WO2021196094A1 - 电压攻击检测电路和芯片 - Google Patents

电压攻击检测电路和芯片 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021196094A1
WO2021196094A1 PCT/CN2020/082830 CN2020082830W WO2021196094A1 WO 2021196094 A1 WO2021196094 A1 WO 2021196094A1 CN 2020082830 W CN2020082830 W CN 2020082830W WO 2021196094 A1 WO2021196094 A1 WO 2021196094A1
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Prior art keywords
voltage
attack
range
sensor
detection circuit
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PCT/CN2020/082830
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
杨江
薛建锋
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深圳市汇顶科技股份有限公司
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Application filed by 深圳市汇顶科技股份有限公司 filed Critical 深圳市汇顶科技股份有限公司
Priority to CN202080001158.4A priority Critical patent/CN111566492B/zh
Priority to EP20924972.1A priority patent/EP3929602B1/en
Priority to PCT/CN2020/082830 priority patent/WO2021196094A1/zh
Priority to US17/486,292 priority patent/US11940471B2/en
Publication of WO2021196094A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021196094A1/zh

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
    • G01R31/00—Arrangements for testing electric properties; Arrangements for locating electric faults; Arrangements for electrical testing characterised by what is being tested not provided for elsewhere
    • G01R31/28—Testing of electronic circuits, e.g. by signal tracer
    • G01R31/2832—Specific tests of electronic circuits not provided for elsewhere
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
    • G01R19/00—Arrangements for measuring currents or voltages or for indicating presence or sign thereof
    • G01R19/165—Indicating that current or voltage is either above or below a predetermined value or within or outside a predetermined range of values
    • G01R19/16533—Indicating that current or voltage is either above or below a predetermined value or within or outside a predetermined range of values characterised by the application
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/75—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation
    • G06F21/755—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation with measures against power attack
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
    • G01R19/00—Arrangements for measuring currents or voltages or for indicating presence or sign thereof
    • G01R19/165—Indicating that current or voltage is either above or below a predetermined value or within or outside a predetermined range of values
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
    • G01R19/00—Arrangements for measuring currents or voltages or for indicating presence or sign thereof
    • G01R19/165—Indicating that current or voltage is either above or below a predetermined value or within or outside a predetermined range of values
    • G01R19/16533—Indicating that current or voltage is either above or below a predetermined value or within or outside a predetermined range of values characterised by the application
    • G01R19/16538—Indicating that current or voltage is either above or below a predetermined value or within or outside a predetermined range of values characterised by the application in AC or DC supplies
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
    • G01R31/00—Arrangements for testing electric properties; Arrangements for locating electric faults; Arrangements for electrical testing characterised by what is being tested not provided for elsewhere
    • G01R31/28—Testing of electronic circuits, e.g. by signal tracer
    • G01R31/282—Testing of electronic circuits specially adapted for particular applications not provided for elsewhere
    • G01R31/2827—Testing of electronic protection circuits
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05F—SYSTEMS FOR REGULATING ELECTRIC OR MAGNETIC VARIABLES
    • G05F1/00—Automatic systems in which deviations of an electric quantity from one or more predetermined values are detected at the output of the system and fed back to a device within the system to restore the detected quantity to its predetermined value or values, i.e. retroactive systems
    • G05F1/10—Regulating voltage or current

Definitions

  • the embodiments of the present application relate to the field of electronics, and more specifically, to a voltage attack detection circuit and a chip containing or equipped with the voltage attack detection circuit.
  • a security chip can be used to realize functions such as user identification and key data storage, and it is widely used in the financial field.
  • security chips play a vital role in information security.
  • more and more chip-level attack methods and examples have been disclosed, and accordingly, higher and higher requirements are put forward for chip-level security.
  • error injection attack There are many ways to attack the chip level, of which error injection attacks are the most effective.
  • the purpose of the error injection attack is to force the chip to perform an abnormal operation, thereby exposing the security information in the chip. At this point, the attacker can easily obtain the confidential data in the security chip by using fault analysis technology.
  • error injection attack such as voltage attack, temperature attack, laser attack, electromagnetic attack, etc.
  • the chip Under normal circumstances, the chip is divided into multiple different power domains. Although each power domain is independent, there are certain dependencies and interactions. Therefore, each power domain must be protected. In other words, the chip needs to build a complete voltage attack protection scheme for the full power domain; in addition, the current voltage attack protection scheme is only for the protection of the voltage to be detected, and its protection form is single and there are certain protection blind spots.
  • a voltage attack detection circuit and chip are provided, which can not only perform voltage attack protection for the entire power domain, but also improve the reliability of the protection scheme.
  • a voltage attack detection circuit including:
  • At least one voltage regulation circuit At least one voltage regulation circuit
  • the at least one voltage regulation circuit is all connected to an external power source, the at least one voltage regulation circuit is respectively used to convert the external power source into at least one internal power source, and the at least one internal power source is respectively used to output at least one first voltage ;
  • At least one voltage sensor and at least one glitch sensor are At least one voltage sensor and at least one glitch sensor
  • the at least one voltage sensor is respectively used to receive the at least one first voltage and respectively used to output at least one first signal
  • the at least one first signal is respectively used to indicate whether the at least one internal power supply is under attack
  • the at least one glitch sensor is respectively used to receive the at least one first voltage and respectively used to output at least one second signal
  • the at least one glitch sensor is respectively used to receive the at least one first voltage and respectively used to output at least one second signal
  • the at least one glitch sensor The second signal is respectively used to indicate whether the at least one internal power supply has been attacked by a voltage attack whose duration is within the third range and the attack strength is within the fourth range, and the minimum value of the first range is greater than or equal to the third range
  • the absolute value of the maximum value of the second range is less than or equal to the absolute value of any value in the fourth range.
