CN101782951A - Hard disc remote destroying antitheft system and method - Google Patents
Hard disc remote destroying antitheft system and method Download PDFInfo
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- CN101782951A CN101782951A CN200910221798A CN200910221798A CN101782951A CN 101782951 A CN101782951 A CN 101782951A CN 200910221798 A CN200910221798 A CN 200910221798A CN 200910221798 A CN200910221798 A CN 200910221798A CN 101782951 A CN101782951 A CN 101782951A
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Abstract
The invention relates to a hard disc remote destroying antitheft system and a method. The system is formed by a client terminal platform and a control execution platform, wherein the client terminal platform is formed by the supporting customized U disc of the system and a user mobile phone; and the control execution platform is formed by a GSM module and an FPGA module. The on/off of hard disc secrete anti-leakage function and all kinds of parameters are set through mobile phone short messages and the client terminal of a computer platform; the client terminal of the computer platform is saved in the supporting customized U disc of the a hard disc, and all kinds of parameters are saved in the memory of the FPGA module. The system adopts the remote antitheft design based on the GSM network, so the client can conveniently set the system and implement destruction and the flexibility is high.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the hard disc data security fields, it is a kind of system and method that ensures the computer hard disc data security, specifically, exactly by the supporting anti-hard disk of giving away secrets, according to the teleinstruction that receives (sending short message by user mobile phone realizes), destroy the data of losing in (or out of control for a long time) computer hard disc reliably.
Background technology
Information age, computer has become the instrument of people's store information and even company's secret of the trade, computer is more because easy to carry and often with user trip, occurs in all over the world the computer in office, airport, taxi, hotel and loses or stolen incident but almost constantly all can have.Report demonstration according to authority, whenever there is a computer to lose or stolen, it will cause the loss that comprises that information dropout, intellecture property are impaired, reconfigure all many-sides such as computer, working time loss and relevant law expense, 49,246 dollars of average out to (from Ponemon Institute).
In fact in the computer with the surcharge of data far above computer itself, under such situation, it is important that the hard disc data safety problem seems all the more, and computer to lose the direct and consequential damage that is caused often relevant with user's position, position is high more, the valuable quantity of information of being grasped is big more, and it is also just big more that computer is lost the potential loss that caused.Show according to investigations, be responsible for or manager's level user's computer is worth and is respectively 6.08 ten thousand dollars and 6.1 ten thousand dollars, the highest even can reach dollars up to a million.Though present most of computer can be provided with system and BIOS password, or there are fingerprint identification function, data security to seem watertight.But computer is in case stolen, and the thief pulls down hard disk and connects other main frames, still can read the data in the hard disk.
At present, wanting effectively to contain that the data in the hard disk leak, when strengthening the computer hardware anti-theft measure, mainly is to prevent leaking of sensitive data by the mode that data are encrypted.But any cryptographic algorithm all has its relativity, completely obtaining on the basis of all data in the hard disk, and along with cracking algorithm and technical development, the hidden danger that exists sensitive data to leak all the time.
In addition, the domestic hard disc of computer anti-thefting monitoring and the anti-destruct system of divulging a secret that proposition is also arranged based on GPS.Existing GPS positioning system is also not high to the open bearing accuracy of demestic user, adopts the mode of external device simultaneously, and dirigibility is short of to some extent.
Summary of the invention
The present invention relates to the hard disc data security fields, is a kind of system and method that ensures the computer hard disc data security.Defective at prior art exists provides a kind of technical scheme: native system is made up of client platform and control execution platform, and described client terminal platform is made up of the customization USB flash disk and the user mobile phone of system support; Control is carried out platform and is made up of gsm module and FPGA module.System adopts the long-range anti theft design based on the GSM network, makes things convenient for user's initialization system and implement to destroy, and dirigibility is higher.Simultaneously in conjunction with the supporting anti-hard disk of giving away secrets, and, proposed a cover complete safe strategy and had higher reliability at may various case in the implementation process.
System mainly comprises FPGA module, client platform, gsm module, monitoring module and FLASH memory module.Wherein the FPGA module is connected with client platform by SATA, PATA interface, the FPGA module is connected with gsm module with clock line by read data line, write data line, read-write control line, the FPGA module is connected with monitoring module, and the FPGA module is connected with the FLASH memory module.
