WO2021249325A1 - 切片服务验证方法及其装置 - Google Patents

切片服务验证方法及其装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021249325A1
WO2021249325A1 PCT/CN2021/098545 CN2021098545W WO2021249325A1 WO 2021249325 A1 WO2021249325 A1 WO 2021249325A1 CN 2021098545 W CN2021098545 W CN 2021098545W WO 2021249325 A1 WO2021249325 A1 WO 2021249325A1
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Prior art keywords
network
terminal device
slice
authentication code
identifier
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PCT/CN2021/098545
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
雷中定
吴义壮
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华为技术有限公司
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Priority to EP21821738.8A priority Critical patent/EP4156741A4/en
Publication of WO2021249325A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021249325A1/zh
Priority to US18/063,525 priority patent/US20230102604A1/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
    • H04W12/35—Protecting application or service provisioning, e.g. securing SIM application provisioning
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Definitions

  • This application relates to the field of communications, and in particular to a slice service verification method and device.
  • Network slicing is an on-demand networking method that allows operators to separate multiple virtual end-to-end networks on a unified infrastructure. Each network slice is logically isolated from the wireless access network to the bearer network, and then to the core network to adapt to various types of applications.
  • the terminal device accesses the service network and can use the network slicing slicing service provided by the service network.
  • the terminal device For the roaming scenario in the mobile network, that is, when the terminal device roams to the visited network, it can access the visited network, and further can use the network slicing service provided by the visited network; if the terminal device uses the slicing service provided by the visited network Service, the visited network can ask the home network of the terminal device for the service fee for providing the slice service.
  • the home network cannot determine whether the visited network provides a slicing service for the terminal. Therefore, the visited network may lie to the home network that the visited network provides the slicing service for the terminal device; or, the visited network may lie to the home network that the visited network provides the terminal device with a higher-performance network
  • the slicing slicing service in turn requires higher service fees from the home network, resulting in poor network security.
  • the embodiments of the present application provide a slice service verification method and device, which are used to improve network security.
  • the first aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a slice service verification method, which includes:
  • the slice service verification function entity receives the first message sent by the terminal device, the first message carrying the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is calculated and generated according to the first network identifier;
  • the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier, and when the verification passes, the slice service verification function entity sends the second network identifier to the authentication server.
  • the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code sent by the terminal device according to the second network identifier.
  • the slice service verification function entity can determine that the second network identifier corresponds to The network is the slicing service of the first network slicing provided by the terminal device. Therefore, through the above solution, the behavior of cheating the home network of the terminal device due to the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device can be avoided or prevented, and network security can be improved.
  • the slice service verification method of the embodiment of the present application can enhance the control of the home network's access to the terminal device and the terminal device's use of network slicing, avoiding the use of the visited network in the slice authentication process of the network slicing and/or the use of network slicing The act of deceiving the home network during the process.
  • the slice service verification function entity verifying the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier includes: the slice service verification function entity obtains the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF ; then, slice The service verification function entity generates a second message authentication code according to the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF and the second network identifier, and matches the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code to obtain a verification result.
  • the slice service verification function entity uses the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF and the second network identity to generate the second message
  • the authentication code is compared with the received first message authentication code and the second message authentication code to realize the verification of the first message authentication code, and a specific verification method is provided.
  • the slice service verification function entity generating a second message authentication code according to the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF and the second network identity includes: the slice service verification function entity according to the second The integrity protection key K NSSAAF , the identifier of the first network slice, and the second network identifier obtain the second message authentication code.
  • the terminal device in the process of generating the first message authentication code, the terminal device further uses the identifier of the first network slice as a parameter for generating the first message authentication code, so that the slice service verification function entity is generating the first message
  • the slice service verifies the first message authentication code.
  • the slice service verification function entity is a network slice-specific authentication and authorization function (NSSAAF) entity; the slice service verification function entity obtains the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF includes: the slice service verification function entity receives the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF sent by the authentication server function (authentication server function, AUSF) entity, and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF is the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF for the AUSF entity according to the first An intermediate key K AUSF is generated.
  • NSSAAF network slice-specific authentication and authorization function
  • the terminal device and the AUSF entity respectively generate the first intermediate key K AUSF
  • the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF is the first intermediate key that the AUSF entity obtains from the first intermediate key.
  • the key K AUSF is deduced, so that only the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF can verify the first message verification.
  • only the relevant network element entity in the home network of the terminal device has the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF , which means that the visited network cannot verify the first message authentication code and cannot be tampered with, so as to avoid
  • the visited network deceives the home network during the slice authentication process of the network slice and/or during the use process of the network slice.
  • the slice service verification function entity verifying the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier includes: the slice service verification function entity according to the first intermediate key K AUSF and the second network The identifier generates a second message authentication code; then, the slice service verification function entity matches the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code to obtain a verification result.
  • the terminal device and the AUSF entity respectively generate the first intermediate key K AUSF , so that only the first intermediate key K AUSF can verify the first message verification .
  • the relevant network element entity in the home network of the terminal device owns the first intermediate key K AUSF , that is to say, the first message authentication code that the visited network cannot verify and cannot be tampered with, thereby avoiding visits.
  • the behavior of the network to deceive the home network during the slice authentication process of the network slice and/or during the use process of the network slice.
  • the first message further includes first identification information
  • the second network identification is determined by the slice service verification function entity according to the first identification information; wherein, the first identification information includes the first identification information.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identity of the first network (serving network identity, SN-ID), or the identity of the public land mobile network (PLMN) corresponding to the first network, or the name of the first network (serving network name, SNN), or the network identifier (NID) of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identity of the access and mobility management function (AMF) entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, and the AMF entity is the first network in the first network.
  • the terminal device initiates the slice authentication functional entity of the first network slice.
  • a second aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a slice service verification method, which includes:
  • the terminal device generates a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier; then, the terminal device sends a first message to the slice service verification function entity, the first message carrying the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code.
  • the terminal device generates a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier, and carries it in the first message and sends it to the slice service verification function entity, so that the slice service verification function entity can verify the first message authentication code. Therefore, the behavior of cheating the home network of the terminal device due to the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device can be avoided or prevented, and network security can be improved.
  • the method before the terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier, the method further includes: the terminal device according to the first encryption and decryption key (cypher key, CK) and the first complete protection key (integrity key, IK) generating a first intermediate key K AUSF; then, the terminal device key K AUSF generating a second integrity protection key according to the first intermediate K NSSAAF; the terminal device according to a first
  • the network identification generating the first message authentication code includes:
  • the terminal device generates a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF.
  • a method for generating the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF for the terminal device is provided, using the first encryption and decryption key CK generated after the first level authentication of the terminal device and the first integrity protection
  • the key IK is used to generate the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF .
  • the method before the terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier, the method further includes: the terminal device according to the first encryption/decryption key CK and the first integrity protection key IK Generate a second encryption and decryption key CK' and a third integrity protection key IK'; the terminal device generates a first intermediate key K according to the second encryption and decryption key CK' and the third integrity protection key IK' AUSF ; the terminal device generates a second integrity protection key K NSSAAF according to the first intermediate key K AUSF ; the terminal device generates a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier includes: the terminal device generates a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier And the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF to generate a first message authentication code.
  • the method before the terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier, the method further includes: the terminal device according to the first encryption/decryption key CK and the first integrity protection key IK Generating the first intermediate key K AUSF ; the terminal device generating the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier includes: the terminal device generating the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier and the first intermediate key K AUSF .
  • the terminal device and the AUSF entity respectively generate the first intermediate key K AUSF
  • the terminal device generates the first message authentication code through the first intermediate key K AUSF .
  • the relevant network element entity in the home network of the terminal device owns the first intermediate key K AUSF , that is to say, the first message authentication code that the visited network cannot verify and cannot be tampered with, thereby avoiding visits.
  • the behavior of the network to deceive the home network during the slice authentication process of the network slice and/or during the use process of the network slice.
  • the terminal device generating the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF includes: the terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the second integrity protection key K The NSSAAF , the identifier of the first network slice, and the first network identifier generate the first message authentication code.
  • the first message authentication code may be further generated in combination with the identification of the first network slice, so that the slice service verification function entity can pass the first message
  • the authentication code is used to verify whether the first network corresponding to the first network identifier provides the slicing service of the first network slice for the terminal device.
  • the first message further includes first identification information, and the first network identification corresponds to the first identification information; wherein the first identification information is the identification of the first network or the first identification information.
  • An identifier of a functional entity in the network, and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the identification information carried in the first identification information is provided.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • the third aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a slice service verification method, which includes:
  • the authentication server receives a second message sent by the terminal device, the second message carrying the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code, the first message authentication code is calculated and generated according to the second network identifier; then, the authentication The server verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier, and when the verification passes, the authentication server determines that the network corresponding to the second network identifier provides the terminal device with the slicing service of the first network slice.
  • the foregoing solution can avoid or prevent the behavior of cheating the home network of the terminal device due to the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device, thereby improving network security.
  • the slice service verification method of the embodiment of the present application can enhance the control of the home network's access to the terminal device and the terminal device's use of network slicing, avoiding the use of the visited network in the slice authentication process of the network slicing and/or the use of network slicing The act of deceiving the home network during the process.
  • the authentication server verifying the first message authentication code according to the second network identification includes: the authentication server verifying the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the second network identification, the The first credential is used for slice authentication for the first network slice between the terminal device and the authentication server.
  • a specific verification manner in which the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code is provided. Since the terminal device side generates the first message authentication code through the first credential, the security of the first message authentication code is improved, and it is prevented from being tampered with during transmission; accordingly, the authentication server is based on the first credential and the first credential. The message authentication code is verified.
  • the first credential is the public key of the terminal device and the private key of the terminal device; the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the second network identification. Including: the authentication server decrypts the first message authentication code according to the public key of the terminal device to obtain a first digest; then, the authentication server generates a second digest according to the second network identifier according to the first preset key generation function , And match the first summary with the second summary to obtain the verification result.
  • the first credential is a public key private key pair of the terminal device.
  • the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code through the public key and private key of the terminal device.
  • the first credential is a first password
  • the authentication service verifying the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the second network identifier specifically includes: the authentication server according to the first password Generate a second message authentication code with the second network identifier, and match the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code to obtain a verification result.
  • the first credential is a first password.
  • the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code through the first password.
  • the authentication server verifying the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier includes: generating the second message authentication code according to the first key Kemsk and the second network identifier, and combining the first message authentication code The message authentication code and the second message authentication code are matched to obtain the verification result.
  • the first key Kemsk is a key generated in an extensible authentication protocol (extensible authentication protocol, EAP) authentication process for the first network slice of the terminal device.
  • the second message also carries first identification information, and the second network identification is determined by the authentication server according to the first identification information; wherein, the first identification information includes the first identification information of the first network An identifier or an identifier of a functional entity in the first network, and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the public land mobile network PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • the fourth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a slice service verification method, which includes:
  • the terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier; then, the terminal device sends a second message to the authentication server, the second message carrying the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code.
  • the terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier, and carries it in the second message and sends it to the authentication server, so that the authentication server can verify the first message authentication code, which can avoid or prevent Since the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device deceives the home network of the terminal device, the network security is improved.
  • the terminal device generating the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier includes: the terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the first network identifier, and the first credential is used for the Slice authentication for the first network slice between the terminal device and the authentication server.
  • the terminal device generates the first message authentication code by using the first credential used for the slice authentication of the first network slice between the terminal device and the authentication server, so as to realize the verification of the first message.
  • the integrity of the authentication code is protected to avoid tampering during transmission.
  • the terminal device uses the private key of the terminal device to generate the first message authentication code, so as to protect the integrity of the first message authentication code and avoid tampering during transmission.
  • the first credential is a first password
  • the terminal device generating the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the first network identifier includes: the terminal device according to the first password and the first network Identify the generation of the second message authentication code.
  • the terminal device uses the first password used in the EAP authentication process to generate the first message authentication code, so as to protect the integrity of the first message authentication code and avoid tampering during transmission.
  • the terminal device generating the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier includes: the terminal device generating the first message authentication code according to the first key Kemsk and the first network identifier, the first key Kemsk is the key generated in the EAP authentication process for the first network slice of the terminal device.
  • the terminal device uses the key generated in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device to generate the first message authentication code, so as to protect the integrity of the first message authentication code and avoid It was tampered with during transmission.
  • the second message also carries first identification information, and the first identification information corresponds to the first network identification; the first identification information includes the identification of the first network or the identification of the first network The identifier of the functional entity, the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • first identification information includes the identification of the first network or the identification of the first network
  • the identifier of the functional entity, the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • the fifth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a slice service verification method, which includes:
  • the AMF entity updates the second key K AMF according to the identity of the first network slice, and obtains the updated second key K AMF .
  • the two keys K AMF are used for transmission between the terminal device and the first network (including slice data transmission or signaling transmission), and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the home network of the terminal device can determine through the updated first key K AMF that the first network provides the terminal device with the slicing service of the first network slice.
  • the slicing service of network slicing includes slicing data transmission or signaling transmission. Therefore, through the above solution, the behavior of cheating the home network of the terminal device due to the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device can be avoided or prevented, and network security can be improved.
  • the method further includes: the AMF entity sends second instruction information to the terminal device, where the second instruction information updates the second key K AMF for the first network slice according to the instruction.
  • the AMF entity instructs the terminal device to update the second key K AMF through the second indication information.
  • AMF key K AMF updating the second entity comprises a network according to a first slice identification: AMF entity key K AMF updating the second network based on the first key identifier and a third slice
  • the third key is a key generated in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device, or a credential used in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device.
  • the method further includes: the AMF entity receives a completion notification message sent by the terminal device, where the completion notification message is used to notify the AMF entity that the terminal device has completed updating the second key K AMF.
  • a sixth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a slice service verification method, which includes:
  • the terminal device receives the second instruction information sent by the AMF entity; then, the terminal device updates the second key K AMF according to the second instruction information, and the updated second key K AMF is used for the terminal device to communicate with the first network For transmission (including slice data transmission or signaling transmission), the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the terminal device updating the second key K AMF according to the second indication information includes: the terminal device determines to update the second key K AMF for the first network slice according to the second indication information; then , The terminal device updates the second key K AMF according to the identifier of the first network slice.
  • the terminal device updating the second key K AMF according to the identification of the first network slice includes: the terminal device updating the second key K AMF according to the identification of the first network slice and the third key
  • the key K AMF , the third key is the key generated in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device, or the credential used in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device.
  • the method further includes: the terminal device sends a completion notification message to the AMF entity, where the completion notification message is used to notify the AMF entity that the terminal device has completed updating the second key K AMF.
  • a seventh aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a slice service verification function entity, and the slice service verification function entity includes:
  • a transceiver module configured to receive a first message sent by a terminal device, the first message carrying an identifier of the first network slice and a first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is calculated and generated according to the first network identifier;
  • a processing module configured to verify the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier
  • the transceiver module is configured to send the second network identifier to the authentication server by the slice service verification function entity when the verification is passed.
  • the processing module is specifically used for:
  • the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are matched to obtain a verification result.
  • processing module is specifically used for:
  • the slice service verification function entity is an NSSAAF entity; the processing module is specifically used for:
  • the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF Ausf entity receives the transmitted, the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF AUSF entity key K AUSF generated for a first intermediate.
  • processing module is specifically used for:
  • the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are matched to obtain a verification result.
  • the first message further includes first identification information
  • the second network identification is determined by the slice service verification function entity according to the first identification information; wherein, the first identification information includes the first identification information.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • An eighth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a terminal device, and the method includes:
  • a processing module configured to generate a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier
  • the transceiver module is configured to send a first message to the slice service verification function entity, where the first message carries the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code.
  • processing module is also used to:
  • the processing module is specifically used for:
  • a first message authentication code is generated according to the first network identifier and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF.
  • processing module is also used to:
  • the processing module is specifically used for:
  • a first message authentication code is generated according to the first network identifier and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF.
  • processing module is also used to:
  • the processing module is specifically used for:
  • processing module is specifically used for:
  • the first message authentication code is generated according to the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF , the identifier of the first network slice, and the first network identifier.
  • the first message further includes first identification information, and the first network identification corresponds to the first identification information; wherein, the first identification information is the identification of the first network or the first identification information.
  • An identifier of a functional entity in the network, and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • a ninth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides an authentication server, and the authentication server includes:
  • a transceiver module configured to receive a second message sent by a terminal device, the second message carrying an identifier of the first network slice and a first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is calculated and generated according to the second network identifier;
  • a processing module configured to verify the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier
  • the transceiver module is configured to, when the verification is passed, determine that the network corresponding to the second network identifier provides the terminal device with the slicing service of the first network slice.
  • the processing module is specifically used for:
  • the first message authentication code is verified according to the first credential and the second network identifier, and the first credential is used for slice authentication for the first network slice between the terminal device and the authentication server.
  • the first credential is the public key of the terminal device and the private key of the terminal device; the processing module is specifically used for:
  • the first digest and the second digest are matched to obtain a verification result.
  • the first credential is a first password
  • the processing module is specifically configured to:
  • the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are matched to obtain a verification result.
  • processing module is specifically used for:
  • the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are matched to obtain a verification result.
  • the second message also carries first identification information, and the second network identification is determined by the authentication server according to the first identification information; wherein, the first identification information includes the first identification information of the first network An identifier or an identifier of a functional entity in the first network, and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • a tenth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a terminal device, and the terminal device includes:
  • a processing module configured to generate a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier
  • the transceiver module is configured to send a second message to the authentication server, where the second message carries the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code.
  • the processing module is specifically used for:
  • a first message authentication code is generated according to the first credential and the first network identifier, and the first credential is used for slice authentication for the first network slice between the terminal device and the authentication server.
  • the first credential is the public key of the terminal device and the private key of the terminal device; the processing module is specifically used for:
  • the first digest is encrypted according to the private key of the terminal device to obtain the first message authentication code.
  • the first credential is a first password
  • the processing module is specifically configured to:
  • a second message authentication code is generated according to the first password and the first network identification.
  • processing module is specifically used for:
  • a first message authentication code is generated according to the first key Kemsk and the first network identifier, and the first key Kemsk is a key generated in the EAP authentication process for the first network slice of the terminal device.
  • the second message also carries first identification information, and the first identification information corresponds to the first network identification; the first identification information includes the identification of the first network or the identification of the first network The identifier of the functional entity, the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • the eleventh aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides an AMF entity, and the AMF entity includes:
  • the processing module is configured to update the second key K AMF according to the identifier of the first network slice to obtain the updated second key K AMF .
  • the latter second key K AMF is used for transmission between the terminal device and the first network, and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the AMF entity further includes a transceiver module
  • the transceiver module is configured to send second instruction information to the terminal device, where the second instruction information updates the second key K AMF for the first network slice according to the instruction.
  • processing module is specifically used for:
  • the second key K AMF is updated according to the identification of the first network slice and the third key.
  • the third key is the key generated in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device, or the terminal device’s The credential used in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice.
  • the transceiver module is also used for:
  • a twelfth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a terminal device, which includes:
  • the transceiver module is configured to receive the second indication information sent by the AMF entity;
  • the processing module is configured to update the second key K AMF according to the second instruction information.
  • the updated second key K AMF is used for transmission between the terminal device and the first network, and the first network is the terminal device currently connected to Into the network.
  • the processing module is specifically used for:
  • processing module is specifically used for:
  • the second key K AMF is updated according to the identification of the first network slice and the third key.
  • the third key is the key generated in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device, or the terminal device’s The credential used in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice.
  • the transceiver module is also used for:
  • a completion notification message is sent to the AMF entity, and the completion notification message is used to notify the AMF entity that the terminal device has completed updating the second key K AMF.
  • the thirteenth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a slicing service verification functional entity.
  • the slicing service verification functional entity includes: a processor, a memory, an input/output device, and a bus; the memory stores computer instructions; the processor is executing the When there are computer instructions in the memory, the memory stores the computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory, it is used to implement any one of the implementation manners as in the first aspect.
  • the processor, the memory, and the input/output device are respectively connected to the bus.
  • a fourteenth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a terminal device.
  • the terminal device includes: a processor, a memory, an input/output device, and a bus; the memory stores computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory , The memory stores computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory, it is used to implement any one of the implementation manners of the second aspect.
  • the processor, memory, and input/output device are respectively connected to the bus.
  • a fifteenth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides an authentication server, which includes: a processor, a memory, an input/output device, and a bus; the memory stores computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory , The memory stores computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory, it is used to implement any one of the implementation manners of the third aspect.
  • the processor, the memory, and the input/output device are respectively connected to the bus.
  • the sixteenth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a terminal device, which includes: a processor, a memory, an input/output device, and a bus; the memory stores computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory , The memory stores computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory, it is used to implement any one of the implementation manners of the fourth aspect.
  • the processor, memory, and input/output device are respectively connected to the bus.
  • the seventeenth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides an AMF entity
  • the AMF entity includes: a processor, a memory, an input/output device, and a bus; the memory stores computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory , The memory stores computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory, it is used to implement any one of the implementation manners of the fifth aspect.
  • the processor, the memory, and the input/output device are respectively connected to the bus.
  • An eighteenth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a terminal device, which includes: a processor, a memory, an input/output device, and a bus; the memory stores computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory , The memory stores computer instructions; when the processor executes the computer instructions in the memory, it is used to implement any one of the implementation manners of the sixth aspect.
  • the processor, the memory, and the input/output device are respectively connected to the bus.
  • the nineteenth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a computer program product including instructions, which is characterized in that, when it is run on a computer, the computer executes aspects such as the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, and the fourth aspect. , The fifth aspect and the sixth aspect.
  • the twentieth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, which is characterized by including instructions, which when run on a computer, cause the computer to execute the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, and the third aspect. Any one of the four aspects, the fifth aspect, and the sixth aspect.
  • the twenty-first aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a chip, including a memory and a processor, the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program from the memory, so that the processor executes the above-mentioned first aspect , Any one of the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, the fifth aspect, and the sixth aspect.
  • the twenty-second aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a communication system, which includes the slice service verification function entity according to the first aspect and the terminal device according to the second aspect.
  • a twenty-third aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a communication system, which includes the authentication server according to the third aspect and the terminal device according to the fourth aspect.
  • the twenty-fourth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a communication system, which includes the AMF entity of the fifth aspect and the terminal device of the sixth aspect.
  • the twenty-fifth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a chip, including a memory and a processor, the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program from the memory, so that the processor executes the above-mentioned first aspect , Any one of the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, the fifth aspect, and the sixth aspect.
  • the slice service verification function entity receives the first message sent by the terminal device, the first message carries the first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is calculated and generated according to the first network identifier; then, the The slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier, and when the verification passes, the slice service verification function entity sends the second network identifier to the authentication server. It can be seen that the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code sent by the terminal device according to the second network identifier. When the verification is passed, the slice service verification function entity can determine that it is the network corresponding to the second network identifier. The slicing service of the first network slicing provided for the terminal device. Therefore, through the above solution, the behavior of cheating the home network of the terminal device due to the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device can be avoided or prevented, and network security can be improved.
  • FIG. 1A is a schematic diagram of an architecture of a communication system according to an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 1B is a schematic diagram of a network architecture of a network architecture according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 2A is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 2B is a schematic diagram of a scene of an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a slice service verification function entity according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic structural diagram of an authentication server according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 12 is another schematic structural diagram of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of an AMF entity according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 14 is another schematic structural diagram of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic diagram of another structure of a slice service verification function entity according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of a circuit system according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 17 is another schematic structural diagram of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 18 is another schematic diagram of the structure of the authentication server according to the embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 19 is another schematic structural diagram of an AMF entity according to an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 20 is a schematic diagram of a communication system according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 21 is another schematic diagram of a communication system according to an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 22 is another schematic diagram of a communication system according to an embodiment of the application.
  • the embodiments of the present application provide a slice service verification method and device, which are used to improve network security.
  • At least one (item) refers to one or more
  • multiple refers to two or more than two
  • at least two (item) refers to two or three and three
  • “and/or” is used to describe the association relationship of associated objects, which means that there can be three kinds of relationships.
  • a and/or B can mean: only A, only B, and both A and B. In this case, A and B can be singular or plural.
  • the character “/” generally indicates that the associated objects before and after are in an "or” relationship.
  • the following at least one item (a) or similar expressions refers to any combination of these items, including any combination of a single item (a) or a plurality of items (a).
  • At least one (a) of a, b or c can mean: a, b, c, "a and b", “a and c", “b and c", or "a and b and c" ", where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.
  • PLMN part operated by the operator
  • the part operated by the operator can be called PLMN (it can also be called operator network, etc.).
  • PLMN is a network established and operated by the government or its approved operators to provide land mobile communication services to the public. It is mainly a public network operator (mobile network operator, MNO) that provides users with mobile broadband access services.
  • MNO public network operator
  • the internet The PLMN described in this application may specifically be a network that meets the requirements of the 3rd generation partnership project (3rd generation partnership project, 3GPP) standard, referred to as the 3GPP network.
  • 3rd generation partnership project 3rd generation partnership project
  • 3GPP networks generally include, but are not limited to, fifth-generation mobile communication (5th-generation, 5G) networks (abbreviated as 5G networks), fourth-generation mobile communication (4th-generation, 4G) networks (abbreviated as 4G networks), and the like.
  • 5G fifth-generation mobile communication
  • 4G fourth-generation mobile communication
  • 4G networks abbreviated as 4G networks
  • LTE long term evolution
  • FDD frequency division duplex
  • TDD LTE time division duplex
  • WiMAX global interoperability for microwave access
  • 5G fifth generation
  • NR new radio
  • 5G networks have made network architecture adjustments relative to 4G networks.
  • the 5G network splits the mobility management entity (MME) in the 4G network into the access and mobility management function (AMF) and the session management function (session management function). , SMF) and many other network functions.
  • MME mobility management entity
  • AMF access and mobility management function
  • SMF session management function
  • FIG. 1A is a schematic diagram of the architecture of the communication system according to the embodiment of the present application. It uses the 5G network architecture based on the service-oriented architecture in the non-roaming scenario defined in the 3GPP standardization process as an example.
  • the network architecture may include three parts, namely a terminal equipment part, a PLMN, and a data network (DN).
  • the terminal equipment part may include a terminal equipment 110, and the terminal equipment 110 may also be referred to as user equipment (UE).
  • the terminal device 110 in this application is a device with a wireless transceiver function, and can be connected to one or Multiple core network (core network, CN) devices (or may also be referred to as core devices) communicate.
  • the terminal device 110 may also be referred to as an access terminal, a terminal, a user unit, a user station, a mobile station, a mobile station, a remote station, a remote terminal, a mobile device, a user terminal, a user agent, or a user device.
  • the terminal device 110 can be deployed on land, including indoor or outdoor, handheld or vehicle-mounted; it can also be deployed on the water (such as a ship, etc.); it can also be deployed in the air (such as a plane, a balloon, a satellite, etc.).
  • the terminal device 110 can be a cellular phone, a cordless phone, a session initiation protocol (SIP) phone, a smart phone, a mobile phone, or a wireless local loop (WLL). ) Station, personal digital assistant (PDA), etc.
  • SIP session initiation protocol
  • WLL wireless local loop
  • PDA personal digital assistant
  • the terminal device 110 may also be a handheld device with a wireless communication function, a computing device or other devices connected to a wireless modem, a vehicle-mounted device, a wearable device, a drone device or a terminal in the Internet of Things, the Internet of Vehicles, and a 5G network.
  • a wireless communication function e.g., a Wi-Fi connection
  • a vehicle-mounted device e.g., a Wi-Fi connection
  • a wearable device e.g., a smart watch, or a smart watch, or a smart watch, etc.
  • the terminal device 110 may be a virtual reality (VR) terminal, an augmented reality (AR) terminal, a wireless terminal in industrial control, a wireless terminal in self-driving (self-driving), and a remote Wireless terminals in medical (remote medical), wireless terminals in smart grids, wireless terminals in transportation safety, wireless terminals in smart cities, and smart homes Wireless terminals, etc.
  • VR virtual reality
  • AR augmented reality
  • remote Wireless terminals in medical remote Wireless terminals in medical
  • wireless terminals in smart grids wireless terminals in transportation safety
  • wireless terminals in smart cities smart homes Wireless terminals, etc.
  • the embodiments of the present application do not limit the types or types of terminal devices.
  • PLMN can include: network exposure function (NEF) 131, network storage function (network function repository function, NRF) 132, policy control function (PCF) 133, unified data management (unified data management, UDM) 134, application function (AF) 135, AUSF136, AMF137, session management function (session management function, SMF) 138, user plane function (UPF) 139, and (radio) access network ((radio) )access network, (R)AN)140, NSSAAF141, etc.
  • NRF network exposure function
  • PCF policy control function
  • the data network (DN) 120 may also be referred to as a packet data network (PDN), and is usually a network located outside the PLMN, such as a third-party network.
  • PLMN packet data network
  • the PLMN can access multiple data network DN 120, and multiple services can be deployed on the data network DN 120, so as to provide the terminal device 110 with services such as data and/or voice.
  • the data network DN 120 may be a private network of a smart factory, the sensors installed in the workshop of the smart factory may be terminal devices 110, and the data network DN 120 may have a sensor control server deployed, and the control server may provide services for the sensors.
  • the sensor can communicate with the control server, obtain instructions from the control server, and transmit the collected sensor data to the control server according to the instructions.
  • the data network DN 120 may be the internal office network of a certain company.
  • the mobile phone or computer of the company's employee may be the terminal device 110, and the employee's mobile phone or computer may access information and data resources on the company's internal office network.
  • the terminal device 110 may establish a connection with the PLMN through an interface provided by the PLMN (for example, the N1 interface in FIG. 1A, etc.), and use services such as data and/or voice provided by the PLMN.
  • the terminal device 110 may also access the data network DN 120 through the PLMN, and use the operator services deployed on the data network DN 120 and/or services provided by a third party.
  • the above-mentioned third party may be a service party other than the PLMN and the terminal device 110, and may provide other data and/or voice services for the terminal device 110.
  • the specific form of expression of the above-mentioned third party can be determined according to actual application scenarios, and is not limited here.
  • (R) AN 140 is a sub-network of the PLMN, and is an implementation system between the service node (or network function) and the terminal device 110 in the PLMN.
  • the terminal device 110 To access the PLMN, the terminal device 110 first passes through the (R)AN 140, and then connects to the service node in the PLMN through the (R)AN 140.
  • the access network device in the embodiment of the present application is a device that provides a wireless communication function for the terminal device 110, and may also be referred to as an access device, (R)AN device, or network device, etc.
  • the access equipment includes but is not limited to: next generation node base station (gNB) in 5G system, evolved node B (eNB) in LTE system, radio network controller, RNC), node B (node B, NB), base station controller (base station controller, BSC), base transceiver station (base transceiver station, BTS), home base station (home evolved nodeB, or home node B, HNB), baseband Unit (base band unit, BBU), transmission and receiving point (transmitting and receiving point, TRP), transmitting point (transmitting point, TP), small cell equipment (pico), mobile switching center, or network equipment in the future network, etc.
  • gNB next generation node base station
  • eNB evolved node B
  • RNC radio network controller
  • node B node B
  • base station controller base station controller
  • BTS base transceiver station
  • BTS home base station
  • home evolved nodeB home evolved nodeB, or home node B, HNB
  • baseband Unit base band unit
  • the access device may include a centralized unit (CU) and a distributed unit (DU).
  • CU can also be divided into CU-control plane (CP) and CU-user plan (UP).
  • UP CU-user plan
  • the access equipment may also be an open radio access network (open radio access network, ORAN) architecture, etc. This application does not limit the specific deployment mode of the access equipment.
  • the network open function NEF (also called NEF network function or NEF network function entity) 131 is a control plane function provided by the operator.
  • the NEF network function 131 opens the external interface of the PLMN to a third party in a secure manner.
  • the SMF network function 138 needs to communicate with a third-party network function
  • the NEF network function 131 can serve as a relay for the SMF network function 138 to communicate with a third-party network entity.
  • the NEF network function 131 is used as a relay, it can be used as the translation of the identification information of the subscriber and the translation of the identification information of the third-party network function.
  • the NEF network function 131 when the NEF network function 131 sends the subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI) of the subscriber from the PLMN to the third party, it can translate the SUPI into its corresponding external identity (identity, ID). Conversely, when the NEF network function 131 sends the external ID (third-party network entity ID) to the PLMN, it can be translated into SUPI.
  • SUPI subscriber permanent identifier
  • ID identity
  • the network storage function NRF 132 can be used to maintain real-time information of all network functions and services in the network.
  • the policy control function PCF 133 is a control plane function provided by the operator, and is used to provide a protocol data unit (protocol data unit, PDU) session policy to the session management function SMF 138.
  • Policies can include charging-related policies, QoS-related policies, and authorization-related policies.
  • Unified data management UDM 134 is a control plane function provided by operators, responsible for storing subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI), security context (security context), subscription data and other information of subscribers in the PLMN.
  • the above-mentioned PLMN subscribers may specifically be users who use the services provided by the PLMN, such as users who use China Telecom's terminal equipment core card, or users who use China Mobile's terminal equipment core card.
  • the SUPI of the subscriber may be the number of the core card of the terminal device, etc.
  • the aforementioned security context may be data (cookie) or token (token) stored on a local terminal device (for example, a mobile phone).
  • the contract data of the aforementioned subscriber may be a supporting service of the core card of the terminal device, for example, a data package of the core card of the mobile phone.
  • Application function AF 135 is used for data routing affected by applications, access to network opening functions, and interaction with policy frameworks for policy control, etc.
  • the authentication server function AUSF 136 is a control plane function provided by the operator, and is usually used for first-level authentication, that is, authentication between the terminal device 110 (subscribed user) and the PLMN.
