated
(3.1) receiving terminal submits identity information IDBTo key generation centre, key generation centre calculating section private key DB=
s2QB, wherein QB=H1(IDB), key generation centre is by part private key DBIt is sent to receiving terminal.
(3.2) receiving terminal is randomly choosedIt is used as secret value.
(3.3) receiving terminal sets complete private key SB=(DB,xB)。
(3.4) receiving terminal calculates public key PKB=xBP2。
(4) sign close
Referring to Fig. 1, transmitting terminal is getting the identity ID of receiving terminalBWith public key PKBAfterwards, it is possible to use identity IDAAnd private key
SALabel are carried out to message m close.Step is as follows：
(4.1) randomly selectCalculate V1=rP1、V2=rP2、And U=rPKB。
(4.2) h=H is calculated2(V1,V2,T,U,IDB,PKB)。
(4.3) calculate
(4.4) W=rH is calculated3(V1,V2,c,IDA)+H4(V1,V2,c,IDA)SA。
(4.5) label ciphertext σ=(V of message m is sent1,V2, c, W) and transmitting terminal identity IDATo receiving terminal.
(5) solution label are close
Referring to Fig. 2, receiving terminal is receiving ciphertext σ=(V1,V2, c, W) and transmitting terminal identity IDAWhen, perform following steps：
(5.1) equation is checked
Whether set up.If above formula is invalid, refuse the ciphertext；Otherwise following step 5.2 is continued executing with.
(5.2) calculateAnd U=xBV2。
(5.3) obtained T, U value is calculated based on step (5.2), cryptographic Hash h=H is calculated2(V1,V2,T,U,IDB,PKB),
Wherein V1=rP1、V2=rP2。
(5.4) message is recovered
Applicant is in Intel's Duo (Intel Core) i7 4770S processors (3.10GHz), the interior calculating for saving as 4G
On machine, run time checking has been carried out to above two embodiment using PBC storehouses (Selective type A pairings)：For embodiment 1,
The time that the time that initialization system parameter needs, which is 26.756 milliseconds, generate the key of identity-based environment needs is 12.457 millis
Second, time for needing of key of the generation without certificate environment be 19.379 milliseconds, the time of the close needs of label be 45.744 milliseconds, solution label
The time of close needs is 62.004 milliseconds.To embodiment 2, the time that initialization system parameter needs is 25.375 milliseconds, generates base
The time that the time needed in the key of identity environment is 12.756 milliseconds, key of the generation without certificate environment needs is 18.643
Millisecond, the time of the close needs of label are 50.237 milliseconds, the time of the close needs of solution label is 62.083 milliseconds.It can be seen that the present invention has place
The characteristics of managing high efficiency and be practical.
The foregoing is only a specific embodiment of the invention, any feature disclosed in this specification, except non-specifically
Narration, can alternative features equivalent by other or with similar purpose replaced；Disclosed all features or all sides
Method or during the step of, in addition to mutually exclusive feature and/or step, can be combined in any way.
