Classifications

• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64C—AEROPLANES; HELICOPTERS
  • B64C39/00—Aircraft not otherwise provided for
  • B64C39/02—Aircraft not otherwise provided for characterised by special use
  • B64C39/024—Aircraft not otherwise provided for characterised by special use of the remote controlled vehicle type, i.e. RPV
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64D—EQUIPMENT FOR FITTING IN OR TO AIRCRAFT; FLIGHT SUITS; PARACHUTES; ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF POWER PLANTS OR PROPULSION TRANSMISSIONS IN AIRCRAFT
  • B64D1/00—Dropping, ejecting, releasing or receiving articles, liquids, or the like, in flight
  • B64D1/02—Dropping, ejecting, or releasing articles
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64D—EQUIPMENT FOR FITTING IN OR TO AIRCRAFT; FLIGHT SUITS; PARACHUTES; ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF POWER PLANTS OR PROPULSION TRANSMISSIONS IN AIRCRAFT
  • B64D47/00—Equipment not otherwise provided for
  • B64D47/02—Arrangements or adaptations of signal or lighting devices
  • B64D47/04—Arrangements or adaptations of signal or lighting devices the lighting devices being primarily intended to illuminate the way ahead
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64D—EQUIPMENT FOR FITTING IN OR TO AIRCRAFT; FLIGHT SUITS; PARACHUTES; ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF POWER PLANTS OR PROPULSION TRANSMISSIONS IN AIRCRAFT
  • B64D47/00—Equipment not otherwise provided for
  • B64D47/08—Arrangements of cameras
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64U—UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES [UAV]; EQUIPMENT THEREFOR
  • B64U70/00—Launching, take-off or landing arrangements
  • B64U70/30—Launching, take-off or landing arrangements for capturing UAVs in flight by ground or sea-based arresting gear, e.g. by a cable or a net
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F41—WEAPONS
  • F41H—ARMOUR; ARMOURED TURRETS; ARMOURED OR ARMED VEHICLES; MEANS OF ATTACK OR DEFENCE, e.g. CAMOUFLAGE, IN GENERAL
  • F41H11/00—Defence installations; Defence devices
  • F41H11/02—Anti-aircraft or anti-guided missile or anti-torpedo defence installations or systems
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
  • G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
  • G05D1/10—Simultaneous control of position or course in three dimensions
  • G05D1/101—Simultaneous control of position or course in three dimensions specially adapted for aircraft
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
  • G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
  • G05D1/12—Target-seeking control
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
  • G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
  • G05D1/60—Intended control result
  • G05D1/656—Interaction with payloads or external entities
  • G05D1/683—Intercepting moving targets
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
  • G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
  • G05D1/60—Intended control result
  • G05D1/656—Interaction with payloads or external entities
  • G05D1/689—Pointing payloads towards fixed or moving targets
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
  • G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
  • G05D1/80—Arrangements for reacting to or preventing system or operator failure
  • G05D1/82—Limited authority control, e.g. enforcing a flight envelope
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
  • G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
  • G05D1/80—Arrangements for reacting to or preventing system or operator failure
  • G05D1/86—Monitoring the performance of the system, e.g. alarm or diagnosis modules
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64D—EQUIPMENT FOR FITTING IN OR TO AIRCRAFT; FLIGHT SUITS; PARACHUTES; ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF POWER PLANTS OR PROPULSION TRANSMISSIONS IN AIRCRAFT
  • B64D2203/00—Aircraft or airfield lights using LEDs
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64U—UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES [UAV]; EQUIPMENT THEREFOR
  • B64U2101/00—UAVs specially adapted for particular uses or applications
  • B64U2101/15—UAVs specially adapted for particular uses or applications for conventional or electronic warfare
  • B64U2101/16—UAVs specially adapted for particular uses or applications for conventional or electronic warfare for controlling, capturing or immobilising other vehicles
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64U—UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES [UAV]; EQUIPMENT THEREFOR
  • B64U2101/00—UAVs specially adapted for particular uses or applications
  • B64U2101/15—UAVs specially adapted for particular uses or applications for conventional or electronic warfare
  • B64U2101/19—UAVs specially adapted for particular uses or applications for conventional or electronic warfare for use as targets or decoys
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64U—UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES [UAV]; EQUIPMENT THEREFOR
  • B64U2101/00—UAVs specially adapted for particular uses or applications
