WO2017201753A1 - Procédé et appareil d'authentification de réseau mobile - Google Patents

Procédé et appareil d'authentification de réseau mobile Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017201753A1
WO2017201753A1 PCT/CN2016/083753 CN2016083753W WO2017201753A1 WO 2017201753 A1 WO2017201753 A1 WO 2017201753A1 CN 2016083753 W CN2016083753 W CN 2016083753W WO 2017201753 A1 WO2017201753 A1 WO 2017201753A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
mobile network
network device
random number
key
terminal
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Application number
PCT/CN2016/083753
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
程紫尧
龙水平
衣强
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Priority to PCT/CN2016/083753 priority Critical patent/WO2017201753A1/fr
Priority to CN201680084751.3A priority patent/CN109076058B/zh
Publication of WO2017201753A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017201753A1/fr

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols

Definitions

  • Embodiments of the present invention relate to the field of communications technologies, and, more particularly, to a method and apparatus for authenticating a mobile network.
  • 3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
  • 3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
  • Authentication parameters or authentication vectors, authentication quaternions
  • RAND Random Number
  • AUTN Authentication Token
  • RES Response
  • EXRES Expected Response
  • K ASME K ASME
  • the K ASME is an intermediate key that can be generated by both the UE and the Access Security Management Entity (ASME).
  • ASME Access Security Management Entity
  • UMTS Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
  • E-UTRAN Terrestrial Radio Access Network
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • the authentication method is only applicable to the user terminal that has been contracted with the operator, that is, the operator allocates an International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (IMSI) and a root key to the subscriber, so as to facilitate Two-way authentication between the terminal and the network side.
  • IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number
  • the terminal pre-sets the same root key as the operator, and can authenticate through the existing two-way authentication process.
  • the terminal does not preset the root key with the operator. It is not possible to authenticate through the existing two-way authentication process, nor is it possible to derive keys for encryption and integrity checking based on the root key.
  • the application provides a method and apparatus for authenticating a mobile network to enable unsigned users to perform mutual authentication with a mobile network.
  • the application provides a method for authenticating a mobile network, where the method includes: the terminal sends the first indication information and the first random number to the mobile network device, where the first indication information is used to indicate the terminal request Accessing the mobile network in a non-subscription access manner; the terminal receiving the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain sent by the mobile network device, and according to the first random number Verifying the first digital signature by the second random number and the first digital certificate chain, wherein the first digital signature is determined by the mobile network device based at least on the first random number and the second random number Number generation, the second random number generated by the mobile network device based on the first indication information; the terminal generating a second digital signature according to at least the second random number; the terminal to the mobile network device Transmitting the second digital signature and the second digital certificate chain to facilitate the mobile network device to verify the second number according to the second random number and the second digital certificate chain Signature.
  • the mobile network device is a network device of the mobile network, and the mobile network includes the mobile network device, for example, a core network device (eg, a core network authentication entity, a core network credential storage entity), and an access network.
  • a core network device eg, a core network authentication entity, a core network credential storage entity
  • the device and the like, the present invention is not particularly limited to the network device included in the mobile network.
  • the non-subscription access mode can be understood as an access mode different from the prior art.
  • the unlicensed terminal that needs to remotely configure the subscription data can be independent of the root key preset by the terminal and the network. Two-way authentication is performed, and the authentication method of the digital certificate and the digital signature is performed in both directions with the network side.
  • a digital signature is generated between the terminal and the mobile network device, and the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party are verified, thereby completing the two-way relationship between the unsigned user and the network. Authentication, so that unsigned users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • the terminal sends the first indication information and the first random number to the mobile network device, where the terminal sends an access request message to the mobile network device, where the access request message carries the first indication information and the A random number.
  • the first digital certificate chain includes: a digital certificate of an operator of the mobile network device and a digital certificate of the mobile network device, or a digital certificate of the mobile network device;
  • the second digital certificate chain includes a digital certificate of the embedded universal integrated circuit card eUICC configured by the terminal, and the eUICC Manufacturer's digital certificate.
  • the terminal is configured with an eUICC
  • the second digital certificate chain includes a digital certificate of the eUICC
  • Transmitting the first indication information and the first random number to the mobile network device where the terminal sends the first indication information, the first random number, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the a third digital signature, to cause the mobile network device to verify the third digital signature, to generate the second random number and the first digital signature, wherein the third digital signature is by the mobile
  • the network device is generated based at least on the first random number.
  • the digital certificate and the third digital certificate of the eUICC may be sent simultaneously with the first indication information and the first random number, or may be sent by the terminal after or before transmitting the first indication information and the first random number.
  • the terminal sends the first indication information, the first random number, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature to a mobile network device, including: the terminal to the mobile network The device sends an access request message, where the access request message carries the first indication information, the first random number, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature.
  • the integrity of the first random number is verified by transmitting a third digital signature to the mobile network device to prevent the first random number from being tampered with during transmission to the mobile network device, thereby improving the security of the authentication.
  • the terminal receives the first digital signature, the second random number, and the second digital signature sent by the mobile network device
  • the first digital certificate chain includes: the terminal receiving the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and an encrypted session key sent by the mobile network device, where the encryption The session key is generated by the mobile network device by encrypting a session key generated by the mobile network device according to a public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC, the first digital signature being at least according to the mobile network device.
  • the first random number, the second random number, and the encrypted session key are generated; the authentication method further includes: the terminal decrypting the encrypted session key according to the private key of the eUICC, and obtaining The session key, the session key is used to generate a derivation key, and the derivation key is used for encryption and integrity protection between an access layer and a non-access layer between the terminal and the network device, where The private key of the eUICC corresponds to a public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC.
  • the terminal decrypts the encrypted session key according to the private key of the eUICC, Obtaining the session key may be performed after the terminal verifies the first digital signature, or may be performed before or simultaneously with the terminal verifying the first digital signature.
  • the terminal decrypts the encrypted session key according to the private key of the eUICC to obtain the session key, where the private key of the eUICC Corresponding to the public key contained in the digital certificate of the eUICC.
  • the terminal receiving, by the mobile network device, the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and an encrypted session key including: the terminal receiving station And an authentication request message sent by the mobile network device, where the authentication request message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the encrypted session key.
  • the terminal sends the second digital signature and the second digital certificate chain to the mobile network device, where the terminal sends an authentication response message to the mobile network device, where the authentication response message carries the Two digital signatures and the second digital certificate chain.
  • the session key is generated by the mobile network device and sent to the terminal, so that both parties can generate a derived key according to the same session key to implement encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access layer between the terminal and the mobile network.
  • the first digital certificate chain includes a digital certificate of the mobile network device
  • the authentication method further includes The terminal generates a session key and generates an encrypted session key by encrypting the session key according to a public key included in a digital certificate of the mobile network device, the session key being used to generate a derived key, Deriving a key for the encryption and integrity protection of the access layer and the non-access stratum between the terminal and the mobile network; the terminal generating a second digital signature according to the second random number, including: the terminal Generating the second digital signature according to the second random number and the encrypted session key; the terminal transmitting the second digital signature and the second digital certificate chain to the mobile network device, including: Transmitting, by the terminal, the second digital signature, the second digital certificate chain, and the encrypted session key to the mobile network device, so that the mobile network device is configured according to the Moving network device private key to decrypt the encrypted session key to obtain the session key, where
  • the terminal generating the session key may be performed after the terminal verifies the first digital signature, or may be performed before or simultaneously with the terminal verifying the first digital signature. Preferably, the terminal generates the session key after verifying the first digital signature.
  • the terminal receiving, by the mobile network device, the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain including: the terminal receiving an authentication request sent by the mobile network device The message, the authentication request message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain.
  • the sending, by the terminal, the second digital signature, the second digital certificate chain, and the encrypted session key to the mobile network device includes: the terminal sending an authentication to the mobile network device In response to the message, the authentication response message carries the second digital signature, the second digital certificate chain, and the encrypted session key.
  • the session key is generated by the terminal and sent to the mobile network device, so that both parties can generate a derived key according to the same session key, so as to implement encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access layer between the terminal and the mobile network.
  • the terminal receives the first digital signature, the second random number, and the a first digital certificate chain, and verifying the first digital signature, comprising: the terminal receiving the first digital signature sent by the mobile network device, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and a first public key, the first digital signature generated by the mobile network device according to at least the first random number, the second random number, and the first public key, where the first public key is a public key in a first public private key pair generated by the mobile network device, the first public private key pair including the first public key and a first private key, the first public key corresponding to the first private key
  • the terminal verifies the first digital signature; the method further includes: the terminal generating a session key according to the first public key sent by the mobile network device and the second private key generated by the terminal, The session key is used to generate a derived key.
  • Derived key is used for encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access stratum between the terminal and the mobile network, where the second private key is in a second public private key pair generated by the terminal a private key, the second public private key pair includes the second private key and a second public key, the second public key and the second private key; the terminal is based at least on the second random number Generating a second digital signature, comprising: the terminal generating a second digital signature according to at least the second random number and the second public key; the terminal transmitting the second digital signature to the mobile network device
  • the two-digit certificate chain includes: the terminal transmitting the second digital signature, the second digital certificate chain, and the second public key to the mobile network device.
  • the terminal generates a session key according to the second public key of the first public key and the second public private key pair sent by the mobile network device, and may perform after the terminal verifies the first digital signature.
  • the line may also be executed before or at the same time as the terminal verifies the first digital signature.
  • the terminal After verifying the first digital signature, the terminal generates a session key according to the second public key sent by the mobile network device and the second private key of the second public private key pair.
  • the receiving, by the terminal, the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the first public key that are sent by the mobile network device And an authentication request message sent by the mobile network device, where the authentication request message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the first public key.
  • the sending, by the terminal, the second digital signature, the second digital certificate chain, and the second public key to the mobile network device includes: the terminal sending an authentication response to the mobile network device The message, the authentication response message carries the second digital signature, the second digital certificate chain, and the second public key.
  • the session key is negotiated between the mobile network device and the terminal, so that both parties can generate a derived key according to the same session key to implement encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access layer between the terminal and the mobile network.
  • the terminal is configured with an eUICC, and the first indication information and the first information are sent to the mobile network device by the terminal Before the random number, the method further includes: the terminal sending a first request message to the eUICC, so that the eUICC generates the first random number based on the first request message; or The eUICC sends a first request message, so that the eUICC generates the first random number based on the first request message, and generates a third digital signature according to at least the first random number.
  • the first request message is a first authentication command, where the first authentication command is used to instruct the eUICC to generate the first random number.
  • the application provides a method for authenticating a mobile network, where the method includes: receiving, by a first mobile network device, first indication information that is sent by a terminal, and a first random number, where the first indication information is used to indicate the The terminal requests to access the mobile network in a non-subscription access manner; the first mobile network device sends a first digital signature, a second random number, and a first digital certificate chain to the terminal, so that the terminal verifies the a digital signature, the first digital signature and the second random number being generated based on the first indication information, the first digital signature being based at least on the second random number and the first random number And generating, by the first mobile network device, a second digital certificate chain sent by the terminal, and a second digital signature generated by the terminal according to the second random number, and verifying the second digital signature.
  • a digital signature is generated between the terminal and the mobile network device, and the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party are verified, thereby completing the two-way relationship between the unsigned user and the network. Authentication, so that unsigned users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • the first mobile network device receives the first indication information and the first random number that are sent by the terminal, where the first mobile network device receives an access request message sent by the terminal, where the access request message carries the first Indicating information and the first random number.
  • the first mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain to the terminal, where the first mobile network device sends an authentication request message to the terminal, where The authentication request message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain.
  • the first mobile network device receives the second digital certificate chain sent by the terminal, and the second digital signature generated by the terminal according to the second random number, including: the first mobile network device Receiving an authentication response message sent by the terminal, where the authentication response message carries the second digital certificate chain and the second digital signature generated by the terminal according to at least the second random number.
