WO2019062530A1 - Procédé et dispositif de suivi et anti-contrefaçon de marchandises - Google Patents

Procédé et dispositif de suivi et anti-contrefaçon de marchandises Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019062530A1
WO2019062530A1 PCT/CN2018/104822 CN2018104822W WO2019062530A1 WO 2019062530 A1 WO2019062530 A1 WO 2019062530A1 CN 2018104822 W CN2018104822 W CN 2018104822W WO 2019062530 A1 WO2019062530 A1 WO 2019062530A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
information
electronic tag
inner cover
package
goods
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2018/104822
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
朝鲁
Original Assignee
浙江鑫泊物流科技有限公司
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Publication date
Application filed by 浙江鑫泊物流科技有限公司 filed Critical 浙江鑫泊物流科技有限公司
Priority to JP2020517551A priority Critical patent/JP7022821B2/ja
Publication of WO2019062530A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019062530A1/fr
Priority to JP2022017439A priority patent/JP2022081481A/ja

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/018—Certifying business or products
    • G06Q30/0185—Product, service or business identity fraud
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/077—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier
    • G06K19/07749—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords

Definitions

  • the invention relates to the technical field of logistics, in particular to a method and a device for traceability of goods.
  • Haitao's goods "Fake goods become a sea tao authentic", taking cosmetics as an example: on the second-hand trading platform, bulk purchase of large-name cosmetics empty bottles, after forging foreign express orders and purchasing small tickets, forging logistics information and production areas After reaching the goal of “overseas gold plating”, it appeared on the major sales platforms as a genuine purchasing agent.
  • the traditional technology only scans in various logistics links, and informs the consumer of the logistics information after the face sheet is recognized, and the consumer is not clear about the actual state of the goods in the middle.
  • a method for traceability of goods comprising the following steps:
  • the goods information is written in the electronic tag, the first encryption key is obtained, and the goods information is encrypted by the first encryption key; wherein the electronic tag is set on the package or package for packaging the goods, At the same time, a tampering device is provided, and the tampering device destroys the electronic tag when the package is opened;
  • the logistics information is written in the electronic tag, the second encryption key is obtained, and the logistics information is encrypted by the second encryption key;
  • the decryption key is obtained, the target information in the electronic tag is read by the decryption key, and the source is verified by the source according to the target information; wherein the decryption key is respectively associated with the first encryption key and the second encryption key
  • the key matches, and the target information includes goods information or logistics information
  • the goods information is written in the electronic tag, and the goods information is encrypted by using the first encryption key; in the logistics transportation stage, the logistics information is written in the electronic tag, And using the second encryption key to encrypt the logistics information; since the goods information and the logistics information are encrypted by the encryption key, which is equivalent to setting the read and write authority, the information in the electronic tag is generally difficult to forge, and the accuracy of the information is ensured;
  • the information in the electronic tag is read by using the decryption key matched with the encryption key, the target information is obtained to verify the source of the goods, and the goods information and the logistics information are encrypted and decrypted by the matched key.
  • the tamper device will destroy the electronic tag and use the tamper device to ensure the integrity of the electronic tag. Prevent the goods in the package from being replaced.
  • the tamper device comprises a mechanical tamper device, the mechanical tamper device is disposed at the opening of the package of the packaged goods, the electronic tag is located in the mechanical tamper device, and the mechanical tamper device is destroyed when the package opening is opened Electronic tags.
  • the mechanical tamper device includes an inner cover, an outer cover, and a fixed plug
  • the upper end surface of the inner cover is provided with an annular cutting groove and an electronic tag.
  • the chip of the electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove, and the antenna of the electronic tag extends across the annular cutting groove to the periphery of the inner cover, and the lower end surface of the inner cover is fixed.
  • a tooth, a lower portion of the inner cover and the fixing plug are provided with a matching guiding mechanism for rotating the fixing plug relative to the inner cover in a first direction;
  • the outer cover is disposed outside the inner cover, and the lower end surface of the outer cover is fixed with a cutter,
  • the cutter is located in the annular cutting groove, and at least one of the inner cover and the outer cover is threadedly coupled to the fixing plug.
  • a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are disposed between the inner cover and the outer cover, and the first limiting mechanism prevents the inner cover from rotating relative to the outer cover in the first direction, and the second limiting mechanism The inner cover is partially prevented from rotating in the second direction relative to the outer cover, and when the force applied to the inner cover or the outer cover in the second direction is greater than a preset value, the inner cover is rotated in the second direction relative to the outer cover.
  • the second encryption key is multiple, and the logistics transportation phase is divided into multiple sub-phases, and the plurality of second encryption keys respectively correspond to the plurality of sub-phases one by one;
  • the corresponding logistics information is written in the electronic tag, the corresponding second encryption key is obtained, and the corresponding logistics information is encrypted by the corresponding second encryption key.
  • the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting method further comprises the following steps:
  • the first encryption key is obtained from the blockchain server, and the package information is uploaded to the blockchain server;
  • the decryption key and the package information of the goods are obtained from the blockchain server, wherein the package information of the goods is used for comparison with the physical package of the goods, and the comparison result is used for source verification of the goods.
  • the package information includes a video slice of the package of the item, wherein the video slice is taken during the packing of the item, the package of the item, the writing of the electronic tag or the data check.
  • the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting method further comprises the following steps:
  • the logistics information is uploaded to the blockchain server; wherein the logistics information includes whether the electronic tag is destroyed.
  • a cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device comprising the above electronic tag.
