CN109672530A - Anti- quantum calculation digital signature method and anti-quantum calculation digital signature system based on unsymmetrical key pond - Google Patents
Anti- quantum calculation digital signature method and anti-quantum calculation digital signature system based on unsymmetrical key pond Download PDFInfo
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- CN109672530A CN109672530A CN201910016976.0A CN201910016976A CN109672530A CN 109672530 A CN109672530 A CN 109672530A CN 201910016976 A CN201910016976 A CN 201910016976A CN 109672530 A CN109672530 A CN 109672530A
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- public key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
- H04L9/0855—Quantum cryptography involving additional nodes, e.g. quantum relays, repeaters, intermediate nodes or remote nodes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
Abstract
The present invention relates to anti-quantum calculation digital signature method and anti-quantum calculation digital signature system based on unsymmetrical key pond, each participant is configured with key card, has unsymmetrical key pond, public key pointer random number and private key in the key card；It include: to carry out operation to original text using the private key of signer to be signed when being signed；Ciphertext is obtained to the encrypted signature using random number to sign；Ciphertext random number is obtained to the random number encryption using encryption key；The original text, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature and the ciphertext random number are sent to authentication；Wherein public key corresponding with the private key, and decruption key corresponding with the encryption key are obtained using unsymmetrical key pond described in conjunction with the public key pointer random number.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to secure communications, especially a kind of number that anti-quantum calculation is realized using key card technological means
Word endorsement method.
Background technique
Since diffies in 1976 and Herman propose digital signature conception, it is outstanding that digital signature technology causes academia
It is the extensive attention of password educational circles and computer network circle, rapid development in particular with Intemet, Intranet and wide
General application, digital signature technology obtain more extensive research and application.
ISO specially sets up the project thus in September, 1984, specified to be responsible to define the standard by the WGZ of SC20 subordinate, this demonstrate
Attention of the ISO to digital signature.Digital signature is formally divided into three classes by SC20: signet digital signature, the number with shadow
Signature and the digital signature for using Hash function；Propose " data encryption: using the digital signature of Hash function " in May, 1988
Draft proplsal, i.e. DP9796；In October, 1989, the draft was promoted to DIS9796.At the same time, standardization body's logarithm of various countries
The standardization effort of word signature also carries out in full preparation, especially the U.S., and NIST was proposed United States digital signature in 1991
One DSA/DSS Digital Signature Algorithm standard of algorithm standard rules is announced in May, 1994 in federation's record, and in December, 1994 is adopted.
In theoretical side, Chaum and Antwerpen in 1989 proposes the signature of non-repudiation, the signature of non-repudiation
Be a kind of special digital signature: the recipient of signature does not have the help recipient of signer that cannot verify signature, this is at certain
The interests of signer are protected in kind degree.
The signature of non-repudiation is made of confirmation agreement, Denial protocal and a signature algorithm.In confirmation agreement, verifying
Person can verify the legitimacy of signature by the dialogue with signer, and signer is had no chance to the legal of invalid signature
Property make the explanation forged, if legitimate verification is not over verifier can judge that signature is nothing by Denial protocal
The still signer of effect is dishonest.Undeniable signature is better than digital signature, such as a software publishing in numerous applications
Quotient can be signed using undeniable signature to his product, and user must close to the authenticity of confirmation product with publisher
Make, such publisher can control the use of product: the user only Jing Guo legal authorization could use product.
Dvaid in 1991 et al. has also been proposed group ranking theory, it allows each member in group anonymous with the name of group
Sign and issue message, group ranking is to have characteristics that
(l) only have group members that could represent group to information signature；
(2) sign recipient be able to verify that the validity of signature, but cannot make out generate signature be group which member；
(3) in subsequent contentious situation, can also be known by a trusted authority by all members of group
This other signer.
Under present information-based environment, it is desirable to carry out rapid, remote file by digital communications network
Signature, at this moment the exchange of information is all in the form of electronic document.Due to its particularity, we can easily replicate file or
One signature is copied in other file from a file；It can also be modified without being found by the file of signature.
In such a situa-tion, we will have a kind of powerful method to guarantee the safety of information, guarantee the equity of communicating pair.Number label
Name just produces under such requirement.Digital signature is prevent communicating pair from denying, forge, distorting, pretending to be etc. one
Kind authentication techniques, are the simulations of traditional file handwritten signature.Although what digital signature was taken is completely different with traditional signatures
Technology, but as signature, it still must reach the requirement that all signature schemes should all reach.