  • the first mobile network device sends a first digital signature, a second random number, and a first digital certificate chain to the terminal, so as to facilitate Determining, by the terminal, the first digital signature, the first digital signature and the second random number are generated based on the first indication information, where the first digital signature is based on at least the second random number sum
  • the first random number generated by the first mobile network device generates the second random number based on the first indication information, and at least according to the second random number and the first random number Generating the first digital signature; the first mobile network device transmitting the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain to the terminal.
  • the first digital certificate chain includes: a digital certificate and a location of an operator of the first mobile network device a digital certificate of the first mobile network device, or a digital certificate of the first mobile network device;
  • the second digital certificate chain includes: a digital certificate of the embedded universal integrated circuit card eUICC configured by the terminal, and the Digital certificate of the manufacturer of eUICC.
  • the terminal is configured with an eUICC
  • the second digital certificate chain includes the eUICC a digital certificate
  • the first mobile network device receives the first indication information and the first random number sent by the terminal, where the first mobile network device receives the first indication information sent by the terminal, the first a random number, a digital certificate of the eUICC, and a third digital signature, and verifying the third digital signature, wherein the third digital signature is generated by the terminal according to at least the first random number; the first After the mobile network device verifies the third digital signature, the second random number and the first digital signature are generated.
  • the first mobile network device receives the first indication information, the first random number, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and a third digital signature sent by the terminal, including: the first mobile The network device receives the access request message sent by the terminal, where the access request message carries the first indication information, the first random number, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and a third digital signature.
  • the integrity of the first random number is verified by transmitting a third digital signature to the mobile network device to prevent the first random number from being tampered with during transmission to the mobile network device, thereby improving the security of the authentication.
  • the first mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digit to the terminal
  • the certificate chain includes: the first mobile network device generates a session key, and encrypts the session key according to a public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC to generate an encrypted session key, where the session is secret a key for generating a derived key, the derived key being used for encryption and integrity protection between an access layer and a non-access stratum between the terminal and the mobile network; the first mobile network device being at least according to the Generating the first digital signature by a random number, the second random number, and the encrypted session key; the first mobile network device transmitting the first digital signature, the second random to the terminal Number, the first digital certificate chain and the encrypted session key, so that the terminal decrypts the encrypted session key according to the private key of the eUICC to obtain the session key, wherein the eUICC Public digital certificate private key
  • the first mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the encrypted session key to the terminal, including: The first mobile network device sends the authentication request message to the terminal, where the authentication request message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the encrypted session secret key.
  • the session key is generated by the mobile network device and sent to the terminal, so that both parties can generate a derived key according to the same session key to implement encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access layer between the terminal and the mobile network.
  • the first digital certificate chain includes a digital certificate of the first mobile network device, and the first Receiving, by the mobile network device, the second digital certificate chain sent by the terminal and the second digital signature generated according to the second random number, and verifying the second digital signature, including: the first mobile network device receiving Said second digital certificate chain, said second digital signature and an encrypted session key sent by said terminal, said encrypted session key being included by said terminal according to said digital certificate of said first mobile network device Keys are generated by encrypting a session key generated by the terminal, and the second digital signature is generated by the terminal according to at least the second random number and the encrypted session key, and the session key is used to generate a derivation a key for the encryption and integrity protection of the access layer and the non-access stratum between the terminal and the mobile network device; the first mobile network device verifying the second a word signature; the authentication method further includes: after the second digital signature verification is passed, the first mobile network device decrypt
  • the first mobile network device receives the second digital certificate chain, the second digital signature, and the encrypted session key sent by the terminal, including: the first mobile network device receiving the The authentication response message sent by the terminal, the authentication response message carrying the second digital certificate chain, the second digital signature, and the encrypted session key.
  • the session key is generated by the terminal and sent to the mobile network device, so that both parties can generate a derived key according to the same session key, so as to implement encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access layer between the terminal and the mobile network.
  • the first mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digit to the terminal a certificate chain, comprising: the first mobile network device generating a first public private key pair, the first public private key pair comprising a first public key and a first private key, the first public key and the first private key Correspondingly, the first public private key pair is generated by the first mobile network device based on the first indication information; the first mobile network device sends a first digital signature, a second random number, a a digital certificate chain and the first public key, the first digital signature by the first mobile network device Generating at least according to the second random number, the first random number, and the first public key; the first mobile network device receiving a second digital certificate chain sent by the terminal and at least according to the second random And generating the second digital signature, and verifying, by the first mobile network device, the second digital certificate chain, the second digital signature, the first a second
  • the second private key and the first public key are used by the terminal to generate a session key, the session key is used to generate a derived key, and the derived key is used by the terminal and the mobile network indirectly Encryption and integrity protection for the ingress and non-access strata; the first move A second network device verifying the digital signature;
  • the authentication method further comprising: the first mobile network equipment according to the first public key and the second private key to generate the session key.
  • the first mobile network device generates the session key according to the first public key and the second private key, and may be performed after the first mobile network device verifies the second digital signature. It may also be performed before or simultaneously with the first mobile network device verifying the second digital signature. Preferably, the first mobile network device generates the session key according to the first public key and the second private key after verifying the second digital signature.
  • the first mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the first public key to the terminal, including: the first mobile network device The terminal sends an authentication request message, where the authentication request message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the first public key.
  • the first mobile network device receives, by the terminal, the second digital certificate chain, the second digital signature, the second random number, and a second public key generated by the terminal, including The first mobile network device receives an authentication response message sent by the terminal, where the authentication response message carries the second digital certificate chain, the second digital signature, the second random number, and the terminal generation The second public key.
  • the session key is negotiated between the mobile network device and the terminal, so that both parties can generate a derived key according to the same session key to implement encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access layer between the terminal and the mobile network.
  • the first mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain to the terminal, Facilitating that the terminal verifies the first digital signature, the first digital signature and the second random number are generated based on the first indication information, and the first digital signature is based on at least the second random number And the first random number generated by the first mobile network device, where the first mobile network device sends the first indication information and the first random number to the second mobile network device; Said first digital signature, said second random number and said first digital certificate chain sent by said second mobile network device, said first digital signature and said second random number being said second mobile network
  • the device generates, based on the first indication information, the first digital signature generated by the second mobile network device according to at least the first random number and the second random number; the first mobile network device
  • the terminal transmits the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain.
  • the first mobile network device sends the first indication information and the first random number to the second mobile network device, where the first mobile network device sends the authentication data to the second mobile network device. And in response to the message, the authentication data response message carries the first indication information and the first random number.
  • the first mobile network device receives the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain sent by the second mobile network device, including: the first mobile The network device receives an authentication data response message sent by the second mobile network device, where the authentication data response message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain.
  • the first digital certificate chain includes: a digital certificate of an operator of the second mobile network device, and the a digital certificate of the second mobile network device, or a digital certificate of the second mobile network device;
  • the second digital certificate chain includes a digital certificate of the embedded universal integrated circuit card eUICC configured by the terminal and the eUICC Manufacturer's digital certificate.
  • the terminal is configured with an eUICC
  • the second digital certificate chain includes a digital certificate of the eUICC
  • the integrity of the first random number is verified by receiving the third digital signature sent by the terminal to prevent the first random number from being tampered with in the process of being sent to the mobile network device, thereby improving the security of the authentication.
  • the first mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digit to the terminal a certificate chain, comprising: the first mobile network device sending the first random number, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the first indication information to the second mobile network device; the first mobile network device receiving The first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, a session key, and an encrypted session key sent by the second mobile network device, where the session key is Generating, by the second mobile network device, the encrypted session key is generated by the second mobile network device according to a public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the session key is used to generate a derivation a key for the encryption and integrity protection of the access layer and the non-access stratum between the terminal and the mobile network, the second random number being based on the second mobile network device First indication information generation, the first digital signature generated by the second mobile network device according to at least
  • the first mobile network device sends the first random number, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the first indication information to the second mobile network device, including: the first mobile network device Sending an authentication data request message to the second mobile network device, where the authentication data request message carries the first random number, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the first indication information.
  • the first mobile network device receives, by the second mobile network device, the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, a session key, and an encrypted
  • the session key includes: the first mobile network device receives an authentication data response message sent by the second mobile network device, where the authentication data response message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, and the The first digital certificate chain, the session key, and the encrypted session key are described.
  • the first mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first a digital certificate chain, comprising: the first mobile network device sending the first random number and the first indication information to the second mobile network device; the first mobile network device receiving the second mobile network The first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and a private key of the second mobile network device sent by the device, where the second random number is used by the second mobile network device Generating, based on the first indication information, that the first digital signature is generated by the second mobile network device according to at least the first random number and the second random number, wherein the second mobile network device The private key corresponds to a public key included in the digital certificate of the second mobile network device; the first mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first a digital certificate chain; the first mobile network device receives a second digital certificate chain sent by the terminal, and a second digital signature generated by the terminal
  • the first mobile network device sends the first random number and the first indication information to the second mobile network device, including: the first mobile network device to the second mobile network An authentication data request message sent by the device, where the authentication data request message carries the first random number and the first indication information.
  • the first mobile network device receives the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the second mobile network device that are sent by the second mobile network device
  • the private key includes: the first mobile network device receiving an authentication data response message sent by the second mobile network device, where the authentication data response message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, Describe a first digital certificate chain and a private key of the second mobile network device.
  • the same session key generates a derived key to implement encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access layer between the terminal and the mobile network.
  • the first mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first a digital certificate chain, comprising: the first mobile network device sending the first random number and the first indication information to the second mobile network device; the first mobile network device receiving the second mobile network The first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the first public private key pair sent by the device, where the first public private key pair includes a first public key and a first private key, The first public key corresponds to the first private key, and the first digital signature is used by the second mobile network device according to at least the first random number, the second random number, and the first public Key generation, the second random number and the first public private key pair are generated by the second mobile network device based on the first indication information; the first mobile network device sends a first digital signature to the terminal Second random number and first a word certificate chain, comprising: the first mobile network device transmitting the first digital signature, the second random number,
  • the first mobile network device generates the session key according to the first public key and the second private key, and may be performed after the first mobile network device verifies the second digital signature. It may also be performed before or simultaneously with the first mobile network device verifying the second digital signature. Preferably, the first mobile network device generates the session key according to the first public key and the second private key after verifying the second digital signature.
  • the first mobile network device sends the first to the second mobile network device And the first indication information, the first mobile network device sending an authentication data request message to the second mobile network device, where the authentication data request message carries the first random number and the An indication message.
  • the first mobile network device receives the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the first public-private key pair sent by the second mobile network device, including: the first mobile Receiving, by the network device, an authentication data response message sent by the second mobile network device, where the authentication data response message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the first Public-private key pair.
  • the session key is negotiated between the mobile network device and the terminal, so that both parties can generate a derived key according to the same session key to implement encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access layer between the terminal and the mobile network.
  • the application provides a method for authenticating a mobile network, where the authentication method includes: receiving, by the second mobile network device, first indication information and a first random number sent by the first mobile network device, where the first indication information And the second mobile network device is configured to generate a second random number based on the first indication information, and at least according to the first random number and the a second random number, generating a first digital signature; the second mobile network device transmitting, by the first mobile network device, the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain to a terminal In order for the terminal to verify the first digital signature.
  • a digital signature is generated between the terminal and the mobile network device, and the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party are verified, thereby completing the two-way relationship between the unsigned user and the network. Authentication, so that unsigned users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • the second mobile network device receives the first indication information and the first random number sent by the first mobile network device, where the second mobile network device receives the authentication data request message sent by the first mobile network device, where the authentication The data request message carries the first indication information and the first random number.
  • the second mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain to the terminal by using the first mobile network device, including: the second The mobile network device sends an authentication data response message to the first mobile network device, the authentication data response message carrying the first data signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain to facilitate the The first mobile network device sends an authentication response message to the terminal, where the authentication response The message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain.