  • the electronic tag is set on the package or package for packaging the goods; in the delivery phase, the goods information is written in the electronic tag, and the goods information is encrypted by using the first encryption key; In the logistics transportation stage, the logistics information is written in the electronic tag, and the logistics information is encrypted by using the second encryption key; since the goods information and the logistics information are encrypted by the encryption key, the read/write permission is set, and the electronic tag is The information is generally difficult to forge, to ensure the accuracy of the information; in the receiving phase, the information in the electronic tag is read by using the decryption key matching the encryption key, and the target information is verified to trace the source, and the matching is performed.
  • the key encrypts and decrypts the goods information and the logistics information, which can avoid information forgery, ensure the authenticity of the traceability of the goods and the true and complete state of the goods during transportation.
  • the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device further includes a writing device and a reading device;
  • the writing device writes the goods information in the electronic tag, obtains the first encryption key, and encrypts the goods information by using the first encryption key;
  • the writing device writes the logistics information in the electronic tag, acquires the second encryption key, and encrypts the logistics information through the second encryption key;
  • the reading device acquires the decryption key, reads the target information in the electronic tag through the decryption key, and performs traceability verification on the product according to the target information; wherein the decryption key and the first encryption key respectively The two encryption keys are matched, and the target information includes goods information or logistics information.
  • the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device further includes a tampering device that destroys the electronic tag when the package is opened.
  • the tamper device comprises a mechanical tamper device, the mechanical tamper device is disposed at the opening of the package of the packaged goods, the electronic tag is located in the mechanical tamper device, and the mechanical tamper device is destroyed when the package opening is opened Electronic tags.
  • the mechanical tamper device includes an inner cover, an outer cover, and a fixed plug
  • the upper end surface of the inner cover is provided with an annular cutting groove and an electronic tag.
  • the chip of the electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove, and the antenna of the electronic tag extends across the annular cutting groove to the periphery of the inner cover, and the lower end surface of the inner cover is fixed.
  • a tooth, a lower portion of the inner cover and the fixing plug are provided with a matching guiding mechanism for rotating the fixing plug relative to the inner cover in a first direction;
  • the outer cover is disposed outside the inner cover, and the lower end surface of the outer cover is fixed with a cutter,
  • the cutter is located in the annular cutting groove, and at least one of the inner cover and the outer cover is threadedly coupled to the fixing plug.
  • a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are disposed between the inner cover and the outer cover, and the first limiting mechanism prevents the inner cover from rotating relative to the outer cover in the first direction, and the second limiting mechanism The inner cover is partially prevented from rotating in the second direction relative to the outer cover, and when the force applied to the inner cover or the outer cover in the second direction is greater than a preset value, the inner cover is rotated in the second direction relative to the outer cover.
  • the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device further includes a buckle locking device, the buckle locking device is disposed on the package or the package of the packaged goods, and is connected with the pulse generator, and the buckle locking device is opened when the package is opened. At the same time, the buckle lock device triggers the pulse generator.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a method for tracking source anti-counterfeiting in an embodiment
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a method for tracking source anti-counterfeiting in an embodiment
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of an AES module in an embodiment
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a data path in an embodiment
  • FIG. 5-a is a schematic diagram of an encryption process of an authentication server in an embodiment
  • FIG. 5-b is a schematic diagram of a decryption process of an authentication label in an embodiment
  • FIG. 5-c is a schematic diagram of an encryption process of an authentication label in an embodiment
  • FIG. 5-d is a schematic diagram of a decryption process of an authentication server in an embodiment
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of an AES module architecture in an embodiment
  • Figure 7 is a longitudinal cross-sectional view of the mechanical tampering device in one embodiment
  • Figure 8 is a schematic transverse cross-sectional view of the mechanical tampering device in one embodiment
  • Figure 9 is a partial cross-sectional view showing the mechanical tampering device in one embodiment
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic structural view of a product traceability anti-counterfeiting device in an embodiment
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic structural view of a cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device in another embodiment
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic structural view of a cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device in still another embodiment
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of a product traceability anti-counterfeiting device in still another embodiment
  • FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram of a package wrapping process in an embodiment
  • Figure 15 is a schematic view showing the process of shipment and transportation of goods in one embodiment
  • 16 is a schematic diagram of an abnormal processing flow of a parcel shipment in an embodiment
  • Figure 17 is a schematic view showing the process of receiving goods in an embodiment.
  • first ⁇ second is merely an object that distinguishes similar objects, and does not represent a specific ordering for an object. It can be understood that “first ⁇ second” is allowed. In this case, a specific order or order can be interchanged. It is to be understood that the "first/second" distinguished objects may be interchanged as appropriate to enable the embodiments of the invention described herein to be carried out in a sequence other than those illustrated or described herein.
  • the traceability anti-counterfeiting method provided by the present application can be applied to the application environment as shown in FIG.
  • the shipper writes the goods information in the electronic tag, obtains the first encryption key, encrypts the goods information by using the first encryption key, and the carrier writes the logistics information in the electronic tag to obtain the second encryption key.
  • the logistics information is encrypted by the second encryption key; the consignee obtains the decryption key, reads the target information in the electronic tag through the decryption key, and verifies the authenticity of the goods according to the target information, and also sets the defense Disassemble the device and the tamper device destroys the electronic tag when the package is opened.
  • the electronic tag can be read and written by a dedicated reader and a key.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a method for source-originating anti-counterfeiting according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the method for tracking source anti-counterfeiting in the embodiment includes the following steps:
  • Step S110 In the delivery phase, the goods information is written in the electronic tag, the first encryption key is obtained, and the goods information is encrypted by the first encryption key; wherein the electronic tag is set on the package for packaging the goods or In the package, a tampering device is also provided, and the tamper device destroys the electronic tag when the package is opened;
  • the electronic tag can be set on the package or in the package, and is disposed on the package.