  • a voltage attack with an attack duration in the first range and an attack intensity in the second range can be detected, and through the at least one glitch sensor, it can be detected that the attack duration is in the third range and the attack intensity is in the second range.
  • the four-range voltage attack can provide a full range of voltage attack protection in terms of attack duration and attack strength, so as to improve the reliability of the voltage attack protection scheme.
  • the attack means for each power domain that is, each voltage regulation circuit
  • the attack means for each power domain is used to construct a comprehensive and reliable anti-attack solution for the entire power domain (that is, the at least one voltage regulation circuit).
  • the minimum value of the first range is 0.1 us.
  • the third range is 1 ns to 0.1 us.
  • the absolute value of the maximum value of the second range and/or the absolute value of the minimum value of the fourth range is proportional to the absolute value of the voltage of the external power supply.
  • the second range is -0.5*V ⁇ 0.5*V, where V represents the voltage value of the external power supply.
  • the fourth range is 0.5*V to V, and/or the fourth range is -V to -0.5*V.
  • the at least one voltage sensor is respectively connected to the at least one internal power source to receive the at least one first voltage, and the at least one voltage sensor is configured to be based on the received reference voltage and The at least one first voltage outputs the at least one first signal.
  • the voltage attack detection circuit further includes:
  • the external power supply is used to output a second voltage
  • the external power supply voltage sensor is connected to the external power supply
  • the external power supply voltage sensor is used to receive the second voltage and output a third signal
  • the third The signal is used to indicate whether the second voltage has been attacked by a voltage attack whose duration is within the first range and the attack intensity is within the second range
  • the external power glitch sensor is connected to the external power source, and the external power source
  • the power glitch sensor is used to receive the second voltage and output a fourth signal
  • the third signal is used to indicate whether the second voltage has been attacked.
  • the duration is within the third range and the attack intensity is within the fourth range Voltage attack inside.
  • each voltage regulation circuit in the at least one voltage regulation circuit includes at least one of the following elements: a low dropout linear regulator, a charge pump, a step-down variation circuit, and a step-up type Changing circuit and bidirectional DC converter.
  • each of the at least one voltage sensor includes a hysteresis comparator.
  • a chip including:
  • Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a voltage attack type in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of the positional relationship between the voltage sensor and the glitch sensor and the voltage adjustment circuit in an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a voltage attack detection circuit according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a voltage attack type in an embodiment of the present application.
  • two characteristics of voltage attack are defined, namely attack strength V attack and attack duration t attack .
  • the voltage attack is divided into the first type of voltage attack and the second type of voltage attack.
  • the V attack of the first type of voltage attack is small and the t attack is large
  • the second type of voltage attack is V attack is large and t attack is small.
  • the first type of voltage attack may be a supply voltage attack
  • the second type of voltage attack may be a glitch attack.
  • Both the first type of voltage attack and the second type of voltage attack can make the circuit inside the chip work abnormally, causing the trigger to enter an error state, causing the processor to skip or perform the wrong operation, and make the chip safer. The information is exposed.
  • a voltage sensor (Voltage Sensor) can be used to protect against the first type of voltage attack
  • a glitch sensor (Glitch Sensor) can be used to protect against the second type of voltage attack.
  • the chip will have multiple power domains (ie, internal power).
  • a voltage regulator circuit Voltage Regulator converts the input voltage (Input Voltage) into an output voltage (Output Voltage), and supplies power to other modules.
  • Voltage Regulator converts the input voltage (Input Voltage) into an output voltage (Output Voltage), and supplies power to other modules.
  • the chip contains multiple such voltage regulation circuits, it constitutes a complex and diverse power domain.
  • Each power domain needs a voltage sensor and a glitch sensor to detect whether it is subject to voltage attacks.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of the positional relationship between the voltage sensor and the glitch sensor and the voltage adjustment circuit in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the voltage attack detection circuit 100 may include a voltage adjustment circuit 101, a first voltage sensor 102, a second voltage sensor 103, a first glitch sensor 104 and a second glitch sensor 105.
  • the first voltage sensor 102 and the first glitch sensor 104 are connected to the input end of the voltage regulation circuit 101, and the second voltage sensor 103 and the second glitch sensor 105 are connected to the voltage regulation circuit 101.
  • the output terminal of the circuit 101 corresponds to the first voltage sensor 102 and the second voltage sensor 103 are respectively used to detect the input voltage and output voltage of the voltage regulation circuit 101, so as to detect whether the power domain where the voltage regulation circuit 101 is located is subject to the first A voltage attack type of voltage attack.
  • the first burr sensor 104 and the second burr sensor 105 are respectively used to detect the input voltage and output voltage of the voltage regulation circuit 101 to detect whether the power domain where the voltage regulation circuit 101 is located is attacked by the second voltage Type of voltage attack.
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a voltage attack detection circuit according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the voltage attack detection circuit 200 may include at least one voltage adjustment circuit; for example, the at least one voltage adjustment circuit may include a first voltage adjustment circuit 231 and a second voltage adjustment circuit as shown in FIG. 232,..., and the Nth voltage regulating circuit 23N.
