WO2019179899A1 - Procédé de sécurisation cryptologique d'une plaque d'immatriculation pour un véhicule automobile - Google Patents

Procédé de sécurisation cryptologique d'une plaque d'immatriculation pour un véhicule automobile Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019179899A1
WO2019179899A1 PCT/EP2019/056598 EP2019056598W WO2019179899A1 WO 2019179899 A1 WO2019179899 A1 WO 2019179899A1 EP 2019056598 W EP2019056598 W EP 2019056598W WO 2019179899 A1 WO2019179899 A1 WO 2019179899A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
identifier
hash
chain
security
license plate
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2019/056598
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Tilman Schwinn
Dietmar Groh
Bernd Pfundstein
Original Assignee
Erich Utsch Ag
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Erich Utsch Ag filed Critical Erich Utsch Ag
Publication of WO2019179899A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019179899A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R13/00—Elements for body-finishing, identifying, or decorating; Arrangements or adaptations for advertising purposes
    • B60R13/10—Registration, licensing, or like devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09F—DISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00—Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02—Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/0297—Forms or constructions including a machine-readable marking, e.g. a bar code
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/84—Vehicles

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for the cryptological securing of a license plate for a motor vehicle having the features of the preamble of claim 1,
  • the object of the invention is therefore to improve the security of the association between a license plate and a distributed ledger for managing those data associated with the license plate numberplate.
  • Essential to the invention is the realization that not only can data be included in a blockchain and its integrity cryptographically secured by a hash, but that such a hash can also be used to generate a security symbol for placement on a license plate, from which Safety sign then the hash can be read out again. This closes the circle between the license plate and the data chain or block chain. It is then no longer possible, as described above to present a whole new data chain, as this will not correspond to the hash on the license plate.
  • the proposed method is used for the cryptological securing of a license plate for a motor vehicle, wherein at least one identifier associated with the motor vehicle is inserted into a data chain with cryptologically linked chain elements and the cryptological chaining is extended to the at least one identifier.
  • Such an insertion into a data chain also includes the first creation of a data string with the above identifier so far.
  • the term "license plate” is to be understood as the physical license plate carrier. It is therefore the physical object on which a structure or device for reproducing the mark - that is, to reproduce the corresponding alphanumeric sequence - possibly together with badges or the like. and safety signs attached.
  • the term "data chain” is to be understood as a basically arbitrary sequence of the chain links, wherein the chain links are data records of basically any type. In addition to these chain links the kete may have other components, in particular for cryptological Verketung. The cryptological concatenation of the chain links means that the integrity of the data chain is cryptologically secured.
  • any subsequent change or deletion of one of the already existing Keten members of the data chain or any other change in their constellation is recognizable.
  • This cryptological concatenation can be carried out in any manner known per se from the prior art.
  • the extension of the cryptological concatenation to the at least one identifier means that the chain links of the data chain and in particular the inserted identifier are also and in particular cryptologically linked after this insertion.
  • the identifier may be an im
  • the identifier hash is a hash value, which term - as already stated above - is also referred to as a hash.
  • This hash value or hash is referred to as a label hash for clarity only. It is not necessary for the tag hash to be generated by directly applying a hash function to the tag. It may also be that the identifier hash is generated by a hash function which is based on one or more values.
  • the tag hash is calculated by applying a hash function to at least a portion of the data string. It is preferred that the identifier hash itself is also part of the data chain. In particular, it may be that the identifier hash is calculated on the extension of the cryptological concatenation to the at least one identifier.
  • the proposed method is now characterized in that a security mark, from which a security value based on the identifier hash can be read out, is produced and arranged on the license plate. This can also be done substantially simultaneously with the production of the license plate.
  • the security token may be established based on the identifier hash.
  • safety sign here refers to the physical structure, which reproduces the security value as information in basically any manner readable.
  • the security value can be identical to the identifier hash. However, it may also be that the identifier hash must first be determined from the safety value by one or more arithmetic operations. It is then preferred that the security value be calculated based on the identifier hash.