  • the process of attaching the electronic tag is relatively simple, and the package is disposed in the package to protect the electronic tag and prevent the electronic tag from being damaged;
  • the product information mainly includes BOM (Bill of Material) information, factory time information, identification code and GPS (Global Positioning System) positioning information;
  • the function of the tamper is to prevent the package from being opened. Open, can destroy the electronic label, at this time the electronic label will be invalid;
  • Step S120 In the logistics transportation phase, the logistics information is written in the electronic tag, the second encryption key is obtained, and the logistics information is encrypted by the second encryption key;
  • the logistics information mainly includes the receiving time, the receiving address, the inspection status, the transit time and the receiver code of the goods;
  • Step S130 In the receiving phase, acquiring a decryption key, reading the target information in the electronic tag through the decryption key, and performing source verification on the product according to the target information; wherein the decryption key and the first encryption key respectively The second encryption key is matched, and the target information includes the goods information or the logistics information; if the electronic tag is destroyed, it is determined that the goods traceability fails.
  • the decryption key is matched with the first encryption key and the second encryption key, and the decrypted key can decrypt the encrypted item information or the logistics information in the electronic tag; if the electronic tag is destroyed The information in it can not be read, the packaging of the goods has been opened in the middle, and it can be determined that the traceability of the goods has failed.
  • the goods information is written in the electronic tag, and the goods information is encrypted by using the first encryption key; in the logistics transportation stage, the logistics information is written in the electronic tag, and the The second encryption key encrypts the logistics information; since the goods information and the logistics information are encrypted by the encryption key, it is equivalent to setting the read and write authority, and the information in the electronic tag is generally difficult to forge, ensuring the accuracy of the information;
  • the information in the electronic tag is read by using the decryption key matched with the encryption key, the target information is obtained to verify the source of the goods, and the goods information and the logistics information are encrypted and decrypted by the matched key, thereby avoiding the information.
  • the tamper device will destroy the electronic tag, and the tamper device is used to ensure the integrity of the electronic tag, which can prevent the package from being damaged. The goods were replaced.
  • the encryption key and the decryption key may be provided in advance by a service provider.
  • AES Advanced Encryption Standard
  • a plurality of key pairs are generated. Each key pair includes a public key B and a private key A, and a key N attached to A, and the private key A is assigned to the delivery.
  • a person as the first encryption key; assigning the key N to the carrier as the second encryption key; assigning the private key B to the consignee as the decryption key;
  • the electronic tag may be an RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) electronic tag, and the RFID electronic tag is provided with a plurality of blocks (block areas) for writing product information or logistics information respectively; and has been written into the RFID electronic tag. Product information and logistics information can only be read by combining the corresponding key.
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • the RFID electronic tag includes an analog front end and an AES module; the AES module includes a controller, a RAM module, and a data path; a sub-module is built in the data path, and the sub-module performs only one-quarter of the MixColumns operation, as shown in FIG. And Figure 4 shows.
  • the authentication process for RFID electronic tags involves an authentication server, an authentication reader, and an authentication tag (ie, an RFID tag).
  • the encryption unit of the authentication server includes an XOR execution unit 201.
  • the XOR execution unit 201 performs an XOR operation on the 0 to 15 bits of the acknowledgment data 203 and the output key 205 to be encrypted, through the bit unit for generating the cryptographic confirmation data 207.
  • the encryption confirmation data 207 is transmitted to the authentication reader together with the input key (InputKey_RN), and the confirmation data 207 and the input key (InputKey_RN) transmitted to the authentication reader are generated as one message and transmitted to the authentication tag.
  • the decryption unit of the authentication tag includes an XOR execution unit 211.
  • the XOR execution unit 211 performs an XOR operation with respect to bits 0 to 15 of the output key 215 and the encryption confirmation data 213 included in the Sec_Auth command message, and the unit 217 is configured to generate decryption confirmation data.
  • the output key 215 is used by the key processor of the authentication tag to use the input key (InputKey_RN) included in the Sec_Auth command message and the AES key included in the authentication memory.
  • the encryption unit of the authentication tag includes an XOR execution unit 221.
  • the XOR execution unit 221 performs XOR on the acknowledgment data 223 to be encrypted and the bits 16 to 31 of the output key 225, and performs an XOR operation in bit units to generate cryptographic confirmation data 227.
  • the confirmation data 223 to be encrypted may be the confirmation data 217 decrypted from the decryption unit of the authentication tag. Therefore, the XOR execution unit 221 re-encrypts the decrypted confirmation data 217 to generate the encrypted confirmation data 227.
  • the encryption confirmation data 227 is composed of a Sec_auth response message and is sent to the authentication reader. Further, the confirmation data 227 sent to the authentication reader is transmitted to the authentication server.
  • the decryption unit of the authentication server includes an XOR execution unit 231.
  • the XOR execution unit 231 performs an XOR operation on the bits 16 to 31 of the encryption confirmation data 233 and the output key 235, and generates decrypted confirmation data 237 in units of bits.
  • the authentication server compares the confirmation data 203 generated in the authentication server with the decryption confirmation data 237 received from the authentication reader, thereby verifying the authenticity of the authentication tag.
  • the RFID authentication system includes an authentication server 301, an authentication reader 321 and an authentication tag 331; the authentication server 301 includes a key database 302, a key processor 303, an authentication data generator 304, an encryption unit 305, a tag authentication unit 306, and a decryption unit 307.
  • the key processor 303 uses the authentication information to determine the AES key.
  • the authentication information includes an electronic product code (EPC) and SecParam. That is, the key processor 303 determines the AES key corresponding to the AES key index of the SecParam in the key database 302.
  • EPC electronic product code
  • the key processor 303 generates an output key by using an AES key and an input key (InputKey_RN) randomly generated in the authentication server 301.
  • the input key (InputKey_RN) can be a public key.
  • the confirmation data generator 304 generates confirmation data of a predetermined length, and encrypts the confirmation data by using the encryption unit 305. Subsequently, the confirmation data generator 304 transmits the input key and the encryption confirmation data to the authentication reader 321.