  • Network slicing authentication and authorization function NSSAAF141 is a control plane function provided by the operator, and is usually used for slicing authentication of network slicing. That is, the slice authentication performed between the terminal device 110 and an authentication server (such as an authentication server of an operator's network or an authentication server of a third-party DN).
  • an authentication server such as an authentication server of an operator's network or an authentication server of a third-party DN.
  • Access and mobility management function AMF 137 is a control plane network function provided by the PLMN. It is responsible for the access control and mobility management of the terminal device 110 accessing the PLMN, for example, including mobility status management, assignment of temporary user identities, authentication and authorization User and other functions.
  • the session management function SMF 138 is a control plane network function provided by the PLMN, which is responsible for managing the protocol data unit (PDU) session of the terminal device 110.
  • the PDU session is a channel used to transmit PDUs, and the terminal device needs to transmit PDUs to each other with the DN 120 through the PDU session.
  • the PDU session can be established, maintained, and deleted by the SMF 138.
  • SMF 138 includes session management (such as session establishment, modification, and release, including tunnel maintenance between UPF 139 and (R)AN 140, etc.), selection and control of UPF 139, service and session continuity (SSC) ) Session-related functions such as mode selection and roaming.
  • session management such as session establishment, modification, and release, including tunnel maintenance between UPF 139 and (R)AN 140, etc.
  • SSC service and session continuity
  • the user plane function UPF 139 is a gateway provided by the operator and a gateway for the communication between PLMN and DN 120.
  • UPF 139 includes user plane-related functions such as packet routing and transmission, packet inspection, service usage reporting, quality of service (QoS) processing, lawful monitoring, upstream packet inspection, and downstream packet storage.
  • QoS quality of service
  • the network function in the PLMN shown in FIG. 1A may also include a network slice selection function (NSSF) (not shown in FIG. 1A), which is responsible for determining the network slice instance, selecting the AMF network function 137, and so on.
  • NSSF network slice selection function
  • the network functions in the PLMN shown in FIG. 1A may also include unified data repository (UDR), etc.
  • UDR unified data repository
  • Nnef, Nausf, Nnssaaf, Nnrf, Npcf, Nudm, Naf, Namf, Nsmf, N1, N2, N3, N4, and N6 are interface serial numbers.
  • the meaning of the aforementioned interface serial number can be referred to the meaning defined in the 3GPP standard protocol, and this application does not limit the meaning of the aforementioned interface serial number.
  • the terminal device 110 is used as an example for the UE.
  • the name of the interface between the various network functions in FIG. 1A is only an example. In a specific implementation, the name of the interface of the system architecture It may also be other names, which are not limited in this application.
  • the mobility management network function in this application may be the AMF 137 shown in FIG. 1A, or may be other network functions having the access and mobility management function AMF 137 in the future communication system.
  • the mobility management network function in this application may also be a mobility management entity (mobility management entity, MME) in the LTE system.
  • MME mobility management entity
  • NSSAAF141 is deployed alone in the network architecture, or the NSSAAF141 can also be integrated with other network functional entities or combined with other network functional entities, for example, with AUSF136, AF135 or authentication server Agent (not shown in the figure) integration, etc., are not specifically limited by this application.
  • the access and mobility management function AMF137 is abbreviated as AMF entity
  • the unified data management UDM134 is abbreviated as UDM
  • the authentication server function AUSF136 is abbreviated as AUSF entity
  • the network slice authentication and authorization functions are abbreviated as UDM.
  • NSSAAF141 is referred to as NSSAAF entity for short. That is, the AMF entities described later in the embodiments of this application can be replaced with access and mobility management functions, UDM can be replaced with unified data management, AUSF can be replaced with authentication server functions, and NSSAAF can be replaced with network slicing. Authentication and authorization functions.
  • the network architecture (such as the 5G network architecture) shown in Figure 1A adopts a service-based architecture and general interfaces.
  • the traditional network element functions are split into several self-contained and self-managed based on network function virtualization (NFV) technology.
  • NFV network function virtualization
  • Reusable network function service module by flexibly defining the service module set, customized network function reconstruction can be realized, and the business process can be formed through a unified service call interface externally.
  • the schematic diagram of the network architecture shown in FIG. 1A can be understood as a schematic diagram of a service-based 5G network architecture in a non-roaming scenario.
  • Network slicing technology can enable operators to respond to customer needs more flexibly and quickly, and support the flexible allocation of network resources.
  • a slice may be composed of a set of network functions (NF) and/or sub-networks.
  • the sub-network (R) AN 140, AMF 137, SMF 138, and UPF 139 in FIG. 1A can form a slice. It is understandable that only one of each network function in FIG. 1A is schematically drawn, but in actual network deployment, there may be multiple, tens, or hundreds of each network function or sub-network. Many slices can be deployed in PLMN, and each slice can have different performance to meet the needs of different applications and different vertical industries. Operators can tailor a slice according to the needs of customers in different vertical industries. Operators can also allow some industry customers to enjoy greater autonomy and participate in part of the management and control functions of slicing.
  • slice-level authentication is a network control function with limited participation of industry customers, that is, authentication and authorization of terminal equipment access to slices, namely “slice-level authentication”, which can also be referred to as “second-level authentication” and “secondary authentication”. This application is referred to as “slice certification” for short.
  • the terminal device Before the terminal device is allowed to access the network or slice, it needs to perform mutual authentication with the network and/or slice and obtain authorization from the network and/or slice. Generally, the network needs to authenticate and authorize the terminal device once or twice before it can access the network or slice.
  • the PLMN needs to be authenticated based on the SUPI contracted with the PLMN used by the terminal device. This type of authentication is called primary authentication.
  • the PLMN needs to be authenticated based on the identification of the contract with the DN used by the terminal equipment, that is, slice authentication or secondary authentication.
  • the UE 110 may provide the requested slice to the core network.
  • the slice requested by the UE 110 may include a requested network slice selection assistance information set (requested network slice selection assistance information, requested NSSAI).
  • the NSSAI may include one or more single network slice selection assistance information (S-NSSAI).
  • S-NSSAI is used to identify a network slice type, which can also be understood as: S-NSSAI is used to identify Slice, or it can be understood that S-NSSAI is the identification information of the slice.
  • the slice in this application may also be referred to as a network slice, a network slice instance, or S-NSSAI, etc., and this application does not limit the identifier of the network slice.
  • this application does not make a strict distinction between network slice identification or S-NSSAI, etc., and the two may be equally applicable.
  • the core network network function (such as AMF network function 137 or NSSF network function) according to the subscription data of the UE 110, the network slice requested by the UE 110, the roaming agreement, and the local configuration information are:
  • the UE 110 selects a set of network slices allowed to be accessed.
  • the set of network slices allowed to be accessed may be represented by allowed NSSAI, and the S-NSSAI included in the allowed NSSAI may be the S-NSSAI that the current PLMN allows the UE 110 to access.
  • the data network DN 120 outside the PLMN (such as the DN serving the vertical industry) UE 110 also has requirements for authentication and authorization.
  • a commercial company provides a game platform and provides game services to game players through PLMN.
  • the PLMN needs to authenticate or authorize the identity (SUPI) of the UE 110, that is, the first level authentication.
  • the game player is a customer of a commercial company, and the commercial company also needs to authenticate or authorize the identity of the game player.
  • this authentication can be based on slices, or in other words, the authentication is based on slices.
  • this authentication may be called slice authentication (slice authentication), or network slice-specific authentication and authorization (NSSAA).
  • slice authentication can be, for example, authentication performed between a terminal device and a third-party network (such as a DN or its authentication server).
  • the slice authentication result will determine whether the PLMN authorizes the terminal device to access the slice provided by the PLMN. It should also be understood that the method applied to slice authentication in this application is also applicable to scenarios such as session-based secondary authentication (secondary authentication) or slice-based secondary authentication, and will not be described in detail here.
  • the first-level authentication and slice authentication described above are only to describe the basic procedures of the first-level authentication and slice authentication.
  • the corresponding network should provide services for the terminal device and the terminal device's home network in order to complete the first-level authentication or slice authentication based on the adaptability of the terminal device's state (roaming state or non-roaming state). For example, when a terminal device roams to a visited network, the visited network forwards the first-level authentication request to the home network of the terminal device as the terminal device, and then the home network of the terminal device and the terminal device perform the first-level authentication.
  • the visited network initiates slice authentication for the terminal device for the terminal device, and then the slice authentication server subscribed by the home network of the terminal device (or deployed by the home network) performs the slice authentication with the terminal device.
  • the home network of the terminal device initiates primary authentication and slice authentication for the terminal device, and the home network or slice authentication server performs primary authentication or slice authentication with the terminal device.
  • the slice service verification method provided in the embodiment of the present application is suitable for determining the service network that provides the network slicing service for the terminal device and the real slice service provided.
  • Scenario 1 Roaming scenario, that is, the terminal device roams to the visited network.
  • FIG. 1B in a roaming scenario, the terminal device moves to a visited public land mobile network (visited public land mobile network, VPLMN), which is referred to as the visited network in this application; then, the terminal device is connected through the AMF entity in the visited network VPLMN Into the VPLMN, the VPLMN provides the terminal device with the slicing service of the first network slicing.
  • VPLMN visited public land mobile network
  • the home public land mobile network is the home network of the terminal device, which is referred to as the home network in this application; then, the NSSAAF entity or the AUSF entity in the HPLMN can use the slice service in the embodiment of this application.
  • the verification method is determined to be the slice service of the first network slice provided by the VPLMN for the terminal device (for example, for network slices that need to perform slice authentication, the slice service may be slice authentication of the first network slice or the first network slice Other slice services (including data transmission and signaling transmission of the first network slice); and for network slices that do not need to perform slice authentication, the slice service may be data transmission and signaling transmission of the first network slice).
  • the authentication, authorization, and accounting server authentication, authorization, accounting server, AAA-S
  • Scenario 2 Non-roaming scenario, that is, the network to which the terminal device is currently connected is the home network of the terminal device.
  • AMF entities there are multiple AMF entities in the home network of the terminal device.
  • the NSSAAF entity or the AUSF entity in the HPLMN determines through the slice service verification method in the embodiment of the present application that the AMF entity provides the first network slice slice service for the terminal device.
  • the AAA-S determines that the AMF entity of the HPLMN provides the slicing service of the first network slice for the terminal device through the slice service verification method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the NSSAAF entity or AUSF entity or AAA-S in HPLMN can be verified by the slice service verification method in the embodiment of this application, thereby Improve network security.
  • scenario one is taken as an example for introduction.
  • FIG. 2A is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of this application.
  • the method includes:
  • the terminal device generates a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier.
  • the first message authentication code is calculated and generated according to the first network identification, and the first message authentication code is for integrity protection of information including the first network identification.
  • the first network identifier is the identifier of the first network currently accessed by the terminal device. For example, in a roaming scenario, the first network identifier is the identifier of the visited network accessed by the terminal device.
  • the first network identifier is an identifier of the first network or an identifier of a functional entity in the first network.
  • the identification of the first network includes the identification SN-ID of the first network, or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network.
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the terminal device.
  • the terminal device calculates and generates the first message authentication code according to the first network identification. There are many ways to generate the first message authentication code, which will be introduced as examples below:
  • Manner 1 The terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF.
  • the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF is generated according to the first intermediate key K AUSF.
  • the terminal device uses the first intermediate key K AUSF as an input parameter of the first preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF .
  • the input parameters of the first preset authentication code generation function further include the identity of the slice service verification function entity (for example, the identity of the NSSAAF entity or the identity of the AUSF entity), the first network identity, and the identity of the first network slice.
  • the freshness parameter is a random number (random number), the value of a counter (count), or the parameter FC.
  • the parameter FC is an identifier of an instance of a key generation function (key derivation function, KDF) specified in the 3GPP standard.
  • the first preset authentication code generation function includes the KDF specified in the 3GPP standard, or is any kind of key generation function, or is any kind of hash function (Hash), or a hash-based message authentication code ( Hash based MAC (HMAC) generation function, any integrity protection algorithm.
  • Hash hash function
  • HMAC hash-based message authentication code
  • function can also be referred to as “algorithm”, and this application does not make a distinction.
  • the terminal device generates a first intermediate key K AUSF according to the first encryption and decryption key CK and the first integrity protection key IK, and then the terminal device generates a second integrity protection key according to the first intermediate key K AUSF K NSSAAF .
  • the terminal device when the terminal device performs the first-level authentication, uses the first encryption and decryption key CK and the first integrity protection key IK generated by the terminal device to generate the first intermediate key K AUSF .
  • the terminal device to obtain a second integrity protection key K NSSAAF key K AUSF deduced by the first intermediate.
  • the terminal device generates a second encryption and decryption key CK' and a third integrity protection key IK' according to the first encryption and decryption key CK and the first integrity protection key IK, and then according to the second encryption and decryption key CK 'and the third integrity key IK' generate a first intermediate key K AUSF, then the key K AUSF generating a second integrity protection key K NSSAAF based on the first intermediate.
  • the terminal device uses the terminal device's first encryption and decryption key CK and the first integrity protection key IK to first derive the second encryption and decryption key CK' and the third Integrity protection key IK'; Then, the terminal device derives the first intermediate key K AUSF through the second encryption and decryption key CK' and the third integrity protection key IK'.
  • the terminal device to obtain a second integrity protection key K NSSAAF according to the first intermediate key K AUSF derivation embodiment in the present application.
  • the terminal device uses the first network identifier and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF as input parameters of the first preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the first message authentication code.
  • the preset authentication code generation function when calculating the first message authentication code may also include other input parameters, and this application does not limit other input parameters.
  • the input parameter of the first preset authentication code generation function further includes at least one of the identification S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the counter value of the identification code, and a random number.
  • the first network identifier is SN-ID
  • Manner 2 The terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier and the first intermediate key K AUSF.
  • the generation of the first intermediate key K AUSF includes the following two possible implementation modes:
  • the terminal device generates a first intermediate key K AUSF according to the first encryption and decryption key CK and the first integrity protection key IK.
  • the terminal device generates a second encryption and decryption key CK' and a third integrity protection key IK' according to the first encryption and decryption key CK and the first integrity protection key IK, and then according to the second encryption and decryption key CK' and the third integrity protection key IK' generate the first intermediate key K AUSF .
  • the terminal device uses the first network identifier and the first intermediate key K AUSF as input parameters of the first preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the first message authentication code.
  • the preset authentication code generation function when calculating the first message authentication code may also include other input parameters, and this application does not limit other input parameters.
  • the terminal device sends a first message to the slice service verification function entity.
  • the first message carries the first message authentication code.
  • the first message authentication code is calculated and generated based on the first network identifier, and the first message authentication code is used to protect the integrity of the first network identifier (and other information).
  • the slice service verification functional entity is a functional entity in the home network of the terminal device.
  • the first message also carries any one or more of the following information:
  • the first identification information carries the first network identification.
  • the terminal device informs the slice service verification function entity of the identifier of the first network slice through the identifier of the first network slice carried in the first message.
  • the terminal device informs the slice service verification function entity of the first network identification through the first identification information carried in the first message.
  • the first message carries the first identification information and the identification of the first network slice at the same time.
  • the first message authentication code is calculated and generated based on the first identification information and the first network slice, and the first message authentication code can be used to compare the first identification information and the first network slice.
  • the identification of the slice is integrity protected.
  • the first network identifier is the identifier of the first network or the identifier of the functional entity in the first network included in the first identification information.
  • the first network identifier is the identifier of the first network or the identifier of the functional entity in the first network included in the first identification information.
  • the first message sent by the terminal device carries the first identification information.
  • the AMF entity may also send the first identification information to the slice service verification function entity, and the first identification information is carried in the first message sent by the terminal device, or carried in other messages.
  • the AMF entity sends the first identification information to the slice service verification network element, and the first identification information is carried in the first message sent by the terminal device, or carried in other messages.
  • the slice service verification function entity may determine the second network identification according to the first identification information, and then according to The second network identifier verifies the first message authentication code.
  • the slice service verification function entity when the AMF entity also sends the first identification information to the slice service verification function entity, the slice service verification function entity does not carry information according to the first message sent by the terminal device
  • the first identification information of the AMF determines the second network identification, but the second network identification is determined according to the first identification information sent by the AMF entity.
  • the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier.
  • the AMF entity may send the first identification information through the first message or other messages.
  • the first identification information is carried in a token of the first message.
  • the slice service verification function entity may further verify the second network identity. For example, the slice service verification function entity judges whether the second network identity verified by the first message authentication code is the same as the network identity included in the first identity information carried in the first message sent by the terminal device; or, the slice service verification function entity Determine whether the second network identifier verified by the first message authentication code is the same as the network identifier included in the first identification information sent by the AMF entity.
  • the AMF entity may send the first identification information through the first message or other messages.
  • the first identification information is carried in a token of the first message.
  • the slice service verification function entity may determine the second network according to the first identification information sent by the AMF entity Identification; then, the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identification.
  • the AMF entity may send the first identification information through the first message or other messages.
  • the first identification information is carried in a token of the first message.
  • the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier.
  • the slice service verification function entity may determine the second network identity from the first identification information sent by the AMF entity; or, the slice service verification function entity may determine the second network identity from the first identification information carried in the first message sent by the terminal device Determine the second network identifier.
  • the slice service verification function entity may determine the second network identity from the first identification information sent by the AMF entity; or, the slice service verification function entity may determine the second network identity from the first identification information carried in the first message sent by the terminal device Determine the second network identifier.
  • step 203 specifically includes step 203a to step 203c.
  • Step 203a The slice service verification function entity obtains the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF .
  • the slice service verification function entity is an NSSAAF entity
  • the NSSAAF entity receives the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF sent by the AUSF entity.
  • the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF AUSF entity generates intermediate key based on the first K AUSF for.
  • the first entity generates Ausf intermediate key K AUSF manner as described above is generated in step 201 in the terminal device generates a first intermediate key generating K AUSF similar manner, as described in the above description related to step 201, no further explanation .
  • Step 203b The slice service verification function entity generates a second message authentication code according to the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF and the second network identifier.
  • the NSSAAF entity uses the second network identifier and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF as input parameters of the first preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the second message authentication code.
  • the method for generating the second message authentication code by the slicing service verification function entity is similar to the method for generating the first message authentication code by the terminal device. For details, please refer to the related introduction in method 1 in step 201 above.
  • Step 203c The slice service verification function entity matches the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code to obtain a verification result.
  • the slice service verification function entity matches the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code, and when the first message authentication code is the same as the second message authentication code, the slice service verification function entity determines that the verification is passed; When the message authentication code is different from the second message authentication code, the slice service verification function entity determines that the verification fails.
  • the slice service verification function entity may determine that the first network provides the terminal device with the slice service of the first network slice.
  • the slice service verification function entity can determine that the second network identity has been tampered with, and the slice service verification function entity determines that it is not corresponding to the second network identity
  • the network provides the slicing service of the first network slicing for the terminal device.
  • the slice service of the first network slice includes slice authentication of the first network slice and/or slice data transmission or signaling transmission of the first network slice.
  • the slice service of the first network slice includes slice data transmission or signaling transmission of the first network slice.
  • step 203 specifically includes step 203d and step 203e.
  • Step 203d The slice service verification function entity generates a second message authentication code according to the first intermediate key K AUSF and the second network identifier.
  • the slice service verification function entity is an AUSF entity.
  • the AUSF entity uses the second network identifier and the first intermediate key K AUSF as input parameters of the first preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the second message authentication code.
  • the first preset authentication code generation function may also include other input parameters, which are not limited in this embodiment.
  • the manner in which the AUSF entity generates the second message authentication code is similar to the manner in which the terminal device generates the first message authentication code. For details, please refer to the related introduction of method 2 in step 201 above.
  • Step 203e The slice service verification function entity matches the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code to obtain a verification result.
  • Step 203e is similar to the aforementioned step 203c.
  • Step 203e is similar to the aforementioned step 203c.
  • the slice service verification function entity sends the second network identifier to the authentication server.
  • the slice service verification function entity can determine that the second network identifier has been tampered with. Then, the slice service verification function entity determines that it is not the network corresponding to the second network identifier that provides the terminal device with the slice service of the first network slice.
  • the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A further includes step 205.
  • Step 205 The NSSAAF entity sends a second message to the terminal device.
  • the NSSAAF entity sends the second message to the AMF entity, and then the AMF entity sends the second message to the terminal device.
  • the second message is an authentication request message, or an authentication response message, or an authentication success message.
  • the second message may be understood as an authentication request message or an authentication response message.
  • the NSSAAF entity after the NSSAAF entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier, the NSSAAF entity stores the verification result of the first message authentication code or stores the second network identifier that has passed the verification. Further, optionally, when the slice authentication of the first network slice is completed, the NSSAAF entity saves the slice authentication result of the first network slice.
  • the NSSAAF entity may forward the verification result of the first message authentication code or the verified second network identifier and/or the slice verification result of the first network slice to other network functional entities (such as UDM), and the network
  • the functional entity (such as UDM) stores the verification result of the first message authentication code or the verified second network identifier and/or the slice authentication result of the first network slice.
  • the terminal device when a terminal device simultaneously accesses multiple network slices that need to be separately authenticated, for example, the first network slice and the second network slice are taken as examples here; then the terminal device is based on the first network identifier and the second network slice.
  • the identifier of a network slice and the identifier of the second network slice generate the first message authentication code.
  • the terminal device may further generate the first message authentication code according to the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF or the first intermediate key K AUSF and other parameters).
  • the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier, the identifier of the first network slice, and the identifier of the second network slice.
  • the specific verification process is similar to the process of step 203 described above, and can be understood with reference to the relevant description of step 203 described above.
  • the terminal device sends a first message to the slice service verification function entity.
  • the first message carries the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code. Obtained after integrity protection; then, the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier, and when the verification passes, the slice service verification function entity sends the second network identifier to the authentication server . It can be seen that the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code sent by the terminal device according to the second network identifier. When the verification is passed, the slice service verification function entity can determine that it is the network corresponding to the second network identifier. The slicing service of the first network slicing provided for the terminal device.
  • the slice service verification method of the embodiment of the present application can enhance the control of the home network's access to the terminal device and the terminal device's use of network slicing, avoiding the use of the visited network in the slice authentication process of the network slicing and/or the use of network slicing The act of deceiving the home network during the process.
  • the above embodiment shown in FIG. 2A uses the slice service verification function entity after verifying the first message authentication code, and when the verification is passed, the slice service verification function entity sends the second network identifier to the authentication server as an example. .
  • the slice service verification function entity may send the second network identity and the first indication information to the authentication server, and the first indication information is used to indicate The second network identity has not been verified, and is not specifically limited in this application.
  • the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A is only described by taking the terminal device generating the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier as an example.
  • the present application also provides another embodiment, which is similar to the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A, except for step 201, step 202, step 203, and step 204.
  • Step 201 can be replaced with: the terminal device generates a first message authentication code according to the identifier of the first network slice.
  • the first message authentication code is obtained after performing integrity protection on the identity of the first network slice, and the identity of the first network slice is the ID of the first network slice or the first network slice auxiliary selection information NSSAI.
  • the identity of the first network slice of the terminal device may vary with the PLMN network currently accessed by the terminal device, and the PLMN corresponding to the identity of the first network slice can be determined through the difference.
  • the internet Therefore, the terminal device can generate the first message authentication code through the identification of the first network slice, so that when the slice service verification function entity successfully verifies the first message verification code, it is determined that the terminal device provides the network slice service of the first network slice. .
  • the terminal device to generate the first message authentication code, which will be introduced below through examples.
  • Manner 1 The terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the identifier of the first network slice and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF.
  • step 201 for the method of generating the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF, please refer to the related introduction of step 201 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A, and will not be repeated here.
  • the terminal device uses the identifier of the first network slice and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF as input parameters of the first preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the first message authentication code.
  • the preset authentication code generation function when calculating the first message authentication code may also include other input parameters, and this application does not limit other input parameters.
  • the input parameter of the first preset authentication code generation function further includes at least one of the second network identification, the counter value of the identification code, and the random number RAND.
  • Manner 2 The terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the identifier of the first network slice and the first intermediate key K AUSF.
  • step 201 for the method of generating the first intermediate key K AUSF, please refer to the related introduction of step 201 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.
  • the terminal device uses the identifier of the first network slice and the first intermediate key K AUSF as input parameters of the first preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the first message authentication code.
  • step 201 for the related introduction of the first preset authentication code generation function and the related introduction of the input parameters of the first preset authentication code generation function, please refer to the relevant description of step 201 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A, and will not be repeated here. .
  • the preset authentication code generation function when calculating the first message authentication code may also include other input parameters, and this application does not limit other input parameters.
  • Step 203 can be replaced with: the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the first identifier.
  • the first identifier is determined by the slice service verification function entity according to the identifier of the first network slice sent by the AMF entity, or it is the identifier of the first network slice carried in the first message sent by the slice service verification function entity from the terminal device definite.
  • the slice service verification function entity verifies the first message verification based on the first message authentication code generated by the terminal device. Introduce separately below.
  • step 203 shown in FIG. 2A includes step 203a to step 203c.
  • the difference lies in: Step 203b, which will be described below.
  • Step 203b can be replaced with: the slice service verification function entity generates a second message authentication code according to the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF and the first identifier.
  • the slice service verification function entity is an NSSAAF entity.
  • the slice service verification function entity uses the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF and the first identifier as input parameters of the first preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the second message authentication code.
  • the method for generating the second message authentication code by the slicing service verification function entity is similar to the method for generating the first message authentication code by the terminal device. For details, please refer to the related introduction in method 1 in step 201 after the above replacement.
  • step 203 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A specifically includes step 203d and step 203e. The difference lies in step 203d, which will be described below.
  • Step 203d can be replaced with: the slice service verification function entity generates a second message authentication code according to the first intermediate key K AUSF and the first identifier.
  • the slice service verification function entity is an AUSF entity.
  • the AUSF entity uses the first identifier and the first intermediate key K AUSF as input parameters of the first preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the second message authentication code.
  • the first preset authentication code generation function may also include other input parameters, which are not limited in this embodiment.
  • the manner in which the AUSF entity generates the second message authentication code is similar to the manner in which the terminal device generates the first message authentication code. For details, please refer to the related introduction of method 2 in step 201 after the replacement.
  • Step 204 may be replaced with: when the verification is passed, the slice service verification function entity sends the first identifier to the authentication server.
  • the first message carries first identification information.
  • first identification information please refer to the related description of step 202 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.
  • step 202 carries the identification information of the first network slice.
  • the slice service verification function entity may also generate a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier and the identifier of the first network slice.
  • the details are similar to the description from step 202 to step 205 in the embodiment shown in 2A, and will not be repeated here.
  • the first message carries first identification information. Then, the slice service verification function entity determines the second network identity through the first identity information, which will be described as an example in the following embodiments.
  • the present application does not limit the first-level authentication method between the terminal device and the HPLMN network.
  • the server responsible for slice authentication is AAA-S, which can be deployed in the HPLMN network; or, the AAA-S can also be deployed outside the HPLMN/VPLMN network.
  • the terminal device can transfer the AAA-S through the proxy service provided by the AAA proxy (AAA-proxy, AAA-P) deployed in the HPLMN network to realize the UE and AAA- Authentication message exchange between S.
  • AAA-P can be deployed separately from NSSAAF; in other deployment modes, AAA-P can be deployed together with NSSAAF (or AUSF). Therefore, the embodiment of the present application does not limit the deployment mode of AAA-P and NSSAAF (or AUSF).
  • AAA-S is deployed outside the HPLMN network, that is, the terminal device provides proxy services through the AAA-P inside the HPLMN network, and transfers AAA-S to achieve slice authentication.
  • the AAA-P and NSSAAF or AUSF is deployed separately as an example.
  • the embodiments of this application are equally applicable.
  • the slice service verification function entity is an NSSAAF entity or an AUSF entity or other NF, which is not specifically limited in this application.
  • the AUSF entity or other NF may also perform the verification of the first message authentication code, which is not specifically limited in this application.
  • the process of the AUSF entity performing the authentication code of the first message after the slice authentication of the first network slice of the terminal device is completed.
  • the NSSAAF entity or other NF may also perform the verification of the first message authentication code, which is not specifically limited in this application.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the slice service verification method includes:
  • the AMF entity determines to perform slice authentication on the first network slice according to the slice subscription information of the terminal device and the slice identifier of the first network slice.
  • the AMF entity obtains the slice subscription information of the terminal device from the UDM; then, the AMF entity judges whether it needs to execute the first network slice of the terminal device according to the slice identifier of the first network slice and the authentication status of the first network slice stored by the AMF entity. For slice authentication of network slices, if slice authentication needs to be performed, the AMF entity performs step 302; if not, the AMF entity sends a message allowing access to the first network slice to the terminal device.
  • the AMF entity when the first network slice is not subscribed in the slice subscription information of the terminal device, the AMF entity sends a message to the terminal device that denies access to the first network slice.
  • the AMF entity sends a NAS message to the terminal device, where the NAS message carries an EAP ID request (request) used for slice authentication and an identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice; correspondingly, the terminal device receives the NAS message.
  • EAP ID request request
  • S-NSSAI identifier of the first network slice
  • EAP is formulated by the International Organization for Standardization-Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
  • the EAP ID request may be carried in a non-access stratum (NAS) message in the 3GPP network.
  • the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice may be used to indicate that the EAP ID request is a slice authentication request for the first network slice.
  • the EAP ID request and the identification S-NSSAI of the first network slice can also be carried in other types of (non-NAS) messages, and this application does not limit the carrying messages.
  • the terminal device sends a NAS message to the AMF entity, where the NAS message carries the EAP ID response, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first message authentication code, and the first identification information.
  • the first identification information is identification information corresponding to the first network identification.
  • the NAS message may not include the first identification information.
  • the EAP ID response, the identification S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first message authentication code, and the first identification information can also be carried in other types of (non-NAS) messages, and this application does not limit the carrying messages.
  • the first message authentication code is obtained by performing integrity protection on the first network identifier, and for the specific method of generating the first message authentication code, please refer to step 201 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.
  • the identifier of the network slice is represented by S-NSSAI.
  • the identification information of the UE is represented by a publicly available subscription identifier (generic public subscription identifier, GPSI) or SUPI, but it should not be construed as a limitation to the embodiments of the present application.
  • the AMF entity sends a first request message to the NSSAAF entity, where the first request message carries an EAP ID response (response), GPSI, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first message authentication code, and the first identification information.
  • the first request message does not include the first identification information.
  • the first request message is a slice authentication request message.
  • the NSSAAF entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier.
  • step 305 please refer to the detailed description of step 203 shown in FIG. 2A. It can be known from step 203 that the NSSAAF entity obtains the relevant parameters and generates the second message authentication code; then, the NSSAAF entity matches the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code to obtain the verification result.
  • the NSSAAF entity determines that the verification is passed, which means that the second network identification carried in the received first identification information has not been tampered with. In this way, the NSSAAF entity determines that the network that provides the slicing service of the first network slice for the terminal device is the first network. For example, the NSSAAF entity may determine that the first network initiates the slice authentication of the first network slice for the terminal device.
  • the first request message also carries an AMF ID.
  • the message sent by the AMF entity to the NSSAAF entity usually includes a token, and the role of the token is to allow the NSSAAF entity to verify that the AMF entity is an authorized AMF entity.
  • the token contains an AMF entity identity that can be verified by the NSSAAF entity, such as an AMF-ID. From the format of the AMF ID, it can be known that part of the AMF ID represents the PLMN ID, that is, the PLMN ID can also be obtained from the AMF ID. Taking the first identification information as SNN as an example, a part of the SNN also represents the PLMN ID.
  • the NSSAAF entity can determine whether the PLMN ID in the AMF ID is consistent or the same as the PLMN ID in the first identification information SNN. If they are the same, the NSSAAF entity determines that the AMF entity has no fraudulent behavior, and then determines the credibility of the AMF entity.
  • the NSSAAF entity sends an AAA protocol message to the AAA-S, where the AAA message carries the EAP ID response, GPSI, the identity of the first network slice S-NSSAI, and the second network identity.
  • the NSSAAF entity first sends the AAA message to the AAA-P, and then the AAA-P sends the AAA message to the AAA-S.
  • the EAP ID response, GPSI, the first network slice identifier S-NSSAI, and the second network identifier may also be carried in other types of messages, and this application does not limit the carrying messages.
  • the AAA-S sends an AAA message to the NSSAAF entity, where the AAA message carries the EAP message, GPSI, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, and the second network identifier.
  • GPSI, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, and the second network identifier are parameters carried in the EAP message.
  • the EAP message, GPSI, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, and the second network identifier may also be carried in other types of messages, and this application does not limit the carrying messages.
  • EAP message does not limit the specific type of the EAP message.
  • the EAP message may have different names or types. It is understandable that the following description is also applicable to this description.
  • the NSSAAF entity sends a first response message to the AMF entity, where the first response message carries the EAP message, the GPSI, and the S-NSSAI of the first network slice.
  • the first response message is a slice authentication response message.
  • the AMF entity sends a NAS message to the terminal device, where the NAS message carries the EAP message and the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice.
  • the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice is a parameter carried in the EAP message.
  • the EAP message and the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice can also be carried in other types of (non-NAS) messages, and this application does not limit the carrying message.
  • the terminal device sends a NAS message to the AMF entity, where the NAS message carries the EAP message, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first identification information, and the first message authentication code.
  • Step 310 is similar to step 303.
  • Step 310 please refer to the related introduction of step 303.
  • This embodiment shows that the terminal device sends the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice and the first message authentication code to the AMF entity multiple times during the slice authentication process, and the NSSAAF entity receives the first message authentication code each time When, the first message authentication code will be verified.
