Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
  • H04L67/01—Protocols
  • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
  • H04L67/01—Protocols
  • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
  • H04L67/50—Network services
  • H04L67/56—Provisioning of proxy services
  • H04L67/562—Brokering proxy services
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/06—Authentication
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
  • H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
  • H04L63/0236—Filtering by address, protocol, port number or service, e.g. IP-address or URL
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
  • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
  • H04W12/71—Hardware identity
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
  • H04W4/70—Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W48/00—Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
  • H04W48/02—Access restriction performed under specific conditions
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W84/00—Network topologies
  • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
  • H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks
  • H04W84/042—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems
  • H04W84/047—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems using dedicated repeater stations

Definitions

• This invention relates generally to the field of computer systems. More particularly, the invention relates to a system and method for automatic wireless network authentication in an IoT system.
• IoT The "Internet of Things” refers to the interconnection of uniquely-identifiable embedded devices within the Internet infrastructure. Ultimately, IoT is expected to result in new, wide-ranging types of applications in which virtually any type of physical thing may provide information about itself or its surroundings and/or may be controlled remotely via client devices over the Internet.
• the registration will fail because the low coverage condition will corrupt the process of registration which will result in the access point rejecting the registration of the new device.
• the problem is more complicated for users who have multiple WiFi networks inside their home or business. In these circumstances, each network will require its own registration process.
• FIGS. 1A-B illustrates different embodiments of an IoT system architecture
• FIG.2 illustrates an IoT device in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
• FIG. 3 illustrates an loT hub in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
• FIG. 4A-B illustrate embodiments of the invention for controlling and collecting data from loT devices, and generating notifications
• FIG. 5 illustrates embodiments of the invention for collecting data from loT devices and generating notifications from an loT hub and/or loT service
• FIG. 6 illustrates embodiments of the invention which implements improved security techniques such as encryption and digital signatures
• FIG. 7 illustrates one embodiment of an architecture in which a subscriber identity module (SIM) is used to store keys on loT devices;
• SIM subscriber identity module
• FIG. 8A illustrates one embodiment in which loT devices are registered using barcodes or QR codes
• FIG. 8B illustrates one embodiment in which pairing is performed using barcodes or QR codes
• FIG. 9 illustrates one embodiment of a method for programming a SIM using an loT hub
• FIG. 10 illustrates one embodiment of a method for registering an loT device with an loT hub and loT service
• FIG. 11 illustrates one embodiment of a method for encrypting data to be transmitted to an loT device
• FIG. 12 illustrates one embodiment of an architecture for collecting and storing network credentials
• FIG. 13 illustrates one embodiment of an architecture for registering a user with a wireless access point
• FIG. 14 illustrates one embodiment of a method for collecting and storing network credentials
• FIG. 15 illustrates one embodiment of a method for registering a new device using stored credentials
• FIGS. 16A-B illustrate different embodiments of the invention for encrypting data between an loT service and an loT device
• FIG. 17 illustrates embodiments of the invention for performing a secure key exchange, generating a common secret, and using the secret to generate a key stream;
• FIG. 18 illustrates a packet structure in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
• FIG. 19 illustrates techniques employed in one embodiment for writing and reading data to/from an loT device without formally pairing with the loT device
• FIG. 20 illustrates an exemplary set of command packets employed in one embodiment of the invention
• FIG. 21 illustrates an exemplary sequence of transactions using command packets
• FIG. 22 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
• FIGS. 23A-C illustrate a method for secure pairing in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
• FIG. 24 illustrates one embodiment of a system for configuring an loT hub with WiFi security data
• FIG. 25 illustrates a system architecture employed in one embodiment of the invention
• FIG. 26 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
• FIG. 27 illustrates one embodiment of a master loT hub comprising a WiFi router, with authentication logic and a firewall
• FIG. 28 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.
• One embodiment of the invention comprises an Internet of Things (loT) platform which may be utilized by developers to design and build new loT devices and applications.
• a base hardware/software platform for loT devices including a predefined networking protocol stack and an loT hub through which the loT devices are coupled to the Internet.
• one embodiment includes an loT service through which the loT hubs and connected loT devices may be accessed and managed as described below.
• the loT platform includes an loT app or Web application (e.g., executed on a client device) to access and configured the loT service, hub and connected devices.
• existing online retailers and other Website operators may leverage the loT platform described herein to readily provide unique loT functionality to existing user bases.
• Figure 1 A illustrates an overview of an architectural platform on which embodiments of the invention may be implemented.
• the illustrated embodiment includes a plurality of loT devices 101-105 communicatively coupled over local communication channels 130 to a central loT hub 110 which is itself
• the loT service 120 includes an end user database 122 for maintaining user account information and data collected from each user's loT devices.
• the loT devices include sensors (e.g., temperature sensors, accelerometers, heat sensors, motion detectore, etc)
• the database 122 may be continually updated to store the data collected by the loT devices 101-105.
• the data stored in the database 122 may then be made accessible to the end user via the loT app or browser installed on the user's device 135 (or via a desktop or other client computer system) and to web clients (e.g., such as websites 130 subscribing to the loT service 120).
• the loT app or browser installed on the user's device 135 (or via a desktop or other client computer system) and to web clients (e.g., such as websites 130 subscribing to the loT service 120).
• the loT devices 101 -105 may be equipped with various types of sensors to collect information about themselves and their surroundings and provide the collected information to the loT service 120, user devices 135 and/or external Websites 130 via the loT hub 110. Some of the loT devices 101 -105 may perform a specified function in response to control commands sent through the loT hub 110. Various specific examples of information collected by the loT devices 101-105 and control commands are provided below.
• the loT device 101 is a user input device designed to record user selections and send the user selections to the loT service 120 and/or Website.
• the loT hub 110 includes a cellular radio to establish a connection to the Internet 220 via a cellular service 115 such as a 4G (e.g., Mobile WiMAX, LTE) or 5G cellular data service.
• a cellular service 115 such as a 4G (e.g., Mobile WiMAX, LTE) or 5G cellular data service.
• the loT hub 110 may include a WiFi radio to establish a WiFi connection through a WiFi access point or router 116 which couples the loT hub 110 to the Internet (e.g., via an Internet Service Provider providing Internet service to the end user).
• WiFi Wireless Fidelity
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of communication channel or protocol.
• the loT devices 101 -105 are ultra low-power devices capable of operating for extended periods of time on battery power (e.g., years).
• the local communication channels 130 may be implemented using a low-power wireless communication technology such as Bluetooth Low Energy (LE).
• LE Bluetooth Low Energy
• each of the loT devices 101-105 and the loT hub 110 are equipped with Bluetooth LE radios and protocol stacks.
• the loT platform includes an loT app or Web application executed on user devices 135 to allow users to access and configure the connected loT devices 101-105, loT hub 110, and/or loT service 120.
• the app or web application may be designed by the operator of a Website 130 to provide loT functionality to its user base.
• the Website may maintain a user database 131 containing account records related to each user.