Digital signature passes through years of researches, it was also proposed that many reliable optinal plans, but these schemes are big
All there is a certain distance with practical application.Various demands in real life, existing digital signature scheme are answered
To relatively difficult.Especially in certain special occasions (such as E-Government), targeted Study of Digital Signature is still blank,
This greatly affects the progress of China's informatization.In addition, existing digital signature scheme practicability is poor, scheme is multiple
Problem miscellaneous, inefficient, that expense is excessive is generally existing, and how to simplify operation is also urgently to be solved in Study of Digital Signature ask
Topic.
Quantum computer has great potential in password cracking.Asymmetric (public key) Encryption Algorithm of current mainstream, such as
RSA cryptographic algorithms, the calculating of most of factorization or the discrete logarithm in finite field for being all based on big integer the two
Difficult math question.Their difficulty that cracks also is dependent on the efficiency solved these problems.On traditional computer, it is desirable that solve the two
Difficult math question, cost time are exponential time (cracking the time as the growth of public key length is increased with exponential), this is in reality
It is unacceptable in the application of border.It and is that your the elegant algorithm that quantum computer is made to measure (can be broken in polynomial time
The solution time is increased with the growth of public key length with the speed of k power, and wherein k is the constant unrelated with public key length) carry out it is whole
Number factorization or discrete logarithm calculate, to provide possibility for RSA, cracking for discrete logarithm Encryption Algorithm.
Problem of the existing technology:
1. in the prior art, corresponding private key is obtained quickly through public key due to quantum calculation function, based on public and private
The digital signature method of key is easy to be cracked by quantum computer.
2. the outputting and inputting for digital signature in the prior art, based on public and private key can be known to enemy, in quantum meter
In the presence of calculation machine, it may be derived private key, digital signature is caused to be cracked by quantum computer.
Summary of the invention
Based on this, it is necessary to be easy to crack problem by quantum computer for the digital signature method based on public and private key, mention
For a kind of higher digital signature method of safety and system.
Anti- quantum calculation digital signature method of the application based on unsymmetrical key pond, each participant are configured with key card,
There are unsymmetrical key pond, public key pointer random number and private key in the key card；Include: when being signed
Operation is carried out to original text using the private key of signer to be signed；
Ciphertext is obtained to the encrypted signature using random number to sign；
Ciphertext random number is obtained to the random number encryption using encryption key；
The original text, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature and the ciphertext random number are sent to verifying
Side；Wherein public key corresponding with the private key, and decruption key corresponding with the encryption key is using the public key
Pointer random number is obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond.
Several optional ways also provided below, but be not intended as the additional qualification to above-mentioned overall plan, only into
The supplement of one step is preferred, and under the premise of no technology or logical contradiction, each optional way can be individually for above-mentioned totality side
Case is combined, and be can also be and is combined between multiple optional ways.
Optionally, include: when being verified
Receive the original text from signer, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature and the ciphertext with
Machine number；
Decruption key is obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond using the public key pointer random number, it is close using the decryption
Key decrypts the ciphertext random number and obtains the random number；
It signs to obtain the signature using ciphertext described in the random nnrber decryption；
Public key corresponding with the private key, benefit are obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond using the public key pointer random number
The signature is verified with the public key and the original text.
Optionally, the corresponding relationship of the private key and public key corresponding with the private key is based on RSA Algorithm or is based on DSA
Algorithm.
Optionally, the generation method of the signature includes:
One-way hash function operation is carried out to the original text, obtains eap-message digest, then utilizes the private key of the signer
Algorithm for encryption is digitally signed to the eap-message digest, obtains the signature.
Optionally, the signature is { Mr, Ms }, in which:
Mr=(gamod p)mod q；
Ms=[a-1(H(m)+(sk)(Mr))]mod q；
G=h(p-1)/qmod p；
The true random number that a generates for signer, and 1 < a < p；
H is random integers；
P is prime number, and 2L-1≤p<2L, 512≤L < 1024, L are 64 multiples；
Q is prime number, and q is the prime factor of (p-1), 2159<q<2160；
Sk is the private key of the signer；
H (m) is the hash code of the original text generated using hashing algorithm；
G, p, q are stored in the key card of each participant configuration.
