WO2023222683A1 - Communication sans fil - Google Patents

Communication sans fil Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023222683A1
WO2023222683A1 PCT/EP2023/063105 EP2023063105W WO2023222683A1 WO 2023222683 A1 WO2023222683 A1 WO 2023222683A1 EP 2023063105 W EP2023063105 W EP 2023063105W WO 2023222683 A1 WO2023222683 A1 WO 2023222683A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data
burst
data symbol
guard interval
secure
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PCT/EP2023/063105
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English (en)
Inventor
Håkon André HJORTLAND
Original Assignee
Novelda As
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Publication of WO2023222683A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023222683A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/104—Location integrity, e.g. secure geotagging
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
    • G01S13/02—Systems using reflection of radio waves, e.g. primary radar systems; Analogous systems
    • G01S13/06—Systems determining position data of a target
    • G01S13/08—Systems for measuring distance only
    • G01S13/10—Systems for measuring distance only using transmission of interrupted, pulse modulated waves
    • G01S13/106—Systems for measuring distance only using transmission of interrupted, pulse modulated waves using transmission of pulses having some particular characteristics
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
    • G01S13/02—Systems using reflection of radio waves, e.g. primary radar systems; Analogous systems
    • G01S13/06—Systems determining position data of a target
    • G01S13/08—Systems for measuring distance only
    • G01S13/32—Systems for measuring distance only using transmission of continuous waves, whether amplitude-, frequency-, or phase-modulated, or unmodulated
    • G01S13/325—Systems for measuring distance only using transmission of continuous waves, whether amplitude-, frequency-, or phase-modulated, or unmodulated using transmission of coded signals, e.g. P.S.K. signals
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
    • G01S13/74—Systems using reradiation of radio waves, e.g. secondary radar systems; Analogous systems
    • G01S13/76—Systems using reradiation of radio waves, e.g. secondary radar systems; Analogous systems wherein pulse-type signals are transmitted
    • G01S13/765—Systems using reradiation of radio waves, e.g. secondary radar systems; Analogous systems wherein pulse-type signals are transmitted with exchange of information between interrogator and responder
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S7/00—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00
    • G01S7/003—Transmission of data between radar, sonar or lidar systems and remote stations
    • G01S7/006—Transmission of data between radar, sonar or lidar systems and remote stations using shared front-end circuitry, e.g. antennas
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S7/00—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00
    • G01S7/02—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00 of systems according to group G01S13/00
    • G01S7/36—Means for anti-jamming, e.g. ECCM, i.e. electronic counter-counter measures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H04L9/0631—Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
    • H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
    • H04L9/0662—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
    • H04W4/023—Services making use of location information using mutual or relative location information between multiple location based services [LBS] targets or of distance thresholds
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
    • G01S13/003—Bistatic radar systems; Multistatic radar systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/63—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent

Definitions

  • This invention relates to wireless communication, including methods of communication of data and corresponding apparatus for wireless communication, including communication of data.
  • Wireless data communications systems can be used for many different purposes. Some data is transmitted as a data payload to send information from one device to another. Other data is transmitted as part of security protocols, e.g. to ensure that the devices that are in communication are properly authenticated and to ensure integrity of the data being transmitted. Such security protocols have the benefit of preventing attackers from reading and/or spoofing data, but they come with an overhead as they reduce the overall data rate for the main payload.
  • One security technique is known as secure ranging and involves transmission of a cryptographically secure sequence of data from a first device to a second device.
  • the second device uses this sequence to calculate the time-of-arrival of the signal and could respond by sending its own cryptographically secure sequence to the first device.
  • the first device can then calculate the time of flight for the round trip of the wireless transmissions and can therefore calculate the distance between the first and second devices.
  • the first device may subtract a known processing time at the second device in order to measure just the time taken for the wireless transmissions. The first device can therefore verify whether the second device is within a given range. This process makes it hard for a malicious attacker to inject or alter a signal without being detected by the receiver or being rejected for breaching the maximum distance bounding principle.
  • the cryptographically secure sequence is unpredictable by the attacker such that they cannot anticipate upcoming sequence data. Therefore the attacker can at best introduce a delay by repeating the signal, but that will necessarily add to the time of flight measurement making the attacker appear further away.
  • such secure ranging can prevent an attacker from using a relay or repeater attack between a car and a key fob.
  • the car may be designed to unlock when the fob is within a short range such as 3 metres, but when the fob is outside that range, an attacker cannot provide a bridge between the two devices without appearing at an even greater range.
  • US109243032 describes a mechanism for including a secure training sequence (STS) using an 802.15.4 data packet.
  • STS sequence is a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) generated from Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) bits.
  • CSPRNG cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator
  • Transmission of an STS sequence for secure ranging (now referred to as a scrambled timestamp sequence) was included in the IEEE 802.15.4z standard and can be included at various places within the frame, e.g. before or after the PHY header and payload parts of the frame.