• Figure 1 B illustrates additional connection options for a plurality of loT hubs 110-111 , 190
• a single user may have multiple hubs 110-111 installed onsite at a single user premises 180 (e.g., the user's home or business). This may be done, for example, to extend the wireless range needed to connect all of the loT devices 101 -105.
• a user may be connected via a local communication channel (e.g., Wifi, Ethernet, Power Line
• each of the hubs 110-111 may establish a direct connection to the loT service 120 through a cellular 115 or WiFi 116 connection (not explicitly shown in Figure 1 B).
• one of the loT hubs such as loT hub 110 may act as a "master" hub which provides connectivity and/or local services to all of the other loT hubs on the user premises 180, such as loT hub 111 (as indicated by the dotted line connecting loT hub 110 and loT hub 111).
• the master loT hub 110 may be the only loT hub to establish a direct connection to the loT service 120.
• only the "master" loT hub 110 is equipped with a cellular communication interface to establish the connection to the loT service 120.
• the loT service 120 will logically associate the hubs with the user and combine all of the attached loT devices 101-105 under a single comprehensive user interface, accessible via a user device with the installed app 135 (and/or a browser-based interface).
• the master loT hub 110 and one or more slave loT hubs 111 may connect over a local network which may be a WiFi network 116, an Ethernet network, and or a using power-line communications (PLC) networking (e.g., where all or portions of the network are run through the user's power lines).
• a local network which may be a WiFi network 116, an Ethernet network, and or a using power-line communications (PLC) networking (e.g., where all or portions of the network are run through the user's power lines).
• PLC power-line communications
• each of the loT devices 101 -105 may be interconnected with the loT hubs 110-111 using any type of local network channel such as WiFi, Ethernet, PLC, or Bluetooth LE, to name a few.
• Figure 1 B also shows an loT hub 190 installed at a second user premises 181.
• loT hubs 190 may be installed and configured to collect data from loT devices 191 -192 at user premises around the world.
• the two user premises 180-181 may be configured for the same user.
• one user premises 180 may be the user's primary home and the other user premises 181 may be the user's vacation home.
• the loT service 120 will logically associate the loT hubs 110-111, 190 with the user and combine all of the attached loT devices 101-105, 191-192 under a single comprehensive user interface, accessible via a user device with the installed app 135 (and/or a browser-based interface).
• an exemplary embodiment of an loT device 101 includes a memory 210 for storing program code and data 201-203 and a low power microcontroller 200 for executing the program code and processing the data.
• the memory 210 may be a volatile memory such as dynamic random access memory (DRAM) or may be a non-volatile memory such as Flash memory.
• DRAM dynamic random access memory
• Flash memory non-volatile memory
• a non-volatile memory may be used for persistent storage and a volatile memory may be used for execution of the program code and data at runtime.
• the memory 210 may be integrated within the low power microcontroller 200 or may be coupled to the low power microcontroller 200 via a bus or communication fabric. The underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular implementation of the memory 210.
• the program code may include application program code 203 defining an application-specific set of functions to be performed by the loT device 201 and library code 202 comprising a set of predefined building blocks which may be utilized by the application developer of the loT device 101.
• the library code 202 comprises a set of basic functions required to implement an loT device such as a communication protocol stack 201 for enabling communication between each loT device 101 and the loT hub 110.
• the loT device such as a communication protocol stack 201 for enabling communication between each loT device 101 and the loT hub 110.
• Bluetooth LE radio and antenna 207 may be integrated within the low power microcontroller 200.
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular communication protocol.
• the particular embodiment shown in Figure 2 also includes a plurality of input devices or sensors 210 to receive user input and provide the user input to the low power microcontroller, which processes the user input in accordance with the application code 203 and library code 202.
• each of the input devices include an LED 209 to provide feedback to the end user.
• the illustrated embodiment includes a battery 208 for supplying power to the low power microcontroller.
• a battery 208 for supplying power to the low power microcontroller.
• a non-chargeable coin cell battery is used.
• an integrated rechargeable battery may be used (e.g., rechargeable by connecting the loT device to an AC power supply (not shown)).
• a speaker 205 is also provided for generating audio.
• the low power microcontroller 299 includes audio decoding logic for decoding a compressed audio stream (e.g., such as an MPEG-4/Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) stream) to generate audio on the speaker 205.
• AAC Advanced Audio Coding
• the low power microcontroller 200 and/or the application code/data 203 may include digitally sampled snippets of audio to provide verbal feedback to the end user as the user enters selections via the input devices 210.
• one or more other/alternate I/O devices or sensors 250 may be included on the loT device 101 based on the particular application for which the loT device 101 is designed.
• an environmental sensor may be included to measure temperature, pressure, humidity, etc.
• a security sensor and/or door lock opener may be included if the loT device is used as a security device.
• these examples are provided merely for the purposes of illustration.
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of loT device.
• an application developer may readily develop new application code 203 and new I/O devices 250 to interface with the low power microcontroller for virtually any type of loT application.
• the low power microcontroller 200 also includes a secure key store for storing encryption keys for encrypting communications and/or generating signatures.
• the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM).
• SIM subscriber identify module
• a wakeup receiver 207 is included in one embodiment to wake the loT device from an ultra low power state in which it is consuming virtually no power.
• the wakeup receiver 207 is configured to cause the loT device 101 to exit this low power state in response to a wakeup signal received from a wakeup transmitter 307 configured on the loT hub 110 as shown in Figure 3.
• the transmitter 307 and receiver 207 together form an electrical resonant transformer circuit such as a Tesla coil. In operation, energy is transmitted via radio frequency signals from the transmitter 307 to the receiver 207 when the hub 110 needs to wake the loT device 101 from a very low power state.
• the loT device 101 may be configured to consume virtually no power when it is in its low power state because it does not need to continually "listen" for a signal from the hub (as is the case with network protocols which allow devices to be awakened via a network signal). Rather, the microcontroller 200 of the loT device 101 may be configured to wake up after being effectively powered down by using the energy electrically transmitted from the transmitter 307 to the receiver 207.
• the loT hub 110 also includes a memory 317 for storing program code and data 305 and hardware logic 301 such as a microcontroller for executing the program code and processing the data.
• a wide area network (WAN) interface 302 and antenna 310 couple the loT hub 110 to the cellular service 115.
• WAN wide area network
• the loT hub 110 may also include a local network interface (not shown) such as a WiFi interface (and WiFi antenna) or Ethernet interface for establishing a local area network communication channel.
• the hardware logic 301 also includes a secure key store for storing encryption keys for encrypting communications and generating/verifying signatures. Alternatively, the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM).
• SIM subscriber identify module
• a local communication interface 303 and antenna 311 establishes local communication channels with each of the loT devices 101-105.
• the local communication interface 303/antenna 311 implements the Bluetooth LE standard.
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular protocols for establishing the local communication channels with the loT devices 101-105.
• the WAN interface 302 and or local communication interface 303 may be embedded within the same chip as the hardware logic 301.
• the program code and data includes a communication protocol stack 308 which may include separate stacks for communicating over the local communication interface 303 and the WAN interface 302.