Optionally, it is obtained using the public key pointer random number in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond corresponding with the private key
The method of public key includes:
The public key pointer random number is acted on public key pointer function, obtains public key pointer, which is directed toward institute
It states and is stored with the public key in the corresponding position in unsymmetrical key pond.
Optionally, the encryption key is the private key of the signer, and the decruption key is corresponding with the private key
Public key.
Optionally, the encryption key is identical with the decruption key, and generation method includes:
The public key pointer random number is acted on public key pointer function, obtains public key pointer, the public key pointer combination institute
It states unsymmetrical key pond and obtains corresponding public key, which is used and generates hash code, and the hash code using hashing algorithm
As the encryption key and the decruption key.
The present invention also provides a kind of anti-quantum calculation digital signature system based on unsymmetrical key pond, each participant configuration
There is key card, has unsymmetrical key pond, public key pointer random number and private key in the key card；The anti-quantum calculation
Digital signature system includes:
Signature blocks carry out operation to original text for the private key using signer and are signed；
First encrypting module is signed for obtaining ciphertext to the encrypted signature using random number；
Second encrypting module, for obtaining ciphertext random number to the random number encryption using encryption key；
Sending module, for the original text, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature and the ciphertext is random
Number is sent to authentication；Wherein public key corresponding with the private key, and decruption key corresponding with the encryption key
It is obtained using the public key pointer random number in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond.
The present invention also provides a kind of anti-quantum calculation digital signature system based on unsymmetrical key pond, each participant configuration
There is key card, has unsymmetrical key pond, public key pointer random number and private key in the key card；Each participant includes depositing
Reservoir and processor are stored with computer program in memory, the processor realized when executing computer program it is described based on
The anti-quantum calculation digital signature method in unsymmetrical key pond.
In the present invention, key card storage of public keys, private key and public key pointer random number are used；And the only public key externally issued
Pointer random number, be not original public key itself.Key card is independent hardware isolated equipment, by Malware or malice
Operation is stolen key possibility and is substantially reduced.Since quantum computer is unable to get plaintext public key, it is then also unable to get correspondence
Private key, therefore the digital signature of the program is not easy to be cracked by quantum computer.
In the present invention, the digital signature based on public and private key is further encrypted by random number key, and random number key is added
Key further encrypts, and forms the digital signature of encryption.Even if in the presence of quantum computer, it is also difficult to be derived
Encryption key out.Therefore digital signature is not easy to be cracked by quantum computer.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is key card internal structure chart used in the present invention；
Fig. 2 is that the recipient of embodiment 1 in the present invention verifies the flow chart of digital signature；
Fig. 3 is that the public key pointer random number of embodiment 1 calculates the flow chart of public key；
Fig. 4 is that the public key pointer random number of embodiment 2 calculates the flow chart of public key.
Specific embodiment
Following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention carries out clear, complete
Site preparation description, it is clear that described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.It is based on
Embodiment in the present invention, it is obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts every other
Embodiment shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
In order to better describe and illustrate embodiments herein, one or more attached drawing can refer to, but attached for describing
The additional detail or example of figure are not construed as to present invention creation, current described embodiment or preferred side
The limitation of the range of any one in formula.
In one embodiment, the anti-quantum calculation digital signature method based on unsymmetrical key pond, it is each to join referring to Fig. 1
It is configured with key card with side, has unsymmetrical key pond, public key pointer random number and private key in the key card；
The unsymmetrical key pond content of each participant is identical, public key pointer random number produce corresponding key for plus solve
It is close.
Each participant generally comprises signer and authentication, and key card is entity hardware, and when use is used with participant
Terminal device be connected, safety is further increased by the physical isolation to pool of keys.
Include: when being signed
Operation is carried out to original text using the private key of signer to be signed；
Ciphertext is obtained to the encrypted signature using random number to sign；
Ciphertext random number is obtained to the random number encryption using encryption key；
The original text, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature and the ciphertext random number are sent to verifying
Side；Wherein public key corresponding with the private key, and decruption key corresponding with the encryption key is using the public key
Pointer random number is obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond.
The corresponding relationship of the private key and public key corresponding with the private key is based on RSA Algorithm or is based on DSA algorithm.
When carrying out Encrypt and Decrypt for random number, wherein the encryption key is the private of the signer in an embodiment
Key, the decruption key are public key corresponding with the private key.