  • B64U2101/30—UAVs specially adapted for particular uses or applications for imaging, photography or videography
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64U—UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES [UAV]; EQUIPMENT THEREFOR
  • B64U2201/00—UAVs characterised by their flight controls
  • B64U2201/10—UAVs characterised by their flight controls autonomous, i.e. by navigating independently from ground or air stations, e.g. by using inertial navigation systems [INS]
  • B64U2201/104—UAVs characterised by their flight controls autonomous, i.e. by navigating independently from ground or air stations, e.g. by using inertial navigation systems [INS] using satellite radio beacon positioning systems, e.g. GPS
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
  • G05D2105/00—Specific applications of the controlled vehicles
  • G05D2105/80—Specific applications of the controlled vehicles for information gathering, e.g. for academic research
  • G05D2105/85—Specific applications of the controlled vehicles for information gathering, e.g. for academic research for patrolling or reconnaissance for police, security or military applications
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
  • G05D2109/00—Types of controlled vehicles
  • G05D2109/20—Aircraft, e.g. drones
  • G05D2109/25—Rotorcrafts
  • G05D2109/254—Flying platforms, e.g. multicopters
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
  • G05D2111/00—Details of signals used for control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles
  • G05D2111/10—Optical signals

Definitions

• Unmanned aerial vehicles such as multi-rotor drones, fixed-wing drones, and tilt rotor drones
• UAVs Unmanned aerial vehicles
• This popularity coupled with their constantly improving performance capabilities, pose threats in terms of collisions with other aerial vehicles or structures, whether accidental or deliberate. More serious threats are also becoming more of a realization and possibility, such as terrorist attacks on high- value targets, such as government complexes, international airports, nuclear or other power plants, petrochemical facilities, water reservoirs, sporting events, and other highly-populated or critical infrastructure or locations.
• Factors that contribute to such threats are the high rate of speed of drones, their small signature, the possibility of simultaneous, coordinated attacks from a number of attacking drones, their ability to carry increasingly large payloads, and others.
• drones are relatively inexpensive, easy to acquire, highly portable, and highly maneuverable.
• consumer drones are dramatically improving in terms of endurance, range, and payload transport capabilities (e.g., some consumer drones can carry up to 50 lbs., with other more expensive and advanced drones being able to carry up to 400 pounds), which is enough to carry significant amounts of explosives, projectiles, biological, and/or chemical weapons.
• a drone operated for a deliberate attack can be launched and flown into a protected perimeter within just a few seconds, which leaves minimal time to detect and neutralize the attacking drone.
• adversarial drones can be autonomously or manually flown into a protected area while potentially causing a large amount of damage and/or harm, ail at a very low cost and effort by a programmer/operator. Counteracting such threats with existing technologies can be very costly and complex, particularly when trying to protect a relatively large airspace associated with hundreds of acres or square kilometers of a property.
• the present disclosure sets forth a counter-attack unmanned aerial vehicle (“counter-attack UAV”) for aerial neutralization of a target aerial vehicle.
• the counter-attack UAV can comprise a flight body and a flight control system that controls flight of the counter-attack UAV to intercept a detected target aerial vehicle.
• the counter-attack UAV can comprise an aerial vehicle capture countermeasure, carried by the flight body, and that is operable to capture the detected target aerial vehicle, thereby neutralizing the target aerial vehicle.
• the counter-attack UAV comprises at least one sensor configured to detect a position of the target aerial vehicle.
• the flight control system can comprise a flight controller operable to control autonomous flight of the counter-attack UAV based on a detected position of the target aerial vehicle.
• the counter-attack UAV comprises a wireless
• the communication device supported by the flight body and communicatively coupled to an external aerial vehicle detection system.
• the communication device can be configured to receive command data, which can include location data, from the external aerial vehicle detection system to intercept the target aerial vehicle, and the command data can be associated with the target aerial vehicle as detected by the external aerial vehicle detection system.
• the present disclosure sets forth a system for defecting and neutralizing a target aerial vehicle.
• the system can comprise a counter attack UAV comprising: a flight body; a flight control system that controls flight of the counter-attack UAV; and an aerial vehicle capture countermeasure carried by the flight body.