  • a corresponding preferred embodiment of the method is characterized in that the security value is obtained by a cryptographic encryption of the identifier hash. In such a case, the appropriate cryptographic key must be present in order to determine the actual identifier hash from the security value. It is further preferred that the security value is obtained by a particularly asymmetric cryptographic encryption of the identifier hash. Then a private key would be required to get the identifier hash from the security value.
  • the above at least one identifier can in principle be any information.
  • the at least one identification assigned to the motor vehicle is a vehicle identification for identifying the motor vehicle, a personal identification for identifying a holder of the motor vehicle and / or a registration identifier for identifying a registration of the motor vehicle by the owner - or by an adherent of the motor vehicle - includes.
  • a vehicle identifier would be about a type number or a chassis number.
  • the above personal identifier may be a holder's badge number.
  • the registration identifier may be an identifier that identifies the assignment of the vehicle to the holder by registration.
  • the registration code can also be on the license plate moisge given license plate - according to the well-known license plate - itself. Accordingly, it is then preferred that the license plate has a representation of the registration identifier. Under the registration identifier, the identifier is to be understood as information and to that extent abstract, whereas the representation of the physical structure -. B. Painting - on the license plate sign for the registration of the registration mark. The representation is thus set up to reproduce the registration identifier.
  • the representation is an unchangeable part of the license plate. In other words, the representation can then no longer be removed or otherwise altered without destroying the license plate.
  • the security sign be unchangeable on the License plate is arranged. As a result, the safety sign can not be removed or altered without destroying the license plate.
  • the license plate may be that for the arrangement of the safety sign any license plate and in particular a blank license plate is used without a specific identification or a similar feature. But it may also be that the license plate from home assigned an identifier - referred to here as a tag - and this sign tag is included in the data chain. Preferably, the license plate then has a sign recognition representation for reproducing the sign recognition.
  • a tag identifier may be, for example, a serial number from the production of the license plate.
  • the same way to the registration identifier is also distinguished in the sign recognition between the sign recognition as information as such and the sign recognition representation as a physical implementation on the license plate in particular for the reproduction of the sign recognition.
  • the license plate is prefabricated ready and has a prefabricated, preferably readable, sign recognition representation for reproducing a sign recognition and that the sign identifier is inserted into the data chain and the cryptological chaining is extended to the sign recognition.
  • the cryptological identifier hash is calculated when inserting the label.
  • the identifier hash is based on the tag identifier, which may be the case, directly or indirectly, as described above for the identifier hash with respect to the identifier.
  • the assignment between the data chain and the license plate is thus even safer, since the data chain can then be matched both by the identifier hash from the safety sign and by the shield identifier with the license plate.
  • this sign recognition can only be determined by destruction of the license plate.
  • the tag identifier may be encrypted in the data string and the cryptographic chaining extended to the encrypted tag identifier. In principle, several types of information can also be inserted together as a single chain link in the data chain.
  • no sorting of the chain links is required in the data chain.
  • a preferred embodiment of the method is characterized in that the chain links of the data string are sorted according to an order.
  • the basis of the sorting of the chain links can be arbitrary. It is preferred that the chain links of the data string have a respective time stamp at the time of creation or insertion of the respective chain member and that the order in which the chain links of the data string are sorted correspond to the time sequence according to the respective time stamp.
  • the Zeitstempei can act both an absolute time and a relative time only in particular in comparison to each other time stamps, so that the time stamps possibly only make an indication of the temporal sequence with each other.
  • chain links of the data chain are digitally signed.
  • Digital signatures are basically known from the prior art and represent an asymmetric cryptosystem by which the non-repudiated authorship and the integrity of the digitally signed data, in this case each individual chain link, can be checked. It is further preferred that each chain link is digitally signed when inserted into the data chain.
  • a further preferred embodiment of the proposed method is characterized in that the chain links of the data chain are cryptologically linked by the fact that the data chain for at least some, preferably all, chain links has a cryptological element hash of the respective chain link and that the data chain is a series of cryptological meta - has hash, each based on an element hash.
