WO2018199844A1 - Sceau sécurisé pour authentification de produit - Google Patents

Sceau sécurisé pour authentification de produit Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018199844A1
WO2018199844A1 PCT/SG2017/050230 SG2017050230W WO2018199844A1 WO 2018199844 A1 WO2018199844 A1 WO 2018199844A1 SG 2017050230 W SG2017050230 W SG 2017050230W WO 2018199844 A1 WO2018199844 A1 WO 2018199844A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
secure seal
fixture
product
security token
code
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/SG2017/050230
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Haiwei Wang
Yueqing ZHANG
Xuchu ZHOU
Xiaohong Zhu
Kan Wang
Original Assignee
Wang, Jianyi
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Wang, Jianyi filed Critical Wang, Jianyi
Priority to PCT/SG2017/050230 priority Critical patent/WO2018199844A1/fr
Publication of WO2018199844A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018199844A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H04L63/0838—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords using one-time-passwords
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09F—DISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00—Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02—Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/03—Forms or constructions of security seals
    • G09F3/0305—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used
    • G09F3/0329—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used having electronic sealing means
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H04L63/0846—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords using time-dependent-passwords, e.g. periodically changing passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/068—Authentication using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
    • Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
    • Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
    • Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

Definitions

  • the present application relates to a secure seal for product authentication.
  • the application also relates methods for making, assembling, disassembling, installing, configuring, maintaining and using the secure seal for product authentication.
  • the present invention aims to provide a new and useful secure seal for product authentication.
  • the invention also aims to present new and useful methods of making, assembling, installing, repairing, upgrading, modifying, configuring and using the secure seal for product authentication.
  • Essential features of the secure seal are provided by one or more independent claims, whilst advantageous features of the secure seal are presented by their dependent claims respectively.
  • the present application provides a secure seal for authenticating a product or a secure seal with authentication capability.
  • the secure seal provides a reliable, durable or elegant lid for keeping the product.
  • the secure seal is often attached to an opening of the product, including a bottle cap, a stopper, a bung, a cork, a tag, a key, a lock, a sticker, a tape, a strap, a cover or a combination of any of these, whether detachable or recyclable.
  • the secure seal comprises a bottle cap or a stopper for closing, sealing or shutting a bottle of Champagne.
  • the secure seal prevents unauthorized tampering of the product so that users or consumers of the product arte able to recognize counterfeit products by checking or verifying with the secure seal.
  • the secure seal comprises a fixture for locking an opening of the product, and a security token attached to the fixture for generating a dynamic or one-time password.
  • the fixture can have a size, shape, profile or structure that is able to seal the opening of the product.
  • the fixture optionally has engagement means for locking, attaching or sealing the opening of the product.
  • the engagement means includes screw thread, roughened surface, slightly oversized for tight fitting, sticker or another fastener for securing to the product or the opening of the product.
  • the fixture includes a tapered and spongy cylinder (e.g. made from rubber or cork oak) that fits tightly with an opening of a wine bottle for sealing.
  • the fixture includes a clasp, a buckle, a catch, a clamp, a clutch, a fastener, a hook, a grip or a snap that resides at a joint or seam between two parts of a container box.
  • the security token is a physical device to generate security information in order to gain access privileged resource.
  • the security token includes a static password token, a synchronous dynamic password token, an asynchronous password token and a challenge response token using public key cryptography.
  • the asynchronous password token is an OTP (one-time password) security token or a dynamic password. The OTP may be generated multiple times, although each of those one-time password may be different, this known as dynamic password or unique dynamic password.
  • the security token includes a disconnected token, a connected token, a smart card token (e.g. smart-card-based USB token), a contactless token, a Bluetooth token, a NFC (Near-Field Communication) token, a single sign-on software token and a mobile device token.
  • the security token provides information verifiable by a manufacturer or authorized dealer of the product so that a consumer of the product is able to verify authenticity of the product by comparing information carried by the security token with information from the manufacturer or authorized dealer, such as via internet.
  • the secure seal provides a reliable, simple and convenient tool to consumers for verifying identity of the product.
  • the secure seal is fixed to a bottle of French Burgundy (about £8,310) so that a purchaser is assured of authenticity of the bottle by verifying with the security token easily.
  • the fixture may comprise a bottle cap, a stopper, a bung, a cork, a tag, a key, a lock or a combination of any of these.
  • the fixture is directly attached or affixed to an opening of a bottle, a box or any other container (e.g. envelop) so that the secure seal provides an intuitive indication on authenticity of the product attached.
  • the fixture is capable of being made compact, attractive or robust so that the fixture is able to be integrated with the product, providing an unitary image.
  • the fixture may also have a roughened external cylindrical surface to facilitate hand gripping or rotating as a bottle cap.
  • the fixture may further have an internal screw thread for detachably fastening to an opening of a wine bottle.
  • the secure seal, OTP token or eToken can further comprise a local electric or electrical power source (e.g. induction coil) that is connected to the security token for generating the password.
