WO2018086171A1 - Pcie interface-based solid-state hard disk security system and method - Google Patents
Pcie interface-based solid-state hard disk security system and method Download PDFInfo
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- WO2018086171A1 WO2018086171A1 PCT/CN2016/108179 CN2016108179W WO2018086171A1 WO 2018086171 A1 WO2018086171 A1 WO 2018086171A1 CN 2016108179 W CN2016108179 W CN 2016108179W WO 2018086171 A1 WO2018086171 A1 WO 2018086171A1
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- Prior art keywords
- user
- module
- hard disk
- erase
- signal
- Prior art date
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 23
- 239000007787 solid Substances 0.000 claims description 20
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000003491 array Methods 0.000 abstract 1
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 21
- 238000001994 activation Methods 0.000 description 13
- 230000004913 activation Effects 0.000 description 11
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 9
- 238000013403 standard screening design Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005336 cracking Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000009977 dual effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000003780 insertion Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000037431 insertion Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011084 recovery Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005728 strengthening Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/78—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data
- G06F21/79—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data in semiconductor storage media, e.g. directly-addressable memories
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2143—Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of solid state hard disk data security, and in particular, to a solid state hard disk confidentiality system and method based on a PCIE interface.
- SSD Solid state disk
- FLASH chip Solid state storage unit
- a hard disk remote erasing security system and method are disclosed in the prior art, Chinese Patent Application No. 200910 221798.1.
- the system has a customer platform and a control execution platform, and the client terminal platform is composed of a customized USB flash drive and a user mobile phone; the control execution platform is composed of a GSM module and an FPGA module.
- the mobile terminal short message and the client terminal of the computer platform are set to turn on and off the hard disk anti-missing function and various parameters; the client terminal of the computer platform is stored in the customized U disk matched with the hard disk; various parameters are saved in the memory of the FPGA module.
- the system adopts a remote anti-theft design based on GSM network, which is convenient for users to set the system and implement erasure, and has high flexibility.
- the implementation of this invention must be accompanied by a customized USB flash drive to achieve its use.
- the present invention provides a solid state hard disk security system and method based on a PCIE interface.
- a solid state hard disk storing important data is lost, the data stored in the solid state hard disk can be locked, erased, and erased through the GSM network.
- Lock operation ensures the security of confidential data stored by users on SSDs. Prevent important data leakage on the SSD and cause loss to the user.
- the present invention provides a solid state hard disk security system and method based on a PCIE interface.
- the system consists of an antenna 101, a GS M module 102, an MCU module 103, a PCIE/SATA protocol converter 104, a PCIE interface 105, and a power module A106, 8 Eight controllers eight 107, Flash array A 108, power module B 109, SAT A controller B 11 0, and Flash array B 111.
- the function of the antenna 101 module is that the receiving user's mobile phone sends the short message signal through the wireless base station and the transmitting GSM module 102 sends the short message signal.
- the GSM module 102 is responsible for receiving and transmitting short messages. As we all know, CDMA2000 module, TD-CDM
- the A module and the WCDMA module are also applicable to the present invention, and can also perform the function of receiving and transmitting information.
- the MCU module 103 is a core module of the present invention, and is responsible for processing various operation instructions of the user, and transmitting an erasure signal and a lock signal according to the user instruction, so as to implement the locking function, the erasing function, and the erasing function of the present invention. Lock function.
- the MCU module 103 reads the lock command sent by the user from the GSM module 102, and the MCU module 103 sets the lock signal A to the disable state, and simultaneously sets the lock signal B.
- the SATA controller 107 and the flash array 108 powered by the power module A106 are in a power-off state.
- the data stored on the Flash array Ij l08 is invisible, instead, The SATA controller 110 and the flash array 111 powered by the power module A109 are in a power supply state.
- the data pre-stored on the flash array 111 is visible, thus ensuring the security of the confidential data; when the user sends the erasure
- the command ⁇ the MCU module 103 reads from the GSM module 102 to the user.