  • the terminal device may send the first message authentication code only once during the slice authentication process, or the terminal device may send the first message authentication code multiple times during the slice authentication process.
  • the NSSAAF entity verifies the first message authentication code once and saves the verification result of the first message authentication code, so the NSSAAF entity does not need to verify the first message authentication code multiple times.
  • the terminal device may only send the first message authentication code in step 303, and there is no need to send it again in step 310. Then, after performing step 305, the NSSAAF entity saves the verification result of the first message authentication code.
  • the AMF entity sends a second request message to the NSSAAF entity, where the second request message carries the EAP ID response, GPSI, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first identification information, and the first message authentication code.
  • the NSSAAF entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier.
  • the NSSAAF entity sends an AAA message to the AAA-S, where the AAA message carries the EAP message, GPSI, the first network slice identifier S-NSSAI, and the second network identifier.
  • Steps 311 to 313 are similar to the foregoing steps 304 to 306.
  • Steps 311 to 313 are similar to the foregoing steps 304 to 306.
  • the AAA-S sends an AAA message to the NSSAAF entity, where the AAA message carries the success or failure of EAP authentication, GPSI, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, and the second network identifier.
  • this embodiment further includes step 315.
  • the NSSAAF entity saves the second network identifier of the authentication code that has passed the verification and the slice authentication result of the first network slice.
  • the NSSAAF entity also saves the identification of the first network slice and the terminal identification of the terminal device.
  • the NSSAAF entity saves the GPSI of the terminal device, the slice information of the first network slice (for example, S-NSSAI), and the information of the first network (VPLMN) that initiated slice authentication for the terminal device, that is, the second network identity that passed the verification. (For example, the SN ID of the VPLMN) and information such as the success or failure of slice authentication.
  • the NSSAAF entity stores the verified second network identifier and the slice authentication result authentication code of the first network slice in the UDM. Specifically, the NSSAAF entity forwards the verified second network identifier and the slice authentication result authentication code of the first network slice to the UDM, and the UDM performs the verification on the second network identifier and the slice authentication result authentication code of the first network slice. storage.
  • step 315 only shows the manner in which the NSSAAF entity saves the second network identifier that has passed the verification.
  • the NSSAAF entity may also identify a network that fails the verification and mark the network identification accordingly to indicate that the network identification has not passed the verification.
  • the NSSAAF entity sends a second response message to the AMF entity, where the second response message carries the success or failure of EAP authentication and the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice.
  • the AMF entity sends a NAS message to the terminal device, where the NAS message carries the success or failure of EAP authentication.
  • each AAA message sent by the NSSAAF entity to the AAA-S carries the second network identifier.
  • the NSSAAF entity may only carry the second network identification in one of the AAA messages sent to AAA-S; or, the AAA message sent by the NSSAAF entity to AAA-S may not carry the second network identification. Since the session ID (Session ID) in the EAP message in step 303 to step 317 is the same, the AAA-S can determine the second network ID through the Session ID.
  • steps 302 to 303 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3 are optional steps in the EAP authentication process, that is, for some EAP authentication methods, there are no steps 302 to 303.
  • the first request message does not carry the first message authentication code
  • the verification of the second network identity or the first message authentication code is not performed.
  • the terminal device may carry the first message authentication code and the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice in step 310, so that the NSSAAF entity can perform step 312 to verify the first message authentication code.
  • the NSSAAF entity may not send the second network identity to AAA-S; or, the NSSAAF entity may also send the second network identity and the first network identity to AAA-S.
  • Indication information where the first indication information is used to indicate that the second network identity is not verified. For example, as shown in FIG. 3, the NSSAAF entity does not perform step 305, but directly performs step 306; then, the AAA message in step 306 can carry the first indication information.
  • step 315 may not carry the second network identifier. That is, in this embodiment, the sending of the second network identifier by the NSSAAF entity/AUSF entity to the AAA-S is optional.
  • the terminal device sends the first message authentication code, the identifier of the first network slice, and the first identification information to the NSSAAF entity;
  • the second network identifier is determined in the identification information, and the first message authentication code is verified according to the second network identifier; when the verification is passed, the NSSAAF entity sends the second network identifier to the AAA-S. It can be seen that the NSSAAF entity verifies the first message authentication code sent by the terminal device according to the second network identifier. When the verification is passed, the NSSAAF entity can determine that the first network slice is provided by the first network for the terminal device. Slice certification.
  • the slice service verification method of the embodiment of the present application can enhance the control of the home network's access to the terminal device and the terminal device's use of network slicing, avoiding the use of the visited network in the slice authentication process of the network slicing and/or the use of network slicing The act of deceiving the home network during the process.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the slice service verification method includes:
  • the terminal device sends a NAS message to the AMF entity, where the NAS message carries the network slice-specific authentication and authorization (NSSAA) authentication status (success or failure) of the first network slice and the identifier of the first network slice S-NSSAI, first identification information, and first message authentication code.
  • NSSAA network slice-specific authentication and authorization
  • the first identification information is identification information corresponding to the first network identification.
  • the first message authentication code is obtained by performing integrity protection on any one or more of the first network identifier and the first network slice identifier.
  • Step 201 in the embodiment shown in 2A will not be repeated here.
  • the NSSAA authentication status (success or failure) of the first network slice, the identification S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first identification information and the first message authentication code can also be carried in other types of (non-NAS) messages. There are no restrictions on the bearer message.
  • the terminal device sends the first message authentication code to the HPLMN (for example, the AUSF entity or the NSSAAF entity) after the slice authentication of the first network slice is completed, and the HPLMN verifies the first message authentication code.
  • the terminal device performing the slice authentication process of the first network slice may be based on the existing slice authentication process.
  • the AMF entity sends the GPSI, the success or failure of the slice authentication NSSAA of the first network slice, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first identification information, and the first message authentication code to the AUSF entity.
  • steps 401 and 402 may not include NSSAA authentication status (success or failure) information.
  • the terminal device may be pre-configured or agreed in advance that the terminal device executes step 401 only for network slices with successful slice authentication, that is, if the slice authentication fails, the terminal device does not execute step 401.
  • the AUSF entity verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier.
  • Step 402 to step 403 are similar to step 304 to step 305 in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the function of the AUSF entity in this embodiment is different from that of the NSSAAF entity or the AUSF entity in the first embodiment.
  • the NSSAAF entity or AUSF entity in the first embodiment has a function of assisting in slice authentication.
  • the AUSF entity in this embodiment may not have the function of assisting slice authentication.
  • this embodiment further includes step 404 to step 405.
  • the AUSF entity saves the second network identifier that has passed the authentication code verification and the slice authentication result of the first network slice.
  • the AUSF entity also saves the identification of the first network slice and the terminal identification of the terminal device.
  • Step 404 is similar to step 315 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3. For details, please refer to the related introduction of step 315.
  • the AUSF entity sends the second network identifier to the AAA-S.
  • the AUSF entity may send the second network identity to the AAA-S. For example, if the AMF entity does not send the second network identification to AAA-S in the existing slice authentication process, or the NSSAAF entity sends an unverified second network identification to AAA-S; then, the AUSF entity can send the second network identification to AAA-S. Send the second network identification.
  • the embodiment shown in Figure 4 above shows that after the slice authentication of the first network slice is completed, the terminal device sends the first message authentication code, the first network slice identifier, and the first identification information to the AUSF entity, and the AUSF entity performs The verification process of the network identification to the first message authentication code.
  • the terminal device can perform slice authentication for multiple network slices at the same time. Then the terminal device can uniformly send the slice authentication results of all network slices or multiple network slices and all network slices or multiple network slices to the AUSF entity after all network slices or multiple network slices of the terminal device have been authenticated.
  • the message authentication code corresponding to the network slice is verified to save signaling overhead; the terminal device can also be used when the slice authentication of each network slice is completed (for example, after the slice authentication result is determined, but any step before the end of the slice authentication process) ), the slice authentication result of the network slice is sent to the AUSF entity, which is not specifically limited by this application.
  • the terminal device sends the first message authentication code, the identifier of the first network slice, and the first identification information to the AUSF entity, and the AUSF entity performs the authentication according to the second network slice.
  • the identifier verifies the first message authentication code; when the verification is passed, the AUSF entity sends the second network identifier to the AAA-S. It can be seen that the AUSF entity verifies the first message authentication code sent by the terminal device according to the second network identifier. When the verification is passed, the AUSF entity can determine that the first network slice is provided by the first network for the terminal device. Slice certification.
  • the slice service verification method of the embodiment of the present application can enhance the control of the home network's access to the terminal device and the terminal device's use of network slicing, avoiding the use of the visited network in the slice authentication process of the network slicing and/or the use of network slicing The act of deceiving the home network during the process.
  • the slice service verification function entity executes the slice service verification method provided in the embodiment of the present application
  • the slice service verification method in the embodiment of the present application may also be performed by the authentication server, which is described below with reference to FIG. 5.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the method includes:
  • the terminal device generates a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier.
  • the first network identifier is similar to the first network identifier in step 201 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A.
  • the first message authentication code is calculated and generated according to the first network identifier, and is used to protect the integrity of the first network identifier.
  • the terminal device In order to protect the integrity of the first network identifier, the terminal device generates a first message authentication code. There are many ways to generate the first message authentication code, which will be introduced as examples below:
  • Manner 1 The terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the first network identifier.
  • the first credential is used for slice authentication for the first network slice between the terminal device and the authentication server.
  • the terminal device uses the first credential and the first network identifier as input parameters of the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the first message authentication code.
  • the input parameter of the first preset authentication code generation function further includes at least one of the identification S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the counter value of the identification code, and the random number RAND.
  • the second preset authentication code generation function is a function similar to the first preset authentication code generation function in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A.
  • the first credential is a credential (EAP credential) used in the EAP authentication process included in the slice authentication process of the first network slice.
  • EAP credential used in the EAP authentication process included in the slice authentication process of the first network slice.
  • the credential used by each EAP authentication method may be different, and the method of generating the first message authentication code may also be different.
  • Two possible first credentials are listed below by way of examples.
  • the first type of credential is a certificate or a public-private key pair.
  • the public key of the terminal device and the private key of the terminal device are taken as an example for description.
  • the terminal device generating the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the first network identifier specifically includes steps a and b.
  • Step a The terminal device generates a first digest according to the second preset key generation function and the first network identifier. It should be noted that in addition to the first network identifier, parameters or content such as the identifier of the first network slice and the EAP ID can also be added to generate the first summary. This application does not limit the addition of other parameters or content.
  • the second preset key generation function includes KDF specified in the 3GPP standard, or any kind of KDF, or any kind of hash function (Hash), or HMAC function.
  • Step b The terminal device encrypts the first digest with the private key of the terminal device to obtain the first message authentication code.
  • the terminal device digitally signs the first digest through the private key of the terminal device, and the “digital signature” here can also be understood as the “function” in the second preset authentication code generation function.
  • the terminal device may also use the public key of the authentication server to digitally sign the first digest.
  • the second type of credential is the first password. That is, the EAP authentication method adopts the password-based EAP method.
  • the terminal device uses the first password and the first network identifier as input parameters in the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the first message authentication code.
  • the input parameter of the second preset authentication code generation function further includes at least one of the identification S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the counter value of the identification code, and the random number RAND.
  • Manner 2 The terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first key Kemsk and the first network identifier.
  • the first key Kemsk is a key generated in the EAP authentication process for the first network slice of the terminal device.
  • the terminal device uses the first key Kemsk and the first network identifier as input parameters of the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the first message authentication code.
  • the input parameter of the second preset authentication code generation function further includes at least one of the identification S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the counter value of the identification code, and the random number RAND.
  • the second preset authentication code generation function is a function similar to the first preset authentication code generation function in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A.
  • the first key Kemsk is generated during the slice authentication process of the first network slice, or is generated after the slice authentication of the first network slice ends, which is not specifically limited in this application.
  • the terminal device can generate the first message authentication code after the first key Kemsk is generated. Therefore, the first message authentication code may be generated during the slice authentication process of the first network slice, or may be the authentication code generated after the slice authentication of the first network slice ends.
  • the terminal device sends a third message to the authentication server, where the third message carries the first message authentication code and the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice.
  • the content carried by the third message is similar to the first message in step 202 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A.
  • the third message sent by the terminal device carries the first identification information.
  • the AMF entity may also send the first identification information to the NSSAAF entity or the AUSF entity, and the first identification information is carried in the first message sent by the terminal device, or carried in other messages.
  • the AMF entity sends the first identification information to the NSSAAF entity or the AUSF entity, and the first identification information is carried in the third message sent by the terminal device, or carried in other messages.
  • the authentication server may determine the second network identification according to the first identification information, and according to the The second network identification degree verifies the first message authentication code.
  • the authentication server when the AMF entity also sends the first identification information to the NSSAAF entity or the AUSF entity, the authentication server does not use the first identification information carried in the third message sent by the terminal device.
  • the information determines the second network identification, but the second network identification is determined according to the first identification information sent by the AMF entity.
  • the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier.
  • the AMF entity may send the first identification information through the third message or other messages. For example, the first identification information is carried in a token of the third message.
  • the authentication server may further verify the second network identity. For example, the authentication server determines whether the second network identifier verified by the first message authentication code is the same as the network identifier included in the first identification information carried in the third message sent by the terminal device; or, the authentication server determines whether the first message is verified Whether the verified second network identity is the same as the network identity included in the first identity information sent by the AMF entity.
  • the AMF entity may send the first identification information through the third message or other messages.
  • the first identification information is carried in a token of the third message.
  • the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier.
  • the second network identifier is similar to the second network identifier in step 203 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A.
  • step 503 includes the following two possible implementation manners:
  • Implementation manner 1 The authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the second network identifier.
  • the authentication server may use the first credential, the second network identifier, and the first network slice identifier as input parameters of the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculate the second message authentication code. If the generation of the first message authentication code is based on the public-private key pair in step 501, the authentication server can also calculate the second message authentication code accordingly, and the specific verification process will be described later with examples.
  • Implementation manner 2 The authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the first key Kemsk and the first network identifier.
  • the authentication server uses the first key Kemsk and the second network identifier as input parameters of the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the second message authentication code.
  • the following describes the verification process of the authentication code of the first message by the authentication server based on the implementation manner 1 and the implementation manner 2.
  • Step 1 The authentication server decrypts the first message authentication code by using the public key of the terminal device to obtain the first digest.
  • the terminal device sends the public key of the terminal device to the authentication server in advance or at the same time.
  • the terminal device will take the certificate carrying the public key of the terminal device as an EAP message and send it to the authentication server Send the EAP message.
  • the authentication server decrypts the first message authentication code using the private key of the authentication server.
  • the authentication server can use the certificate carrying the public key of the authentication server as an EAP message, and send the EAP message to the terminal device.
  • Step 2 The authentication server generates a second digest according to the second preset key generation function and the second network identifier.
  • Step 3 The authentication server matches the first digest and the second digest to obtain the verification result.
  • the authentication server compares the first digest and the second digest, and when the first digest and the second digest are the same, the authentication server determines that the verification is passed; when the first digest and the second digest are not the same, the authentication server determines that the verification is not pass through.
  • the authentication server may determine that the first network corresponding to the second network identifier provides the terminal device with the slicing service of the first network slice.
  • the authentication server can determine that the second network identifier has been tampered with or the key does not match, and the authentication server determines that the network corresponding to the second network identifier provides the terminal device with the The slice service of the first network slice.
  • the slicing service of the first network slicing please refer to the related introduction of step 203 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.
  • the implementation method 1 is introduced based on the second credential provided in the method 1 in step 501. Then, the authentication server verifying the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the second network identifier specifically includes steps 1 to 2.
  • Step 1 The authentication server generates a second message authentication code according to the first password and the second network identifier.
  • the authentication server uses the first password and the second network identifier as input parameters in the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the second message authentication code.
  • the input parameter of the second preset authentication code generation function further includes at least one of the identification S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the counter value of the identification code, and the random number RAND.
  • Step 2 The authentication server matches the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code to obtain a verification result.
  • the authentication server compares the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code. When the first message authentication code is the same as the second message authentication code, the authentication server determines that the verification is passed; when the first message authentication code is not the same as the second message authentication code, the authentication server determines that the verification fails.
  • the authentication server may determine that the first network corresponding to the second network identifier provides the terminal device with the slicing service of the first network slice.
  • the authentication server can determine that the second network identifier has been tampered with, and the authentication server determines that the first network corresponding to the second network identifier is not provided for the terminal device
  • the slice service of the first network slice For the description of the slicing service of the first network slicing, please refer to the related introduction of step 203 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.
  • Implementation mode 2 is introduced in mode two in step 501 above. Then, the authentication server verifying the first message authentication code according to the first key Kemsk and the second network identifier specifically includes steps 1 to 2.
  • Step 1 The authentication server generates a second message authentication code according to the first key Kemsk and the second network identifier.
  • the authentication server uses the first key Kemsk and the first network identifier as input parameters in the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the second message authentication code.
  • the input parameter of the second preset authentication code generation function further includes at least one of the identification S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the counter value of the identification code, and the random number RAND.
  • the first key Kemsk is generated during the slice authentication process of the first network slice; or, the first key Kemsk is generated after the slice authentication of the first network slice ends. Therefore, when the first message authentication code is generated during the slice authentication process of the first network slice, the authentication server may perform the authentication process during the slice authentication process of the first network slice or after the slice authentication of the first network slice ends. Verification of a message verification. When the first message authentication code is generated after the slice authentication of the first network slice ends, the authentication server executes the verification of the first message authentication code after the slice authentication of the first network slice ends.
  • Step 2 The authentication server matches the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code to obtain a verification result.
  • the authentication server compares the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code. When the first message authentication code is the same as the second message authentication code, the authentication server determines that the verification is passed; when the first message authentication code is not the same as the second message authentication code, the authentication server determines that the verification fails.
  • the authentication server may determine that the first network corresponding to the second network identifier provides the terminal device with the slicing service of the first network slice.
  • the authentication server can determine that the second network identifier has been tampered with, and the authentication server determines that the first network corresponding to the second network identifier is not provided for the terminal device
  • the slice service of the first network slice For the description of the slicing service of the first network slicing, please refer to the related introduction of step 203 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.
  • step 504 is further included in this embodiment.
  • the authentication server sends a fourth message to the terminal device.
  • the authentication server sends a fourth message to the terminal device through the NSSAAF entity and the AMF entity, and the fourth message is an authentication request message, or an authentication response message, or an authentication success message.
  • the fourth message is an authentication request message, or an authentication response message, or an authentication success message.
  • the second message may be understood as an authentication request message or an authentication response message.
  • the terminal device sends a third message to the authentication server.
  • the third message carries the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is to protect the integrity of the first network identifier. Obtained later; then, the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier, and when the verification passes, the authentication server sends a fourth message to the terminal device. It can be seen that the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code sent by the terminal device according to the second network identification. When the verification is passed, the authentication server can determine that the network corresponding to the second network identification provides the terminal device. The slice service of the first network slice.
  • the slice service verification method of the embodiment of the present application can enhance the control of the home network's access to the terminal device and the terminal device's use of network slicing, avoiding the use of the visited network in the slice authentication process of the network slicing and/or the use of network slicing The act of deceiving the home network during the process.
  • the above-mentioned embodiment shown in FIG. 5 only uses the terminal device to generate the first message authentication code according to the first network identifier as an example for description.
  • the present application further provides another embodiment, which is similar to the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, and the difference lies in step 501 and step 503.
  • Step 501 may be replaced with: the terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the identifier of the first network slice.
  • the first message authentication code is obtained after performing integrity protection on the identity of the first network slice, and the identity of the first network slice is the ID of the first network slice or the first network slice auxiliary selection information NSSAI.
  • the identity of the first network slice of the terminal device may vary with the PLMN network currently accessed by the terminal device, and the PLMN corresponding to the identity of the first network slice can be determined through the difference.
  • the internet Therefore, the terminal device can generate the first message authentication code through the identifier of the first network slice, so that the authentication server verifies the first message verification to determine the network that provides the slice service of the first network slice for the terminal device.
  • the terminal device to generate the first message authentication code, which will be introduced below through examples.
  • Manner 1 The terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the identifier of the first network slice.
  • step 501 for the related description of the first credential, please refer to the related introduction in step 501 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, which will not be repeated here.
  • the following describes the process of generating the first message authentication code by the terminal device in combination with the two possible first credentials shown.
  • the first type of credential is a certificate or a public-private key pair.
  • the public key of the terminal device and the private key of the terminal device are taken as an example for description. It can be seen from the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 that the terminal device generating the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the identifier of the first network slice specifically includes step a.
  • step a can be replaced with: the terminal device generates the first digest according to the second preset key generation function and the identifier of the first network slice.
  • the terminal device generates the first digest according to the second preset key generation function and the identifier of the first network slice.
  • parameters or content such as the first network identifier and EAP ID can also be added to generate the first summary. This application does not limit the addition of other parameters or content.
  • the identification of the first network slice and the second preset key generation function please refer to the related description in step 501 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, which will not be repeated here.
  • the second type of credential is the first password. That is, the EAP authentication method adopts the password-based EAP method.
  • the terminal device uses the first password and the identifier of the first network slice as input parameters in the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the first message authentication code.
  • the terminal device uses the first password and the identifier of the first network slice as input parameters in the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the first message authentication code.
  • the input parameters of the second preset authentication code generation function please refer to the relevant description in step 501 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, which will not be repeated here.
  • Manner 2 The terminal device generates the first message authentication code according to the first key Kemsk and the identifier of the first network slice.
  • the terminal device uses the first key Kemsk and the identifier of the first network slice as input parameters of the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the first message authentication code.
  • the relevant description of the input parameters of the second preset authentication code generation function please refer to the relevant description in step 501 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, which will not be repeated here.
  • Step 503 can be replaced with: the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the first identifier.
  • the first identifier is determined by the authentication server according to the identifier of the first network slice sent by the AMF entity, or determined by the identifier of the first network slice carried in the third message sent by the authentication server from the terminal device.
  • the authentication server can verify the first message authentication code in the following two possible implementation manners.
  • Implementation manner 1 The authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the first identifier.
  • Implementation manner 2 The authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the first key Kemsk and the first identifier.
  • the following describes the verification process of the authentication code of the first message by the authentication server based on the implementation manner 1 and the implementation manner 2.
  • Step 1 Introduce realization mode 1 based on the first credential provided in mode one in step 501 after replacement.
  • step 503 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 based on the first credential of mode one of step 501, the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the second network identifier, specifically including the steps 1 to step 3. Then the difference lies in: Step 2.
  • Step 2 can be replaced with: the authentication server generates the second digest according to the second preset key generation function and the first identifier.
  • the implementation method 1 is introduced based on the second credential provided in the method 1 in step 501 after the replacement.
  • step 503 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 based on the second credential of mode one of step 501, the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the second network identifier, specifically including steps 1 to step 3. Then the difference lies in: Step 1.
  • Step 1 can be replaced with: the authentication server generates a second message authentication code according to the first password and the first identifier.
  • the authentication server uses the first password and the first identifier as input parameters in the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the second message authentication code.
  • the second preset authentication code generation function please refer to the related introduction of step 503 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5.
  • step 503 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, based on the second method of step 501, the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code according to the first credential and the second network identifier, specifically including steps 1 to 3. Then the difference lies in: Step 1.
  • Step 1 can be replaced by: the authentication server generates a second message authentication code according to the first key Kemsk and the first identifier.
  • the authentication server uses the first key Kemsk and the first identifier as input parameters in the second preset authentication code generation function, and calculates the second message authentication code.
  • the related introduction of the first key Kemsk and the second preset authentication code generation function please refer to the related introduction of step 503 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5.
  • the first message carries first identification information. Then, the authentication server determines the second network identifier through the first identification information, which will be described as an example in the following embodiments.
  • the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 is executed during the slice authentication process of the first network slice, or after the slice authentication of the first network slice is completed.
  • the following is introduced through the embodiment shown in FIG. 6 and the embodiment shown in FIG. 7 respectively.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of this application.
  • the method includes:
  • the AMF entity determines to perform slice authentication on the first network slice according to the slice subscription information of the terminal device and the slice identifier of the first network slice.
  • the AMF entity sends a NAS message to the terminal device, where the NAS message carries an EAP ID request (request) used for slice authentication and the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice; correspondingly, the terminal device receives the NAS message.
  • EAP ID request request
  • the terminal device sends a NAS message to the AMF entity, where the NAS message carries the EAP ID response and the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice.
  • the AMF entity sends a third request message to the AUSF entity or the NSSAAF entity, where the third request message carries the EAP ID response, GPSI, and the first network slice identifier S-NSSAI.
  • the AUSF entity or the NSSAAF entity sends an AAA message to the AAA-S, where the AAA message carries the EAP ID response, GPSI, and the first network slice identifier S-NSSAI.
  • the AAA-S sends an AAA message to the AUSF entity or the NSSAAF entity, where the AAA message carries the EAP message, GPSI, and the first network slice identifier S-NSSAI.
  • the AUSF entity or the NSSAAF entity sends a third response message to the AMF entity, where the third response message carries the EAP message, the GPSI, and the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice.
  • the AMF entity sends a NAS message to the terminal device, where the NAS message carries the EAP message and the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice.
  • Step 601 to step 604 are similar to step 301 to step 304 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3, and step 605 to step 608 are similar to step 306 to step 309 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 301 to step 304 and step 306 to step 309 carry the first message authentication code and the first identification information.
  • step 605 to step 608 are similar to step 306 to step 309 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 301 to step 304 and step 306 to step 309 carry the first message authentication code and the first identification information.
  • steps 301 to 304 and steps 306 to 309 carry the first message authentication code and the first identification information.
  • the terminal device sends a NAS message to the AMF entity, where the NAS message carries the EAP message, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first identification information, and the first message authentication code.
  • the first identification information corresponds to the first network identification.
  • the specific content of the first identification information please refer to the related introduction of step 202 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.
  • the first message authentication code is obtained by performing integrity protection on the first network identifier, and for the specific method of generating the first message authentication code, please refer to the introduction of step 501 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, which will not be repeated here.
  • the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first identification information, and the first message authentication code are parameters carried in the EAP message.
  • the EAP message, the identification S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first identification information, and the first message authentication code may also be carried in other types of messages, and the application does not limit the carrying messages.
  • EAP message does not limit the specific type of the EAP message.
  • the EAP message may have different names or types. It is understandable that the following description is also applicable to this description.
  • the identifier of the network slice is represented by S-NSSAI.
  • the identification information of the UE may be expressed in publicly available GPSI or SUPI, but it should not be understood as a limitation to the embodiments of the present application.
  • the AMF entity sends a fourth request message to the AAA-S, where the fourth request message carries the EAP ID response, GPSI, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first message authentication code, and the first identification information.
  • the fourth request message is a slice authentication request message.
  • the AAA-S verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier.
  • step 611 For the related description of step 611, please refer to the related description of step 503 shown in FIG. 5 above.
  • the AAA-S sends an AAA message to the NSSAAF entity or the AUSF entity, where the AAA message carries the success or failure of EAP authentication, GPSI, the identity of the first network slice S-NSSAI, and the second network identity.
  • the AAA message may also authenticate the verification result of the code to the first message.
  • this embodiment further includes step 613.
  • the NSSAAF entity or the AUSF entity stores the second network identification authentication code that has passed the verification and the slice authentication result of the first network slice.
  • Step 613 is similar to step 315 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3, and for details, please refer to the related introduction of step 315 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3, which will not be repeated here.
  • the NSSAAF entity or the AUSF entity sends a fourth response message to the AMF entity, where the fourth response message carries the success or failure of EAP authentication, GPSI, and the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice.
  • the AMF entity sends a NAS message to the terminal device, where the NAS message carries the success or failure of EAP authentication.
  • the third request message of the terminal device in step 604 may also carry the first message authentication code, so that the AAA-S can verify the first message authentication code.
  • AAA-S can verify the first message authentication code every time it receives the first message authentication code, or AAA-S can verify the first message authentication code every time it receives the first message authentication code.
  • the above steps 609 to 610 may be executed multiple times (the content of the EAP message is different each time).
  • the terminal device carries the first message authentication code and the first identification information through only one of the steps 609 to 610 executed once. This application does not limit when to carry the first message authentication code and the first identification information.
  • the terminal device sends the first message authentication code, the identifier of the first network slice, and the first identification information to AAA-S; then, AAA-S The second network identification is determined from the first identification information, and the first message authentication code is verified according to the second network identification; when the verification is passed, the AAA-S sends the second network identification to the NSSAAF entity. It can be seen that AAA-S verifies the first message authentication code sent by the terminal device according to the second network identifier. When the verification is passed, AAA-S can determine that it is the first network provided by the first network for the terminal device. Slice certification of slices.
  • the slice service verification method of the embodiment of the present application can enhance the control of the home network's access to the terminal device and the terminal device's use of network slicing, avoiding the use of the visited network in the slice authentication process of the network slicing and/or the use of network slicing The act of deceiving the home network during the process.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the slice service verification method includes:
  • the terminal device sends a NAS message to the AMF entity, where the NAS message carries the success or failure of the NSSAA of the first network slice, the identifier S-NSSAI of the first network slice, the first identification information, and the first message authentication code.
  • Step 701 is similar to step 401 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4, and for details, please refer to the related introduction of step 401, which will not be repeated here.
  • the AMF entity sends to the AAA-S GPSI, the success or failure of the first network slice slice authentication NSSAA, the first network slice identifier S-NSSAI, the first identification information, and the first message authentication code.
  • step 501 for the related introduction of the first identification information and the first message authentication code, please refer to the related introduction of step 501 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, which will not be repeated here.
  • the AAA-S verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier.
  • Step 702 is similar to step 503 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5. For details, please refer to the related introduction of step 503 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, which will not be repeated here.
  • the AAA-S sends the slice authentication NSSAA results (results) of the first network slice to the NSSAAF entity or AUSF entity, and the NSSAA results carry GPSI, slice authentication success or failure, the first network slice identifier S-NSSAI, and the first identifier information.
  • this embodiment further includes step 705.
  • Step 705 The NSSAAF entity saves the second network identifier that has passed the authentication code verification and the slice authentication result of the first network slice.
  • Step 705 is similar to step 315 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3. For details, please refer to the related introduction of step 705 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3, which will not be repeated here.
  • the terminal device sends the first message authentication code, the identifier of the first network slice, and the first identification information to the AAA-S, and the AAA-S is based on the first network slice. 2.
  • the network identifier verifies the first message authentication code; when the verification is passed, the AAA-S sends the second network identifier to the NSSAAF entity. It can be seen that AAA-S verifies the first message authentication code sent by the terminal device according to the second network identifier. When the verification is passed, AAA-S can determine that it is the first network provided by the first network for the terminal device. Slice certification of slices.
  • the slice service verification method of the embodiment of the present application can enhance the control of the home network's access to the terminal device and the terminal device's use of network slicing, avoiding the use of the visited network in the slice authentication process of the network slicing and/or the use of network slicing The act of deceiving the home network during the process.
  • the slice service verification function entity or the authentication server verifies the first message authentication code sent by the terminal device , Determine the first network that provides the slicing service of the network slicing for the terminal device, and the first message authentication code is obtained by performing integrity protection on the first network identifier.
  • the home network can determine which network specifically initiated the slice authentication of the first network slice for the terminal device; or, the home network can determine whether the visited network has initiated slice authentication for the first network slice of the terminal device; or , The home network may determine the service network that initiates the slice authentication for the first network slice of the terminal device and completes the slice authentication of the first network slice.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides another slice service verification method.
  • the AMF entity binds the first key K AMF with the slice information of the first network slice and/or the identity of the first network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the first key K AMF is used for (data or signaling) transmission between the terminal device and the first network.
  • the home network of the terminal device can determine through the first key K AMF used by the terminal device or the access network device that the visited network provides the terminal device with the slicing service of the first network slice.
  • the slice service of the first network slice includes slice data transmission or signaling transmission.
  • the slice service is verified by updating the first key K AMF.
  • the following examples illustrate applicable scenarios:
  • Scenario 1 Roaming scenario, that is, the terminal device roams to the visited network.
  • the first network currently accessed by the terminal device is the visited network.
  • the AMF entity binds the first key K AMF with the slice information of the first network slice and/or the identity of the first network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the home network can determine through the first key K AMF that the visited network provides the terminal device with the slice service of the first network slice, and the slice service of the first network slice includes slice data transmission or signaling transmission.
  • Scenario 2 Non-roaming scenario, that is, the network currently accessed by the terminal device is the home network of the terminal device.
  • the AMF entity in the home network updates the first key K AMF , it binds the first key K AMF with the slice information of the first network slice and/or the identity of the home network currently accessed by the terminal device. In this way, the home network can determine through the first key K AMF that the home network provides the terminal device with the slice service of the first network slice, and the slice service of the first network slice includes slice data transmission or signaling transmission. Avoid abnormal behaviors of AMF entities in the home network and improve network security.
  • scenario one is taken as an example for introduction.
  • the AMF entity is used as the executive body to introduce the scheme of updating the second key K AMF.
  • the main reason for selecting the AMF entity to perform the embodiment shown in FIG. 8 is: after the first level authentication of the terminal device, the control signaling key and the data key related to the terminal device are based on the first key K AMF It is generated by deduction, and the AMF entity can directly participate in the slice authentication process of the terminal device and obtain the slice authentication result. Therefore, Figure 8 uses the AMF entity as the executive body to introduce the update of the first key K AMF . In practical applications, other functions can also be used The entity or network element executes the solution shown in FIG. 8, which is not specifically limited in this application.
  • control signaling key and the data key related to the terminal device are both derived and generated based on the first key K AMF.
  • K AMF is used to generate NAS signaling keys: NAS integrity protection key K NASint and NAS encryption and decryption key K NASenc .