  • the local electric power source can either be an electricity storage unit (e.g. battery) or a generator (e.g. induction coil) that is operable to supply suitable electric voltage or current to the security token.
  • the local electric power source is a button battery or coin cell that is silver oxide, alkaline or lithium manganese type.
  • the security token or the fixture has a connector (e.g. socket) for receiving external power supply.
  • the electric power supply may comprise a solar panel for supplying electricity to the security token.
  • the solar panel When connected to the security token or any other parts of the secure seal, the solar panel is able to supply electricity readily whenever the solar panel is exposed to ambient light or sunlight.
  • the solar panel, the security token, the fixture or any other parts of the secure seal is able to be made soft, flexible or resilient whereby the solar panel, the security token, the fixture or any other parts of the secure seal may conform to contour of the product (e.g. bottle or cap), without disrupting a well-designed image of the product.
  • the secure seal can further comprise a machine-readable (e.g. by scanned or sensing) code (e.g. barcode) for reading by an electronic device (e.g. mobile phone, barcode reader, NFC reader).
  • a machine-readable code e.g. barcode
  • the machine-readable code comprises a Quick Response Code.
  • the QR code is a matrix barcode or two-dimensional barcode following four standardized encoding modes (numeric, alphanumeric, byte/binary, and kanji) to efficiently store data.
  • the QR code provides fast readability and greater storage capacity compared to standard UPC barcodes.
  • a QR code includes of black squares arranged in a square grid on a white background, which can be read by an imaging device such as a camera, and processed using Reed-Solomon error correction until the image can be appropriately interpreted. The required data is then extracted from patterns that are present in both horizontal and vertical components of the image.
  • the QR code supports URL (Universal Resource Locator) redirection or URL forwarding, website login, data encryption, error correction and encoding, the QR code is simple to implement and easy to use (e.g. scanned by a mobile phone).
  • URL Universal Resource Locator
  • the QR code is capable of storing about 7,089 numeric characters, about 4,296 alphanumeric characters or about 2,953 binary/byte characters (8-bit bytes), the QR code can be used to store place of origin, manufacturing date, product ingredient, shipping history, dealer information and many other types of information that is informative or reliable for confirming authenticity of the product.
  • the security token may comprise an activation button that is covered with the machine-readable code.
  • the activation button is either a push-button or a contactless button that is connected to the security token so that the security token is actuated by a user or consumer of the secure seal for verifying identity or authenticity of the product.
  • the activation button may be embossed or colored to be differentiated from its surrounding or to attract attention of a consumer.
  • the activation is possibly printed with a QR code so that the same button is used to activate the security token and be scanned by a mobile phone, saving much space of the secure seal for other purposes (e.g. product decoration).
  • the secure seal, the fixture, the security token or a combination of any of these parts are optionally self-destructible after opening or authenticating the product.
  • an electronic circuit on a PCB Printed Circuit Board
  • PCB Printed Circuit Board
  • the secure seal, the fixture, the security token or a combination of any of these parts prevent people from using them twice or more, avoiding fraudulent activities of the product.
  • the security token is broken by twisting of the secure seal on a vintage wine bottle so that the same secure seal can no longer be used to seal or authenticate another wine from unknown source.
  • the secure seal further comprises a protector for protecting the security token, the fixture or any other parts of the secure seal.
  • the protector includes a rim that is raised from a circumference of a bottle cap so that another bottle on top of the bottle will not damage the secure seal below.
  • the protector alternatively includes a thin film a cover, a sticker, an envelope, a packaging box or a transparent plastic lump on top of the secure seal. The protector is useful to guard integrity of the secure seal, the fixture or the security token.
  • the secure seal further comprises an unique code (e.g. a serial number as identification of the secure seal or an uniquely associated product), whether readable by machine (e.g. barcode scanner) or human.
  • the unique code provides identification information of the secure seal, the fixture, the security token or the product.
  • the identification information or the unique code is possibly stored by a remote computer server for user verification by a computing device (e.g. tablet computer).
  • a computing device e.g. tablet computer.
  • not only a QR code in printed on a cap of a bottle a serial number (e.g. a 12-digit number) of the secure seal or the product is further printed on a fixture (e.g. a cap) of the uniquely associated product. If there is no machine code reader (e.g.
  • a consumer of the product still can call a service hotline telephone number, and tell an operator of the authentic manufacturer with the serial number together with a 6-digit OTP (one-time password or dynamic password) to perform product authentication.
  • OTP one-time password or dynamic password
  • the security token comprises an electronic circuit that is prevented from unauthorized access.
  • the electronic circuit is possible to be sealed by epoxy or other materials. Unauthorized parties become difficult or not possible to decipher, imitate, copy or reverse-engineer parts of the secure seal.
  • the fixture comprises a material that is recyclable or biodegradable.
  • the recyclable material includes paper, wood, cardboard, metal, plastic, tires, textiles and electronics.
  • the biodegradable material can be broken down into carbon dioxide, water, methane or simple organic molecules by microorganisms and other living things using composting, aerobic digestion, anaerobic digestion or similar processes. Hence, disposal or recycling of the fixture becomes easy or rewarding.