When carrying out Encrypt and Decrypt for random number, wherein in an embodiment, the encryption key and the decruption key phase
Together, generation method includes:
The public key pointer random number is acted on public key pointer function, obtains public key pointer, the public key pointer combination institute
It states unsymmetrical key pond and obtains corresponding public key, which is used and generates hash code, and the hash code using hashing algorithm
As the encryption key and the decruption key.
Wherein in an embodiment, the generation method of the signature includes:
One-way hash function operation is carried out to the original text, obtains eap-message digest, then utilizes the private key of the signer
Algorithm for encryption is digitally signed to the eap-message digest, obtains the signature.
Wherein in an embodiment, the signature is { Mr, Ms }, in which:
Mr=(gamod p)mod q；
Ms=[a-1(H(m)+(sk)(Mr))]mod q；
G=h(p-1)/qmod p；
The true random number that a generates for signer, and 1 < a < p；
H is random integers；
P is prime number, and 2L-1≤p<2L, 512≤L < 1024, L are 64 multiples；
Q is prime number, and q is the prime factor of (p-1), 2159<q<2160；
Sk is the private key of the signer；
H (m) is the hash code of the original text generated using hashing algorithm；
G, p, q are stored in the key card of each participant configuration.
Include: when being verified
Receive the original text from signer, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature and the ciphertext with
Machine number；
Decruption key is obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond using the public key pointer random number, it is close using the decryption
Key decrypts the ciphertext random number and obtains the random number；
It signs to obtain the signature using ciphertext described in the random nnrber decryption；
Public key corresponding with the private key, benefit are obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond using the public key pointer random number
The signature is verified with the public key and the original text.
In the present invention, all users of this tissue are owned by one piece of key card, have unsymmetrical key pond in key card, also referred to as
Public key pond, there are also public key pointer random number and private keys.The corresponding key card of each user is owned by identical public key pond and difference
Private key, public key pond possesses this public key for organizing all users.
Public key corresponding with the private key is obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond using the public key pointer random number
Method includes:
The public key pointer random number is acted on public key pointer function, obtains public key pointer, which is directed toward institute
It states and is stored with the public key in the corresponding position in unsymmetrical key pond.
Public key in the present invention is all underground, and what disclosure used is all the position of the public key with storing in pool of keys in key card
Set related public key pointer random number.The corresponding method of the two is: for some user, a public key pointer random number rk is taken,
It is acted on a public key pointer function frkp, obtains public key pointer rkp, then will be asymmetric close in rkp direction key card
Key pond obtains a position, is stored in the public key krk of the user in the position.Using disclosed public key pointer random number rk as anti-amount
Son calculates public key.Because unsymmetrical key pond is in key card, it is desirable to obtain really original public key, the handle only in key card
Anti- quantum public key and pool of keys combine operation just available original public key, so public key is leaked a possibility that being cracked
Substantially reduce, largely improve safety.
Referring to fig. 2, Fig. 3 is specifically included wherein public private key algorithm is based on RSA Algorithm in an embodiment:
1. the user as each participant takes one's own key card from key card issuing organization, have in key card
Unsymmetrical key pond (public key pond), public key pointer random number and private key.The wherein public key pointer random number rk that basis obtains at random,
Public-key method is accessed described in specific embodiment, it is corresponding to store user in the unsymmetrical key pond in key card
Public key krk.Public key pointer random number rk is externally announced as anti-quantum calculation public key.
2. digital signature
2.1 are signed to obtain Ms as the user A of signer to original text M.According to traditional data signature mode, first will
M carries out one-way hash function operation, obtains eap-message digest, is then digitally signed calculation to eap-message digest with the private key of A oneself
Method encryption obtains signature Ms.
2.2 take a random number rs, encrypt to the signature Ms in 2.1, obtain encrypted signature { Ms } rs.
2.3, which encrypt the random number in 2.2 with the private key krkp (being equivalent to encryption key) of oneself, obtains { rs } krkp, and
It combines, is formed { rk, { Ms } rs, { rs } krkp } and and former with { Ms } rs in public key pointer random number rk and 2.2
Literary M is encrypted issue user B together.
3. digital signature authentication
3.1 as authentication user B receive user A transmission message, extract original text M and rk, { Ms } rs,
{rs}krkp}.First according to obtained rk and user B oneself key card, it is corresponding that user A is read from the public key pond in key card
Public key krk (being equivalent to decruption key), then { rs } krkp is decrypted with krk to obtain random number rs, then with rs pairs
{ Ms } rs is decrypted to obtain the signature that A is calculated, and is finally decrypted to obtain the message that A is calculated to signature with public key krk
Abstract.