• device pairing program code and data 306 may be stored in the memory to allow the loT hub to pair with new loT devices.
• each new loT device 101-105 is assigned a unique code which is communicated to the loT hub 110 during the pairing process.
• the unique code may be embedded in a barcode on the loT device and may be read by the barcode reader 106 or may be communicated over the local
• the unique ID code is embedded magnetically on the loT device and the loT hub has a magnetic sensor such as an radio frequency ID (RFID) or near field communication (NFC) sensor to detect the code when the loT device 101 is moved within a few inches of the loT hub 110.
• RFID radio frequency ID
• NFC near field communication
• the loT hub 110 may verify the unique ID by querying a local database (not shown), performing a hash to verify that the code is acceptable, and/or communicating with the loT service 120, user device 135 and/or Website 130 to validate the ID code. Once validated, in one embodiment, the loT hub 110 pairs the loT device 101 and stores the pairing data in memory 317 (which, as mentioned, may include non-volatile memory). Once pairing is complete, the loT hub 110 may connect with the loT device 101 to perform the various loT functions described herein.
• the organization running the loT service 120 may provide the loT hub 110 and a basic hardware/software platform to allow developers to easily design new loT services.
• developers may be provided with a software development kit (SDK) to update the program code and data 305 executed within the hub 110.
• the SDK may include an extensive set of library code 202 designed for the base loT hardware (e.g., the low power microcontroller 200 and other components shown in Figure 2) to facilitate the design of various different types of applications 101.
• the SDK includes a graphical design interface in which the developer needs only to specify input and outputs for the loT device.
• the SDK also includes a library code base to facilitate the design of apps for mobile devices (e.g., iPhone and Android devices).
• the loT hub 110 manages a continuous bi-directional stream of data between the loT devices 101-105 and the loT service 120.
• the loT hub may maintain an open TCP socket to provide regular updates to the user device 135 and/or external Websites 130.
• the specific networking protocol used to provide updates may be tweaked based on the needs of the underlying application. For example, in some cases, where may not make sense to have a continuous bi-directional stream, a simple request response protocol may be used to gather information when needed.
• both the loT hub 110 and the loT devices 101 -105 are automatically upgradeable over the network.
• a new update may automatically download and install the update from the loT service 120. It may first copy the updated code into a local memory, run and verify the update before swapping out the older program code.
• updates may initially be downloaded by the loT hub 110 and pushed out to each of the loT devices 101 -105.
• Each loT device 101-105 may then apply the update in a similar manner as described above for the loT hub and report back the results of the update to the loT hub 110. If the update is successful, then the loT hub 110 may delete the update from its memory and record the latest version of code installed on each loT device (e.g., so that it may continue to check for new updates for each loT device).
• the loT hub 110 is powered via A/C power.
• the loT hub 110 may include a power unit 390 with a transformer for transforming A/C voltage supplied via an A/C power cord to a lower DC voltage.
• FIG. 4A illustrates one embodiment of the invention for performing universal remote control operations using the loT system.
• a set of loT devices 101-103 are equipped with infrared (IR) and/or radio frequency (RF) blasters 401-403, respectively, for transmitting remote control codes to control various different types of electronics equipment including air
• IR infrared
• RF radio frequency
• the loT devices 101-103 are also equipped with sensors 404-406, respectively, for detecting the operation of the devices which they control, as described below.
• sensor 404 in loT device 101 may be a temperature and or humidity sensor for sensing the current temperature/humidity and responsively controlling the air conditioner/heater 430 based on a current desired temperature.
• the air conditioner/heater 430 is one which is designed to be controlled via a remote control device (typically a remote control which itself has a temperature sensor embedded therein).
• the user provides the desired temperature to the loT hub 110 via an app or browser installed on a user device 135.
• Control logic 412 executed on the loT hub 110 receives the current
• temperature/humidity data from the sensor 404 and responsively transmits commands to the loT device 101 to control the IR/RF blaster 401 in accordance with the desired temperature/humidity. For example, if the temperature is below the desired
• control logic 412 may transmit a command to the air
• the command may include the necessary remote control code stored in a database 413 on the loT hub 110.
• the loT service 421 may implement control logic 421 to control the electronics equipment 430-432 based on specified user preferences and stored control codes 422.
• loT device 102 in the illustrated example is used to control lighting 431.
• sensor 405 in loT device 102 may photosensor or photodetector configured to detect the current brightness of the light being produced by a light fixture 431 (or other lighting apparatus).
• the user may specify a desired lighting level (including an indication of ON or OFF) to the loT hub 110 via the user device 135.
• the control logic 412 will transmit commands to the IR/RF blaster 402 to control the current brightness level of the lights 431 (e.g., increasing the lighting if the current brightness is too low or decreasing the lighting if the current brightness is too high; or simply turning the lights ON or OFF).
• loT device 103 in the illustrated example is configured to control audiovisual equipment 432 (e.g., a television, A V receiver, cable/satellite receiver, AppleTVTM, etc).
• Sensor 406 in loT device 103 may be an audio sensor (e.g., a microphone and associated logic) for detecting a current ambient volume level and/or a photosensor to detect whether a television is on or off based on the light generated by the television (e.g., by measuring the light within a specified spectrum).
• sensor 406 may include a temperature sensor connected to the audiovisual equipment to detect whether the audio equipment is on or off based on the detected temperature.
• the control logic 412 may transmit commands to the audiovisual equipment via the IR blaster 403 of the loT device 103.
• the sensor data and commands are sent over the Bluetooth LE channel.
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to Bluetooth LE or any other communication standard.
• control codes required to control each of the pieces of electronics equipment are stored in a database 413 on the loT hub 110 and/or a database 422 on the loT service 120.
• the control codes may be provided to the loT hub 110 from a master database of control codes 422 for different pieces of equipment maintained on the loT service 120.
• the end user may specify the types of electronic (or other) equipment to be controlled via the app or browser executed on the user device 135 and, in response, a remote control code learning module 491 on the loT hub may retrieve the required IR/RF codes from the remote control code database 492 on the loT service 120 (e.g., identifying each piece of electronic equipment with a unique ID).
• the loT hub 110 is equipped with an IR/RF interface 490 to allow the remote control code learning module 491 to "learn" new remote control codes directly from the original remote control 495 provided with the electronic equipment.
• the remote control code learning module 491 may interact with the loT hub 110 via the app/browser on the user device 135 to teach the loT hub 110 the various control codes generated by the original remote control (e.g., increase temperature, decrease temperature, etc).
• the remote control codes may be stored in the control code database 413 on the loT hub 110 and/or sent back to the loT service 120 to be included in the central remote control code database 492 (and subsequently used by other users with the same air conditioner unit 430).
• each of the loT devices 101 -103 have an extremely small form factor and may be affixed on or near their respective electronics equipment 430-432 using double-sided tape, a small nail, a magnetic attachment, etc.
• the loT device 101 For control of a piece of equipment such as the air conditioner 430, it would be desirable to place the loT device 101 sufficiently far away so that the sensor 404 can accurately measure the ambient temperature in the home (e.g., placing the loT device directly on the air conditioner would result in a temperature measurement which would be too low when the air conditioner was running or too high when the heater was running).