  • the secure seal can further comprise an illuminator for highlighting a part of the secure seal to ease usage.
  • the illuminator is capable to show the one-time password, the dynamic password, the QR code or other information of the secure seal in a dark place, such as in a bar, a pub or a dark room for easy reading.
  • the present application also provides an authentication centre for verifying identity of a product.
  • the authentication centre comprises a computer (e.g. computing server, server, remote server) having electronic records (e.g. database or information) of the secure seal, many secure seals or authentication seals.
  • the computer is operable to verify correctness of an OTP (e.g. dynamic password) from the security token.
  • OTP e.g. dynamic password
  • the computer or several computing servers have a catalogue that holds codes or identity records of security tokens, which are associated to authentic products of a manufacturer.
  • numbers transmitted from a mobile phone that cannot be found in the codes or identify records of the authentication centre cannot be verified or authenticated. Accordingly, a product affixed with one of the numbers is unable to be authenticated, and considered as counterfeit.
  • the authentication centre optionally mark verified records as authenticated or expire within a limited time period, which prevents an identity of a product from being used multiple times or in different geographical regions simultaneously.
  • the electronic records optionally contain geographical information, dealers' information or retail price of the product.
  • the authentication centre comprises a network (e.g. computer network, data network, telecommunication network) that is connected to the computer for providing intranet, internet, telecommunication network, Bluetooth or other types of communication channels.
  • the network allows users or consumers to connect to the authentication centre anywhere of the globe, provided with network connection (e.g. intranet, wireless network, Local Area Network) with the authentication centre.
  • the present application provides a method for making a secure seal.
  • the method comprises a first step of providing a fixture for locking an opening of a product; and a second step of fixing or integrating a security token (e.g. OTP token) with the fixture.
  • a security token e.g. OTP token
  • Any of the steps can be integrated or separated into multiple steps.
  • a first manufacturer provides a security token according to predetermined specification on material(s), dimension(s) or cost price, whilst another manufacturer offers a fixture for receiving the security token.
  • the first manufacturer, the second manufacturer or a third manufacturer can assembly or install parts of the secure seal for packaging an authenticated product with the security token.
  • the method presents a consistent technique for manufacturing the security token or the authenticated product with the security token.
  • the method may further comprise a step of connecting the security token to an electric power source.
  • the security token may be connected to the electric power source temporarily or permanently.
  • an USB (Universal Serial Bus) socket of a mobile phone is connected to the security token via a cable so that the security token may receive electricity from or communicate with the mobile phone.
  • the method can alternatively comprise a step of affixing an unique code onto the secure seal.
  • the unique code can be printed by a sticker or written via inerasable ink or permanent marker.
  • the unique code provides an additional verification information to the product or to the secure seal.
  • the method may further comprise a step of protecting the fixture, the security token or both.
  • the method can additionally comprise a step of affixing the secure seal to an opening of an authentic product.
  • An original manufacturer or authorized dealer can verify identity of the product and affix the secure seal onto the opening, eventually prevent an unauthorized party from labelling a counterfeit product with verifiable onetime password or security token.
  • the present application offers a method for using a secure seal.
  • the method comprises a first step of receiving an input (e.g. an OTP or dynamic password as electronic signals or graphic display) from the secure seal at an authentication centre; a second step of comparing the input with records on a computer of the authentication centre automatically; and a third step of indicating authenticity of the secure seal after comparing the input with the records.
  • an input e.g. an OTP or dynamic password as electronic signals or graphic display
  • a consumer, a dealer, a retailer or a distributor is able to check authenticity of the product according to the method speedily and cheaply.
  • the method may further comprise a step of destroying or terminating a generator of the input automatically.
  • the security token is destructed automatically after verification identity of the product once or after a limited number of trials.
  • the fixture, the security token or the generator may further self-destruct within specified time limit (e.g. 5 years, 10 years or 20 years).
  • the act of automatic destruction includes disabling the generator or any other parts of the secure seal, known as disruption some original functions of the secure seal, the fixture or the security token.
  • An embodiment of the method further comprises a step of updating the records after authenticating the secure seal.
  • An authentication centre is optionally configured to mark its records or database(s) on verified or authenticated products, thus keeping information up-to-date or real-time.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates an authentication system using a secure seal, a mobile phone and a remote computing server;
  • Fig. 2 illustrates a schematic diagram of the authentication system with the secure seal
  • Fig. 3 illustrates a first embodiment of the secure seal
  • Fig. 4 illustrates a process flow of an OTP token
  • Fig. 5 illustrates a process flow of a mobile phone
  • Fig. 6 illustrates a process flow of a remote computing server
  • Fig. 7 illustrates a second embodiment of the secure seal
  • Fig. 8 illustrates the second embodiment of the secure seal from a bottom perspective.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates an authentication of a secure seal 1 18 using a mobile device and communicating with a remote server 300.