  • K AMF is also used to generate access layer (Access Stratum, AS) key K gNB and non-3GPP network interoperability anchor key K N3IWF , and the access layer key K gNB is used to further generate the access layer control key: the access layer control signaling integrity protection key
  • the key K RRCint and the access layer control signaling encryption and decryption key K RRCenc , the data plane integrity protection key K UPint and the data plane encryption and decryption key K UPenc The key K RRCint and the access layer control signaling encryption and decryption key K RRCenc , the data plane integrity protection key K UPint and the data plane encryption and decryption key K UPenc .
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a slice service verification method according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the method includes:
  • the AMF entity updates the second key K AMF according to the identifier of the first network slice, and obtains the updated second key K AMF .
  • the first network slice is a network slice of the terminal device that has been successfully sliced and authenticated.
  • the updated second key K AMF is used for transmission between the terminal device and the first network (including slice data transmission or signaling transmission), and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the AMF entity uses the identifier of the first network slice and the unupdated second key K AMF as input parameters of the first preset key generation function, and calculates the updated second key K AMF .
  • New K AMF KDF (K AMF , NSSAI,...)
  • "" represents that the input parameters of the function KDF can also include other parameters, which are not limited in this application.
  • step 801 specifically includes:
  • the AMF entity updates the second key K AMF according to the identifier of the first network slice and the third key to obtain the updated second key K AMF .
  • the third key is a key generated in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device, or a credential used in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device.
  • the third key is the key generated in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device
  • the third key may be generated during the slice authentication process of the first network slice, or it may be the first network slice.
  • a network slice is generated after the slice authentication is completed, and it depends on the setting of the EAP authentication process.
  • the slice authentication process of the first network slice of the first terminal device includes an EAP authentication process
  • the AMF entity may use the third key generated in the EAP authentication process and the identifier of the first network slice as the first preset Assuming the input parameters of the key generation function, the updated second key K AMF is calculated.
  • the input parameter further includes the identification of the first network.
  • the identification of the first network includes the identification SN-ID of the first network, or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network.
  • the identification of the first network may also be an identification of a functional entity in the first network.
  • a functional entity in the first network For example, the identity of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity.
  • the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the terminal device.
  • New K AMF KDF (K AMF , Kaaa/Kemsk, NSSAI, SN-ID,).
  • KDF KDF (K AMF , Kaaa/Kemsk, NSSAI, SN-ID,).
  • "" represents that the input parameters of the function KDF may also include other parameters, which are not limited in this application.
  • the AMF entity updates the second key K AMF after the slice authentication of the first network slice succeeds, and the terminal device performs the slice authentication process of the first network slice based on the existing slice authentication process, or based on the above-mentioned Figure 3
  • the embodiment shown or the slice authentication process in the embodiment shown in FIG. 6 is not specifically limited in this application.
  • the AMF entity sends second indication information to the terminal device.
  • the second indication information carries an identifier of the first network slice, and the second indication information is used to indicate to update the second key K AMF for the first network slice.
  • the second indication information is used to instruct the terminal device to update the second key K AMF for the network slice for which the slice authentication of the terminal device is successful.
  • the second indication information also carries an update method and/or update parameters used to update the second key K AMF.
  • the update parameter includes the identifier S-NSSAI of the network slice or the identifier list of the network slice (ie, NSSAI) or other related parameters for updating the second key K AMF.
  • the second indication information of step 802 may be sent to the terminal device in step 317, and the above step 801 may be that the AMF entity receives the slice authentication success in step 316.
  • the specific application is not limited.
  • the terminal device updates the second key K AMF according to the second indication information.
  • the second indication information carries an identifier of the first network slice, and the second indication information is used to indicate to update the second key K AMF for the first network slice.
  • the terminal device determines the identity of the first network slice according to the second indication information, and then the terminal device updates the second key K AMF according to the identity of the first network slice to obtain the updated second key K AMF .
  • the specific update process is similar to the process of the AMF entity updating the second key K AMF . For details, please refer to the relevant description of the foregoing step 801.
  • the second indication information is used to instruct the terminal device to update the second key K AMF for the network slice for which the slice authentication of the terminal device is successful.
  • the terminal device determines the identity of the first network slice for which the slice authentication is successful, and then the terminal device updates the second key K AMF according to the identity of the first network slice to obtain the updated second key K AMF .
  • the specific update process is similar to the process of the AMF entity updating the second key K AMF . For details, please refer to the relevant description of the foregoing step 801.
  • the second indication information also carries an update mode and/or update parameter, then the terminal device updates the second key K AMF according to the update mode and update parameter.
  • this embodiment further includes step 804.
  • the terminal device sends a completion notification message to the AMF entity.
  • the completion notification message is used to notify the AMF entity that the terminal device has completed updating the second key K AMF.
  • the terminal device sends the completion notification message to the AMF entity and starts the updated second key K AMF .
  • the data transmission and signaling transmission, a second key K AMF updating process for slice data transmission or signaling transmission, a second key K AMF and The first network and the slice information of the network slice are bound.
  • the K AMF of each network slice can be the same or different.
  • the updated second key K AMF is a slice-level key.
  • the home network can use the updated second key K AMF to determine whether the first network actually provides the first network slice slicing service for the terminal device, or the home network can use the updated second key K AMF It is determined that what the first network provides for the terminal device is the slicing service of the first network slice.
  • the first network merely provides a slicing service of the first network slice for the terminal device, while the first network falsely reports that it provides the terminal device with other network slices with higher performance than the first network slice.
  • the behavior of slicing services and requesting additional service fees from the home network is not limited.
  • the embodiment shown in FIG. 8 uses the identification of the first network slice as an example to illustrate the scheme of updating the second key K AMF.
  • K AMF1 is a key updated according to the identifier S-NSSAI1 of network slice 1
  • K AMF1 is used for the terminal device to perform network slice 1 transmission with the first network.
  • K AMF2 is a key updated according to the identifier S-NSSAI2 of network slice 2
  • K AMF2 is used for terminal equipment to perform network slice 2 transmission with the first network.
  • the AMF entity updates the second key K AMF according to the identity of the first network slice to obtain the updated second key K AMF ; then, the AMF entity sends the second indication information to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device updates the second key K AMF according to the second indication information, and the updated second key K AMF is used for transmission between the terminal device and the first network (including slice data transmission or signaling transmission), so that the ownership
  • the network may determine through the updated first key K AMF that the first network provides the terminal device with the slice service of the first network slice, and the slice service of the first network slice includes slice data transmission or signaling transmission.
  • the slice service verification method in the embodiments of the present application can enhance the control of the access of the terminal device by the home network and the terminal device using the network slice, and avoid the behavior of the visited network deceiving the home network during the use of the network slice.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a slice service verification function entity in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the slice service verification function entity can be used to perform the operations performed by the slice service verification function entity in the embodiments shown in FIG. 2A, FIG. 3, and FIG. 4
  • the slice service verification function entity includes a transceiver module 901 and a processing module 902.
  • the transceiver module 901 is configured to receive a first message sent by a terminal device, the first message carrying an identifier of a first network slice and a first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is calculated and generated according to the first network identifier;
  • the processing module 902 is configured to verify the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier
  • the transceiver module 901 is configured to, when the verification is passed, the slice service verification function entity sends the second network identifier to the verification server.
  • processing module 902 is specifically configured to:
  • the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are matched to obtain a verification result.
  • processing module 902 is specifically configured to:
  • the slice service verification function entity is an NSSAAF entity; the processing module 902 is specifically configured to:
  • the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF Ausf entity receives the transmitted, the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF AUSF entity key K AUSF generated for a first intermediate.
  • processing module 902 is specifically configured to:
  • the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are matched to obtain a verification result.
  • the first message further includes first identification information
  • the second network identification is determined by the slice service verification function entity according to the first identification information; wherein, the first identification information includes the first identification information.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • the transceiver module 901 receives the first message sent by the terminal device.
  • the first message carries the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code.
  • the first message authentication code completes the first network identifier.
  • the processing module 902 verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier, and when the verification passes, the slice service verification function entity sends the second network identifier to the authentication server. It can be seen that the processing module 902 verifies the first message authentication code sent by the terminal device according to any one or more of the second network identifier and the identifier of the first network slice.
  • the processing module 902 can It is determined that the network corresponding to the second network identifier provides the slicing service of the first network slice for the terminal device. Therefore, through the above solution, the behavior of cheating the home network of the terminal device due to the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device can be avoided or prevented, and network security can be improved.
  • the slice service verification method of the embodiment of the present application can enhance the control of the home network's access to the terminal device and the terminal device's use of network slicing, avoiding the use of the visited network in the slice authentication process of the network slicing and/or the use of network slicing The act of deceiving the home network during the process.
  • FIG. 10 a schematic diagram of a structure of a terminal device in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the terminal device can be used to execute the steps performed by the terminal device in the embodiments shown in FIG. 2A, FIG. 3, and FIG. Related description.
  • the terminal device includes a processing module 1001 and a transceiver module 1002.
  • the processing module 1001 is configured to generate a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier
  • the transceiver module 1002 is configured to send a first message to the slice service verification function entity, where the first message carries the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code.
  • processing module 1001 is also used for:
  • the processing module 1001 is specifically used for:
  • a first message authentication code is generated according to the first network identifier and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF.
  • processing module 1001 is further used for:
  • the processing module 1001 is specifically used for:
  • a first message authentication code is generated according to the first network identifier and the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF.
  • processing module 1001 is further used for:
  • the processing module is specifically used for:
  • processing module 1001 is specifically configured to:
  • the first message authentication code is generated according to the second integrity protection key K NSSAAF , the identifier of the first network slice, and the first network identifier.
  • the first message further includes first identification information, and the first network identification corresponds to the first identification information; wherein the first identification information is the identification of the first network or the first identification information.
  • An identifier of a functional entity in the network, and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • the processing module 1001 generates a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier; the transceiver module 1002 sends a first message to the slice service verification function entity, and the first message carries the first message authentication code to facilitate slice service verification
  • the functional entity verifies the first message authentication code, so as to avoid or prevent the behavior of cheating the home network of the terminal device due to the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device, thereby improving network security.
  • the following describes an authentication server provided in an embodiment of the present application. Please refer to Figure 11, a schematic diagram of the structure of the authentication server in the embodiment of this application.
  • the authentication server can be used to execute the steps performed by the authentication server in the embodiments shown in Figures 5, 6, and 7. You can refer to the above method embodiment Related description.
  • the authentication server includes a transceiver module 1101 and a processing module 1102.
  • the transceiver module 1101 is configured to receive a second message sent by a terminal device, the second message carrying the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is calculated and generated according to the second network identifier;
  • the processing module 1102 is configured to verify the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier
  • the transceiver module 1101 is configured to, when the verification is passed, determine that the network corresponding to the second network identifier provides the terminal device with the slicing service of the first network slicing.
  • processing module 1102 is specifically configured to:
  • the first message authentication code is verified according to the first credential and the second network identifier, and the first credential is used for slice authentication for the first network slice between the terminal device and the authentication server.
  • the first credential is the public key of the terminal device and the private key of the terminal device; the processing module 1102 is specifically configured to:
  • the first digest and the second digest are matched to obtain a verification result.
  • the first credential is a first password
  • the processing module 1102 is specifically configured to:
  • the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are matched to obtain a verification result.
  • processing module 1102 is specifically configured to:
  • the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are matched to obtain a verification result.
  • the second message also carries first identification information, and the second network identification is determined by the authentication server according to the first identification information; wherein, the first identification information includes the first identification information of the first network An identifier or an identifier of a functional entity in the first network, and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • the transceiver module 1101 receives a second message sent by the terminal device.
  • the second message carries the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code.
  • the first message authentication code is calculated based on the second network identifier.
  • the processing module 1102 verifies the first message authentication code according to the second network identifier. When the verification is passed, the processing module 1102 determines that the network corresponding to the second network identifier provides the terminal device with the first Slicing service for network slicing. In this way, the behavior of cheating the home network of the terminal device due to the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device can be avoided or prevented, and network security can be improved.
  • FIG. 12 a schematic diagram of the structure of the terminal device in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the terminal device can be used to execute the steps performed by the terminal device in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, FIG. 6 and FIG. 7. You can refer to the above method embodiment Related description.
  • the terminal device includes a processing module 1201 and a transceiver module 1202.
  • the processing module 1201 is configured to generate a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier
  • the transceiver module 1202 is configured to send a second message to the authentication server, where the second message carries the identifier of the first network slice and the first message authentication code.
  • processing module 1201 is specifically configured to:
  • a first message authentication code is generated according to the first credential and the first network identifier, and the first credential is used for slice authentication for the first network slice between the terminal device and the authentication server.
  • the first credential is the public key of the terminal device and the private key of the terminal device; the processing module 1201 is specifically configured to:
  • the first digest is encrypted according to the private key of the terminal device to obtain the first message authentication code.
  • the first credential is a first password
  • the processing module 1201 is specifically configured to:
  • a second message authentication code is generated according to the first password and the first network identification.
  • processing module 1201 is specifically configured to:
  • a first message authentication code is generated according to the first key Kemsk and the first network identifier, and the first key Kemsk is a key generated in the EAP authentication process for the first network slice of the terminal device.
  • the second message also carries first identification information, and the first identification information corresponds to the first network identification; the first identification information includes the identification of the first network or the identification of the first network The identifier of the functional entity, the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the identifier of the first network includes:
  • the identification SN-ID of the first network or the PLMN identification corresponding to the first network, or the name SNN of the first network, or the network identifier NID of the first network;
  • the identification of the functional entity in the first network includes:
  • the identifier of the AMF entity, or the name of the AMF entity, or the globally unique identifier of the AMF entity, the AMF entity is a functional entity in the first network that initiates slice authentication of the first network slice for the first terminal device.
  • the processing module 1201 generates a first message authentication code according to the first network identifier, and the transceiver module 1202 sends a first message to the authentication server.
  • the first message carries the first message authentication code so that the authentication server can respond to the The first message authentication code is verified, thereby avoiding or preventing the behavior of cheating the home network of the terminal device due to the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device, thereby improving network security.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of an AMF entity in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the AMF entity can be used to execute the steps performed by the AMF entity in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the AMF entity includes a processing module 1301.
  • the AMF entity further includes a transceiver module 1302.
  • the processing module 1301 is configured to update the second key K AMF according to the identifier of the first network slice to obtain the updated second key K AMF .
  • the first network slice is the network slice of the terminal device whose slice authentication is successful.
  • the updated second key K AMF is used for transmission between the terminal device and the first network, and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the AMF entity further includes a transceiver module 1302;
  • the transceiver module 1302 is configured to send second instruction information to the terminal device, where the second instruction information updates the second key K AMF for the first network slice according to the instruction.
  • processing module 1301 is specifically configured to:
  • the second key K AMF is updated according to the identification of the first network slice and the third key.
  • the third key is the key generated in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device, or the terminal device’s The credential used in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice.
  • the transceiver module 1302 is also used for:
  • the processing module 1301 updates the second key K AMF according to the identifier of the first network slice, and obtains the updated second key K AMF , and the first network slice is the network of the terminal device that has been successfully sliced and authenticated. Slicing, the updated second key K AMF is used for transmission between the terminal device and the first network (including slicing data transmission or signaling transmission), and the first network is the network currently accessed by the terminal device.
  • the home network of the terminal device can determine through the updated first key K AMF that the first network provides the terminal device with the slicing service of the first network slice.
  • the slice service includes slice data transmission or signaling transmission. Therefore, through the above solution, the behavior of cheating the home network of the terminal device due to the visited network currently accessed by the terminal device can be avoided or prevented, and network security can be improved.
  • FIG. 14 a schematic structural diagram of the terminal device in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the terminal device can be used to execute the steps performed by the terminal device in the embodiment shown in FIG. 8. You can refer to the related description in the above method embodiment.
  • the terminal device includes a transceiver module 1401 and a processing module 1402.
  • the transceiver module 1401 is configured to receive the second indication information sent by the AMF entity;
  • the processing module 1402 is configured to update the second key K AMF according to the second instruction information.
  • the updated second key K AMF is used for transmission between the terminal device and the first network, and the first network is the current terminal device Accessed network.
  • processing module 1402 is specifically configured to:
  • processing module 1402 is specifically configured to:
  • the second key K AMF is updated according to the identification of the first network slice and the third key.
  • the third key is the key generated in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice of the terminal device, or the terminal device’s The credential used in the EAP authentication process of the first network slice.
  • the transceiver module 1401 is also used for:
  • a completion notification message is sent to the AMF entity, and the completion notification message is used to notify the AMF entity that the terminal device has completed updating the second key K AMF.
  • This application also provides a slice service verification function entity 1500. Please refer to FIG. 15. Another structural schematic diagram of the slice service verification function entity in the embodiment of this application.
  • the slice service verification function entity can be used to execute FIG. 2A, FIG. 3 and FIG.
  • FIG. 2A, FIG. 3 and FIG. For the steps performed by the slice service verification function entity in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4, reference may be made to the related description in the foregoing method embodiment.
  • the slice service verification function entity 1500 includes a processor 1501, a memory 1502, an input/output device 1503, and a bus 1504.
  • the processor 1501, the memory 1502, and the input/output device 1503 are respectively connected to the bus 1504, and computer instructions are stored in the memory.
  • the processing module 902 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the processor 1501 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the processor 1501 will not be described in detail.
  • the transceiver module 901 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the input and output device 1503 in this embodiment.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of the circuit system in an embodiment of this application.
  • the circuit system can be used to perform the slice service verification function in the embodiments shown in FIG. 2A, FIG. 3, and FIG. 4
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of the circuit system in an embodiment of this application.
  • the circuit system can be used to perform the slice service verification function in the embodiments shown in FIG. 2A, FIG. 3, and FIG. 4
  • FIG. 2A, FIG. 3, and FIG. 4 For the steps performed by the entity, reference may be made to the relevant description in the above method embodiment.
  • the circuit system includes: a processing circuit 1601 and an interface circuit 1602.
  • the processing circuit 1601 may be a chip, a logic circuit, an integrated circuit, a processing circuit, or a system on chip (SoC) chip, etc.
  • the interface circuit 1602 may be a communication interface, an input/output interface, and the like.
  • the processing module 902 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the processing circuit 1601 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the processing circuit 1601 will not be repeated.
  • the transceiver module 901 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the interface circuit 1602 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the interface circuit 1602 will not be described in detail.
  • FIG. 17 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal device provided by an embodiment of the application. It may be the terminal device in the above embodiment, and is used to implement the operation of the terminal device in the above embodiment.
  • the terminal device includes: an antenna 1710, a radio frequency part 1720, and a signal processing part 1730.
  • the antenna 1710 is connected to the radio frequency part 1720.
  • the radio frequency part 1720 receives the information sent by the network device through the antenna 1710, and sends the information sent by the network device to the signal processing part 1730 for processing.
  • the signal processing part 1730 processes the information of the terminal equipment and sends it to the radio frequency part 1720
  • the radio frequency part 1720 processes the information of the terminal equipment and sends it to the network equipment via the antenna 1710.
  • the signal processing part 1730 may include a modem subsystem, which is used to process data at various communication protocol layers; it may also include a central processing subsystem, which is used to process terminal equipment operating systems and application layers; in addition, it may also Including other subsystems, such as multimedia subsystems, peripheral subsystems, etc., where the multimedia subsystem is used to control the terminal camera, screen display, etc., and the peripheral subsystem is used to realize the connection with other devices.
  • the modem subsystem can be a separate chip.
  • the above apparatus for terminal equipment may be located in the modem subsystem.
  • the modem subsystem may include one or more processing elements 1731, for example, including a main control CPU and other integrated circuits.
  • the modem subsystem may also include a storage element 1732 and an interface circuit 1733.
  • the storage element 1732 is used to store data and programs, but the program used to execute the method performed by the terminal device in the above method may not be stored in the storage element 1732, but is stored in a memory outside the modem subsystem, When in use, the modem subsystem is loaded and used.
  • the interface circuit 1733 is used to communicate with other subsystems.
  • the above apparatus for terminal equipment may be located in a modem subsystem, which may be implemented by a chip.
  • the chip includes at least one processing element and an interface circuit, wherein the processing element is used to perform any of the above terminal equipment executions.
  • the interface circuit is used to communicate with other devices.
  • the unit for the terminal device to implement each step in the above method can be implemented in the form of a processing element scheduler.
  • the device for the terminal device includes a processing element and a storage element, and the processing element calls the program stored by the storage element to Perform the method performed by the terminal device in the above method embodiment.
  • the storage element may be a storage element whose processing element is on the same chip, that is, an on-chip storage element.
  • the program used to execute the method executed by the terminal device in the above method may be a storage element on a different chip from the processing element, that is, an off-chip storage element.
  • the processing element calls or loads a program from the off-chip storage element to the on-chip storage element to call and execute the method executed by the terminal device in the above method embodiment.
  • the unit of the terminal device that implements each step in the above method may be configured as one or more processing elements, and these processing elements are arranged on the modem subsystem, where the processing element may be an integrated circuit, For example: one or more ASICs, or, one or more DSPs, or, one or more FPGAs, or a combination of these types of integrated circuits. These integrated circuits can be integrated together to form a chip.
  • the units of the terminal device that implement each step in the above method can be integrated together and implemented in the form of a system-on-a-chip (SOC), and the SOC chip is used to implement the above method.
  • SOC system-on-a-chip
  • the chip can integrate at least one processing element and a storage element, and the processing element can call the stored program of the storage element to implement the method executed by the above terminal device; or, the chip can integrate at least one integrated circuit to implement the above terminal The method executed by the device; or, it can be combined with the above implementations.
  • the functions of some units are implemented in the form of calling programs by processing elements, and the functions of some units are implemented in the form of integrated circuits.
  • the above apparatus for terminal equipment may include at least one processing element and an interface circuit, wherein at least one processing element is used to execute any of the methods performed by the terminal equipment provided in the above method embodiments.
  • the processing element can execute part or all of the steps executed by the terminal device in the first way: calling the program stored in the storage element; or in the second way: combining instructions through the integrated logic circuit of the hardware in the processor element Part or all of the steps executed by the terminal device are executed in the manner; of course, part or all of the steps executed by the terminal device may also be executed in combination with the first manner and the second manner.
  • the processing element here is the same as the above description, and it can be a general-purpose processor, such as a CPU, or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the above method, such as: one or more ASICs, or, one or more micro-processing DSP, or, one or more FPGAs, etc., or a combination of at least two of these integrated circuit forms.
  • a general-purpose processor such as a CPU
  • integrated circuits configured to implement the above method, such as: one or more ASICs, or, one or more micro-processing DSP, or, one or more FPGAs, etc., or a combination of at least two of these integrated circuit forms.
  • the storage element can be a memory or a collective term for multiple storage elements.
  • This application also provides an authentication server 1800. Please refer to FIG. 18. Another structural diagram of the authentication server in the embodiment of this application.
  • the authentication server can be used to execute the authentication server in the embodiments shown in FIG. 5, FIG. 6 and FIG.
  • the authentication server 1800 includes a processor 1801, a memory 1802, an input/output device 1803, and a bus 1804.
  • the processor 1801, the memory 1802, and the input/output device 1803 are respectively connected to the bus 1804, and computer instructions are stored in the memory.
  • the processing module 1102 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the processor 1801 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the processor 1801 will not be described again.
  • the transceiver module 1101 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the input/output device 1803 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the input/output device 1803 will not be described in detail.
  • Figure 16 is reused, and Figure 16 can also be used to execute the steps performed by the authentication server in the embodiment shown in Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7, and reference may be made to the relevant description in the above method embodiment.
  • the circuit system includes: a processing circuit 1601 and an interface circuit 1602.
  • the processing circuit 1601 may be a chip, a logic circuit, an integrated circuit, a processing circuit, or a system on chip (SoC) chip, etc.
  • the interface circuit 1602 may be a communication interface, an input/output interface, and the like.
  • the processing module 1102 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the processing circuit 1601 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the processing circuit 1601 will not be described in detail.
  • the transceiver module 1101 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the interface circuit 1602 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the interface circuit 1602 will not be described in detail.
  • This application also provides an AMF entity 1900. Please refer to FIG. 19, another structural diagram of the AMF entity in the embodiment of this application.
  • the AMF entity can be used to perform the steps performed by the AMF entity in the embodiment shown in FIG. Related description in the above method embodiment.
  • the AMF entity 1900 includes a processor 1901, a memory 1902, an input/output device 1903, and a bus 1904.
  • the processor 1901, the memory 1902, and the input/output device 1903 are respectively connected to the bus 1904, and computer instructions are stored in the memory.
  • the processing module 1301 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the processor 1901 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the processor 1901 will not be described in detail.
  • the transceiver module 1302 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the input/output device 1903 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the input/output device 1903 will not be described in detail.
  • Figure 16 is reused, and Figure 16 can also be used to execute the steps performed by the AMF entity in the embodiment shown in Figure 8, and reference may be made to the relevant description in the above method embodiment.
  • the circuit system includes: a processing circuit 1601 and an interface circuit 1602.
  • the processing circuit 1601 may be a chip, a logic circuit, an integrated circuit, a processing circuit, or a system on chip (SoC) chip, etc.
  • the interface circuit 1602 may be a communication interface, an input/output interface, and the like.
  • the processing module 1301 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the processing circuit 1601 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the processing circuit 1601 will not be repeated.
  • the transceiver module 1302 in the foregoing embodiment may specifically be the interface circuit 1602 in this embodiment, so the specific implementation of the interface circuit 1602 will not be described in detail.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a communication system.
  • the communication system includes a terminal device, a slice service verification function entity, and an authentication server.
  • the slice service verification function entity may be as shown in FIG. 9
  • the slicing service verification function entity, the terminal device may be the terminal device shown in FIG. 10 above.
  • the slice service verification function entity shown in FIG. 9 is used to perform all or part of the steps performed by the slice service verification function entity in the embodiments shown in FIG. 2A, FIG. 3, and FIG. 4.
  • the terminal device shown in FIG. 10 is used to execute all or part of the steps performed by the terminal device in the embodiments shown in FIG. 2A, FIG. 3, and FIG. 4.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a communication system.
  • the communication system includes an authentication server and a terminal device.
  • the authentication server may include the authentication server shown in FIG. 11, and the terminal device may be Terminal equipment as shown in Figure 12.
  • the authentication server shown in FIG. 11 is used to execute all or part of the steps performed by the authentication server in the embodiments shown in FIG. 5, FIG. 6 and FIG. 7.
  • the terminal device shown in FIG. 12 is used to perform all or part of the steps performed by the terminal device in the embodiments shown in FIG. 5, FIG. 6 and FIG. 7.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a communication system.
  • the communication system includes an AMF entity and a terminal device.
  • the AMF entity may include the AMF entity shown in FIG. 13, and the terminal device may be Terminal equipment as shown in Figure 14.
  • the authentication server shown in FIG. 13 is used to execute all or part of the steps performed by the authentication server in the embodiment shown in FIG. 8.
  • the terminal device shown in FIG. 14 is used to execute all or part of the steps performed by the terminal device in the embodiment shown in FIG. 8.
  • An embodiment of the present application provides a chip, including a memory and a processor, the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program from the memory, so that the processor executes the foregoing FIG. 2A, FIG. 3, and FIG. 4 , Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 shown in the embodiment of the slice service verification method.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product including instructions, which when it runs on a computer, causes the computer to execute as shown in Figure 2A, Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8.
  • the slice service verification method of the illustrated embodiment is shown in Figure 2A, Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, including instructions, which when run on a computer, cause the computer to execute the above-mentioned Figure 2A, Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and The power control method of the embodiment shown in FIG. 8.
  • the disclosed system, device, and method may be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, for example, the division of the units is only a logical function division, and there may be other divisions in actual implementation, for example, multiple units or components can be combined or It can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not implemented.
  • the displayed or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the objectives of the solutions of the embodiments.
  • the functional units in the various embodiments of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the above-mentioned integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional unit.
  • the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
  • the technical solution of the present application essentially or the part that contributes to the existing technology or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium , Including several instructions to make a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application.
  • the aforementioned storage media include: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (read-only memory, ROM), random access memory (random access memory, RAM), magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program code .