3.2 couples of original text M extracted carry out one-way hash function operation identical with A and obtain eap-message digest.
3.3 are compared the eap-message digest calculated of B in eap-message digest and 3.2 that A obtained in 3.1 is calculated, such as
Fruit is equal, just illustrates that the original text that B is received derives from user A really, and without change in transmission process.
Referring to fig. 2, Fig. 4 is specifically included wherein public private key algorithm is based on DSA algorithm in an embodiment:
Respective private key, unsymmetrical key pond (public key pond) and one's own side are stored in the key card of signer and sign test side
The public key pointer random number of public key.One's own side's public key pointed by the pointer address that public key pointer random number is calculated and one's own side are private
Key partners public private key pair.
Specific generating mode is as follows: when server creates group, can define a Big prime p (2L-1≤p<2L, 512≤L <
1024, and L is 64 multiple), (q is the prime factor of (p-1) to prime number q, and 2159<q<2160) and a random integers h, and
Parameter g=h is calculated(p-1)/qmod p.Server can generate n true random number according to group member number n, each random
Number is greater than 0 and is less than p.Assuming that private key is x, corresponding public key is then X=gxmod p.Parameter needed for the algorithm { g, p, q }
The specific position that can be stored in when server issues key card in key card.It is wherein random according to the public key pointer obtained at random
Number rk, public-key method is accessed described in specific embodiment, stores user in the unsymmetrical key pond in key card
Corresponding public key krk.Public key pointer random number rk is externally announced as anti-quantum calculation public key.
1. signer user's signature
1.1 sign to message as the user A of signer: assuming that message is M in plain text, user A generate one very with
Machine number a (1 < a < p).User A takes out one's own side's private key sk and Mr=(g is calculatedaMod p) mod q and Ms=[a-1(H(m)+
(sk) (Mr))] mod q, wherein H (m) is the hash code of the M generated using hashing algorithms such as SHA-1 or SHA-2.User A is to M
Signature be { Mr, Ms }.
1.2 user's A ciphering signatures: user A generates a true random number rs, using rs and symmetric encipherment algorithm to signature
{ Mr, Ms }, which is encrypted, obtains { Mr, Ms } rs.
1.3 user's A encrypted random numbers: user A takes out one's own side's public key pointer random number rpk and carries out public key pointer function fppk
Public key pointer ppk is calculated.User A takes out corresponding public key pk using public key pointer ppk from unsymmetrical key pond.With
Family A uses public key pk and generates hash code Hpk=H (pk) using hashing algorithms such as SHA-1 or SHA-2.User A uses Hpk (phase
When in encryption key) and symmetric encipherment algorithm random number rs is encrypted to obtain { rs } Hpk.
1.4 user A transmit message: public key pointer random number rpk, { rs } Hpk and { Mr, Ms } rs are packaged by user A
It generates { rpk, { rs } Hpk, { Mr, Ms } rs }.{ rpk, { rs } Hpk, { Mr, Ms } rs } and message M encryption are sent to use by user A
Family B.
2. sign test side's user's signature
The 2.1 user B decryption parsing message as authentication: user B is decrypted the message from user A and parses
To message M ', rpk ', { rs } Hpk ' and { Mr, Ms } rs '.
2.2 user's B decrypted signatures: user B carries out the meter of public key pointer function fppk using public key pointer random number rpk '
Calculation obtains public key pointer ppk '.User B takes out corresponding public key pk ' using public key pointer ppk ' from unsymmetrical key pond.With
Family B generates hash code Hpk '=H (pk ') using using hashing algorithms such as SHA-1 or SHA-2 to public key pk '.User B is utilized
Hpk ' (being equivalent to decruption key) obtains rs ' to { rs } Hpk ' decryption.User B recycles rs ' that { Mr, Ms } rs ' is decrypted
Obtain Mr ' and Ms '.
2.3 user B verifying signature: w=(Ms ') is obtained by calculation in user B-1Mod q, u1=(H (M ') * w) mod q,
U2=(Mr*w) mod q.V=((g is calculated in end user Bu1*pk’u2)mod p)mod q.If v=Mr ', this disappears
The signature of breath be effectively signature, on the contrary it is then be invalid signature.