  • the encryption unit 305 performs exclusive OR (XOR) for the confirmation data and the output key for encrypting the confirmation data.
  • the tag authentication unit 306 Upon receiving the encrypted acknowledgment response data from the authentication reader 321, the tag authentication unit 306 decrypts the encrypted acknowledgment response data by using the decryption unit 307, and compares the acknowledgment data with the decrypted acknowledgment response data to verify the authentication tag 331.
  • the authenticity that is, when the confirmation data and the decrypted confirmation response data are the same, the authentication tag 331 is authenticated by the authentication reader 321 , and therefore, the tag authentication unit 305 verifies that the authentication tag 331 is authentic, indicating that the authentication tag 331 is Produced by legal producers.
  • the authentication reader 321 does not authenticate the authentication tag 331, so the tag authentication unit 305 verifies that the authentication tag 331 is not authentic, indicating that the authentication tag 331 is not generated by the legal producer. . Subsequently, the tag authentication unit 305 can transmit the authentication result to the authentication reader 321.
  • the decryption unit 307 can perform XOR on the encrypted acknowledgment response data and the output key for decrypting the encrypted acknowledgment response data.
  • the encryption unit 305 performs XOR on the input data by using the output key, and performs an encryption key on the input data in the same manner as the decryption unit 307 performs XOR with respect to the input data using the output to decrypt the input data, and thus, the encryption unit 305 and The decryption unit 307 can have the same structure.
  • the authentication reader 321 may further include an authentication information transmission unit 323 and an acknowledgment information transmission unit 325.
  • the authentication information transmission unit 323 transmits a part of the authentication information when receiving the authentication information from the authentication tag 331.
  • the authentication information includes Protocol Control (PC), Extended Protocol Control (XPC), EPC, and a SecParam.
  • the authentication information transmission unit 323 can receive the PC, XPC, EPC, and SecParam transmitted after the ST bit of the XPC is identified as T through the authentication tag 331.
  • the authentication information transmission unit 323 first receives the PC, XPC and EPC in the authentication information, and the authentication information transmitting unit 323 determines that the ST bit XPC of the authentication information transmitting unit 323 is identified as "1". Subsequently, the authentication information transmission unit 323 can receive the SecParam from the authentication tag 331 by using the Get_SecParam command and the response message.
  • the consignee first confirms whether the parcel has physical damage, and if there is physical damage, it can directly reject the product, that is, the traceability of the product fails, otherwise the RFID is read through the assigned public key.
  • the goods information or logistics information in the electronic label will be signed after confirmation.
  • the tamper device includes a mechanical tamper device, the mechanical tamper device is disposed at the opening of the package of the packaged goods, and the electronic tag is located in the mechanical tamper device, and the mechanical tamper device destroys the electronic device when the package opening is opened label.
  • a mechanical tampering device is disposed at the opening of the package of the packaged goods, and the electronic tag is disposed therein.
  • the mechanical tamper device destroys the electronic tag, and the electronic tag is destroyed and cannot be normal.
  • the information indicates that the goods are opened by unknown persons during the delivery or logistics transportation stage, and there is a risk of damage or replacement of the goods.
  • the tampering device can prevent the goods from being received before receiving the goods. Opened by others to reduce the possibility of goods replacement.
  • the above reading device can be used to read the information in the electronic tag. If the information can be read normally, it indicates that the product is not opened after being packaged; otherwise, Indicates that the goods have been opened, the goods can be rejected, and the consignor or carrier is liable; in addition, the mechanical tampering device is located at the normal opening of the package of the packaged goods. Under normal circumstances, the goods are from Enter or leave the parcel at the opening. If the parcel has an opening at other locations, indicating that the parcel is violently opened, the goods can be rejected.
  • the mechanical tamper device includes an inner cover, an outer cover, and a fixed plug
  • the upper end surface of the inner cover is provided with an annular cutting groove and an electronic tag.
  • the chip of the electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove, and the antenna of the electronic tag extends across the annular cutting groove to the periphery of the inner cover, and the lower end surface of the inner cover is fixed.
  • a tooth, a lower portion of the inner cover and the fixing plug are provided with a matching guiding mechanism for rotating the fixing plug relative to the inner cover in a first direction;
  • the outer cover is disposed outside the inner cover, and the lower end surface of the outer cover is fixed with a cutter,
  • the cutter is located in the annular cutting groove, and at least one of the inner cover and the outer cover is threadedly coupled to the fixing plug.
  • the mechanical tampering device comprises an inner cover, an outer cover and a fixing plug, the upper end surface of the inner cover is provided with an annular cutting groove and an electronic tag, the outer cover is disposed outside the inner cover, and the lower end surface of the outer cover is fixedly cut
  • the inner cover or the outer cover is screwed to the fixed plug, and the antenna of the electronic tag at the periphery of the inner cover can be cut when rotating, thereby destroying the electronic tag when the mechanical tampering device is operated.
  • a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are disposed between the inner cover and the outer cover, the first limiting mechanism prevents the inner cover from rotating relative to the outer cover in the first direction, and the second limiting mechanism portion The inner cover is prevented from rotating in the second direction relative to the outer cover, and when the force applied to the inner cover or the outer cover in the second direction is greater than a preset value, the inner cover is rotated in the second direction relative to the outer cover.
  • a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are disposed between the inner cover and the outer cover to limit the rotation range of the inner cover so that it can only rotate in the second direction relative to the outer cover, and needs to be applied. Appropriate force can be rotated to prevent the mechanical tamper from being opened by vibration.