Claims (4)
1. it is a kind of from identity-based environment to the label decryption method without certificate environment, it is characterised in that to comprise the following steps：
Initialization system parameter, the systematic parameter includesWherein G1Represent that rank adds for p circulation
Method group, G2The circulation multiplicative group that rank is p is represented,Represent G1×G1→G2Two-wire mapping, H1~H4Hash function is represented, wherein
H1And H3For from { 0,1 }*It is mapped toH2From { 0,1 }*It is mapped to { 0,1 }t, H4It is from { 0,1 }*It is mapped toWherein { 0,1 }*
The set of the binary sequence composition of any bit long is represented,Represent circled addition group G1Remove the addition obtained by identical element
Group, { 0,1 }tThe set that bit length constitutes for t binary sequence is represented, wherein t is parameter preset,Represent finite field Zp
Remove the finite field obtained by element zero in={ 0,1 ..., p-1 }；
The transmitting terminal of identity-based environment submits identity information IDACenter is generated to private key, private key generates center according to systematic parameter
With identity information IDAGenerate the private key S of transmitting terminalAAnd it is sent to transmitting terminal, wherein SA=s1QA,QA=H1(IDA)；
Receiving terminal without certificate environment submits identity information IDBTo key generation centre, key generation centre according to systematic parameter and
Identity information IDBGenerating portion private key DBAnd it is sent to receiving terminal, wherein DB=s2QB,QB=H1(IDB)；
Receiving terminal is based on systematic parameter one secret value x of generation at randomB, according to secret value xBWith part private key DBSet completely private
Key SBWith public key PKB, wherein secret valuePublic key PKB=xBP, P represent circled addition group G1Generation member；
Transmitting terminal is according to systematic parameter, the identity ID of transmitting terminalAWith private key SA, receiving terminal identity IDBWith public key PKBAnd message m,
Generation label ciphertext σ, and ciphertext σ and identity ID will be signedAIt is sent to receiving terminal；
Ciphertext σ is signed in generation：Randomly choose finite fieldIn either element r, calculate promise to undertake V=rP,And U=rPKB, wherein public key Ppub2=s2P；Based on hash function H2Calculate cryptographic Hash h=H2(V,T,U,IDB,
PKB), so that label ciphertext σ=(V, c, the W) on message m is generated, whereinSign W=rH3(V,c,IDA)+H4
(V,c,IDA)SA；
Receiving terminal is according to systematic parameter, the identity ID of transmitting terminalA, receiving terminal identity IDBWith public key PKB, receiving terminal complete private
Key SBThe close processing of solution label is carried out to ciphertext σ：JudgeWhether set up,
If not, then it is assumed that current ciphertext σ is invalid, wherein public key Ppub1=s1P；Otherwise it is based on complete private key SBRecover to promise to undertakeU=xBAfter V, by hash function H2Calculate cryptographic Hash h=H2(V,T,U,IDB,PKB), it is based onOutput disappears
Cease m.
2. the method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that the complete private key SB=xB||DB, wherein symbol " | | " represents
Bit is cascaded.
3. the method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that the public key Ppub1=s1P1, Ppub2=s2P2, wherein P1And P2
Represent circled addition group G1Different generation members,
In generation label ciphertext σ=(V1,V2, c, W) when, cryptographic Hash h=H2(V1,V2,T,U,IDB,PKB), wherein V1=rP1、V2
=rP2, sign W=rH3(V1,V2,c,IDA)+H4(V1,V2,c,IDA)SA；
When solution signs close processing, judgeWhether set up, if so,
Then basisU=xBV2Recover to promise to undertake after T and U, calculate h=H2(V1,V2,T,U,IDB,PKB)。
4. method as claimed in claim 2 or claim 3, it is characterised in that parameter preset t is the bit length of message m.
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| CN104767611B (en) * | 2015-05-05 | 2017-10-24 | 九江学院 | It is a kind of from PKIX environment to the label decryption method without certificate environment |
| CN104767612B (en) * | 2015-05-05 | 2017-10-24 | 九江学院 | It is a kind of from the label decryption method without certificate environment to PKIX environment |
| CN104811302B (en) * | 2015-05-15 | 2016-08-17 | 陕西师范大学 | Mix based on the elliptic curve without certificate and sign decryption method |
| CN108449326B (en) * | 2018-02-27 | 2021-03-16 | 淮阴工学院 | Authentication method and system for heterogeneous repudiation |
| CN109660332A (en) * | 2019-01-21 | 2019-04-19 | 电子科技大学 | A kind of parallel Key-insulated label decryption method based on no certificate |
| CN110120939B (en) * | 2019-04-08 | 2021-06-08 | 淮阴工学院 | Encryption method and system capable of repudiation authentication based on heterogeneous system |
| CN112398637A (en) * | 2020-07-08 | 2021-02-23 | 电子科技大学 | Equality test method based on certificate-free bookmark password |
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