WO2019174771A1 - A method and a device of detecting radio disturbances in a radio communication system - Google Patents
A method and a device of detecting radio disturbances in a radio communication system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2019174771A1 WO2019174771A1 PCT/EP2018/084261 EP2018084261W WO2019174771A1 WO 2019174771 A1 WO2019174771 A1 WO 2019174771A1 EP 2018084261 W EP2018084261 W EP 2018084261W WO 2019174771 A1 WO2019174771 A1 WO 2019174771A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- power level
- radio
- detector
- signal
- receiver
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B29/00—Checking or monitoring of signalling or alarm systems; Prevention or correction of operating errors, e.g. preventing unauthorised operation
- G08B29/02—Monitoring continuously signalling or alarm systems
- G08B29/04—Monitoring of the detection circuits
- G08B29/046—Monitoring of the detection circuits prevention of tampering with detection circuits
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/20—Countermeasures against jamming
- H04K3/22—Countermeasures against jamming including jamming detection and monitoring
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
- H04K3/45—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by including monitoring of the target or target signal, e.g. in reactive jammers or follower jammers for example by means of an alternation of jamming phases and monitoring phases, called "look-through mode"
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/20—Countermeasures against jamming
- H04K3/22—Countermeasures against jamming including jamming detection and monitoring
- H04K3/222—Countermeasures against jamming including jamming detection and monitoring wherein jamming detection includes detecting the absence or impossibility of intelligible communication on at least one channel
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method and a device of detecting radio disturbances in a radio communication system.
- a prior art alarm system for handling jamming situations is dis- closed in EP2541518.
- a first alarm installation is arranged to supervise a second alarm installation and to monitor radio signals exchanged in said sec- ond alarm installation. Absence of monitored radio signals will result in the generation of a jamming alarm signal. It should be noted that if communica- tion between a peripheral device and a gateway in either alarm installation is interrupted during a longer time period, such as several minutes, a supervi- sion alarm can be generated in that alarm installation.
- a method of de- tecting radio disturbances in a radio communication system comprising a gateway device and a peripheral device, each arranged to send radio signals to and to receive radio signals from the other.
- the method comprises
- a jam- ming alarm can comprise generation of an alarm signal in premises where the radio communication system is installed and/or forwarding an alarm sig nal to remote central monitoring station where further steps for managing the situation can be taken.
- the method will provide a higher security in detecting sophisticated targeted jamming attempts in radio communication systems in general and on alarm systems specifically, even where a jamming signal dis- turbs or destroys specific information segments exchanged in radio commu- nication.
- the disclosed method can be used in a home wireless communica- tions system comprising a plurality of wireless nodes including a first gateway at least one wireless peripheral device and, in some installations, at least one second gateway.
- the home wireless communications system forms an instal- lation that can include a conventional home security system that comprises at least one wireless alarm detector and at least one gateway. If any of the de- vices or nodes fail - some action is taken, such as notifying the home owner or triggering a tamper alarm.
- the tamper alarm can comprise generation of an alarm signal in premises where the radio communication system is in- stalled and/or forwarding an alarm signal to remote central monitoring station where further steps for managing the situation can be taken.
- a home wireless communications system in general can be any type of wireless system comprising a plurality of peripheral wireless nodes, such as an intruder alarm, and a central unit.
- a security system having a plurality of wireless detectors, sensitive to the presence or passage of persons and objects, communicating with a central unit such as a gateway using wireless communication.
- Intentional radio disturbance measures or interference can be caused by a radio jammer that is a device that deliberately blocks, jams or interferes with authorized wireless communications.
- jammers work by the transmission of radio signals that disrupt communications by de- creasing the signal-to-noise ratio.
- the concept can be used in wireless data networks to disrupt information flow.
- Jamming is usually distinguished from interference that can occur due to device malfunctions or other accidental cir cumstances.
- Security and alarm systems used today normally comprise a control panel and a gateway that is connected to a central station, either by a tele- phone line or by a wireless telecommunications system such as GSM or other radio frequency systems. The connection can also be through the inter- net.