  • the structure of the mechanical tampering device please refer to FIG. 7 and FIG. 8, including the inner cover 2, the outer cover 1 and the fixed plug 3;
  • the upper end surface of the inner cover 2 is provided with an annular cutting groove 25 and an RFID electronic tag 4, the chip 41 of the RFID electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove 25, and the antenna 42 of the RFID electronic tag extends across the annular cutting groove 25 to the inner cover
  • the lower end surface of the inner cover 2 is provided with fixing teeth 5 for fixing the package seal 34.
  • the lower portion of the inner cover 2 and the fixing plug are provided with a matching guiding mechanism, and only the fixing plug 3 is allowed to be along the inner cover 2
  • the first direction (clockwise or counterclockwise, in the clockwise direction in this embodiment) is rotated. As shown in FIG.
  • the guiding mechanism includes a reversely disposed inner cover rotation guide tooth 21 and a fixed plug rotation guide tooth 31;
  • the fixed plug rotation guide teeth 31 are rotatable in the counterclockwise direction, but when they are rotated clockwise, the inner cover rotation guide teeth 21 and the fixed plug rotation guide teeth 31 are caught by each other.
  • the outer cover 1 is disposed outside the inner cover, the lower end surface of the outer cover 1 is fixed with a cutter 11, and the cutter 11 is located in the annular cutting groove 25. When the outer cover 1 is rotated, the cutter 11 makes a circumference in the annular cutting groove 25. Movement, cutting the antenna of the RFID electronic tag to achieve the purpose of destroying the RFID electronic tag and making it unable to work normally.
  • a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are disposed between the inner cover 2 and the outer cover 1.
  • the first limiting mechanism completely prevents the inner cover 2 from rotating relative to the outer cover 1 in the first direction
  • the second limiting mechanism partially blocks
  • the inner cover 2 is rotated relative to the outer cover 1 in a second direction (clockwise or counterclockwise, in this embodiment may be counterclockwise), and only the force applied to the inner or outer cover in the second direction is greater than a threshold At this time, the inner cover 2 is rotated in the second direction with respect to the outer cover 1.
  • the first limiting member includes a first protrusion 23 on the outer peripheral side of the inner cover 2 and a second protrusion 14 disposed on the inner peripheral side of the outer cover 1 against the first protrusion 23, and the second protrusion 14 is located on the first protrusion 23
  • the outer cover 1 is further provided with a fourth protrusion 15 which is located in the clockwise direction of the first protrusion 23 and functions as a second limiting mechanism.
  • the implementation is partially defined.
  • the second limiting mechanism includes a plurality of recesses 24 disposed on the outer peripheral side of the inner cover 2 and third projections 13 disposed on the inner peripheral side of the outer cover 1 to engage the recesses 24.
  • the number of the recesses 24 is six, evenly
  • the outer cover 1 is provided with a certain elasticity to rotate the outer cover in a clockwise or counterclockwise direction.
  • the third protrusion 13 is disengaged from the groove 24 to realize the outer cover 1
  • the third bump 13 intersects the antenna 42 of the RFID electronic tag in the vertical direction. When the third bump 13 is turned to the position of the antenna 42, the third bump 13 presses the antenna to achieve secondary damage.
  • At least one of the inner cover 2 and the outer cover 1 is threadedly coupled to the fixed plug.
  • the fixing plug 3 and the inner cover 2 are connected by a thread 22 and a thread 33, and the fixing plug 3 is connected to the outer cover 1 via a thread 12 and a thread 32.
  • Step A1 Combining the inner cover and the outer cover, and pressing the inner cover into the outer cover by using the elasticity of the outer cover, and limiting by the second limiting mechanism to prevent the outer cover from falling off;
  • Step A2 aligning the package seal with the fixed teeth in the inner cover, the package seal includes a bag mouth of the package bag or a tongue portion extending from the package cover;
  • Step A3 screwing the fixing plug into the inner cover and the outer cover in the first direction to the bottom to realize packaging of the package sealing;
  • Step B1 rotating the outer cover in the second direction, the fixed plug and the inner cover are relatively fixed due to the action of the guiding mechanism;
  • Step B2 gradually increase the strength, when the threshold is reached, the outer cover rotates along the inner cover, and the cutter moves in the annular cutting groove;
  • Step B3 When the cutter touches the antenna of the RFID electronic tag, the antenna is cut off.
  • the second encryption key is multiple, and the logistics transportation phase is divided into multiple sub-phases, and the plurality of second encryption keys respectively correspond to the plurality of sub-phases one by one;
  • the corresponding logistics information is written in the electronic tag, the corresponding second encryption key is obtained, and the corresponding logistics information is encrypted by the corresponding second encryption key.
  • the logistics transportation phase can be carried out by multiple carriers respectively, and each carrier is in the sub-phase of transportation when the goods are carried.
  • the corresponding logistics information can be written.
  • the electronic label is encrypted by the corresponding second encryption key, so that the logistics and transportation information of each carrier can be independent of each other, which facilitates the division and definition of subsequent transportation responsibility.
  • the method for tracking source anti-counterfeiting further includes the following steps:
  • the first encryption key is obtained from the blockchain server, and the package information is uploaded to the blockchain server;
  • the decryption key and the package information of the goods are obtained from the blockchain server, wherein the package information of the goods is used for comparison with the physical package of the goods, and the comparison result is used for source verification of the goods.
  • data storage and invocation are performed in conjunction with the blockchain server.
  • the blockchain ensures that the service request cannot be tampered with during the transmission process through the asymmetrically encrypted digital signature.
  • the publicity mechanism ensures that the data of each node is consistently stored.
  • the self-checking function of the node of the node and the multi-node quasi-real-time data check function ensure that the stored data record cannot be modified, the first encryption key, the second encryption key and the decryption key.
  • the key can be specified by the shipper and stored in the blockchain server in advance to ensure that the key cannot be modified, and the confidentiality and integrity of the information can be enhanced.