• the system can comprise an aerial vehicle detection system comprising at least one detection sensor operable to detect a target aerial vehicle while the target aerial vehicle is in flight.
• the aerial vehicle detection system can be operable to provide command data, which can include location data, to the counter-attack UAV to facilitate interception of the target aerial vehicle by the counter-attack UAV.
• the counter-attack UAV is operable to capture the detected target aerial vehicle with the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure, thereby neutralizing the target aerial vehicle.
• the aerial vehicle detection system comprises an on board aerial vehicle defection system comprising at least one sensor configured to detect a position of the target aerial vehicle.
• the flight control system can comprise a flight controller operable to control autonomous flight of the counter attack UAV based on the detected position of the target aerial vehicle.
• the aerial vehicle detection system can comprise an external aerial vehicle detection system comprising at least one detection sensor operable to detect the target aerial vehicle, and to provide command data to the counter-attack UAVs to facilitate interception of the target aerial vehicle by the counter-attack UAVs
• the external aerial vehicle detection system is associated with a ground-based structure to monitor an airspace, and the at least one detection sensor comprises a plurality of detection sensors configured to detect at least one target aerial vehicle.
• the system can comprise a plurality of counter-attack UAVs and an aerial vehicle capture countermeasure coupling together the plurality of counter-attack UAVs.
• the plurality of counter-attack UAVs can be operable in a coordinated manner to capture the target aerial vehicle with the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure, thereby neutralizing the target aerial vehicle.
• FIG. 7 illustrates a counter-attack UAV supporting and towing an aerial vehicle capture countermeasure in accordance with another example of the present disclosure.
• FIG. 8 illustrates a counter-attack UAV supporting and towing an aerial vehicle capture countermeasure in accordance with another example of the present disclosure.
• target aerial vehicie(s) 104a and 104b have been identified in successive frames of video (e.g., using IR and/or 4K optical cameras, and/or other sensors such as Radar), autonomously tracking a dynamic flight position or path of the target aerial vehicie(s) 104a and 104b and fusing position information provided by different sensing methodology (e.g., camera and Radar) can be performed by utilizing a Kalman filter, extended Kalman filter, particle filters, or another variation of a Bayesian filter. These filters work by taking an estimate of the velocity, position, and orientation of the particular target aerial vehicle 104a, for instance, and then predicting where the target aerial vehicle 104a will be in the next frame of video.
• different sensing methodology e.g., camera and Radar
• a bi-directional free space communication link 113 can be utilized in replacement of (or to supplement) radios 118a-c.
• the command data can include location data, and can be associated with the detected position(s) of the target aerial vehicle(s) 104a and 104b, and the command data can include data pertaining to a flight path, altitude, longitude, latitude, GPS coordinates (degrees, minutes, seconds), and/or other data associated with a geolocation and/or flight path of a particular target aerial vehicle.
• the command data can also include intercept data, such as
• the rotor assemblies can each comprises an electronic speed controller 130 and a motor/propeiler 132 that causes the counter-attack UAV 102a to operate autonomously in flight.
• the CPU 122, the flight controller 126, and the rotor assemblies 128 can define a flight control system 133 that is operable to facilitate flight of the counter-attack UAV 102a to intercept the target aerial vehicle 104a, as further described herein.
• Updated command data can be continuously communicated to the counter-attack UAV 102a so that the flight controller 126 can control flight of the counter-attack UAV 102a, as corresponding to a tracked flight path or position of the target aerial vehicle 104a. in this manner, the counter-attack UAV 102a can intercept the target aerial vehicle 104a, and can then neutralize the target aerial vehicle 104a with an aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a (e.g., a deployable net) coupled to the counter-attack UAV 102a, as further exemplified below regarding FIGS. 4A-8.
• an aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a e.g., a deployable net
• Such on-board camera and narrow band pass filter can also be used to detect only that frequency of light illuminated onto a target aerial vehicle by an illumination device 116a of the external aerial vehicle detection system 100, as initially mentioned above regarding the description of FIG. 1.