  • the at least one voltage regulation circuit is all connected to an external power supply (VDD), and the at least one voltage regulation circuit is respectively used to convert the external power supply into at least one internal power supply; for example, the at least one internal power supply may include
  • the internal power supplies V1, V2,..., and VN shown in 2 are respectively used to output at least one first voltage for supplying power to one or some modules in the chip.
  • the at least one first voltage may be partially equal, or all may be equal, or may not be equal to each other, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the voltage attack detection circuit 200 may also include multiple external power sources.
  • each of the multiple external power sources may be an external power source as shown in FIG. 3. .
  • the plurality of external power sources may be respectively connected to a plurality of voltage regulating circuits, and each voltage regulating circuit of the plurality of voltage regulating circuits is used to convert the external power source connected to it into an internal power source.
  • the first voltage output by each voltage regulation circuit in the circuit can be connected to a voltage sensor and a glitch sensor, so that the first voltage sensor and the first glitch sensor perform voltage attack detection, correspondingly, in the full power domain Perform attack protection.
  • the voltage attack detection circuit 200 may further include at least one voltage sensor; for example, the voltage attack detection circuit 200 may further include a first voltage sensor 241 and a second voltage sensor 242 as shown in FIG. ,..., and the Nth voltage sensor 24N.
  • the voltage attack detection circuit 200 may further include at least one glitch sensor; for example, the voltage attack detection circuit 200 may further include a first glitch sensor 251, a second glitch sensor 252,..., and the Nth glitch sensor as shown in FIG. Glitch sensor 25N.
  • the at least one voltage sensor is respectively used to receive the at least one first voltage and respectively used to output at least one first signal
  • the at least one first signal is respectively used to indicate whether the at least one internal power supply is under attack
  • the at least one glitch sensor is respectively used to receive the at least one first voltage and respectively used to output at least one second signal
  • the at least one glitch sensor is respectively used to receive the at least one first voltage and respectively used to output at least one second signal
  • the at least one glitch sensor The second signal is respectively used to indicate whether the at least one internal power supply has been attacked by a voltage attack whose duration is within the third range and the attack strength is within the fourth range, and the minimum value of the first range is greater than or equal to the third range
  • the absolute value of the maximum value of the second range is less than or equal to the absolute value of any value in the fourth range.
  • a voltage attack with an attack duration in the first range and an attack intensity in the second range can be detected, and through the at least one glitch sensor, it can be detected that the attack duration is in the third range and the attack intensity is in the second range.
  • the four-range voltage attack can provide a full range of voltage attack protection in terms of attack duration and attack strength, so as to improve the reliability of the voltage attack protection scheme.
  • the attack means for each power domain that is, the output voltage of each voltage regulation circuit
  • the attack means for each power domain that is, the output voltage of each voltage regulation circuit
  • the minimum value of the first range is 0.1 microsecond (us).
  • the first range is 0.1us ⁇ + ⁇ .
  • V attack can be a DC voltage value
  • t attack is used to indicate the duration of the voltage.
  • the third range is 1 nanosecond (ns) to 0.1 microsecond (us).
  • the second range is -0.5*V ⁇ 0.5*V, where V represents the voltage value of the external power supply.
  • the fourth range is 0.5*V to V, and/or the fourth range is -V to -0.5*V.
  • any one of the first range, the second range, the third range, and the fourth range can adjust any one of the first range, the second range, the third range, and the fourth range based on actual conditions. For example, when a glitch sensor is used to detect a voltage attack with a longer attack time, the larger the value of the resistance and capacitance required, the larger the layout area and power consumption required, that is, the shorter the time the glitch sensor is used to detect the attack. In the case of a voltage attack, the smaller the required layout area and power consumption, those skilled in the art can adjust the third range and the fourth range based on the actual configuration of the glitch sensor or the actual requirements of the layout area and power consumption. Similarly, those skilled in the art can also adjust the first range and the second range according to the actual configuration or actual requirements of the voltage sensor.
  • the first range and the third range shown in Table 1 are distinguished by 0.1us, and the second range and the fourth range are distinguished by ⁇ 0.5*V are just examples, and the embodiments of the present application do not make this distinction. Specific restrictions.
  • the absolute value of the maximum value of the second range and/or the absolute value of the minimum value of the fourth range is proportional to the absolute value of the voltage of the external power supply.
  • the absolute value of the maximum value of the second range and/or the absolute value of the minimum value of the fourth range may be the product of the absolute value of the voltage of the external power source and a preset percentage.
  • the second range and the fourth range may be distinguished by 20% of the voltage of the external power source, that is, the second range is -0.2*V ⁇ 0.2*V.
  • the fourth range is 0.2*V ⁇ V, and/or the fourth range is -V ⁇ -0.2*V.
  • the at least one voltage sensor is connected to the at least one internal power source to respectively receive the at least one first voltage, and the at least one voltage sensor is configured to be based on the received reference voltage. And the at least one first voltage to output the at least one first signal.
  • each of the at least one voltage sensor may be used to output a first signal component according to the received first voltage and the received first reference signal, and the first signal component is used to indicate the received Whether the first voltage is greater than or equal to the first reference voltage; each of the at least one voltage sensor may also be used to output a second signal according to the received first voltage and the received second reference voltage Component, the second signal component may be used to indicate whether the second voltage is less than or equal to the second reference voltage, and the first reference voltage is greater than the second reference voltage.