It should be understood that there is no stringent for the execution of each these steps of embodiment unless expressly stating otherwise herein
Sequence limitation, these steps can execute in other order.Moreover, at least part step may include multiple sub-steps
Perhaps these sub-steps of multiple stages or stage are not necessarily to execute completion in synchronization, but can be different
Moment executes, and the execution in these sub-steps or stage sequence, which is also not necessarily, successively to be carried out, but can with other steps or
The sub-step or at least part in stage of the other steps of person execute in turn or alternately.
Wherein in an embodiment, the anti-quantum calculation digital signature system based on unsymmetrical key pond, each participant are provided
Configured with key card, there are unsymmetrical key pond, public key pointer random number and private key in the key card；The anti-quantum
Calculating digital signature system includes:
Signature blocks carry out operation to original text for the private key using signer and are signed；
First encrypting module is signed for obtaining ciphertext to the encrypted signature using random number；
Second encrypting module, for obtaining ciphertext random number to the random number encryption using encryption key；
Sending module, for the original text, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature and the ciphertext is random
Number is sent to authentication；Wherein public key corresponding with the private key, and decruption key corresponding with the encryption key
It is obtained using the public key pointer random number in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond.
In order to implement to verify, wherein in an embodiment, the anti-quantum calculation digital signature system based on unsymmetrical key pond,
Further include:
Receiving module, for receiving the original text, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature from signer
With the ciphertext random number；
First deciphering module, it is close for obtaining decryption in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond using the public key pointer random number
Key obtains the random number using ciphertext random number described in the decryption key decryption；
Second deciphering module obtains the signature for signing using ciphertext described in the random nnrber decryption；
Authentication module, for being obtained and the private key using the public key pointer random number in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond
Corresponding public key verifies the signature using the public key and the original text.
Specific restriction about anti-quantum calculation digital signature system may refer to above for anti-quantum calculation number
The restriction of endorsement method, details are not described herein.Modules in above-mentioned anti-quantum calculation digital signature system can whole or portion
Divide and is realized by software, hardware and combinations thereof.Above-mentioned each module can be embedded in the form of hardware or independently of computer equipment
In processor in, can also be stored in a software form in the memory in computer equipment, in order to processor calling hold
The corresponding operation of the above modules of row.
In one embodiment, a kind of computer equipment is provided, i.e., based on a kind of anti-quantum by unsymmetrical key pond
Digital signature system is calculated, which can be terminal, and internal structure may include the place connected by system bus
Manage device, memory, network interface, display screen and input unit.Wherein, the processor of the computer equipment for provide calculate and
Control ability.The memory of the computer equipment includes non-volatile memory medium, built-in storage.The non-volatile memory medium
It is stored with operating system and computer program.The built-in storage is the operating system and computer journey in non-volatile memory medium
The operation of sequence provides environment.The network interface of the computer equipment is used to communicate with external terminal by network connection.The meter
To realize above-mentioned anti-quantum calculation digital signature method when calculation machine program is executed by processor.The display screen of the computer equipment can
To be liquid crystal display or electric ink display screen, the input unit of the computer equipment can be the touching covered on display screen
Layer is touched, the key being arranged on computer equipment shell, trace ball or Trackpad are also possible to, can also be external keyboard, touching
Control plate or mouse etc..
The anti-quantum calculation digital signature system based on unsymmetrical key pond of the present embodiment, each participant are configured with key
Card, stores first key pond and the second pool of keys in the key card；Each participant includes memory and processor, storage
Computer program is stored in device, which realizes described in the various embodiments described above when executing computer program based on asymmetric
The anti-quantum calculation digital signature method of pool of keys.
Each technical characteristic of embodiment described above can be combined arbitrarily, for simplicity of description, not to above-mentioned reality
It applies all possible combination of each technical characteristic in example to be all described, as long as however, the combination of these technical characteristics is not deposited
In contradiction, all should be considered as described in this specification.
The embodiments described above only express several embodiments of the present invention, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but simultaneously
It cannot therefore be construed as limiting the scope of the patent.It should be pointed out that coming for those of ordinary skill in the art
It says, without departing from the inventive concept of the premise, various modifications and improvements can be made, these belong to protection of the invention
Range.Therefore, the scope of protection of the patent of the invention shall be subject to the appended claims.