The FPGA module is the control core of native system, the function that it is finished: the read-write operation of control FLASH; Receive testing result that monitoring module sends, indicate and carry out logic determines, switch corresponding security strategy according to the result who judges; Receive the indication that gsm module sends, the anti-function of giving away secrets of On/Off is provided with parameter and in time destroys data; With communicate by letter between the client platform, preserve the various parameters that the user is provided with.The FPGA module communicates by read data line, write data line, read-write control line and clock line and gsm module, communicates by the client platform in SATA, PATA bus and the computer.
In the gsm module four GSM transceiver frequently is responsible for receiving, sending short message.Single chip control module in the gsm module is responsible for carrying out interpretation, the filtration of short message content, and sends command adapted thereto according to short message content to the FPGA module.In addition, single chip control module also is responsible for the electrifying condition and the interface internal resistance of monitoring hard-disk interface.
Client platform can be provided with the various running parameters of system easily, arbitrarily system is provided with in order to prevent the unauthorized personnel, must use the safe U disc supporting with hard disk when being provided with by client platform.
Monitoring module detects the residing working environment of hard disk in real time, comprises GSM RST, supply voltage etc.When testing result changes, send corresponding indicating signals for the FPGA module.
Concrete grammar is: opening and closing and various parameter that the anti-function of giving away secrets of hard disk is set by the client terminal of SMS and computer platform; The client terminal of computer platform be kept at the supporting customization USB flash disk of hard disk in; Various parameters are saved in the storer of FPGA module; The parameter that client terminal can be provided with comprises: the time interval, subscriber phone number, the content of short message, the hard disk access code of timing search signal when the timing wake-up time interval, no GSM signal during dormant state.
Major advantage of the present invention is:
1, based on the remote destroying anti theft design of GSM network, guarantee that sensitive data is not stolen, and after the destruction data finish, send the feedback note, make the user relieved.
2, client terminal platform design guarantees that working state of system and parameter setting are not revised easily.
3, complete safe strategy is tackled the generation of various situations, even anti-gsm communication of giving away secrets between hard disk and user mobile phone interrupts, still can independently initiate data destroying by hdd control logic, guarantees the reliable destruction of data and prevents the destruction of data mistake.
Description of drawings is
Fig. 1 is the system architecture synoptic diagram.
Fig. 2 is the detailed security strategy process flow diagram of system.
Specific implementation method
The opening and closing and being provided with of various parameters of the anti-function of giving away secrets of hard disk can be undertaken by the client terminal of SMS and computer platform.When being provided with by SMS, the note that only needs to send appointment arrives and the corresponding SIM card of hard disk.The client terminal of computer platform be kept at the supporting customization USB flash disk of hard disk in, main effect is that duty and various running parameter conveniently are set, and various parameters is saved in the storer of FPGA module.Give away secrets function when opening when hard disk is anti-, and hard disk can constantly detect the residing working environment of current hard disk, and according to the corresponding adjustment security strategy of testing result, and activation data is destroyed program when condition satisfies, and guarantees that data are anti-to give away secrets.The parameter that client terminal can be provided with comprises: the time interval, subscriber phone number, the content of short message, the hard disk access code of timing search signal when the timing wake-up time interval, no GSM signal during dormant state; After the anti-function of giving away secrets of hard disk was closed, hard disk no longer carried out logic determines, and the data destroying program can not be activated yet.
When hard disk is in power-up state but environment of living in when not having the GSM signal, be installed in finger daemon in the hard disk with computer locking, and the prompting user imports unlocking pin, if the user correctly imports unlocking pin stipulated number (or time) in, computer unlocks; Otherwise maintenance lock-out state.In case the end of people's malice is arranged or unloads this finger daemon, hardware destroy data.
The FPGA module is a system control core, and the function that the FPGA control program is finished mainly comprises: to hard disk conduct interviews control, reading writing harddisk, handover security strategy, destroy data.After hard disk powered on, the user wanted the input reference password during access hard disk first time, had only the correct access password of input to carry out read-write operation to hard disk.After removing the hard disk restrict access, computer can be by FPGA module controls read-write FLASH, and after receiving the destruction data command that is sent by gsm module when the FPGA module, carries out the destruction task control.Communication bus between FPGA module and the gsm module is made up of read data line, write data line, clock and read-write control line; When monitoring module detects the residing working environment of hard disk and changes, send indicator signal to the FPGA module, when the FPGA module receives this indicator signal, carry out logic determines, and switch to corresponding security strategy according to judged result.