  • US109243032 describes how bits of the STS sequence can be encoded within the 802.15.4 data symbol in various ways, including one bit by selection of the burst position within the symbol (one of two available positions under the binary pulse modulation (BPM) scheme), one bit by selection of the phase (inverted or noninverted) of the burst, and one bit by selection of the time hopping position within the available burst interval (also referred to as a burst position interval (BPI)).
  • BPM binary pulse modulation
  • BPI burst position interval
  • the invention provides a method of transmitting both payload data and secure ranging data simultaneously, the method comprising: transmitting a data symbol, the data symbol comprising a burst of one or more chip pulses; wherein bits of the payload data are encoded in the data symbol as at least one of: i) the position of the burst within a set of possible burst intervals of the data symbol, and ii) the polarity of the burst; and wherein the secure ranging data is encoded in the chip pulses of the burst.
  • the invention provides a transmitter for transmitting both payload data and secure ranging data simultaneously, the transmitter arranged to: transmit a data symbol, the data symbol comprising a burst of one or more chip pulses; encode bits of the payload data in the data symbol as at least one of: i) the position of the burst within a set of possible burst intervals of the data symbol, and ii) the polarity of the burst; and encode the secure ranging data in the chip pulses of the burst.
  • the invention provides a transmitter for transmitting both payload data and secure ranging data simultaneously, the transmitter comprising: a transmitter interface for transmission of a signal; a processor; a memory; instructions, stored in the memory, which when executed by the processor cause the transmitter interface to transmit a data symbol, the data symbol comprising a burst of one or more chip pulses; wherein the instructions cause bits of the payload data to be encoded in the data symbol as at least one of: i) the position of the burst within a set of possible burst intervals of the data symbol, and ii) the polarity of the burst; and wherein the instructions cause the secure ranging data to be encoded in the chip pulses of the burst.
  • the invention allows both payload data and secure ranging data to be transmitted simultaneously, thereby providing an efficient method of secure communications.
  • the overall time required for secure communications is reduced and as a consequence the data rate can be increased.
  • the secure ranging data is encoded using pulses that were already present in the chips used to transmit standard payload data, there is a power saving in the transmitter as the secure ranging data and payload data can be transmitted with overall fewer chip pulses than previously.
  • the payload chip pulses were simply encoded using a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR).
  • LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register
  • the number of chip pulses per burst can be varied according to requirements such as channel conditions and target communications distance.
  • the secure ranging data is a stream of data
  • bits of that stream can simply be transmitted in successive data symbols according to the number of chip pulses being used in those data symbols. This may be varied and may be agreed according to a set up process when communication is established. Therefore the number of chip pulses per burst may be one.
  • the burst may comprise a plurality of chip pulses.
  • the data symbol may comprise a guard interval after the burst.
  • the guard interval may be used to allow multipath reflections following the transmission of the burst and before the transmission of the next burst.
  • BPM Binary Pulse Modulation
  • the guard interval can also be used for pulse-echo ranging, e.g. radar.
  • the ranging may be monostatic radar in which echoes (reflections from objects) are received by the transmitter, e.g.
  • the guard interval provides a transmission free period in which the antenna (or other transmission interface such as sound transducer, e.g. for ultrasound communications) can listen for any reflections and pass the received signal on for further signal processing. It may be noted that even where two separate antennae are used, but are collocated on the same device, the receive antenna will still normally be blinded while the transmitter is operational due to saturation from the direct path signal. Therefore the guard interval is still desirable for sensing in such cases.
  • the guard interval is also useful for bistatic radar, where the transmitter and receiver are separated, e.g. as is the case for the transmitter and receiver of a communications system.
  • the receiver is not blinded by the direct path of the receiver as they are generally far enough apart. Therefore receiving is also possible during the burst interval as well as in the subsequent guard interval. Reception of the earliest signal can be deemed to be the direct path and this can be used to time the arrival of subsequent copies of the signal which can be assumed to have arrived by less direct paths, e.g. after reflecting of nearby objects and/or surfaces. In this way, the receiver can determine the extra time (and thus distance) taken by each additional path relative to the direct path, thereby acquiring spatial information about the environment surrounding the transmitter and receiver. This may be useful for determining a channel impulse response and/or for beam forming to optimise use of strongly reflecting surfaces for more reliable data transfers.
  • the guard interval after a burst interval in a data symbol is the same length as the burst interval.
  • the burst taking one of two time slots (“hops”) and always being transmitted in either the first or third quarter, with the second and fourth quarters being guard intervals, the burst always takes up one eighth of a data symbol.
  • Burst lengths of 512, 64, 8 or 2 chips then define various possible data rates. For example, with a burst length of 2 chips, each of 2 ns length, a data rate of 27.24 Mbps is achieved.