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Abstract

本申请实施例公开了一种切片服务验证方法和装置，用于提升网络安全性。本申请实施例方法包括：切片服务验证功能实体接收终端设备发送的第一消息，所述第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，所述第一消息认证码是根据第一网络标识计算生成的；所述切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对所述第一消息认证码进行验证；当验证通过时，所述切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送所述第二网络标识。

Description

切片服务验证方法及其装置
本申请要求于2020年6月10日提交中国专利局，申请号为202010525590.5，发明名称为“切片服务验证方法及其装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及通信领域，尤其涉及一种切片服务验证方法及其装置。
背景技术
网络切片是一种按需组网的方式，可以让运营商在统一的基础设施上分离出多个虚拟的端到端网络。每个网络切片从无线接入网到承载网，再到核心网上进行逻辑隔离，以适配各类型的应用。
终端设备接入服务网络，并可以使用服务网络提供的网络切片的切片服务。而针对移动网络中的漫游场景，即该终端设备漫游至拜访网络时，可以接入拜访网络，进一步也可以使用拜访网络提供的网络切片的切片服务；如果终端设备使用了该拜访网络提供的切片服务，拜访网络可以向终端设备的归属网络索取提供该切片服务的服务费用。
但是，归属网络并无法确定该拜访网络是否为该终端提供了切片服务。因此，该拜访网络可以向归属网络谎报：该拜访网络为该终端设备提供了该切片服务；或者，该拜访网络可以向归属网络谎报：该拜访网络为该终端设备提供了具有更高性能的网络切片的切片服务，进而向归属网络索取更高的服务费用，导致网络安全性较差。
发明内容
本申请实施例提供了一种切片服务验证方法和装置，用于提升网络安全性。
本申请实施例第一方面提供一种切片服务验证方法，该方法包括：
切片服务验证功能实体接收终端设备发送的第一消息，该第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是根据该第一网络标识计算生成的；然后，该切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，该切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送该第二网络标识。
本实施例中，切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对终端设备发送的第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，切片服务验证功能实体可以确定是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供的第一网络切片的切片服务。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。例如，通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法可以增强归属网络对终端设备的接入和终端设备使用网络切片的控制，避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
一种可能的实现方式中，该切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证包括：该切片服务验证功能实体获取第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；然后，切片 服务验证功能实体根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和该第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码，并将该第一消息认证码与该第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
在该实现方式中，由于第一消息认证码是对第一网络标识进行完整性保护之后得到的，切片服务验证功能实体利用第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码，并比对接收到的第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码以实现对第一消息认证码的验证，提供了一种具体的验证方式。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该切片服务验证功能实体根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和该第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码包括：该切片服务验证功能实体根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF、该第一网络切片的标识和该第二网络标识获得该第二消息认证码。
在该实现方式中，在第一消息认证码的生成过程中，终端设备还进一步地将第一网络切片的标识作为生成第一消息认证码的参数，这样切片服务验证功能实体在生成第一消息认证码时，需将接收到的第一网络切片的标识作为生成第一消息认证码的参数，这样有益于针对该第二网络标识所对应的网络是否为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务，对该第一消息认证码进行验证。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该切片服务验证功能实体为网络切片认证与授权功能(network slice-specific authentication and authorization function，NSSAAF)实体；该切片服务验证功能实体获取第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF包括：切片服务验证功能实体接收认证服务器功能(authentication server function，AUSF)实体发送的该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF，该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF为该AUSF实体根据第一中间密钥K AUSF生成的。
在该实现方式中，在终端设备的一级认证之后，终端设备和AUSF实体分别生成该第一中间密钥K AUSF，而该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF是AUSF实体从该第一中间密钥K AUSF推演得到的，这样只有拥有第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF才能对该第一消息验证进行验证。在漫游场景下，该终端设备的归属网络中的相关网元实体才拥有该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF，也就是说拜访网络无法验证且不可篡改的第一消息认证码，从而实现避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证包括：该切片服务验证功能实体根据第一中间密钥K AUSF和该第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；然后，切片服务验证功能实体将该第一消息认证码和该第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
在该实现方式中，在终端设备的一级认证之后，终端设备和AUSF实体分别生成该第一中间密钥K AUSF，这样只有拥有第一中间密钥K AUSF才能对该第一消息验证进行验证。在漫游场景下，该终端设备的归属网络中的相关网元实体才拥有该第一中间密钥K AUSF，也就是说拜访网络无法验证且不可篡改的第一消息认证码，从而实现避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一消息还包括第一标识信息，该第二网络标识为该切片服务验证功能实体根据该第一标识信息确定的；其中，该第一标识信息包括第一网络的 标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。
在该实现方式中，提供了第一消息携带第一网络的标识信息的多种形式。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识(serving network identity，SN-ID)，或者该第一网络所对应的公共陆地移动网络(public land mobile network，PLMN)标识，或者该第一网络的名称(serving network name，SNN)，或者该第一网络的网络识别符(network identifier，NID)；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
接入与移动性管理功能(access and mobility management function，AMF)实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
在该实现方式中，提供了表征第一网络的多种形式的标识和用于表征第一网络中的功能实体的多种形式的标识。
本申请实施例第二方面提供一种切片服务验证方法，该方法包括：
终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码；然后，该终端设备向切片服务验证功能实体发送第一消息，该第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码。
本实施例中，终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，并携带在第一消息中发送给切片服务验证功能实体，以便于切片服务验证功能实体对该第一消息认证码进行验证，从而可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。
一种可能的实现方式中，该终端设备根据该第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码之前，该方法还包括：该终端设备根据第一加解密密钥(cypher key，CK)以及第一完整性保护密钥(integrity key，IK)生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；然后，该终端设备根据该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；该终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码包括：
该终端设备根据该第一网络标识和该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码。
在该可能的实现方式中，提供了该终端设备生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF的生成方式，利用终端设备的一级认证之后生成的第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK来生成该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码之前，该方法还包括：该终端设备根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’；该终端设备根据该二加解密密钥CK’和该第三完整性保护密钥IK’生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；该终端设备根据该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；该终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码包括：该终端设备根据该第一网络标识和该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码。
在该可能的实现方式中，提供了该终端设备生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF的另一种生成方式。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码之前，该方法还包括：该终端设备根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；该终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码包括：该终端设备根据该第一网络标识和该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第一消息认证码。
在该可能的实现方式中，在终端设备的一级认证之后，终端设备和AUSF实体分别生成该第一中间密钥K AUSF，终端设备通过该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第一消息认证码。在漫游场景下，该终端设备的归属网络中的相关网元实体才拥有该第一中间密钥K AUSF，也就是说拜访网络无法验证且不可篡改的第一消息认证码，从而实现避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该终端设备根据该第一网络标识和该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码包括：该终端设备根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF、该第一网络切片的标识和该第一网络标识生成该第一消息认证码。
在该可能的实现方式中，终端设备在生成第一消息认证码，还可以进一步地结合该第一网络切片的标识生成该第一消息认证码，从而便于切片服务验证功能实体通过该第一消息认证码以实现验证该第一网络标识所对应的第一网络是否有为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一消息还包括第一标识信息，该第一网络标识与该第一标识信息对应；其中，该第一标识信息为第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。在该可能的实现方式中，提供了第一标识信息携带的标识信息。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
在该实现方式中，提供了表征第一网络的多种形式的标识和用于表征第一网络中的功能实体的多种形式的标识。
本申请实施例第三方面提供一种切片服务验证方法，该方法包括：
认证服务器接收终端设备发送的第二消息，该第二消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是根据该第二网络标识计算生成的；然后，该认证服务器根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，认证服务器确定是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供第一网络切片的切片服务。
在该可能的实现方式中，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。例如，通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法可以增强归属网络对终端设备的接入和终端设备使用网络切片的控制，避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络 的行为。
一种可能的实现方式中，该认证服务器根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证包括：该认证服务器根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证，该第一信任状用于该终端设备和该认证服务器之间的针对第一网络切片的切片认证。
在该可能的实现方式中，提供了一种具体的认证服务器验证第一消息认证码的验证方式。由于终端设备侧通过该第一信任状生成该第一消息认证码，以提高第一消息认证码的安全性，避免在传输过程中被篡改；相应的，认证服务器根据第一信任状和第一消息认证码进行验证。
另一种可能的实现方式中，第一信任状为该终端设备的公钥和该终端设备的私钥；该认证服务器根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证具体包括：该认证服务器根据该终端设备的公钥对该第一消息认证码进行解密，得到第一摘要；然后，认证服务器根据该第二网络标识按照第一预设密钥生成函数生成第二摘要，并将该第一摘要和该第二摘要进行匹配以获取验证结果。
在该可能的实现方式中，第一信任状为终端设备的公钥私钥对。相应的，认证服务器通过该终端设备的公钥私钥对对该第一消息认证码进行验证。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一信任状为第一口令；该认证服务根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证具体包括：认证服务器根据该第一口令和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码，并将该第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
在该可能的实现方式中，该第一信任状为第一口令。相应的，认证服务器通过该第一口令对第一消息认证码进行验证。
另一种可能的实现方式中，认证服务器根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证包括：根据第一密钥Kemsk和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码，并将该第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。该第一密钥Kemsk为针对该终端设备的第一网络切片的可扩展的身份验证协议(extensible authentication protocol，EAP)认证流程中生成的密钥。
在该可能的实现方式中，提供了另一种认证服务器验证第一消息认证码方式，通过第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中生成的密钥进行验证。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第二消息还携带第一标识信息，该第二网络标识为该认证服务器根据该第一标识信息确定的；其中，该第一标识信息包括第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。
在该实现方式中，提供了第一消息携带第一网络的标识信息的多种形式。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的公共陆地移动网络PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF 实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
在该实现方式中，提供了表征第一网络的多种形式的标识和用于表征第一网络中的功能实体的多种形式的标识。
本申请实施例第四方面提供一种切片服务验证方法，该方法包括：
终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码；然后，该终端设备向认证服务器发送第二消息，该第二消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码。
本实施例中，终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，并携带在第二消息中发送给认证服务器，以便于认证服务器对该第一消息认证码进行验证，从而可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。
一种可能的实现方式中，终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码包括：终端设备根据第一信任状和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，该第一信任状用于该终端设备和该认证服务器之间的针对第一网络切片的切片认证。
在该可能的实现方式中，终端设备采用用于该终端设备和该认证服务器之间的针对第一网络切片的切片认证的第一信任状生成该第一消息认证码，以实现对第一消息认证码的完整性保护，避免在传输过程中被篡改。
另一种可能的实现方式中，第一信任状为该终端设备的公钥和该终端设备的私钥；终端设备根据第一信任状和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码包括：终端设备根据该第一网络标识按照第一预设密钥生成函数生成第一摘要；然后，终端设备根据该终端设备的私钥对该第一摘要进行加密，得到第一消息认证码。
在该可能的实现方式中，终端设备采用终端设备的私钥生成该第一消息认证码，以实现对第一消息认证码的完整性保护，避免在传输过程中被篡改。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一信任状为第一口令；终端设备根据第一信任状和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码包括：终端设备根据该第一口令和第一网络标识生成第二消息认证码。
在该可能的实现方式中，终端设备采用EAP认证流程中采用的第一口令生成第一消息认证码，以实现对第一消息认证码的完整性保护，避免在传输过程中被篡改。
另一种可能的实现方式中，终端设备根据该第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码包括：终端设备根据第一密钥Kemsk和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，该第一密钥Kemsk为针对该终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中生成的密钥。
在该可能的实现方式中，终端设备采用该终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中生成的密钥生成第一消息认证码，以实现对第一消息认证码的完整性保护，避免在传输过程中被篡改。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第二消息还携带第一标识信息，该第一标识信息与第一网络标识对应；该第一标识信息包括第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。在该实现方式中，提供了第一消息携带第一网络的标识信息的多种形式。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
在该实现方式中，提供了表征第一网络的多种形式的标识和用于表征第一网络中的功能实体的多种形式的标识。
本申请实施例第五方面提供一种切片服务验证方法，该方法包括：
AMF实体根据第一网络切片的标识更新第二密钥K AMF，得到更新后的第二密钥K AMF，该第一网络切片为终端设备的已切片认证成功的网络切片，该更新后的第二密钥K AMF用于终端设备与第一网络进行传输(包括切片数据传输或信令传输)，第一网络为终端设备当前所接入的网络。
本实施例中，在漫游场景中，终端设备的归属网络可以通过该更新后的第一密钥K AMF确定是由第一网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务，该第一网络切片的切片服务包括切片数据传输或信令传输。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。
一种可能的实现方式中，该方法还包括：该AMF实体向终端设备发送第二指示信息，该第二指示信息根据指示针对第一网络切片更新第二密钥K AMF。在该可能的实现方式，AMF实体通过第二指示信息指示该终端设备更新该第二密钥K AMF。
另一种可能的实现方式中，AMF实体根据第一网络切片的标识更新第二密钥K AMF包括：AMF实体根据该第一网络切片的标识和第三密钥更新该第二密钥K AMF，该第三密钥为终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所生成的密钥，或终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所使用的信任状。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该方法还包括：AMF实体接收终端设备发送的完成通知消息，该完成通知消息用于通知该AMF实体：该终端设备更新第二密钥K AMF完成。
本申请实施例第六方面提供一种切片服务验证方法，该方法包括：
终端设备接收AMF实体发送的第二指示信息；然后，终端设备根据该第二指示信息更新该第二密钥K AMF，该更新后的第二密钥K AMF用于终端设备与第一网络进行传输(包括切片数据传输或信令传输)，第一网络为终端设备当前所接入的网络。
一种可能的实现方式中，该终端设备根据该第二指示信息更新该第二密钥K AMF包括：终端设备根据该第二指示信息确定针对第一网络切片更新第二密钥K AMF；然后，终端设备根据该第一网络切片的标识更新该第二密钥K AMF。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该终端设备根据该第一网络切片的标识更新该第二密钥K AMF包括：终端设备根据该第一网络切片的标识和第三密钥更新该第二密钥K AMF，该第三密钥为终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所生成的密钥，或终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所使用的信任状。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该方法还包括：终端设备向AMF实体发送完成通知消息， 该完成通知消息用于通知该AMF实体：该终端设备更新第二密钥K AMF完成。
本申请实施例第七方面提供一种切片服务验证功能实体，该切片服务验证功能实体包括：
收发模块，用于接收终端设备发送的第一消息，该第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是根据该第一网络标识计算生成的；
处理模块，用于根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证；
该收发模块，用于当验证通过时，该切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送该第二网络标识。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
获取第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和该第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
将该第一消息认证码与该第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF、该第一网络切片的标识和该第二网络标识获得该第二消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该切片服务验证功能实体为NSSAAF实体；该处理模块具体用于：
接收AUSF实体发送的该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF，该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF为该AUSF实体根据第一中间密钥K AUSF生成的。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
根据第一中间密钥K AUSF和该第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
将该第一消息认证码和该第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一消息还包括第一标识信息，该第二网络标识为该切片服务验证功能实体根据该第一标识信息确定的；其中，该第一标识信息包括第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
本申请实施例第八方面提供一种终端设备，该方法包括：
处理模块，用于根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码；
收发模块，用于向切片服务验证功能实体发送第一消息，该第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块还用于：
根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
根据该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第一网络标识和该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块还用于：
根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’；
根据该二加解密密钥CK’和该第三完整性保护密钥IK’生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
根据该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第一网络标识和该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块还用于：
根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第一网络标识和该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第一消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF、该第一网络切片的标识和该第一网络标识生成该第一消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一消息还包括第一标识信息，该第一网络标识与该第一标识信息对应；其中，该第一标识信息为第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
本申请实施例第九方面提供一种认证服务器，该认证服务器包括：
收发模块，用于接收终端设备发送的第二消息，该第二消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是根据该第二网络标识计算生成的；
处理模块，用于根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证；
该收发模块，用于当验证通过时，确定是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供第一网络切片的切片服务。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证，该第一信任状用于该终端设备和该认证服务器之间的针对第一网络切片的切片认证。
另一种可能的实现方式中，第一信任状为该终端设备的公钥和该终端设备的私钥；该处理模块具体用于：
根据该终端设备的公钥对该第一消息认证码进行解密，得到第一摘要；
根据该第二网络标识按照第一预设密钥生成函数生成第二摘要；
将该第一摘要和该第二摘要进行匹配以获取验证结果。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一信任状为第一口令；该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第一口令和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
将该第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
根据第一密钥Kemsk和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
将该第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第二消息还携带第一标识信息，该第二网络标识为该认证服务器根据该第一标识信息确定的；其中，该第一标识信息包括第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
本申请实施例第十方面提供一种终端设备，该终端设备包括：
处理模块，用于根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码；
收发模块，用于向认证服务器发送第二消息，该第二消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
根据第一信任状和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，该第一信任状用于该终端设备和该认证服务器之间的针对第一网络切片的切片认证。
另一种可能的实现方式中，第一信任状为该终端设备的公钥和该终端设备的私钥；该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第一网络标识按照第一预设密钥生成函数生成第一摘要；
根据该终端设备的私钥对该第一摘要进行加密，得到第一消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一信任状为第一口令；该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第一口令和第一网络标识生成第二消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
根据第一密钥Kemsk和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，该第一密钥Kemsk为针对该终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中生成的密钥。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第二消息还携带第一标识信息，该第一标识信息与第一网络标识对应；该第一标识信息包括第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
本申请实施例第十一方面提供一种AMF实体，该AMF实体包括：
处理模块，用于根据第一网络切片的标识更新第二密钥K AMF，得到更新后的第二密钥K AMF，该第一网络切片为终端设备的已切片认证成功的网络切片，该更新后的第二密钥K AMF用于终端设备与第一网络进行传输，第一网络为终端设备当前所接入的网络。
一种可能的实现方式中，该AMF实体还包括收发模块；
该收发模块，用于向终端设备发送第二指示信息，该第二指示信息根据指示针对第一网络切片更新第二密钥K AMF。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第一网络切片的标识和第三密钥更新该第二密钥K AMF，该第三密钥为终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所生成的密钥，或终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所使用的信任状。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该收发模块还用于：
接收终端设备发送的完成通知消息，该完成通知消息用于通知该AMF实体：该终端设备更新第二密钥K AMF完成。
本申请实施例第十二方面提供一种终端设备，该终端设备包括：
收发模块，用于接收AMF实体发送的第二指示信息；
处理模块，用于根据该第二指示信息更新该第二密钥K AMF，该更新后的第二密钥K AMF用于终端设备与第一网络进行传输，第一网络为终端设备当前所接入的网络。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第二指示信息确定针对第一网络切片更新第二密钥K AMF；
根据该第一网络切片的标识更新该第二密钥K AMF。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第一网络切片的标识和第三密钥更新该第二密钥K AMF，该第三密钥为终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所生成的密钥，或终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所使用的信任状。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该收发模块还用于：
向AMF实体发送完成通知消息，该完成通知消息用于通知该AMF实体：该终端设备更新第二密钥K AMF完成。
本申请实施例第十三方面提供一种切片服务验证功能实体，该切片服务验证功能实体包括：处理器、存储器、输入输出设备以及总线；该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该 存储器中的计算机指令时，用于实现如第一方面任意一种实现方式。
在第十三方面的一种可能的实现方式中，该处理器、存储器、输入输出设备分别与该总线相连。
本申请实施例第十四方面提供一种终端设备，该终端设备包括：处理器、存储器、输入输出设备以及总线；该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，用于实现如第二方面任意一种实现方式。
在第十四方面的一种可能的实现方式中，该处理器、存储器、输入输出设备分别与该总线相连。
本申请实施例第十五方面提供一种认证服务器，该认证服务器包括：处理器、存储器、输入输出设备以及总线；该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，用于实现如第三方面任意一种实现方式。
在第十五方面的一种可能的实现方式中，该处理器、存储器、输入输出设备分别与该总线相连。
本申请实施例第十六方面提供一种终端设备，该终端设备包括：处理器、存储器、输入输出设备以及总线；该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，用于实现如第四方面任意一种实现方式。
在第十六方面的一种可能的实现方式中，该处理器、存储器、输入输出设备分别与该总线相连。
本申请实施例第十七方面提供一种AMF实体，该AMF实体包括：处理器、存储器、输入输出设备以及总线；该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，用于实现如第五方面任意一种实现方式。
在第十七方面的一种可能的实现方式中，该处理器、存储器、输入输出设备分别与该总线相连。
本申请实施例第十八方面提供一种终端设备，该终端设备包括：处理器、存储器、输入输出设备以及总线；该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，该存储器中存储有计算机指令；该处理器在执行该存储器中的计算机指令时，用于实现如第六方面任意一种实现方式。
在第十八方面的一种可能的实现方式中，该处理器、存储器、输入输出设备分别与该总线相连。
本申请实施例第十九方面提供一种包括指令的计算机程序产品，其特征在于，当其在计算机上运行时，使得该计算机执行如第一方面、第二方面、第三方面、第四方面、第五方面和第六方面中任一种的实现方式。
本申请实施例第二十方面提供一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，包括指令，当 该指令在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行如第一方面、第二方面、第三方面、第四方面、第五方面和第六方面的任一方面中的任一种实现方式。
本申请实施例第二十一方面提供一种芯片，包括存储器和处理器，该存储器用于存储计算机程序，该处理器用于从存储器中调用并运行计算机程序，使得该处理器执行上述第一方面、第二方面、第三方面、第四方面、第五方面和第六方面中的任一方面中的任一种实现方式。
本申请实施例第二十二方面提供一种通信系统，该通信系统包括如第一方面的切片服务验证功能实体和如第二方面的终端设备。
本申请实施例第二十三方面提供一种通信系统，该通信系统包括如第三方面的认证服务器和如第四方面的终端设备。
本申请实施例第二十四方面提供一种通信系统，该通信系统包括第五方面的AMF实体和第六方面的终端设备。
本申请实施例第二十五方面提供一种芯片，包括存储器和处理器，该存储器用于存储计算机程序，该处理器用于从存储器中调用并运行计算机程序，使得该处理器执行上述第一方面、第二方面、第三方面、第四方面、第五方面和第六方面中的任一方面中的任一种实现方式。
从以上技术方案可以看出，本申请实施例具有以下优点：
经由上述技术方案可知，切片服务验证功能实体接收终端设备发送的第一消息，该第一消息携带第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是根据第一网络标识计算生成的；然后，该切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，该切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送该第二网络标识。由此可知，切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对终端设备发送的第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，切片服务验证功能实体可以确定是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供的第一网络切片的切片服务。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。
附图说明
图1A为本申请实施例通信系统的一个架构示意图；
图1B为本申请实施例网络架构的一个网络架构示意图；
图2A为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的一个实施例示意图；
图2B为本申请实施例的一个场景示意图；
图3为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图；
图4为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图；
图5为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图；
图6为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图；
图7为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图；
图8为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图；
图9为本申请实施例切片服务验证功能实体的一个结构示意图；
图10为本申请实施例终端设备的一个结构示意图；
图11为本申请实施例认证服务器的一个结构示意图；
图12为本申请实施例终端设备的另一个结构示意图；
图13为本申请实施例AMF实体的一个结构示意图；
图14为本申请实施例终端设备的另一个结构示意图；
图15为本申请实施例切片服务验证功能实体的另一个结构示意图；
图16为本申请实施例电路系统的一个结构示意图；
图17为本申请实施例终端设备的另一个结构示意图；
图18为本申请实施例认证服务器的另一个结构示意图；
图19为本申请实施例AMF实体的另一个结构示意图；
图20为本申请实施例通信系统的一个示意图；
图21为本申请实施例通信系统的另一个示意图；
图22为本申请实施例通信系统的另一个示意图。
具体实施方式
本申请实施例提供了一种切片服务验证方法和装置，用于提升网络安全性。
为了使本申请的目的、技术方案和优点更加清楚，下面将结合附图对本申请作进一步地描述。
本申请的说明书、权利要求书及附图中的术语“包括”和“具有”以及它们的任何变形，意图在于覆盖不排他的包含。例如包含了一系列步骤或单元的过程、方法、系统、产品或设备等，没有限定于已列出的步骤或单元，而是可选地还包括没有列出的步骤或单元等，或可选地还包括对于这些过程、方法、产品或设备等固有的其它步骤或单元。
在本文中提及的“实施例”意味着，结合实施例描述的特定特征、结构或特性可以包含在本申请的至少一个实施例中。在说明书中的各个位置出现该短语并不一定均是指相同的实施例，也不是与其它实施例互斥的独立的或备选的实施例。本领域技术人员可以显式地和隐式地理解的是，本文所描述的实施例可以与其它实施例相结合。
在本申请中，“至少一个(项)”是指一个或者多个，“多个”是指两个或两个以上，“至少两个(项)”是指两个或三个及三个以上，“和/或”，用于描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，“A和/或B”可以表示：只存在A，只存在B以及同时存在A和B三种情况，其中A，B可以是单数或者复数。字符“/”一般表示前后关联对象是一种“或”的关系。“以下至少一项(个)”或其类似表达，是指这些项中的任意组合，包括单项(个)或复数项(个)的任意组合。例如，a，b或c中的至少一项(个)，可以表示：a，b，c，“a和b”，“a和c”，“b和c”，或“a和b和c”，其中a，b，c可以是单个，也可以是多个。
下面对本申请应用的通信系统进行介绍：
本申请提供的技术方案可以应用于各种通信系统。一个通信系统中，由运营者运营的 部分可称为PLMN(也可以称为运营商网络等)。PLMN是由政府或其所批准的经营者，为公众提供陆地移动通信业务目的而建立和经营的网络，主要是移动网络运营商(mobile network operator，MNO)为用户提供移动宽带接入服务的公共网络。本申请中所描述的PLMN，具体可为符合第三代合作伙伴项目(3rd generation partnership project，3GPP)标准要求的网络，简称3GPP网络。3GPP网络通常包括但不限于第五代移动通信(5th-generation，5G)网络(简称5G网络)、第四代移动通信(4th-generation，4G)网络(简称4G网络)等。
为了方便描述，本申请实施例中将以PLMN为例进行说明。或者，本申请提供的技术方案还可以应用于长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)系统、LTE频分双工(frequency division duplex，FDD)系统、LTE时分双工(time division duplex，TDD)、通用移动通信系统(universal mobile telecommunication system，UMTS)、全球互联微波接入(worldwide interoperability for microwave access，WiMAX)通信系统、第五代(5th generation，5G)通信系统或新无线(new radio，NR)以及未来的其他通信系统如6G等。
随着移动带宽接入服务的扩展，移动网络也会随之发展以便更好地支持多样化的商业模式，满足更加多样化的应用业务以及更多行业的需求。例如，为了给更多的行业提供更好、更完善的服务，5G网络相对于4G网络做了网络架构调整。如5G网络将4G网络中的移动管理实体(mobility management entity，MME)进行拆分，拆分为包括接入与移动性管理功能(access and mobility management function，AMF)和会话管理功能(session management function，SMF)等多个网络功能。
图1A是本申请实施例通信系统的一个架构示意图，它以3GPP标准化过程中定义的非漫游场景下基于服务化架构的5G网络架构为例。该网络架构可以包括三部分，分别是终端设备部分、PLMN和数据网络(data network，DN)。
终端设备部分可以包括终端设备110，该终端设备110也可以称为用户设备(user equipment，UE)。本申请中的终端设备110是一种具有无线收发功能的设备，可以经无线接入网(radio access network，RAN)140中的接入网设备(或者也可以称为接入设备)与一个或多个核心网(core network，CN)设备(或者也可以称为核心设备)进行通信。终端设备110也可称为接入终端、终端、用户单元、用户站、移动站、移动台、远方站、远程终端、移动设备、用户终端、用户代理或用户装置等。终端设备110可以部署在陆地上，包括室内或室外、手持或车载；也可以部署在水面上(如轮船等)；还可以部署在空中(例如飞机、气球和卫星上等)。终端设备110可以是蜂窝电话(cellular phone)、无绳电话、会话启动协议(session initiation protocol，SIP)电话、智能电话(smart phone)、手机(mobile phone)、无线本地环路(wireless local loop，WLL)站、个人数字处理(personal digital assistant，PDA)等。或者，终端设备110还可以是具有无线通信功能的手持设备、计算设备或连接到无线调制解调器的其它设备、车载设备、可穿戴设备、无人机设备或物联网、车联网中的终端、5G网络以及未来网络中的任意形态的终端、中继用户设备或者未来演进的PLMN中的终端等。其中，中继用户设备例如可以是5G家庭网关(residential gateway，RG)。例如终端设备110可以是虚拟现实(virtual reality，VR) 终端、增强现实(augmented reality，AR)终端、工业控制(industrial control)中的无线终端、无人驾驶(self driving)中的无线终端、远程医疗(remote medical)中的无线终端、智能电网(smart grid)中的无线终端、运输安全(transportation safety)中的无线终端、智慧城市(smart city)中的无线终端、智慧家庭(smart home)中的无线终端等。本申请实施例对终端设备的类型或种类等并不限定。
PLMN可以包括：网络开放功能(network exposure function，NEF)131、网络存储功能(network function repository function，NRF)132、策略控制功能(policy control function，PCF)133、统一数据管理(unified data management，UDM)134、应用功能(application function，AF)135、AUSF136、AMF137、会话管理功能(session management function，SMF)138、用户面功能(user plane function，UPF)139以及(无线)接入网((radio)access network，(R)AN)140、NSSAAF141等。上述PLMN中，除(无线)接入网140部分之外的部分可以称为核心网络(core network，CN)部分或核心网部分。
数据网络(data network,DN)120，也可以称为分组数据网络(packet data network，PDN)，通常是位于PLMN之外的网络，例如第三方网络。示例性的，PLMN可以接入多个数据网络DN 120，数据网络DN 120上可部署多种业务，从而为终端设备110提供数据和/或语音等服务。例如，数据网络DN 120可以是某智能工厂的私有网络，智能工厂安装在车间的传感器可为终端设备110，数据网络DN 120中部署了传感器的控制服务器，控制服务器可为传感器提供服务。传感器可与控制服务器通信，获取控制服务器的指令，根据指令将采集的传感器数据传送给控制服务器等。又例如，数据网络DN 120可以是某公司的内部办公网络，该公司员工的手机或者电脑可为终端设备110，员工的手机或者电脑可以访问公司内部办公网络上的信息、数据资源等。终端设备110可通过PLMN提供的接口(例如图1A中的N1接口等)与PLMN建立连接，使用PLMN提供的数据和/或语音等服务。终端设备110还可通过PLMN访问数据网络DN 120，使用数据网络DN 120上部署的运营商业务，和/或第三方提供的业务。其中，上述第三方可为PLMN和终端设备110之外的服务方，可为终端设备110提供其他数据和/或语音等服务。其中，上述第三方的具体表现形式，具体可根据实际应用场景确定，在此不做限制。