• the loT device 102 used for controlling lighting may be placed on or near the lighting fixture 431 for the sensor 405 to detect the current lighting level.
• one embodiment of the loT hub 110 and/or loT service 120 transmits notifications to the end user related to the current status of each piece of electronics equipment.
• the notifications which may be text messages and or app-specific notifications, may then be displayed on the display of the user's mobile device 135. For example, if the user's air conditioner has been on for an extended period of time but the temperature has not changed, the loT hub 110 and/or loT service 120 may send the user a notification that the air conditioner is not functioning properly.
• a notification may be sent to the user, asking if the user would like to turn off the audiovisual equipment 432 and/or lights 431.
• the same type of notification may be sent for any equipment type.
• the user may remotely control the electronics equipment 430-432 via the app or browser on the user device 135.
• the user device 135 is a touchscreen device and the app or browser displays an image of a remote control with user-selectable buttons for controlling the equipment 430-432.
• the user may open the graphical remote control and turn off or adjust the various different pieces of equipment.
• the user's selections may be forwarded from the loT service 120 to the loT hub 110 which will then control the equipment via the control logic 412.
• the user input may be sent directly to the loT hub 110 from the user device 135.
• the user may program the control logic 412 on the loT hub 110 to perform various automatic control functions with respect to the electronics equipment 430-432.
• the control logic 412 may automatically turn off the electronics equipment if certain conditions are detected. For example, if the control logic 412 detects that the user is not home and that the air conditioner is not functioning, it may automatically turn off the air conditioner. Similarly, if the user is not home, and the sensors 406 indicate that audiovisual equipment 430 is on or sensors 405 indicate that the lights are on, then the control logic 412 may automatically transmit commands via the IR/RF blasters 403 and 402, to turn off the audiovisual equipment and lights, respectively.
• FIG. 5 illustrates additional embodiments of loT devices 104-105 equipped with sensors 503-504 for monitoring electronic equipment 530-531.
• the loT device 104 of this embodiment includes a temperature sensor 503 which may be placed on or near a stove 530 to detect when the stove has been left on.
• the loT device 104 transmits the current temperature measured by the temperature sensor 503 to the loT hub 110 and or the loT service 120. If the stove is detected to be on for more than a threshold time period (e.g., based on the measured temperature), then control logic 512 may transmit a notification to the end user's device 135 informing the user that the stove 530 is on.
• a threshold time period e.g., based on the measured temperature
• the loT device 104 may include a control module 501 to turn off the stove, either in response to receiving an instruction from the user or automatically (if the control logic 512 is programmed to do so by the user).
• the control logic 501 comprises a switch to cut off electricity or gas to the stove 530.
• the control logic 501 may be integrated within the stove itself.
• Figure 5 also illustrates an loT device 105 with a motion sensor 504 for detecting the motion of certain types of electronics equipment such as a washer and/or dryer.
• a motion sensor 504 for detecting the motion of certain types of electronics equipment such as a washer and/or dryer.
• Another sensor that may be used is an audio sensor (e.g., microphone and logic) for detecting an ambient volume level.
• this embodiment may transmit notifications to the end user if certain specified conditions are met (e.g., if motion is detected for an extended period of time, indicating that the washer/dryer are not turning off).
• loT device 105 may also be equipped with a control module to turn off the washer/dryer 531 (e.g., by switching off electric/gas), automatically, and/or in response to user input.
• a first loT device with control logic and a switch may be configured to turn off all power in the user's home and a second loT device with control logic and a switch may be configured to turn off all gas in the user's home.
• loT devices with sensors may then be positioned on or near electronic or gas-powered equipment in the user's home. If the user is notified that a particular piece of equipment has been left on (e.g., the stove 530), the user may then send a command to turn off all electricity or gas in the home to prevent damage.
• the control logic 512 in the loT hub 110 and/or the loT service 120 may be configured to automatically turn off electricity or gas in such situations.
• the loT hub 110 and loT service 120 communicate at periodic intervals. If the loT service 120 detects that the connection to the loT hub 110 has been lost (e.g., by failing to receive a request or response from the loT hub for a specified duration), it will communicate this information to the end user's device 135 (e.g., by sending a text message or app-specific notification).
• the low power microcontroller 200 of each loT device 101 and the low power logic/microcontroller 301 of the loT hub 110 include a secure key store for storing encryption keys used by the embodiments described below (see, e.g., Figures 6-11 and associated text).
• the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM) as discussed below.
• SIM subscriber identify module
• Figure 6 illustrates a high level architecture which uses public key
• PKI public key exchange/encryption
• Embodiments which use public/private key pairs will first be described, followed by embodiments which use symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques.
• a unique public/private key pair is associated with each loT device 101 -102, each loT hub 110 and the loT service 120.
• a new loT hub 110 is set up, its public key is provided to the loT service 120 and when a new loT device 101 is set up, it's public key is provided to both the loT hub 110 and the loT service 120.
• Various techniques for securely exchanging the public keys between devices are described below.
• all public keys are signed by a master key known to all of the receiving devices (i.e., a form of certificate) so that any receiving device can verify the validity of the public keys by validating the signatures.
• a master key known to all of the receiving devices (i.e., a form of certificate) so that any receiving device can verify the validity of the public keys by validating the signatures.
• each loT device 101 , 102 includes a secure key storage 601 , 603, respectively, for security storing each device's private key.
• Security logic 602, 1304 then utilizes the securely stored private keys to perform the encryption/decryption operations described herein.
• the loT hub 1 10 includes a secure storage 61 1 for storing the loT hub private key and the public keys of the loT devices 101 -102 and the loT service 120; as well as security logic 612 for using the keys to perform encryption/decryption operations.
• the loT service 120 may include a secure storage 621 for security storing its own private key, the public keys of various loT devices and loT hubs, and a security logic 613 for using the keys to encrypt/decrypt communication with loT hubs and devices.
• a secure storage 621 for security storing its own private key, the public keys of various loT devices and loT hubs, and a security logic 613 for using the keys to encrypt/decrypt communication with loT hubs and devices.
• the loT hub 110 when the loT hub 110 receives a public key certificate from an loT device it can verify it (e.g., by validating the signature using the master key as described above), and then extract the public key from within it and store that public key in it's secure key store 611.
• the security logic 613 encrypts the data/command using the public key of the loT device 101 to generate an encrypted loT device packet. In one embodiment, it then encrypts the loT device packet using the public key of the loT hub 1 10 to generate an loT hub packet and transmits the loT hub packet to the loT hub 110.
• the service 120 signs the encrypted message with it's private key or the master key mentioned above so that the device 101 can verify it is receiving an unaltered message from a trusted source.
• the device 101 may then validate the signature using the public key corresponding to the private key and/or the master key.
• symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques may be used instead of public/private key encryption.
• the devices may each be provided with a copy of the same symmetric key to be used for encryption and to validate signatures.