  • the glitch sensor in the embodiment of the present application may be any sensor that can be used to detect the second type of voltage attack.
  • the glitch sensor may include a latched sensor.
  • the voltage attack detection circuit further includes:
  • the external power supply is used to output a second voltage
  • the external power supply voltage sensor 210 is connected to the external power supply
  • the external power supply voltage sensor 210 is used to receive the second voltage and output a third signal.
  • the third signal is used to indicate whether the second voltage has been attacked by a voltage attack whose duration is within the first range and the attack strength is within the second range
  • the external power glitch sensor 220 is connected to the external power source
  • the external power glitch sensor 220 is used to receive the second voltage and output a fourth signal
  • the third signal is used to indicate whether the second voltage has been attacked for a duration within the third range and the attack intensity is within the range.
  • the voltage attack in the fourth range is described.
  • a dedicated voltage sensor and glitch sensor can be configured for the external power supply.
  • each of the at least one voltage regulation circuit includes at least one of the following elements:
  • LDO Low dropout linear regulator
  • Charge Pump charge pump
  • BUCK step-down change circuit
  • Boost step-up change circuit
  • bidirectional DC converter Direct current-Direct current converter
  • DC-DC converter DC-DC converter
  • each of the at least one voltage sensor includes a hysteresis comparator.
  • FIGS. 1 to 3 are only examples of the present application, and should not be construed as a limitation to the present application.
  • the voltage attack detection circuit 200 may further include a reference voltage generation circuit, the reference voltage generation circuit is configured to generate a reference voltage, and the reference voltage generation circuit is connected to the at least one voltage sensor, respectively. And the at least one glitch sensor, so that each of the at least one voltage sensor outputs a first signal based on the received reference voltage and the received first voltage, and each of the at least one glitch sensor The glitch sensor outputs a second signal based on the received reference voltage and the received first voltage.
  • the voltage attack detection circuit 200 may further include a reference voltage detection circuit connected to the reference voltage generation circuit for detecting whether the reference voltage is abnormal, and then generating an indication signal and outputting it.
  • a reference voltage detection circuit connected to the reference voltage generation circuit for detecting whether the reference voltage is abnormal, and then generating an indication signal and outputting it.
  • the indication signal indicates that the reference voltage is abnormal, even if the at least one first signal is respectively used to indicate that the at least one internal power source is under attack for a duration within a first range and attack intensity within a second range Voltage attack, reset it to indicate that the at least one internal power supply is not under voltage attack.
  • the voltage attack circuit 200 may further include a glitch signal detection circuit and the reference voltage generation circuit to eliminate glitches on the reference voltage, thereby improving the accuracy of the indication signal .
  • the present application also provides a chip that includes a power management unit and the voltage attack detection circuit described above; wherein, the power management unit is connected to the voltage attack detection circuit, and the voltage attack detection circuit is used for It is detected whether the power supply voltage of the power management unit is attacked by voltage.
  • the voltage attack detection circuit can be applied to any chip with a power management unit.
  • a security chip for example, the security chip may be a fingerprint sensor chip or a processor chip or the like.
  • the security chip is suitable for any kind of electronic equipment.
  • portable or mobile computing devices such as smartphones, notebook computers, tablet computers, and gaming devices, as well as other electronic devices such as electronic databases, automobiles, and bank automated teller machines (ATM).
  • ATM bank automated teller machines
  • the disclosed system, device, and method can be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are only illustrative.
  • the division of the units is only a logical function division, and there may be other divisions in actual implementation, for example, multiple units or components may be combined or It can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not implemented.
  • the displayed or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the objectives of the solutions of the embodiments.
  • the functional units in the various embodiments of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the function is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
  • the technical solution of the present application essentially or the part that contributes to the existing technology or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including Several instructions are used to make a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application.
  • the aforementioned storage media include: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disks or optical disks and other media that can store program codes. .