After gsm module receives short message, short message is decoded.If the order that the client setting only allows the special handset user to send is just effective, then can filter the order that other any cellphone subscribers send after the gsm module decoding, whether the content match of no matter ordering to be; Otherwise the content match of short message just executes instruction in the time of as long as decode.Also can be provided with by short message, comprise: the time interval, subscriber phone number, the content of short message, the hard disk access code of timing search signal when the timing wake-up time interval, no GSM signal during dormant state running parameter.If gsm module receives the short message of destroying data, then its decoding is converted to the discernible instruction of FPGA module, after receiving, the FPGA module begins to destroy data, beam back the indication that data destroying finishes to gsm module after destruction finishes, after gsm module is received predefined data destroying is confirmed that short message sends to the special handset user.
Monitoring module constantly detects the GSM signal of supply voltage, source resistance and the hard disk environment of living in of hard disk, and different security strategies is selected according to the result who detects by system.
Accompanying drawing 2 is the detailed security strategy flow process of system (under the situation based on the systemic-function unlatching):
1, powers on (comprise the unlatching of computer and restart) when detecting hard disk, require the user to import harddisk password immediately.If the user provides correct password in the number of times (or time) of regulation, then normally start hard disk, otherwise directly start the hardware destroy program.
2, after hard disc data is destroyed program start, can't stop.
3, computer is normally opened, and finger daemon normally moves, and is in the environment that the GSM signal is arranged.Finger daemon detects the duty of gsm module all the time.Because environment of living in has the GSM signal, so the gsm module operate as normal after finger daemon starts, when detecting the gsm module operate as normal first, sends instruction to gsm module, make it send a note to the cellphone subscriber, show that computer is in running order.Can determine when if the user receives this note booting computer be by own or reliable people initiate could ignore note; And determine that when the user receives note PC is out of control, then can start " distant ruining " by note.
If the user not gsm module in hard disk sends the short message (promptly not starting " distant ruining " function) with special instruction, then destroy steering logic and do not do any operation.Under the user determined situation that computer do not lose, the note that the user sends when receiving the GSM start can not done any answer, destroys operation to avoid sending note repeatedly with cancellation, makes things convenient for the user like this.
If the user can send the short message (promptly starting " distant ruining " function) with special instruction by special mobile phone SIM card (or special-purpose terminal of appointment) to the phone number with the hard disk binding).Gsm module in the hard disk starts destruction affirmation program after receiving this short message: beam back one and confirm inquiry message, if the user confirms, gsm module and FPGA module communicate, and start hard disc data and destroy program, and beam back the indication information that data have been destroyed by short message.If user's cancellation then enters the next judgement cycle.
When the GSM blackout, switch to security strategy 4.Unloaded or when finishing process when finger daemon, switch to security strategy 5.
4, computer is normally opened, and finger daemon normally moves, and is in the environment that does not have the GSM signal.Finger daemon detects the duty of GSM all the time, and no GSM signal in the hypothesis surrounding environment in this scene is so gsm module can't operate as normal.At this moment finger daemon can be controlled computer locking, warns the user then and imports unlocking pin.
If the user can provide correct password in the number of times (or time) of regulation, then the computing machine normal release can't provide then to start the hardware destroy program.
When detecting the GSM signal again, if computing machine is not unlocked, computing machine keeps locking; If computing machine by normal release, switches to security strategy 3.
Unloaded or when being moved to end process when finger daemon, switch to security strategy 5.
5, unloaded or when being moved to end process when finger daemon, start the hardware destroy program immediately.
6, computer is not opened, and hard disk is in power-down state, and is in the environment that the GSM signal is arranged.At this moment, hdd control logic starts timing and tally function, makes the gsm module time opening of hard disk inside.After gsm module is opened, send an information to the user and show that it is in running order, in the stand-by period of setting, wait for then receiving the note instruction, then open the affirmation program of destroying (in step and the security strategy 3 identical) if receive instruction; If do not receive the note instruction in the stand-by period of setting, then gsm module enters dormant state, waits for the arrival of wake-up period next time.
When the number of times of gsm module unlatching arrives the number of times of regulation, no matter whether receive instruction, all open hard disc data and destroy program.After starting hard disc data destruction program, gsm module can be beamed back the affirmation indication information that a hard disc data has been destroyed.