  • the data symbol for such transmissions has a burst interval lasting 8 ns (2 ns per chip x 2 chips x 2 time slotting hops) which is followed by a corresponding 8 ns guard interval.
  • a burst length of 512 chips each of 2 ns length gives a data rate of 0.11 Mbps.
  • the data symbol for such transmissions has a burst interval lasting 2048 ns (2 ns per chip x 512 chips x 2 time slotting hops) which is followed by a corresponding 2048 ns guard interval.
  • the shortest guard interval of 8 ns gives only a very short receive window for monostatic or bistatic pulse-echo (e.g. radar) operation.
  • This range is still useful for short range tasks such as presence detection, e.g. detection of the presence or absence of a person in front of a laptop for automated wake up or the like.
  • the guard interval is a different length to the burst interval.
  • This flexibility allows the guard interval to be selected more appropriately for ranging, i.e. the guard interval may be set according to the desired range of any monostatic or bistatic ranging processes and therefore the guard interval may be tailored to a desired sensing distance and/or desired sensing task. While varying the length of the guard interval will affect the data rate, the two processes (ranging and data transmission) will not be so strongly linked. For example, for a ranging distance up to 10 metres, requiring a guard interval of 66 nanoseconds, data rates can still be varied enormously based on burst lengths of 2 to 512 chips (or indeed other burst lengths), thereby providing improved flexibility.
  • the guard interval is shorter than the burst interval. In some embodiments the guard interval is longer than the burst interval.
  • the guard interval may be at least 10 nanoseconds long, optionally at least 20 nanoseconds long, optionally at least 50 nanoseconds long.
  • a guard interval of 10 nanoseconds gives a sensing window appropriate for monostatic ranging up to 1.5 metres which is a useful range for short-range presence detection.
  • a guard interval of 50 nanoseconds gives a sensing window appropriate for monostatic sensing up to 7.5 metres which gives a sensing window appropriate for mid-range sensing within a typical domestic room or office.
  • a guard interval of at least 60 nanoseconds is appropriate for monostatic sensing up to 9 metres which corresponds to typical ranges of other short range wireless protocols and can therefore provide useful integration of functionality over the same range.
  • the length of the guard interval does not need to be tied to a particular data rate or burst length, but rather may be established entirely separately.
  • the guard interval may be predefined in advance for a given setup or application, e.g. where the sensing range and/or the data rate are fixed and known in advance.
  • the method may comprise selecting the length of the guard interval.
  • the guard interval can be established by agreement between transmitter and receiver through a handshake or setup process.
  • the length of the guard interval may remain fixed for a certain period, e.g. for the duration of a communication connection or session.
  • the length of the guard interval may be varied dynamically during a session, e.g. responsive to a changing environment or responsive to a request for a particular ranging service.
  • the method may comprise a step of adjusting the length of the guard interval.
  • the method may further comprise receiving one or more reflections of the burst during the guard interval and determining the distance to the or each reflector. In other examples the distance to reflectors may not be determined. The presence of (or number of) reflectors may be determined. The received data about reflectors may be stored as a channel profile that characterizes the transmission paths between the transmitter and receiver.
  • the monostatic sensing or bistatic sensing are from the same interface.
  • the interface may be a single antenna, e.g. an RF antenna.
  • the interface may be a transducer such as an acoustic transducer, e.g. an ultrasound transducer.
  • the secure ranging data may take any suitable form for providing some form of security in relation to the range of the transmission.
  • the secure ranging data is generated by a cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator (CSPRNG).
  • CSPRNG cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator
  • the use of a CSPRNG is particularly convenient for transmission of bursts of chip pulses as it is typically desirable that these have pseudo-noise properties.
  • Previously such sequences have been generated by a Linear Feedback Shift Register, but such sequences are well-known and predictable and are therefore not secure as an attacker can predict future transmission sequences.
  • the CSPRNG is secure in that it is not predictable by an attacker without the appropriate cryptographic key. This prevents certain types of attack and allows the receiver to have some confidence regarding the authenticity of the source.
  • the method may comprise sharing a cryptographic key for the cryptographically secure random number generator with one or more receivers before transmitting the secure ranging data.
  • the cryptographic key may be shared using any number of mechanisms, e.g. it may be shared via a separate secure channel, e.g. over a separate wireless or wired link or may be entered directly by a user on the receiver.
  • the key may be shared using public key cryptography.
  • the secure ranging data may be any form of cryptographically secured data, e.g. a stream or sequence of data bits.
  • the secure ranging data is a secure ranging sequence such as a scrambled timestamping sequence.
  • Such sequences are already used in existing standards such as IEEE 802.15.4z, thereby allowing for ease of implementation and interaction with existing software and/or hardware.