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Abstract

一种电压攻击检测电路和芯片,包括至少一个电压调节电路（231,232，…，23N）、至少一个电压传感器（241,242，….，24N）和至少一个毛刺传感器（251,252，…，25N）；至少一个电压传感器（241,242，….，24N）分别用于接收至少一个电压调节电路（231,232，…，23N）输出的至少一个第一电压并分别用于输出至少一个第一信号，至少一个第一信号分别用于指示是否受到攻击时长位于第一范围内且攻击力度位于第二范围内的电压攻击，至少一个毛刺传感器（251,252，…，25N）分别用于接收至少一个第一电压并分别用于输出至少一个第二信号，至少一个第二信号分别用于指示是否受到攻击时长位于第三范围内且攻击力度位于第四范围内的电压攻击。电压攻击检测电路不仅能够针对全电源域进行电压攻击防护，而且能够提高防护方案的可靠性。

Description

电压攻击检测电路和芯片 技术领域
本申请实施例涉及电子领域，并且更具体地，涉及电压攻击检测电路和含有或配备有该电压攻击检测电路的芯片。
背景技术
随着移动支付与交易得到广泛的普及，电子设备被越来越多的用于存储、处理、传输包含关键信息的数据。例如，安全芯片可以用于实现用户身份识别与关键数据存储等功能，其被广泛应用于金融领域。安全芯片作为安全硬件的基础，对信息安全起着至关重要的作用。近年来，越来越多的芯片级攻击方法与实例被公开，相应的，对芯片级的安全提出来越来越高的要求。
针对芯片级的攻击方式有多种，其中错误注入攻击最为有效。错误注入攻击的目的是迫使芯片执行一个非正常的操作，从而使得芯片中的安全信息暴露出来。此时，攻击者可以利用故障分析技术轻易获取安全芯片中的机密数据。错误注入攻击的方式有很多种，例如电压攻击、温度攻击、激光攻击、电磁攻击等。
针对电压攻击，通过改变芯片电源域的供电电压，使得芯片内部的电路工作发生异常，从而引起触发器进入错误状态，致使处理器跳过或执行错误的操作，以便芯片内的安全信息暴露出来。
通常情况下，芯片内部会被划分成多个不同的电源域，每个电源域虽然独立，但也存在一定的依赖与交互，因此每个电源域都必须被保护。换言之，芯片要构建一套完备的针对全电源域的电压攻击防护方案；此外，目前的电压的防攻击方案仅针对待检测电压的防护，其防护形式单一，且存在一定的防护盲区。
因此，针对电源攻击，提供一套完整且可靠的防护方案十分重要。
发明内容
提供一种电压攻击检测电路和芯片，不仅能够针对全电源域进行电压攻击防护，而且能够提高防护方案的可靠性。
第一方面，提供了一种电压攻击检测电路，包括：
至少一个电压调节电路；
所述至少一个电压调节电路均连接至外部电源，所述至少一个电压调节电路分别用于将所述外部电源转化为至少一个内部电源，所述至少一个内部电源分别用于输出至少一个第一电压；
至少一个电压传感器和至少一个毛刺传感器；
其中，所述至少一个电压传感器分别用于接收所述至少一个第一电压并分别用于输出至少一个第一信号，所述至少一个第一信号分别用于指示所述至少一个内部电源是否受到攻击时长位于第一范围内且攻击力度位于第二范围内的电压攻击，所述至少一个毛刺传感器分别用于接收所述至少一个第一电压并分别用于输出至少一个第二信号，所述至少一个第二信号分别用于指示所述至少一个内部电源是否受到攻击时长位于第三范围内且攻击力度位于第四范围内的电压攻击，所述第一范围的最小值大于或等于所述第三范围的最大值，所述第二范围的最大值的绝对值小于或等于所述第四范围的任意值的绝对值。
通过所述至少一个电压传感器，能够检测出攻击时长位于第一范围且攻击力度位于第二范围的电压攻击，通过所述至少一个毛刺传感器，能够检测出攻击时长位于第三范围且攻击力度位于第四范围的电压攻击，从攻击时长和攻击力度上，能够全方位的电压攻击防护，以提高电压攻击的防护方案的可靠性。
换言之，通过明确电压攻击的特性(即攻击时长和攻击力度)区分电压攻击类型，进而针对不同的电压攻击类型采用不同的防护措施(即电压传感器和毛刺传感器)进行电压攻击防护，以全方位覆盖针对每一个电源域(即每一个电压调节电路)的攻击手段，以构建全面、可靠的全电源域(即所述至少一个电压调节电路)的防攻击方案。
在一些可能的实现方式中，所述第一范围的最小值为0.1us。
在一些可能的实现方式中，所述第三范围为1ns～0.1us。
在一些可能的实现方式中，所述第二范围的最大值的绝对值和/或所述第四范围的最小值的绝对值，与所述外部电源的电压的绝对值成正比。
在一些可能的实现方式中，所述第二范围为-0.5*V～0.5*V，其中，V表示所述外部电源的电压值。
在一些可能的实现方式中，所述第四范围为0.5*V～V，和/或所述第四范 围为-V～-0.5*V。
在一些可能的实现方式中，所述至少一个电压传感器分别连接至所述至少一个内部电源，以分别接收所述至少一个第一电压，所述至少一个电压传感器用于基于接收到的参考电压和所述至少一个第一电压输出所述至少一个第一信号。
在一些可能的实现方式中，所述电压攻击检测电路还包括：
外部电源电压传感器和外部电源毛刺传感器；
其中，所述外部电源用于输出第二电压，所述外部电源电压传感器连接至所述外部电源，所述外部电源电压传感器用于接收所述第二电压并输出第三信号，所述第三信号用于指示所述第二电压是否受到攻击时长位于所述第一范围内且攻击力度位于所述第二范围内的电压攻击；所述外部电源毛刺传感器连接至所述外部电源，所述外部电源毛刺传感器用于接收所述第二电压并输出第四信号，所述第三信号用于指示所述第二电压是否受到攻击时长位于所述第三范围内且攻击力度位于所述第四范围内的电压攻击。
在一些可能的实现方式中，所述至少一个电压调节电路中的每一个电压调节电路包括以下元件中的至少一项：低压差线性稳压器、电荷泵、降压式变化电路、升压式变化电路以及双向直流变换器。
