WO2021027644A1 - 一种基于冗余异构的安全总线系统 - Google Patents

一种基于冗余异构的安全总线系统 Download PDF

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WO2021027644A1
WO2021027644A1 PCT/CN2020/106969 CN2020106969W WO2021027644A1 WO 2021027644 A1 WO2021027644 A1 WO 2021027644A1 CN 2020106969 W CN2020106969 W CN 2020106969W WO 2021027644 A1 WO2021027644 A1 WO 2021027644A1
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bus
system bus
data
replicator
host
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PCT/CN2020/106969
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French (fr)
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张力航
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南京芯驰半导体科技有限公司
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F13/00—Interconnection of, or transfer of information or other signals between, memories, input/output devices or central processing units
    • G06F13/38—Information transfer, e.g. on bus
    • G06F13/382—Information transfer, e.g. on bus using universal interface adapter
    • G06F13/387—Information transfer, e.g. on bus using universal interface adapter for adaptation of different data processing systems to different peripheral devices, e.g. protocol converters for incompatible systems, open system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F15/00—Digital computers in general; Data processing equipment in general
    • G06F15/76—Architectures of general purpose stored program computers
    • G06F15/78—Architectures of general purpose stored program computers comprising a single central processing unit
    • G06F15/7807—System on chip, i.e. computer system on a single chip; System in package, i.e. computer system on one or more chips in a single package

