CN109887150A - The agency of approval voting system signs decryption method again - Google Patents
The agency of approval voting system signs decryption method again Download PDFInfo
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- CN109887150A CN109887150A CN201910054085.4A CN201910054085A CN109887150A CN 109887150 A CN109887150 A CN 109887150A CN 201910054085 A CN201910054085 A CN 201910054085A CN 109887150 A CN109887150 A CN 109887150A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of agencies of approval voting system to sign decryption method again, belongs to public key cryptography and Secure calculating field.It is signed in close again in agency, one and half trusted agent servers pass through the message encrypted under the public key of sender by transition key signs the close ciphertext be converted under recipient's public key encryption again, and proxy server cannot obtain plaintext and private key information.Heavy label existing at present are close to be widely used in cloud computing system, and personal health information records system, safe distribution file system and e-mail forward etc..The present invention provides a kind of new agencies with false identity to sign decryption method again, and agency again label secret skill art and electronic voting is combined, under the premise of proxy server is half believable, ensure that any third party cannot obtain the connection between voter and ballot paper in election process, the count of votes method that can verify that is provided to voter simultaneously, to improve the privacy and fairness of electronic voting.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to field of cryptography, in particular, be construct a kind of agency for supporting electronic voting system sign again it is close
Method.This method can not only realize Anonymous Electronic Voting on line, prevent the vote buying in reality ballot scene from threatening, additionally it is possible to add
The confirmability of strong voting user identity, guarantees the fair and just of ballot system, securely and reliably.
Background technique
Electronic voting it is convenient and efficient, can be improved the enthusiasm and participation of the common people.In addition to this, electronic voting also has
Have the advantages that at low cost, mistake rate is low, count of votes is high-efficient, for election, the ballot systems society application such as expresses public opinions
Scene is provided convenience.However, the further application of ballot system is faced with lot of challenges, how to be protected by cryptological technique
The privacy for protecting user, the accuracy for guaranteeing count of votes result are all the increasingly serious problems for needing to solve.Cryptological technique is not
Disconnected progress becomes the guarantee of electronic voting system security developments.
1997, Mambo and Okamoto were put forward for the first time the concept for acting on behalf of weight password, among these included that agency signs again
Name and agency sign close again.Agency signs the close function of combining proxy re-encryption and signature again, so that user is realizing re-encryption
Process realizes non-repudiation, confidentiality and integrity simultaneously.Label secret skill art allows one and half believable third parties will to agency again
The ciphertext that sender can be decrypted is converted into the ciphertext that receiver can be decrypted, the two corresponding plaintexts of ciphertext are identical.
And during the entire process of converting to ciphertext, proxy server itself cannot generate sender and receiver is any
The encryption of one side can not also obtain any information in plain text with private key.In practical application scene, the information that user is transmitted exists
Distorting for attacker is easily subject in transmittance process, attacker may distort the data of storage for certain improper intention.
Decryption method is signed again by application proxy, and for receiver by signing to the information of sending, sender can when receiving information
With by signature verification come the source of confirmation message and the integrality of information.
Summary of the invention
Personal secrets are transmitted in order to solve the data of ballot system, the present invention provides a kind of electronic voting systems supported
Agency signs decryption method again.In the method, the ciphertext encrypted under the public key of sender can be converted to receiver public affairs by agency
The ciphertext encrypted under key.Close difference is signed again with traditional agency, our method not only allows for receiver to decrypt ciphertext, also permits
Perhaps it verifies source and the validity of message.The invention also achieves the vote buyings prevented in ballot system, threaten the functions such as ballot.
The public key encryption and digital signature function provided using label secret skill art maintains secrecy to voter's information in electronic voting system
And verifying is signed close while ensuring authentication and non-repudiation with lower cost compared with traditional encrypted signature, secret
Property and integrality.After receiving agency and signing ciphertext again, verifier can verify its correctness by given verification process.
Allograph method has been widely used in many actual scenes, and agency signs close data integrity again, and confidentiality can not
The property denied meets the demand of ballot system.Therefore, it is a function admirable that the agency of identity-based signs dense body system again, convenient for electricity
The cipher system applied in sub- ballot system.