  • the second mobile network device receives the first indication information and the first random number that are sent by the first mobile network device, including:
  • the eUICC is configured in the terminal Transmitting, by the second mobile network device, the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain to the terminal by using the first mobile network device, including: the second mobile network device Transmitting, by the first mobile network device, the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, a session key, and an encrypted session key, the session key being used by the second mobile Generating, by the second mobile network device, the session key is encrypted by the second mobile network device according to a public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC, the session key is used to generate a derived key And the derived key is used for encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access stratum between the terminal and the network device, where the first digital signature is used by the second mobile network device according to at least the Generating a random number, the second random number, and
  • the second mobile network device receives the first digital signature, the second random number, and the digital certificate of the eUICC sent by the first mobile network device, where the second mobile network device receives An authentication data request message sent by the first mobile network device, the authentication data request message carrying the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and an embedded universal integrated circuit card eUICC Digital certificate.
  • the second mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, a session key, and an encrypted session secret to the first mobile network device. And the second mobile network device sends the authentication data response message to the first mobile network device, where the authentication data response message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, and the A first digital certificate chain, the session key, and the encrypted session key.
  • the second mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain to the terminal via the first mobile network device, including: the second mobile network device Transmitting, to the first mobile network device, the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and a private key of the second mobile network device, where the second mobile network device The private key corresponds to a public key included in a digital certificate of the second mobile network device; the second mobile network device transmits the first digital signature to the terminal via the first mobile network device, a second random number and the first digital certificate chain.
  • the second mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the second mobile network device to the first mobile network device
  • the private key includes: the second mobile network device sends an authentication data response message to the first mobile network device, where the authentication data response message carries the first digital signature, the second random number, and the A digital certificate chain and a private key of the second mobile network device.
  • the second mobile network device Transmitting, by the second mobile network device, the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, the session key, and the encrypted session key to the terminal to the first mobile network device, where the session key is Generating, by the second mobile network device, the encrypted session key is generated by the second mobile network device according to a public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the session key generated by the second mobile network device is encrypted.
  • the session key is used to generate a derived key for encryption and integrity protection of the access layer and the non-access stratum between the terminal and the network device.
  • the second mobile network device sends the first digital signature to the terminal via the first mobile network device, a second random number and the first digital certificate chain, comprising: the second mobile network device generating a first public private key pair, the first public private key pair including a first public key and a first private key, the first a public key corresponding to the first private key, the first public private key pair being generated by the second mobile network device based on the first indication information; the second mobile network device being at least according to the first Generating the first digital signature by the random number, the second random number, and the first public key; the second mobile network device transmitting the first digital signature to the first mobile network device, a first digital certificate chain, the second random number, and the first public private key pair, the first private key and a second public key sent by the terminal to the first mobile network device for the first a mobile network device generates a session key, The session key is used to generate a derivation key,
  • the second mobile network device sends the first digital signature, the first digital certificate chain, the second random number, and the first public-private key pair to the first mobile network device,
  • the second mobile network device sends an authentication data response message to the first mobile network device, where the authentication data response message carries the first digital signature, the first digital certificate chain, and the second random The number and the first public private key pair.
  • the session key is negotiated between the mobile network device and the terminal, so that both parties can generate a derived key according to the same session key to implement encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access layer between the terminal and the mobile network.
  • the present application provides an authentication apparatus for a mobile network, for performing the method of the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.
  • the apparatus comprises means for performing the method of the first aspect or any of the possible implementations of the first aspect.
  • the present application provides an authentication apparatus for a mobile network, for performing the method in any of the possible implementations of the second aspect or the second aspect.
  • the apparatus comprises means for performing the method of any of the second aspect or any of the possible implementations of the second aspect.
  • the present application provides an authentication apparatus for a mobile network, for performing the method in any of the possible implementations of the third aspect or the third aspect.
  • the apparatus comprises means for performing the method of any of the third aspect or any of the possible implementations of the third aspect.
  • the application provides an authentication device for a mobile network, the authentication device including: a transceiver, a memory, a processor, and a bus system.
  • the transceiver, the memory and the processor are connected by a bus system
  • the memory is for storing instructions for executing the instructions stored by the memory to control the transceiver to send and receive signals
  • the processor executes the instructions stored by the memory The execution causes the processor to perform the method of the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.
  • the application provides an authentication device for a mobile network, the authentication device including: a transceiver, a memory, a processor, and a bus system.
  • the transceiver, the memory and the processor are connected by a bus system
  • the memory is for storing instructions for executing the instructions stored by the memory to control the transceiver to send and receive signals
  • the processor executes the instructions stored by the memory The execution causes the processor to perform the method of the second aspect or any possible implementation of the second aspect.
  • the application provides an authentication device for a mobile network, the authentication device including: a transceiver, a memory, a processor, and a bus system.
  • the transceiver, the memory and the processor are connected by a bus system
  • the memory is for storing instructions for executing the instructions stored by the memory to control the transceiver to send and receive signals
  • the processor executes the instructions stored by the memory
  • the execution causes the processor to perform the method of any of the third aspect or any of the possible implementations of the third aspect.
  • the application provides a computer readable medium for storing a computer program, the computer program comprising instructions for performing the method of the first aspect or any of the possible implementations of the first aspect.
  • the present application provides a computer readable medium for storing a computer program, the computer program comprising instructions for performing the method of any of the second aspect or any of the possible implementations of the second aspect.
  • the present application provides a computer readable medium for storing a computer program, the computer program comprising instructions for performing the method of any of the third aspect or any of the possible implementations of the third aspect.
  • the present invention provides a method and apparatus for authenticating a mobile network that enables unsigned subscribers to perform two-way authentication with a mobile network.
  • Figure 1 is a 3GPP authentication and key agreement procedure using the EPS AKA mechanism.
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a method for authenticating a mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is another schematic flowchart of a method for authenticating a mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is still another schematic flowchart of a method for authenticating a mobile network according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 6 is still another schematic flowchart of a method for authenticating a mobile network according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart of a method for authenticating a mobile network according to another embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 is another schematic flowchart of a method for authenticating a mobile network according to another embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 9 is still another schematic flowchart of a method for authenticating a mobile network according to another embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 is still another schematic flowchart of a method for authenticating a mobile network according to another embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication apparatus of a mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication apparatus of a mobile network according to another embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication apparatus of a mobile network according to still another embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 14 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication device of a mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication device of a mobile network according to another embodiment of the present invention.
  • 16 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication device of a mobile network according to still another embodiment of the present invention.
  • a component can be, but is not limited to being, a process running on a processor, a processor, an object, an executable, a thread of execution, a program, and/or a computer.
  • an application running on a computing device and a computing device can be a component.
  • One or more components can reside within a process and/or execution thread, and the components can be located on one computer and/or distributed between two or more computers.
  • these components can execute from various computer readable media having various data structures stored thereon.
  • a component may, for example, be based on signals having one or more data packets (eg, data from two components interacting with another component between the local system, the distributed system, and/or the network, such as the Internet interacting with other systems) Communicate through local and/or remote processes.
  • data packets eg, data from two components interacting with another component between the local system, the distributed system, and/or the network, such as the Internet interacting with other systems
  • GSM Global System of Mobile communication
  • CDMA code division multiple access
  • WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
  • GPRS General Packet Radio Service
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • LTE-A Advanced long term evolution
  • UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
  • the user equipment includes but is not limited to a mobile station (Mobile Station, MS), a mobile terminal (Mobile Terminal), a mobile phone (Mobile Telephone), a mobile phone (handset). And portable devices, etc., the user equipment can communicate with one or more core networks via a Radio Access Network (RAN), for example, the user equipment can be a mobile phone (or "cellular"
  • RAN Radio Access Network
  • the user equipment can be a mobile phone (or "cellular"
  • the telephone device, the computer with wireless communication function, etc., the user equipment can also be a mobile device that is portable, pocket-sized, handheld, built-in, or in-vehicle.
  • FIG. 1 is a 3GPP authentication and key agreement process using an Evolved Packet System ("EPS") AKA mechanism. As shown in Figure 1, the authentication and key agreement process specifically includes the following steps:
  • S110 The terminal performs mutual authentication with the network side.
  • the terminal and the network side generate an authentication vector (RAND, AUTN, K ASME , XRES/RES) for mutual authentication according to the pre-negotiated root key.
  • the network side may calculate and generate an authentication vector (RAND, AUTN, K ASME , XRES/RES) through a Home Subscriber Server (HSS), and send the authentication vector to the mobility management network.
  • Element Mobility Management Entity, MME
  • the MME sends the RAND and AUTN in the authentication vector to the terminal, reserves the XRES, waits for the response of the UE (ie, RES), and sends the RES and the network side of the terminal.
  • the reserved XRES is the same, the UE is considered to be successfully authenticated.
  • the terminal authenticates the network according to the received RAND and AUTN.
  • the UE and the network side (for example, the MME) use the K ASME described above to calculate a derived key for encryption and integrity protection of a Non-Access Stratum ("NAS") layer.
  • NAS Non-Access Stratum
  • the UE and the network side calculate the derived key for encryption and integrity verification of the Access Stratum ("AS") layer by using the above K ASME .
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • the K is a permanent key stored in the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (“USIM”) and the Authentication Center (AuC) (ie, the network side and the terminal are pre-negotiated well). Root key), which is the basis of all key generation algorithms;
  • USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
  • AuC Authentication Center
  • CK and IK are key pairs generated by AuC and USIM in the AKA authentication process for encryption and integrity verification;
  • K ASME is an intermediate key generated by the terminal and the HSS according to CK and IK, and is used to generate a lower layer key;
  • K NASenc is a key generated by the UE and the MME according to K ASME for NAS layer encryption
  • K NASint is a key generated by the UE and the MME according to K ASME for NAS layer integrity protection
  • the K eNB is an intermediate key generated by the UE and the MME according to the K ASME , and is used to generate a lower layer key;
  • K UPenc is a key generated by the UE and the eNB according to the K eNB , and is used for AS layer user data encryption;
  • the K RRCint is a key generated by the UE and the eNB according to the K eNB , and is used for the AS layer radio resource control (Radio Resource Control, referred to as "RRC") signaling integrity protection;
  • RRC Radio Resource Control
  • K RRCenc is a key generated by the UE and the eNB according to the K eNB for AS layer signaling encryption.
  • the above-mentioned keys for performing encryption and integrity check when the terminal communicates with the network side are all generated according to K ASME , and K ASME is generated according to the root key K. Without the root key K, the generation of subsequent keys (denoted as derived keys for ease of understanding and explanation) cannot be completed.
  • the derived keys described herein include K NASenc , K NASint , K eNB , K UPenc , K RRCint , and K RRCenc as described above .
  • the plurality of derived keys are used for encryption and integrity protection at the NAS layer and the AS layer.
  • the present invention provides a mobile network authentication method for performing mutual authentication between an unsigned terminal and a mobile network, and negotiating a key for generating a derived key (for ease of distinction and description, the following is recorded as a session secret) key).
  • a digital certificate and a digital signature are used to perform mutual authentication between devices (for example, device A and device B).
  • devices for example, device A and device B.
  • the specific process of two-way authentication between devices through digital certificates and digital signatures is first described in detail.
  • device A and device B are authenticated in both directions by digital certificate and digital signature.
  • Device A holds a pair of public and private key pairs, including public key A and private key A.
  • the public key A is the public key contained in the digital certificate of device A
  • device B also holds a pair of public and private key pairs, including the public key.
  • B and private key B the public key A is the public key contained in the digital certificate of the device A.
  • device A sends a message M to device B.
  • Device A encrypts the hash value (or message digest) of message M using private key A to generate digital signature A.
  • the device A With the message M as the digital information, the device A generates a hash value of the digital information (for example, the message M) through a hash function, and then uses the private key A held by the device A to hash the hash. The value is encrypted to generate a digital signature A.
  • Device A sends message M (ie, an example of digital information) and digital signature A to device B.
  • the digital information can be understood as plain text information or signed plaintext information.
  • the device A sends its own digital certificate to the device B, and the device B first verifies the digital certificate. If the digital certificate is verified, the digital signature A is decrypted based on the public key A in the digital certificate of the device A. The hash value of this message M.