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  • the embodiment of the present invention relates to the technical field of system on chip (SoC), and in particular to a virtualized system on chip bus.
  • SoC system on chip
  • the core of the safety requirements of electronic control systems is the definition and realization of system safety mechanisms.
  • the so-called safety mechanism is a mechanism to detect or control failures through the functions, components or related technologies of the electronic and electrical system, so that the system can transfer and maintain a safe state.
  • each subsystem needs to complete the definition and realization of its own safety mechanism.
  • SoC on-chip electronic control system
  • microcontroller the system bus also has its own security requirements, and needs to complete the definition and implementation of the security mechanism.
  • system bus As a system bus, its safety requirements are mainly:
  • the commonly used security mechanisms for system buses mainly include the following measures:
  • ECC error control codes
  • Dual Core Lockstep is used to monitor bus logic failures.
  • the above measures 1) and 2) have relatively low diagnostic coverage for faults, while measure 3) can achieve a relatively high diagnostic coverage, but its hardware resource overhead and design complexity are relatively high.
  • the present invention provides a redundant and heterogeneous safe bus system to provide safe bus data transmission for the on-chip system.
  • At least one embodiment of the present invention provides a redundant and heterogeneous secure bus system, including a host access replicator, a system bus, a redundant system bus, and a device access replicator, where:
  • the host accesses the replicator, which copies and processes the data request sent by the host, and then sends the data request to the system bus and the redundant system bus respectively;
  • the device When the device accesses the replicator, it receives and processes the data request through the system bus and the redundant system bus respectively.
  • the host accesses the replicator, delays the received data request sent by the host, performs address conversion and sends it to the redundant system bus.
  • AddrMax is the maximum addressing space of the system
  • N is the maximum address width of the system
  • Addr is the current address.
  • the host accesses the replicator, and in the write operation, the data is inverted bit by bit and sent to the redundant system bus; in the read operation, the data read from the system bus is delayed, The data read from the redundant system bus is inverted bit by bit, and the data is compared to confirm whether there is an error in the data transmitted by the bus.
  • the device accesses the replicator, delays the data request sent by the system bus, and compares the received data request sent by the redundant system bus with the received data request sent by the redundant system bus. Whether there is an error in the data transfer request.
  • AddrMax is the maximum addressing space of the system
  • N is the maximum address width of the system
  • Addr is the current address.
  • the device accesses the replicator, and in the write operation, delays the received data sent by the system bus, and reverses the received data sent by the redundant system bus bit by bit, and performs Data comparison, confirm whether there is an error in the bus transmission data.
  • the device accesses the replicator, and during the read operation, sends the data returned by the device directly to the system bus; delays the data returned by the device, reverses it bit by bit, and adds a unique identification After the number is sent to the redundant system bus.
  • the address of the host or device on the redundant system bus is a mirrored address of the host or device on the system bus.
  • the redundant and heterogeneous safety bus system of the present invention reduces the cost of hardware resources and the complexity of design; it greatly improves the reliability of data transmission between the host and the device, mainly as follows:
  • the redundant bus design makes the two buses a mutual diagnosis mechanism, which can monitor each other at all times when the system is running, which improves the fault diagnosis rate of the bus.
  • Fig. 1 is a structural block diagram of a redundant and heterogeneous safety bus system according to the present invention.
  • Embodiments of the present invention At least one embodiment adopts a simple heterogeneous bus structure to realize system bus interconnection with high diagnostic coverage, and can reuse traditional non-secure system bus designs.
  • Fig. 1 is a structural block diagram of a redundant and heterogeneous safety bus system according to the present invention.
  • the redundant and heterogeneous safety bus system of the present invention includes a host access replicator 10, a system bus 20, and a redundant system bus 30, and device access duplicator 40, in which,
  • the host accesses the replicator 10, which has a single-input and dual-output structure. Its input terminal is connected to the master (Master), and the output terminal is connected to the system bus 20 and the redundant system bus 30 respectively. After the data request sent by the host is copied, respectively Send to the system bus 20 and the redundant system bus 30.
  • the host access replicator 10 copies the data request sent by the host and adds a unique identification number to each data request, and then sends them to different interfaces (such as s_0 connected to the system bus 20). ⁇ and are connected to the redundant system bus 30 s_1).
  • the data request (read or write request) sent to s_1 is delayed by C clocks (C is greater than or equal to 1), and the address sent to s_1 is converted according to the following formula:
  • the host accesses the replicator 10 to invert the data sent to s_1 bit by bit.
  • the data sent to s_0 is 0x5555_5555 and the data sent to s_1 is 0xAAAA_AAAA; when the read data returns from s_0, the data is delayed by C clocks (C is greater than or equal to 1), and then the data returned from s_1 is bit by bit
  • C is greater than or equal to 1
  • the bus transmission data is correct; if they are not equal, the return data timeout or the return data unique identification number is not equal, the bus transmission data error will be reported to the system security controller (not shown in the figure).
  • the system bus (Fabric) 20 is an ordinary non-functional safety system bus.
  • the redundant system bus (Fabric_D) 30 is an ordinary non-functionally safe system bus, and its implementation is slightly different from Fabric. The main point is that the addresses of each device on Fabric_D are mirrored addresses on Fabric. For example, the address segment occupied by device_0 in Fabric is 0x3000_0000 to 0x3FFF_FFFF, and the address segment occupied by Fabric_D becomes 0xCFFF_FFFF to 0xC000_0000.
  • the device access duplicator (DuplicatorS) 40 is connected to the system bus 20 and the redundant system bus 30 respectively, and receives data from the host through the m_0 port connected to the system bus 20 and m_1 connected to the redundant system bus 30 Request and process.
  • the device access duplicator 40 delays C clocks after receiving the data request of m_0, performs inverse mirror transformation on the received address signal, and compares it with the data request received by m_1, such as If they are equal, the bus transmission data request is correct. If it is not equal, the request identification number is not equal or timed out, it is determined that the bus transmission data request error is required to be reported to the system safety controller (not shown in the figure).
  • the following inverse mirror transformation is performed on the received address signal
  • the device access replicator 40 delays the data received by m_0 by C clocks and compares it with the data received by m_1 after bit-by-bit inversion. If they are equal, the bus The transmitted data is correct; if it is not equal, the data identifier is not equal, or the transmission is overtime, the bus transmission data is judged to be an error and needs to be reported to the system security controller (not shown in the figure).
  • the device access duplicator 40 sends the data returned by the device to m_0 during a read operation, and at the same time delays C clocks and inverts bit by bit, adds a unique identification number and sends it to m_1.