  • the secure seal 1 18 shown in the Fig. 1 is a screw cap 100 with an internal screw-thread design below a gasket-seat having a plurality of ridges 108 on an external side surface circumscribing the periphery of a top flat surface 102 and a skirt 1 12 below a cut line 1 10.
  • a push button 104 is mounted on the top flat surface 102 of the screw cap 100.
  • the push button 104 is impressed with an identification code specifically a QR (Quick Response) code 106.
  • Beneath the push button 104 is an electronics circuit 130 fabricated on a film not shown in this figure.
  • a display screen 1 14 is located on the side surface of the skirt 1 12.
  • a solar film panel 1 16 is positioned below the display screen 1 14.
  • the screw cap 100 is for a standard 750ml wine glass bottle 126.
  • the screw cap 100 sits above the skirt 1 12 that encompass securely around the neck of the bottle 126.
  • the screw cap 100 is joined to the skirt 1 12 by a perforated line or also known as a cut line 1 10 around the bottom periphery of the screw cap 100.
  • the cross sectional outer diameter of the screw cap 100 is 29.80mm with an inner diameter of 28.50mm.
  • the outer diameter of the skirt 1 12 is 30.40mm with an inner diameter of 29.10mm.
  • the height of the screw cap 100 is 17.20mm.
  • the thickness of the cut line 1 10 is 1 .44mm.
  • the skirt 1 12 height is about 22.3mm.
  • the mobile device is a smart phone 200 having a built-in camera 202 and a software application 204 installed communicates with a remote server 300.
  • the mobile device can also be a tablet or a desktop with the camera 202.
  • the remote server 300 communicates with the smart phone 200 through a cellular network.
  • the remote server 300 is a computer that is located remotely with a memory storage and a software application 204 that resides within to process the information sent from the smart phone 200 and respond with a result to the smart phone 200.
  • the ridges 108 are also known as knurl 108 circumscribing the surface of the bottle cap provides a gripping part for the fingers of a consumer to screw and unscrew onto an orifice or a mouth of the bottle 126.
  • the gasket seat is underneath the screw cap 100 to provide a seal so that there is no spillage or leakage of fluid from the bottle 126.
  • the gasket seal also provides a protection of an electronics circuit 130 that sits underneath the flat surface of the screw cap 100.
  • the push button 104 provides a tactile activation of the microcontroller 122 to generate a data specifically a six-digit personal identification number (PIN). For example, ⁇ 23456".
  • the QR code 106 provides a machine-readable optical label for reading by a smart phone 200.
  • the QR code 106 comprises a unique identity code of the OTP token 120 and a direction to a webpage presented on a web browser 206 on the smart phone 200.
  • the QR code 106 is encoded with an address or a unique resource identifier of a webpage and the unique identity code also known as a serial number of the OTP token 120.
  • the QR code 106 is laser marked on the push button 104.
  • the display screen provides a visual display for the consumer of the status of the OTP token 120 as well as displaying the generated PIN.
  • the display screen displays the alphabet "0" and "n” to indicate that the OTP token 120 is operational.
  • the generated PIN is displayed on the screen when the push button 104 is depressed.
  • the display screen provides an electrophoretic display which is a type of electronic paper named because of the thinness and its low power consumption.
  • an electrophoretic display titanium dioxide (titania) particles approximately one micrometer in diameter are dispersed in a hydrocarbon oil. A dark-colored dye is also added to the oil, along with surfactants and charging agents that cause the particles to take on an electric charge. This mixture is placed between two parallel, conductive plates separated by a gap of 10 to 100 micrometres ( ⁇ ). When a voltage is applied across the two plates, the particles migrate electrophoretically to the plate that bears the opposite charge from that on the particles.
  • the particles When the particles are located at the front (viewing) side of the display, it appears white, because light is scattered back to the viewer by the high-index titania particles. When the particles are located at the rear side of the display, it appears dark, because the incident light is absorbed by the colored dye. If the rear electrode is divided into a number of small picture elements (pixels), then an image can be formed by applying the appropriate voltage to each region of the display to create a pattern of reflecting and absorbing regions.
  • the solar film panel 1 16 provides an electrical energy converted from light as required by the OTP token 120.
  • the film thickness varies from a few nanometers (nm) to tens of micrometers ( ⁇ ), much thinner than thin-film's rival technology, the conventional, first-generation crystalline silicon solar cell (c-Si), that uses wafers of up to 200 ⁇ .
  • the think-film solar cell is made by depositing one or more thin layers, or thin film (TF) of photovoltaic material on a substrate such as glass, plastic or metal.
  • the solar film panel 1 16 can encompass the skirt 1 12 providing more electrical energy.
  • the smart phone 200 provides a camera 202 for the image capturing of the QR code 106.
  • the software application 204 of the smart phone 200 interprets the QR code 106 and sends data comprising the unique resource identifier (URI) and the unique identity code of the OTP token 120 over the cellular network.
  • the URI provides a destination address to the remote server 300 and transmitting the unique identity code of the OTP token 120 to the remote server 300.
  • the software application 204 also opens the web browser 206 on the smart phone 200 to facilitate in the authentication through an online form presented on the webpage.