  • the device B may perform a calculation on the message M using a hash function, and compare the obtained result with the hash value of the decrypted message M. If the two are consistent, it may be determined that the digital signature A is the device A utilizing itself. The unique private key A is calculated, so that device B verifies the identity of device A, and at the same time, it can also prove that the digital signature A protected message M has not been tampered with.
  • the device B can generate a digital signature based on the method for generating a digital signature, and the device A verifies the digital signature B sent by the device B based on the method for verifying the digital signature. For the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.
  • the signature algorithm and the signature hash algorithm for calculating the digital signature are calculated according to the algorithm indicated in the digital certificate.
  • the terminal and the core network (Core Network, referred to as “CN”) (for example, core network authentication)
  • CN Core Network
  • AN Access Network
  • the same situation will not be specifically described.
  • the core network device core network authentication entity and the core network certificate storage entity enumerated herein are merely illustrative and should not be construed as limiting the invention.
  • the core network authentication entity may be a Mobility Management Entity (MME)
  • the core network credential storage entity may be a Home Subscriber Server (HSS).
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • HSS Home Subscriber Server
  • the MME and the HSS listed here are only examples of the core network authentication entity and the core network credential storage entity.
  • the present invention does not exclude other core network elements having the same or similar functions defined in the future 5G for performing the embodiments of the present invention.
  • the authentication method in .
  • the mobile network device may include a first mobile network device (for example, a core network authentication entity), and may also include the first mobile network device and the second mobile network device (for example, a core network) Credential storage entity).
  • the mobile network device includes the first mobile network device (Case 1) and the mobile network device includes the first mobile network device and the second mobile network device (Case 2) as an example, and the method for authenticating the embodiment of the present invention is detailed. Description.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of an authentication method 300 for a mobile network according to an embodiment of the invention. It should be understood that FIG. 3 illustrates a detailed communication step or operation of the authentication method of the mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention described from the perspective of the first mobile network device (eg, the core network authentication entity) interacting with the terminal, but These steps or operations are merely examples, and embodiments of the present invention may perform other operations or variations of the various operations in FIG. Moreover, the various steps in FIG. 3 may be performed in a different order than that presented in FIG. 3, and it is possible that not all operations in FIG. 3 are to be performed.
  • the first mobile network device eg, the core network authentication entity
  • the authentication method 300 includes:
  • the terminal sends the first indication information and the first random number to the core network authentication entity.
  • the terminal may send the first indication information to the core network authentication entity, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the terminal requests to access the network in a non-subscription access manner.
  • the terminal determines that it is an unlicensed terminal. It can be understood that the terminal does not obtain an identity identifier for identifying the subscriber, such as an International Mobile Subscriber Identification (IMSI), from the operator.
  • IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identification
  • the root key K used to authenticate and generate the derived key, personalized identification, network parameters, and frequency bands.
  • a non-contracted access method can be understood as an access method different from the prior art, which is directed to the need to remotely configure subscription data.
  • the unsigned terminal can perform mutual authentication without relying on the root key of the terminal and the network preset, and perform mutual authentication with the network side through the verification method of the digital certificate and the digital signature.
  • the non-subscription access mode is used as the name of the above access method, and the present invention should not be limited. The present invention does not exclude the use of other names to refer to the access mode that is the same or similar to the "no subscription mode".
  • the terminal includes an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (“eUICC”) and a modem, before the S302 terminal sends the first indication information and the first random number to the core network authentication entity.
  • eUICC embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card
  • the method 300 includes:
  • the modem selects an application corresponding to the user subscription from the eUICC, such as a Universal Subscriber Identity Module ("USIM”) application or a Global System for Mobile Communication (“GSM”) application, and reads the application.
  • the user information in the application such as the IMSI; the application protocol data unit (Application Protocol Data Unit) is sent to the eUICC by the eUICC because the unsigned subscription terminal cannot select the application corresponding to the user subscription from the eUICC.
  • “APDU” command for example, a first authentication command (Authenticate Command);
  • the eUICC generates a first random number based on the first authentication command
  • the eUICC sends a first request response message to the modem, where the first request response message carries the first random number;
  • the modem After receiving the first random number, the modem generates an identifier that identifies the terminal requesting to access the network through the non-subscription access mode, and the identifier may be an attachment type, that is, the terminal is identified as having no subscription access mode. The type of attachment to the access network.
  • the card informs the modem that the card is an eUICC through a reset to answer (ATR), and the required protocol and parameter selection between the eUICC and the modem (Protocol and Parameter Selection)
  • ATR reset to answer
  • PPS protocol and Parameter Selection
  • the modem can select an application on the eUICC, for example, a global user USIM application or a GSM application, and read the IMSI from the USIM application or the GSM application.
  • the first request message is sent to the eUICC, and the first request message is used to trigger the eUICC to generate a random number for subsequent authentication (for the sake of distinction and description, it is recorded as the first random number).
  • first request message, the first authentication command, and the first response message listed above are merely exemplary descriptions, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention.
  • the present invention may also be through other messages.
  • the eUICC is triggered to generate a first random number, or the first random number generated by the eUICC is carried by other messages.
  • the eUICC described herein is based on the authentication command, and the generation of the first random number may be understood as the authentication command triggering the eUICC to generate the first random number, and does not mean that the first random number is calculated according to the authentication command, or authentication.
  • the command does not contain parameters for calculating the first random number.
  • the core network authentication entity described in the following is based on the first indication information, and generating the second random number may be understood as the first indication information triggering the core network authentication entity to generate the second random number, and does not represent the second The random number is calculated according to the first indication information, or the first indication information does not include a parameter for calculating the second random number.
  • the first digital signature in order to ensure the integrity of the first random number in the process of being sent by the terminal to the core network authentication device, the first digital signature may be generated according to at least the first random number, and the first digital signature is sent to the core network authentication device. Digital signature, first random number, and first digital certificate chain.
  • the S302 terminal sends the first indication information and the first random number to the core network authentication entity, including:
  • the terminal sends the first indication information, the first random number, the third digital signature, and the digital certificate of the eUICC to the core network authentication entity, so that the core network authentication entity passes the verification of the third digital signature to generate a second random And a first digital signature, wherein the third digital signature is generated by the mobile network device based at least on the first random number.
  • the terminal may first send a third digital signature to the core network authentication entity.
  • the core network authentication entity may verify the integrity of the first random number of the terminal before generating the first digital signature.
  • the terminal sends the first random number, the third digital signature, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the first indication information to the core network authentication entity, where the third digital signature is generated by the terminal according to at least the first random number, so as to facilitate the
  • the mobile network device verifies the third digital signature, and after confirming the integrity of the first random number, generates a first digital signature according to at least the first random number, and performs mutual authentication between the subsequent terminal and the mobile network.
  • the eUICC may preset a second digital certificate chain.
  • the second digital certificate chain includes a digital certificate of the eUICC configured by the terminal and a digital certificate of the manufacturer of the eUICC.
  • the eUICC Manufacturer can apply for a number from a Certification Authority ("CA") approved by the Global Mobile System Alliance (GSMA). Certificate (for easy identification and description, recorded as a digital certificate of the eUICC manufacturer), the eUICC manufacturer (EUM) can issue a certificate to the eUICC as a secondary CA after applying for a digital certificate from the eUICC manufacturer (for easy identification and explanation) , as a digital certificate of eUICC).
  • the second digital certificate chain includes a digital certificate of the eUICC manufacturer and a digital certificate of the eUICC, unless otherwise specified.
  • the certificate chain listed here includes the digital certificate of the eUICC manufacturer and the digital certificate of the eUICC is merely an exemplary description, and the certificate chain may further include more levels of digital certificates, and the lower level digital certificates depend on the superior numbers. Certificate, superior digital certificate can be used to verify the lower level digital certificate.
  • the second digital certificate chain listed herein is in the form of a certificate chain, which is merely exemplary, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention. The present invention does not exclude the manufacturer's CA that may be introduced, and directly issues a digital certificate to the eUICC. The possibility, in this case, the second digital certificate chain may only include one digital certificate, ie a digital certificate of eUICC.
  • the eUICC is preset with the public key of the root certificate of the CA approved by the GSMA, or may be preset with the root certificate of the CA approved by the GSMA to verify the digital certificates issued by other CAs approved by the GSMA. It should be noted that eUICC can be understood as a platform. If the eUICC is a subscription user, the user subscription information of the eUICC is saved, and various applications are provided, for example, a GSM application is provided for the 2G user, and a USIM application is provided for the 3G and 4G users. If the eUICC is an unlicensed user, no application corresponding to the user subscription is saved in the card.
  • the eUICC generates a first random number based on the first request message, and sends the first random number to the core network authentication entity through the modem, so that the core network authentication entity generates a digital signature according to the first random number (for the purpose of distinguishing and explaining, remembering Make the first digital signature).
  • the core network authentication entity generates a second random number based on the first indication information.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a first digital signature according to at least the first random number and the second random number.
  • the core network authentication entity After receiving the first indication information, that is, determining that the terminal needs to access through the non-subscription access mode, the core network authentication entity generates a vector for authentication, for example, a second random number. And generating a first digital signature based on at least the received first random number and the generated second random number.
  • the core network authentication entity generates the first according to at least the first random number and the second random number.
  • the digital signature that is, the first signature is generated by using at least the first random number and the second random number as the digital information.
  • the core network authentication entity sends the first digital signature, the first digital certificate chain, and the second random number to the terminal.
  • the terminal verifies the first digital signature.
  • the terminal verifies the first digital signature according to the first random number, the second random number, and the first digital certificate.
  • the S310 terminal verifies the first digital signature, including:
  • the terminal triggers the eUICC to verify the first digital signature by using the second request message, and generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number carried by the second request message.
  • the second request message may be a second authentication command (Authenticate Command).
  • the terminal triggers the eUICC to authenticate the first digital signature by using the second authentication command, or performs identity authentication on the core network authentication entity.
  • the second digital signature is generated according to the second random number sent by the core network authentication entity, and sent to the core network authentication entity, so that the core network authentication entity authenticates the first Two digital signatures are authenticated, or the terminal is authenticated.
  • the second request message, the second authentication command, and the second response message listed above are merely exemplary descriptions, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention.
  • the present invention may also trigger the eUICC to verify the first digital signature by using other messages. Generating a second digital signature or carrying a second digital signature generated by the eUICC and a second digital certificate chain by other messages.
  • the core network authentication entity may preset the first digital certificate chain, or obtain the first digital certificate chain after receiving the first indication information, which is not specifically limited in the present invention.
  • the first digital certificate chain comprises: a digital certificate of an operator of the mobile network device and a digital certificate of the mobile network device, or a digital certificate of the mobile network device.
  • the mobile network device may obtain a digital certificate through a CA of an operator of the mobile network device (for example, a core network authentication entity or a core network credential storage entity) (for convenience of distinction and description, it is recorded as a mobile network device.
  • the digital certificate) the digital certificate of the mobile network device is directly issued by the carrier's CA, and the carrier's CA of the mobile network device is the root CA.
  • the first digital certificate chain may include only one digital certificate.
  • the terminal and the mobile network entity must be authenticated.
  • the eUICC needs to configure the carrier's CA's root certificate, the mobile network.
  • the device configures the root certificate of the root CA of the eUICC (for example, the CA that is approved by the GSMA); or, the mutual trust between the two root CAs is completed, and the authentication between the terminal and the mobile network device is completed, that is, cross-authentication [3GPP TS 33.310].
  • the two root CAs issue digital certificates to each other.
  • the root CA of the eUICC application certificate issues a digital certificate for the operator's CA.
  • the carrier CA also issues a digital certificate for the root CA of the eUICC application certificate.
  • the digital certificate issued by each other when the mobile network device authenticates the terminal identity, the CA of the operator needs to obtain the digital certificate issued by the CA of the operator as the root CA of the opposite party, and verify the digital certificate by using the steps of the digital certificate chain verification; or
  • the two CAs are cross-certified by the bridge CA.