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Abstract

一种基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，包括，主机访问复制器、系统总线、冗余系统总线，以及设备访问复制器，其中，所述主机访问复制器，其将主机发送的数据请求进行复制、处理后，分别发送到所述系统总线、所述冗余系统总线；所述设备访问复制器，其分别通过所述系统总线、所述冗余系统总线接收所述安全数据请求，并进行处理。本发明的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，采用简单的异构总线结构实现高诊断覆盖率的系统总线互联，极大的提升了主机和设备之间的数据传输的可靠性。

Description

一种基于冗余异构的安全总线系统 技术领域
本发明实施例涉及片上系统(SoC)技术领域，尤其涉及虚拟化片上系统总线。
背景技术
电控系统安全需求的核心是系统安全机制的定义和实现。所谓安全机制就是通过电子电气系统的功能，元件或相关技术来检测或控制失效，以便系统转移并保持在安全状态的机制。为了整个电控系统能够达到安全的需求，各个子系统需要完成各自的安全机制的定义和实现。
系统总线作为片上电控系统(SoC或者微控制器)的重要组成部也有自身的安全需求，需要完成安全机制的定义和实现。作为系统总线，其安全需求主要为:
1)能够检测到系统中主机与设备间数据、地址以及控制信息传输错误的故障；
2)能够检测到系统总线地址解析以及路由功能的故障。
为了达到上述的安全需求，需要为系统总线添加相应的安全机制来检测上述故障。现有技术中，系统总线常用的安全机制主要有以下措施：
1)适用差错控制编码(如ECC)对总线传输的数据进行保护；
2)增加逻辑对总线传输数据包的一致性经行检测；
3)采用双核锁步(Dual Core Lockstep)的结构对总线逻辑故障进行监控。
其中，上述的措施中1)和2)对于故障的诊断覆盖率相对较低，而措施3)虽然能够达到比较高的诊断覆盖率，但是其硬件资源的开销以及设计复杂度都比较高。
发明内容
为了解决现有技术存在的不足，本发明提供一种基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，为片上系统提供安全的总线数据传输。
为实现上述目的，本发明至少一个实施例提供一种基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，包括，主机访问复制器、系统总线、冗余系统总线，以及设备访问复制器，其中，
所述主机访问复制器，其将主机发送的数据请求进行复制、处理后，分别发送到所述系统总线、所述冗余系统总线；
所述设备访问复制器，其分别通过所述系统总线、所述冗余系统总线接收所述数据请求，并进行处理。
进一步地，所述主机访问复制器，将接收到的主机发送的数据请求进行延时、进行地址转换后发送给所述冗余系统总线。
进一步地，所述主机访问复制器将主机发送的数据请求进行地址转换的公式为：
AddrD[N-1:12]＝AddrMax[N-1:12]-Addr[N-1:12]
其中，AddrD转换后的地址，AddrMax为系统最大寻址空间，N为系统最大的地址位宽，Addr为当前地址。
进一步地，所述主机访问复制器，在写操作时，将数据逐比特位取反后发送到所述冗余系统总线；在读操作时，将从所述系统总线读取的数据进行延时、将从所述冗余系统总线读取的数据逐比特位取反，进行数据比较，确认总线传输数据是否存在错误。
进一步地，所述设备访问复制器，将接收到所述系统总线发送的数据请求进行延时、地址进行逆镜像变换后与接收到的所述冗余系统总线发送的数据请求进行比较，确认总线传输数据请求是否存在错误。
进一步地，所述设备访问复制器将所述系统总线发送的数据请求进行地址逆镜像变换的公式为：
AddrD[N-1:12]＝AddrMax[N-1:12]-Addr[N-1:12]
其中，AddrD转换后的地址，AddrMax为系统最大寻址空间，N为系统最大的地址位宽，Addr为当前地址。
进一步地，所述设备访问复制器，在写操作时，将接收到的所述系统总线发送的数据进行延时、将接收到的所述冗余系统总线发送的数据逐比特位取反，进 行数据比较，确认总线传输数据是否存在错误。
进一步地，所述设备访问复制器，在读操作时，将设备返回的数据直接发送给到所述系统总线；将所述设备返回的数据进行延时、逐比特位取反，并添加唯一的识别号后发送到所述冗余系统总线。
更进一步地，主机或设备在所述冗余系统总线上的地址，是所述主机或设备在所述系统总线上的镜像地址。
与现有技术相比，本发明的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，降低了硬件资源的开销以及设计复杂度；极大的提升了主机和设备之间的数据传输的可靠性，主要表现为：
1)避免了由于随机性失效导致的总线数据传输故障；
2)避免了由于随机性失效导致的总线地址以及控制信息的传输故障；
3)避免了由于随机性失效导致的总线地址解析逻辑故障；