示例性的，下面对PLMN中的网络功能进行简要介绍。
(R)AN 140是PLMN的子网络，是PLMN中业务节点(或网络功能)与终端设备110之间的实施系统。终端设备110要接入PLMN，首先是经过(R)AN 140，进而通过(R)AN 140与PLMN中的业务节点连接。本申请实施例中的接入网设备，是一种为终端设备110提供无线通信功能的设备，也可以称为接入设备、(R)AN设备或网络设备等。如该接入设备包括但不限于：5G系统中的下一代基站(next generation node basestation，gNB)、LTE系统中的演进型基站(evolved node B，eNB)、无线网络控制器(radio network controller，RNC)、节点B(node B，NB)、基站控制器(base station controller，BSC)、基站收发台(base transceiver station，BTS)、家庭基站(home evolved nodeB，或home node B，HNB)、基带单元(base band unit，BBU)、传输接收点(transmitting and receiving point，TRP)、发射点(transmitting point，TP)、小基站设备(pico)、移动交换中心，或者未 来网络中的网络设备等。可理解，本申请对接入网设备的具体类型不作限定。采用不同无线接入技术的系统中，具备接入网设备功能的设备的名称可能会有所不同。
可选的，在接入设备的一些部署中，接入设备可以包括集中式单元(centralized unit，CU)和分布式单元(distributed unit，DU)等。在接入设备的另一些部署中，CU还可以划分为CU-控制面(control plane，CP)和CU-用户面(user plan，UP)等。在接入设备的又一些部署中，接入设备还可以是开放的无线接入网(open radio access network，ORAN)架构等，本申请对于接入设备的具体部署方式不作限定。
网络开放功能NEF(也可以称为NEF网络功能或NEF网络功能实体)131是由运营商提供控制面功能。NEF网络功能131以安全的方式对第三方开放PLMN的对外接口。在SMF网络功能138需要与第三方的网络功能通信时，NEF网络功能131可作为SMF网络功能138与第三方的网络实体通信的中继。NEF网络功能131作为中继时，可作为签约用户的标识信息的翻译，以及第三方的网络功能的标识信息的翻译。比如，NEF网络功能131将签约用户的用户永久标识符(subscriber permanent identifier，SUPI)从PLMN发送到第三方时，可以将SUPI翻译成其对应的外部身份标识(identity，ID)。反之，NEF网络功能131将外部ID(第三方的网络实体ID)发送到PLMN时，可将其翻译成SUPI。
网络存储功能NRF 132，可用于维护网络中所有网络功能服务的实时信息。
策略控制功能PCF 133是由运营商提供的控制面功能，用于向会话管理功能SMF 138提供协议数据单元(protocol data unit，PDU)会话的策略。策略可以包括计费相关策略、QoS相关策略和授权相关策略等。
统一数据管理UDM 134是由运营商提供的控制面功能，负责存储PLMN中签约用户的用户永久标识符(subscriber permanent identifier，SUPI)、安全上下文(security context)、签约数据等信息。上述PLMN的签约用户具体可为使用PLMN提供的业务的用户，例如使用中国电信的终端设备芯卡的用户，或者使用中国移动的终端设备芯卡的用户等。示例性的，签约用户的SUPI可为终端设备芯卡的号码等。上述安全上下文可以为存储在本地终端设备(例如手机)上的数据(cookie)或者令牌(token)等。上述签约用户的签约数据可以为该终端设备芯卡的配套业务，例如该手机芯卡的流量套餐等。
应用功能AF 135，用于进行应用影响的数据路由，接入网络开放功能，与策略框架交互进行策略控制等。
认证服务器功能AUSF 136是由运营商提供的控制面功能，通常用于一级认证，即终端设备110(签约用户)与PLMN之间的认证。
网络切片认证与授权功能NSSAAF141是由运行商提供的控制面功能，通常用于网络切片的切片认证。即终端设备110与认证服务器(如运营商网络的认证服务器或第三方DN的认证服务器)之间执行的切片认证。
接入与移动性管理功能AMF 137是由PLMN提供的控制面网络功能，负责终端设备110接入PLMN的接入控制和移动性管理，例如包括移动状态管理，分配用户临时身份标识，认证和授权用户等功能。
会话管理功能SMF 138是由PLMN提供的控制面网络功能，负责管理终端设备110的协 议数据单元(protocol data unit，PDU)会话。PDU会话是一个用于传输PDU的通道，终端设备需要通过PDU会话与DN 120互相传输PDU。PDU会话可以由SMF 138负责建立、维护和删除等。SMF 138包括会话管理(如会话建立、修改和释放，包含UPF 139和(R)AN 140之间的隧道维护等)、UPF 139的选择和控制、业务和会话连续性(service and session continuity，SSC)模式选择、漫游等会话相关的功能。
用户面功能UPF 139是由运营商提供的网关，是PLMN与DN 120通信的网关。UPF 139包括数据包路由和传输、包检测、业务用量上报、服务质量(quality of service，QoS)处理、合法监听、上行包检测、下行数据包存储等用户面相关的功能。
图1A所示的PLMN中的网络功能还可以包括网络切片选择功能(network slice selection function，NSSF)(图1A中未示出)，用于负责确定网络切片实例，选择AMF网络功能137等。图1A所示的PLMN中的网络功能还可以包括统一数据存储(unified data repository，UDR)等，本申请实施例对于PLMN中包括的其他网络功能不作限定。
图1A中Nnef、Nausf、Nnssaaf、Nnrf、Npcf、Nudm、Naf、Namf、Nsmf、N1、N2、N3、N4，以及N6为接口序列号。示例性的，上述接口序列号的含义可参见3GPP标准协议中定义的含义，本申请对于上述接口序列号的含义不做限制。需要说明的是，图1A中仅以终端设备110为UE作出了示例性说明，图1A中的各个网络功能之间的接口名称也仅仅是一个示例，在具体实现中，该系统架构的接口名称还可能为其他名称，本申请对此不作限定。
本申请中的移动性管理网络功能可以是图1A所示的AMF 137，也可以是未来通信系统中的具有上述接入与移动性管理功能AMF 137的其他网络功能。或者，本申请中的移动性管理网络功能还可以是LTE系统中的移动管理实体(mobility management entity，MME)等。
图1A所示的网络架构中，NSSAAF141单独部署在该网络架构中，或者，该NSSAAF141也可以是集成于其他网络功能实体中或与其他网络功能实体合并设置，例如，与AUSF136、AF135或认证服务器代理(图中没有示出)集成等，具体本申请不做限定。
为方便描述，本申请实施例中将接入与移动性管理功能AMF137简称为AMF实体，将统一数据管理UDM134简称为UDM，将认证服务器功能AUSF 136简称为AUSF实体，将网络切片认证与授权功能NSSAAF141简称为NSSAAF实体。即本申请实施例中后文所描述的AMF实体均可替换为接入与移动性管理功能，UDM均可替换为统一数据管理，AUSF均可替换为认证服务器功能，NSSAAF均可替换为网络切片认证与授权功能。
图1A中示出的网络架构(例如5G网络架构)采用基于服务的架构和通用接口，传统网元功能基于网络功能虚拟化(network function virtualization，NFV)技术拆分成若干个自包含、自管理、可重用的网络功能服务模块，通过灵活定义服务模块集合，可以实现定制化的网络功能重构，对外通过统一的服务调用接口组成业务流程。图1A中示出的网络架构示意图可以理解为一种非漫游场景下基于服务的5G网络架构示意图。在该架构中，根据特定场景需求，将不同网络功能按需有序组合，可以实现网络的能力与服务的定制化，从而为不同业务部署专用网络，实现5G网络切片(network slicing)。网络切片技术可以使运营商能够更加灵活、快速地响应客户需求，支持网络资源的灵活分配。
以下对本申请实施例涉及的切片和切片认证进行介绍。
切片简单理解就是将运营商的物理网络切割成多个虚拟的端到端的网络，每个虚拟网络之间(包括网络内的设备、接入网、传输网和核心网)是逻辑独立的，任何一个虚拟网络发生故障都不会影响到其它虚拟网络。为了满足多样性需求和切片间的隔离，需要业务间相对独立的管理和运维，并提供量身定做的业务功能和分析能力。不同业务类型的实例可以部署在不同的网络切片上，相同业务类型的不同实例也可部署在不同的网络切片上。切片可以由一组网络功能(network function，NF)和/或子网络等构成。比如，图1A中的子网络(R)AN 140、AMF 137、SMF 138、UPF 139可以组成一个切片。可理解，图1A中的每种网络功能只示意性地画出了一个，而在实际网络部署中，每种网络功能或子网络可以有多个、数十个或上百个。PLMN中可以部署很多切片，每个切片可以有不同的性能来满足不同应用、不同垂直行业的需求。运营商可以根据不同垂直行业客户的需求，“量身定做”一个切片。运营商也可以允许一些行业客户享有较大的自主权，参与切片的部分管理、控制功能。其中，切片级的认证就是由行业客户有限参与的一种网络控制功能，即对终端设备接入切片进行认证和授权，即“切片级认证”，也可称为“二级认证”、“二次认证”等，本申请简称为“切片认证”。
终端设备在被允许接入网络或切片之前，需要与网络和/或切片进行双向认证并得到该网络和/或切片的授权。一般的，网络需要对终端设备经过一次或者两次的认证与授权才能接入网络或切片。首先，PLMN要基于终端设备所使用的与PLMN签约的SUPI进行认证，这种认证被称为一级认证(primary authentication)。其次，PLMN要基于终端设备所使用的与DN的签约标识进行认证，即切片认证或二级认证等。
如以图1A为例，当核心网中部署了切片，UE 110需要接入到某个切片时，UE 110可以提供请求的切片给核心网。其中，UE 110请求的切片可以包括请求的网络切片选择辅助信息集合(requested network slice selection assistance information，requested NSSAI)。该NSSAI可以包括一个或多个单网络切片选择辅助信息(single network slice selection assistance information，S-NSSAI)，一个S-NSSAI用于标识一个网络切片类型，也可以理解为，S-NSSAI用于标识切片，或者可以理解为S-NSSAI是切片的标识信息。可理解，本申请中切片还可以称为网络切片、网络切片实例或S-NSSAI等，本申请对于该网络切片的标识不作限定。为方便理解，在后文的描述中，本申请对网络切片标识或S-NSSAI等不做严格区分，二者可以同样适用。
进一步的，UE 110向网络发送注册请求后，核心网网络功能(如AMF网络功能137或NSSF网络功能)根据UE 110的签约数据、UE 110请求的网络切片、漫游协议以及本地配置等信息，为UE 110选择允许接入的网络切片集合。其中，允许接入的网络切片集合可以用允许的(allowed)NSSAI来表示，允许的NSSAI中包括的S-NSSAI可以为当前PLMN允许该UE 110接入的S-NSSAI。
举例说明一级认证和二级认证，示例性的，随着垂直行业和物联网的发展，PLMN之外的数据网络DN 120(如服务于垂直行业的DN)，对于接入到该DN 120的UE 110同样有认证与授权的需求。比如，某商业公司提供了游戏平台，通过PLMN为游戏玩家提供游戏服务。 一方面，由于玩家使用的UE 110是通过PLMN接入游戏平台，因此PLMN需要对该UE 110的身份(SUPI)进行认证或授权等，即一级认证。游戏玩家是商业公司的客户，该商业公司也需要对游戏玩家的身份进行认证或授权。如对游戏玩家的身份进行认证或授权，这种认证可以是基于切片的认证，或者说认证是以切片为单位。该情况下，这种认证可以被称为切片认证(slice authentication)，或称为基于网络切片的认证(network slice-specific authentication and authorization，NSSAA)。
需要说明的是，切片认证的实际含义如可以是：终端设备与第三方网络(如DN或其认证服务器)之间执行的认证。切片认证结果将会决定PLMN是否授权终端设备接入该PLMN提供的切片。还应理解，本申请中应用于切片认证的方法也同样适用于基于会话的二次认证(secondary authentication)或基于切片的二次认证等场景，在此不再详述。
需要说明的是，上述介绍的一级认证和切片认证仅仅是为了描述一级认证和切片认证的基本流程。在实际应用中，应当结合终端设备的状态(漫游状态或非漫游状态)适应性由相应的网络为终端设备及该终端设备的归属网络提供服务以便完成一级认证或切片认证。例如，当终端设备漫游至拜访网络时，由该拜访网络为终端设备向该终端设备的归属网络转发一级认证请求，再由该终端设备的归属网络与该终端设备进行一级认证。或者，由该拜访网络为终端设备发起针对该终端设备的切片认证，再由该终端设备的归属网络签约的(或归属网络部署的)切片认证服务器执行与该终端设备之间的切片认证。当该终端设备处于非漫游状态时，由该终端设备的归属网络为该终端设备发起一级认证和切片认证，并由归属网络或切片认证服务器与该终端设备进行一级认证或切片认证。
本申请实施例提供的切片服务验证方法适用于确定为终端设备提供网络切片服务的服务网络及所提供的真实的切片服务。对于适用的场景，以下进行举例说明：
场景一：漫游场景，即终端设备漫游至拜访网络。
下面结合图1B对场景一进行介绍。在图1B中，在漫游场景下，终端设备移动至拜访公共陆地移动网络(visited public land mobile network，VPLMN)，本申请中简称拜访网络；然后，该终端设备通过拜访网络VPLMN中的AMF实体接入该VPLMN，由该VPLMN为该终端设备提供第一网络切片的切片服务。
而归属公共陆地移动网络(home public land mobile network，HPLMN)为该终端设备的归属网络，本申请中简称为归属网络；那么可以通过HPLMN中的NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法确定是由该VPLMN为该终端设备提供的该第一网络切片的切片服务(例如，针对需要执行切片认证的网络切片，该切片服务可以为第一网络切片的切片认证或者第一网络切片的其他切片服务(包括第一网络切片的数据传输和信令传输)；而针对不需要执行切片认证的网络切片，该切片服务可以为第一网络切片的数据传输和信令传输)。或者是，通过认证、授权和计费服务器(authentication、authorization、accounting server，AAA-S)通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法确定是由该VPLMN为该终端设备提供的该第一网络切片的切片服务，从而避免或防止拜访网络欺骗归属网络的行为，提高网络安全性。
场景二：非漫游场景，即终端设备当前所接入网的网络为该终端设备的归属网络。
该终端设备的归属网络中有多个AMF实体。为了验证是由该终端设备的归属网络中的哪个AMF实体为终端设备发起的切片认证服务或者其他切片服务。HPLMN中的NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法确定是由该AMF实体为该终端设备提供的该第一网络切片的切片服务。或者是，AAA-S通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法确定是由该HPLMN的该AMF实体为该终端设备提供的该第一网络切片的切片服务。当归属网络中为该终端设备发起切片认证或提供其他切片服务的AMF实体存在异常行为，HPLMN中的NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体或AAA-S可以通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法来验证，从而提高网络安全性。
在后续的实施例中，以场景一为例进行介绍。
请参阅图2A，图2A为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的一个实施例示意图。在图2A中，该方法包括：
201、终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码。
其中，该第一消息认证码是根据第一网络标识计算生成的，该第一消息认证码是对包括该第一网络标识的信息进行的完整性保护。第一网络标识为该终端设备当前所接入的第一网络的标识。例如，在漫游场景下，该第一网络标识为该终端设备所接入的拜访网络的标识。
可选的，第一网络标识为第一网络的标识或第一网络中的功能实体的标识。
该第一网络的标识包括第一网络的标识SN-ID、或者第一网络所对应的PLMN标识、或者第一网络的名称SNN、或者第一网络的网络识别符NID。
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识、或者AMF实体的名称、或者AMF实体的全球唯一标识符。该AMF实体为第一网络中为该终端设备发起第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
终端设备根据第一网络标识计算生成第一消息认证码。而第一消息认证码的生成方式有多种，下面分别举例进行介绍：
方式1：终端设备根据第一网络标识和第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码。
其中，第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF是根据第一中间密钥K AUSF生成的。
具体的，终端设备将该第一中间密钥K AUSF作为第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF。
可选的，该第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数还包括切片服务验证功能实体的标识(例如，NSSAAF实体的标识或AUSF实体的标识)、第一网络标识、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和新鲜性参数中的至少一个。其中，新鲜性参数为随机数(random number)、计数器的值(count)或参数FC。其中，参数FC为3GPP标准中规定的密钥生成函数(key derivation function，KDF)的实例的标识。
其中，该第一预设认证码生成函数包括3GPP标准中规定的KDF，或者为任意一种密钥生成函数，或者为任意一种哈希函数(Hash)、或基于哈希的消息认证码(Hash based MAC，HMAC)生成函数、任意一种完整性保护算法。需要说明的是，“函数”也可称为“算法”，本申请不作区分。
关于第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF的生成，下面先对两种生成方式进行举例说明。需要指出的是，本实施例对第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF的生成方式不作限定。
a、终端设备根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF，然后，终端设备根据第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF。
请参阅图2B，终端设备在进行一级认证时，终端设备使用终端设备生成的第一加解密密钥CK和第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF。本申请实施例中，终端设备通过该第一中间密钥K AUSF推演得到第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF。
b、终端设备根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’，再根据该第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’生成第一中间密钥K AUSF，然后再根据该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF。
请参阅图2B，终端设备在进行一级认证时，终端设备使用终端设备的第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK先推演出第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’；然后，终端设备通过该第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’推演得到第一中间密钥K AUSF。在本申请实施例中，终端设备根据该第一中间密钥K AUSF推演得到第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF。
具体的，终端设备将第一网络标识和第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF作为第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第一消息认证码。需要说明的是，计算该第一消息认证码时的预设认证码生成函数还可以包括其他输入参数，本申请对其他输入参数不作限定。例如，该第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数还包括第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、识别码的计数器值和随机数中的至少一个。
该第一预设认证码生成函数的相关说明请参阅前述介绍，这里不再赘述。
例如，第一网络标识为SN-ID，第一消息认证码MAC-I＝KDF(Key＝K NSSAAF,SN-ID,S-NSSAI，…)。“…”代表其他任意的输入参数。
方式2：终端设备根据第一网络标识和第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第一消息认证码。
其中，第一中间密钥K AUSF的生成包括以下两种可能的实现方式：
a、终端设备根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF。
b、终端设备根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’，再根据该第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’生成第一中间密钥K AUSF。
具体的，终端设备将第一网络标识和第一中间密钥K AUSF作为第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第一消息认证码。其中，第一预设认证码生成函数的相关介绍和该第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数的相关介绍请参阅前述相关说明，这里不再赘述。需要说明的是，计算该第一消息认证码时的预设认证码生成函数还可以包括其他输入参数，本申请对其他输入参数不作限定。
202、终端设备向切片服务验证功能实体发送第一消息。
其中，第一消息携带第一消息认证码。该第一消息认证码是根据第一网络标识计算生 成的，该第一消息认证码用于对第一网络标识(及其他信息)进行完整性保护。
可选的，该切片服务验证功能实体为该终端设备的归属网络中的功能实体。
可选的，该第一消息还携带以下信息中的任一种或任多种：
第一网络切片的标识、第一标识信息；
其中，该第一标识信息携带该第一网络标识。
该第一消息还携带第一网络切片的标识时，即终端设备通过第一消息携带的第一网络切片的标识告知切片服务验证功能实体该第一网络切片的标识。
该第一消息还携带第一标识信息时，即终端设备通过第一消息携带的第一标识信息告知切片服务验证功能实体该第一网络标识。
一种可能的实现方式中，该第一消息同时携带该第一标识信息和第一网络切片的标识。那么在该实现方式下，可选的，该第一消息认证码是根据该第一标识信息和第一网络切片计算生成的，该第一消息认证码可用于对第一标识信息和第一网络切片的标识进行完整性保护。
该第一网络标识为该第一标识信息所包括的第一网络的标识或第一网络中的功能实体的标识。具体请参阅上述步骤201对第一网络的标识或第一网络中的功能实体的标识的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
下面针对终端设备发送的第一消息中是否携带第一标识信息的两种可能的情况进行介绍：
情况1、终端设备发送的第一消息中携带该第一标识信息。
在该实现方式中，AMF实体也可以向切片服务验证功能实体发送该第一标识信息，该第一标识信息携带在该终端设备发送的第一消息中，或者携带在其他消息中。
情况2、终端设备发送的第一消息中不携带该第一标识信息。
在该实现方式中，AMF实体向切片服务验证网元发送第一标识信息，该第一标识信息携带在该终端设备发送的第一消息中，或者携带在其他消息中。
在情况1中的一种可能的实现方式中，当终端设备发送的第一消息携带该第一标识信息时，该切片服务验证功能实体可以根据该第一标识信息确定第二网络标识，然后根据该第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
在情况1的另一种可能的实现方式中，当AMF实体也向该切片服务验证功能实体发送该第一标识信息时，该切片服务验证功能实体不根据该终端设备发送的第一消息中携带的第一标识信息确定第二网络标识，而是根据该AMF实体发送的第一标识信息确定该第二网络标识。然后，切片服务验证功能实体根据该第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。其中，该AMF实体可以通过该第一消息或其他消息发送该第一标识信息。例如，该第一标识信息携带在该第一消息的令牌(token)中。
可选的，在情况1中，该切片服务验证功能实体还可以进一步验证该第二网络标识。例如，切片服务验证功能实体判断经过第一消息认证码验证的第二网络标识与终端设备发送的第一消息中携带的第一标识信息所包括的网络标识是否相同；或者，切片服务验证功能实体判断经过第一消息认证码验证的第二网络标识与AMF实体发送第一标识信息所包括 的网络标识是否相同。其中，该AMF实体可以通过该第一消息或其他消息发送该第一标识信息。例如，该第一标识信息携带在该第一消息的令牌(token)中。
在情况2中的一种可能的实现方式中，当终端设备发送的第一消息未携带该第一标识信息时，切片服务验证功能实体可以根据该AMF实体发送第一标识信息确定该第二网络标识；然后，切片服务验证功能实体根据该第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。其中，该AMF实体可以通过该第一消息或其他消息发送该第一标识信息。例如，该第一标识信息携带在该第一消息的令牌(token)中。
203、切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
本实施例中，切片服务验证功能实体可以从AMF实体发送的第一标识信息中确定第二网络标识；或者，切片服务验证功能实体从该终端设备发送的第一消息携带的第一标识信息中确定第二网络标识。其中，第一标识信息的相关介绍请参阅前述步骤202的相关说明，这里不再赘述。
下面结合上述步骤201中终端设备生成第一消息认证码的生成方式介绍切片服务验证功能实体对第一消息认证码的验证过程：
一、基于步骤201中的方式1，步骤203具体包括步骤203a至步骤203c。
步骤203a：切片服务验证功能实体获取第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF。
具体的，该切片服务验证功能实体为NSSAAF实体，NSSAAF实体接收AUSF实体发送的第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF。
其中，该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF为该AUSF实体根据第一中间密钥K AUSF生成的。而AUSF实体生成该第一中间密钥K AUSF的生成方式与上述步骤201中终端设备生成第一中间密钥K AUSF的生成方式类似，具体请参阅上述步骤201中的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
步骤203b：切片服务验证功能实体根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码。
具体的，在该实现方式中，该NSSAAF实体将第二网络标识和第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF作为第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第二消息认证码。切片服务验证功能实体生成第二消息认证码的生成方式与终端设备生成第一消息认证码的方式类似，具体请参阅上述步骤201中方式1中的相关介绍。
步骤203c：切片服务验证功能实体将第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
具体的，切片服务验证功能实体将第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码进行匹配，当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码相同时，切片服务验证功能实体确定验证通过；当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码不相同时，切片服务验证功能实体确定验证不通过。
其中，当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码相同时，切片服务验证功能实体可以确定是由该第一网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码不相同时，那么切片服务验证功能实体可以确定该第二网络标识被篡改过，则切片服务验证功能实体确定不是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。
需要说明的是，针对需要执行切片认证的网络切片来说，第一网络切片的切片服务包括第一网络切片的切片认证和/或第一网络切片的切片数据传输或信令传输。针对无需执行切片认证的网络切片来说，第一网络切片的切片服务包括第一网络切片的切片数据传输或信令传输。
二、基于步骤201的方式2，步骤203具体包括步骤203d和步骤203e。
步骤203d：切片服务验证功能实体根据该第一中间密钥K AUSF和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码。
具体的，在该实现方式中，该切片服务验证功能实体为AUSF实体。该AUSF实体将第二网络标识和第一中间密钥K AUSF作为第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第二消息认证码。其中，该第一预设认证码生成函数还可以包括其他输入参数，本实施例不做限定。AUSF实体生成第二消息认证码的生成方式与终端设备生成第一消息认证码的生成方式类似，具体请参阅上述步骤201中的方式2的相关介绍。
步骤203e：切片服务验证功能实体将第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
步骤203e与前述步骤203c类似，具体请参阅前述步骤203c的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
204、当验证通过时，切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送该第二网络标识。
需要说明的是，当验证不通过时，切片服务验证功能实体可以确定该第二网络标识是被篡改过的。那么，切片服务验证功能实体确定不是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。
一种可能的实现方式中，图2A所示的实施例还包括步骤205。
步骤205：NSSAAF实体向终端设备发送第二消息。
具体的，NSSAAF实体向AMF实体发送该第二消息，然后AMF实体再向终端设备发送第二消息，该第二消息为认证请求消息，或者为认证响应消息，或者为验证成功消息。例如，如图3所示的第一网络切片的切片认证过程中，该第二消息可以理解为认证请求消息或认证响应消息。
可选的，本实施例中，NSSAAF实体根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证之后，NSSAAF实体保存该第一消息认证码的验证结果或保存验证通过的第二网络标识。进一步的，可选的，当第一网络切片的切片认证完成时，NSSAAF实体保存该第一网络切片的切片认证结果。
具体的，NSSAAF实体可以将该第一消息认证码的验证结果或验证通过的第二网络标识和/或第一网络切片的切片认证结果转发给其他网络功能实体(如UDM)，并由该网络功能实体(如UDM)存储该第一消息认证码的验证结果或验证通过的第二网络标识和/或第一网络切片的切片认证结果。
需要说明的是，当终端设备同时接入多个需要分别做切片认证的网络切片时，例如，这里以第一网络切片和第二网络切片为例；那么终端设备根据该第一网络标识、第一网络切片的标识和第二网络切片的标识生成该第一消息认证码。可选的，终端设备还可以进一 步根据第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF或第一中间密钥K AUSF以及其他参数生成该第一消息认证码)。相应的，切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识、第一网络切片的标识和第二网络切片的标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证。具体的验证过程与上述步骤203的过程类似，可以参考前述步骤203的相关说明来进行理解。
本申请实施例中，终端设备向切片服务验证功能实体发送第一消息，该第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是对第一网络标识进行完整性保护之后得到的；然后，该切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，该切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送该第二网络标识。由此可知，切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对终端设备发送的第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，切片服务验证功能实体可以确定是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供的第一网络切片的切片服务。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。例如，通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法可以增强归属网络对终端设备的接入和终端设备使用网络切片的控制，避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
上述图2A所示的实施例以切片服务验证功能实体在对第一消息认证码进行验证后，且当验证通过时，切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送该第二网络标识为示例进行了说明。在实际应用中，当切片服务验证功能实体未对第二网络标识进行验证时，切片服务验证功能实体可以向认证服务器发送该第二网络标识和第一指示信息，该第一指示信息用于指示该第二网络标识未经验证，具体本申请不做限定。
本申请实施例中，上述图2A所示的实施例仅以终端设备根据该第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码为例进行了说明。可选的，本申请还提供另一个实施例，该实现方式与图2A所示的实施例类似，不同的地方在于步骤201、步骤202、步骤203和步骤204。
步骤201可以替换为：终端设备根据该第一网络切片的标识生成第一消息认证码。
该第一消息认证码用于对该第一网络切片的标识进行完整性保护之后得到的，该第一网络切片的标识为该第一网络切片的ID或第一网络切片辅助选择信息NSSAI。
由于在不同PLMN网络中，终端设备的第一网络切片的标识可以随着终端设备当前所接入的PLMN网络的不同而有差异，并且通过该差异可以确定该第一网络切片的标识对应的PLMN网络。因此终端设备可以通过该第一网络切片的标识生成第一消息认证码，这样当切片服务验证功能实体通过第一消息验证码验证成功确定为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务的网络。
其中，终端设备生成该第一消息认证码的方式有多种，下面通过举例进行介绍。
方式1：终端设备根据该第一网络切片的标识和第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码。
其中，第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF的生成方式请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中步骤201的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
具体的，终端设备将第一网络切片的标识和第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF作为第一预设 认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第一消息认证码。
需要说明的是，计算该第一消息认证码时的预设认证码生成函数还可以包括其他输入参数，本申请对其他输入参数不作限定。例如，该第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数还包括第二网络标识、识别码的计数器值和随机数RAND中的至少一个。
第一预设认证生成函数的相关介绍请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
方式2：终端设备根据该第一网络切片的标识和第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第一消息认证码。
其中，第一中间密钥K AUSF的生成方式请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中步骤201的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
具体的，终端设备将该第一网络切片的标识和第一中间密钥K AUSF作为第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第一消息认证码。
其中，第一预设认证码生成函数的相关介绍和该第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数的相关介绍请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中步骤201的相关说明，这里不再赘述。
需要说明的是，计算该第一消息认证码时的预设认证码生成函数还可以包括其他输入参数，本申请对其他输入参数不作限定。
步骤203可以替换为：切片服务验证功能实体根据第一标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
其中，第一标识为切片服务验证功能实体根据AMF实体发送的第一网络切片的标识确定的，或者是，切片服务验证功能实体从终端设备发送的第一消息中携带的第一网络切片的标识确定的。
切片服务验证功能实体基于终端设备生成的第一消息认证码的方式对第一消息验证进行验证。下面分别进行介绍。
一、基于替换后的步骤201的方式1，上述图2A所示的步骤203包括步骤203a至步骤203c。不同的地方在于：步骤203b，下面进行说明。
步骤203b可以替换为：切片服务验证功能实体根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和第一标识生成第二消息认证码。
具体的，在该实现方式中，该切片服务验证功能实体为NSSAAF实体。切片服务验证功能实体将该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和第一标识作为第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第二消息认证码。切片服务验证功能实体生成第二消息认证码的生成方式与终端设备生成第一消息认证码的方式类似，具体请参阅上述替换后的步骤201中方式1中的相关介绍。
二、基于替换后的步骤201的方式2，上述图2A所示的实施例中步骤203具体包括步骤203d和步骤203e。不同的地方在于步骤203d，下面进行说明。
步骤203d可以替换为：切片服务验证功能实体根据该第一中间密钥K AUSF和第一标识生成第二消息认证码。
具体的，在该实现方式中，该切片服务验证功能实体为AUSF实体。该AUSF实体将第 一标识和第一中间密钥K AUSF作为第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第二消息认证码。
其中，该第一预设认证码生成函数还可以包括其他输入参数，本实施例不做限定。AUSF实体生成第二消息认证码的生成方式与终端设备生成第一消息认证码的生成方式类似，具体请参阅上述替换后的步骤201中的方式2的相关介绍。
步骤204可以替换为：当验证通过时，切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送该第一标识。
可选的，该第一消息携带第一标识信息。第一标识信息的相关介绍请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中步骤202的相关说明，这里不再赘述。
其次，关于第一消息是否携带第一网络切片的标识信息的情况，具体请参阅前述2A所示的实施例中步骤202的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
可选的，切片服务验证功能实体还可以根据该第一网络标识和第一网络切片的标识生成第一消息认证码。具体类似前述2A所示的实施例中从步骤202至步骤205的描述，这里不再赘述。
本申请实施例中，可选的，第一消息携带第一标识信息。那么，切片服务验证功能实体通过该第一标识信息确定第二网络标识，在后续的实施例中以此方式为例进行说明。
本申请实施例中，对于终端设备与HPLMN网络之间的一级认证方法，本申请不做限定。负责切片认证的服务器为AAA-S，该AAA-S可以部署于HPLMN网络之内；或者，该AAA-S也可以部署于HPLMN/VPLMN网络之外。在该AAA-S部署于网络之外时，终端设备可以通过HPLMN网络之内部署的AAA代理(AAA-proxy，AAA-P)所提供的代理服务来转接AAA-S，实现UE与AAA-S之间的认证消息交互。进一步的，在一些部署方式中，AAA-P可以与NSSAAF分开部署；在另一些部署方式中，AAA-P可以与NSSAAF(或AUSF)部署在一起。因此，本申请实施例对于AAA-P和NSSAAF(或AUSF)的部署方式不作限定。
在后续实施例中，以AAA-S部署于HPLMN网络之外，即终端设备通过HPLMN网络内部的AAA-P提供代理服务，转接AAA-S实现切片认证，同时该AAA-P和NSSAAF(或AUSF)是分开部署的为例进行说明。但是对于其他部署情况，本申请实施例同样适用。
上述图2A所示的实施例在第一网络切片的切片认证过程中执行，或者在第一网络切片的切片认证完成后执行，下面分别通过图3所示的实施例和图4所示的实施例进行介绍。其中，切片服务验证功能实体为NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体或其他NF，具体本申请不做限定。
图3所示的实施例中，以切片服务验证功能实体为NAASSF实体为例，示出了NAASSF实体在终端设备的第一网络切片的切片认证过程中对第一消息认证码的验证。可选的，在该终端设备的第一网络切片的切片认证过程中，也可以由AUSF实体或其他NF执行对第一消息认证码的验证，具体本申请不做限定。
图4所示的实施例中，以切片服务验证功能实体为AUSF实体为例，示出了AUSF实体在终端设备的第一网络切片的切片认证完成后执行对第一消息认证码的过程。可选的，在终端设备的第一网络切片的切片认证完成后，也可以由NSSAAF实体或其他NF执行对第一消息认证码的验证，具体本申请不做限定。
请参阅图3，图3为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图。在图3中，该切片服务验证方法包括：
301、AMF实体根据终端设备的切片签约信息和第一网络切片的切片标识确定对该第一网络切片执行切片认证。
AMF实体从UDM中获取该终端设备的切片签约信息；然后，AMF实体根据第一网络切片的切片标识和AMF实体存储的关于该第一网络切片的认证状态判断是否需要执行该终端设备的第一网络切片的切片认证，如果需要执行切片认证，则AMF实体执行步骤302；如果不需要，则AMF实体向终端设备发送允许接入该第一网络切片的消息。
需要说明的是，当该终端设备的切片签约信息中未签约该第一网络切片时，AMF实体向终端设备发送拒绝接入该第一网络切片的消息。
302、AMF实体向终端设备发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带用于切片认证的EAP ID请求(request)和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI；相应的，该终端设备接收该NAS消息。
其中，EAP是由国际标准组织-国际互联网工程任务组(internet engineering task force，IETF)制定。该EAP ID请求可以承载于3GPP网络中的非接入层(non access stratum，NAS)消息中。该第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI可以用于表示该EAP ID请求是针对该第一网络切片的切片认证请求。EAP ID请求和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI也可以承载在其他类型的(非NAS)消息中,本申请对承载消息不作限定。
303、终端设备向AMF实体发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带EAP ID响应、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一消息认证码和第一标识信息。
其中，第一标识信息为该第一网络标识所对应的标识信息。该第一标识信息的内容请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中步骤201的相关介绍。可选的，该NAS消息中可以不包括第一标识信息。EAP ID响应、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一消息认证码和第一标识信息也可以承载在其他类型的(非NAS)消息中,本申请对承载消息不作限定。
该第一消息认证码是对第一网络标识进行完整性保护得到的，而第一消息认证码的生成方式具体请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中的步骤201，这里不再赘述。
可理解，为便于描述，以下涉及网络切片的标识时，网络切片的标识以S-NSSAI表示。UE的标识信息以可公开使用的签约标识(generic public subscription identifier，GPSI)或SUPI表示，但是不应将其理解为对本申请实施例的限定。
304、AMF实体向NSSAAF实体发送第一请求消息，该第一请求消息中携带EAP ID响应(response)、GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一消息认证码、第一标识信息。可选的，该第一请求消息中不包括第一标识信息。其中，该第一请求消息为切片认证请求消息。
305、NSSAAF实体根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
步骤305的相关说明请参阅前述图2A所示的步骤203中的详细介绍。由步骤203可知，NSSAAF实体获取相关参数，并生成第二消息认证码；然后，NSSAAF实体将第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
如果第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码相同，则NSSAAF实体确定验证通过，即代表接 收到的第一标识信息所携带的第二网络标识并未被篡改过。这样NSSAAF实体确定为该终端设备提供第一网络切片的切片服务的网络为该第一网络。例如，NSSAAF实体可以确定是由该第一网络为该终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证。
可选的，该第一请求消息还携带AMF ID。需要说明的是，在AMF实体发送到NSSAAF实体的消息中，通常会包括一个令牌(token)，该令牌的作用是让NSSAAF实体验证AMF实体是被授权的AMF实体。该令牌中包含有该NSSAAF实体可验证的AMF实体身份，例如AMF-ID。由AMF ID的格式可知，AMF ID中一部分代表PLMN ID，即从AMF ID也可以获取PLMN ID。以第一标识信息为SNN为例，该SNN的一部分也代表了PLMN ID。NSSAAF实体可以判断AMF ID中的PLMN ID与第一标识信息SNN中的PLMN ID是否一致或相同，如果相同，NSSAAF实体确定该AMF实体没有欺骗行为，进而确定该AMF实体的可信度。
306、NSSAAF实体向AAA-S发送AAA协议消息，该AAA消息携带EAP ID响应、GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和第二网络标识。
如果该AAA-S部署在HPLMN之外，NSSAAF实体向AAA-P先发送给该AAA消息，然后AAA-P向AAA-S发送该AAA消息。该EAP ID响应、GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和第二网络标识也可以承载在其他类型的消息中,本申请对承载消息不作限定。
307、AAA-S向NSSAAF实体发送AAA消息，该AAA消息携带EAP消息、GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和第二网络标识。
可选的，GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和第二网络标识为该EAP消息中携带的参数。该EAP消息、GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和第二网络标识也可以承载在其他类型的消息中,本申请对承载消息不作限定。
本申请对于该EAP消息的具体类型不作限定，例如，对于不同的EAP认证方法，该EAP消息可能有不同名称或类型等。可理解，对于该说明，下文同样适用。
308、NSSAAF实体向AMF实体发送第一响应消息，该第一响应消息携带EAP消息、GPSI和第一网络切片的S-NSSAI。其中，该第一响应消息为切片认证响应消息。
309、AMF实体向终端设备发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带EAP消息和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI。
可选的，第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI为该EAP消息中携带的参数。EAP消息和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI也可以承载在其他类型的(非NAS)消息中,本申请对承载消息不作限定。