- the erase command sent the MCU module 103 maintains the lock signal A unchanged in the original enable state, the erase signal A is asserted, triggers the erase function of the SATA controller A 107, and the SATA controller A 107 executes the flash array 108.
- the erase operation cannot be restored to ensure the security of the data. Of course, the erase is unrecoverable. Even if the user retrieves the disk again, the data cannot be recovered.
- the MCU The module 103 reads the erase relock command sent by the user from the GSM module 102, and the MCU module 103 maintains the lock signal A unchanged in the original enable state, and the erase signal A is asserted to trigger the erase function of the SATA controller A107.
- the SATA controller A107 will perform a non-recoverable erase operation on the Flash array Ij l08, and then the MCU module 103 sets the lock signal A to the disable state, and simultaneously sets the lock signal B to the enable state.
- the SATA controller 107 and the Flash array Ij l08 powered by the power module A106 are in a power-off state.
- the data stored on the Flash array Ij l08 is invisible, and instead, the power module A109 is powered.
- Flash SATA controller 110 and array 111 is electrically powered state for the user, the data previously stored in the Flash array 111 is visible, double security can better ensure the operation of the user data.
- the SATA controller of the present invention is the Barefoot ECO controller of INDILINX Corporation.
- the PCIE interface 104 is responsible for connecting the secure solid state hard disk of the present invention to various types of computer motherboards to achieve connection of individual signal lines.
- the PCIE/SATA protocol converter 105 is responsible for converting the motherboard's PCIE signal into a SATA controller A and SAT.
- a controller B can identify and process the SATA signal, and cooperate with the selection of the power module to achieve signal bridging.
- the data stored in the solid state hard disk is locked, erased, and erased, thereby ensuring the security of the confidential data stored by the user on the solid state hard disk.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the structure of the system of the present invention.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an activation process of the present invention
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the process of erasing and locking according to the present invention.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the structure of a system of the present invention. It is a solid state hard disk security system and method based on PCIE interface.
- the system consists of an antenna 101, a GSM module 102, an MCU module 103, a PCIE interface 104, a PCIE/SATA protocol converter 105, a power module A1 06, and an eight-eighth eight controller. Eight 107, Flash Array A108, Power Module B 109, SAT A Controller B 110, and F lash Array B111.
- the function of the antenna 101 module is to receive the short message sent by the user's mobile phone through the wireless base station and transmit the short message signal to the transmitting GSM module 102.
- the GSM module 102 is responsible for receiving and transmitting short messages. As we all know, CDMA2000 module, TD-CDM
- the A module and the WCDMA module are also applicable to the present invention, and can also perform the function of receiving and transmitting information.
- the MCU module 103 is a core module of the present invention, and is responsible for processing various operation instructions of the user, and transmitting an erasing signal and a lock signal according to the user instruction, so as to implement the locking function, the erasing function, and the erasing function of the present invention. Lock function.
- the MCU module 103 reads the lock command sent by the user from the GSM module 102, and the MCU module 103 sets the lock signal A to the disable state, and simultaneously sets the lock signal B.
- the SATA controller 107 and the flash array 108 powered by the power module A106 are in a power-off state.
- the data stored on the Flash array Ij l08 is invisible, instead, The SATA controller 110 and the flash array 111 powered by the power module A109 are in a power supply state.
- the data pre-stored on the flash array 111 is visible, thereby ensuring the security of the user data; when the user sends the erasure After the command, the MCU module 103 reads the erase command sent by the user from the GSM module 102, and the MCU module 103 maintains the lock signal A in the original enable state, and the erase signal A is asserted, triggering the wipe of the SATA controller A107.
- the SATA controller A107 will perform an unrecoverable to erase operation on the flash array 108 to ensure data security. When the SATA controller completes the erase operation, it will wipe.
- the MCU detects that the erase completion signal A is valid, indicating that the SATA controller A107 has completed the erase operation.