  • the two root CAs trust a bridge CA. That is, the two root CAs and the bridge CA respectively issue digital certificates to each other, and cross-certification is completed by the bridge CA.
  • the specific method for establishing a mutual trust relationship between CAs in the present invention is not particularly limited.
  • the terminal may verify the first digital signature according to at least the received first digital certificate chain (or the digital certificate of the mobile network device) and the second random number, and the first random number generated by itself. It should be understood that the terminal verifies the first digital signature according to the first digital certificate chain, the first random number and the second random number, and the device A described above verifies the digital signature B according to the digital certificate B and the message M. The principle is the same. The specific process needs to be verified according to the type of the digital certificate, the signature algorithm marked in the digital certificate, and the signature hash algorithm.
  • the digital certificate type can be a format supporting X.509, Global Platform ("GP") or the like.
  • digital certificate signature algorithm can support Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), Ronald Levist, Adi Samuel, Ron Rivest , Adi Shamir, Leonard Adleman (“RSA”) public key encryption algorithm, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), ELGamal algorithm, etc.
  • signature hash algorithm can support message digest algorithm fifth edition (Message Digest Algorithm 5 (referred to as "MD5"), Secure Hash Algorithm (“SHA”)-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, and so on.
  • MD5 Message Digest Algorithm 5
  • SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
  • the terminal is verifying the first digital signature, not only depending on the first digital certificate chain enumerated above, the first random number and the second random number, but also depends on the private key of the terminal itself, as described above.
  • the specific function of the public and private keys has been detailed in the specific process of the device A to verify the digital signature B according to the digital certificate B and the message M. For brevity, details are not described herein again. Following, in order to Concise, omitting the description of the same or similar situations.
  • the carrier CA of the mobile network device is a secondary CA.
  • the operator of the mobile network device can apply for a digital certificate to the CA approved by the GMSA (for the purpose of distinguishing and explaining, it is recorded as a digital certificate of the operator), and the operator can apply as a second after applying for the digital certificate of the operator.
  • the level CA issues a certificate for the core network authentication entity (for the sake of distinction and description, it is recorded as a digital certificate for the mobile network device).
  • the carrier CA of the mobile network device needs to apply for a certificate from the GSMA-approved CA, and also needs to configure the root certificate of the GSMA-approved CA for the mobile network device.
  • the certificate chain listed here includes the certificate of the operator and the digital certificate of the mobile network device is merely an exemplary description, and the certificate chain may further include more digital certificates, and the lower digital certificates depend on the superior digital certificates.
  • the mobile network device includes a first mobile network device (for example, a core network authentication entity), and the first digital certificate chain may be a digital certificate of the first mobile network device and an operator.
  • a digital certificate, or a digital certificate for the first mobile network device may be a digital certificate of the first mobile network device and an operator.
  • the mobile network device includes a first mobile network device and a second mobile network device (for example, a core network credential storage entity), and the first digital certificate chain may be a second mobile The digital certificate of the network device and the digital certificate of the operator, or the digital certificate of the second mobile network device.
  • the digital certificate of the mobile network device is used to refer to the digital certificate of the first mobile network device (for example, the digital certificate of the core network authentication entity) or the digital certificate of the second mobile network device (unless otherwise specified)
  • the core network credentials store the digital certificate of the entity).
  • the terminal verifies the first digital signature, including:
  • the terminal verifies the digital certificate of the operator according to the root certificate of the CA approved by the GSMA or the public key of the root certificate of the CACA approved, and the digital certificate of the mobile network device according to the public key of the digital certificate of the operator authenticating;
  • the terminal determines that the digital certificate verification of the mobile network device is passed, the first digital signature is verified according to at least the first random number, the second random number, and the digital certificate of the mobile network device.
  • Case 1 When the CA of the operator and the root CA of the eUICC (for example, the CA approved by the GSMA) are two different primary CAs, cross-certification is required between the two CAs, and the GSMA approves
  • the CA can issue a digital certificate to the operator (for easy identification and description, recorded as digital certificate 1), and the operator's CA issues a digital certificate to the GCA-approved CA.
  • the eUICC verifies the operator's digital certificate, First, the digital certificate 1 is verified. After the digital certificate 1 is verified, the operator's digital certificate is verified; and after the operator's digital certificate is verified, the digital certificate of the mobile network device is verified.
  • Case 2 When the carrier's CA is a secondary CA, the operator and the eUICC share a root CA (for example, a GSMA-approved CA), and cross-certification is not required.
  • the eUICC first verifies that the GCA-approved CA is a digital certificate issued by the operator (ie, the operator's digital certificate), and verifies the digital certificate of the mobile network device after the operator's digital certificate verification is passed.
  • the root certificate of the other party may be preset, that is, preset for the mobile network device of the operator.
  • the eUICC root certificate the eUICC presets the operator's root certificate.
  • verifying the digital certificate of the mobile network device the eUICC directly verifies the digital certificate of the mobile network device by using the preset root certificate of the operator. It should be understood that the specific process of verifying the digital certificate of the mobile network device in different situations described above may be performed according to the existing cross-certification standard [3GPP TS33.310], and the specific implementation manner is not detailed here. Description.
  • the terminal verifies the first digital signature according to at least the first digital certificate chain (or the digital certificate of the mobile network device), the first random number and the second random number is compared with the device A described above.
  • the digital certificate B and the message M are the same for verifying the digital signature B.
  • the specific process needs to be verified according to the type of the digital certificate, the signature algorithm marked in the digital certificate, and the signature hash algorithm. For brevity, no further details are provided here.
  • the terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number.
  • the S312 terminal generates the second digital signature according to the second random number, including:
  • the terminal generates a second digital signature by using the configured eUICC according to at least the second random number.
  • the terminal sends a second digital certificate chain and a second digital signature to the core network authentication entity.
  • the S314 terminal sends the second digital certificate chain and the second digital signature to the core network authentication entity, including:
  • the terminal forwards the second request response message generated by the eUICC, where the second request response message carries the second digital certificate chain and the second digital signature.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the second digital signature.
  • the terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the received second random number, and the second digit
  • the signature and the second digital certificate chain are sent to the core network authentication entity, so that the core network authentication entity authenticates the terminal, or performs identity authentication on the terminal.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the second digital signature according to at least the second digital certificate chain and the second random number.
  • the second digital certificate chain is sent in the form of a certificate chain, that is, a digital certificate of the eUICC manufacturer and a digital certificate of the eUICC are included. Therefore, the terminal first needs to verify the certificate chain.
  • the second digital certificate chain includes a digital certificate of the eUICC manufacturer and a digital certificate of the eUICC;
  • the core network authentication entity first verifies the digital certificate of the eUICC manufacturer, and after the verification is passed, verifies the digital certificate of the eUICC according to the digital certificate of the eUICC manufacturer;
  • the core network authentication entity determines that the digital certificate verification of the eUICC is passed, the second digital signature is verified according to the second random number and the digital certificate of the eUICC.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the second digital signature according to at least the second digital certificate chain and the second random number
  • the device A described above verifies the digital signature B according to the digital certificate B and the message M.
  • the principle is the same.
  • the specific process needs to be verified according to the type of the digital certificate, the signature algorithm marked in the digital certificate, and the signature hash algorithm. For brevity, no further details are provided here.
  • the two-way authentication is completed between the core network authentication entity and the terminal.
  • a digital signature is generated between the terminal and the mobile network device, and the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party are verified, thereby completing the relationship between the unsigned user and the network.
  • Two-way authentication so that unsigned users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • the terminal After the terminal completes the two-way authentication with the network, the terminal can communicate. However, since the terminal accesses the network through the non-signed access mode, the terminal does not hold the root key without pre-negotiating. Therefore, the terminal and the mobile network device The keys for encryption and integrity protection between the NAS layer and the AS layer are not derived from the root key in the prior art.
  • the terminal or the mobile network device may generate a session key by itself, and the session key may be used to generate a derived key for the NAS layer and the AS layer between the terminal and the mobile network device. Used for encryption and integrity protection.
  • the S308 core network authentication entity sends the first digital signature, the first digital certificate chain, and the second random number to the terminal, including:
  • the core network authentication entity generates a session key, and encrypts the session key according to the public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC to generate an encrypted session key, where the session key is used to generate a derived key, and the derived key
  • the key is used for encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access stratum between the terminal and the mobile network;
  • the core network authentication entity sends the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the encrypted session key to the terminal, so that the terminal decrypts the encrypted session according to the private key of the eUICC.
  • the key is obtained by the key, wherein the private key of the eUICC corresponds to the public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC.
  • the method 300 further includes:
  • the terminal decrypts the encrypted session key according to the private key of the eUICC to obtain the session key.
  • the specific process of generating a session key by the core network authentication entity is described in detail in the method 1.
  • the session key is encrypted according to the public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the encrypted session key only passes through the private key of the terminal (ie, the digital certificate included in the eUICC)
  • the private key corresponding to the public key can be decrypted.
  • the core network authentication entity generates the first digital signature according to the first random number, the second random number, and the encrypted session key, and sends the second random number, the first digital signature, and the encrypted session key to the terminal,
  • the encrypted session key is decrypted to obtain a session key.
  • the first digital certificate chain includes a digital certificate of the core network authentication entity
  • the method 300 further includes:
  • the terminal generates a session key, and encrypts the session key according to the public key included in the digital certificate of the core network authentication entity to generate an encrypted session key, where the session key is used to generate a derived key, the party
  • the birth key is used for encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access layer between the terminal and the network device;
  • S312 The terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number, including:
  • the terminal generates the second digital signature according to the second random number and the encrypted session key
  • S314 The terminal sends the second digital certificate chain and the second digital signature to the core network authentication entity, including:
  • the terminal sends the second digital signature, the second digital certificate chain and the encrypted session key to the core network authentication entity, so that the core network authentication entity decrypts the encrypted session according to the private key of the core network authentication entity.
  • the key obtains the session key, wherein the private key of the core network authentication entity corresponds to a public key included in the digital certificate of the core network authentication entity.
  • the terminal may generate a session key after the first digital signature sent by the core network authentication entity is verified, and encrypt the session key according to the public key included in the digital certificate of the mobile network device, where the encrypted session key is only
  • the private key of the mobile network device ie, the private key corresponding to the public key contained in the digital certificate of the mobile network device
  • the terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number and the encrypted session key, and sends the second digital signature and the encrypted session key to the core network authentication entity, so that the core network authentication entity pairs the second number
  • the signature is verified, and after the verification is passed (ie, the identity authentication of the terminal is passed), the encrypted session key is decrypted to obtain a session key.
  • the session key may be specifically generated by the eUICC and encrypted according to the public key of the mobile network device to obtain an encrypted session key.
  • the terminal and the mobile network device can jointly negotiate to generate a session key, which can be used to generate a derived key, which is used for the NAS layer between the terminal and the mobile network device and
  • the AS layer is used for encryption and integrity protection.
  • the S308 core network authentication entity sends the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain to the terminal, including:
  • the core network authentication entity generates a first public private key pair, where the first public private key pair includes a first public key and a first private key, and the first public key corresponds to the first private key, and the first public private key pair is Core network recognition
  • the verification body is generated based on the first indication information
  • the core network authentication entity sends the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and the first public key to the terminal, where the first digital signature is determined by the core network authentication entity according to the first random number And generating the second random number and the first public key;
  • the method 300 also includes:
  • the core network authentication entity receives a second public key sent by the terminal, the second public key is a public key in a second public private key pair generated by the terminal, and the second public private key pair includes the second public key and the second a private key, the second public key corresponding to the second private key, the second private key and the first public key being used by the terminal to generate a session key, the session key being used to generate a derived key, the derivation
  • the key is used for encryption and integrity protection between the access layer and the non-access stratum between the terminal and the network device;
  • the core network authentication entity generates the session key according to the second public key and the first private key.
  • the core network authentication entity and the terminal may respectively generate a one-time public-private key pair.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a first public-private key pair
  • the terminal generates a second public-private key pair.