The technology used in the present invention method is: close algorithm is signed by agency again, act on behalf of the message m that encrypts sender into
Row is signed close again, is converted into the message that receiver can be decrypted, and by the way that false identity information is arranged for user sender, guarantee use
Non-repudiation is realized while the anonymity of family.The problems such as efficiently solving in ballot system and buy tickets, threatening ballot, realizes throwing
The double shield of anonymity and verifiability in bill system.
Compared with prior art, it the beneficial effects of the invention are as follows craftsmenship realizes again to sign agency and close is applied to ballot
System, exposure personal identification when avoiding user's ballot the problems such as efficiently solving vote buying, threaten ballot, and utilize ballot system
System false identity is verified, and guarantees that the justice of ballot system is reliable.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is that a kind of agency of approval voting system of the present invention signs the system flow chart of decryption method again.
Specific embodiment
Embodiment of the present invention includes following six algorithm.
(1) system initialization:
(a) security parameter k is inputted；
(b) select bilinear map group (q,E), q is groupWithOrder, e be mapping e: It is the relevant finite cyclic group of Bilinear Pairing；
(c) member g, h are generated1,Main code keyCalculate Ppub=sP, PpubGlobal common parameter, whereinIt is with q
For the residual class ring of mould,It isIn all pairs of modular multiplication invertible elements constitute set；
(d) then private key for user space is As message space, hash function Wherein { 0,1 }*It is random length
The set of bit strings；
(e) global common parameter par:{ q, e are finally exported,G, Ppub, H1(), H2(), H3(), H4(·) H5
(·)}。
(2) key generates:
(a) common parameter par is inputted；
(b) for user after ballot system registration, system manager generates voter's identity set: I for iti∈{I1... In, altogether
There is n user, if user's false identity private key SI=sQI, QI=H1(I)；
(c) identity ID is inputted, calculating private key for user is SID=sQID,QID=H1(ID)。
(3) it signs close: given messageUser A represents sender, and user B represents receiver, input user A's
Private keyThe identity ID of user BB, it calculates as follows:
(a) it randomly chooses
(b) it calculatesXS=rSI；Vs1=zX,
(c) it calculatesH=H2(X, m),R2=hu,
(d)
(e) y=mw, U=H3(X, Z, y)；
(f) V=rU；
(g) A=rI is calculatedi, i ∈ { 1 ..., n }, B=QI, C=r ' Ii, D=SKE.Enc (k, m), k=rQID, generate
Sign SV=H5(A||B||C||D)·r+r′mod q；
(h) the ciphertext C of user A is exported1=(X, XS, Z, y, V, Vs1, Vs2, R1, R2, A, B, C, D, SV, Ii)。
(4) key generation is signed again:
(a) it calculates
(b) rk is calculated1=W-SI,rk3=XSI；
(c) transition key RK={ rk is exported1, rk2, rk3}。
Note: this step is operated by user A, is generated transition key with the private key of oneself and the public key of specified recipient, will be converted close
Key is sent to agency, and agency in this way can not obtain the plaintext of the transmission information of user, can not also obtain the public private key information of user.
(5) it signs again close: the ciphertext C of input user A1=(X, XS, Z, y, V, Vs1, Vs2, R1, R2, A, B, C, D, SV, Ii),
With transition key RK；
(a) U=H is calculated3(X, Z, y) examines e (U, rk3)=e (V, rk2),SV·Ii=H5(A | | B | | C | | D) A+C whether
Meet, if it is satisfied, then continuing, otherwise exports ⊥, stop operation；
(b) y '=ye (X, rk is calculated1), Sr1=rk2,Sr2=rk3；
(c) ciphertext C is signed in output again2=(X, XS, Z, y ', Sr, Vs1, Vs2, R1, R2, A, B, C, D, SV, Ii)。
(6) solution label are close: ciphertext C is signed in input again2, the private key of user B, user calculates as follows:
(a) h=H is calculated2(X, m) examines e (Z, P)=e (X+hR1, Ppub), SV·Ii=H5(A||B||C||D)·A+C；
(b) e (S is examinedr1, VS1)=e (Sr2, VS2)；
If all met, calculateOtherwise, stop operation.