  • the element hash is calculated by applying a first hash function - called an element hash function - to the chain link.
  • the meta hash will accordingly calculated by the application of a second hash function - called a meta-hash function.
  • the meta hash function can be identical to the element hash function. But she can also be different from her.
  • meta-hashes are each based on an eggement hash means that the eggement hash - directly or indirectly - at least part of the output data in the calculation of the respective meta-hash - by applying the above meta-hash function - forms.
  • Such further meta-hashes can be formed by applying a possibly further meta-hash function to two or more meta-hashes, so that the resulting structure of the meta-hash corresponds to a hash tree known per se from the prior art, which also is called "noticed tree".
  • the above identifier hash may be any hash in principle.
  • the identifier hash is a meta-hash.
  • the identifier hash may also be an eggement hash
  • the meta-hashes form a linked list, wherein the meta-hashes are based on a respective eggement hash and a preceding meta-hash.
  • Each meta hash can be assigned to a chain member, and each meta hash can be assigned a different meta hash than the previous meta hash.
  • that previous meta hash may be the meta-hash associated with the chain link preceding the chain link associated with the particular meta-hash according to the above sorting of the chain links.
  • the order of the linked list of the meta-hash corresponds to the order in which the chain links are sorted according to the assignment of the preceding meta-hash.
  • a start value which is not assigned to a chain member, can be assigned to a first meta-hash of the list as a preceding meta-hash.
  • the data chain can be checked to determine whether a subsequent manipulation of the chain tenths of the data chain, including a change within a chain link as well as a removal or insertion of an entire chain link or any other change in the order of the chain links. It may also be that the element hash and / or the meta-hash are based on a key-dependent hash function. In the case of a data chain with a large number of chain links, in this way the computational effort for checking the integrity of the data chain can be reduced.
  • the safety sign can be read out in any desired manner.
  • a preferred embodiment of the method is characterized in that the security symbol is set up for optical reproduction of the security value.
  • the security sign is retroreflective.
  • a further preferred embodiment of the method is characterized in that the security sign has a holographic structure for generating a reproduction of the security value.
  • the holographic structure for generating a hologram can be set up with such a reproduction.
  • the hologram itself then has a representation of the security value, for example as a three-dimensional number representation. It is preferred that the hologram has a holographic microtext.
  • the holographic structure is arranged for angle-dependent generation of at least two different images, of which only one reproduces the security value. To reproduce the safety value, the tilting effect is then used.
  • the safety sign has a diffraction structure for reproducing the safety value.
  • a diffraction structure is therefore a safety sign which visually reproduces the safety value by diffraction of light waves.
  • this diffraction structure can be produced in any desired manner. It is preferred that the diffraction structure is produced by a hot stamping process.
  • the safety mark luminous pigments for reproducing the safety value may be fluorescent luminescent pigments and, alternatively or additionally, phosphorescent luminescent pigments.
  • a preferred embodiment of the method is characterized in that the safety mark has angle-dependent visible markings for reproducing the safety value.
  • This angular dependence refers to the angle between a viewer of the security badge and a surface of the license plate on which the security badge is located.
  • markings can basically be produced in any desired manner. It is preferred that the markings are produced by lasering. It is particularly preferred that the markings are produced by interference of laser beams from at least two sources and especially under a cover layer of the license plate. Such an interference method allows production in layers other than the outermost layer of the license plate.
  • a further preferred embodiment of the method is characterized in that the safety sign has a graphic code for reproducing the safety value.
  • graphics codes are particularly suitable for automatic detection of the security value.
  • this graphic code can be one-dimensional, such as a barcode.
  • dimensionality is meant the number of directions into which the different elements of the graphics code extend.
  • a bar code has a basically planar extent, the individual elements are arranged side by side in one direction only.
  • the graphics code is preferably two-dimensional, which may be, for example, a QR code.
  • the security symbol is set up to reproduce the security value by radio waves.
  • radio waves are electromagnetic waves with frequencies below 3000 GHz to understand. These radio waves can basically be generated in any desired manner.