- the control panel can be provided with an input device or be activated and controlled by a control device such as a keypad which can be a wireless remote device.
- a packet sniping jammer normally would incorporate an intelli gent receiver chain and listen for packets or power in the air during digital wireless communication.
- a packet comprises a dataset of pre- amble, sync-word, payload and cyclic redundancy check (CRC).
- CRC cyclic redundancy check
- the power of the incoming signal is contin- uously measured and changes in that power are detected in a detector.
- step changes both positive and negative, that would arise from packet snip- ing.
- the continuous measurement of power could be done at any suitable po- sition in the receiver chain. The measurement is done with a sufficiently high bandwidth (the power measurement speed should be in the order of the bi- trate of the received signal).
- the power measurements could be done by measuring the power of the incoming signal in relevant radio receiver parts, such as the Automated Gain Control (AGC), the Intermediate Frequency Amplifier (IF AMP) or the Analog to digi- tal converter (ADC).
- ADC Automated Gain Control
- IF AMP Intermediate Frequency Amplifier
- ADC Analog to digi- tal converter
- the power measurement can also be made by measur- ing the level of the digital IQ data. In practice, different measurement meth- ods are used depending on receiver architecture.
- Fig. 1 is a schematic view of an installation of a home wireless system
- Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram showing power of a received radio signal in a simple jamming situation in the time domain
- Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram showing power of a received radio signal in the time domain where a jamming signal is generated by a sniping jammer in a more sophisticated way
- Fig. 4 schematically shows signal measurements of the signal shown in
- Fig. 5 is a schematic diagram showing an analogue type receiver compris- ing one embodiment of a detector in accordance with the invention
- Fig. 6 is a schematic diagram showing a digital type receiver comprising one embodiment of a detector in accordance with the invention
- Fig. 7 is a schematic diagram showing one embodiment of a detector in accordance with the invention
- Fig. 8 is a schematic diagram showing a typical installation including two communication units comprising a detector in accordance with the invention
- Fig. 9 is a table showing part of a correctly received bit stream package and corresponding energy levels.
- Fig. 10 is a table showing part of a received jammed bit stream package and corresponding energy levels.
- Fig. 1 shows a home wireless system installed in a building 10.
- the home wireless system is an alarm system installation and comprises a plural- ity of wireless peripheral nodes including wireless peripheral devices, a first gateway 12 and a second gateway 12’.
- the second gateway 12’ is mains powered and normally is not provided with battery backup.
- One wireless pe- ripheral node is a first infrared detector 14 mounted in the corner of a room close to the ceiling.
- the first infrared detector 14 has a sensing area that co vers the first gateway 12.
- a first perimeter alarm detector 16 is mounted at a window 17 in the same room.
- the infrared detector operates in a conven- tional manner to detect presence and movements of objects emitting infrared radiation.
- the perimeter alarm detector also operates in a conventional man- ner to detect when a door or a window is opened.
- the perimeter alarm detector comprises a magnetic sensor that will detect when a magnet attached to the door or window is moved.
- Second gateway 12’ is arranged in a second room separated from the room where the first gateway 12 is arranged.
- a second infrared detector 14’ is mounted in the same room as the second gateway 12’ to cover it within its operative area and a second perimeter alarm detector 16’ is mounted at a second window 17’ in the same room.
- a keypad 19 is mounted close to a front door 20 of the building 10. The keypad 19 is used by an operator of the alarm system to arm and to disarm the alarm system.
- the keypad 19 also is a wireless peripheral node.
- the front door 20 is covered by a third perimeter alarm detector 21.
- Another type of wireless peripheral device is a smoke de- tector 23 mounted in the ceiling of building. In various embodiments a plural- ity of smoke detectors 23 are arranged throughout the building 10 to ensure that fire can be detected at an early stage.
- the first gateway 12 and the second gateway 12’ are connected to a remote central monitoring station 22 either through a wired connection 24 or through a wireless connection such as GSM or a similar digital cellular network 34.
- the connection to the remote central monitoring station 22 can also be through the internet 26.
- internet connection is provided through a wireless router 32 that is connected to internet by fibre, cable or Digital Subscriber Line, such as ADSL.