(c) it calculates
It is described in detail below by the voting method that the agency signs decryption method construction again:
In the voting method based on agency again label decryption method, voter plays the part of agency and signs sender in decryption method again
Role, candidate plays the part of the role of receiver, the encrypted ballot paper weight for being sent voter by a proxy server
Sign the close message that is converted into candidate and can decrypt.The voting method comprises the steps of:
(1) ballot system initializes.Detailed process are as follows:
(a) manager to vote issues the open parameter par for signing decryption method again is acted on behalf of on the bulletin board of ballot；
(b) manager to vote is by the candidate lists C={ c after coding1, c2..., cnIssue on the bulletin board of ballot.
(2) voter's registration phase.Detailed process are as follows:
(a) voter is registered with the identity information of oneself to manager: system manager generates voter's identity set as it:
Ii∈{I1... In}。
(b) manager checks whether he is eligible for voting by the identity information of voter；After registration phase terminates,
The label packing and issuing that administrator uploads all legal voters is on the bulletin board of ballot.
(3) it votes the stage.Detailed process are as follows:
(a) voter chooses the candidate's coding oneself supported from the candidate lists issued on bulletin board, this is encoded
In plain text as message, the Encryption Algorithm in decryption method is signed again using the agency of proposition to encrypt this in plain text, obtain message ciphertext；
(b) encrypted ballot paper is sent to agent by anonymous channel by voter.
(4) the close stage is signed again.In this stage, proxy server signs the close calculation of label again in decryption method by the agency proposed again
Method, the ballot paper that voter sends is signed again it is close, and by sign again it is close after result issue on bulletin board.
(5) it makes out an invoice the count of votes stage.Detailed process are as follows:
(a) after the stage of making out an invoice starts, candidate uses the private key of oneself, and the agency proposed signs the solution in decryption method again
Close algorithm, it is intended to decrypt the ballot paper on bulletin board；
(b) whether the plaintext that candidate relatively decrypts and the number for representing oneself identity are identical, if identical, just by oneself
Number and the ballot paper in the label of voter oneself private key signature, and issue on bulletin board；
(c) manager to vote starts count of votes after end of making out an invoice.Count of votes can be complete by a script on bulletin board
At, and be also that can be disclosed verifying.
(6) audit phase.If occurring exception during making out an invoice count of votes, such as same label appears in two candidates
In the ticket left, then vote into audit phase.Ballot manager requires candidate to disclose oneself private key to bulletin board, then
Anyone can verify and audit to this ballot.
Claims (4)
1. a kind of false identity agency of approval voting system signs decryption method again, which is characterized in that including
Following steps:
A, the open parameter of system is set；
B, public key and private key are generated for user according to the open parameter of system；
C, believed according to the open parameter of system, plaintext m, user's A private key, identity information and false identity information and the identity of B
Breath, user A is close to carrying out signing in plain text, output label ciphertext；
D, according to clear-text message, the identity information of user A private key and identity information and false identity information and B, common parameter,
User A is close to carrying out signing in plain text, output label ciphertext；
E, according to the open parameter of system, the private key of user, the identity information of false identity and user B generates the conversion of user
Key and recovery key；
F, according to common ciphertext and transition key, the ciphertext that user B can be decrypted is generated.
2. a kind of false identity agency of approval voting system as described in claim 1 signs decryption method again, which is characterized in that one
The false identity agency of kind approval voting system signs decryption method again, it is characterized in that being registration user's generation ballot by proxy server
System false identity set, user is dense at corresponding ballot ciphertext by signing again, and user A uses the private key signature of oneself, with certainly
Oneself public key encryption, generating label ciphertext can be close by signing again by ciphertext that A can be decrypted, is converted into the ciphertext that B can be decrypted,
And can verify ballot by signing close false identity whether this belongs to the user in legal voter's set, the two ciphertexts are corresponding
Be in plain text it is identical, agency is signed into close first time again and is applied to ballot system, common realize prevents from buying tickets in ballot system,
The functions such as ballot are threatened, ensure that the double shield of anonymity and verifiability in ballot system.