• AES Advanced Encryption Standard
• each device 101 enters into a secure key exchange protocol to exchange a symmetric key with the loT hub 110.
• a secure key provisioning protocol such as the Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP) may be used to exchange the keys over a secure communication channel (see, e.g., Request for Comments (RFC) 6063).
• RRC Request for Comments
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular key provisioning protocol.
• the symmetric keys may be used by each device 101 and the loT hub 1 10 to encrypt communications.
• the loT hub 1 10 and loT service 120 may perform a secure symmetric key exchange and then use the exchanged symmetric keys to encrypt communications.
• a new symmetric key is exchanged periodically between the devices 101 and the hub 110 and between the hub 110 and the loT service 120.
• a new symmetric key is exchanged with each new communication session between the devices 101 , the hub 110, and the service 120 (e.g., a new key is generated and securely exchanged for each communication session).
• the service 120 could negotiate a session key with the hub security module 1312 and then the security module 612 would negotiate a session key with each device 120. Messages from the service 120 would then be decrypted and verified in the hub security module 612 before being re-encrypted for transmission to the device 101.
• a one-time (permanent) installation key may be negotiated between the device 101 and service 120 at installation time.
• the service 120 could first encrypt MAC with this device installation key, then encrypt/MAC that with the hub's session key.
• the hub 110 would then verify and extract the encrypted device blob and send that to the device.
• a counter mechanism is implemented to prevent replay attacks.
• each successive communication from the device 101 to the hub 110 may be assigned a continually increasing counter value.
• Both the hub 110 and device 101 will track this value and verify that the value is correct in each successive communication between the devices.
• the same techniques may be implemented between the hub 110 and the service 120. Using a counter in this manner would make it more difficult to spoof the communication between each of the devices (because the counter value would be incorrect). However, even without this a shared installation key between the service and device would prevent network (hub) wide attacks to all devices.
• the loT hub 110 when using public/private key encryption, uses its private key to decrypt the loT hub packet and generate the encrypted loT device packet, which it transmits to the associated loT device 101.
• the loT device 101 then uses its private key to decrypt the loT device packet to generate the
• command data originated from the loT service 120. It may then process the data and/or execute the command.
• each device would encrypt and decrypt with the shared symmetric key. If either case, each transmitting device may also sign the message with it's private key so that the receiving device can verify it's authenticity.
• a different set of keys may be used to encrypt communication from the loT device 101 to the loT hub 110 and to the loT service 120.
• the security logic 602 on the loT device 101 uses the public key of the loT hub 110 to encrypt data packets sent to the loT hub 110.
• the security logic 612 on the loT hub 110 may then decrypt the data packets using the loT hub's private key.
• the security logic 602 on the loT device 101 and/or the security logic 612 on the loT hub 110 may encrypt data packets sent to the loT service 120 using the public key of the loT service 120 (which may then be decrypted by the security logic 613 on the loT service 120 using the service's private key).
• the device 101 and hub 110 may share a symmetric key while the hub and service 120 may share a different symmetric key.
• data/command itself is not encrypted, but a key is used to generate a signature over the data/command (or other data structure). The recipient may then use its key to validate the signature.
• the secure key storage on each loT device 101 is implemented using a programmable subscriber identity module (SIM) 701.
• SIM subscriber identity module
• the loT device 101 may initially be provided to the end user with an un-programmed SIM card 701 seated within a SIM interface 700 on the loT device 101.
• the user takes the programmable SIM card 701 out of the SIM interface 500 and inserts it into a SIM programming interface 702 on the loT hub 110.
• Programming logic 725 on the loT hub then securely programs the SIM card 701 to register/pair the loT device 101 with the loT hub 110 and loT service 120.
• a public/private key pair may be randomly generated by the programming logic 725 and the public key of the pair may then be stored in the loT hub's secure storage device 411 while the private key may be stored within the programmable SIM 701.
• the programming logic 525 may store the public keys of the loT hub 110, the loT service 120, and/or any other ⁇ devices 101 on the SIM card 601 (to be used by the security logic 1302 on the loT device 101 to encrypt outgoing data).
• the new loT device 101 may be provisioned with the loT Service 120 using the SIM as a secure identifier (e.g., using existing techniques for registering a device using a SIM).
• both the loT hub 110 and the loT service 120 will securely store a copy of the loT device's public key to be used when encrypting communication with the loT device 101.
• the techniques described above with respect to Figure 7 provide enormous flexibility when providing new loT devices to end users. Rather than requiring a user to directly register each SIM with a particular service provider upon sale/purchase (as is currently done), the SIM may be programmed directly by the end user via the loT hub 110 and the results of the programming may be securely communicated to the loT service 120. Consequently, new loT devices 101 may be sold to end users from online or local retailers and later securely provisioned with the loT service 120.
• SIM Subscriber Identity Module
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to a "SIM" device. Rather, the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented using any type of device having secure storage for storing a set of encryption keys.
• the embodiments above include a removable SIM device, in one embodiment, the SIM device is not removable but the loT device itself may be inserted within the programming interface 702 of the loT hub 110.
• the SIM is pre-programmed into the loT device 101 , prior to distribution to the end user.
• various techniques described herein may be used to securely exchange encryption keys between the loT hub 110/loT service 120 and the new loT device 101.
• each loT device 101 or SIM 401 may be packaged with a barcode or QR code 701 uniquely identifying the loT device 101 and/or SIM 701.
• the barcode or QR code 801 comprises an encoded representation of the public key for the loT device 101 or SIM 1001.
• the barcode or QR code 801 may be used by the loT hub 110 and/or loT service 120 to identify or generate the public key (e.g., used as a pointer to the public key which is already stored in secure storage).
• the barcode or QR code 601 may be printed on a separate card (as shown in Figure 8A) or may be printed directly on the loT device itself.
• the ⁇ hub 110 is equipped with a barcode reader 206 for reading the barcode and providing the resulting data to the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 110 and/or the security logic 1013 on the loT service 120.
• the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 110 may then store the public key for the loT device within its secure key storage 1011 and the security logic 1013 on the loT service 120 may store the public key within its secure storage 1021 (to be used for subsequent encrypted communication).
• the data contained in the barcode or QR code 801 may also be captured via a user device 135 (e.g., such as an iPhone or Android device) with an installed loT app or browser-based applet designed by the loT service provider.
• a user device 135 e.g., such as an iPhone or Android device
• the barcode data may be securely communicated to the loT service 120 over a secure connection (e.g., such as a secure sockets layer (SSL) connection).
• SSL secure sockets layer
• the barcode data may also be provided from the client device 135 to the loT hub 110 over a secure local connection (e.g., over a local WiFi or Bluetooth LE connection).
• the security logic 1002 on the loT device 101 and the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 110 may be implemented using hardware, software, firmware or any combination thereof.
• the security logic 1002, 1012 is implemented within the chips used for establishing the local communication channel 130 between the loT device 101 and the loT hub 110 (e.g., the Bluetooth LE chip if the local channel 130 is Bluetooth LE).