When the GSM blackout, and the destruction program switches to security strategy 7 when being not activated.If the destruction program starts, switch to security strategy 2.
7, computer is not opened, and hard disk is in power-down state, and is in the environment that does not have the GSM signal.Under the driving of hard disk internal cell, hdd control logic starts timing and tally function, makes the gsm module time opening of hard disk inside.GSM opens just search GSM signal in the time of setting of back, then switches to security strategy 6 if can search.If search is waited for the arrival of wake-up period next time less than then entering dormancy.
In the number of starts that gsm module is being set, all can not search the GSM signal, then directly start the hardware destroy program.If after destroying program start, detect the GSM signal, switch to security strategy 2.
8, when detecting hard disk internal cell electric weight when extremely low, gsm module sends a short message to the user, and notice custom system function is about to lose efficacy.
Claims (5)
1. hard disc remote destroying antitheft system and method comprise client platform and control execution platform, and it is characterized in that: client terminal platform is made up of the customization USB flash disk and the user mobile phone of system support; Control is carried out platform and is made up of gsm module and FPGA module.
2. hard disc remote destroying antitheft system according to claim 1 and method is characterized in that: system mainly comprises FPGA module, client platform, gsm module, monitoring module and FLASH memory module; Wherein the FPGA module is connected with client platform by SATA, PATA interface, the FPGA module is connected with gsm module with clock line by read data line, write data line, read-write control line, the FPGA module is connected with monitoring module, and the FPGA module is connected with the FLASH memory module.
3. hard disc remote destroying antitheft system according to claim 1 and method is characterized in that: opening and closing and various parameter that the anti-function of giving away secrets of hard disk is set by the client terminal of SMS and computer platform; The client terminal of computer platform be kept at the supporting customization USB flash disk of hard disk in; Various parameters are saved in the storer of FPGA module.
4. the anti-destruct system of giving away secrets based on solid state hard disc according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: hard disk GSM transceiver module mainly comprises: GSM receives and dispatches kernel control module, the clock circuit module, GSM running parameter memory module, lithium battery voltage detection module, the lithium cell charging administration module, the SPI interface, the SATA interface detection module, reach parts such as four frequency GSM transceiver modules, wherein GSM transmitting-receiving kernel control module is the center, respectively with the clock circuit module, GSM running parameter memory module, lithium battery voltage detection module, the SPI interface, the SATA interface detection module, four GSM transceiver module connections frequently, lithium battery voltage detection module is connected with the lithium cell charging administration module.
5. hard disc remote destroying antitheft system according to claim 1 and method is characterized in that: the parameter that client terminal can be provided with comprises: the time interval, subscriber phone number, the content of short message, the hard disk access code of timing search signal when the timing wake-up time interval, no GSM signal during dormant state.
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| CN200910221798A CN101782951A (en) | 2009-11-10 | 2009-11-10 | Hard disc remote destroying antitheft system and method |
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| WO2012031508A1 (en) * | 2010-09-07 | 2012-03-15 | 湖南源科高新技术有限公司 | Method and computer for controlling access to computer storage device |
| CN102722343A (en) * | 2012-06-01 | 2012-10-10 | 湖南国安思科计算机系统有限公司 | Wireless private security cloud storage equipment |
| CN102902633A (en) * | 2011-07-29 | 2013-01-30 | 苏州捷泰科信息技术有限公司 | Remote encryption system and remote encryption method for solid-state disk |