- the erase is unrecoverable, and even if the user retrieves the disk again, the recovery cannot be resumed.
- the MCU module 103 when the user sends an erase relock command, the MCU module 103 is from G
- the SM module 102 reads the erase relock command sent by the user, and the MCU module 103 maintains the lock signal A unchanged in the original enable state, and the erase signal A is asserted, triggering the erase function of the SATA controller A 107, SA TA
- the controller A107 will perform an unrecoverable to erase operation on the Flash array ij 108, and then the MCU module 103 sets the lock signal A to the disable state, and simultaneously sets the lock signal B to the enable state.
- the SATA controller 107 and the flash array Ij l08 powered by the module A106 are in a power-off state. For the user, the data stored on the flash array Ij l08 is invisible.
- the SAT A control powered by the power module A109 is controlled.
- the device 110 and the flash array 111 are in a power supply state.
- the data pre-stored on the flash array 111 is visible, and the dual operation can better ensure the security of the user data.
- the SATA controller of the present invention is the Barefoot ECO controller of INDILINX Corporation.
- the PCIE interface 104 is responsible for connecting the secure solid state hard disk of the present invention to various types of computer motherboards to achieve connection of individual signal lines.
- the PCIE/SATA protocol converter 105 is responsible for converting the motherboard's PCIE signal into a SATA controller A and SAT.
- a controller B can identify and process the SATA signal, and cooperate with the selection of the power module to achieve signal bridging.
- Step 201 waiting for the user to register or replace the SIM card program execution, proceed to step 202;
- Step 202 detecting whether there is currently a SIM card in place, if not, proceeding to step 203, and if so, proceeding to step 204;
- Step 203 directly execute the lock command without waiting for the user instruction
- Step 204 Read IMSI information of the SIM card.
- IMSI international Mobile Subscriber
- Step 205 The MCU reads the IMSI information of the SIM card and the IM stored in the flash of the MCU.
- Step 206 The MCU reads the IMSI information in the flash. If the part of the information is empty, it determines that the card is inserted for the first time, and proceeds to step 211. If the IMSI information in the flash is not empty, and the IMSI information does not match, it is determined to be changed. card
- Step 207 The MCU sends a wait for card verification information to the user mobile phone stored in the flash, and the same message Knowing that the user's mobile phone will change the card number of the card, so that the user can verify the information, and proceeds to step 208;
- Step 208 the user sends information to the card change number, to verify, if correct, then proceeds to step 210, if not, proceeds to step 209;
- Step 209 the MCU counts the number of verifications to 3 times, and if so, proceeds to step 203, and if not, proceeds to step 207;
- Step 210 The MCU writes the IMSI information of the SIM card to the internal flash, and binds the SIM card.
- Step 211 waiting for the user to send information to verify the binding of the SIM card, proceeds to step 212;
- Step 212 the MCU verifies whether the information sent by the user matches the content of the information stored in the internal flash, and if so, proceeds to step 214, and if no, proceeds to step 213;
- Step 213 the MCU counts the number of verifications to 3 times, and if so, proceeds to step 203, and if not, proceeds to step 211 again;
- Step 214 the MCU writes the IMSI information of the SIM card to the internal flash, and the binding of the SIM card to the system is implemented, and the process proceeds to step 215;
- Step 215 Send the user the SIM card number and the user password of the user waiting for the binding, and proceed to step 2
- Step 216 the user sends the SIM card number of the user and the specific user password to the binding SIM card by means of short message; proceed to step 217;
- Step 217 the MCU determines whether the user user password is consistent with the password stored in the flash, and if so, proceeds to step 218, and if not, proceeds to step 215;
- Step 219 completing the first card insertion or card replacement process.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a locking process of the present invention.