- second gateway 12’ is connected by wire 33 to wireless router 32.
- the wired connection 24 can be part of a public switched telephone network 25.
- the remote central monitoring station 22 comprises an interface module 27, a database 28 and a web server 29.
- the database 28 stores installation and application data relating to the installation including all wireless network nodes and alarm settings.
- the first gateway 12 is capable of communicating with the second gateway 12’ because of the more powerful radio transmitting units even though some peripheral nodes cannot.
- An installation such as the alarm system shown in Fig. 1 holds a large amount of dynamic state information, such as arm state, alarm status, peripheral battery status, etc. in a total system state information dataset. Similar information is stored also in other types of home wireless systems.
- Each gateway or controller continuously receives inputs from different au- thenticated sources such as peripheral nodes, a RCMS, adjacent systems, etc. that affects a distributed state of the application or system.
- a second gateway can utilize the RF com- munication link of another gateway for tunnelling messages to a remote cen- tral monitoring station (RCMS).
- RCMS remote cen- tral monitoring station
- another gateway up-link can be utilized.
- FIG. 2 shows power levels of received ra- dio signals in a jamming situation in the time domain where a jamming signal 40 is transmitted as noise.
- Message signals 42 received at a power level PA are concealed or at least not fully readable when a noise level PN extends above message signal level PA.
- a jamming situation as shown in Fig. 2 is detected in prior art systems a jamming alarm can be generated.
- FIG. 3 shows a jamming situation in the time domain where a jamming signal is generated by a sniping jammer in a more sophisticated way.
- a sniping jammer normally comprises a more intelli gent receiver chain and will listen for message signals 42 or power in the air. Once a message signal 42 such as a packet is detected the jammer emits a short surge 43 of power at power level PN lasting at least and normally only a fraction of the packet length. The actual length normally would be based on the protocol being jammed. If error correctional coding is used more bits would have to be jammed to ensure a destroyed packet.
- the diagram in Fig. 4 illustrates a situation starting with receiving a normal radio signal during four consecutive time periods, each time period Tn including one information segment.
- each time period Tn including one information segment.
- the power level value of each time period is referred to as Pm.
- Pm The power level value of each time period
- a statistical value Pd of measured power levels Pm is continuously determined based on power levels of previ- ously received information segments.
- Pm is meas- ured over a limited time period Tm, such as 1 s.
- a basic statistical value is a mean value as indicated with a dashed line in Fig. 4 indicates that the received power level may vary up and down over time.
- the mean value is continuously determined based on power levels of previously received information segments or determined continuously for each information segment.
- the statistical value is the standard deviation of a set of or all power level values Pm.
- the set of power level values can be based on a plurality of values, values measured over a time period, or all or a subset of values of a specific information seg- ment.
- a jamming signal 44 is broadcast and received during a time period where an information segment also is broadcast.
- the jamming signal 44 has a power level Pj which is different from the power level Pm of the information segment and also different from the mean value Pd.
- Power level Pj is greater than the mean power level. The difference is Pe. If the power level Pj deviates more from the mean value or the statistical value than a reference or threshold value power level Pj is determined to indicate that intentional or unintentional radio disturbance measures have occurred.
- the threshold value can be two to five times the standard deviation or preferably around three times the stand- ard deviation.
- a detector 44 for detecting intentional or unintentional radio disturb- ance measures is connected to an appropriate location in a receiver chain where the measurement can be done with high enough bandwidth (the power measurement speed should be in the order of the bitrate of the received sig- nal but any bandwidth allowing for more than one measurement per infor- mation segment will be usable). The exact location depends on the receiver architecture.
- the detector will produce an alert signal when intentional or un- intentional radio disturbance measures are detected.
- an antenna 46 is con- nected to a Low Noise Amplifier (LNA) 48 in a conventional manner.
- LNA Low Noise Amplifier
- An out- put of LNA 48 is connected to a mixer 50 mixing the amplified signal with an adjustable frequency signal from an oscillator 52.