  • the first public private key pair includes a first public key and a first private key
  • the second public private key pair includes a second public key and a second private key.
  • a public-private key pair is generated according to the Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm, the first public key is b, the first private key is g b modp, and the second public key is a, second.
  • the private key is g a modp.
  • the scheme also supports extension of multiple DH algorithms, such as DH cryptographic exchange algorithm ("ECDH”) based on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (“ECC”), DH algorithm based on elliptic curve, etc.
  • ECDH DH cryptographic exchange algorithm
  • ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
  • the algorithm for generating the session key is not particularly limited.
  • the first public key and the second private key are used by the terminal to generate a session key
  • the second public key and the first private key are used by the core network authentication entity to generate a session key
  • the terminal and core network authentication entity may generate a session key based on the same key negotiation algorithm (eg, DH algorithm).
  • the algorithm for generating the root key by the terminal and the core network authentication entity enumerated above is merely exemplary, and the present invention should not be limited in any way, and the present invention should not be limited thereto.
  • the second public-private key pair used to generate the session key may be generated by the eUICC. Therefore, the session key may be specifically generated by the eUICC and the mobile network device.
  • the core network authentication entity may send the first number to the terminal. a word signature, a first digital certificate chain, a second random number, and a first public key, so that the terminal passes the first digital signature verification (ie, identity authentication of the core network authentication entity), according to the first public key and itself
  • the generated second private key generates a session key.
  • the terminal may send the second digital signature, the second digital certificate chain, and the second public key to the core network authentication entity, so as to facilitate After the core network authentication entity passes the second digital signature verification (ie, the identity authentication for the terminal), the session key is generated according to the second public key and the first private key generated by itself.
  • the second digital signature verification ie, the identity authentication for the terminal
  • encryption and integrity protection of the NAS layer and the AS layer between the terminal and the network device herein may include: encryption and integrity protection of NAS signaling, encryption and integrity protection of AS signaling, and user plane. Encryption and integrity protection.
  • session key described above functions similarly to the K ASME shown in FIG. 2. It is referred to as a session key in the embodiment of the present invention, and should not be limited in any way. The present invention also does not exclude the possibility of expressing a session key having the same effect as in the embodiment of the present invention by other names.
  • terminal and the core network authentication entity described above respectively mutually transmit the public key
  • the specific process based on public key encryption and private key decryption (asymmetric encryption) is similar to the prior art, and is not described herein for the sake of brevity. .
  • the core network authentication entity since the core network authentication entity may process the access request of multiple terminals at the same time, in order to facilitate distinguishing the first private key corresponding to each terminal, the core network authentication entity stores each terminal. Context information, for example, the core network authentication entity may store the correspondence between the first private key and the terminal.
  • the third digital signature when the terminal sends a third digital signature to the core network authentication entity, the third digital signature includes an identifier (Identity, referred to as “ID”) for identifying the terminal, or is used to identify the terminal.
  • ID identifier
  • EID eUICC identifier
  • the identifier used to identify the terminal is not limited to the ID or the EID, and may be other identifiers that can be used to uniquely identify the terminal, which is not specifically limited in the present invention.
  • the identifier corresponding to the terminal is recorded as the first identifier.
  • the core network authentication entity When the first public key is generated, the core network authentication entity sends the first public key to the terminal, and saves the context information of the terminal, such as the correspondence between the first private key and the first identifier. In other words, the core network authentication entity stores context information of multiple terminals.
  • the core network authentication entity When the core network authentication entity receives the second public key sent by the terminal, it can be based on the terminal.
  • the first identifier acquires a first private key corresponding to the terminal, and further generates a session key.
  • the method for generating a derived key by the terminal and the core network authentication entity according to the session key is similar to the method shown in FIG. 2, and is not described here for brevity. Therefore, the session key is generated by the terminal and the core network authentication entity, thereby generating a key for encryption and integrity check of the communication between the terminal and the network, thereby ensuring the security of communication between the two parties.
  • the process of the bidirectional authentication and the session key generation may be performed simultaneously, that is, the information for the mutual authentication and the information for generating the session key are carried in the same message. Thereby reducing the signaling interaction between the terminal and the network.
  • the first random number, the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature may be simultaneously carried in the first message, where the first message may be an access request message; the second random number, the first number
  • the signature, the first digital certificate chain, and the first public key may be simultaneously carried in the second message, where the second message may be an authentication request message; the second digital signature, the second digital certificate chain, and the second public key may be simultaneously carried in
  • the third message may be an authentication response message.
  • FIG. 4 is another schematic flowchart of an authentication method 400 for a mobile network according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 4 illustrates detailed communication steps or operations of the method of authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention described by the first mobile network device (eg, core network authentication entity) from the perspective of the terminal interaction, but these steps or The operations are merely examples, and embodiments of the present invention may perform other operations or variations of the various operations in FIG. Moreover, the various steps in FIG. 4 may be performed in a different order than that presented in FIG. 4, and it is possible that not all operations in FIG. 4 are to be performed.
  • the first mobile network device eg, core network authentication entity
  • the authentication method 400 includes:
  • the terminal sends an access request message to the core network authentication entity, where the access request message carries the first random number, the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the third digital signature according to the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature, to verify the integrity of the first random number.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a second random number based on the first indication information.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a session key, and encrypts the session key according to the public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC to generate an encrypted session key.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a first digital signature according to at least the first random number, the second random number, and the encrypted session key.
  • the core network authentication entity sends an authentication request message to the terminal, where the authentication request message carries a first digital certificate chain, a first digital signature, a second random number, and an encrypted session key.
  • the terminal verifies the first digital signature according to the first digital certificate chain, the second random number, and the encrypted session key (that is, identity authentication of the core network authentication entity).
  • the terminal After the terminal verifies the first digital signature, the terminal decrypts the encrypted session key according to the private key corresponding to the public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC, to obtain the session key.
  • the terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number.
  • S420 The terminal sends an authentication response message to the core network authentication entity, where the authentication response message carries a second digital signature and a second digital certificate chain.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the second digital signature according to the second digital certificate chain and the second random number (that is, authenticates the identity of the terminal), and if the verification passes, performs subsequent operations (ie, according to the session secret) Key generation derivative key); if the verification fails, execute S424;
  • the core network authentication entity deletes the session key when the second digital signature verification fails.
  • the core network authentication entity obtains the digital certificate from the carrier's CA
  • the operator's CA is the root CA of the core network authentication entity
  • the first digital certificate chain includes the digital certificate of the core network authentication entity.
  • the authentication request message sent in S412 carries the digital certificate of the operator, and in S414, the terminal verifies the first digital signature according to the third digital certificate; if the core network authentication entity obtains the digital certificate from the carrier's CA, The operator obtains the digital certificate from the CA approved by the GSMA, that is, the carrier's CA is a secondary CA, and the first digital certificate chain includes the operator's digital certificate and the digital certificate of the core network authentication entity, and the authentication request sent in S412.
  • the message carries the digital certificate of the operator and the digital certificate of the core network authentication entity.
  • the terminal performs verification according to the digital certificate of the operator and the digital certificate of the core network authentication entity, and performs verification on the digital certificate of the core network authentication entity.
  • the first digital signature is verified according to the digital certificate of the core network authentication entity.
  • the terminal-configured eUICC obtains the eUICC's digital certificate from the manufacturer, and the manufacturer obtains the eUICC manufacturer's digital certificate from the GSMA-approved CA.
  • the access request message sent in S402 may only carry the digital certificate of the eUICC, and in S404, the core network authentication entity verifies the integrity of the first random number according to the digital certificate of the eUICC; the authentication response message sent in S420 It can carry the digital certificate of eUICC manufacturer and the digital certificate of eUICC In S422, the core network authentication entity verifies the digital certificate of the eUICC according to the digital certificate of the eUICC manufacturer, and verifies the second digital signature according to the digital certificate of the eUICC when the digital certificate verification of the eUICC is passed.
  • the specific method for the core network authentication entity to verify the second digital signature according to the second digital certificate chain is similar to the specific method for the device A to verify the digital signature B according to the digital certificate B and the message M. Concise, no more details here.
  • a plurality of other certificates may be pre-stored in the eUICC configured by the terminal, and the number or type of the certificates in the eUICC is not particularly limited.
  • FIG. 5 is still another schematic flowchart of an authentication method 500 for a mobile network according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates a detailed communication step or operation of the method of authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention described by the first mobile network device (eg, core network authentication entity) from the perspective of the terminal interaction, but these steps or The operations are merely examples, and embodiments of the present invention may perform other operations or variations of the various operations in FIG. Moreover, the various steps in FIG. 5 may be performed in a different order than that presented in FIG. 5, and it is possible that not all operations in FIG. 5 are to be performed.
  • the authentication method 500 includes:
  • the terminal sends an access request message to the core network authentication entity, where the access request message carries the first random number, the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the third digital signature according to the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature, to verify the integrity of the first random number.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a second random number based on the first indication information.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a first digital signature according to at least the first random number and the second random number.
  • the core network authentication entity sends an authentication request message to the terminal, where the authentication request message carries a first digital certificate chain, a first digital signature, and a second random number.
  • the terminal verifies the first digital signature according to the first digital certificate chain and the second random number (that is, identity authentication of the core network authentication entity).
  • S514 After verifying the first digital signature, the terminal generates a session key, and encrypts the session key according to the public key included in the digital certificate of the mobile network device to generate an encrypted session secret. key;
  • the terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number and the encrypted session key.
  • the terminal sends an authentication response message to the core network authentication entity, where the authentication response message carries a second digital signature, a second digital certificate chain, and an encrypted session key.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the second digital signature according to the second digital certificate chain and the second random number (that is, authenticates the identity of the terminal).
  • the core network authentication entity After verifying the second digital signature, the core network authentication entity decrypts the encrypted session key according to the private key of the core network authentication entity, and obtains the session key, and the private key of the core network authentication entity and the core network authentication entity The public key contained in the digital certificate corresponds.
  • FIG. 6 is still another schematic flowchart of a method for authenticating a mobile network according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 6 illustrates a detailed communication step or operation of the method of authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention described by the first mobile network device (eg, core network authentication entity) from the perspective of the terminal interaction, but these steps or The operations are merely examples, and embodiments of the present invention may perform other operations or variations of the various operations in FIG. Moreover, the various steps in FIG. 6 may be performed in a different order than that presented in FIG. 6, and it is possible that not all operations in FIG. 6 are to be performed.
  • the first mobile network device eg, core network authentication entity
  • the authentication method 600 includes:
  • the terminal sends an access request message to the core network authentication entity, where the access request message carries the first random number, the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the third digital signature according to the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature, to verify the integrity of the first random number.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a second random number based on the first indication information.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a first public private key pair, where the first public private key pair includes a first public key and a first private key.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a first digital signature according to at least the first random number, the second random number, and the first public key.
  • the core network authentication entity sends an authentication request message to the terminal, where the authentication request message carries a first digital certificate chain, a first digital signature, a second random number, and a first public key.
  • the terminal compares the first number according to the first digital certificate chain, the second random number, and the first public key.
  • Signature verification ie, identity authentication of the core network authentication entity
  • the terminal generates a second public private key pair, where the second public private key pair includes a second public key and a second private key.
  • the terminal may generate a session key according to the first public key and the second private key.
  • the terminal may generate a second digital signature according to at least the second random number and the second public key.
  • the terminal sends an authentication response message to the core network authentication entity, where the authentication response message carries a second digital signature, a second digital certificate chain, and a second public key.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the second digital signature according to the second digital certificate chain and the second random number (ie, identity authentication of the terminal).
  • the session key may be generated according to the first private key and the second public key.
  • a digital signature is generated between the terminal and the mobile network device, and the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party are verified, thereby completing the relationship between the unsigned user and the network.