• the security logic 1002, 1012 is designed to establish a secure execution environment for executing certain types of program code. This may be implemented, for example, by using TrustZone technology (available on some ARM processors) and/or Trusted Execution Technology (designed by Intel).
• TrustZone technology available on some ARM processors
• Trusted Execution Technology designed by Intel.
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of secure execution technology.
• the barcode or QR code 701 may be used to pair each loT device 101 with the loT hub 110.
• a pairing code embedded within the barcode or QR code 701 may be provided to the loT hub 110 to pair the loT hub with the corresponding loT device.
• Figure 8B illustrates one embodiment in which the barcode reader 206 on the loT hub 110 captures the barcode/QR code 801 associated with the loT device 101.
• the barcode/QR code 801 may be printed directly on the loT device 101 or may be printed on a separate card provided with the loT device 101.
• the barcode reader 206 reads the pairing code from the barcode/QR code 801 and provides the pairing code to the local communication module 880.
• the local communication module 880 is a Bluetooth LE chip and associated software, although the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular protocol standard.
• the pairing code is received, it is stored in a secure storage containing pairing data 885 and the loT device 101 and loT hub 110 are automatically paired. Each time the loT hub is paired with a new loT device in this manner, the pairing data for that pairing is stored within the secure storage 685.
• the local communication module 880 of the loT hub 110 may use the code as a key to encrypt communications over the local wireless channel with the loT device 101.
• the local communication module 890 stores pairing data within a local secure storage device 895 indicating the pairing with the loT hub.
• the pairing data 895 may include the pre-programmed pairing code identified in the barcode/QR code 801.
• the pairing data 895 may also include pairing data received from the local communication module 880 on the loT hub 110 required for establishing a secure local communication channel (e.g., an additional key to encrypt communication with the loT hub 110).
• the barcode QR code 801 may be used to perform local pairing in a far more secure manner than current wireless pairing protocols because the pairing code is not transmitted over the air.
• the same barcode/QR code 801 used for pairing may be used to identify encryption keys to build a secure connection from the loT device 101 to the loT hub 110 and from the loT hub 110 to the loT service 120.
• FIG. 9 A method for programming a SIM card in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 9. The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
• a user receives a new loT device with a blank SIM card and, at 802, the user inserts the blank SIM card into an loT hub.
• the user programs the blank SIM card with a set of one or more encryption keys.
• the loT hub may randomly generate a public/private key pair and store the private key on the SIM card and the public key in its local secure storage.
• at least the public key is transmitted to the loT service so that it may be used to identify the loT device and establish encrypted communication with the loT device.
• a programmable device other than a "SIM" card may be used to perform the same functions as the SIM card in the method shown in Figure 9.
• Figure 10 The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
• a user receives a new loT device to which an encryption key has been pre-assigned.
• the key is securely provided to the loT hub.
• this involves reading a barcode associated with the loT device to identify the public key of a public/private key pair assigned to the device.
• the barcode may be read directly by the loT hub or captured via a mobile device via an app or bowser.
• a secure communication channel such as a Bluetooth LE channel, a near field communication (NFC) channel or a secure WiFi channel may be established between the loT device and the loT hub to exchange the key. Regardless of how the key is transmitted, once received, it is stored in the secure keystore of the loT hub device.
• the loT hub may store and protect the key such as Secure Enclaves, Trusted Execution Technology (TXT), and/or Trustzone.
• TXT Trusted Execution Technology
• the key is securely transmitted to the loT service which stores the key in its own secure keystore. It may then use the key to encrypt communication with the loT device.
• the exchange may be implemented using a certificate/signed key.
• the hub 110 it is particularly important to prevent modification/addition/ removal of the stored keys.
• FIG. 11 A method for securely communicating commands/data to an loT device using public/private keys is illustrated in Figure 11. The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
• the loT service encrypts the data/commands using the loT device public key to create an loT device packet. It then encrypts the loT device packet using loT hub's public key to create the loT hub packet (e.g., creating an loT hub wrapper around the loT device packet).
• the loT service transmits the loT hub packet to the loT hub.
• the loT hub decrypts the loT hub packet using the loT hub's private key to generate the loT device packet.
• the loT device processes the data/commands.
• a symmetric key exchange may be negotiated between each of the devices (e.g., each device and the hub and between the hub and the service). Once the key exchange is complete, each transmitting device encrypts and/or signs each transmission using the symmetric key before transmitting data to the receiving device.
• the loT hub In order to connect the loT hub to a local wireless network such as a WiFi network, the user must provide network credentials such as a network security key or password. Other layers of authentication may also be required such as a user
• the loT hub securely transmits the network credentials to a secure storage location such as the loT service 120.
• the loT device may be configured to transmit a request for network credentials to the loT hub.
• the loT hub may forward the request to the loT service 120 which may perform a lookup in a credentials database using, for example, the identity of the loT device, the user, and/or the access point to which connection is needed to identify the relevant network credentials. If the network credentials can be identified, they are transmitted back to the loT device, which then uses the network credentials to seamlessly connect to the local wireless network.
• FIG 12 illustrates an exemplary system architecture in which a credentials management module 1210 on the loT hub 1202 implements the credential processing techniques described herein.
• the user may provide network credentials such as a network security key or password to the loT hub 1202 via a user device 135 (which may be a mobile smartphone device, wearable data processing device, laptop computer, or desktop computer).
• the user device 135 initially connects to the loT hub 1202 through a wired connection or a short range wireless connection such as BTLE and the user provides the credentials via an app or browser configured to connect with the loT hub 1202.
• the network credentials comprise a security key such as a Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) or Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2).
• WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access
• WPA2 Wi-Fi Protected Access II
• the network credentials may be in the form of a pre-shared key (PSK) for WPA-Personal implementations or may rely on more advanced authentication techniques such as those used by WPA-Enterprise (which may utilize a RADIUS authentication server and various forms of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)).
• PSK pre-shared key
• EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
• the loT hub 1202 uses the credentials to establish a secure wireless connection to the WiFi access point router 1200 which then provides connectivity to a cloud service 1220 over the Internet 1222.
• the credentials management module 1210 on the loT hub 1210 establishes a connection with a credentials management module 1215 on the cloud service 1220 (e.g., which may be the loT service 120 or an external web site 130 described above).
• one or more of the key-based s techniques described above may be employed to ensure that the connection between the credentials management module 1210 on the loT hub 1202 and the credentials management module 1215 on the cloud service 1220 is secure (e.g., using a symmetric or asymmetric key to encrypt all network traffic).
• the credentials management module 1210 on the loT hub 1202 transmits a copy of the network credentials to the credentials management module 1215 on the cloud service, which stores a copy of the credentials in a secure credentials database 1230.
• the credentials database 1230 may include data uniquely identifying the loT hub 1202, data uniquely identifying the user account associated with the loT hub 1202, and/or data uniquely identifying the WiFi access point/router 1200 (to ensure that the network credentials are associated with the correct user and WiFi access point/router).
• the loT device will enable its local wireless interface (e.g., BTLE) and search for any enabled devices within coverage (e.g., the loT Hub 1202, other loT devices, or the user's mobile device).