4)避免了由于共因引起的总线故障(共因失效)；
5)冗余的总线设计使得两个总线互为诊断机制，在系统运行时可以时刻相互监测，提高了总线的故障诊断率。
本发明的其它特征和优点将在随后的说明书中阐述，并且，部分地从说明书中变得显而易见，或者通过实施本发明而了解。
附图说明
附图用来提供对本发明的进一步理解，并且构成说明书的一部分，并与本发明的内容和实施例一起，用于解释本发明，并不构成对本发明的限制。在附图中：
图1为根据本发明的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统结构框图。
具体实施方式
以下结合附图对本发明的优选实施例进行说明，应当理解，此处所描述的实施例仅用于说明和解释本发明，并不用于限定本发明。
本发明的实施例至少一个实施例采用简单的异构总线结构实现高诊断覆盖率的系统总线互联，且可重用传统的非安全的系统总线设计。
图1为根据本发明的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统结构框图，如图1所示， 本发明的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，包括，主机访问复制器10、系统总线20、冗余系统总线30，以及设备访问复制器40，其中，
主机访问复制器10，为单输入、双输出结构，其输入端与主机(Master)相连接，输出端分别与系统总线20、冗余系统总线30相连接，将主机发送的数据请求复制后分别发送给系统总线20、冗余系统总线30。
本发明的一个实施例中，主机访问复制器10将主机发送的数据请求进行复制并为每一个数据请求添加唯一的识别号后，分别发送到不同的接口(如与系统总线20相连接的s_0口和与冗余系统总线30相连接s_1)。
本发明的一个实施例中，将送往s_1的数据请求(读或写请求)延时C个时钟(C大于等于1)，将发送到s_1的地址按照如下公式进行转换：
AddrD[N-1:12]＝AddrMax[N-1:12]-Addr[N-1:12]
其中，AddrMax为系统最大寻址空间，在32位系统中AddrMax＝(4GB–1B)；N为系统最大的地址位宽，32位系统中N＝32；Addr为当前地址；AddrD转换后的地址。
本发明的一个实施例中，在写操作时，主机访问复制器10将发送到s_1的数据逐比特位取反。例如发往s_0的数据为0x5555_5555发往s_1的数据为0xAAAA_AAAA；当读取的数据从s_0返回后，将数据延时C个时钟(C大于等于1)，而后与从s_1返回的数据逐比特位取反后进行比较，如相等则表示总线传输数据正确；如不等，返回数据超时或者返回数据唯一识别号不等，则总线传输数据错误同时上报系统安全控制器(图中未示出)。
系统总线(Fabric)20，为普通的非功能安全的系统总线。
冗余系统总线(Fabric_D)30，为普通的非功能安全的系统总线，在实现上与Fabric略有不同主要在于：各个设备在Fabric_D上的地址为在Fabric上的镜像地址。例如，设备_0在Fabric中占用的地址段为0x3000_0000到0x3FFF_FFFF，在Fabric_D中占用的地址段则变成了0xCFFF_FFFF到0xC000_0000。
设备访问复制器(DuplicatorS)40，其分别与系统总线20、冗余系统总线30相连接，通过与系统总线20相连接的m_0口和与冗余系统总线30相连接的m_1接收主机发出的数据请求并进行处理。
本发明的一个实施例中，设备访问复制器40在接收到m_0的数据请求后延时C个时钟、并对接收到的地址信号进行逆镜像变换后与m_1接收到的数据请求进行比较，如相等则总线传输数据请求正确。如不相等、请求识别号不等或者超时则判定为总线传输数据请求错误需上报系统安全控制器(图中未示出)。
优选地，对接收到的地址信号进行如下逆镜像变换
AddrD[N-1:12]＝AddrMax[N-1:12]-Addr[N-1:12]
其中AddrMax为系统最大寻址空间，在32位系统中AddrMax＝(4GB–1B)；N为系统最大的地址位宽，32位系统中N＝32。
本发明的一个实施例中，设备访问复制器40在写操作时，将m_0接收到的数据延时C个时钟后与m_1接收到数据逐比特位取反后的数据进行比较，如果相等则总线传输数据正确；如果不等、数据标识符不等或者传输超时，则总线传输数据判定为错误需上报系统安全控制器(图中未示出)。
本发明的一个实施例中，设备访问复制器40在读操作时，将设备返回的数据发送往m_0，同时延时C个时钟后逐比特位取反后添加唯一的识别号发送给m_1。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解：以上所述仅为本发明的优选实施例而已，并不用于限制本发明，尽管参照前述实施例对本发明进行了详细的说明，对于本领域的技术人员来说，其依然可以对前述各实施例记载的技术方案进行修改，或者对其中部分技术特征进行等同替换。凡在本发明的精神和原则之内，所作的任何修改、等同替换、改进等，均应包含在本发明的保护范围之内。