  • the package information can also be uploaded for receipt. The party compares the packaging information at the time of receipt to further verify the goods.
  • the blockchain has the self-checking function of the node: the blockchain uses the blockchain structure to store the data record, and the modification of the partial record destroys the integrity of the blockchain structure, and can be quickly verified and from other nodes. Restore the data.
  • each billing node of the blockchain has its own private key, and each block header contains the signature of the private key of the node, and the modification of the data in the block can be verified by the signature;
  • the blockchain also has a multi-node quasi-real-time data check function: when the private key of the node is stolen, the malicious user has the possibility of modifying all the data on the ledger chain, and the blockchain provides quasi-real-time between multiple nodes.
  • the data comparison mechanism can timely find out that a certain node's account book data has been tampered with.
  • User information and blockchain addresses in the blockchain are isolated. From the record storage of each node, the associated user information cannot be obtained.
  • User information storage has multiple layers of protection such as access control, access authentication, and encrypted storage. Users with higher transaction confidentiality can also choose the transaction irrelevance mechanism. Each transaction of the same user is mapped to different addresses on the blockchain, thus ensuring that multiple users of a user cannot be obtained on the transaction book. The relevance of the transaction.
  • a key safe and a user account delegation function are provided to ensure the security of the key.
  • the key safe uses the user information to encrypt and divide the key and store it on multiple different nodes.
  • the key safe is not accessed under the normal business process. After the user key is lost, the key can be found after the user information is authenticated. return.
  • the account entrustment is to realize the account retrieving function by entrusting the account to operate the entrusted account. All the entrusted account operations in the blockchain are independently recorded on the blockchain, and the operation of the entrusted account has strict frequency restriction and independent.
  • the risk control strategy can strictly control the operational risk of the entrusted account.
  • the package information includes a video slice of the package of the item, wherein the video slice is taken during shipment of the item, package of the item, data writing of the electronic tag, or data inspection.
  • the package information includes a video slice of the product at the time of packaging, and the video slice can truly reflect the packaging process of the product, and can be used to assist in verifying the product.
  • the goods are packaged on the packaging line, and an image system is set on the packaging table to record and trace back the packaging process, as well as the comparison function.
  • a camera is mounted on the packaging table.
  • the key action is completed (packing completion, packaging and packaging, data writing, data checking, etc.)
  • the HD camera framing action is triggered, and the video slice is generated after the image recording, and stored in the image.
  • the blockchain server In the blockchain server.
  • the video slice may also indicate the location, environment, time, and data security watermark for auxiliary verification; in the receiving phase, the video slice is obtained through the blockchain server to perform auxiliary verification on the product.
  • the method for tracking source anti-counterfeiting further includes the following steps:
  • the logistics information is uploaded to the blockchain server; wherein the logistics information includes whether the electronic tag is destroyed.
  • the carrier in the logistics stage, can read the information of the electronic tag, determine whether the electronic tag is destroyed, and use it as part of the logistics information, upload the logistics information to the blockchain server, and record the logistics information. And to prevent being tampered with, in the goods receipt verification stage, you can trace the failure of the goods verification according to the logistics information, so as to identify the relevant responsible person.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device, and the following describes an embodiment of the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device.
  • FIG. 10 it is a schematic structural view of a cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device of one embodiment.
  • the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device in this embodiment includes the above-described electronic tag 200.
  • the electronic tag 200 is disposed on a package or package for packaging goods; in the delivery phase, the goods information is written in the electronic tag 200, and the goods information is encrypted by using the first encryption key; In the logistics transportation phase, the logistics information is written in the electronic tag 200, and the logistics information is encrypted by using the second encryption key; since the goods information and the logistics information are encrypted by the encryption key, the read/write permission is set, and the electronic The information in the tag 200 is generally difficult to forge, ensuring the accuracy of the information; in the receiving phase, the information in the electronic tag 200 is read using the decryption key matching the encryption key, and the target information is verified to trace the source.
  • the tampering device By encrypting and decrypting the goods information and the logistics information through the matching key, information forgery can be avoided, the authenticity of the goods and the true and complete state of the goods in the transportation process can be ensured; in addition, when the package is opened midway, the tampering device will Destroy electronic tags, use tamper-proof devices to ensure the integrity of electronic tags, and prevent the replacement of goods in the package
  • the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device further includes a writing device 300 and a reading device 400;
  • the writing device 300 writes the goods information in the electronic tag 200, acquires the first encryption key, and encrypts the goods information by using the first encryption key;
  • the writing device 300 writes the logistics information in the electronic tag 200, acquires the second encryption key, and encrypts the logistics information by using the second encryption key;
  • the reading device 400 acquires the decryption key, reads the target information in the electronic tag 200 through the decryption key, and performs source verification on the product according to the target information; wherein the decryption key and the first encryption key respectively The second encryption key is matched, and the target information includes goods information or logistics information.
  • the writing device 300 and the reading device 400 can perform processing in cooperation with the server when performing operations, and the specific process is as described above.
  • the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device further includes a tamper-evident device 500 that tampers the electronic tag 200 when the package is opened.
  • the tamper device 500 includes a mechanical tamper device 510 disposed at the opening of the package of the packaged goods, and the electronic tag 200 is located in the mechanical tamper device 510.
  • the mechanical tamper device 510 destroys the electronic tag 200 when the package opening is opened.
  • the mechanical tamper device includes an inner cover, an outer cover, and a fixed plug
  • the upper end surface of the inner cover is provided with an annular cutting groove and an electronic tag.
  • the chip of the electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove, and the antenna of the electronic tag extends across the annular cutting groove to the periphery of the inner cover, and the lower end surface of the inner cover is fixed.