• each counter-attack UAV can implement this VIO technology (along with a high resolution video (e.g., 4K), other low-resolution cameras, dual band Wi-Fi, GNSS, IMU, and a barometer sensor) to“track” a designated target aerial vehicle in which a swarm of counter-attack UAVs can follow its target aerial vehicle at some fixed distance and will navigate obstacles that may block its flight path in some examples, each counter-attack UAV can utilize GPS-VIO fusion technology to assist with navigation in situations where GPS signals are intermittent (and therefore accurate satellite positioning is unavailable or inaccurate) in this scenario, each counter-attack UAV can comprise a sensor fusion position estimator (e.g., as part of the on-board CPU) to determine and/or update an accurate positon.
• a sensor fusion position estimator e.g., as part of the on-board CPU
• countermeasure 134a can comprise an upper deploy mechanism 206a that pivotally supports Inner or proximate or first ends of the upper support members 2QGa-d, and can comprise a lower deploy mechanism 206b that pivotally supports inner or proximate or first ends of the lower support members 2Q2a-d.
• the primary support member 208 could be replaced with a flexible tether or filament, assuming the weight of the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a is heavy enough to remain disposed generally below and/or behind the counter-attack UAV 102a to prevent accidental tangling.
• an elastic cord could be coupled to the upper deploy mechanism 206a and then through elongate openings of each support member 2QGa-d, and then coupled to ends of each upper support members 2Q0a-d to generate a downward pulling force on the support members in response to being released from each other, so that each upper support member 2QGa-d is pulled or snapped into place while moving to the deployed position D.
• the CPU 122 can cause the flight controller 128 to fly the counter-attack UAV 102a (and its aerial vehicle capture countermeasure) to be positioned just above a flight path of the target aerial vehicle 104a, and in approximately 5 seconds of flight time to intercept the target aerial vehicle 104a. Accordingly, just a few seconds before Intercepting” the target aerial vehicle 104a, the CPU 122 can transmit a deployment signal to the net restraint device 210 to deploy the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a to the deployed position D.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a could then quickly deploy in approximately 1 -2 seconds to cover a relatively large area of airspace, sufficient to cause the target aerial vehicle 104a to fly into the net 204, such that its rotors and/or body gets entangled in the filaments of the net 204, thereby capturing the target aerial vehicle 104a, and thereby neutralizing it. This can all occur autonomously via the CPU 122 (as described above), such that no external control or manual control Is required to intercept the target aerial vehicle 104a with the counter-attack UAV 102a, and then to deploy the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a to capture the target aerial vehicle 104a.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a when in the deployed position D can define a plurality of capture zones 212a-d each extending in different directions from each other to define a three- dimensional zone of capture.
• the capture zones 212a-d can be generally rectangular shaped and have planar capture areas extending 90 degrees relative to adjacent capture zones (like a cross or plus sign when viewing from above or below).
• a generally 380 degree zone of capture can be defined by the outer boundaries of the capture zones 212a-d. Therefore, regardless of the particular rotational position of the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a, at least one capture zone 212a-d may always be in a position to intercept the target aerial vehicle 104a.
• This increases the likelihood that the target aerial vehicle 104a will be captured in the net 204, while not necessarily controlling the rotational position of the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a.
• This also provides a low-drag configuration because of the plus-shape configuration providing a symmetrical net assembly having capture zones extending orthogonally relative to one another or adjunct zones, which minimizes wind drag forces acting on the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a (and the captured target aerial vehicle 104a) can be transported and released at a particular drop zone or location, such as away from populated areas, as illustrated in FIG. 4D.
• a release mechanism 214 can be coupled between the counter-attack UAV 102a and the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a, and can be operated to release the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a from the counter-attack UAV 102a when desired or programmed.
• the release mechanism 214 can be communicatively coupled to the CPU 122, which can cause transmission of a control signal to the release mechanism 214 to actuate a release device that separates the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a from the counter attack UAV 102a.
• Any suitable mechanical and/or electrical release mechanism can be incorporated that separates two bodies or parts from being coupled to each other, such as a parachute 3-ring release system, or similar approach using a wire activated quick release or pin-in-hole release device.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a and the captured target aerial vehicle 104a can then be retrieved by an individual based on a tagged position of the drop zone (which can be programmed or recorded by the CPU 122 and then transmitted accordingly).
• the target aerial vehicle 104a can be removed and the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a can be re-used with the same or another counter-attack UAV for another operation.
• the deployed aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a can be autonomously returned to the folded position F in instances where the target aerial vehicle 104a was not captured.
• the net restraint device 210 can be operated to retract a tether (or other device) coupled to ends of the support members that folds the support members of the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a back to the folded position F.