Claims (9)

  1. 一种基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，其特征在于，包括，主机访问复制器、系统总线、冗余系统总线，以及设备访问复制器，其中，
    所述主机访问复制器，其将主机发送的数据请求进行复制、处理后，分别发送到所述系统总线、所述冗余系统总线；
    所述设备访问复制器，其分别通过所述系统总线、所述冗余系统总线接收所述数据请求，并进行处理。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，其特征在于，所述主机访问复制器，将接收到的主机发送的数据请求进行延时、进行地址转换后发送给所述冗余系统总线。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，其特征在于，所述主机访问复制器将主机发送的数据请求进行地址转换的公式为：
    AddrD[N-1:12]＝AddrMax[N-1:12]-Addr[N-1:12]
    其中，AddrD转换后的地址，AddrMax为系统最大寻址空间，N为系统最大的地址位宽，Addr为当前地址。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，其特征在于，所述主机访问复制器，在写操作时，将数据逐比特位取反后发送到所述冗余系统总线；在读操作时，将从所述系统总线读取的数据进行延时、将从所述冗余系统总线读取的数据逐比特位取反，进行数据比较，确认总线传输数据是否存在错误。
  5. 根据权利要求1所述的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，其特征在于，所述设备访问复制器，将接收到所述系统总线发送的数据请求进行延时、地址进行逆镜像变换后与接收到的所述冗余系统总线发送的数据请求进行比较，确认总线传输数据请求是否存在错误。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，其特征在于，所述设备访问复制器将所述系统总线发送的数据请求进行地址逆镜像变换的公式为：
    AddrD[N-1:12]＝AddrMax[N-1:12]-Addr[N-1:12]
    其中，AddrD转换后的地址，AddrMax为系统最大寻址空间，N为系统最大的地址位宽，Addr为当前地址。
  7. 根据权利要求1所述的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，其特征在于，所述设备访问复制器，在写操作时，将接收到的所述系统总线发送的数据进行延时、将接收到的所述冗余系统总线发送的数据逐比特位取反，进行数据比较，确认总线传输数据是否存在错误。
  8. 根据权利要求1所述的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，其特征在于，所述设备访问复制器，在读操作时，将设备返回的数据直接发送给到所述系统总线；将所述设备返回的数据进行延时、逐比特位取反，并添加唯一的识别号后发送到所述冗余系统总线。
  9. 根据权利要求1所述的基于冗余异构的安全总线系统，其特征在于，主机或设备在所述冗余系统总线上的地址，是所述主机或设备在所述系统总线上的镜像地址。
PCT/CN2020/106969 2019-08-13 2020-08-05 一种基于冗余异构的安全总线系统 WO2021027644A1 (zh)

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