  • Two-way authentication so that unsigned users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart of an authentication method 700 of a mobile network according to another embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 illustrates a perspective description of a first mobile network device (eg, a core network authentication entity), a second mobile network device (eg, a core network credential storage entity) interacting with a terminal, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • a first mobile network device eg, a core network authentication entity
  • a second mobile network device eg, a core network credential storage entity
  • FIG. 7 illustrates a perspective description of a first mobile network device (eg, a core network authentication entity), a second mobile network device (eg, a core network credential storage entity) interacting with a terminal, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Detailed communication steps or operations of the method of authentication but these steps or operations are merely examples, and embodiments of the invention may perform other operations or variations of the various operations in FIG.
  • the various steps in FIG. 7 may be performed in
  • the authentication method 700 includes:
  • S702 The terminal sends the first indication information and the first random number to the core network authentication entity.
  • the core network authentication entity forwards the first indication information and the first random number to the core network credential storage entity.
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a second random number based on the first indication information.
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a first digital signature according to at least the first random number and the second random number.
  • the core network credential storage entity sends a first digital certificate chain, a first digital signature, and a second random number to the core network authentication entity.
  • the core network authentication entity forwards the first digital certificate chain, the first digital signature, and the second random number to the terminal.
  • the terminal verifies the first digital signature.
  • the terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number.
  • the terminal sends a second digital signature and a second digital certificate chain to the core network authentication entity.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the second digital signature.
  • the S702 sends the first indication information and the first random number to the core network authentication entity, where the terminal sends the first indication information, the first random number, and the digital certificate of the eUICC to the core network authentication entity.
  • the S704 core network authentication entity forwards the first indication information and the first random number to the core network credential storage entity, including:
  • the core network authentication entity forwards the first indication information, the first random number, and the digital certificate of the eUICC to the core network credential storage entity;
  • the S708 core network credential storage entity generates the first digital signature according to the first random number and the second random number, including:
  • the core network credential storage entity generates the first digital signature according to at least the first random number, the second random number, and the encrypted session key, the encrypted session key being included by the core network credential storage entity according to the digital certificate of the eUICC
  • the public key is generated by encrypting the session key, and the session key is used to generate a derived key, which is used for encryption and integrity protection of the access layer and the non-access stratum between the terminal and the network device.
  • the S710 core network credential storage entity sends the first digital certificate chain, the first digital signature, and the second random number to the core network authentication entity, including:
  • the core network credential storage entity transmits a first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, the session key, and the encrypted session key to the terminal via the core network authentication entity.
  • the S710 core network credential storage entity sends the first digital certificate chain, the first digital signature, and the second random number to the core network authentication entity, including:
  • the core network credential storage entity sends the first digital signature, the second random number, the first digital certificate chain, and a private key of the core network credential storage entity to the core network authentication entity, wherein the core network credential storage entity The private key corresponds to the public key contained in the digital certificate of the core network credential storage entity.
  • the S716 terminal generates the second digital signature according to the second random number, including:
  • the terminal generates a session key, and encrypts the session key according to the public key of the digital certificate of the core network credential storage entity to generate an encrypted session key;
  • the terminal generates the second digital signature according to the second random number and the encrypted session key.
  • the method 700 further includes:
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a first public private key pair, where the first public private key pair includes a first public key and a first private key, and the first public key corresponds to the first private key;
  • the terminal generates a second public private key pair, where the second public private key pair includes a second public key and a second private key, and the second public key and the second private key correspond to each other;
  • the S708 core network credential storage entity generates the first digital signature according to the first random number and the second random number, including:
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a first digital signature according to the first random number, the second random number, and the first public key;
  • the S710 core network credential storage entity sends a first digital certificate chain, a first digital signature, and a second random number to the core network authentication entity, including:
  • the core network credential storage entity sends a first digital certificate chain, a first digital signature, a second random number, and a first public key to the core network authentication entity;
  • the S712 core network authentication entity forwards the first digital certificate chain, the first digital signature, and the second random number to the terminal, including:
  • the core network authentication entity forwards the first digital certificate chain, the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first public key to the terminal;
  • the S718 terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number, including:
  • the terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number and the second public key.
  • a digital signature is generated between the terminal and the mobile network device, and the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party are verified, thereby completing the relationship between the unsigned user and the network.
  • Two-way authentication so that unsigned users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • the process of the two-way authentication and the key agreement may also be performed simultaneously, that is, the information for the two-way authentication and the information for generating the session key are carried in the same message.
  • the process of the two-way authentication and the key agreement may also be performed simultaneously, that is, the information for the two-way authentication and the information for generating the session key are carried in the same message.
  • the first random number, the first indication information, the second digital certificate chain, and the third digital signature sent by the terminal to the core network authentication entity may be simultaneously carried in the first message, where the first message may be an access request message.
  • the first indication information and the first random number sent by the core network authentication entity to the core network credential storage entity may be simultaneously carried in the second message, where the second message may be an authentication data request message, and the core network credential storage entity is to the core network.
  • the second random number, the first digital signature, the first digital certificate chain, and the first public private key pair sent by the authentication entity may be simultaneously carried in the third message, where the second message may be an authentication data response message;
  • the first digital signature, the first digital certificate chain, and the first public key sent by the terminal may be simultaneously carried in the fourth message, where the fourth message may be an authentication request message;
  • the second digital certificate chain and the second public key may be simultaneously carried in the fifth message, and the fifth message may be an authentication response message.
  • the interaction between the first mobile network device (for example, the core network authentication entity), the second mobile network device (for example, the core network credential storage entity), and the terminal is described in detail below by taking FIG. 8 to FIG.
  • FIG. 8 is another schematic flowchart of an authentication method 800 for a mobile network according to another embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 illustrates a perspective description of a first mobile network device (eg, a core network authentication entity), a second mobile network device (eg, a core network credential storage entity) interacting with a terminal, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • a first mobile network device eg, a core network authentication entity
  • a second mobile network device eg, a core network credential storage entity
  • FIG. 8 illustrates a perspective description of a first mobile network device (eg, a core network authentication entity), a second mobile network device (eg, a core network credential storage entity) interacting with a terminal, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Detailed communication steps or operations of the method of authentication but these steps or operations are merely examples, and other embodiments of the present invention or other variations of the operations of FIG. 8 may be performed.
  • the various steps in FIG. 8 may be
  • the authentication method 800 includes:
  • the terminal sends an access request message to the core network authentication entity, where the access request message carries the first random number, the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the third digital signature according to the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature, to verify the integrity of the first random number.
  • the core network authentication entity sends an authentication data request message to the core network credential storage entity, where the authentication data request message carries the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature.
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a second random number based on the first indication information.
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a session key, and encrypts the session key according to the public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC to generate an encrypted session key.
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a first digital signature according to at least the first random number, the second random number, and the encrypted session key.
  • the core network credential storage entity sends an authentication data response message to the core network authentication entity, where the authentication data response message carries the second random number, the first digital signature, the first digital certificate chain, the session key, and the encrypted session key. ;
  • the core network authentication entity sends an authentication request message to the terminal, where the authentication request message carries the second random number, the first digital signature, the first digital certificate chain, and the encrypted session key.
  • S818 The terminal verifies the first digital signature according to the first digital certificate chain, the second random number, and the encrypted session key (that is, identity authentication of the core network authentication entity).
  • the terminal After verifying that the first digital signature is passed, the terminal decrypts the encrypted session key according to the private key of the eUICC to obtain the session key, where the private key of the eUICC corresponds to the public key included in the digital certificate of the eUICC;
  • the terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number.
  • the terminal sends an authentication response message to the core network authentication entity, where the authentication response message carries the second digital signature and the second digital certificate chain.
  • S826 The core network authentication entity verifies the second digital signature according to the second digital certificate chain and the second random number (that is, authenticates the identity of the terminal), and if the verification passes, performs subsequent operations (ie, according to the session secret) Key generation derivative key); if the verification fails, execute S828;
  • the core network authentication entity deletes the session key when the second digital signature verification fails.
  • FIG. 9 is another schematic flowchart of an authentication method 900 for a mobile network according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 9 illustrates a perspective description of a first mobile network device (eg, a core network authentication entity), a second mobile network device (eg, a core network credential storage entity) interacting with a terminal, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • a first mobile network device eg, a core network authentication entity
  • a second mobile network device eg, a core network credential storage entity
  • FIG. 9 illustrates a perspective description of a first mobile network device (eg, a core network authentication entity), a second mobile network device (eg, a core network credential storage entity) interacting with a terminal, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Detailed communication steps or operations of the method of authentication but these steps or operations are merely examples, and embodiments of the invention may perform other operations or variations of the various operations in FIG.
  • the various steps in FIG. 9 may be performed in
  • the authentication method 900 includes:
  • the terminal sends an access request message to the core network authentication entity, where the access request message carries the first random number, the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the third digital signature according to the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature, to verify the integrity of the first random number.
  • the core network authentication entity sends an authentication data request message to the core network credential storage entity, where the authentication data request message carries the first indication information and the third digital signature.
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a second random number based on the first indication information.
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a first digital signature according to at least the first random number and the second random number.
  • the core network credential storage entity sends an authentication data response message to the core network authentication entity, where the authentication data response message carries a first digital certificate chain, a first digital signature, a second random number, and a private key of the core network credential storage entity.
  • the private key of the core network credential storage entity corresponds to the public key included in the digital certificate of the core network credential storage entity;
  • the core network authentication entity sends an authentication request message to the terminal, where the authentication request message carries a first digital certificate chain, a first digital signature, and a second random number.
  • S916 The terminal verifies the first digital signature according to the first digital certificate chain and the second random number (that is, identity authentication of the core network authentication entity).
  • the terminal After verifying the first digital signature, the terminal generates a session key, and encrypts the session key according to the public key included in the digital certificate of the mobile network device to generate an encrypted session key.
  • S920 The terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second random number and the encrypted session key.
  • the terminal sends an authentication response message to the core network authentication entity, where the authentication response message carries a second digital signature, a second digital certificate chain, and an encrypted session key.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the second digital signature according to the second digital certificate chain and the second random number (that is, authenticates the identity of the terminal).
  • the core network authentication entity After verifying the second digital signature, the core network authentication entity decrypts the encrypted session key according to the private key of the core network credential storage entity to obtain the session key.
  • FIG. 10 is still another schematic flowchart of a method for authenticating a mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 illustrates detailed communication steps or operations of the method of authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention described in terms of interaction of a first mobile network device (eg, a core network authentication entity) with a terminal, but these steps or The operations are merely examples, and embodiments of the present invention may perform other operations or variations of the various operations in FIG.
  • the various steps in FIG. 10 may be performed in a different order than that presented in FIG. 10, and it is possible that not all operations in FIG. 10 are to be performed.
  • the authentication method 1000 includes:
  • the terminal sends an access request message to the core network authentication entity, where the access request message carries the first random number, the first indication information, the digital certificate of the eUICC, and the third digital signature.
  • S1004 The core network authentication entity verifies the third digital signature according to the third digital signature, to verify the integrity of the first random number.
  • the core network authentication entity sends an authentication data request message to the core network credential storage entity, where the authentication data request message carries the first random number and the first indication information.
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a second random number based on the first indication information.
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a first public private key pair, where the first public private key pair includes a first public key and a first private key;
  • the core network credential storage entity generates a first digital signature according to at least the first random number, the second random number, and the first public key.
  • the core network credential storage entity sends an authentication data response message to the core network authentication entity, where the data authentication response message carries a second random number, a first digital certificate chain, a first digital signature, and a first public-private key pair.
  • the core network authentication entity saves the first private key.
  • the core network authentication entity sends an authentication request message to the terminal, where the authentication request message carries a first digital certificate chain, a first digital signature, a second random number, and a first public key.
  • the terminal verifies the first digital signature according to the first digital certificate and the second random number.
  • the terminal generates a second public-private key pair, where the second public-private key pair includes a second public key and a second private key.
  • the terminal generates a session key according to the first public key and the second private key.
  • the terminal generates a second digital signature according to at least the second public key and the second random number.
  • the terminal sends an authentication response message to the core network authentication entity, where the authentication response message carries a second digital signature, a second digital certificate chain, and a second public key.