• the counter-attack UAV can be operable to trail behind a detected target aerial vehicle at a velocity that it passes along or nearby the target aerial vehicle close enough so that the tendrils get sucked into or engulfed by the rotors of the target aerial vehicle.
• the net 204 (and other nets or filament elements discussed herein) can be manufactured as a number of different high-strength filaments.
• high-strength ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene (UHMWPE) fibers such as Dyneema ® produced by DSM, or Spectra ® produced by Honeywell (i.e. , monofilaments) can be utilized, which use long molecular chains to transfer loads within individual fibers.
• UHMWPE ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene
• Spectra ® produced by Honeywell
• Other types will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
• Various pound test and mesh sizes can be used, depending on the application, such as, but not being limited to, 1.5-pound test and 2.25 square inch mesh may be suitable to capture any number of available UAVs, for instance.
• Some nets may have knots where they intersect, and others may be knotiess netting that utilizes four-strand braiding techniques that eliminate knots. The elimination of knots reduces drag
• the strength of the net required to capture one or more target aerial vehicles will ultimately determine the type of filament needed. Based on the type of filament and its diameter, and based on mesh size and overall net coverage, it is necessary to balance aerodynamic drag at a given angle to ensure that the net does not deploy and then trail too far behind and horizontal from the counter-attack UAV when in tow and deployed.
• One or more counterweights could be used to prevent such effect by being coupled to the net or individual strands or filaments.
• the counter-attack UAV 102a can be connected to power and/or data lines.
• the counter-attack UAV 102a can also be operable to“return home” to the pedestal 218 in instances where the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134a was not deployed.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134c can be quickly deployed near or along a predicted or known flight path of the target aerial vehicle 104b to capture the target aerial vehicle 104b in the aerial vehicle capture
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134c can comprise a pair of radial support members 336a and 336b coupled together by at least one flexible entangling element, such as a net 305 (e.g., a monofilament gill net).
• the radial support members 336a and 336b can be flexible, light weight rods or members, such as fiberglass, that can each be folded or wrapped around themselves and each other (and wrapping the net) when in the folded position in FIG. 6A.
• the radial support members 336a and 336b can be relatively thin (1/4” diameter) and long (e.g., 20 or more feet in circumference).
• a net restraint device 310 can be operably coupled between the counter attack UAV 102c and the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134c.
• the radial support members 338a and 336b can each be folded in a manner such that they have stored energy as a result of them being flexible, wrapped or bundled fiberglass rods, for instance, and being folded upon themselves.
• the radial support members 338a and 336b automatically deploy or unwrap by releasing such stored energy, so that each radial support member 336a and 336b expands to a circular or oval shape, and separate from each other (limited by the size of the net 305) until they are positioned in the deployed position D shown in FIG. 6C.
• Such actuation to deploy the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134c can be effectuated autonomously by the CPU 122 (see e.g., FIG. 3) that can transmit a deployment signal to a controller (not shown) that controls actuation of the net restraint device 310.
• the CPU 122 can be configured to transmit such deployment signal based on the detected proximity of the target aerial vehicle 104b relative to the counter-attack UAV 102, similarly as described regarding the example of FIGS. 4A-4D.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134c when in the deployed position D the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134c can define a three-dimensional capture zone in the shape of a cylindrical region or net capture area.
• a section of the cylindricaily shaped netting may always be facing the target aerial vehicle 104b. This increases the likelihood that the target aerial vehicle 104b will be captured in the net 305, while not necessarily needing to control the rotational position of the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134c.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134c (and the captured target aerial vehicle 104b) can be transported and released at a particular drop zone or location via a release mechanism 314 that can be coupled between the counter-attack UAV 102c and the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134c, similarly as described regarding the example discussed and shown in FIG. 4D.
• a human operator can control the counter-attack UAV 102c to operate its flight and deployment of the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134c to capture the target aerial vehicle 104.
• a live video feed can be viewed by the human operator, and a remote control can be used to control the counter-attack UAV 102c.
• human reaction time may not be as seamless or timely as compared to the autonomous tracking of the target aerial vehicle, and the autonomous navigation of the counter-attack UAV for interception and neutralization purposes.
• an aerial vehicle capture countermeasure can include just one (deployable) radial support member (e g., 336a), and a net and/or tendrils can be coupled thereto.