• the loT device 1300 has detected and connected to an loT hub 1202.
• a network registration module 1310 transmits a network credentials request to the credentials management module 1210 on the loT hub 1202.
• the credentials request may include data identifying the WiFi access point/router 1200 to which the loT device 1300 would like to connect (e.g., the SSID, MAC address or other data uniquely identifying the WiFi access point/router 1200) as well as data uniquely identifying the loT device 1300.
• the credentials management module 1210 then securely transmits a credentials management request to the credentials management module 1215 on the cloud service 1220, which uses the data uniquely identifying the user, the loT device 1300, and/or the WiFi access point/router 1200 to perform a lookup in the credentials database 1230.
• any of the key-based security techniques may be used to ensure the connection between the loT hub and cloud service is secure.
• the credentials management module 1215 securely transmits the network credentials back to the credentials management module 1210 on the loT hub 1202, which then provides the network credentials to the network registration module 1310 of the loT device 1300.
• the loT device 1300 uses the network credentials to automatically establish a secure connection to the WiFi access point/router 1200.
• the end result is that the user is not required to manually configure the new loT device 1300 to connect with the WiFi access point router 1200. Rather, because the network credentials have already been associated with the user's account on the cloud service 1220 they may be automatically provided to the loT device 1300 which will then seamlessly connect to the network.
• Figure 13 illustrates the loT device 1300 connecting through an loT hub 1202
• the loT device 1300 may connect through another loT device if the lot hub 1202 is not within range.
• the other loT device (which is connected to the loT hub) may then couple the new loT device to the credentials management module 1210 on the loT hub 1202.
• the loT device 1300 may be configured to connect with the user's mobile device 135, which may include a browser/app to connect with the credentials management module 1215 on the cloud service (either directly or through the loT hub 1202).
• the network registration module 1310 on the loT hub 1300 is configured to search first for an loT hub 1202, then for another loT device, and then for a user mobile device. It will then connect to the first one of the above devices to offer a connection.
• the above connections may be formed using any type of local communication protocol including, but not limited to BTLE.
• the network credentials may be stored locally in a secure storage device accessible by the loT hub 1202 or contained within the loT hub 1202 (in addition to or in lieu of storing the network credentials remotely on the cloud service 1220). Consequently, in this embodiment, the network credentials may be provided without the need for a remote query to the cloud service 1220.
• the term "cloud service” and ⁇ cloud service” may refer to any service on the Internet capable of storing and providing network credentials for loT devices as described herein (e.g., such as the loT service and external services referenced above).
• the cloud service 1220 is owned and operated by the same entity that provides the loT hub and loT devices to the end user.
• at least some of the loT devices may be designed and sold by OEMs which coordinate with the cloud service (e.g., via an agreed-upon business arrangement) to ensure that the techniques described herein may be implemented using the cloud service 1220.
• FIG. 14 A method for collecting and storing network credentials in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 14. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any particular architecture.
• the user provides network credentials to the loT hub.
• the credentials may be provided, for example, through a network setup wizard executed within a browser or app installed on the user's data processing device, which may connect to the loT hub through a wired or local wireless connection (e.g., BTLE).
• BTLE wired or local wireless connection
• the loT hub establishes a secure connection to the loT cloud service over the Internet and, at 1403, securely transmits the network credentials to the loT cloud service.
• the loT Cloud Service stores the network credentials in its database, associating the credentials with the user's account on the loT cloud service and/or with the particular WiFi access point/router for which the network credentials are being used.
• Figure 15 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention for seamlessly updating a new loT device using stored network credentials.
• the method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any particular architecture.
• the user receives a new loT device.
• the loT device may have been ordered from the loT cloud service and/or from an OEM who has a relationship with the loT cloud service. In either case, the new loT device is associated with the an account of the user who received the new loT device.
• the new loT device when the new loT device is powered on, it initially searches for a local loT hub. As mentioned, the search may be performed using a local wireless protocol such as BTLE. If it cannot locate an loT hub (e.g., because it is out of range), it may then search for another loT device and/or a mobile device of the end user (with an app or browser installed thereon to enable a connection to the loT cloud service). [00124] At 1503 a determination is made as to whether the new loT device has detected the presence of an loT hub, another loT device, or the user's mobile device.
• BTLE a local wireless protocol
• the new loT device connects to the loT hub and, at 1505, the loT hub retrieves the network credentials from the cloud service on behalf of the new loT device and provides the credentials to the new loT device.
• the new loT device uses the network credentials to register with the wireless network.
• the new loT device detects another loT device, then at 1506 it connects to the other loT device and, at 1507, the loT device retrieves the network credentials from the loT cloud service and provides them to the new loT device. In one embodiment, this may be accomplished through the loT hub (i.e., if the other device is connected to the loT hub). Once again, at 1510, the new loT device uses the network credentials to register with the wireless network.
• the new loT device detects the user's mobile device, then at 1508, it connects to the mobile device.
• the connection is managed by an app such as a connection wizard or browser-executable code on the user's mobile device.
• the loT device retrieves the network credentials from the loT cloud service and provides them to the new loT device. In one embodiment, this may be accomplished through the loT hub (i.e., if the other device is connected to the loT hub).
• the new loT device uses the network credentials to register with the wireless network.
• the network registration module 1310 executed on the new mobile device utilizes a connection priority scheme to determine the order of devices that it should search for when powered on. In one embodiment, it will initially search for an loT hub and, if one cannot be found, will search for other loT devices. If none or available, it will then attempt to connect to the user's mobile device. Alternatively, the new loT device may simply connect to the first device it locates and/or may connect to the device for which it sees the highest signal strength (i.e., RSSI value). Various other connection techniques may be programmed into the network registration module 1310 while still complying with the underlying principles of the invention.
• encryption and decryption of data is performed between the loT service 120 and each loT device 101 , regardless of the intermediate devices used to support the communication channel (e.g., such as the user's mobile device 611 and/or the loT hub 110).
• the intermediate devices used to support the communication channel e.g., such as the user's mobile device 611 and/or the loT hub 110.
• the loT service 120 includes an encryption engine 1660 which manages a set of "service session keys" 1650 and each loT device 101 includes an encryption engine 1661 which manages a set of "device session keys” 1651 for encrypting decrypting communication between the loT device 101 and loT service 120.
• the encryption engines may rely on different hardware modules when performing the security/encryption techniques described herein including a hardware security module 1630-1631 for (among other things) generating a session public/private key pair and preventing access to the private session key of the pair and a key stream generation module 1640-1641 for generating a key stream using a derived secret.
• the service session keys 1650 and the device session keys 1651 comprise related public/private key pairs.
• the device session keys 1651 on the loT device 101 include a public key of the loT service 120 and a private key of the loT device 101.
• the public/private session key pairs, 1650 and 1651 are used by each encryption engine, 1660 and 1661, respectively, to generate the same secret which is then used by the SKGMs 1640-1641 to generate a key stream to encrypt and decrypt communication between the loT service 120 and the loT device 101. Additional details associated with generation and use of the secret in accordance with one embodiment of the invention are provided below.