- the mixer is connected also to an Intermediate Frequency stage with an amplifier (IF AMP) 54, an output of which is connected to a filter 56 in a conventional way.
- IF AMP Intermediate Frequency stage with an amplifier
- IF AMP 54 comprises an Auto- matic Gain Control (AGC) 58.
- AGC 58 generates a signal that is indicative of the power of the received signal.
- the generated signal is sent to detector 44 through an output of AGC 58 that is connected to detector 44.
- An output of filter 56 is connected to an analog-to-digital con- verter (ADC) 60 providing a bitstream of digital data and a power level output.
- ADC analog-to-digital con- verter
- the power level output is connected to detector 44.
- a signal at the power level output is indicative of the power of the received signal and thus can be used for detecting intentional or unintentional radio disturbance measures.
- antenna 46 is connected to LNA 48 in a conventional manner.
- the signal amplified in LNA 48 is pro- Stepd in ADC providing a bitstream of digital data and a power level output.
- the power level output is connected to detector 44.
- a signal at the power level output is indicative of the power of the received signal and thus can be used for detecting intentional or unintentional radio disturbance measures.
- Detector 44 could be physi- cal device or be software implemented.
- a power level detector 62 is con- nected to an appropriate position in a radio receiver to continuously detect a power level signal indicative of the power of information segments in a radio received signal.
- a bit-clock detector 63 is connected to an appropriate posi- tion in a radio receiver to continuously detect a bit-clock to provide basis for synchronization.
- Values of power levels are processed by a processing unit 64 and stored in a memory unit 66. In various embodiments, the processing of power levels comprises calculating at least one statistical value. Normally, a mean value of power level values is continuously calculated.
- power level detector 62 is connected to an appropriate position in a radio receiver to continuously detect a power level signal indicative of the power of separate information segments in a radio re- ceived signal.
- Detector 44 can be used also to measure continuously power of a received package of data and to detect if any steps in power should oc cur. As soon as the start of a package is detected an evaluation of power starts. Regardless of bit synchronization an alarm will be generated, should there be a positive or negative power step.
- the processing further comprises repeatedly comparing a present value of the power level of at least one information segment of a received signal with said statistical value.
- a present power level value or a set of recently received power level values, differs from the statistical value by more than a threshold value intentional or unintentional radio disturbance measures is considered to be present.
- processing unit 64 instructs an output unit 68 to produce an alert signal and to forward the alert signal to a central unit, as described in more detail below.
- FIG. 8 A basic installation of a radio system is shown in Fig. 8.
- This em- bodiment relates to a home alarm system comprising first gateway 12, sec- ond gateway 12’ and at least one wireless peripheral device, such as an in- frared detector 14.
- First gateway 12, second gateway 12’ and infrared detec- tor 14 all communicate using radio communication.
- At least one gateway is repeatedly communicating with remote central monitoring station 22 as dis closed above.
- a sniping jammer device 70 has been moved to a position where radio signals in the installation can be received and radio disturbance measures can be taken.
- First and second gateways 12, 12’ comprise first communication units 72 and second communication units 74.
- First communication units 72 is used for communicating with remote central monitoring station 22 either through a wired connection 24 or through a wireless connection such as GSM or a similar digital cellular network.
- the connection to the remote cen- tral monitoring station 22 can also be through a wired connection, such as a public switched telephone network or the internet.
- Second communication units 74 is mainly used for communication within the installation between gateways and between gateways and periph- eral nodes.
- Each gateway is controlled by a central unit 76 and comprise a power unit 78, normally a battery.
- At least one gateway is provided with a de- tector 44 continuously monitoring radio communication received in the gate- way.
- detector 44 detects intentional or unintentional radio disturbance measures in the radio communication system an alert signal is transferred to central unit 76.
- An alarm signal then can be generated in the gateway and forwarded to the remote central monitoring station 22 in an appropriate way.
- the table in Fig. 9 describes a part of a correctly received package with the bits as“1” and“0” in the top row and the energy level as“A” to“Z” in the sec- ond row.
- a packet sniping activation is present in the table in Fig. 10 . Higher energy levels during packet jamming are indicated with a V resulting in a dif ferent and disturbed bit stream.