  • the secure ranging data may be generated using the advanced encryption standard (AES).
  • AES provides a convenient and widely implemented process for generating a suitable stream of pseudorandom bits from an encryption key, and is therefore readily implemented in many systems with high efficiency of execution (e.g. some systems have hardware implementations of AES encryption and decryption for high speed operation).
  • the secure ranging data can be encoded into the chip pulses in any suitable way, e.g. using different amplitudes or phases of the chip pulses or even using multiple chip pulses to encode a single bit of secure ranging data.
  • a particularly convenient and fast encoding is to encode the secure ranging data by setting the polarity of the individual chip pulses.
  • the polarity of a chip pulse may be positive for one bit state and negative for the other bit state of the secure ranging data (assuming that the secure ranging data is provided in a binary format).
  • the invention provides a method of receiving both payload data and secure ranging data simultaneously, the method comprising: receiving a receive signal and processing it to obtain a data symbol, the data symbol comprising a burst of one or more chip pulses; wherein bits of the payload data are decoded from at least one of the following characteristics of the data symbol: i) the position of the burst within a set of possible burst intervals of the data symbol, and ii) the polarity of the burst; and wherein the secure ranging data is decoded from the chip pulses of the burst.
  • the invention provides a receiver for receiving both payload data and secure ranging data simultaneously, the receiver arranged to: receive a receive signal and process it to obtain a data symbol, the data symbol comprising a burst of one or more chip pulses; decode bits of the payload data from at least one of the following characteristics of the data symbol: i) the position of the burst within a set of possible burst intervals of the data symbol, and ii) the polarity of the burst; and decode the secure ranging data from the chip pulses of the burst.
  • the invention provides a receiver for receiving both payload data and secure ranging data simultaneously, the receiver comprising: a receiver interface for receiving a signal; a processor; a memory; instructions, stored in the memory, which when executed by the processor cause the receiver to receive a receive signal and process it to obtain a data symbol, the data symbol comprising a burst of one or more chip pulses; wherein the instructions cause bits of the payload data to be decoded from at least one of the following characteristics of the data symbol: i) the position of the burst within a set of possible burst intervals of the data symbol, and ii) the polarity of the burst; and wherein the instructions cause the secure ranging data to be decoded from the chip pulses of the burst.
  • the burst may comprise a plurality of chip pulses.
  • the data symbol may comprise a guard interval after the burst.
  • the guard interval may be a different length to the burst interval.
  • the guard interval may be longer or shorter than the burst interval.
  • the guard interval may be at least 10 nanoseconds long, at least 20 nanoseconds long, or at least 50 nanoseconds long.
  • the receiver may select the length of the guard interval.
  • the receiver may receive one or more reflections of the burst during the guard interval and determine the distance to the or each reflector. The distance may be determined as an additional distance over and above the distance of the shortest path.
  • the data symbol comprises at least one guard interval after the burst, and the receiving further comprises processing the signal received during the guard interval to obtain a channel impulse response profile.
  • a channel impulse response profile may include the relative strengths and timings of various copies of received signal corresponding to different transmission paths (e.g. due to reflections from different objects and/or surfaces). The channel impulse response profile therefore contains information that is dependent on the relative positions of the transmitter and receiver and therefore provides information on the environment through which the received signal has travelled.
  • the channel impulse response profile may be used to improve the receiving of the receive signal. For example, having once established the various reflections and their relative timings this information can be used to add up (or otherwise combine) various different paths for future transmissions, thereby improving the received signal strength or improving the signal cross-correlation process so as to improve detection.
  • the channel impulse response profile may be combined with a cross-correlation template for improved correlation processing.
  • channel impulse response profiles from two different received data symbols may be compared in the receiver to check that the two data symbols come from a common source.
  • the channel impulse response profiles from more than two different data symbols can be compared.
  • the channel impulse responses of different data symbols may be compared regularly or continually.
  • the secure ranging data may be a cryptographically secure pseudo random number sequence and the receiver may decode the pseudo random number sequence using a cryptographic key.
  • a cryptographic key for the decoding the cryptographically secure random number sequence may be obtained prior to receiving the secure ranging data.
  • the secure ranging data is a scrambled timestamping sequence.
  • the secure ranging data may be decoded using the advanced encryption standard (AES).
  • AES advanced encryption standard
  • the secure ranging data may be decoded by analysing the polarity of the individual chip pulses.
  • a method of combined data transmission and range sensing comprising: transmitting a data symbol, the data symbol encoding bits of payload data and comprising a burst of one or more chip pulses followed by a guard interval; receiving, during the guard interval, a receive signal; and processing the receive signal to extract reflection signals from one or more reflectors.
  • a transmitter for data communication and ranging the transmitter arranged to: transmit a data symbol, the data symbol encoding bits of payload data and comprising a burst of one or more chip pulses followed by a guard interval; receive, during the guard interval, a receive signal; and process the receive signal to extract reflection signals from one or more reflectors.