3. a kind of false identity agency of the approval voting system as described in claims 1 or 2 signs decryption method again, feature exists
In the step includes:
This method shares following six step:
(1) system initialization: input security parameter k randomly selects the generation member g in Big prime q and the mould prime number module, choosing
Select bilinear map groupAnd corresponding hash function is set,It is the residual class ring using q as mould It is
In all pairs of modular multiplication invertible elements constitute set, { 0,1 }*It is the set of the bit strings of random length,It is two-wire
Property the relevant finite cyclic group of pairing；
(2) key generates: input common parameter par, the algorithm generate the public key and private key of user；
(3) it signs close: input message m, user's A private key, the identity information of identity information and false identity information and B, public ginseng
Number, user A is close to carrying out signing in plain text, output label ciphertext；
(4) sign key generation again: the private key of input user A, the identity information of false identity and user B, the algorithm generate weight
Key is signed, heavy label key is used to sign again in close algorithm is signed close conversion to the sender of the message A ciphertext sent again, is turned
It is changed to the ciphertext that B can be decrypted, is made an uproar work by user A；
(5) it signs again close: inputting common ciphertext and transition key, first verify that whether ciphertext is tampered, distort, stop, if do not had
Have, then the A ciphertext generated is converted into the ciphertext that the person of being received B can be decrypted, this step is by agent operation；
(6) solution label are close: ciphertext and the private key of B are signed in input again, and B executes decryption oprerations, are obtained in plain text.
4. the agency of ballot system according to claim 1,2 or 3 signs decryption method again, it is characterised in that: the system tool
Body comprises the steps of:
(1) system initialization:
(a) security parameter k is inputted；
(b) bilinear map group is selectedQ is groupWithOrder, e be mapping
E: It is the relevant finite cyclic group of Bilinear Pairing；
(c) member g, h are generated1,Main code keyCalculate Ppub=sP, whereinIt is the residual class ring using q as mould,
It isIn all pairs of modular multiplication invertible elements constitute set；
(d) then private key for user space is As message space, hash function H1:H2:
H3:H4:H5:Wherein { 0,1 }*It is the set of the bit strings of random length；
(e) global common parameter par is finally exported:
(2) key generates:
(a) common parameter par is inputted；
(b) for user after ballot system registration, system manager generates voter's identity set: I for iti∈{I1... In, altogether
There is n user, if user's false identity private key SI=sQI, QI=Hi(I)；
(c) identity ID is inputted, calculating private key for user is SID=sQID, QID=H1(ID)；
(3) it signs close: given messageUser A represents sender, and user B represents receiver, inputs the private key of user AThe identity ID of user BB, it calculates as follows:
(a) r, r ' are randomly choosed,
(b) it calculatesXs=rSI；Vs1=zX,
(c) it calculatesH=H2(X, m),, R2=hu,
(d)
(e) y=mw, U=H3(X, Z, y)；
(f) V=rU；
(g) A=rI is calculatedi, i ∈ { 1 ..., n }, B=QI, C=r ' Ii, D=SKE.Enc (k, m), k=rQID generate label
Name SV=H5(A | B | | C | | D) r+r ' mod q, wherein A | | B | | C | | D indicates elements A, B, C, the connection of D；
(h) the ciphertext C of user A is exported1=(X, XS, Z, y, V, Vs1, Vs2, R1, R2, A, B,C, D, SV, Ii)；
(4) key generation is signed again:
(a) it calculates
(b) rk is calculated1=W-SI,rk3=XSI；
(c) transition key RK={ rk is exported1, rk2, rk3}；
Note: this step is made an uproar work by user A, is generated transition key with the private key of oneself and the public key of specified recipient, will be converted close
Key is sent to agency, and agency in this way can not obtain the plaintext of the transmission information of user, can not also obtain the public private key information of user；
(5) it signs again close: the ciphertext C of input user A1=(X, XS, Z, y, V, Vs1, Vs2, R1, R2, A, B, C, D, SV, Ii), and conversion
Key RK；
(a) U=H is calculated3(X, Z, y) examines e (U, rk3)=e (V, rk2), SV·Ii=H5(A | | B | | C | | D) A+C whether
Meet, if it is satisfied, then continuing, otherwise exports ⊥, stop operation；
(b) y '=y.e (X, rk is calculated1), Sr1=rk2, Sr2=rk3；
(c) ciphertext C is signed in output again2=(X, XS, Z, y ', Sr, Vs1, Vs2, R1, R2, A, B, C, D, SV, Ii)；
(6) solution label are close: ciphertext C is signed in input again2, the private key of user B, user calculates as follows:
(a) h=H is calculated2(X, m) examines e (Z, P)=e (X+hR1, Ppub), SV·Ii=H5(A||B||C||D)·A+C；
(b) e (S is examinedr1, VS1)=e (Sr2, VS2)；
If all met, calculateOtherwise, stop operation；