- a step in power would be easily detected and by pairing the power step with the bit pattern before and after the power step it can be determined that there was a package en route to the receiver that was sniped.
- the snip- ing detection could also be solely based on short changes in power if the re- ceived bit stream ignoring the packet recognition factor although this would most likely cause some false alarms since neighboring systems and other RF protocols could be mistaken for snipers.
- calculating the statistical value comprises calculation of a standard deviation of power level values of separate infor- mation segments.
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- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Monitoring And Testing Of Transmission In General (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
IL277244A IL277244B2 (en) | 2018-03-15 | 2018-12-11 | A method and a device of detecting radio disturbances in a radio communication system |
BR112020018409-8A BR112020018409A2 (en) | 2018-03-15 | 2018-12-11 | A METHOD AND DEVICE FOR DETECTING RADIO DISTURBANCES IN A RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP18161928.9 | 2018-03-15 | ||
EP18161928.9A EP3540707B1 (en) | 2018-03-15 | 2018-03-15 | A method and a device of detecting radio disturbances in a radio communication system |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2019174771A1 true WO2019174771A1 (en) | 2019-09-19 |
Family
ID=61683625
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2018/084261 WO2019174771A1 (en) | 2018-03-15 | 2018-12-11 | A method and a device of detecting radio disturbances in a radio communication system |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP3540707B1 (en) |
BR (1) | BR112020018409A2 (en) |
CL (1) | CL2020002331A1 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2952840T3 (en) |
IL (1) | IL277244B2 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2019174771A1 (en) |
Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6229998B1 (en) * | 1999-04-12 | 2001-05-08 | Qualcomm Inc. | Method and system for detecting in-band jammers in a spread spectrum wireless base station |
EP2541518A1 (en) | 2011-07-01 | 2013-01-02 | Securitas Direct AB | A method for supervising intruder alarm systems |
EP2733853A1 (en) * | 2012-11-19 | 2014-05-21 | Gemalto M2M GmbH | Method, device and system for detecting a jamming transmitter |
EP3026835A1 (en) * | 2014-11-28 | 2016-06-01 | Gemalto M2M GmbH | Method of detecting a jamming transmitter affecting a communication user equipment |
Family Cites Families (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6996373B2 (en) * | 2002-06-18 | 2006-02-07 | Nokia Corporation | Base station |
-
2018
- 2018-03-15 ES ES18161928T patent/ES2952840T3/en active Active
- 2018-03-15 EP EP18161928.9A patent/EP3540707B1/en active Active
- 2018-12-11 BR BR112020018409-8A patent/BR112020018409A2/en unknown
- 2018-12-11 WO PCT/EP2018/084261 patent/WO2019174771A1/en active Application Filing
- 2018-12-11 IL IL277244A patent/IL277244B2/en unknown
-
2020
- 2020-09-09 CL CL2020002331A patent/CL2020002331A1/en unknown
Patent Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6229998B1 (en) * | 1999-04-12 | 2001-05-08 | Qualcomm Inc. | Method and system for detecting in-band jammers in a spread spectrum wireless base station |
EP2541518A1 (en) | 2011-07-01 | 2013-01-02 | Securitas Direct AB | A method for supervising intruder alarm systems |
EP2733853A1 (en) * | 2012-11-19 | 2014-05-21 | Gemalto M2M GmbH | Method, device and system for detecting a jamming transmitter |
EP3026835A1 (en) * | 2014-11-28 | 2016-06-01 | Gemalto M2M GmbH | Method of detecting a jamming transmitter affecting a communication user equipment |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
ES2952840T3 (en) | 2023-11-06 |
IL277244B1 (en) | 2023-06-01 |
EP3540707C0 (en) | 2023-08-02 |
IL277244B2 (en) | 2023-10-01 |
BR112020018409A2 (en) | 2020-12-22 |
EP3540707A1 (en) | 2019-09-18 |
IL277244A (en) | 2020-10-29 |
EP3540707B1 (en) | 2023-08-02 |
CL2020002331A1 (en) | 2020-12-18 |
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