310、终端设备向AMF实体发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带EAP消息、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一标识信息和第一消息认证码。
步骤310与步骤303类似，具体请参阅步骤303的相关介绍。
本实施例示出了终端设备在切片认证过程中多次向AMF实体多次发送该第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和该第一消息认证码，NSSAAF实体每次接收到该第一消息认证码时，都会对该第一消息认证码进行验证的实现方式。
而在实际应用中，终端设备可以在切片认证过程仅发送一次该第一消息认证码，或者是，终端设备在切片认证过程中多次发送该第一消息认证码。而NSSAAF实体对该第一消息 认证码进行一次验证，并保存第一消息认证码的验证结果，那么NSSAAF实体无需多次对第一消息认证码进行验证。例如，图3所示的实施例中，终端设备可以只在步骤303中发送该第一消息认证码，步骤310中无需再次发送。那么NSSAAF实体在执行步骤305之后，将第一消息认证码的验证结果进行保存。
311、AMF实体向NSSAAF实体发送第二请求消息，该第二请求消息携带EAP ID响应、GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一标识信息、第一消息认证码。
312、该NSSAAF实体根据该第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
313、该NSSAAF实体向AAA-S发送AAA消息，该AAA消息携带EAP消息、GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和第二网络标识。
步骤311至步骤313与前述步骤304至步骤306类似，具体请参阅前述步骤304至步骤306的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
314、AAA-S向NSSAAF实体发送AAA消息，该AAA消息携带EAP认证成功或失败、GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和第二网络标识。
在一种可能的实现方式中，本实施例还包括步骤315。
315、NSSAAF实体保存验证通过的认证码第二网络标识和第一网络切片的切片认证结果。
可选的，NSSAAF实体还保存该第一网络切片的标识和该终端设备的终端标识。
例如，NSSAAF实体保存终端设备的GPSI、第一网络切片的切片信息(例如，S-NSSAI)、为该终端设备发起切片认证的第一网络(VPLMN)的信息，即验证通过的第二网络标识(例如，该VPLMN的SN ID)以及切片认证成功或失败等信息。
可选的，NSSAAF实体将验证通过的第二网络标识和第一网络切片的切片认证结果认证码存储至UDM中。具体的，NSSAAF实体向UDM转发该验证通过的第二网络标识和第一网络切片的切片认证结果认证码，UDM对该验证通过的第二网络标识和第一网络切片的切片认证结果认证码进行存储。
需要说明的是，步骤315仅仅示出了NSSAAF实体保存验证通过的第二网络标识的方式。可选的，NSSAAF实体也可以将验证不通过的网络标识，并对该网络标识做相应的标记，以指示该网络标识未验证通过。
316、NSSAAF实体向AMF实体发送第二响应消息，该第二响应消息携带EAP认证成功或失败，和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI。
317、AMF实体向终端设备发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带EAP认证成功或失败。
上述图3所示的实施例中，在一种可能的实现方式中，NSSAAF实体每次向AAA-S发送的AAA消息中都携带有第二网络标识。而实际应用中，NSSAAF实体可以仅在其中一次向AAA-S发送的AAA消息中携带该第二网络标识；或者，NSSAAF实体向AAA-S发送的AAA消息中也可以不携带第二网络标识。由于步骤303至步骤317中的EAP消息中的会话标识(Session ID)是相同的，因此AAA-S可以通过该Session ID确定第二网络标识。
需要说明的是，若图3所示的实施例中步骤302至步骤303在EAP认证流程中为可选步骤，即对于一些EAP认证方法中不存在步骤302至步骤303。那么在这种情况下，则在 步骤304时，第一请求消息中不携带第一消息认证码，而在步骤305中，不进行第二网络标识或第一消息认证码的验证。终端设备可以在步骤310中携带第一消息认证码和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI，以便于NSSAAF实体执行步骤312，实现对第一消息认证码的验证。
若NSSAAF实体未对第二网络标识进行验证，可选的，NSSAAF实体可以不向AAA-S发送该第二网络标识；或者，NSSAAF实体也可以向AAA-S发送该第二网络标识和第一指示信息，该第一指示信息用于指示该第二网络标识未经验证。例如，如图3所示，NSSAAF实体不执行步骤305，而直接执行步骤306；那么，步骤306中的AAA消息中可以携带该第一指示信息。
需要说明的是，如果步骤315不需要执行，步骤306和步骤313中也可以不携带第二网络标识。即本实施例中，NSSAAF实体/AUSF实体向AAA-S发送第二网络标识是可选执行的。
本申请实施例中，在终端设备的第一网络切片的切片认证过程中，终端设备向NSSAAF实体发送第一消息认证码、第一网络切片的标识和第一标识信息；然后，NSSAAF实体从第一标识信息中确定第二网络标识，并根据该第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证；当验证通过时，该NSSAAF实体向AAA-S发送该第二网络标识。由此可知，NSSAAF实体根据第二网络标识对终端设备发送的第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，NSSAAF实体可以确定是由该第一网络为该终端设备提供的第一网络切片的切片认证。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。例如，通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法可以增强归属网络对终端设备的接入和终端设备使用网络切片的控制，避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
请参阅图4，图4为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图。在图4中，该切片服务验证方法包括：
401、终端设备向AMF实体发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带第一网络切片的基于网络切片的认证(network slice-specific authentication and authorization，NSSAA)认证状态(成功或失败)、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一标识信息和第一消息认证码。
其中，第一标识信息为第一网络标识所对应的标识信息，该第一标识信息的内容请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中步骤201的相关介绍。该第一消息认证码是对第一网络标识和第一网络切片的标识中的任一种或任多种信息进行完整性保护得到的，而第一消息认证码的生成方式具体请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中的步骤201，这里不再赘述。
第一网络切片的NSSAA认证状态(成功或失败)、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一标识信息和第一消息认证码也可以承载在其他类型的(非NAS)消息中,本申请对承载消息不作限定。
本实施例中，终端设备在第一网络切片的切片认证完成后向HPLMN(例如，AUSF实体或NSSAAF实体)发送第一消息认证码，并由HPLMN对该第一消息认证码进行验证。其中，终端设备执行第一网络切片的切片认证流程可以是基于现有的切片认证流程。
402、AMF实体向AUSF实体发送GPSI、第一网络切片的切片认证NSSAA成功或失败、 第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一标识信息和第一消息认证码。
需要说明的是，步骤401和步骤402中也可以不包括NSSAA认证状态(成功或失败)信息。可选的，在终端设备中可以预先配置或预先约定，终端设备只针对切片认证成功的网络切片执行步骤401，即如果切片认证失败，则终端设备不执行步骤401。
403、AUSF实体根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
步骤402至步骤403与前述图3所示的实施例中的步骤304至步骤305类似，具体请参阅前述步骤304至步骤305的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本实施例中的AUSF实体与实施例一中的NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体功能不同。具体地，实施例一中的NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体具有辅助进行切片认证的功能。而在本实施例中的AUSF实体可以不具备辅助切片认证的功能。
在一种可能的实现方式中，本实施例还包括步骤404至步骤405。
404、AUSF实体保存认证码验证通过的第二网络标识和第一网络切片的切片认证结果。
可选的，AUSF实体还保存该第一网络切片的标识和该终端设备的终端标识。
步骤404与前述图3所示的实施例中的步骤315类似，具体请参阅前述步骤315的相关介绍。
405、AUSF实体向AAA-S发送该第二网络标识。
在该实现方式中，当AAA-S需要获知该第二网络标识时，AUSF实体可以向该AAA-S发送该第二网络标识。例如，若现有切片认证流程中AMF实体未向AAA-S发送该第二网络标识，或者，NSSAAF实体向AAA-S发送未经验证的第二网络标识；那么，AUSF实体可以向AAA-S发送该第二网络标识。
上述图4所示的实施例示出了在第一网络切片的切片认证完成后，终端设备向AUSF实体发送第一消息认证码、第一网络切片的标识和第一标识信息，AUSF实体根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码的验证过程。在实际应用中，终端设备可以同时进行多个网络切片的切片认证。那么该终端设备可以在该终端设备的所有网络切片或多个网络切片都认证完成后，终端设备向AUSF实体统一发送该所有网络切片或多个网络切片的切片认证结果及所有网络切片或多个网络切片对应的消息认证码进行验证，以节省信令开销；终端设备也可以是每个网络切片的切片认证完成时(例如，在确定切片认证结果之后，但切片认证流程结束前的任一步骤)，就向AUSF实体该网络切片的切片认证结果，具体本申请不做限定。
本申请实施例中，在终端设备的第一网络切片的切片认证完成后，终端设备向AUSF实体发送第一消息认证码、第一网络切片的标识和第一标识信息，AUSF实体根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证；当验证通过时，AUSF实体向AAA-S发送该第二网络标识。由此可知，AUSF实体根据第二网络标识对终端设备发送的第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，AUSF实体可以确定是由该第一网络为该终端设备提供的第一网络切片的切片认证。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。例如，通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法可以增强归属网络对终端设备的接入和终端设备使用网络切片的控制，避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
上面示出了由切片服务验证功能实体执行本申请实施例提供的切片服务验证方法，而本申请实施例中切片服务验证方法也可以由认证服务器来执行，下面通过图5进行介绍。
请参阅图5，图5为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图。在图5中，该方法包括：
501、终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码。
其中，第一网络标识与前述图2A所示的实施例中的步骤201的第一网络标识类似，具体请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中的步骤201的第一网络标识的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
其中，该第一消息认证码是根据第一网络标识计算生成的，用于对第一网络标识的完整性保护。
为了对第一网络标识进行完整性保护，终端设备生成第一消息认证码。而第一消息认证码的生成方式有多种，下面分别举例进行介绍：
方式一：终端设备根据第一信任状和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码。
其中，第一信任状用于终端设备与认证服务器之间的针对第一网络切片的切片认证。
具体的，终端设备将第一信任状和第一网络标识作为第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第一消息认证码。
可选的，该第一预设认证码生成函数的输入参数还包括第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、识别码的计数器值和随机数RAND中的至少一个。该第二预设认证码生成函数为与前述图2A所示的实施例中第一预设认证码生成函数类似的函数。
一种可能的实现方式中，该第一信任状为该第一网络切片的切片认证过程所包含的EAP认证流程所使用的信任状(EAP credential)。例如，第一消息认证码MAC-I＝function(Key＝＝EAP credential,SN-ID,S-NSSAI)。
由于EAP认证方法有多种，每种EAP认证方法所使用的信任状有可能不同，产生第一消息认证码的方式也可以不同。下面通过举例的方式列举两种可能的第一信任状。
第一种信任状：第一信任状为证书或公私密钥对，这里以终端设备的公钥和终端设备的私钥为例进行说明。
那么，终端设备根据第一信任状和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码具体包括步骤a和步骤b。
步骤a：终端设备根据第二预设密钥生成函数和第一网络标识生成第一摘要。需要说明的是，除了第一网络标识之外，还可以加入第一网络切片的标识和EAP ID等参数或内容一起生成第一摘要，本申请对增加其他参数或内容不作限制。
其中，第二预设密钥生成函数包括3GPP标准中规定的KDF，或者任意一种KDF，或者任意一种哈希函数(Hash)、或者HMAC函数。
步骤b：终端设备通过终端设备的私钥对第一摘要进行加密，得到第一消息认证码。
具体的，终端设备通过该终端设备的私钥对该第一摘要进行数字签名，这里的“数字签名”也可以理解为上述第二预设认证码生成函数中的“function”。
可选的，终端设备也可以使用认证服务器的公钥对该第一摘要进行数字签名。
第二种信任状：第一信任状为第一口令。即该EAP认证方法采用基于口令的EAP方法。
具体的，终端设备将第一口令和第一网络标识作为该第二预设认证码生成函数中的输入参数，计算得到该第一消息认证码。可选的，该第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数还包括第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、识别码的计数器值和随机数RAND中的至少一个。
例如，第一信任状＝password(第一口令)，那么第一消息认证码MAC-I＝KDF(key＝第一口令,SN-ID,S-NSSAI,RAND)。
方式二：终端设备根据第一密钥Kemsk和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码。
其中，该第一密钥Kemsk为针对该终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中生成的密钥。
具体的，终端设备将第一密钥Kemsk和第一网络标识作为第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第一消息认证码。
可选的，该第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数还包括第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、识别码的计数器值和随机数RAND中的至少一个。该第二预设认证码生成函数为与前述图2A所示的实施例中第一预设认证码生成函数类似的函数。
本实施例中，该第一密钥Kemsk是在第一网络切片的切片认证过程中生成的，或者是在第一网络切片的切片认证结束后生成的，具体本申请不做限定。终端设备在第一密钥Kemsk生成之后即可生成该第一消息认证码。因此，第一消息认证码可能是在第一网络切片的切片认证过程中生成，也可能是在第一网络切片的切片认证结束后生成的认证码认证码认证码。
502、终端设备向认证服务器发送第三消息，该第三消息携带第一消息认证码和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI。
其中，第三消息所携带的内容与前述图2A所示的实施例中的步骤202中的第一消息类似，具体请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例的步骤202的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
下面针对终端设备发送的第三消息是否携带第一标识信息的两种可能的情况进行介绍：
情况1、终端设备发送的第三消息中携带该第一标识信息。
在该实现方式中，AMF实体也可以向NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体发送该第一标识信息，该第一标识信息携带该终端设备发送的第一消息中，或者携带在其他消息中。
情况2、终端设备发送的第三消息中不携带该第一标识信息。
在该实现方式中，AMF实体向NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体发送该第一标识信息，该第一标识信息携带该终端设备发送的第三消息中，或者携带在其他消息中。
在情况1中的一种可能的实现方式中，当该终端设备发送的第三消息携带该第一标识信息时，该认证服务器可以根据该第一标识信息确定该第二网络标识，并根据该第二网络标识度对第一消息认证码进行验证。
在情况1的另一种可能的实现方式中，当AMF实体也向NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体发送该第一标识信息时，该认证服务器不根据该终端设备发送的第三消息中携带的第一标识信息确定该第二网络标识，而是根据该AMF实体发送的第一标识信息确定该第二网络标识。然后，认证服务器根据该第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。其中，该AMF实体可以通过该第三消息或其他消息发送该第一标识信息。例如，该第一标识信息携带在该第三 消息的令牌(token)中。
可选的，在情况1中，该认证服务器还可以进一步验证该第二网络标识。例如，认证服务器判断经过第一消息认证码验证的第二网络标识与终端设备发送的第三消息中携带的第一标识信息所包括的网络标识是否相同；或者，认证服务器判断经过第一消息验证验证的第二网络标识与AMF实体发送的第一标识信息所包括的网络标识是否相同。其中，该AMF实体可以通过该第三消息或其他消息发送该第一标识信息。例如，该第一标识信息携带在该第三消息的令牌(token)中。
503、认证服务器根据该第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
其中，第二网络标识与前述图2A所示的实施例中的步骤203的第二网络标识类似，具体请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中的步骤203的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
结合上述步骤501可知，可选的，步骤503包括以下两种可能的实现方式：
实现方式1：认证服务器根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
具体的，如果生成第一消息认证码是基于步骤501中的MAC-I＝function(Key＝＝EAP credential,SN-ID,S-NSSAI)。则认证服务器可以将第一信任状和第二网络标识及第一网络切片标识作为第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第二消息认证码。如果生成第一消息认证码是基于步骤501的公私钥对的方式，则认证服务器也可以相应的计算第二消息认证码，后续对具体验证过程进行举例说明。
实现方式2：认证服务器根据第一密钥Kemsk和第一网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
具体的，认证服务器将第一密钥Kemsk和第二网络标识作为第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第二消息认证码。
实现方式1和实现方式2中的第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数和该第二预设认证码生成函数的具体形式请参阅前述步骤501的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
下面基于实现方式1和实现方式2介绍认证服务器对第一消息认证码的验证过程。
一、基于上述步骤501中的方式一中提供的第一种信任状介绍实现方式1。那么，认证服务器根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证具体包括步骤1至步骤3。
步骤1：认证服务器通过终端设备的公钥对该第一消息认证码进行解密，得到第一摘要。
需要说明的是，终端设备提前或同时向认证服务器发送该终端设备的公钥。例如，在可扩展的身份验证协议-传输层安全协议(extensible authentication protocol-transport layer security，EAP-TLS)流程中，终端设备会把携带终端设备的公钥的证书作为EAP消息，并向认证服务器发送该EAP消息。
如果终端设备使用认证服务器的公钥对第一摘要进行加密的，那么认证服务器则通过认证服务器的私钥对该第一消息认证码进行解密。同理，认证服务器可以通过携带认证服务器的公钥的证书作为EAP消息，并向终端设备发送该EAP消息。
步骤2：认证服务器根据第二预设密钥生成函数和第二网络标识生成第二摘要。
其中，第二预设密钥生成函数具体请参阅前述步骤501的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
步骤3：认证服务器将第一摘要和第二摘要进行匹配以获取验证结果。
具体的，认证服务器比对该第一摘要和第二摘要，当第一摘要和第二摘要相同时，认证服务器确定验证通过；当第一摘要和第二摘要不相同时，认证服务器确定验证不通过。
其中，当第一摘要和第二摘要相同时，认证服务器可以确定是由该第二网络标识对应的第一网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。当第一摘要和第二摘要不相同时，认证服务器可以确定该第二网络标识被篡改过或密钥不匹配，则认证服务器确定不是由第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。针对第一网络切片的切片服务的说明请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中步骤203的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
二、基于上述步骤501中的方式一中提供的第二种信任状介绍实现方式1。那么，认证服务器根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证具体包括步骤1至步骤2。
步骤1：认证服务器根据第一口令和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码。
具体的，认证服务器将第一口令和第二网络标识作为第二预设认证码生成函数中的输入参数，计算得到该第二消息认证码。可选的，该第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数还包括第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、识别码的计数器值和随机数RAND中的至少一个。
其中，第二预设认证码生成函数具体请参阅前述步骤501的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
例如，第一信任状＝password(第一口令)，那么第二消息认证码MAC-I＝KDF(key＝第一口令,SN-ID,S-NSSAI,RAND)。
步骤2：认证服务器将第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
具体的，认证服务器比对该第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码。当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码相同时，认证服务器确定验证通过；当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码不相同时，认证服务器确定验证不通过。
其中，当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码相同时，认证服务器可以确定是由该第二网络标识对应的第一网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码不相同时，认证服务器可以确定该第二网络标识被篡改过，则认证服务器确定不是由第二网络标识所对应的第一网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。针对第一网络切片的切片服务的说明请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中步骤203的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
三、基于上述步骤501中的方式二中介绍实现方式2。那么，认证服务器根据第一密钥Kemsk和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证具体包括步骤1至步骤2。
步骤1：认证服务器根据第一密钥Kemsk和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码。
具体的，认证服务器将第一密钥Kemsk和第一网络标识作为第二预设认证码生成函数中的输入参数，计算得到该第二消息认证码。
可选的，该第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数还包括第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、识别码的计数器值和随机数RAND中的至少一个。
其中，第二预设认证码生成函数具体请参阅前述步骤501的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
该第一密钥Kemsk是在第一网络切片的切片认证过程中生成的；或者，该第一密钥Kemsk是在第一网络切片的切片认证结束后生成的。因此，当第一消息认证码在第一网络切片的切片认证过程中生成时，认证服务器可以在该第一网络切片的切片认证过程中或者在该第一网络切片的切片认证结束后执行对第一消息验证的验证。当第一消息认证码在第一网络切片的切片认证结束后生成的，则认证服务器在该第一网络切片的切片认证结束后执行对第一消息认证码的验证。
步骤2：认证服务器将第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
具体的，认证服务器比对该第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码。当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码相同时，认证服务器确定验证通过；当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码不相同时，认证服务器确定验证不通过。
其中，当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码相同时，认证服务器可以确定是由该第二网络标识对应的第一网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。当第一消息认证码与第二消息认证码不相同时，认证服务器可以确定该第二网络标识被篡改过，则认证服务器确定不是由第二网络标识所对应的第一网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。针对第一网络切片的切片服务的说明请参阅前述图2A所示的实施例中步骤203的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
在一种可能的实现方式中，本实施例中还包括步骤504。
504、认证服务器向终端设备发送第四消息。
具体的，认证服务器通过NSSAAF实体和AMF实体向终端设备发送第四消息，该第四消息为认证请求消息，或者为认证响应消息，或者为验证成功消息。例如，如图6所示的第一网络切片的切片认证过程中，第二消息可以理解为认证请求消息或认证响应消息。
本申请实施例中，终端设备向认证服务器发送第三消息，该第三消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是对第一网络标识进行完整性保护之后得到的；然后，该认证服务器根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，认证服务器向终端设备发送第四消息。由此可知，认证服务器根据第二网络标识对终端设备发送的第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，认证服务器可以确定是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供的第一网络切片的切片服务。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。例如，通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法可以增强归属网络对终端设备的接入和终端设备使用网络切片的控制，避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
本申请实施例中，上述图5所示的实施例中仅以终端设备根据该第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码为例进行了说明。可选的，本申请还提供另一个实施例，该实现方式与图5所示的实施例类似，不同的地方在于步骤501和步骤503。
步骤501可以替换为：终端设备根据第一网络切片的标识生成第一消息认证码。
该第一消息认证码用于对第一网络切片的标识进行完整性保护之后得到，该第一网络 切片的标识为该第一网络切片的ID或第一网络切片辅助选择信息NSSAI。
由于在不同PLMN网络中，终端设备的第一网络切片的标识可以随着终端设备当前所接入的PLMN网络的不同而有差异，并且通过该差异可以确定该第一网络切片的标识对应的PLMN网络。因此终端设备可以通过该第一网络切片的标识生成第一消息认证码，这样认证服务器对该第一消息验证进行验证以确定为该终端设备提供第一网络切片的切片服务的网络。
其中，终端设备生成该第一消息认证码的方式有多种，下面通过举例进行介绍。
方式一：终端设备根据第一信任状和第一网络切片的标识生成第一消息认证码。
其中，该第一信任状的相关说明请参阅前述图5所示的实施例中步骤501中的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。下面结合示出的两种可能的第一信任状介绍终端设备生成第一消息认证码的过程。
第一种信任状：第一信任状为证书或公私密钥对，这里以终端设备的公钥和终端设备的私钥为例进行说明。由图5所示的实施例中可知，终端设备根据第一信任状和第一网络切片的标识生成第一消息认证码具体包括步骤a。
那么步骤a可以替换为：终端设备根据该第二预设密钥生成函数和第一网络切片的标识生成第一摘要。需要说明的是，除了第一网络切片的标识之外，还可以加入第一网络标识，EAP ID等参数或内容一起生成第一摘要，本申请对增加其他参数或内容不作限制。第一网络切片的标识和第二预设密钥生成函数的相关介绍请参阅前述图5所示的实施例中步骤501中的相关说明，这里不再赘述。
第二种信任状：第一信任状为第一口令。即该EAP认证方法采用基于口令的EAP方法。
具体的，终端设备将第一口令和第一网络切片的标识作为该第二预设认证码生成函数中的输入参数，计算得到该第一消息认证码。其中，第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数的相关说明请参阅前述图5所示的实施例中步骤501中的相关说明，这里不再赘述。
方式二：终端设备根据第一密钥Kemsk和第一网络切片的标识生成第一消息认证码。
其中，该第一密钥Kemsk的相关介绍请参阅前述图5所示的实施例中步骤501中的相关说明。具体的，终端设备将第一密钥Kemsk和第一网络切片的标识作为第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该第一消息认证码。其中，第二预设认证码生成函数的输入参数的相关说明请参阅前述图5所示的实施例中步骤501中的相关说明，这里不再赘述。
步骤503可以替换为：认证服务器根据第一标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
其中，第一标识为认证服务器根据AMF实体发送的第一网络切片的标识确定的，或者是，认证服务器从终端设备发送的第三消息中携带的第一网络切片的标识确定的。
具体的，基于替换后的步骤501，认证服务器可以通过以下两种可能的实现方式对第一消息认证码进行验证。
实现方式1：认证服务器根据第一信任状和第一标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
实现方式2：认证服务器根据第一密钥Kemsk和第一标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
下面基于实现方式1和实现方式2介绍认证服务器对第一消息认证码的验证过程。
一、基于替换后的步骤501中的方式一中提供的第一种信任状介绍实现方式1。在图5 所示的实施例中的步骤503中，基于步骤501的方式一的第一种信任状，认证服务器根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证具体包括步骤1至步骤3。那么不同地方在于：步骤2。
步骤2可以替换为：认证服务器根据第二预设密钥生成函数和第一标识生成第二摘要。
其中，第二预设密钥生成函数具体请参阅前述步骤501的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
二、基于替换后的步骤501中的方式一中提供的第二种信任状介绍实现方式1。在图5所示的实施例中的步骤503中，基于步骤501的方式一的第二种信任状，认证服务器根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证具体包括步骤1至步骤3。那么不同地方在于：步骤1。
步骤1可以替换为：认证服务器根据第一口令和第一标识生成第二消息认证码。
具体的，认证服务器将第一口令和第一标识作为第二预设认证码生成函数中的输入参数，计算得到该第二消息认证码。该第二预设认证码生成函数的相关介绍请参阅前述图5所示的实施例中步骤503的相关介绍。
二、基于替换后的步骤501中的方式二中介绍实现方式2。在图5所示的实施例中的步骤503中，基于步骤501的方式二，认证服务器根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证具体包括步骤1至步骤3。那么不同地方在于：步骤1。
步骤1可以替换为：认证服务器根据该第一密钥Kemsk和第一标识生成第二消息认证码。
具体的，认证服务器将该第一密钥Kemsk和第一标识作为第二预设认证码生成函数中的输入参数，计算得到该第二消息认证码。第一密钥Kemsk和该第二预设认证码生成函数的相关介绍请参阅前述图5所示的实施例中步骤503的相关介绍。
本申请实施例中，可选的，第一消息携带第一标识信息。那么认证服务器通过该第一标识信息确定该第二网络标识，在后续的实施例中以此方式为例进行说明。
本申请实施例中，上述图5所示的实施例在第一网络切片的切片认证过程中执行，或者是在第一网络切片的切片认证完成后执行。下面分别通过图6所示的实施例和图7所示的实施例进行介绍。
请参阅图6，图6为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图。在图6中，该方法包括：
601、AMF实体根据终端设备的切片签约信息和第一网络切片的切片标识，确定对该第一网络切片执行切片认证。
602、AMF实体向终端设备发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带用于切片认证的EAP ID请求(request)和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI；相应的，该终端设备接收该NAS消息。
603、终端设备向AMF实体发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带EAP ID响应、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI。
604、AMF实体向AUSF实体或NSSAAF实体发送第三请求消息，该第三请求消息携带EAP ID响应、GPSI和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI。
605、AUSF实体或NSSAAF实体向AAA-S发送AAA消息，该AAA消息携带EAP ID响应、 GPSI和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI。
606、AAA-S向AUSF实体或NSSAAF实体发送AAA消息，该AAA消息携带EAP消息、GPSI和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI。
607、AUSF实体或NSSAAF实体向AMF实体发送第三响应消息，该第三响应消息携带EAP消息、GPSI和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI。
608、AMF实体向终端设备发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带EAP消息和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI。
步骤601至步骤604与前述图3所示的实施例中的步骤301至步骤304类似，和步骤605至步骤608与前述图3所示的实施例中的步骤306至步骤309类似，区别在于步骤301至步骤304和步骤306至步骤309中携带了第一消息认证码和第一标识信息。具体可以参阅前述图3所示的实施例中的步骤301至步骤304和步骤306至步骤309的相关介绍来理解步骤601至步骤608。
609、终端设备向AMF实体发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带EAP消息、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一标识信息和第一消息认证码。
其中，第一标识信息与第一网络标识对应，具体第一标识信息的内容请参阅图2A所示的实施例中步骤202的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
该第一消息认证码是对第一网络标识进行完整性保护得到的，而第一消息认证码的生成方式具体请参阅前述图5所示的实施例中步骤501的介绍，这里不再赘述。
可选的，第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一标识信息和第一消息认证码为该EAP消息中携带的参数。该EAP消息、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一标识信息和第一消息认证码也可以承载在其他类型的消息中,本申请对承载消息不作限定。
本申请对于该EAP消息的具体类型不作限定，例如，对于不同的EAP认证方法，该EAP消息可能有不同名称或类型等。可理解，对于该说明，下文同样适用。
可理解，为便于描述，以下涉及网络切片的标识时，网络切片的标识以S-NSSAI表示。UE的标识信息可以以可公开使用的GPSI或SUPI表示，但是不应将其理解为对本申请实施例的限定。
610、AMF实体向AAA-S发送第四请求消息，该第四请求消息携带EAP ID响应、GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一消息认证码和第一标识信息。其中，该第四请求消息为切片认证请求消息。
611、AAA-S根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
步骤611的相关说明请参阅前述图5所示的步骤503的相关介绍。
612、AAA-S向NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体发送AAA消息，该AAA消息携带EAP认证成功或失败、GPSI、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和第二网络标识。
可选的，该AAA消息还可以向该第一消息认证码的验证结果。
在一种可能的实现方式中，本实施例还包括步骤613。
613、NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体保存验证通过的第二网络标识认证码和第一网络切片的切片认证结果。
步骤613与前述图3所示的实施例中的步骤315类似，具体请参阅前述图3所示的实施例中的步骤315的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
614、NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体向AMF实体发送第四响应消息，该第四响应消息携带EAP认证成功或失败、GPSI和第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI。
615、AMF实体向终端设备发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带EAP认证成功或失败。
上述图6所示的实施例中，仅仅示出了在步骤610中终端设备通过AMF实体向AAA-S发送第一消息认证码的方案。在实际应用中，终端设备在步骤604的第三请求消息也可以携带该第一消息认证码，以便于AAA-S对第一消息认证码进行验证。针对终端设备多次发送第一消息认证码的方式下，AAA-S可以是在每次接收到第一消息认证码都对第一消息认证码进行验证，或者是，AAA-S在某一次接收到第一消息认证码时对第一消息认证码进行验证，并由NSSAAF实体保存该第一消息认证码的验证结果。
需要说明的是，根据不同的EAP方法，上述步骤609至步骤610有可能执行多次(每次的EAP消息内容不同)。在一种可能的实现方式中，终端设备只通过其中的一次执行的步骤609至步骤610中携带第一消息认证码和第一标识信息。本申请对在哪一次携带第一消息认证码和第一标识信息不作限定。
本申请实施例中，在终端设备的第一网络切片的切片认证过程中，终端设备向AAA-S发送第一消息认证码、第一网络切片的标识和第一标识信息；然后，AAA-S从第一标识信息中确定第二网络标识，并根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证；当验证通过时，AAA-S向NSSAAF实体发送该第二网络标识。由此可知，AAA-S根据第二网络标识对终端设备发送的第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，AAA-S可以确定是由该第一网络为该终端设备提供的第一网络切片的切片认证。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。例如，通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法可以增强归属网络对终端设备的接入和终端设备使用网络切片的控制，避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
请参阅图7，图7为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图。在图7中，该切片服务验证方法包括：
701、终端设备向AMF实体发送NAS消息，该NAS消息携带第一网络切片的NSSAA成功或失败、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一标识信息和第一消息认证码。
步骤701与前述图4所示的实施例中的步骤401类似，具体请参阅前述步骤401的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
702、AMF实体向AAA-S发送GPSI、第一网络切片的切片认证NSSAA成功或失败、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI、第一标识信息和第一消息认证码。
其中，第一标识信息和第一消息认证码的相关介绍请参阅前述图5所示的实施例中的步骤501的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
703、AAA-S根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证。
步骤702与前述图5所示的实施例中的步骤503类似，具体请参阅前述图5所示的实 施例中的步骤503的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
704、AAA-S向NSSAAF实体或AUSF实体发送第一网络切片的切片认证NSSAA结果(results)，该NSSAA results携带GPSI、切片认证成功或失败、第一网络切片的标识S-NSSAI和第一标识信息。
在一种可能的实现方式中，本实施例还包括步骤705。
步骤705、NSSAAF实体保存认证码验证通过的第二网络标识和第一网络切片的切片认证结果。
步骤705与前述图3所示的实施例中的步骤315类似，具体请参阅前述图3所示的实施例中的步骤705的相关介绍，这里不再赘述。
本申请实施例中，在终端设备的第一网络切片的切片认证完成后，终端设备向AAA-S发送第一消息认证码、第一网络切片的标识和第一标识信息，AAA-S根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证；当验证通过时，AAA-S向NSSAAF实体发送该第二网络标识。由此可知，AAA-S根据第二网络标识对终端设备发送的第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，AAA-S可以确定是由该第一网络为该终端设备提供的第一网络切片的切片认证。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。例如，通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法可以增强归属网络对终端设备的接入和终端设备使用网络切片的控制，避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
上述图2A所示的实施例以及图3至图7所示的实施例中，从网络切片的切片认证方面，切片服务验证功能实体或认证服务器通过对终端设备发送的第一消息认证码进行验证，确定为该终端设备提供网络切片的切片服务的第一网络，该第一消息认证码是对第一网络标识进行完整性保护得到的。这样归属网络可以确定具体是哪个网络为该终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证；或者是，归属网络可以确定拜访网络是否为该终端设备的该第一网络切片发起过切片认证；或者是，归属网络可以确定为该终端设备的该第一网络切片发起切片认证且完成该第一网络切片的切片认证的服务网络。从而避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。
本申请实施例还提供另一种切片服务验证方法，AMF实体将第一密钥K AMF与第一网络切片的切片信息和/或终端设备当前所接入的第一网络的标识进行绑定，该第一密钥K AMF用于终端设备与第一网络进行(数据或信令)传输。这样，该终端设备的归属网络可以通过终端设备或接入网设备所使用的第一密钥K AMF确定是由该拜访网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务。该第一网络切片的切片服务包括切片数据传输或信令传输。
本申请实施例通过更新第一密钥K AMF来实现对切片服务进行验证。下面举例说明适用的场景：
场景一：漫游场景，即终端设备漫游至拜访网络。
为了防止拜访网络存在潜在的欺骗行为，终端设备当前所接入的第一网络为拜访网络。AMF实体在更新第一密钥K AMF时，将第一密钥K AMF与第一网络切片的切片信息和/或终端设备当前所接入的第一网络的标识进行绑定。这样，归属网络可以通过该第一密钥K AMF确定 该拜访网络为该终端设备提供了第一网络切片的切片服务，该第一网络切片的切片服务包括切片数据传输或信令传输。避免拜访网络仅仅为终端设备提供了第一网络切片的切片服务却谎报其为该终端设备提供较第一网络切片来说具有更高性能的其他网络切片的切片服务器，避免网络欺骗行为，提供网络安全性。
场景二：非漫游场景，即终端设备当前接入的网络为该终端设备的归属网络。
归属网络中的AMF实体在更新第一密钥K AMF时，将第一密钥K AMF与第一网络切片的切片信息和/或终端设备当前所接入的归属网络的标识进行绑定。这样，归属网络可以通过该第一密钥K AMF确定该归属网络为该终端设备提供了第一网络切片的切片服务，该第一网络切片的切片服务包括切片数据传输或信令传输。避免出现归属网络中的AMF实体出现异常行为，提高网络安全性。
在后续的实施例中，以场景一为例进行介绍。
图8所示的实施例中以AMF实体为执行主体介绍更新第二密钥K AMF的方案。其中，选择AMF实体来执行图8所示的实施例主要原因是：在终端设备的一级认证之后，与终端设备相关的控制信令密钥和数据密钥都是根据第一密钥K AMF推演生成的，并且AMF实体可以直接参与终端设备的切片认证过程并获取切片认证结果，因此图8以AMF实体为执行主体介绍更新第一密钥K AMF，在实际应用中，还可以采用其他功能实体或网元来执行图8所示的方案，具体本申请不做限定。
其中，与终端设备相关的控制信令密钥和数据密钥都是根据第一密钥K AMF推演生成的。具体请参阅图2B，从图2B可知，K AMF用于生成NAS信令密钥：NAS完整性保护密钥K NASint和NAS加解密密钥K NASenc，K AMF还用于生成接入层(Access Stratum，AS)密钥K gNB、以及非3GPP网络互通锚点密钥K N3IWF，而接入层密钥K gNB用于进一步生成接入层控制密钥：接入层控制信令完整性保护密钥K RRCint和接入层控制信令加解密密钥K RRCenc、数据面完整性保护密钥K UPint和数据面加解密密钥K UPenc。
请参阅图8，图8为本申请实施例切片服务验证方法的另一个实施例示意图。在图8中，该方法包括：
801、AMF实体根据该第一网络切片的标识更新第二密钥K AMF，得到更新后的第二密钥K AMF。