  • a transmitter for data communication and ranging comprising: a transmitter interface for transmitting a signal; a processor; a memory; instructions, stored in the memory, which when executed by the processor cause the receiver to transmit a data symbol, the data symbol encoding bits of payload data and comprising a burst of one or more chip pulses followed by a guard interval; wherein the instructions cause the transmitter interface to receive, during the guard interval, a receive signal; and wherein the instructions cause the processor to process the receive signal to extract reflection signals from one or more reflectors.
  • the guard interval has previously been used by design to allow multipath reflections to die off before the next data symbol is transmitted.
  • the guard interval is used as a period of transmitter silence during which reflection signals can be actively acquired and used.
  • This aspect of the invention therefore combines data transmission (e.g. of normal payload data) with built in range sensing with no (or no significant) extra time overhead as the guard interval is already present in existing data symbol designs.
  • This aspect of the invention therefore uses the chip pulses which have been used to encode and transmit the payload data to serve simultaneously as a range sensing transmission. As the burst of chip pulses is followed by a guard interval, there is a guaranteed window for receiving any reflected transmissions.
  • the length of the guard interval will determine the effective sensing range that can be accommodated. It may be appreciated particularly that this may be achieved as part of the data transmission itself rather than as a separate process either before data transmission or interspersed with packets of data transmission. Integrating the sensing into the data transmission itself allows continuous monitoring of reflectors and/or range information and therefore allows dynamic analysis and/or adaptation to any changes in the transmission environment. A further advantage is in reducing the number of packets required for operation. For example, if separate packets are used for data payload transmission and range sensing and secure ranging then the total number of packets to be sent increases dramatically, increasing network traffic and power consumption in the transmitters. Combining some or all of these into a single packet reduces traffic and reduces transmit power and increases the overall efficiency of the system.
  • the sensing of reflections from objects can be used for completely different purposes unrelated to the data transmission, e.g. for presence sensing or detection of vital signs such as breathing rate or gesture detection, all while piggy-backing on other data communication traffic.
  • vital signs such as breathing rate or gesture detection
  • the transmitting and receiving may be performed through the same interface, i.e. for monostatic ranging.
  • the same interface may be a common antenna or transducer, or it may be co-located transmit and receive antennae or transducers that are sufficiently close that the transmitter obstructs reception by saturating the receiver with the direct path signal.
  • the guard interval length may be set for the transmitting step to allow reflections to be received up to a selected range.
  • the guard interval length may be adjusted so as to alter the sensing range.
  • the setting of the guard interval length may be performed during a setup phase of the data transmission.
  • the burst may comprise a plurality of chip pulses.
  • the burst may be transmitted in a burst interval of the data symbol and the guard interval may be a different length to the burst interval.
  • the guard interval may be longer or shorter than the burst interval.
  • the guard interval may be at least 10 nanoseconds long, at least 20 nanoseconds long, or at least 50 nanoseconds long.
  • the distance to the or each reflector may be determined.
  • the distance may be a distance between the transmitter and the reflector.
  • bistatic sensing i.e. where the receiver is not collocated with the transmitter, the earliest reception of the transmitted signal essentially aligns the transmitter and receiver time frames and all subsequently received copies of the transmitted signal provide a time delay measurement representative of the additional distance travelled over and above the direct (quickest) path.
  • the one or more chip pulses may encode bits of a cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator.
  • the cryptographically secure random number generator may produce a scrambled timestamping sequence.
  • the cryptographically secure random number generator may use the advanced encryption standard (AES).
  • AES advanced encryption standard
  • the cryptographically secure random number generator may be encoded by setting the polarity of the individual chip pulses.
  • a single data symbol may be used to accomplish all of: data transmission, monostatic range sensing, bistatic range sensing and secure ranging.
  • Fig. 1 shows a communication system
  • Fig. 2 shows an example structure of a data symbol of a wireless protocol
  • FIG. 3 schematically illustrates an example data symbol according to the invention
  • Fig. 4 schematically illustrates another example data symbol according to the invention.
  • Fig. 5 schematically illustrates another example data symbol according to the invention.
  • Figure 1 illustrates a communication system comprising a transmitter 100 and a receiver 150.
  • Each of the transmitter 100 and the receiver 150 are actually transceivers, each capable of both transmission and reception, although for the purposes of the following discussions it is useful to identify one device 100 as primarily the transmitter and the other device 200 as primarily the receiver.
  • One such example is in a secure location determination system in which a number of anchors securely transmit e.g. their position and/or time of transmission on a regular basis much like the satellites of a global navigation satellite system. These devices have no need for receiving and therefore may simply be transmitters.
  • the device that receives those signals and uses them to calculate its location does not need to have transmit capability.