- Step 301 the GSM module on the PCIE card receives the lock command sent by the user, and the MCU reads the lock command, and proceeds to step 302;
- Step 302 the MCU compares the user SIM card number that sends the lock command with the card number stored in the internal flash, and proceeds to step 303; [0047] Step 303, the MCU determines whether the user SIM card number has the right to send a lock command, and if so, proceeds to step 305, and if not, proceeds to step 304;
- Step 304 The SIM card bound to the product of the present invention sends an alarm message to the SIM card of the authorized user;
- Step 305 Perform a locking function. That is, the MCU module 103 reads the lock command sent by the user from the GSM module 102, and the MCU module 103 sets the lock signal A to the disable state, and simultaneously sets the lock signal B to the enable state. Thereafter, the power module A106 is powered. The powered SATA controller 107 and the Flash array Ij l08 are in a power-off state. For the user, the data stored on the Flash array 108 is invisible. On the contrary, the SATA controller 110 and the Flash array powered by the power module A109. 111 is in a power supply state, for the user, the data pre-stored on the flash array 111 is visible, proceeds to step 306;
- Step 306 After completing the lock, the MCU sends an acknowledgement message to the user SIM card number to inform the user that the lock function has been completed.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an activation process of the present invention.
- Step 401 the GSM module on the product of the present invention receives the activation command sent by the user, and the MCU reads the activation command, and proceeds to step 402;
- Step 402 the MCU compares the user SIM card number that sends the activation command with the card number stored in the internal flash, and proceeds to step 403;
- Step 403 the MCU determines whether the user SIM card number has the right to send an activation command, and if so, proceeds to step 405, and if not, proceeds to step 404;
- Step 404 The SIM card bound to the product of the present invention sends an alarm message to the SIM card of the authorized user.
- Step 405 Perform a locking function. That is, the MCU module 103 reads the activation command sent by the user from the GSM module 102, and the MCU module 103 sets the lock signal A to the enable state, and simultaneously sets the lock signal B to the disable state. Thereafter, the power module A106 is powered.
- the power supply SATA controller 107 and the flash array Ij l08 are in a power supply state, and the SATA controller 110 and the flash array 111 powered by the power module A 109 are in a power-off state.
- the data stored on the flash array 108 is visible. In contrast, the data on the flash array 111 is invisible, proceeds to step 406;
- Step 406 After completing the activation command, the MCU sends an acknowledgement message to the user SIM card number to inform the user that the activation command has been completed.
- Step 501 the GSM module on the product of the present invention receives the user sends an erase command, and the MCU reads the erase command, and proceeds to step 502;
- Step 502 the MCU compares the user SIM card number that sends the activation command with the card number stored in the internal flash, and simultaneously compares the user SIM card to the password and the secret stored in the flash, and proceeds to step 503;
- Step 503 the MCU determines whether the user SIM card number has the right to send an activation command, and if so, proceeds to step 505, and if not, proceeds to step 504;
- Step 504 the SIM card bound to the product of the present invention sends an alarm message to the authorized user SIM card, and proceeds to step 514;
- Step 505 it is determined whether the data disk is in the locked state, and if so, proceeds to step 506, and if not, proceeds to step 509;
- Step 506 The SIM card bound to the product of the present invention sends an alarm message to the user SIM card, and informs the user that the data disk is in a locked state, and the user cannot send an activation command, and the user needs to send an activation command to proceed to step 507.
- Step 507 waiting for the user to send a command to activate the data disk, proceeds to step 508;
- Step 508 Determine whether the data disk is activated within the specified time T1, and if yes, proceed to step 509.