• a net and/or tendrils can be coupled thereto.
• dozens of tendrils being many meters long (e.g., up to 30 m or more), can be dragged behind the support members. This can provide a very low-drag, three-dimensional capture zone, because the ends of the tendrils tend to flutter or drift in the wind in a sporadic manner to define a zone of capture (much like tendrils of a jellyfish).
• the counter-attack UAV can be operable to trail behind a detected target aerial vehicle at a velocity that it passes along or nearby the target aerial vehicle close enough (e.g., less than 30 m) so that the tendrils get sucked into or engulfed by the rotors of the target aerial vehicle.
• countermeasure 134c can be supported by a platform or pedestal when in a grounded mode, and then operable to launch from the platform in response to detection of a target aerial vehicle, similarly as shown and described with reference to FIG. 5A.
• FIG. 7 shows a system and method of neutralizing a target aerial vehicle 104b with a counter-attack UAV 102b in accordance with one example of the present disclosure.
• the counter-attack UAV 102b and the system it is operational with can have the same or similar features as the counter-attack UAVs and system described above with reference to FIGS. 1-6C to intercept and neutralize the target aerial vehicle 104b.
• the counter-attack UAV 102b can be a fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicle that is operable to neutralize the target aerial vehicle 104b.
• an aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134b can be coupled to the counter-attack UAV 102b for entangling rotors of the target aerial vehicle 104b during flight.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134b comprises a support member 220 (e.g., an aluminum or fiberglass rod) tethered to the counter-attack UAV 102b, and that supports at least one flexible entangling element, such as a net 222, which can have a plurality of tendrils 224 extending from various portions of the net 222.
• a support member 220 e.g., an aluminum or fiberglass rod
• a net 222 which can have a plurality of tendrils 224 extending from various portions of the net 222.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134b can be towed and positioned along a predicted or known flight path of the target aerial vehicle 104b to capture the target aerial vehicle 104b in the net 222 (or its tendrils 224), thereby entangling the rotors and/or body of the target aerial vehicle 104b to neutralize the target aerial vehicle 104b.
• the net 222 can be a relatively large rectangular shape (e.g., 15 m by 50 m, or more), because the drag on the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134b would be relatively low due to its low-profile being towed along a general horizontal direction through airspace, and because the net 222 may be relatively lightweight for its size, as discussed herein.
• the support member 220 can have an aerodynamic shape, such as an airfoil-shaped profile, which reduces drag forces and may assists to orient the net 222 along a desired orientation when being towed.
• Stabilizing devices such as small airfoils or winglets, can be coupled to ends of the support member 220 to orient the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure generally perpendicular to the direction of flight, and to prevent spinning of the support member and the net while in flight.
• winglets and a stabilizing support member with winglets may also be installed on the trailing edge of the capture
• the support member 220 can be configured in a folded position and then deployable in a deployed position in this manner, the support member 220 can be two or more collapsible support members, and the net 222 can be wrapped or bundled around such support members.
• Such support members can be oriented vertically during transport until the time at which the counter-attack UAV 102b deploys or releases a bundle of the support members, for instance.
• the net 222 could then automatically unfold or unwrap from the support member 220 due to drag forces exerted on the support member 220 and the net 222.
• the counter-attack UAV 102b could trail and then pass the target aerial vehicle 104b In close proximity, and then the tendrils 224 and/or net 220 can be entangled in the rotors of the target aerial vehicle 104b (e.g., due to the suction force generated by rotors of the target aerial vehicle 104b).
• a release mechanism 226 can be coupled to the counter-attack UAV 102b and the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134b, and can be operated by the counter-attack UAV 102b to release the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 134b from the counter-attack UAV 102b.
• One primary advantage of various nets disclosed herein is the light weight, low-drag features of the netting, which allows for a relatively large capture area or surface area. For instance, a 16-foot-wide and 550-yard-long net (covering 2,500 m 2 ) of 1.5-pound (or more) test monofilament, with about a 3-inch square average mesh size, can weight just 5 pounds. And, one support member being 16 feet long can weight just a few pounds or less itself, so the entire aerial vehicle capture countermeasure can weigh less than 10 pounds while covering 2,500 m 2 area of capture.