  • the remote server 300 provides a hosting service for the webpage.
  • the webpage is presented on the smart phone 200 providing an online form for entering of the PIN generated by the OTP token 120 when the push button 104 is depressed.
  • the consumer clicks a "Submit" button on the webpage the PIN and the unique identity code of the OTP token 120 are transmitted 302 to the remote server 300.
  • the verification of the PIN is performed at the remote server 300. Regardless whether the PIN is successfully verified and authenticated, a result 304 will be sent to the web browser 206 on the smart phone 200 informing the consumer of the authenticity of the product in this case is the liquor.
  • Fig. 2 illustrates a schematics of the authentication of the secure seal 1 18 whereby the secure seal 1 18 comprises the OTP token 120, the solar film panel 1 16, the display screen and the QR code 106.
  • the OTP token 120 further comprises a microcontroller 122.
  • the microcontroller 122 is a small computer on a single integrated circuit.
  • the microcontroller 122 contains one or more CPUs (processor cores) along with memory and programmable input/output peripherals.
  • the smart phone 200 comprises a camera 202 and a software application 204.
  • the software application 204 interprets the captured image of the QR code 106, opens a web browser 206 and load the webpage as directed by the QR code 106.
  • the webpage is hosted by the remote server 300.
  • Fig. 3 illustrates a first embodiment of the secure seal 1 18 specifically a cork 124 which is shaped cylindrically and made of cork oak.
  • the cork 124 is shown halfway inserted or extracted from the mouth of the bottle 126.
  • the cork 124 is made slightly bigger than the cross-sectional area of the mouth of the bottle 126. The reasons are two-fold. Firstly, a bigger size cork 124 ensures that the fluid (air and liquid) within the bottle 126 is trapped. Secondly, there is the electronics circuit running the OTP token 120 is embedded within the cork 124 whereby the electronics circuit 130 extends to the bottom of the cork 124.
  • An approximate diameter of the wine glass bottle 126 is 18.5mm. Therefore, the diameter of the cork 124 is slightly longer than 18.5mm. The length of the cork 124 is approximately 50mm. A longer and wider cork 124 ensures that the fluid in the bottle 126 stays intact and not expose to contaminants.
  • the electrical connection Prior to inserting the cork 124 into the mouth of the bottle 126, the electrical connection is opened specifically power off because the cork 124 is in its original expanded state. Once the cork 124 is inserted into the mouth of the bottle 126, the connection is closed and the electronics circuit 130 is operational or ready for use because the neck of the bottle 126 reduces the cross sectional diameter similar to the diameter of the neck of the bottle 126.
  • the solar film panel 1 16 On the top surface of the cork 124 is the solar film panel 1 16 being overlaid. In the centre of the round cork 124 is the push down button. The centre of the solar film panel 1 16 is punctured to provide a space for the push down button.
  • the push button 104 On the top of the push button 104 is imprinted with the QR code 106. Underneath the push button 104 is the electronics circuit 130 that comprises a microcontroller 122, a connection between the solar film panel 1 16 and the microcontroller 122, a connection between the microcontroller 122 and the display screen, a connection between the push button 104 and the microcontroller 122.
  • the display screen is the electrophoretic display type that offers flexible and thin surface that allows bending is located on the body of the cork 124 which is at a curved surface.
  • a trench is formed on the curved surface to provide a hollow space for the installation of the electrophoretic display screen 1 14 on the curved surface of the cork 124.
  • a slit 128 is to separate the electrical connection. If the slit 128 were apart, the electronics circuit 130 ceased to operate. When the cork 124 is inserted into the mouth of the bottle 126, the slit 128 comes in close contact sealing the connection. Therefore, when the cork 124 is inserted into the bottle 126, the electronics circuit 130 is operationally standing by.
  • a slit 128 is used to described the second embodiment. It is not limited to just a slit 128.
  • a hollow crater can also be made at the bottom of the cork 124 or a plurality of slits 128.
  • the cork 124 with the electrophoretic display screen 1 14 and embedded electronics circuit 130 is compressed to fit into the mouth of the bottle 126.
  • the electronics circuit 130 operates when exposed to a light source and the push button 104 depressed. There are two positions where the cork 124 can be inserted into the mouth of the bottle 126.
  • the cork 124 can be inserted until the level where the electrophoretic display screen 1 14 is located.
  • the electrophoretic display screen 1 14 may have to be located near the top surface of the cork 124 so as to maximise the surface area of the cork 124 in contact with the internal surface of the bottle 126.
  • the cork 124 can be inserted fully until the brim of the bottle 126 exposing the solar film panel 1 16 and the push button 104.
  • the electrophoretic display screen 1 14 may have to be located near the bottom of the cork 124 to provide easy viewing as the bottle 126 surface near the mouth has curvatures which create visual distortion.
  • the electrophoretic display screen 1 14 may also provide a background light to provide visibility and hence readability of the display.
  • Fig. 4 illustrates a process flow of the OTP token 140 pertaining to the secure seal 1 18.