  • the transmitter 100 and receiver 150 each comprise an antenna 102, 152 and transceiver circuitry 101, 151 that drives the antenna 102, 152 and/or receives signals received at the antenna 102, 152.
  • the transmitter 100 and receiver 150 each also comprise a power source such as a battery 103, 153, a controller 104, 154 such as a microprocessor, and a memory 105, 155 which may include either or both of volatile memory and non-volatile memory and which may store instructions for execution by the controller 104, 154.
  • the transmitter 100 is arranged to transmit data via transmission 106 to the receiver 150.
  • the format of this data communication will be discussed further below.
  • the receiver 150 is arranged to receive the transmission 106 and may also send its own transmissions 156 which may be received by transmitter 100 in the same manner.
  • Two objects 110, 120 are illustrated in Figure 1 which can reflect the transmitted signal 106.
  • the reflections 111, 121 may be received by either or both of the transmitter 100 and the receiver 150 through their respective antennae.
  • Object 110 is a distance D110 away from the transmitter 100 while object 120 is a distance D120 away from the transmitter 100 such that the echoes (reflections) from the two objects 110, 120 travel over different length paths from the transmitter 100 to the objects 110, 120 and back to the transmitter 100.
  • This difference in path length will result in different signal travel times such that a single transmission 106 from the transmitter 100 will be reflected off objects 110, 120 at different times and the return signals will be received at the transmitter 100 at different times.
  • the time of flight of the transmission 106 and reflections can be calculated and used to determine the distances between the transmitter 100 and the two objects 110, 120 based on the speed of transmission (e.g. the speed of light or the speed of sound) of the medium (e.g. air).
  • the speed of transmission e.g. the speed of light or the speed of sound
  • the medium e.g. air
  • FIG. 2 shows the detail of a data symbol that is used to transfer data bits in certain wireless protocols, in particular in certain IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions.
  • the symbol is generally used to include one bit, or possible two bits (which may include a parity or error checking bit).
  • the total length (duration in time) of the symbol is shown by Tdsym.
  • the symbol is divided into two halves, each of length TBPM. These halves are for implementing a Burst Position Modulation (BPM) scheme in which the data bit is encoded by choosing whether the transmit energy is sent in the first half of the data symbol (left half in Figure 2) or the second half of the data symbol (right half in Figure 2).
  • BPM Burst Position Modulation
  • Each half of the data symbol is further subdivided into two halves, namely a possible burst interval and a guard interval.
  • the data symbol Tdsym is made up of four equal length quarters as follows:
  • Each burst interval may be further subdivided into a number (eight in Figure 2) of time hops. These time hops allow spreading of the energy over time and reducing interference between multiple nearby transmitters. Both transmitter and receiver know the hopping sequence and thus the receiver knows where to look for the received energy in each data symbol. Note that the time hop typically changes from one data symbol to the next in a predictable, but pseudo-random manner so as to achieve energy spreading. The energy of the transmission will be delivered in only one of these time hops. Thus, in the data symbol shown in Figure 2, a single time hop out of the total of 32 time hops will contain transmitted energy.
  • the number of chip pulses transmitted will determine the energy of the transmission and may be varied according to requirements such as required transmit power and required data rate.
  • the chip pulses may be transmitted as either positive polarity or negative polarity pulses.
  • the sequence of chip pulses is typically determined by a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) which generates a pseudo-random number sequence. Providing both transmitter and receiver use the same LFSR to generate the same sequence, the receiver can accurately match the transmitted chip code, thereby reducing the effects of interference I noise.
  • LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register
  • a further bit of data (or a parity bit or other error checking or error correction bit) can be transmitted in the data symbol by choosing whether to invert or not invert the chip code. Inversion will simply result in a negative correlation in the receiver which is readily identified and the relevant data bit thereby extracted.
  • the chip length is typically 2 nanoseconds.
  • the burst length (number of chips) may be varied depending on desired power / data rate, etc.
  • Secure ranging is used to determine the time of flight of signals travelling between a transmitter and a receiver, thereby to determine a maximum distance at which the receiver can be located (distance bounding principle). This can be used to ensure that communication only takes place when the transmitter 100 is confident that the receiver 150 is within a certain range, e.g. to ensure that the two devices 100, 150 are in close proximity to one another. This helps to guard against remote attacks or repeater I relay attacks as any actions by the attacker should result in the addition of more time to the processing of the secure ranging code which should always make the attacker look more distant.
  • the secure ranging is achieved by sending secure ranging data in the form of a scrambled timestamping sequence (STS) in a dedicated STS field in a datapacket, which may be transmitted either before any data payload or after any data payload. If there is no data payload, the STS field may be transmitted on its own. However, when STS data and payload data are both sent, the STS data is always sent sequentially to the data of the payload and therefore consumes extra time and data bandwidth in the transmissions.