在一些可能的实现方式中，所述至少一个电压传感器中的每一个电压传感器包括迟滞比较器。
第二方面，提供了一种芯片，包括：
电源管理单元；以及
第一方面或第一方面中任一种可能实现的方式中所述的电压攻击检测电路；其中，所述电源管理单元连接至所述电压攻击检测电路，所述电压攻击检测电路用于检测所述电源管理单元的电源电压是否受到电压攻击。
附图说明
图1是本申请实施例的电压攻击类型的示意图。
图2是本申请实施例的电压传感器和毛刺传感器与电压调节电路的位置关系的示意性结构图。
图3是本申请实施例的电压攻击检测电路的示意性结构图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合附图，对本申请实施例中的技术方案进行描述。
图1是本申请实施例的电压攻击类型的示意图。
如图1所示，定义了电压攻击的两个特性，即攻击力度V 攻击和攻击时长t 攻击。相应的，基于电压攻击的特性，将电压攻击分为第一类电压攻击和第二类电压攻击，其中，所述第一类电压攻击的V 攻击小且t 攻击大，第二类电压攻击的V 攻击大且t 攻击小。例如，所述第一类电压攻击可以是供电电压攻击(Supply Voltage Attack)，所述第二类电压攻击可以是毛刺攻击(Glitch Attack)。所述第一类电压攻击和所述第二类电压攻击都可以使芯片内部的电路工作发生异常，从而引起触发器进入错误状态，致使处理器跳过或执行错误的操作，使得芯片内的安全信息暴露出来。
基于电压攻击类型，本申请实施例中，针对所述第一类电压攻击可以采用电压传感器(Voltage Sensor)防护，针对第二类电压攻击可以利用毛刺传感器(Glitch Sensor)防护。
芯片会具有多个电源域(即内部电源)。例如，由电压调节电路(Voltage Regulator)将输入电压(Input Voltage)转变为输出电压(Output Voltage)，并向其他模块供电。当芯片中包含多个这样的电压调节电路时，便构成了复杂的、多样的电源域，每个电源域都需要由电压传感器和毛刺传感器来检测是否遭受电压攻击。
图2是本申请实施例的电压传感器和毛刺传感器与电压调节电路的位置关系的示意性结构图。
如图2所示，电压攻击检测电路100可以包括电压调节电路101、第一电压传感器102、第二电压传感器103、第一毛刺传感器104以及第二毛刺传感器105。
其中，所述第一电压传感器102和所述第一毛刺传感器104连接至所述电压调节电路101的输入端，所述第二电压传感器103和所述第二毛刺传感器105连接至所述电压调节电路101的输出端。相应的，所述第一电压传感器102和所述第二电压传感器103分别用于检测所述电压调节电路101的输入电压和输出电压，以检测所述电压调节电路101所在的电源域是否受到第一电压攻击类型的电压攻击。所述第一毛刺传感器104和所述第二毛刺传感器105分别用于检测所述电压调节电路101的输入电压和输出电压，以检测 所述电压调节电路101所在的电源域是否受到第二电压攻击类型的电压攻击。
图3是本申请实施例的电压攻击检测电路的示意性结构图。
如图3所示，所述电压攻击检测电路200可以包括至少一个电压调节电路；例如，所述至少一个电压调节电路可以包括如图3所示的第一电压调节电路231、第二电压调节电路232、…、以及第N电压调节电路23N。所述至少一个电压调节电路均连接至外部电源(VDD)，所述至少一个电压调节电路分别用于将所述外部电源转化为至少一个内部电源；例如，所述至少一个内部电源可以包括如图2所示的内部电源V1、V2、…、以及VN，所述至少一个内部电源分别用于输出至少一个第一电压，用于给芯片内某个或某些模块进行供电。可选地，所述至少一个第一电压可以部分相等，也可以全部相等，还可以互不相等，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
当然，在其他可替代实施例中，所述电压攻击检测电路200还可以包括多个外部电源，此时，所述多个外部电源中的每一个外部电源可以为如图3所示的外部电源。换言之，所述多个外部电源可以分别连接至多个电压调节电路，所述多个电压调节电路中的每一个电压调节电路用于将其连接的外部电源转换成内部电源，所述多个电压调节电路中的每一个电压调节电路输出的第一电压可以连接至一个电压传感器和一个毛刺传感器，以便所述第一个电压传感器和第一个毛刺传感器进行电压攻击检测，相应的，在全电源域进行攻击防护。
如图3所示，所述电压攻击检测电路200还可以包括至少一个电压传感器；例如，所述电压攻击检测电路200还可以包括如图3所示的第一电压传感器241、第二电压传感器242、…、以及第N电压传感器24N。所述电压攻击检测电路200还可以包括至少一个毛刺传感器；例如，所述电压攻击检测电路200还可以包括如图3所示的第一毛刺传感器251、第二毛刺传感器252、…、以及第N毛刺传感器25N。其中，所述至少一个电压传感器分别用于接收所述至少一个第一电压并分别用于输出至少一个第一信号，所述至少一个第一信号分别用于指示所述至少一个内部电源是否受到攻击时长位于第一范围内且攻击力度位于第二范围内的电压攻击，所述至少一个毛刺传感器分别用于接收所述至少一个第一电压并分别用于输出至少一个第二信号，所述至少一个第二信号分别用于指示所述至少一个内部电源是否受到攻 击时长位于第三范围内且攻击力度位于第四范围内的电压攻击，所述第一范围的最小值大于或等于所述第三范围的最大值，所述第二范围的最大值的绝对值小于或等于所述第四范围的任意值的绝对值。
通过所述至少一个电压传感器，能够检测出攻击时长位于第一范围且攻击力度位于第二范围的电压攻击，通过所述至少一个毛刺传感器，能够检测出攻击时长位于第三范围且攻击力度位于第四范围的电压攻击，从攻击时长和攻击力度上，能够全方位的电压攻击防护，以提高电压攻击的防护方案的可靠性。