  • the security tag has an RFID (radio frequency identification) transponder for transmitting the security value.
  • FIG. 1 shows schematically an exemplary embodiment of a data chain for carrying out the proposed method
  • Fig. 2 shows schematically a first embodiment of a license plate for cryptological protection by the proposed method
  • Fig. 3 shows schematically a second embodiment of a license plate
  • the proposed method is used cryptologically securing a license plate la, b for a - not shown here - motor vehicle, a respective embodiment of such a license plate la, b in Figs. 2 and 3 is shown.
  • the license plates la, b of FIGS. 2 and 3 each have the representation 2 of a registration identifier 3, in which registration identifier 3 is an example of a per se known, recognizable by a human observer license plate.
  • the representation 2 of the registration identifier 3 is shown purely schematically in FIGS. 2 and 3 as a block area, in which the representation 2 of the registration identifier 3 is arranged on the respective license plate 1a, b.
  • This registration identifier 3 is an example of an identifier 4 assigned to the motor vehicle.
  • the license plates la, b also have a prefabricated respective sign recognition representation 5, which is set up to reproduce a sign recognition 6 and here in particular a serial number from the manufacturing process of the respective license plate la, b.
  • a sign recognition representation 5 can for example be stamped on the license plate la, b.
  • the registration identifier 3 is now created or determined, which registration identifier 3 thus registers the motor vehicle with the respective holder and identifies this assignment. With the registration identifier 3 more information is regularly linked.
  • the representation 2 of the registration identifier 3 is attached to the license plate ia, b, for example, by punching and / or a color Bear processing of the license plate la, b.
  • the registration identifier 3 is inserted as an identifier 4 associated with the motor vehicle and the cryptographic chaining is extended to the registration identifier 3.
  • the data chain 7 was already present with the label 6 as chain link 8.
  • the above extension of the cryptological concatenation to the registration identifier 3 comprises in particular the calculation of an identifier hash 9 by using a hash function. From this identifier hash 9, a security value is now determined using an asymmetric cryptographic key and a respective security symbol 10a, b is produced for reproducing the security value and arranged on the respective license plate 1a, b.
  • the safety sign 10a of the first embodiment of FIG. 2 gives the security value optically again.
  • the security sign 10a is a holographic structure 13 for generating a hologram with a representation of the security value.
  • the holographic structure 13 is arranged offset to the representation 2 of the registration identifier 3. Consequently, the safety mark 10a or the reproduced safety value can be perceived by the human eye.
  • the security badge 10b of the second embodiment of FIG. 3 arranged in the region of the representation 2 of the registration code and thus overlapping it on the license plate 1b has an RFID transponder 14 for transmitting the security value, so that the security value is reproduced in this embodiment - in a read-out by the appropriate, not shown reading device - of the safety sign 10 b by radio waves. Consequently, the license plate 1b is set for machine readout of the security value from the security flag 10b.
  • the cryptological linking of the chain links 8 of the data chain 7 will be explained with reference to FIG.
  • the data chain 7 has, for each chain link 8, a corresponding element hash 11, soft element hash 11 was generated by applying a hash function - the element hash function - on the respective chain link 8,
  • the data chain 7 may also have an arbitrary number of further, but not shown, chain links 8.
  • the data chain 11 has a series of meta-hashes 12 and in particular a meta-hash 12 for each chain link 8 of the data chain 7.
  • the meta-hashes 12 form a linked list whose order corresponds to the order of the chain links 8 to which the meta-hashes 12 are respectively assigned.
  • each meta-hash 12 - with the exception of the first meta-hash 12 of the linked list - is assigned a respective preceding meta-hash 12.
  • Each meta hash 12 is generated by applying a hashing function, namely the meta-hash function, to the associated chain link 8 with the preceding meta-hash 12.
  • the first meta-hash 12 is assigned a start value 12a which can be determined in any manner, so that, deviating from the other meta-hashes 12, the first meta-hash 12 is applied to the associated chain link 8 by applying the hash function - ie here Shield identification 6 - and is generated to the starting value 12a.