- Step 509 the SIM card bound to the product of the present invention sends a confirmation message to the authorized user SIM card, confirming whether the user determines to erase the data disk data, and proceeds to step 510;
- Step 510 Whether the user SIM card is confirmed in the specified time T2, if not, proceeding to step 513, if yes
- step 511 proceeds to step 511;
- Step 511 executing an erase command, that is, the MCU module 103 reads the erase command sent by the user from the GSM module 102, and the MCU module 103 maintains the lock signal A unchanged in the original enable state, and the erase signal A is set to Effective, triggering the erase function of SATA controller A107, SATA controller A107 will perform non-recoverable to erase operation on Flash array Ij l08, in order to ensure data security, when the SATA controller completes the erase operation, The erase completion signal A is asserted, the MCU detects that the erase completion signal A is valid, indicating that the SATA controller A 107 has completed the erase operation, proceeds to step 512;
- Step 512 After the MCU detects that the SATA controller completes the erasure signal, it sends the message to the user SIM card. Complete the erase command information to inform the user that the erase command has been completed;
- Step 513 completing the erase command.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an erase locking process of the present invention.
- Step 601 the GSM module on the product of the present invention receives the erase lock command sent by the user, the MCU reads the erase lock command, and proceeds to step 602;
- Step 602 the MCU compares the user SIM card number that sends the erase command with the card number stored in the internal flash, and proceeds to step 603;
- Step 603 the MCU determines whether the user SIM card number has the right to send an erase lock command, and if so, proceeds to step 605, and if not, proceeds to step 604;
- Step 604 the SIM card bound to the product of the present invention sends an alarm message to the authorized user SIM card;
- Step 605 executing the erase command shown in FIG. 2, proceeds to step 606;
- Step 606 executing the lock command shown in Figure 3, proceeds to step 607;
- Step 607 After completing the erase lock command, the MCU sends an acknowledgement message to the user SIM card number to inform the user that the erase lock command has been completed.
- the present invention provides a solid state hard disk security system and method based on a PCIE interface, and the technical solution of the present invention is further described in detail. It is understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
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CN201610988062.7 | 2016-11-10 | ||
CN201610988062.7A CN108073833A (en) | 2016-11-10 | 2016-11-10 | Solid state disk secrecy system and method based on PCIE interfaces |
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Cited By (3)
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CN108776765A (en) * | 2018-06-11 | 2018-11-09 | 山东超越数控电子股份有限公司 | A kind of hard disk data protection method and device |
CN111045597A (en) * | 2018-10-12 | 2020-04-21 | 三星电子株式会社 | Computer system |
CN113111397A (en) * | 2021-05-11 | 2021-07-13 | 上海爱武信息科技有限公司 | Hard disk data logic and physical destruction control system |
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CN101782951A (en) * | 2009-11-10 | 2010-07-21 | 徐欣 | Hard disc remote destroying antitheft system and method |
CN202189354U (en) * | 2011-07-29 | 2012-04-11 | 苏州捷泰科信息技术有限公司 | Safe solid hard disc system based on universal serial bus (USB) interface |
CN102902633A (en) * | 2011-07-29 | 2013-01-30 | 苏州捷泰科信息技术有限公司 | Remote encryption system and remote encryption method for solid-state disk |
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2016
- 2016-11-10 CN CN201610988062.7A patent/CN108073833A/en active Pending
- 2016-12-01 WO PCT/CN2016/108179 patent/WO2018086171A1/en active Application Filing
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CN101706853A (en) * | 2009-11-10 | 2010-05-12 | 徐欣 | Solid state disk (SSD)-based anti-leakage self-destruction system |
CN101782951A (en) * | 2009-11-10 | 2010-07-21 | 徐欣 | Hard disc remote destroying antitheft system and method |
CN202189354U (en) * | 2011-07-29 | 2012-04-11 | 苏州捷泰科信息技术有限公司 | Safe solid hard disc system based on universal serial bus (USB) interface |
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CN108776765A (en) * | 2018-06-11 | 2018-11-09 | 山东超越数控电子股份有限公司 | A kind of hard disk data protection method and device |
CN111045597A (en) * | 2018-10-12 | 2020-04-21 | 三星电子株式会社 | Computer system |
CN113111397A (en) * | 2021-05-11 | 2021-07-13 | 上海爱武信息科技有限公司 | Hard disk data logic and physical destruction control system |
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CN108073833A (en) | 2018-05-25 |
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