  • STS scrambled timestamping sequence
  • Figure 3 shows a first example of a data symbol according to embodiments of the invention.
  • the data symbol 300 comprises a first data bit 301 and a guard interval 302.
  • Two data symbols 300 are shown in Figure 3, one after the other.
  • the first data bit 301 comprises one or more (eight in this example) chip slots 303 in which chip pulses may be transmitted. No energy is transmitted in the guard interval 302.
  • a scrambled timestamping sequence (STS) 310 is also generated, producing a continuous stream of bits which is dependent on a cryptographic key.
  • the STS 310 is a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number sequence which is unpredictable without the cryptographic key.
  • the STS 310 may be generated using an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) process.
  • AES Advanced Encryption Standard
  • the STS 310 is a digital bit stream, the bits of which are used to determine the corresponding pulses to be included in the chip slots 303.
  • a T in the STS stream 310 may indicate a positive polarity pulse in the corresponding chip slot 303 of the data symbol 300 and a ‘0’ in the STS stream 310 may indicate a negative polarity pulse in the corresponding chip slot 303 of the data symbol 300.
  • the correspondence of the bits of the STS stream 310 and the chip slots 303 of the data symbol 300 is illustrated in Figure 3 by vertical alignment.
  • the STS sequence for secure ranging uses a separate field of the packet having a different structure. No payload data is sent in that field, just the bits of the STS encoded in the chip slots of that field. Any data payload is then sent separately, with the bursts of the data symbol created using an LFSR.
  • the bits of the STS 310 are used to create the pseudo-random sequence for the chip pulses to be sent in chip slots 303. This is in place of the sequence normally generated by an LFSR.
  • the STS sequence has similar spreading properties to the LFSR, but is unpredictable to a third party without the cryptographic key (unlike the sequences generated by an LFSR which are highly predictable).
  • the secure ranging data is sent in a more efficient manner as it is used to generate a part of the data symbol that is used to send payload data.
  • the payload data is sent simultaneously with the STS 310 rather than having to be sent separately and sequentially.
  • the STS 310 can then simply use the next bits in the sequence to provide the chip sequence for the next data bit (“Bit 2” in Fig. 2) and so on such that every bit of transmitted payload data is accompanied by STS sequence 310.
  • This also allows continuous monitoring of the secure ranging status of the transmitter 100 and receiver 150 and thus continual monitoring of the maximum distance between them, thereby providing excellent security.
  • the cryptographic key needs to be shared between the transmitter 100 and receiver 150 in advance, but this can readily be done in a setup or configuration protocol either as part of a hardware setup, or as part of a session configuration.
  • a key may be shared via a separate communication channel (either wired or wireless).
  • the key may be sent via asymmetric encryption such as public key cryptography.
  • Figure 3 also shows a channel impulse response 320 which is related to an additional feature that can be built into the transmission 106 and will be discussed now.
  • the guard interval 302 is normally provided simply in order to allow multipath reflections to die out before transmission of the next data symbol. However, here it is shown that the guard interval 302 provides an extended period in which a receiver 150 can listen for the different multipath reflections and use them to analyse the transmission channel, e.g. to determine the number and relative amplitude of the various transmission paths. This creates a Channel Impulse Response (CIR) such as the CIR 320 shown in Figure 3.
  • CIR Channel Impulse Response
  • the vertical lines in the CIR 320 show the different responses received at the receiver 150. The height of the vertical line indicates the strength of the received signal and the horizontal position of the vertical line indicates the delay after which it was received.
  • the CIR may also include a phase component for each reflection.
  • the leftmost line which is also the strongest (highest amplitude) in this example, represents the direct, shortest path between transmitter 100 and receiver 150. All other copies of the receive signal are received later and therefore must have been received via a longer path, e.g. after reflection of one or more objects or surfaces.
  • This CIR profile is useful for improving the operation of the receiver, e.g. by improving the receiver template to make use of the multiple transmitted paths to improve signal to noise ratio, or it may be used to compare two separate data symbols to check if they appear to have come from the same source.
  • a received signal with a significantly different CIR profile to an earlier profile may indicate that the environment has changed significantly, even to the extent that the two symbols are unlikely to have travelled via the same transmission path or paths, and thus may have come from a different source. This can be used to provide a further layer of security by detection of anomalies.
  • Determination of channel impulse response is known for many transmissions, but again it is typically done in a separate operation, e.g. using a packet header field to analyse the channel ahead of transmitting a data payload.
  • the channel impulse response is probed as part of the data payload transmission and can be done with every transmitted data symbol (or any selected data symbols). This makes efficient use of the presence of the guard interval in the data symbol.
  • the transmitter 100 can also make use of the guard interval 302 for monostatic range sensing.