| CN103548008A (en) * | 2011-02-25 | 2014-01-29 | 韦斯技术有限公司 | System and method for unlocking a device remotely from a server |
| CN106355112A (en) * | 2016-08-30 | 2017-01-25 | 深圳泰首智能技术有限公司 | Method of destructing data in encrypted mobile storage device and server |
| CN107995617A (en) * | 2017-12-21 | 2018-05-04 | 鸿秦（北京）科技有限公司 | A kind of solid storage device for supporting telesecurity to destroy design |
| WO2018086171A1 (en) * | 2016-11-10 | 2018-05-17 | 苏州韦科韬信息技术有限公司 | Pcie interface-based solid-state hard disk security system and method |
| CN108388810A (en) * | 2018-01-31 | 2018-08-10 | 山东华芯半导体有限公司 | A kind of mobile encrypted hard disk and encryption method of having electronic fence function |
| CN110968531A (en) * | 2019-11-27 | 2020-04-07 | 浪潮商用机器有限公司 | Data destruction method, system and device of SSD |
| CN111310247A (en) * | 2020-03-11 | 2020-06-19 | 温州市音咯网络科技有限公司 | Anti-theft device of information secrecy hard disk |
| CN111539045A (en) * | 2020-04-28 | 2020-08-14 | 深圳市智微智能软件开发有限公司 | Water-cooling heat dissipation type computer case with anti-disclosure function |
| CN112131620A (en) * | 2020-08-26 | 2020-12-25 | 苏州浪潮智能科技有限公司 | Hard disk anti-theft method and hard disk |
| CN112541186A (en) * | 2020-12-21 | 2021-03-23 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | Password out-of-control resisting system and method based on motion state perception |
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- 2009-11-10 CN CN200910221798A patent/CN101782951A/en active Pending
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| WO2012031508A1 (en) * | 2010-09-07 | 2012-03-15 | 湖南源科高新技术有限公司 | Method and computer for controlling access to computer storage device |
| CN103548008A (en) * | 2011-02-25 | 2014-01-29 | 韦斯技术有限公司 | System and method for unlocking a device remotely from a server |
| CN103548008B (en) * | 2011-02-25 | 2016-06-01 | 韦斯技术有限公司 | For equipment being carried out from server the system and method for remote de-locking |
| CN102902633A (en) * | 2011-07-29 | 2013-01-30 | 苏州捷泰科信息技术有限公司 | Remote encryption system and remote encryption method for solid-state disk |
| CN102902633B (en) * | 2011-07-29 | 2015-01-14 | 苏州捷泰科信息技术有限公司 | Remote encryption system and remote encryption method for solid-state disk |
| CN102722343A (en) * | 2012-06-01 | 2012-10-10 | 湖南国安思科计算机系统有限公司 | Wireless private security cloud storage equipment |
| CN106355112A (en) * | 2016-08-30 | 2017-01-25 | 深圳泰首智能技术有限公司 | Method of destructing data in encrypted mobile storage device and server |
| WO2018086171A1 (en) * | 2016-11-10 | 2018-05-17 | 苏州韦科韬信息技术有限公司 | Pcie interface-based solid-state hard disk security system and method |
| CN108073833A (en) * | 2016-11-10 | 2018-05-25 | 苏州韦科韬信息技术有限公司 | Solid state disk secrecy system and method based on PCIE interfaces |
| CN107995617A (en) * | 2017-12-21 | 2018-05-04 | 鸿秦（北京）科技有限公司 | A kind of solid storage device for supporting telesecurity to destroy design |
| CN108388810A (en) * | 2018-01-31 | 2018-08-10 | 山东华芯半导体有限公司 | A kind of mobile encrypted hard disk and encryption method of having electronic fence function |
| CN110968531A (en) * | 2019-11-27 | 2020-04-07 | 浪潮商用机器有限公司 | Data destruction method, system and device of SSD |
| CN110968531B (en) * | 2019-11-27 | 2024-01-09 | 浪潮商用机器有限公司 | Data destruction method, system and device for SSD |
| CN111310247A (en) * | 2020-03-11 | 2020-06-19 | 温州市音咯网络科技有限公司 | Anti-theft device of information secrecy hard disk |
| CN111539045A (en) * | 2020-04-28 | 2020-08-14 | 深圳市智微智能软件开发有限公司 | Water-cooling heat dissipation type computer case with anti-disclosure function |
| CN111539045B (en) * | 2020-04-28 | 2023-04-07 | 深圳市智微智能软件开发有限公司 | Water-cooling heat dissipation type computer case with anti-disclosure function |
| CN112131620A (en) * | 2020-08-26 | 2020-12-25 | 苏州浪潮智能科技有限公司 | Hard disk anti-theft method and hard disk |
| CN112131620B (en) * | 2020-08-26 | 2022-08-02 | 苏州浪潮智能科技有限公司 | Hard disk anti-theft method and hard disk |
| CN112541186A (en) * | 2020-12-21 | 2021-03-23 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | Password out-of-control resisting system and method based on motion state perception |
| CN112541186B (en) * | 2020-12-21 | 2022-03-18 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | Password out-of-control resisting system and method based on motion state perception |
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Application publication date: 20100721 |