换言之，通过明确电压攻击的特性(即攻击时长和攻击力度)区分电压攻击类型，进而针对不同的电压攻击类型采用不同的防护措施(即电压传感器和毛刺传感器)进行电压攻击防护，以全方位覆盖针对每一个电源域(即每一个电压调节电路的输出电压)的攻击手段，以构建全面、可靠的全电源域(即所述至少一个电压调节电路)防攻击方案。
下面结合表1对电压传感器和毛刺传感器的防护范围进行说明。
表1电压传感器和毛刺传感器的防护范围
Figure PCTCN2020082830-appb-000001
如表1所示，在本申请的一些实施例中，所述第一范围的最小值为0.1微秒(us)。换言之，所述第一范围为0.1us～+∞。其中，V attack可以是直流电压值，t attack用于表示电压的持续时间。例如，所述第三范围为1纳秒(ns)～0.1微秒(us)。所述第二范围为-0.5*V～0.5*V，其中，V表示所述外部电源的电压值。换言之，所述第四范围为0.5*V～V，和/或所述第四范围为-V～-0.5*V。
应理解，本领域技术人员可以基于实际情况进行调整所述第一范围、第二范围、第三范围以及第四范围中的任一个。例如，毛刺传感器用于检测攻击时长越大的电压攻击时，所需的电阻电容值越大，相应的，所需的版图面积和功耗也越大，即毛刺传感器用于检测攻击时长越小的电压攻击时，所需的版图面积和功耗越小，本领域技术人员可以基于毛刺传感器的实际配置或 版图面积和功耗的实际需求进行调整所述第三范围和所述第四范围。类似地，本领域技术人员也可以根据电压传感器的实际配置或实际需求，调整所述第一范围和所述第二范围。
类似地，表1所示的第一范围和第三范围以0.1us进行区分以及所述第二范围和所述第四范围以±0.5*V区分仅为示例，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
例如，所述第二范围的最大值的绝对值和/或所述第四范围的最小值的绝对值，与所述外部电源的电压的绝对值成正比。例如，所述第二范围的最大值的绝对值和/或所述第四范围的最小值的绝对值可以是所述外部电源的电压的绝对值和预设百分比的乘积。例如，所述第二范围和所述第四范围可以以所述外部电源的电压的20％进行区分，即所述第二范围为-0.2*V～0.2*V。所述第四范围为0.2*V～V，和/或所述第四范围为-V～-0.2*V。
在本申请的一些实施例中，所述至少一个电压传感器分别连接至所述至少一个内部电源，以分别接收所述至少一个第一电压，所述至少一个电压传感器用于基于接收到的参考电压和所述至少一个第一电压输出所述至少一个第一信号。
例如，所述至少一个电压传感器中的每一个电压传感器可以用于根据接收到的第一电压和接收到的第一参考信号输出第一信号分量，所述第一信号分量用于指示接收到的第一电压是否大于或等于所述第一参考电压；所述至少一个电压传感器中的每一个电压传感器还可以用于根据接收到的第一电压和接收到的第二参考电压并输出第二信号分量，所述第二信号分量可以用于指示所述第二电压是否小于或等于所述第二参考电压，所述第一参考电压大于所述第二参考电压。
应理解，本申请实施例中的毛刺传感器可以是任意能够用于检测第二类电压攻击的传感器。例如，所述毛刺传感器可以包括锁存器的传感器。
如图3所示，在本申请的一些实施例中，所述电压攻击检测电路还包括：
外部电源电压传感器210和外部电源毛刺传感器220；
其中，所述外部电源用于输出第二电压，所述外部电源电压传感器210连接至所述外部电源，所述外部电源电压传感器210用于接收所述第二电压并输出第三信号，所述第三信号用于指示所述第二电压是否受到攻击时长位于所述第一范围内且攻击力度位于所述第二范围内的电压攻击；所述外部电 源毛刺传感器220连接至所述外部电源，所述外部电源毛刺传感器220用于接收所述第二电压并输出第四信号，所述第三信号用于指示所述第二电压是否受到攻击时长位于所述第三范围内且攻击力度位于所述第四范围内的电压攻击。
换言之，可以为外部电源配置专属的一个电压传感器和毛刺传感器。
在本申请的一些实施例中，所述至少一个电压调节电路中的每一个电压调节电路包括以下元件中的至少一项：
低压差线性稳压器(Low Dropout Regulator,LDO)、电荷泵(Charge Pump)、降压式变化电路(BUCK)、升压式变化电路(Boost)、双向直流变换器(Direct current-Direct current converter，DC-DC converter)等能够提供稳定输出电压的电路。
在本申请的一些实施例中，所述至少一个电压传感器中的每一个电压传感器包括迟滞比较器。
应理解，图1至图3仅为本申请的示例，不应理解为对本申请的限制。
例如，在其他实施例中，所述电压攻击检测电路200还可以包括参考电压生成电路，所述参考电压生成电路用于生成参考电压，所述参考电压生成电路分别连接至所述至少一个电压传感器和所述至少一个毛刺传感器，以便所述至少一个电压传感器中的每一个电压传感器基于接收到的参考电压和接收到的第一电压输出第一信号，以及所述至少一个毛刺传感器中的每一个毛刺传感器基于接收的参考电压和接收到的第一电压输出第二信号。
又例如，在其他实施例中，所述电压攻击检测电路200还可以包括参考电压检测电路，与所述参考电压生成电路相连，用于检测所述参考电压是否存在异常，进而生成指示信号并输出至所述至少一个电压传感器和所述至少一个毛刺传感器。例如，在所述指示信号指示所述参考电压存在异常时，即便所述至少一个第一信号分别用于指示所述至少一个内部电源受到攻击时长位于第一范围内且攻击力度位于第二范围内的电压攻击，将将其复位为指示所述至少一个内部电源未受到电压攻击。
又例如，在其他实施例中，所述电压攻击电路200还可以包括毛刺信号检测电路，与所述参考电压生成电路，以消除所述参考电压上的毛刺，进而提升所述指示信号的准确度。