  • the transmitter 100 can transmit the data symbol via antenna 102 as normal.
  • the transmitter 100 can also listen (act as a receiver) for reflections 111 and 121 from the objects 110, 120.
  • the guard interval 302 provides a useful period of silence in which such reflections 111 , 121 can be received while the transmitter 100 is not transmitting.
  • the data communication can act simultaneously as a data transmission (for the transmission of one or more bits of payload data) as well as the pulse of a pulse-echo ranging process, e.g. a radar.
  • the structure of the data symbol 300, in particular the guard interval 302 has been used efficiently for two simultaneous processes.
  • reflections can be received in every guard interval 302 of every data symbol 300, i.e. for every bit (or two) of the data payload, over the span of a whole data communication, a large number of reflections can be received giving excellent detection and good time resolution, e.g. for detecting movement of objects in the detectable range.
  • detections may be useful for a number of tasks such as presence detection, gesture detection, life sign (e.g. breathing) monitoring, etc.
  • the ranging and payload communication may be combined without the STS sequence.
  • the STS sequence may be combined with the payload communication without the ranging.
  • the payload communication, STS sequence and ranging may all be combined together and all operate simultaneously all via the same data symbol.
  • Figures 4 and 5 show two alternative data symbols which can also be used with the invention.
  • the data symbol 400 uses a Burst Position Modulation scheme similar to that shown in Figure 2, although the time hopping is not illustrated (it may be present if desired, but is also not required).
  • a bit of data is transmitted by choosing whether to transmit a burst in the 0-block 401a or the 1- block 401b (but not both).
  • An additional bit of data can be transmitted by selected the polarity of the transmitted burst (i.e. by inverting it or not inverting it before transmission).
  • the STS sequence 310 is generated and is used to determine the sequence of chip pulses that form the burst.
  • the CIR detection and monostatic ranging can also be undertaken in the same fashion with this data symbol 400, using the guard intervals 402a, 402b in exactly the same way as was described in relation to Figure 3.
  • Figure 5 shows a high PRF data symbol 500 which is similar to the data symbol 300 of Figure 3 except that the burst 501 is only four chips 503 long rather than eight. Correspondingly, the guard interval 502 is also only four chips long. It will be appreciated that the CIR detection and monostatic ranging can also be undertaken with this data symbol 500 in the same manner as for Figure 3 above.
  • the guard interval may be advantageous to set or control the length of the guard interval specifically for the ranging applications.
  • the guard interval is always the same length as the burst interval, i.e. both use exactly one quarter of the overall data symbol length.
  • the length of the guard interval affects the detectable range (the round trip from transmitter to object and back to transmitter must be within the guard interval for unambiguous detection. Therefore, it is beneficial to be able to extend or shorter the guard interval as required. For example if a short range application is needed, e.g.
  • a range of 1 metre may be sufficient and a guard interval of 10 nanoseconds will suffice.
  • Data symbols can then be packed closely together for high data rates if desired. Equally, if longer range is required for the ranging application, e.g. to analyse a room or to detect motion over a longer distance, e.g. up to around 10 metres, then a guard interval of at least 60 nanoseconds will be required. While extending the guard interval reduces the data rate, the simultaneous ranging and communication makes efficient use of the transmitter anyway.
  • the guard interval may be varied. This may be achieved by the transmitter and receiver agreeing upon a new guard interval for subsequent data symbols.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Dc Digital Transmission (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé de transmission simultanée de données de charge utile et de données de télémétrie sécurisée, le procédé consistant à : transmettre un symbole de données, le symbole de données comprenant une rafale d'une ou de plusieurs impulsions de puce; les bits des données de charge utile étant codés dans le symbole de données en tant qu'au moins un élément parmi les éléments suivants : i) la position de la rafale dans un ensemble d'intervalles de rafale possibles du symbole de données, et ii) la polarité de la rafale; et les données de télémétrie sécurisées étant codées dans les impulsions de puce de la rafale. Par codage des données de télémétrie sécurisées dans les impulsions de puce de la rafale, plutôt que d'envoyer ces dernières séquentiellement, par exemple dans un champ séparé avant ou après d'autres données de charge utile, les données de charge utile et les données de télémétrie sécurisées peuvent être transmises simultanément, ce qui permet d'obtenir un procédé efficace de communications sécurisées. Lorsque les deux flux de données sont transmis simultanément, le temps global requis pour des communications sécurisées est réduit et, par conséquent, le débit de données peut être augmenté. De plus, étant donné que les données de télémétrie sécurisées sont codées à l'aide d'impulsions qui ont déjà été présentes dans les puces utilisées pour transmettre des données de charge utile standard, il existe une économie d'énergie dans l'émetteur lorsque les données de télémétrie sécurisées et les données de charge utile peuvent être transmises avec moins d'impulsions de puce moins que précédemment.
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