  • the core network authentication entity verifies the second digital signature according to the second digital certificate chain and the second random number.
  • the core network authentication entity generates a session key according to the first private key and the second public key.
  • a digital signature is generated between the terminal and the mobile network device, and the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party are verified, thereby completing the relationship between the unsigned user and the network.
  • Two-way authentication so that unsigned users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • the size of the sequence number of each process does not mean the order of execution sequence, and the order of execution of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not be taken by the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the implementation process constitutes any qualification.
  • S616 may be performed before S618, or may be performed after the first digital signature verification is passed in S618, and then generate a session key according to the first public key and the second private key.
  • S1010 may be executed after S1008, or may be performed simultaneously with S1008 or with 1008.
  • the authentication apparatus 10 includes: a transmitting unit 11, a receiving unit 12, and a processing unit. 13 and generating unit 14.
  • the sending unit 11 is configured to send the first indication information and the first random number to the mobile network device, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the authentication device requests to access the mobile network in a non-subscription access manner, so as to facilitate the mobile
  • the network device generates a second random number based on the first indication information, and generates a first digital signature according to the first random number and the second random number;
  • the receiving unit 12 is configured to receive the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain sent by the mobile network device.
  • the processing unit 13 is configured to verify the first digital signature
  • the generating unit 14 is configured to generate a second digital signature according to the second random number at least;
  • the sending unit 11 is further configured to send the second digital signature and the second digital certificate chain to the mobile network device, so that the mobile network device verifies the second digital signature.
  • the authentication device 10 of the mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention may correspond to a terminal in an authentication method of a mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention, and each module in the authentication device 10 and the other operations and/or functions described above are respectively The corresponding processes of the methods in FIG. 3 to FIG. 10 are implemented, and are not described herein for brevity.
  • the authentication apparatus of the mobile network generates a digital signature by and the mobile network device, and verifies the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party, thereby completing the relationship between the unsigned user and the network. Two-way authentication, so that unsigned users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication apparatus 20 of a mobile network according to another embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 12, the authentication apparatus 20 includes a receiving unit 21, a transmitting unit 22, and a processing unit 23.
  • the receiving unit 21 is configured to receive the first indication information that is sent by the terminal, and the first random number, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the terminal requests to access the mobile network in a non-subscription access manner;
  • the sending unit 22 is configured to send, to the terminal, a first digital signature, a second random number, and a first digital certificate chain, so that the terminal verifies the first digital signature, and the first digital signature and the second random number are based on Generated by the first indication information, the first digital signature is generated according to the second random number and the first random number;
  • the receiving unit 21 is further configured to receive a second digital certificate chain sent by the terminal, and a second digital signature generated by the terminal according to the second random number.
  • the processing unit 23 is configured to verify the second digital signature.
  • the authentication device 20 of the mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention may correspond to the first mobile network device in the authentication method of the mobile network according to the embodiment of the present invention, and each module in the authentication device 20 and the other operations described above and/or For the sake of brevity, the functions of the respective methods in FIG. 3 to FIG. 10 are not described here.
  • the authentication device of the mobile network generates a digital signature between the terminal and the terminal, and verifies the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party, thereby completing the mutual authentication between the unsigned user and the network. So that unlicensed users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication device 30 of a mobile network according to still another embodiment of the present invention.
  • the authentication device 30 includes a receiving unit 31, a generating unit 32, and a transmitting unit 33.
  • the receiving unit 31 is configured to receive the first indication information that is sent by the first mobile network device, and the first random number, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the terminal requests to access the network in a non-subscription access manner;
  • the generating unit 32 is configured to generate a second random number based on the first indication information, and generate a first digital signature according to at least the first random number and the second random number;
  • the sending unit 33 is configured to send the first digital signature, the second random number and the first digital certificate chain to the terminal via the first mobile network device, so that the terminal verifies the first number signature.
  • the authentication device 30 of the mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention may correspond to the second mobile network device in the authentication method of the mobile network according to the embodiment of the present invention, and each module in the authentication device 30 and the other operations described above and/or For the sake of brevity, the functions of the respective methods in FIG. 3 to FIG. 10 are not described here.
  • the authentication device of the mobile network generates a digital signature between the terminal and the terminal, and verifies the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party, thereby completing the mutual authentication between the unsigned user and the network. So that unlicensed users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • the authentication device 40 includes a receiver 41, a transmitter 42, a processor 43, a memory 44, and a bus system 45, wherein the receiver 41, the transmitter 42, the processor 43, and the memory 44 pass through the bus system. 45 is connected, the memory 44 is used to store instructions, and the processor 43 is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory 44 to control the receiver 41 to receive signals and control the transmitter 42 to transmit signals.
  • the transmitter 42 is configured to send the first indication information and the first random number to the mobile network device, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the authentication device requests to access the mobile network in a non-subscription access manner, so as to facilitate the mobile
  • the network device generates a second random number based on the first indication information, and generates a first digital signature according to the first random number and the second random number;
  • the receiver 41 is configured to receive the first digital signature, the second random number, and the first digital certificate chain sent by the mobile network device.
  • the processor 43 is configured to verify the first digital signature
  • the processor 43 is configured to generate a second digital signature according to the second random number
  • the transmitter 41 is further configured to send the second digital signature and the second digital certificate chain to the mobile network device, so that the mobile network device verifies the second digital signature.
  • the processor 43 may be a central processing unit (“CPU"), and the processor 43 may also be other general-purpose processors and digital signal processors (DSPs). , an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an off-the-shelf programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, discrete hardware component, and the like.
  • the general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor or any conventional processor or the like.
  • the processor 43 can include read only memory and random access memory and provides instructions and data to the processor 43.
  • a portion of processor 43 may also include a non-volatile random access memory.
  • processor 43 may also store information of the type of device.
  • the bus system 45 may include a power bus, a control bus, a status signal bus, and the like in addition to the data bus. However, for clarity of description, various buses are labeled as bus system 45 in the figure.
  • each step of the above method may be completed by an integrated logic circuit of hardware in the processor 43 or an instruction in a form of software.
  • the steps of the positioning method disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention may be directly implemented as hardware processor execution completion, or performed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the processor.
  • the software module can be located in a random access memory, a flash memory, a read only memory, a programmable read only memory or an electrically erasable programmable memory, a register, etc., and a mature storage medium in the field. in.
  • the storage medium is located in memory 44, and processor 43 reads the information in memory 44 and, in conjunction with its hardware, performs the steps of the above method. To avoid repetition, it will not be described in detail here.
  • the authentication device 40 of the mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention may correspond to a terminal in an authentication method of a mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention, and each module in the authentication device 40 and the other operations and/or functions described above are respectively The corresponding processes of the methods in FIG. 3 to FIG. 10 are implemented, and are not described herein for brevity.
  • the authentication device of the mobile network generates a digital signature between the mobile network device and the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party, thereby completing the relationship between the unsigned user and the network. Two-way authentication, so that unsigned users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication device 50 of a mobile network according to another embodiment of the present invention.
  • the authentication device 50 includes a receiver 51, a transmitter 52, a processor 53, a memory 54, and a bus system 45, wherein the receiver 51, the transmitter 52, the processor 53, and the memory 54 pass through the bus system. 55 is connected, the memory 54 is used to store instructions, and the processor 53 is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory 54 to control the receiver 51 to receive signals and control the transmitter 52 to transmit signals.
  • the receiver 51 is configured to receive the first indication information that is sent by the terminal, and the first random number, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the terminal requests to access the mobile network in a non-subscription access manner;
  • the transmitter 52 is configured to send, to the terminal, a first digital signature, a second random number, and a first digital certificate chain, so that the terminal verifies the first digital signature, and the first digital signature and the second random number are based on Generated by the first indication information, the first digital signature is generated according to the second random number and the first random number;
  • the receiver 51 is further configured to receive a second digital certificate chain sent by the terminal, and a second digital signature generated by the terminal according to the second random number.
  • the processor 53 is configured to verify the second digital signature.
  • the authentication device 50 of the mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention may correspond to the first mobile network device in the authentication method of the mobile network according to the embodiment of the present invention, and each module in the authentication device 50 and the other operations described above and/or For the sake of brevity, the functions of the respective methods in FIG. 3 to FIG. 10 are not described here.
  • the authentication device of the mobile network generates a digital signature by and the terminal, and verifies the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party, thereby completing the Two-way authentication between the unlicensed user and the network, so that the unsigned user can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • the authentication device 60 includes a receiver 61, a transmitter 62, a processor 63, a memory 64, and a bus system 45, wherein the receiver 61, the transmitter 62, the processor 63, and the memory 64 pass through the bus system.
  • the memory 64 is used to store instructions
  • the processor 63 is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory 64 to control the receiver 61 to receive signals and control the transmitter 62 to transmit signals.
  • the receiver 61 is configured to receive the first indication information that is sent by the first mobile network device, and the first random number, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the terminal requests to access the network in a non-subscription access manner;
  • the processor 62 is configured to generate a second random number based on the first indication information, and generate a first digital signature according to at least the first random number and the second random number;
  • the transmitter 62 is configured to send the first digital signature, the second random number and the first digital certificate chain to a terminal via the first mobile network device, so that the terminal verifies the first number signature.
  • the authentication device 60 of the mobile network according to an embodiment of the present invention may correspond to the second mobile network device in the authentication method of the mobile network according to the embodiment of the present invention, and each module in the authentication device 60 and the other operations described above and/or For the sake of brevity, the functions of the respective methods in FIG. 3 to FIG. 10 are not described here.
  • the authentication device of the mobile network generates a digital signature between the terminal and the terminal, and verifies the digital certificate chain and the digital signature of the other party, thereby completing the mutual authentication between the unsigned user and the network. So that unlicensed users can also access the mobile network through the corresponding authentication mechanism.
  • the size of the sequence numbers of the above processes does not mean the order of execution, and the order of execution of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not be directed to the embodiments of the present invention.
  • the implementation process constitutes any limitation.
  • the disclosed systems, devices, and methods may be implemented in other manners.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
  • the division of the unit is only a logical function division.
  • there may be another division manner for example, multiple units or components may be combined or Can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed.
  • the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, device or unit, and may be in an electrical, mechanical or other form.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.
  • each functional unit in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the functions may be stored in a computer readable storage medium if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a standalone product.
  • the technical solution of the present invention which is essential or contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, may be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium, including
  • the instructions are used to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention.
  • the foregoing storage medium includes: a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (RAM), a random access memory (ROM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, and the like, which can store program codes. .

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé et un appareil d'authentification de réseau mobile, qui peuvent être utilisés pour effectuer une authentification bidirectionnelle entre un utilisateur non abonné et un dispositif de réseau mobile. Le procédé comprend les opérations suivantes : un terminal envoie des premières informations d'indication et un premier nombre aléatoire à un dispositif de réseau mobile, les premières informations d'indication étant utilisées pour indiquer que le terminal demande l'accès à un réseau mobile d'un type d'accès non abonné, de telle sorte que le dispositif de réseau mobile génère un second nombre aléatoire sur la base des premières informations d'indication et génère une première signature numérique au moins en fonction du premier nombre aléatoire et du second nombre aléatoire ; le terminal reçoit la première signature numérique, le second nombre aléatoire et une première chaîne de certificats numériques envoyée par le dispositif de réseau mobile, et vérifie la première signature numérique ; le terminal génère une seconde signature numérique au moins en fonction du second nombre aléatoire ; et le terminal envoie la seconde signature numérique et une seconde chaîne de certificats numériques au dispositif de réseau mobile, de telle sorte que le dispositif de réseau mobile vérifie la seconde signature numérique.
PCT/CN2016/083753 2016-05-27 2016-05-27 Procédé et appareil d'authentification de réseau mobile WO2017201753A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CN2016/083753 WO2017201753A1 (fr) 2016-05-27 2016-05-27 Procédé et appareil d'authentification de réseau mobile
CN201680084751.3A CN109076058B (zh) 2016-05-27 2016-05-27 一种移动网络的认证方法和装置

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

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