• a particular counter-attack UAV having a 30-pound payload capacity, for instance, can readily tow such aerial vehicle capture countermeasure, even with a potentially high drag force (e.g., 10-20 pounds) when traveling at relatively high speeds to intercept a target aerial vehicle.
• a potentially high drag force e.g. 10-20 pounds
• FIG. 8 shows a system and method of intercepting and neutralizing a target aerial vehicle 404 with a counter-attack UAV 402 in accordance with one example of the present disclosure.
• the counter-attack UAV 402 can have the same or similar features as described with reference to the counter-attack UAVs described with reference to FIGS. 1 -6C to intercept and neutralize the target aerial vehicle 404.
• an aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 434 can be a plurality of tendrils 435 (i.e., not a net) coupled to the counter-attack UAV 402 for entangling rotors of the target aerial vehicle 404 during flight.
• One or more weights can be coupled to one or more tendrils 435 to help keep the tendrils 435 hanging from the counter-attack UAV 402, and to prevent them from accidentally tangling with the counter-attack UAV 402.
• a semi-rigid or rigid rod or other support member 403 can be coupled to the counter-attack UAV 402 and can extend downwardly from the counter-attack UAV 402 to support the tendrils 435 for the same purpose.
• the tendrils 435 can be deployed (from a stowed to a deployed position) from an elongate cavity through the support member 403 by sufficient wind forces, or by active actuation effectuated by the counter-attack UAV 402 that actuates a release device to release a bundle or collection of tendrils 435 in a suitable manner.
• This tendril configuration can provide a low-drag capture mechanism that minimizes drag forces as the counter-attack UAV 402 is operated in airspace, because the drag forces on an individual strand or filament of a particular tendril Is quite low because the free end is able to flutter or move In the wind without constraint.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 434 can be towed and positioned along a predicted or known flight path of the target aerial vehicle 404 to capture the target aerial vehicle 404 in one or more tendrils 435, thereby entangling rotors of the target aerial vehicle 404 to neutralize the target aerial vehicle 404.
• the tendrils 435 can be a relatively long, such as 15 m to 50 m, or more, due to their lightweight properties and low-drag features.
• the tendrils 435 can be configured in a bundled or stowed position in or about the flight body of the counter-attack UAV 402, and then deployable in a deployed position, as shown in FIG. 8.
• the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 434 and the target aerial vehicle 404 can be transported and released at a particular drop zone, such as away from populated areas (e.g., see FIG. 4D)
• a release mechanism can be coupled to the counter-attack UAV 402 and the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 434, and can be operated by the counter-attack UAV 402 to release the aerial vehicle capture countermeasure 434 from the counter-attack UAV 402.
• netting and their supports could be implemented, such as circular or oval-shaped, polygon-shaped, irregular shaped, etc.
• a plurality of counter-attack UAVs could even deploy a net having a three-dimensional zone of capture, such as the addition of tendrils, or even deploying a spherical net deployed with radial support members, for instance in this example, at least one“net face” or surface area will always face a particular target aerial vehicle regardless of the rotational position of the net, which increases the chances of capturing the target aerial vehicle.
• one or more aerial theatre observer UAV(s) can be operated to hover or fly around a monitored area to assist with neutralizing a target aerial vehicle.
• high-performance aerial theatre observer UAV(s) can have a variety of sensors and devices discussed herein (e.g., optical cameras, gimbals, etc.) that can“observe” terminal fracking and neutralization of the target aerial vehicle, meaning that the aerial theatre observer UAV(s) can also track, in real-time, the target aerial vehicle and then can communicate collected data to one or more counter-attack UAV(s) and/or to the external aerial vehicle detection system 100.
• This system assists to provide track target aerial vehicle(s) where tracking may be intermittent or unavailable by the one or more counter-attack UAV(s) and/or to the external aerial vehicle detection system 100 (e.g., due to weather, detection range issues, birds, etc.).
• Human observers can also received data, such as live video feed, from such aerial theatre observer UAV(s) to observe the success or failure of neutralizing the target aerial vehicle, which can act as a back-up system if the target aerial vehicle avoids neutralization by the counter attack UAV(s).

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• 2018
  • 2018-10-03 US US16/151,279 patent/US11465741B2/en active Active
• 2019
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  • 2019-10-03 JP JP2021518640A patent/JP7185034B2/ja active Active
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