其中，第一网络切片为终端设备的已切片认证成功的网络切片。该更新后的第二密钥K AMF用于终端设备与第一网络进行传输(包括切片数据传输或信令传输)，第一网络为终端设备当前所接入的网络。
具体的，AMF实体将该第一网络切片的标识和未更新的第二密钥K AMF作为第一预设密钥生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该更新后的第二密钥K AMF。例如，New K AMF＝KDF(K AMF,NSSAI，…)，NSSAI为终端设备的已切片认证成功的网络切片的标识集合，若该终端设备只有网络切片1是切片认证成功的，那么该NSSAI＝S-NSSAI1。其中，“…”代表函数KDF 的输入参数还可以包括其他参数，本申请不作限定。
一种可能的实现方式中，步骤801具体包括：
AMF实体根据该第一网络切片的标识和第三密钥更新该第二密钥K AMF，得到更新后的第二密钥K AMF。
其中，该第三密钥为终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所生成的密钥，或终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所使用的信任状。
当该第三密钥为终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所生成的密钥时，该第三密钥可以是在第一网络切片的切片认证过程中生成的，也可以是第一网络切片的切片认证完成后生成的，具体视EAP认证流程的设定来决定。
具体的，第一终端设备的第一网络切片的切片认证过程中包含EAP认证流程，AMF实体可以将该EAP认证流程中所生成的第三密钥和第一网络切片的标识作为该第一预设密钥生成函数的输入参数，计算得到该更新后的第二密钥K AMF。
可选的，该输入参数还包括第一网络的标识。
该第一网络的标识包括第一网络的标识SN-ID、或者第一网络所对应的PLMN标识、或者第一网络的名称SNN、或者第一网络的网络识别符NID。
该第一网络的标识还可以是该第一网络中的功能实体的标识。例如，AMF实体的标识、或者AMF实体的名称、或者AMF实体的全球唯一标识符。该AMF实体为第一网络中为该终端设备发起第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
例如，New K AMF＝KDF(K AMF,Kaaa/Kemsk,NSSAI,SN-ID，…)。其中，“…”代表函数KDF的输入参数还可以包括其他参数，本申请不作限定。
本实施例中，AMF实体在第一网络切片的切片认证成功后更新第二密钥K AMF，而终端设备执行第一网络切片的切片认证流程基于现有的切片认证流程，或者基于上述图3所示的实施例或图6所示的实施例中的切片认证流程，具体本申请不做限定。
802、AMF实体向终端设备发送第二指示信息。
一种可能的实现方式中，第二指示信息携带第一网络切片的标识，该第二指示信息用于指示针对第一网络切片更新第二密钥K AMF。
另一种可能的实现方式中，第二指示信息用于指示终端设备针对终端设备的已切片认证成功的网络切片更新第二密钥K AMF。
可选的，当存在多种更新方式时，该第二指示信息还携带用于更新第二密钥K AMF的更新方式和/或更新参数。例如，更新参数包括网络切片的标识S-NSSAI或网络切片的标识列表(即NSSAI)或其他更新第二密钥K AMF的相关参数。
需要说明的是，结合上述图3所示的示意图，步骤802的第二指示信息可以是在步骤317中向终端设备发送的，而上述步骤801可以是在步骤316中AMF实体接收到切片认证成功的响应消息后执行的，具体本申请不做限定。
803、终端设备根据该第二指示信息更新第二密钥K AMF。
一种可能的实现方式中，第二指示信息携带第一网络切片的标识，该第二指示信息用于指示针对第一网络切片更新第二密钥K AMF。
具体的，终端设备根据该第二指示信息确定第一网络切片的标识，然后，终端设备根据该第一网络切片的标识更新第二密钥K AMF，得到更新后的第二密钥K AMF。具体的更新过程与AMF实体更新第二密钥K AMF的过程类似，具体请参阅前述步骤801的相关说明。
另一种可能的实现方式中，第二指示信息用于指示终端设备针对终端设备的已切片认证成功的网络切片更新第二密钥K AMF。
具体的，终端设备确定已切片认证成功的第一网络切片的标识，然后，终端设备根据该第一网络切片的标识更新第二密钥K AMF，得到更新后的第二密钥K AMF。具体的更新过程与AMF实体更新第二密钥K AMF的过程类似，具体请参阅前述步骤801的相关说明。
可选的，第二指示信息还携带更新方式和/或更新参数，那么终端设备按照该更新方式和更新参数更新第二密钥K AMF。
在一种可能的实现方式中，本实施例还包括步骤804。
804、终端设备向AMF实体发送完成通知消息。
其中，该完成通知消息用于通知该AMF实体：该终端设备更新第二密钥K AMF完成。
具体的，终端设备更新完成后，终端设备向AMF实体发送该完成通知消息，并启动更新后的第二密钥K AMF。
由图8所示的实施例可知，从数据传输方面和信令传输方面，在用于切片数据传输或信令传输的第二密钥K AMF的更新过程中，将第二密钥K AMF与第一网络和网络切片的切片信息绑定。并且每个网络切片的K AMF可以相同，也可以不同。这样更新后的第二密钥K AMF是切片级的密钥。归属网络可以通过该更新后的第二密钥K AMF确定第一网络是否真正为该终端设备提供第一网络切片的切片服务，或者是，归属网络可以通过该更新后的第二密钥K AMF确定第一网络为该终端设备提供的是该第一网络切片的切片服务。例如，可以避免第一网络仅仅是为终端设备提供了第一网络切片的切片服务，而第一网络却谎报其为该终端设备提供了较第一网络切片来说具有更高性能的其他网络切片的切片服务，并向归属网络索取额外服务费用的行为。
上述图8所示的实施例以根据第一网络切片的标识为例说明更新第二密钥K AMF的方案。可选的，当终端设备存在多个切片认证成功的网络切片时，该NSSAI可以是多个网络切片的标识的结合。例如，终端设备的已切片认证成功的网络切片包括网络切片1和网络切片2，那么NSSAI＝S-NSSAI1|S-NSSAI2。其中“|”代表两个标识的级联。或者是，AMF实体针对每个网络切片都更新或生成对应的K AMF。例如，如K AMF1为根据网络切片1的标识S-NSSAI1更新得到的密钥，K AMF1用于终端设备与第一网络进行网络切片1的传输。K AMF2为根据网络切片2的标识S-NSSAI2更新得到的密钥，K AMF2用于终端设备与第一网络进行网络切片2的传输。
本申请实施例中，AMF实体根据第一网络切片的标识更新第二密钥K AMF，得到更新后的第二密钥K AMF；然后，AMF实体向终端设备发送第二指示信息。终端设备根据该第二指示信息更新第二密钥K AMF，该更新后的第二密钥K AMF用于终端设备与第一网络进行传输(包括切片数据传输或信令传输)，以使得归属网络可以通过该更新后的第一密钥K AMF确定是由第一网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务，该第一网络切片的切片服务包括切 片数据传输或信令传输。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。例如，通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法可以增强归属网络对终端设备的接入和终端设备使用网络切片的控制，避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
下面对本申请实施例中提供的一种切片服务验证功能实体进行描述。请参阅图9，本申请实施例中切片服务验证功能实体的一个结构示意图，该切片服务验证功能实体可以用于执行图2A、图3和图4所示实施例中切片服务验证功能实体执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该切片服务验证功能实体包括收发模块901和处理模块902。
收发模块901，用于接收终端设备发送的第一消息，该第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是根据该第一网络标识计算生成的；
处理模块902，用于根据第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证；
该收发模块901，用于当验证通过时，该切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送该第二网络标识。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块902具体用于：
获取第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和该第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
将该第一消息认证码与该第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块902具体用于：
根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF、该第一网络切片的标识和该第二网络标识获得该第二消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该切片服务验证功能实体为NSSAAF实体；该处理模块902具体用于：
接收AUSF实体发送的该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF，该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF为该AUSF实体根据第一中间密钥K AUSF生成的。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块902具体用于：
根据第一中间密钥K AUSF和该第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
将该第一消息认证码和该第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一消息还包括第一标识信息，该第二网络标识为该切片服务验证功能实体根据该第一标识信息确定的；其中，该第一标识信息包括第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
本申请实施例中，收发模块901接收终端设备发送的第一消息，该第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是对第一网络标识进行完整性保护之后得到的；然后，该处理模块902根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，该切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送该第二网络标识。由此可知处理模块902根据第二网络标识和第一网络切片的标识中的任一种或任多种信息对终端设备发送的第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，处理模块902可以确定是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供的第一网络切片的切片服务。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。例如，通过本申请实施例的切片服务验证方法可以增强归属网络对终端设备的接入和终端设备使用网络切片的控制，避免出现拜访网络在网络切片的切片认证过程中和/或网络切片的使用过程中欺骗归属网络的行为。
下面对本申请实施例中提供的一种终端设备进行描述。请参阅图10，本申请实施例中终端设备的一个结构示意图，该终端设备可以用于执行图2A、图3和图4所示实施例中终端设备执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该终端设备包括处理模块1001和收发模块1002。
处理模块1001，用于根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码；
收发模块1002，用于向切片服务验证功能实体发送第一消息，该第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1001还用于：
根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
根据该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
该处理模块1001具体用于：
根据该第一网络标识和该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1001还用于：
根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’；
根据该二加解密密钥CK’和该第三完整性保护密钥IK’生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
根据该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
该处理模块1001具体用于：
根据该第一网络标识和该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1001还用于：
根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
该处理模块具体用于：
根据该第一网络标识和该第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第一消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1001具体用于：
根据该第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF、该第一网络切片的标识和该第一网络标识生成该第一消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一消息还包括第一标识信息，该第一网络标识与该第一标识信息对应；其中，该第一标识信息为第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
本实施例中，处理模块1001根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码；收发模块1002向切片服务验证功能实体发送第一消息，该第一消息携带第一消息认证码，以便于切片服务验证功能实体对该第一消息认证码进行验证，从而可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。
下面对本申请实施例中提供的一种认证服务器进行描述。请参阅图11，本申请实施例中认证服务器的一个结构示意图，该认证服务器可以用于执行图5、图6和图7所示实施例中认证服务器执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该认证服务器包括收发模块1101和处理模块1102。
收发模块1101，用于接收终端设备发送的第二消息，该第二消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是根据该第二网络标识计算生成的；
处理模块1102，用于根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证；
该收发模块1101，用于当验证通过时，确定是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供第一网络切片的切片服务。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1102具体用于：
根据第一信任状和第二网络标识对第一消息认证码进行验证，该第一信任状用于该终端设备和该认证服务器之间的针对第一网络切片的切片认证。
另一种可能的实现方式中，第一信任状为该终端设备的公钥和该终端设备的私钥；该处理模块1102具体用于：
根据该终端设备的公钥对该第一消息认证码进行解密，得到第一摘要；
根据该第二网络标识按照第一预设密钥生成函数生成第二摘要；
将该第一摘要和该第二摘要进行匹配以获取验证结果。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一信任状为第一口令；该处理模块1102具体用于：
根据该第一口令和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
将该第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1102具体用于：
根据第一密钥Kemsk和第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
将该第一消息认证码和第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第二消息还携带第一标识信息，该第二网络标识为该认 证服务器根据该第一标识信息确定的；其中，该第一标识信息包括第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
本申请实施例中，收发模块1101接收终端设备发送的第二消息，该第二消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，该第一消息认证码是根据该第二网络标识计算生成的；然后，处理模块1102根据第二网络标识对该第一消息认证码进行验证，当验证通过时，处理模块1102确定是由该第二网络标识所对应的网络为该终端设备提供第一网络切片的切片服务。这样可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。
下面对本申请实施例中提供的一种终端设备进行描述。请参阅图12，本申请实施例中终端设备的一个结构示意图，该终端设备可以用于执行图5、图6和图7所示实施例中终端设备执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该终端设备包括处理模块1201和收发模块1202。
处理模块1201，用于根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码；
收发模块1202，用于向认证服务器发送第二消息，该第二消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1201具体用于：
根据第一信任状和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，该第一信任状用于该终端设备和该认证服务器之间的针对第一网络切片的切片认证。
另一种可能的实现方式中，第一信任状为该终端设备的公钥和该终端设备的私钥；该处理模块1201具体用于：
根据该第一网络标识按照第一预设密钥生成函数生成第一摘要；
根据该终端设备的私钥对该第一摘要进行加密，得到第一消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一信任状为第一口令；该处理模块1201具体用于：
根据该第一口令和第一网络标识生成第二消息认证码。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1201具体用于：
根据第一密钥Kemsk和第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，该第一密钥Kemsk为针对该终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中生成的密钥。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第二消息还携带第一标识信息，该第一标识信息与第一网络标识对应；该第一标识信息包括第一网络的标识或该第一网络中的功能实体的标识，该第一网络为该终端设备当前所接入的网络。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该第一网络的标识包括：
该第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者该第一网络所对应的PLMN标识，或者该第一网络的名称SNN，或者该第一网络的网络识别符NID；
该第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
AMF实体的标识，或者该AMF实体的名称，或者该AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，该AMF实体为该第一网络中为该第一终端设备发起该第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
本申请实施例中，处理模块1201根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，收发模块1202向认证服务器发送第一消息，该第一消息携带该第一消息认证码，以便于认证服务器对该第一消息认证码进行验证，从而可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。
下面对本申请实施例中提供的一种AMF实体进行描述。请参阅图13，本申请实施例中AMF实体的一个结构示意图，该AMF实体可以用于执行图8所示实施例中AMF实体执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该AMF实体包括处理模块1301。可选的，该AMF实体还包括收发模块1302。
处理模块1301，用于根据第一网络切片的标识更新第二密钥K AMF，得到更新后的第二密钥K AMF，该第一网络切片为终端设备的已切片认证成功的网络切片，该更新后的第二密钥K AMF用于终端设备与第一网络进行传输，第一网络为终端设备当前所接入的网络。
一种可能的实现方式中，该AMF实体还包括收发模块1302；
该收发模块1302，用于向终端设备发送第二指示信息，该第二指示信息根据指示针对第一网络切片更新第二密钥K AMF。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1301具体用于：
根据该第一网络切片的标识和第三密钥更新该第二密钥K AMF，该第三密钥为终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所生成的密钥，或终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所使用的信任状。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该收发模块1302还用于：
接收终端设备发送的完成通知消息，该完成通知消息用于通知该AMF实体：该终端设备更新第二密钥K AMF完成。
本申请实施例中，处理模块1301根据第一网络切片的标识更新第二密钥K AMF，得到更新后的第二密钥K AMF，该第一网络切片为终端设备的已切片认证成功的网络切片，该更新后的第二密钥K AMF用于终端设备与第一网络进行传输(包括切片数据传输或信令传输)，第一网络为终端设备当前所接入的网络。这样，在漫游场景中，终端设备的归属网络可以通过该更新后的第一密钥K AMF确定是由第一网络为该终端设备提供该第一网络切片的切片服务，该第一网络切片的切片服务包括切片数据传输或信令传输。因此，通过上述方案可以避免或防止由于终端设备当前所接入的拜访网络欺骗终端设备的归属网络的行为，提升网络安全性。
下面对本申请实施例中提供的一种终端设备进行描述。请参阅图14，本申请实施例中终端设备的一个结构示意图，该终端设备可以用于执行图8所示实施例中终端设备执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该终端设备包括收发模块1401和处理模块1402。
收发模块1401，用于接收AMF实体发送的第二指示信息；
处理模块1402，用于根据该第二指示信息更新该第二密钥K AMF，该更新后的第二密钥K AMF用于终端设备与第一网络进行传输，第一网络为终端设备当前所接入的网络。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1402具体用于：
根据该第二指示信息确定针对第一网络切片更新第二密钥K AMF；
根据该第一网络切片的标识更新该第二密钥K AMF。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该处理模块1402具体用于：
根据该第一网络切片的标识和第三密钥更新该第二密钥K AMF，该第三密钥为终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所生成的密钥，或终端设备的第一网络切片的EAP认证流程中所使用的信任状。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该收发模块1401还用于：
向AMF实体发送完成通知消息，该完成通知消息用于通知该AMF实体：该终端设备更新第二密钥K AMF完成。
本申请还提供一种切片服务验证功能实体1500，请参阅图15，本申请实施例中切片服务验证功能实体的另一个结构示意图，该切片服务验证功能实体可以用于执行图2A、图3和图4所示实施例中切片服务验证功能实体执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该切片服务验证功能实体1500包括：处理器1501、存储器1502、输入输出设备1503以及总线1504。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理器1501、存储器1502、输入输出设备1503分别与总线1504相连，该存储器中存储有计算机指令。
前述实施例中的处理模块902具体可以是本实施例中的处理器1501，因此该处理器1501的具体实现不再赘述。前述实施例中的收发模块901则具体可以是本实施例中的输入输出设备1503。
本申请还提供一种电路系统，请参阅图16，本申请实施例中电路系统的一个结构示意图，该电路系统可以用于执行图2A、图3和图4所示实施例中切片服务验证功能实体执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该电路系统包括：处理电路1601和接口电路1602。该处理电路1601可以为芯片、逻辑电路、集成电路、处理电路或片上系统(system on chip，SoC)芯片等，接口电路1602可以为通信接口、输入输出接口等。
前述实施例中的处理模块902具体可以是本实施例中的该处理电路1601，因此该处理电路1601的具体实现不再赘述。前述实施例中的收发模块901则具体可以是本实施例中的接口电路1602，因此该接口电路1602的具体实现不再赘述。
请参阅图17，其为本申请实施例提供的一种终端设备的结构示意图。其可以为以上实施例中的终端设备，用于实现以上实施例中终端设备的操作。如图17所示，该终端设备包括：天线1710、射频部分1720、信号处理部分1730。天线1710与射频部分1720连接。 在下行方向上，射频部分1720通过天线1710接收网络设备发送的信息，将网络设备发送的信息发送给信号处理部分1730进行处理。在上行方向上，信号处理部分1730对终端设备的信息进行处理，并发送给射频部分1720，射频部分1720对终端设备的信息进行处理后经过天线1710发送给网络设备。
信号处理部分1730可以包括调制解调子系统，用于实现对数据各通信协议层的处理；还可以包括中央处理子系统，用于实现对终端设备操作系统以及应用层的处理；此外，还可以包括其它子系统，例如多媒体子系统，周边子系统等，其中多媒体子系统用于实现对终端相机，屏幕显示等的控制，周边子系统用于实现与其它设备的连接。调制解调子系统可以为单独设置的芯片。可选的，以上用于终端设备的装置可以位于该调制解调子系统。
调制解调子系统可以包括一个或多个处理元件1731，例如，包括一个主控CPU和其它集成电路。此外，该调制解调子系统还可以包括存储元件1732和接口电路1733。存储元件1732用于存储数据和程序，但用于执行以上方法中终端设备所执行的方法的程序可能不存储于该存储元件1732中，而是存储于调制解调子系统之外的存储器中，使用时调制解调子系统加载使用。接口电路1733用于与其它子系统通信。以上用于终端设备的装置可以位于调制解调子系统，该调制解调子系统可以通过芯片实现，该芯片包括至少一个处理元件和接口电路，其中处理元件用于执行以上终端设备执行的任一种方法的各个步骤，接口电路用于与其它装置通信。在一种实现中，终端设备实现以上方法中各个步骤的单元可以通过处理元件调度程序的形式实现，例如用于终端设备的装置包括处理元件和存储元件，处理元件调用存储元件存储的程序，以执行以上方法实施例中终端设备执行的方法。存储元件可以为处理元件处于同一芯片上的存储元件，即片内存储元件。
在另一种实现中，用于执行以上方法中终端设备所执行的方法的程序可以在与处理元件处于不同芯片上的存储元件，即片外存储元件。此时，处理元件从片外存储元件调用或加载程序于片内存储元件上，以调用并执行以上方法实施例中终端设备执行的方法。
在又一种实现中，终端设备实现以上方法中各个步骤的单元可以是被配置成一个或多个处理元件，这些处理元件设置于调制解调子系统上，这里的处理元件可以为集成电路，例如：一个或多个ASIC，或，一个或多个DSP，或，一个或者多个FPGA，或者这些类集成电路的组合。这些集成电路可以集成在一起，构成芯片。
终端设备实现以上方法中各个步骤的单元可以集成在一起，以片上系统(system-on-a-chip，SOC)的形式实现，该SOC芯片，用于实现以上方法。该芯片内可以集成至少一个处理元件和存储元件，由处理元件调用存储元件的存储的程序的形式实现以上终端设备执行的方法；或者，该芯片内可以集成至少一个集成电路，用于实现以上终端设备执行的方法；或者，可以结合以上实现方式，部分单元的功能通过处理元件调用程序的形式实现，部分单元的功能通过集成电路的形式实现。
可见，以上用于终端设备的装置可以包括至少一个处理元件和接口电路，其中至少一个处理元件用于执行以上方法实施例所提供的任一种终端设备执行的方法。处理元件可以以第一种方式：即调用存储元件存储的程序的方式执行终端设备执行的部分或全部步骤；也可以以第二种方式：即通过处理器元件中的硬件的集成逻辑电路结合指令的方式执行终 端设备执行的部分或全部步骤；当然，也可以结合第一种方式和第二种方式执行终端设备执行的部分或全部步骤。
这里的处理元件同以上描述，可以是通用处理器，例如CPU，还可以是被配置成实施以上方法的一个或多个集成电路，例如：一个或多个ASIC，或，一个或多个微处理器DSP，或，一个或者多个FPGA等，或这些集成电路形式中至少两种的组合。
存储元件可以是一个存储器，也可以是多个存储元件的统称。
本申请还提供一种认证服务器1800，请参阅图18，本申请实施例中认证服务器的另一个结构示意图，该认证服务器可以用于执行图5、图6和图7所示实施例中认证服务器执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该认证服务器1800包括：处理器1801、存储器1802、输入输出设备1803以及总线1804。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理器1801、存储器1802、输入输出设备1803分别与总线1804相连，该存储器中存储有计算机指令。
前述实施例中的处理模块1102具体可以是本实施例中的处理器1801，因此该处理器1801的具体实现不再赘述。前述实施例中的收发模块1101则具体可以是本实施例中的输入输出设备1803，因此该输入输出设备1803的具体实现不再赘述。
复用图16，图16还可以用于执行图5、图6和图7所示的实施例中认证服务器执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该电路系统包括：处理电路1601和接口电路1602。该处理电路1601可以为芯片、逻辑电路、集成电路、处理电路或片上系统(system on chip，SoC)芯片等，接口电路1602可以为通信接口、输入输出接口等。
前述实施例中的处理模块1102具体可以是本实施例中的该处理电路1601，因此该处理电路1601的具体实现不再赘述。前述实施例中的收发模块1101则具体可以是本实施例中的接口电路1602，因此该接口电路1602的具体实现不再赘述。
本申请还提供一种AMF实体1900，请参阅图19，本申请实施例中AMF实体的另一个结构示意图，该AMF实体可以用于执行图8所示实施例中AMF实体执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该AMF实体1900包括：处理器1901、存储器1902、输入输出设备1903以及总线1904。
一种可能的实现方式中，该处理器1901、存储器1902、输入输出设备1903分别与总线1904相连，该存储器中存储有计算机指令。
前述实施例中的处理模块1301具体可以是本实施例中的处理器1901，因此该处理器1901的具体实现不再赘述。前述实施例中的收发模块1302则具体可以是本实施例中的输入输出设备1903，因此该输入输出设备1903的具体实现不再赘述。
复用图16，图16还可以用于执行图8所示的实施例中AMF实体执行的步骤，可以参考上述方法实施例中的相关描述。
该电路系统包括：处理电路1601和接口电路1602。该处理电路1601可以为芯片、逻辑电路、集成电路、处理电路或片上系统(system on chip，SoC)芯片等，接口电路1602 可以为通信接口、输入输出接口等。
前述实施例中的处理模块1301具体可以是本实施例中的该处理电路1601，因此该处理电路1601的具体实现不再赘述。前述实施例中的收发模块1302则具体可以是本实施例中的接口电路1602，因此该接口电路1602的具体实现不再赘述。
请参阅图20，本申请实施例还提供了一种通信系统，该通信系统包括终端设备、切片服务验证功能实体和认证服务器，具体地，该切片服务验证功能实体可以为如图9所示的切片服务验证功能实体，该终端设备可以为如上述图10所示的终端设备。其中，图9所示的切片服务验证功能实体用于执行图2A、图3和图4所示的实施例中切片服务验证功能实体执行的全部或部分步骤。图10所示的终端设备用于执行图2A、图3和图4所示的实施例中终端设备执行的全部或部分步骤。
请参阅图21，本申请实施例还提供了一种通信系统，该通信系统包括认证服务器和终端设备，具体地，该认证服务器可以包括如上述图11所示的认证服务器，该终端设备可以为如图12所示的终端设备。其中，图11所示的认证服务器用于执行图5、图6和图7所示的实施例中认证服务器执行的全部或部分步骤。图12所示的终端设备用于执行图5、图6和图7所示的实施例中终端设备执行的全部或部分步骤。
请参阅图22，本申请实施例还提供了一种通信系统，该通信系统包括AMF实体和终端设备，具体地，该AMF实体可以包括如上述图13所示的AMF实体，该终端设备可以为如图14所示的终端设备。其中，图13所示的认证服务器用于执行图8所示的实施例中认证服务器执行的全部或部分步骤。图14所示的终端设备用于执行图8所示的实施例中终端设备执行的全部或部分步骤。
本申请实施例提供一种芯片，包括存储器和处理器，该存储器用于存储计算机程序，该处理器用于从存储器中调用并运行计算机程序，使得该处理器执行上述图2A、图3、图4、图5、图6、图7和图8所示的实施例的切片服务验证方法。
本申请实施例还提供一种包括指令的计算机程序产品，当其在计算机上运行时，使得该计算机执行如上述图2A、图3、图4、图5、图6、图7和图8所示的实施例的切片服务验证方法。
本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，包括指令，当该指令在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行如上述图2A、图3、图4、图5、图6、图7和图8所示的实施例的功率控制方法。
所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，为描述的方便和简洁，上述描述的系统，装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的系统，装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各个单元单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。上述集成的单元既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用软件功能单元的形式实现。
所述集成的单元如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的全部或部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)、随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，以上实施例仅用以说明本申请的技术方案，而非对其限制；尽管参照前述实施例对本申请进行了详细的说明，本领域的普通技术人员应当理解：其依然可以对前述各实施例所记载的技术方案进行修改，或者对其中部分技术特征进行等同替换；而这些修改或者替换，并不使相应技术方案的本质脱离本申请各实施例技术方案的精神和范围。

Claims (28)

  1. 一种切片服务验证方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    切片服务验证功能实体接收终端设备发送的第一消息，所述第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，所述第一消息认证码是根据第一网络标识计算生成的；
    所述切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对所述第一消息认证码进行验证；
    当验证通过时，所述切片服务验证功能实体向认证服务器发送所述第二网络标识。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对所述第一消息认证码进行验证，包括：
    所述切片服务验证功能实体获取第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
    所述切片服务验证功能实体根据所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和所述第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
    所述切片服务验证功能实体将所述第一消息认证码与所述第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述切片服务验证功能实体根据所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和所述第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码，包括：
    所述切片服务验证功能实体根据所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF、所述第一网络切片的标识和所述第二网络标识获得所述第二消息认证码。
  4. 根据权利要求2或3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述切片服务验证功能实体为网络切片认证与授权功能NSSAAF实体；所述切片服务验证功能实体获取第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF，包括：
    所述切片服务验证功能实体接收认证服务器功能AUSF实体发送的所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF，所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF为所述AUSF实体根据第一中间密钥K AUSF生成的。
  5. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述切片服务验证功能实体根据第二网络标识对所述第一消息认证码进行验证，包括：
    所述切片服务验证功能实体根据第一中间密钥K AUSF和所述第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
    所述切片服务验证功能实体将所述第一消息认证码和所述第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
  6. 根据权利要求1至5中的任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一消息还包括第一标识信息，所述第二网络标识为所述切片服务验证功能实体根据所述第一标识信息确定的；
    其中，所述第一标识信息包括第一网络的标识或所述第一网络中的功能实体的标识，所述第一网络为所述终端设备当前所接入的网络。
  7. 根据要求6所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一网络的标识包括：
    所述第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者所述第一网络所对应的公共陆地移动网络PLMN标识，或者所述第一网络的名称SNN，或者所述第一网络的网络识别符NID；
    所述第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
    接入与移动性管理功能AMF实体的标识，或者所述AMF实体的名称，或者所述AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，所述AMF实体为所述第一网络中为所述第一终端设备发起所述第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
  8. 一种切片服务验证方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码；
    所述终端设备向切片服务验证功能实体发送第一消息，所述第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码。
  9. 根据权利要求8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
    所述终端设备根据所述第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
    所述终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，包括：
    所述终端设备根据所述第一网络标识和所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成所述第一消息认证码。
  10. 根据权利要求8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’；
    所述终端设备根据所述第二加解密密钥CK’和所述第三完整性保护密钥IK’生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
    所述终端设备根据所述第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
    所述终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，包括：
    所述终端设备根据所述第一网络标识和所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成所述第一消息认证码。
  11. 根据权利要求8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥Kausf；
    所述终端设备根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码，包括：
    所述终端设备根据所述第一网络标识和所述第一中间密钥K AUSF生成所述第一消息认证码。
  12. 根据权利要求9或10所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备根据所述第一网络标识和所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码，包括：
    所述终端设备根据所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF、所述第一网络切片的标识和所述第一网络标识生成所述第一消息认证码。
  13. 根据权利要求8至12中的任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一消息还包括第一标识信息，所述第一网络标识与所述第一标识信息对应；
    其中，所述第一标识信息包括第一网络的标识或所述第一网络中的功能实体的标识，所述第一网络为所述终端设备当前所接入的网络。
  14. 根据要求13所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一网络的标识包括：
    所述第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者所述第一网络所对应的公共陆地移动网络PLMN标识，或者所述第一网络的名称SNN，或者所述第一网络的网络识别符NID；
    所述第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
    AMF实体的标识，或者所述AMF实体的名称，或者所述AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，所述AMF实体为所述第一网络中为所述终端设备发起所述第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
  15. 一种切片服务验证功能实体，其特征在于，所述切片服务验证功能实体包括：
    收发模块，用于接收终端设备发送的第一消息，所述第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码，所述第一消息认证码是根据第一网络标识的标识计算生成的；
    处理模块，用于根据第二网络标识对所述第一消息认证码进行验证；
    所述收发模块，用于当验证通过时，向认证服务器发送所述第二网络标识。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述的切片服务验证功能实体，其特征在于，所述处理模块具体用于：
    获取第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
    根据所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF和所述第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
    将所述第一消息认证码与所述第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
  17. 根据权利要求16所述的切片服务验证功能实体，其特征在于，所述处理模块具体用于：
    根据所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF、所述第一网络切片的标识和所述第二网络标识获得所述第二消息认证码。
  18. 根据权利要求16或17所述的切片服务验证功能实体，其特征在于，所述切片服务验证功能实体为网络切片认证与授权功能NSSAAF实体；所述处理模块具体用于：
    接收第一认证服务器功能AUSF实体发送的所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF，所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF为所述AUSF实体根据第一中间密钥K AUSF生成的。
  19. 根据权利要求15所述的切片服务验证功能实体，其特征在于，所述处理模块具体用于：
    根据第一中间密钥K AUSF和所述第二网络标识生成第二消息认证码；
    将所述第一消息认证码和所述第二消息认证码进行匹配以获取验证结果。
  20. 根据权利要求15至19中的任一项所述的切片服务验证功能实体，其特征在于，所述第一消息还包括第一标识信息，所述第二网络标识为所述切片服务验证功能实体根据所述第一标识信息确定的；
    其中，所述第一标识信息为第一网络的标识或所述第一网络中的功能实体的标识，所 述第一网络为所述终端设备当前所接入的网络。
  21. 根据权利要求20所述的切片服务验证功能实体，其特征在于，所述第一网络的标识包括：
    所述第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者所述第一网络所对应的公共陆地移动网络PLMN标识，或者所述第一网络的名称SNN，或者所述第一网络的网络识别符NID；
    所述第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
    AMF实体的标识，或者所述AMF实体的名称，或者所述AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，所述AMF实体为所述第一网络中为所述第一终端设备发起所述第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
  22. 一种终端设备，其特征在于，所述终端设备包括：
    处理模块，用于根据第一网络标识生成第一消息认证码；
    收发模块，用于向切片服务验证功能实体发送第一消息，所述第一消息携带第一网络切片的标识和第一消息认证码。
  23. 根据权利要求22所述的终端设备，其特征在于，所述处理模块还用于：
    根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
    根据所述第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
    所述处理模块具体用于：
    根据所述第一网络标识和所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码。
  24. 根据权利要求22所述的终端设备，其特征在于，所述处理模块还用于：
    根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第二加解密密钥CK’和第三完整性保护密钥IK’；
    根据所述第二加解密密钥CK’和所述第三完整性保护密钥IK’生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
    根据所述第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF；
    所述处理模块具体用于：
    根据所述第一网络标识和所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF生成第一消息认证码。
  25. 根据权利要求22所述的终端设备，其特征在于，所述处理模块还用于：
    根据第一加解密密钥CK以及第一完整性保护密钥IK生成第一中间密钥K AUSF；
    所述处理模块具体用于：
    根据所述第一网络标识和所述第一中间密钥K AUSF生成第一消息认证码。
  26. 根据权利要求23或24所述的终端设备，其特征在于，所述处理模块具体用于：
    根据所述第二完整性保护密钥K NSSAAF、所述第一网络切片的标识和所述第一网络标识生成所述第一消息认证码。
  27. 根据权利要求22至26中的任一项所述的终端设备，其特征在于，所述第一消息还包括第一标识信息，所述第一网络标识与所述第一标识信息对应；
    其中，所述第一标识信息为第一网络的标识或所述第一网络中的功能实体的标识，所述第一网络为所述终端设备当前所接入的网络。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的终端设备，其特征在于，所述第一网络的标识包括：
    所述第一网络的标识SN-ID，或者所述第一网络所对应的公共陆地移动网络PLMN标识，或者所述第一网络的名称SNN，或者所述第一网络的网络识别符NID；
    所述第一网络中的功能实体的标识包括：
    AMF实体的标识，或者所述AMF实体的名称，或者所述AMF实体的全球唯一标识符，所述AMF实体为所述第一网络中为所述终端设备发起所述第一网络切片的切片认证的功能实体。
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