  • the OTP token 120 comprises the microcontroller 122 and the push button 104 electrically connected.
  • the OTP token 120 obtains its power from the solar film panel 1 16 external from the OTP token 120 by exposing to a light source 142.
  • the surge in power energises the microcontroller 122 and enable the electrophoretic display screen 1 14 to power on indicating "On" 144.
  • the OTP token 120 waits 146 for the push button 104 to be depressed. If the microcontroller 122 detects an activation of the push button 104, an algorithm in the microcontroller 122 generates a six-digit PIN 148 and then presents the six-digit PIN 150 on the electrophoretic display screen 1 14.
  • Fig. 5 illustrates a process flow of a smart phone 160.
  • the smart phone 200 scans 162 the QR code 106 that is found on the push button 104 on the top surface 102 of the secure seal 1 18.
  • the secure seal 1 18 can be either the screw cap 100 or the cork 124.
  • the software application 204 in the smart phone 200 interprets the QR code 106 and performs actions as directed by the QR code 106.
  • the QR code 106 directs 164 the software application 204 to open a web browser 206 and presents a webpage prompting for a six-digit PIN 166 and waits for the PIN to be entered 168.
  • the PIN and the unique identity code are then sent 170 to the remote server 300 for verification 172. If the PIN is not verified, the webpage displays "PIN Not Found" 174. Conversely, if the PIN is verified, the webpage displays "Authenticated” 176. The webpage presents the result of the verification and authentication.
  • Fig. 6 illustrates a process flow 180 of a whereby the six-digit PIN generated from the OTP token 120 at the secure seal 1 18 and the unique identity code of the OTP token 120 are sent to the remote server 300 from the smart phone 200.
  • the remote server 300 receives 182 the unique identity code of the OTP token 120 sent via the web browser 206 on the smart phone 200 and checks its own remote server 300 for the unique identity code of the OTP 184.
  • the remote server 300 verifies whether the unique identity code of the OTP 186 is in its remote server 300. If the unique identity code of the OTP existed, the next step of authenticating the PIN follows 188. A mathematical function is applied on the unique identity code which provides a seed value to derive a six-digit PIN at the remote server 300 side so as to match the PIN received from the smart phone 200. If the unique identity code of the OTP token 120 is not found in the remote server 300, the remote server 300 will generate a message informing the web browser 206 on the smart phone "NOT AUTHENTICATED" 192. [0063] The authentication is a success when the PIN from the smart phone 200 and the derived PIN at the remote server 300 is matched 190.
  • the remote server 300 will reiterate the derivation process to match the received PIN from the smart phone 200. However, if after "n" iteration, there were no match found, the remote server 300 will generate a message informing the web browser 206 on the smart phone "NOT AUTHENTICATED" 192. The message from the latter step is then sent to the web browser 206 on the smart phone 194. [0064] The verification step is to check whether the OTP token 120 was used before. There is a counter in the software application in the smart phone 200 and the remote server 300 to track the number of authentication attempts. There may be accidental depression on the push button 104 at the secure seal 1 18 that includes the screw cap 100 and the cork 124.
  • the remote server 300 has to perform more iteration to derive the PIN.
  • the PIN generated will be the same as the derivation is based on the same seed value from the unique identity code of the OTP token 120.
  • the remote server 300 uses the unique identity code (serial number of the OTP token 120) which acts as a seed, s (starting value) for a mathematical algorithm to generate a OTP.
  • a hash function f(s) is applied repeatedly for example 100 times to the seed, giving a value of: f(f(f( ... f(s) ...))). This value is called f 100 (s) is stored on the remote server 300.
  • the first login uses a PIN p derived by applying the function /ninety- nine times to the seed, that is P 9 (s).
  • the remote server 300 can authenticate that this is the correct PIN, because f(p) is f 100 (s), which is the value stored.
  • the value stored in the remote server 300 is then replaced by p and the OTP token 120 is authenticated.
  • the OTP token 120 performs the same process of generating the PIN at the microcontroller 122.
  • the unique identity token of the OTP token 120 or the seed value is programmed in the microcontroller 122.
  • f(p) is generated and shown on the electrophoretic display screen 1 14.
  • the P 9 (p) sent by the web browser 206 on the smart phone 200 is compared with the f 100 (s) on the remote server 300.
  • a result is returned to the web browser 206 on the smart phone 200 indicating "AUTHENTICATED" 176.
  • the screw cap 100 having a plurality of ridges or knurl 108 on an external side surface circumscribing the periphery of the top flat surface 102.
  • the push button 104 is mounted on the top flat surface 102 of the screw cap 100.
  • the push button 1 04 is imprinted with an identification code specifically a QR (Quick Response) code 106.
  • Beneath the push button 104 is an electronics circuit 130 fabricated on a film not shown in this figure.
  • the cut line 1 10 is interposed between the screw cap and the skirt 1 12.
  • the display screen 1 14 is on the side surface of the skirt 1 12.
  • the solar film panel 1 16 is positioned below the display screen 1 14.