  • the hash function - ie here Shield identification 6 - is generated to the starting value 12a.
  • the security value of the Kennzei chenschild la, b are read from the read security value then the identifier hash 9 determined and the identifier hash 9 from the data chain 7 are compared.
  • the assignment of this special data chain 7 and the information contained in it or in its chain links 8 to the respective license plate la, b can be confirmed.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Vehicle Waterproofing, Decoration, And Sanitation Devices (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé de sécurisation cryptologique d'une plaque d'immatriculation (1a, b) pour un véhicule automobile. Au moins un indicateur (4) associé au véhicule automobile est introduit dans une chaîne de données (7) ayant des maillons (8) enchaînés de manière cryptologique et le chaînage cryptologique est étendu au ou aux indicateurs (4) et, lors de l'introduction du ou des indicateurs (4), une valeur de hachage d'indicateur cryptologique (9) est calculée sur la base de la chaîne de données (7) pour sécuriser l'intégrité de la chaîne de données (7). Le procédé est caractérisé en ce qu'un caractère de sécurité (10a, b), à partir duquel peut être lue une valeur de sécurité basée sur la valeur de hachage d'indicatif (9), est produit et est placé au niveau de la plaque d'immatriculation (1a, b).
PCT/EP2019/056598 2018-03-19 2019-03-15 Procédé de sécurisation cryptologique d'une plaque d'immatriculation pour un véhicule automobile WO2019179899A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102018002266.9A DE102018002266A1 (de) 2018-03-19 2018-03-19 Verfahren zur kryptologischen Sicherung eines Kennzeichenschilds für ein Kraftfahrzeug
DE102018002266.9 2018-03-19

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2019179899A1 true WO2019179899A1 (fr) 2019-09-26

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DE (1) DE102018002266A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2019179899A1 (fr)

Citations (5)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102007045412A1 (de) * 2007-09-21 2009-04-02 Erich Utsch Ag Schildanordnung
US8754751B1 (en) * 2012-06-18 2014-06-17 GTBM, Inc. RFID based system and method for vehicle and driver verification
WO2016090095A1 (fr) * 2014-12-05 2016-06-09 Skuchain, Inc. Vérification cryptographique de provenance dans une chaîne d'alimentation
US20170237553A1 (en) * 2015-03-12 2017-08-17 Skuchain, Inc. METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR PROVIDING A UNIVERSAL DETERMINISTICALLY REPRODUCIBLE CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY-PAIR REPRESENTATION FOR ALL SKUs, SHIPPING CARTONS, AND ITEMS
US20180018723A1 (en) 2016-07-18 2018-01-18 Royal Bank Of Canada Distributed ledger platform for vehicle records

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US10402792B2 (en) * 2015-08-13 2019-09-03 The Toronto-Dominion Bank Systems and method for tracking enterprise events using hybrid public-private blockchain ledgers
US10521973B2 (en) * 2015-12-17 2019-12-31 International Business Machines Corporation System for monitoring and enforcement of an automated fee payment
CN107561986A (zh) * 2017-09-06 2018-01-09 合肥维天运通信息科技股份有限公司 一种基于区块链技术的公路治超方法及系统

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102007045412A1 (de) * 2007-09-21 2009-04-02 Erich Utsch Ag Schildanordnung
US8754751B1 (en) * 2012-06-18 2014-06-17 GTBM, Inc. RFID based system and method for vehicle and driver verification
WO2016090095A1 (fr) * 2014-12-05 2016-06-09 Skuchain, Inc. Vérification cryptographique de provenance dans une chaîne d'alimentation
US20170237553A1 (en) * 2015-03-12 2017-08-17 Skuchain, Inc. METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR PROVIDING A UNIVERSAL DETERMINISTICALLY REPRODUCIBLE CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY-PAIR REPRESENTATION FOR ALL SKUs, SHIPPING CARTONS, AND ITEMS
US20180018723A1 (en) 2016-07-18 2018-01-18 Royal Bank Of Canada Distributed ledger platform for vehicle records

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