  • a tooth, a lower portion of the inner cover and the fixing plug are provided with a matching guiding mechanism for rotating the fixing plug relative to the inner cover in a first direction;
  • the outer cover is disposed outside the inner cover, and the lower end surface of the outer cover is fixed with a cutter,
  • the cutter is located in the annular cutting groove, and at least one of the inner cover and the outer cover is threadedly coupled to the fixing plug.
  • a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are disposed between the inner cover and the outer cover, the first limiting mechanism prevents the inner cover from rotating relative to the outer cover in the first direction, and the second limiting mechanism portion The inner cover is prevented from rotating in the second direction relative to the outer cover, and when the force applied to the inner cover or the outer cover in the second direction is greater than a preset value, the inner cover is rotated in the second direction relative to the outer cover.
  • the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device of the embodiment of the present invention corresponds to the above-mentioned product traceability anti-counterfeiting method, and the technical features and the beneficial effects thereof described in the embodiment of the above-described cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting method are applicable to the embodiment of the cargo traceability anti-counterfeiting device.
  • the item traceability anti-counterfeiting method can be applied to a scene of logistics transportation.
  • the packaged goods are registered into the account book server produced by the blockchain technology.
  • the blockchain issues a delivery statement to the designated carrier link, and each carrier confirms the receipt in the respective blockchain account. Goods and parcels that continue to be shipped as a technical unit.
  • the AES continuous key is authenticated by the blockchain server and passed to the link one by one. For example, after the first carrier authenticates the identity through the blockchain, the blockchain server transmits the holding sequence key N and uses the key. After a write operation, the blockchain server will recognize the transfer of the carrier responsibility and will abolish the key seal and issue the consecutive key N+1 that the next carrier should hold on the next link.
  • the carrier Each time a carrier is changed in the transport path, the carrier writes the RFID chip with the phase key N+X held by him, and writes the carrier's receiver information (such as identification number, GPS information, receiving goods). Operator, license plate number, time, etc.) to the specified block, and write the operation to its own blockchain server account, recognize the occurrence of its own responsibility, form a blockchain accounting contract mechanism, and synchronize the upstream and downstream data of the ledger.
  • the carrier's receiver information such as identification number, GPS information, receiving goods.
  • the consignee When the parcel is delivered to the final consignee, the consignee has received the delivery statement and the consignee key B from the consignor's blockchain server, and the consignee can register with the card reader held by the consignee.
  • the terminal with the identity binding reads the encrypted data on the RFID chip and interprets it, and reads all the information of the consignor and the carrier information on the terminal.
  • the confirmation information After the confirmation information is correct, the actual temporary key B and the key A and the carrier continuous key N, N+1...N+X are simultaneously invalidated after the customer receives the goods, and are The mark is invalid and cannot be reused for a limited period of time, and these keys will be cancelled after the expiration date.
  • both the carrier and the final consignee should check the packaging intact to judge whether the packaged goods are received by the most traditional rules. If the packaging is intact, further read the chips that have not been destroyed. If the packaging is damaged, you can investigate the transportation and storage responsibility of the packaged goods without having to read the chip.
  • the chip is protected by the outer packaging and its own protection device during transportation. If the chip is damaged, it means that the packaging is damaged or the chip protection device is violently destroyed, or the package is opened in the middle. Any state occurs, which means The carrier violates the carrier’s liability or is liable for damage to the parcel, and our system limits the carrier’s liability to the current carrier.
  • the next carrier refuses to accept the goods and marks the parcel goods as current carrier liability in the blockchain and announces them to the upstream and downstream links. At this time, the consignor will know the abnormal situation, the parcel goods will be handled abnormally and the responsibility will be clearly defined. The bearer, the final consignee will not be damaged or unpacked parcels.
  • Such a rule guarantees the end-to-end integrity of the technical unit under the protection of the AES encryption protection and the RFID protection device as a blockchain accounting, so that the packaged goods cannot be replaced in the middle, avoiding The generation of intermediate fakes accurately locates the ultimate responsible person of the packaged goods.
  • each package has become a non-counterfeit, data-unchangeable, and directional IoT offline mobile technology unit.
  • This technology unit transfers the responsibility through the blockchain accounting mechanism.
  • the responsibility for the preservation changes as the technical unit registers in the path, forming a blockchain contract.
  • the consignor in the process 1, if there is an e-commerce order corresponding, the consignor generates a distribution list (BOM) according to the e-commerce order (CO), and completes the BOM unloading and packing. If there is no e-commerce order, it can be packaged according to the manufacturer's BOM information, the factory packaged goods BOM content, etc.
  • the data format is agreed by the technical service provider and the shipper. It must contain the valid identification information of the shipper, packaging production line information, BOM, geographic information, etc., in which the shipper can customize random information such as greetings and random gifts. Etc., this information is registered with the image capture information of the packaged package on the blockchain ledger server deployed by the service provider and cannot be changed.
  • This information is also synchronized to the third-party virtual carrier's blockchain server. After registration, both parties can't change it. At the same time, the data is synchronized to the client terminal, and it cannot be changed. (The synchronization in the blockchain is the unreadable information of the encrypted translation. At the same time, it cannot be changed, except that the consignor and the consignee are not readable.
  • the data packet generated as the previous step is combined with the image capture data, combined into a composite data packet, and registered and stored in the blockchain server.
  • the BOM packing completion signal is used as a trigger to generate the key A, and the data packet generated by the previous process is translated into the encrypted compression code, and the key A is encapsulated and written into the original system.
  • the information terminal of the end user pointed to by the order number is obtained at the time of delivery, and the technology is bound, and the address of the recipient or the network communication mode is also obtained.
  • the start of the delivery process is the holder of the package that is packaged by technology at the moment, perhaps a manufacturer or trader, at which point they:
  • the system sends a one-time decryption Key B to the consignee terminal through the blockchain server, and the Key B can only be used for decryption to be paired.