  • the QR code 106 is laser marked on the push down button 104.
  • the display screen is an electrophoretic display screen 1 14 with a back light.
  • the skirt provides a secure attachment around the neck of the bottle 126 (not shown).
  • the cut line provides a sealed screw cap 100 attached to the skirt 1 12 and to provide an easy means to break the seal by turning the screw cap 100 by a hand whilst the skirt 1 12 is firmly secured around the neck.
  • FIG. 8 illustrates the second embodiment of the secure seal 1 18 from a bottom perspective exposing the internal components of the screw cap 100.
  • a thin film electronics circuit 130 is at the underside of the top surface of the screw cap 100 comprises the microcontroller 122 with electrical connections 134 to the electrophoretic display screen 1 14, the push button 104 and the solar film panel 1 16.
  • the screw thread 132 is above the cut line 1 10.
  • the secure seal 1 18 provides a method of assembly of the cork 124 of the first embodiment involves having a mould formed to accommodate the electronics circuit 130, the push button 104, the electrophoretic display screen 1 14 and the solar film panel 1 16 in their intended positions.
  • the solar film panel 1 16 is located at the top surface of the cork provides a most likely place to receive the light source.
  • the push button 104 is also located at the top surface to provide an intuitive visual cue for a consumer to push.
  • the push button 104 can be a tiny convex surface plastic with a diameter of 5mm. Within the convex surface plastic button is a QR code 106 that is laser marked.
  • QR code 106 is prevalent in the modern society and the consumer intuitively knows that the QR code 106 requires a reader like a smart phone 200 with a built-in camera 202.
  • the electrophoretic display screen 1 14 is positioned on the curved surface of the cork 124 providing a display of the PIN from inside the bottle neck when the cork 124 is inserted into the bottle 126.
  • a slit At the bottom of the cork is a slit.
  • the slit provides a "V" shaped groove into the cork 124 for a one electrical connection which is left exposed and tethering from one side of a groove to the second side of the groove.
  • the one exposed electrical connection is to ensure that the connection is broken when the cork 124 is extracted from the bottle 126 rendering the OTP token unusable.
  • the mould is laid with the components in a fixed position. Then loose cork oak is used to fill and pack the mould to form the authentication capable cork 124.
  • the secure seal 1 18 provides a method of assembly of the screw cap 100 of the second embodiment involves having one concentric hole bored or punctured at the top surface 102 providing a hole for the push button 104 with the imprinted QR code 106.
  • the screw cap is made of aluminium which is non-corrosive in room temperature.
  • Another two elongated holes or trenches bored on the curved surface of the screw cap 100 providing space for the installation of the solar film panel 1 16 and the electrophoretic display screen 1 14.
  • the solar film panel 1 16 and the electrophoretic display screen 1 14 fits the contour and of the curved surface of the screw cap 100.
  • the electrical connections are between components are encapsulated by a flexible thin film.
  • a waterproof element specifically epoxy may be used to protect the circuit from moisture and tampering.
  • the secure seal 1 18 specifically the cork 124 provides a method of self- destruction having an inserted mode and an extracted mode.
  • the electronics circuit 130 In an inserted mode the electronics circuit 130 is closed or connected which enables the OTP token 120 to be operational.
  • the sealed mode is applicable when the cork 124 is in the bottle 126.
  • the electronics circuit 130 In an extracted mode, the electronics circuit 130 is opened or disconnected which renders the OTP token 120 to be non-operational as the circuit is broken physically as a result of the force of the expansion of the cork 124 when extracted from the bottle 126.
  • the secure seal 1 18 specifically the screw cap 100 provides a method of self- destruction having a closed mode and an opened mode.
  • a closed mode the screw cap 100 is attached to the skirt 1 12 and the skirt attached to the neck of the bottle 126, the OTP token 120 is operational.
  • an opened mode the screw cap 100 is dislodged from the skirt 1 12 by turning the screw cap 100. The turning breaks the electrical connection at the internal side of the screw cap 100 making the OTP token 120 unusable.
  • the secure seal 1 18 provides a method of authentication whereby the QR code 106 is scanned by the smart phone 200 having a software application 204 that interprets the QR code 106.
  • the QR code 106 is encoded with the web link and the unique identity code of the OTP token 120.
  • the smart phone 200 opens the web browser 206 and loads the web link which is fetched from the remote server 300. At the same time, the unique identity code is sent to the remote server 300.
  • the web browser 206 displaying the web form prompts for the PIN generated by the OTP token 120.
  • the remote server 300 will verify and authenticate the PIN with the stored value at the remote server 300. Upon successful authentication, the result will be sent to the web browser 206 showing "AUTHENTICATED”. If fail, the result will show "NOT AUTHENTICATED”.
  • the OTP token described so far is a disconnected OTP which in this application is separated into four separate components namely the microcontroller 122, the electrophoretic display screen 1 14, the solar film panel 1 16 and the push button 104.
  • the disconnected token has no connection to the client computer.
  • the disconnected token uses a built-in display to display the generated authentication data which is then manually typed in to an online form.