本申请还提供了一种芯片，所述包括电源管理单元以及上文所述的电压 攻击检测电路；其中，所述电源管理单元连接至所述电压攻击检测电路，所述电压攻击检测电路用于检测所述电源管理单元的电源电压是否受到电压攻击。
换言之，所述电压攻击检测电路可以适用于任意一种具有电源管理单元的芯片。例如安全芯片。例如，所述安全芯片可以是指纹传感器芯片或者处理器芯片等等。所述安全芯片适用于任意一种电子设备。例如，智能手机、笔记本电脑、平板电脑、游戏设备等便携式或移动计算设备，以及电子数据库、汽车、银行自动柜员机(Automated Teller Machine，ATM)等其他电子设备。
本领域普通技术人员可以意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，能够以电子硬件、或者计算机软件和电子硬件的结合来实现。这些功能究竟以硬件还是软件方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，为描述的方便和简洁，上述描述的系统、装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的系统、装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各个单元单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。
所述功能如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(ROM，Read-Only Memory)、随机存取存储器(RAM，Random Access Memory)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应所述以权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (11)

  1. 一种电压攻击检测电路，其特征在于，包括：
    至少一个电压调节电路；
    所述至少一个电压调节电路均连接至外部电源，所述至少一个电压调节电路分别用于将所述外部电源转化为至少一个内部电源，所述至少一个内部电源分别用于输出至少一个第一电压；
    至少一个电压传感器和至少一个毛刺传感器；
    其中，所述至少一个电压传感器分别用于接收所述至少一个第一电压并分别用于输出至少一个第一信号，所述至少一个第一信号分别用于指示所述至少一个内部电源是否受到攻击时长位于第一范围内且攻击力度位于第二范围内的电压攻击，所述至少一个毛刺传感器分别用于接收所述至少一个第一电压并分别用于输出至少一个第二信号，所述至少一个第二信号分别用于指示所述至少一个内部电源是否受到攻击时长位于第三范围内且攻击力度位于第四范围内的电压攻击，所述第一范围的最小值大于或等于所述第三范围的最大值，所述第二范围的最大值的绝对值小于或等于所述第四范围的任意值的绝对值。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的电压攻击检测电路，其特征在于，所述第一范围的最小值为0.1us。
  3. 根据权利要求1或2所述的电压攻击检测电路，其特征在于，所述第三范围为1ns～0.1us。
  4. 根据权利要求1至3中任一项所述的电压攻击检测电路，其特征在于，所述第二范围的最大值的绝对值和/或所述第四范围的最小值的绝对值，与所述外部电源的电压的绝对值成正比。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的电压攻击检测电路，其特征在于，所述第二范围为-0.5*V～0.5*V，其中，V表示所述外部电源的电压值。
  6. 根据权利要求4所述的电压攻击检测电路，其特征在于，所述第四范围为0.5*V～V，和/或所述第四范围为-V～-0.5*V。
  7. 根据权利要求1至6中任一项所述的电压攻击检测电路，其特征在于，所述至少一个电压传感器分别连接至所述至少一个内部电源，以分别接收所述至少一个第一电压，所述至少一个电压传感器用于基于接收到的参考电压 和所述至少一个第一电压输出所述至少一个第一信号。
  8. 根据权利要求1至7中任一项所述的电压攻击检测电路，其特征在于，所述电压攻击检测电路还包括：
    外部电源电压传感器和外部电源毛刺传感器；
    其中，所述外部电源用于输出第二电压，所述外部电源电压传感器连接至所述外部电源，所述外部电源电压传感器用于接收所述第二电压并输出第三信号，所述第三信号用于指示所述第二电压是否受到攻击时长位于所述第一范围内且攻击力度位于所述第二范围内的电压攻击；所述外部电源毛刺传感器连接至所述外部电源，所述外部电源毛刺传感器用于接收所述第二电压并输出第四信号，所述第三信号用于指示所述第二电压是否受到攻击时长位于所述第三范围内且攻击力度位于所述第四范围内的电压攻击。
  9. 根据权利要求1至8中任一项所述的电压攻击检测电路，其特征在于，所述至少一个电压调节电路中的每一个电压调节电路包括以下元件中的至少一项：低压差线性稳压器、电荷泵、降压式变化电路、升压式变化电路以及双向直流变换器。
  10. 根据权利要求1至9中任一项所述的电压攻击检测电路，其特征在于，所述至少一个电压传感器中的每一个电压传感器包括迟滞比较器。
  11. 一种芯片，其特征在于，包括：
    电源管理单元；以及
    根据权利要求1至10中任一项所述的电压攻击检测电路；
    其中，所述电源管理单元连接至所述电压攻击检测电路，所述电压攻击检测电路用于检测所述电源管理单元的电源电压是否受到电压攻击。
PCT/CN2020/082830 2020-04-01 2020-04-01 电压攻击检测电路和芯片 WO2021196094A1 (zh)

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