(c) it calculates
(7) it is described in detail below by the voting method that the agency signs close construction again:
With act on behalf of sign again it is close based on voting method in, voter play the part of agency again sign decryption method in A role, candidate
The role for playing the part of B, by the encrypted ballot paper that a proxy server sends voter sign again it is close be converted into candidate can
The message of decryption, the voting method comprise the steps of:
1) ballot system initializes, detailed process are as follows:
(a) manager to vote issues the open parameter par for signing decryption method again is acted on behalf of on the bulletin board of ballot；
(b) manager to vote is by the candidate lists C={ c after coding1, c2..., cnIssue on the bulletin board of ballot；
2) voter's registration phase, detailed process are as follows:
(a) voter is registered with identity information self to manager: system manager generates voter's identity set: I as iti
∈{I1... In}；
(b) manager checks whether he is eligible for voting by the identity information of voter；After registration phase terminates,
The label packing and issuing that administrator uploads all legal voters is on the bulletin board of ballot；
3) it votes the stage, detailed process are as follows:
(a) voter chooses the candidate's coding oneself supported from the candidate lists issued on bulletin board, this is encoded
In plain text as message, the Encryption Algorithm in decryption method is signed again using the agency of proposition to encrypt this in plain text, obtain message ciphertext；
(b) encrypted ballot paper is sent to agent by anonymous channel by voter；
4) the close stage is signed again, and in this stage, proxy server signs the close algorithm of label again in decryption method by the agency proposed again, right
The ballot paper that voter sends signed again it is close, and by sign again it is close after result issue on bulletin board；
5) it makes out an invoice the count of votes stage, detailed process are as follows:
(a) after the stage of making out an invoice starts, candidate uses the private key of oneself, and the agency proposed signs the solution in decryption method again
Close algorithm, it is intended to decrypt the ballot paper on bulletin board；
(b) whether the plaintext that candidate relatively decrypts and the number for representing oneself identity are identical, if identical, just by oneself
Number and the ballot paper in the label of voter oneself private key signature, and issue on bulletin board；
(c) manager to vote starts count of votes, count of votes can be complete by a script on bulletin board after end of making out an invoice
At, and be also that can be disclosed verifying；
6) audit phase, if occurring exception during making out an invoice count of votes, such as the same label appears in two candidates and outputs
It in the ticket come, then votes into audit phase, the manager that votes requires candidate to disclose oneself private key to bulletin board, then any
People can verify and audit to this ballot.
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| CN201910054085.4A CN109887150A (en) | 2019-01-21 | 2019-01-21 | The agency of approval voting system signs decryption method again |
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ID=66926394
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| CN113066220A (en) * | 2021-03-23 | 2021-07-02 | 函谷数巢品牌管理(广州)有限公司 | Auxiliary voting method and network voting system |
| CN113127910A (en) * | 2021-04-30 | 2021-07-16 | 复旦大学 | Controllable anonymous voting system based on block chain and decentralization traceable attribute signature |
| CN115865343A (en) * | 2022-12-06 | 2023-03-28 | 西藏民族大学 | Quantum voting method based on GHZ state |
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Cited By (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110505233A (en) * | 2019-08-29 | 2019-11-26 | 苏州同济区块链研究院有限公司 | A kind of method of anti-conspiracy/secret protection proxy re-encryption |
| CN111882744A (en) * | 2020-07-23 | 2020-11-03 | 浙江永旗区块链科技有限公司 | Anonymous voting public notice method and system |
| CN113066220A (en) * | 2021-03-23 | 2021-07-02 | 函谷数巢品牌管理(广州)有限公司 | Auxiliary voting method and network voting system |
| CN113127910A (en) * | 2021-04-30 | 2021-07-16 | 复旦大学 | Controllable anonymous voting system based on block chain and decentralization traceable attribute signature |
| CN113127910B (en) * | 2021-04-30 | 2022-04-12 | 复旦大学 | Controllable anonymous voting system based on block chain and decentralization traceable attribute signature |
| CN115865343A (en) * | 2022-12-06 | 2023-03-28 | 西藏民族大学 | Quantum voting method based on GHZ state |
| CN115865343B (en) * | 2022-12-06 | 2023-07-14 | 西藏民族大学 | Quantum voting method based on GHZ state |
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