  • the secure seal 1 18 mentioned herein is only good for one-time authentication. In the cork type secure seal 1 18, the electronics circuit will be destroyed when the consumer pierces a bottle opener into the cork. Consequently, when the cork is extracted from the bottle, the electrical connections are destroyed as a result of the piercing.
  • the electronics circuit is damaged once the screw cap is twisted because the electrical connections straddled across the screw cap and the skirt.
  • the skirt is securely fixed to the bottle neck. Therefore, authentication is done prior to opening the seal which is a logical step as winemakers, retailers and consumers want to find out that the wine is genuine.
  • the OTP token 120 can be fabricated into one unit encase with an external chassis to prevent tampering.
  • the unit comprises the push button 104, the power source, the microcontroller 122 and the display screen and then put into the secure seal 1 18 be it the screw cap or the cork.
  • the power source can be a thin film lithium-ion battery which is similar to conventional lithium-ion batteries, but they are composed of thinner materials, some only nanometers or micrometers thick, which allow the finished battery to be just millimeters thick.
  • Other means of power generation can be by frictional force or kinetic energy when twisting open the screw cap or pulling the cork out from the bottle.
  • the cork 124 can be made of food grade polyethylene foam core encased in an elasticised polymer skin. Synthetic cork is made from polyethylene, the same stuff as milk bottles and plastic pipes. The plastic cork performs nearly the same as the natural version with three exceptions. The plastic cork has no taint, the plastic cork lets in a bit more oxygen and the plastic cork is very consistent in oxygen transmission. [0086]
  • the display screen can be adopted using electrofluidic display technology (EFD) which is less than 15 micrometres thick and allows the screen to be rolled.
  • EFD electrofluidic display technology
  • the term "about”, in the context of concentrations of components of the formulations, typically means +/- 5% of the stated value, more typically +/- 4% of the stated value, more typically +/- 3% of the stated value, more typically, +/- 2% of the stated value, even more typically +/- 1 % of the stated value, and even more typically +/- 0.5% of the stated value.
  • certain embodiments may be disclosed in a range format. The description in range format is merely for convenience and brevity and should not be construed as an inflexible limitation on the scope of the disclosed ranges.

Abstract

Un sceau sécurisé destiné à authentifier un produit comprend un dispositif de fixation pour verrouiller une ouverture du produit et un jeton de mot de passe à usage unique fixé au dispositif de fixation et servant à générer un mot de passe. L'authentification comprend un dispositif intelligent lisant un code d'identification provenant du dispositif de fixation, envoyant le code d'identification et le mot de passe généré à un ordinateur distant, vérifiant les données et répondant au téléphone intelligent avec un résultat permettant de valider l'authenticité du produit.
PCT/SG2017/050230 2017-04-27 2017-04-27 Sceau sécurisé pour authentification de produit WO2018199844A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/SG2017/050230 WO2018199844A1 (fr) 2017-04-27 2017-04-27 Sceau sécurisé pour authentification de produit

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/SG2017/050230 WO2018199844A1 (fr) 2017-04-27 2017-04-27 Sceau sécurisé pour authentification de produit

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2018199844A1 true WO2018199844A1 (fr) 2018-11-01

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Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102019102213A1 (de) 2019-01-29 2020-07-30 Closurelogic Gmbh Flaschenkappe
EP3884128A4 (fr) * 2018-11-21 2022-08-10 Honeywell International Inc. Ensemble scellé intelligent

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2709035A2 (fr) * 2012-09-18 2014-03-19 Broadcom Corporation Système, procédé et produit de programme informatique pour détecter toute falsification dans un produit
WO2014045236A2 (fr) * 2012-09-21 2014-03-27 Visa International Service Association Balise d'objet dynamique ainsi que systèmes et procédés associés
WO2014116599A1 (fr) * 2013-01-22 2014-07-31 Infraegis, Inc. Système et procédé de suivi et de vérification de produits
WO2017023831A1 (fr) * 2015-07-31 2017-02-09 Silvio Micali Prévention de contrefaçon

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2709035A2 (fr) * 2012-09-18 2014-03-19 Broadcom Corporation Système, procédé et produit de programme informatique pour détecter toute falsification dans un produit
WO2014045236A2 (fr) * 2012-09-21 2014-03-27 Visa International Service Association Balise d'objet dynamique ainsi que systèmes et procédés associés
WO2014116599A1 (fr) * 2013-01-22 2014-07-31 Infraegis, Inc. Système et procédé de suivi et de vérification de produits
WO2017023831A1 (fr) * 2015-07-31 2017-02-09 Silvio Micali Prévention de contrefaçon

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP3884128A4 (fr) * 2018-11-21 2022-08-10 Honeywell International Inc. Ensemble scellé intelligent
DE102019102213A1 (de) 2019-01-29 2020-07-30 Closurelogic Gmbh Flaschenkappe
WO2020156616A1 (fr) 2019-01-29 2020-08-06 Closurelogic Gmbh Capsule de bouteille

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