Claims (10)
1. the anti-quantum calculation digital signature method based on unsymmetrical key pond, which is characterized in that each participant is configured with key
Card, has unsymmetrical key pond, public key pointer random number and private key in the key card；Include: when being signed
Operation is carried out to original text using the private key of signer to be signed；
Ciphertext is obtained to the encrypted signature using random number to sign；
Ciphertext random number is obtained to the random number encryption using encryption key；
The original text, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature and the ciphertext random number are sent to authentication；Its
In public key corresponding with the private key, and decruption key corresponding with the encryption key using the public key pointer with
Machine number is obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond.
2. the anti-quantum calculation digital signature method based on unsymmetrical key pond as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that into
Include: when row verifying
Receive the original text, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature and the ciphertext random number from signer；
Decruption key is obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond using the public key pointer random number, utilizes the decruption key solution
The close ciphertext random number obtains the random number；
It signs to obtain the signature using ciphertext described in the random nnrber decryption；
Public key corresponding with the private key is obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond using the public key pointer random number, utilizes institute
It states public key and the original text verifies the signature.
3. the anti-quantum calculation digital signature method based on unsymmetrical key pond, feature exist as claimed in claim 1 or 2
In the corresponding relationship of the private key and public key corresponding with the private key is based on RSA Algorithm or is based on DSA algorithm.
4. the anti-quantum calculation digital signature method based on unsymmetrical key pond as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that institute
The generation method for stating signature includes:
One-way hash function operation is carried out to the original text, obtains eap-message digest, then using the private key of the signer to institute
It states eap-message digest and is digitally signed algorithm for encryption, obtain the signature.
5. the anti-quantum calculation digital signature method based on unsymmetrical key pond as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that institute
Stating signature is { Mr, Ms }, in which:
Mr=(gamod p)mod q；
Ms=[a-1(H(m)+(sk)(Mr))]mod q；
G=h(p-1)/qmod p；
The true random number that a generates for signer, and 1 < a < p；
H is random integers；
P is prime number, and 2L-1≤p<2L, 512≤L < 1024, L are 64 multiples；
Q is prime number, and q is the prime factor of (p-1), 2159<q<2160；
Sk is the private key of the signer；
H (m) is the hash code of the original text generated using hashing algorithm；
G, p, q are stored in the key card of each participant configuration.
6. the anti-quantum calculation digital signature method based on unsymmetrical key pond, feature exist as claimed in claim 1 or 2
In using the public key pointer random number in conjunction with the method packet of unsymmetrical key pond acquisition public key corresponding with the private key
It includes:
The public key pointer random number is acted on public key pointer function, obtains public key pointer, which is directed toward described non-
The public key is stored in the corresponding position of pool of symmetric keys.
7. the anti-quantum calculation digital signature method based on unsymmetrical key pond, feature exist as claimed in claim 1 or 2
In the encryption key is the private key of the signer, and the decruption key is public key corresponding with the private key.
8. the anti-quantum calculation digital signature method based on unsymmetrical key pond, feature exist as claimed in claim 1 or 2
In the encryption key is identical with the decruption key, and generation method includes:
The public key pointer random number is acted on public key pointer function, obtains public key pointer, the public key pointer is in conjunction with described non-
Pool of symmetric keys obtains corresponding public key, uses the public key and generates hash code, and the hash code conduct using hashing algorithm
The encryption key and the decruption key.
9. the anti-quantum calculation digital signature system based on unsymmetrical key pond, which is characterized in that each participant is configured with key
Card, has unsymmetrical key pond, public key pointer random number and private key in the key card；The anti-quantum calculation number label
Name system include:
Signature blocks carry out operation to original text for the private key using signer and are signed；
First encrypting module is signed for obtaining ciphertext to the encrypted signature using random number；
Second encrypting module, for obtaining ciphertext random number to the random number encryption using encryption key；
Sending module, for sending out the original text, the public key pointer random number, ciphertext signature and the ciphertext random number
It send to authentication；Wherein public key corresponding with the private key, and decruption key corresponding with the encryption key are available
The public key pointer random number is obtained in conjunction with the unsymmetrical key pond.
10. the anti-quantum calculation digital signature system based on unsymmetrical key pond, which is characterized in that each participant is configured with key
Card, has unsymmetrical key pond, public key pointer random number and private key in the key card；Each participant include memory and
Processor is stored with computer program in memory, which realizes that claim 1~8 is any when executing computer program
The anti-quantum calculation digital signature method based on unsymmetrical key pond described in.
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