  • the key A points to a specific technology encapsulation unit that contains the customer's order items.
  • the terminal binding activation procedure is executed first, and then the process described in the previous paragraph is executed, so that the specific package encapsulated by the technology can form an end-to-end closed loop with the legal recipient binding terminal. contact.
  • the shipper server When the system sends Key B and binds the recipient terminal, the shipper server sends a continuous key N attached to Key A to the first carrier, and the blockchain server issues a delivery statement.
  • the first carrier reads the count value in the RFID chip wrapped as a technical package unit. If the technical and physical verification is normal, the first carrier holds the Key N and writes the block to the system of the RFID chip pointed by Key N.
  • the own receipt information after the successful verification of the write, is sent to the consignor blockchain server by the blockchain server deployed to the first carrier (which can be the SAAS server bound to the first carrier)
  • the notification is also the flow 1 in Figure 15.
  • the first carrier forwards the package, it issues a delivery statement to the shipper (flow 2 in Figure 15), triggering process 3 (see Figure 15), and the next time Key N+1 is sent to the second by the shipper server.
  • the carrier, the second carrier repeats the operation of the first carrier, and after successful, proceeds to process 4 (see Figure 15), and sends the receipt confirmation to the first carrier, while the current carrier of the first carrier and the second carrier
  • the package retention responsibility status change triggers the process 5, and both parties register the status change with the shipper server.
  • This mechanism will be implemented backwards until the Xth carrier as the last carrier bears the responsibility of serving the consignee, where the change in the status of the responsibility and the process data are shipped to the various carriers on the entire logistics link.
  • the human server registers and synchronizes the data until the last carrier delivers to the consignee and issues a delivery statement to the consignor server.
  • Key N-N+X is specified for the number of uses and the validity period. It can be pre-warned before the expiration of the validity period. When the usage count is exhausted, it will be marked abnormally in the following data synchronization.
  • the exception handling will notify the previous carrier Y-1 server and send an abnormal status, notifying Y-1 that the package was rejected and notifying the shipper server.
  • the subsequent warranty is limited to the carrier Y-1, and the consignor issues an agreement with Y-1 for the claim and the notification that the technology package unit has failed. Further, after judging that the technical unit is indeed damaged by physical or technical means (such as chip damage and its minor probability event), the shipper revokes the key B of the technology packaging unit and releases the Key B and the consignee registration. Binding of the terminal.
  • Further processing can be a customer return or the shipper re-delivery.
  • the last carrier X assumes the responsibility of serving the consignee.
  • the specific dispatcher picks up the goods
  • the final judgment is that the goods are in good condition
  • the card is normal with the handheld terminal, and a delivery statement is issued, stating that the goods are delivered.
  • the server of person X is sent to the shipper server.
  • the shipper server sends the data image registered with the binding technical unit to the legal consignee binding terminal.
  • the terminal data is complete, and the pre-issued data does not include the image description, such as the package color of the batch.
  • the shipper server Prior to this, the shipper server has registered the encapsulated technical unit information encapsulated in the blockchain and has been sent to the legal consignee binding terminal with Key B.
  • the consignee activates the APP or computer program (both through the binding terminal), and uses the NFC or dedicated card reader to read the RFID data on the package of the technology package unit using the held Key B, and with the received data. Data comparison
  • the intermediate logistics carrier can also retrieve the original image of the package through the legal interface, which is applied in the definition of responsibility and the search of goods.
  • the packaging platform software system adds a watermark that can indicate the location, environment, time, and identity of the camera when capturing the scene, and retains the “fingerprint” evidence of the image as another means of auxiliary verification packaging in addition to RFID encryption.
  • a watermark that can indicate the location, environment, time, and identity of the camera when capturing the scene, and retains the “fingerprint” evidence of the image as another means of auxiliary verification packaging in addition to RFID encryption.
  • the program can be stored in a readable storage medium.
  • the program when executed, includes the steps described in the above methods.
  • the storage medium includes: a ROM/RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, and the like.
  • the partial data encryption and data protection steps in the method of the foregoing embodiment may be implemented by AES, RSA, and blockchain, and may also pass other remaining internationally recognized reliable encryption algorithms and other reliable and proven class blockchains (such as doubles). Music function) technology to protect.

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé et un dispositif de suivi et anti-contrefaçon de marchandises. Le procédé consiste à : à l'étape de distribution, écrire des informations de marchandises dans une étiquette électronique, et utiliser une première clé de chiffrement pour chiffrer les informations de marchandises (S110); à l'étape de transport logistique, écrire des informations de logistique dans l'étiquette électronique, et utiliser une seconde clé de chiffrement pour chiffrer les informations de logistique (S120); étant donné que les informations de marchandises et les informations de logistique sont chiffrées par la clé de chiffrement, il est généralement difficile de contrefaire les informations dans l'étiquette électronique, garantissant ainsi la précision des informations; et à l'étape de réception, utiliser une clé de déchiffrement correspondant à la clé de chiffrement pour lire les informations dans l'étiquette électronique, et obtenir des informations cibles afin d'effectuer une vérification de traçabilité sur les marchandises, chiffrer et déchiffrer les informations de marchandises et les informations de logistique au moyen des clés appariées pour garantir l'authenticité de traçabilité des marchandises et l'état complet réel des marchandises dans le processus de transport, et si un emballage est ouvert à mi-chemin, un dispositif d'inviolabilité peut endommager l'étiquette électronique, et l'état complet de l'étiquette électronique peut être assuré au moyen du dispositif d'inviolabilité, de façon à empêcher que les marchandises dans l'emballage soient remplacées (S130).
PCT/CN2018/104822 2017-09-30 2018-09-10 Procédé et dispositif de suivi et anti-contrefaçon de marchandises WO2019062530A1 (fr)

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