• the secret and a counter value are used to generate a key stream, which is used to encrypt each message packet. Details of this embodiment are described below with respect to Figure 17. [00131] As illustrated, an SSL connection or other secure channel may be established between the loT service 120 and the loT hub 110.
• the loT hub 110 (which does not have the ability to decrypt the message in one embodiment) transmits the encrypted message to the loT device at 1603 (e.g., over a Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) communication channel).
• the encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 may then decrypt the message using the secret and process the message contents.
• the encryption engine 1661 may generate the key stream using the secret and a counter value and then use the key stream for decryption of the message packet.
• the message itself may comprise any form of communication between the loT service 120 and loT device 101.
• the message may comprise a command packet instructing the loT device 101 to perform a particular function such as taking a measurement and reporting the result back to the client device 611 or may include configuration data to configure the operation of the loT device 101.
• the encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 uses the secret or a derived key stream to encrypt the response and transmits the encrypted response to the loT hub 110 at 1604, which forwards the response to the loT service 120 at 1605.
• the encryption engine 1660 on the loT service 120 then decrypts the response using the secret or a derived key stream and transmits the decrypted response to the client device 611 at 1606 (e.g., over the SSL or other secure communication channel).
• Figure 16B illustrates an embodiment which does not require an loT hub. Rather, in this embodiment, communication between the loT device 101 and loT service 120 occurs through the client device 611 (e.g., as in the embodiments described above with respect to Figures 6-9B).
• the client device 611 transmits an unencrypted version of the message to the loT service 120 at 1611.
• the encryption engine 1660 encrypts the message using the secret or the derived key stream and transmits the encrypted message back to the client device 611 at 1612.
• the client device 611 then forwards the encrypted message to the loT device 101 at 1613, and the encryption engine 1661 decrypts the message using the secret or the derived key stream.
• the loT device 101 may then process the message as described herein. If a response is required, the encryption engine 1661 encrypts the response using the secret and transmits the encrypted response to the client device 611 at 1614, which forwards the encrypted response to the loT service 120 at 1615. The encryption engine 1660 then decrypts the response and transmits the decrypted response to the client device 611 at 1616.
• Figure 17 illustrates a key exchange and key stream generation which may initially be performed between the loT service 120 and the loT device 101.
• this key exchange may be performed each time the loT service 120 and loT device 101 establish a new communication session.
• the key exchange may be performed and the exchanged session keys may be used for a specified period of time (e.g., a day, a week, etc). While no intermediate devices are shown in Figure 17 for simplicity, communication may occur through the loT hub 110 and/or the client device 611.
• the encryption engine 1660 of the loT service 120 sends a command to the HSM 1630 (e.g., which may be such as a CloudHSM offered by Amazon®) to generate a session public/private key pair.
• the HSM 1630 may subsequently prevent access to the private session key of the pair.
• the encryption engine on the loT device 101 may transmit a command to the HSM 1631 (e.g., such as an Atecc508 HSM from Atmel Corporation®) which generates a session public/private key pair and prevents access to the session private key of the pair.
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any specific type of encryption engine or manufacturer.
• the loT service 120 transmits its session public key generated using the HSM 1630 to the loT device 101 at 1701.
• the loT device uses its HSM 1631 to generate its own session public private key pair and, at 1702, transmits its public key of the pair to the loT service 120.
• the encryption engines 1660-1661 use an Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol, which is an anonymous key agreement that allows two parties with an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret.
• ECDH Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
• the encryption engine 1660 of the loT service 120 uses these techniques, at 1703, the encryption engine 1660 of the loT service 120 generates the secret using the loT device session public key and its own session private key.
• the loT service 120 and loT device 101 have both generated the same secret to be used to encrypt communication as described below.
• the encryption engines 1660- 1661 rely on a hardware module such as the KSGMs 1640-1641 respectively to perform the above operations for generating the secret.
• the secret may be used by the encryption engines 1660 and 1661 to encrypt and decrypt data directly.
• the encryption engines 1660-1661 send commands to the KSGMs 1640- 1641 to generate a new key stream using the secret to encrypt decrypt each data packet (i.e., a new key stream data structure is generated for each packet).
• the key stream generation module 1640-1641 one embodiment of the key stream generation module 1640-1641
• GCM Galois/Counter Mode
• the key stream is XORed with the data to generate the encrypted data packet.
• the loT device 101 transmits the counter value with the encrypted data packet to the loT service 120.
• the encryption engine 1660 on the loT service then communicates with the KSGM 1640 which uses the received counter value and the secret to generate the key stream (which should be the same key stream because the same secret and counter value are used) and uses the generated key stream to decrypt the data packet.
• data packets transmitted from the loT service 120 to the loT device 101 are encrypted in the same manner. Specifically, a counter is
• the encryption engines 1660-1661 use their own counter values to generate a key stream to encrypt data and use the counter values received with the encrypted data packets to generate a key stream to decrypt the data.
• each encryption engine 1660-1661 keeps track of the last counter value it received from the other and includes sequencing logic to detect whether a counter value is received out of sequence or if the same counter value is received more than once. If a counter value is received out of sequence, or if the same counter value is received more than once, this may indicate that a replay attack is being attempted. In response, the encryption engines 1660-1661 may disconnect from the communication channel and/or may generate a security alert.
• Figure 18 illustrates an exemplary encrypted data packet employed in one embodiment of the invention comprising a 4-byte counter value 1800, a variable-sized encrypted data field 1801 , and a 6-byte tag 1802.
• the tag 1802 comprises a checksum value to validate the decrypted data (once it has been decrypted).
• the session public/private key pairs 1650- 1651 exchanged between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 may be generated periodically and/or in response to the initiation of each new communication session.
• One embodiment of the invention implements additional techniques for authenticating sessions between the loT service 120 and loT device 101.
• hierarchy of public/private key pairs is used including a master key pair, a set of factory key pairs, and a set of loT service key pairs, and a set of loT device key pairs.
• the master key pair comprises a root of trust for all of the other key pairs and is maintained in a single, highly secure location (e.g., under the control of the organization implementing the loT systems described herein).
• the master private key may be used to generate signatures over (and thereby authenticate) various other key pairs such as the factory key pairs. The signatures may then be verified using the master public key.
• each factory which manufactures loT devices is assigned its own factory key pair which may then be used to authenticate loT service keys and loT device keys.
• a factory private key is used to generate a signature over loT service public keys and loT device public keys. These signature may then be verified using the corresponding factory public key.
• these loT service/device public keys are not the same as the "session" public/private keys described above with respect to Figures 16A-B.
• the session public/private keys described above are temporary (i.e., generated for a service device session) while the loT service/device key pairs are permanent (i.e., generated at the factory).
• one embodiment of the invention performs the following operations to provide additional layers of authentication and security between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 :
• the loT service 120 initially generates a message containing the following:
• the Factory Certificate including:
• loT service session public key signature (e.g., signed with the loT service's private key)
• the message is sent to the loT device on the negotiation channel (described below).
• the loT device parses the message and:
• the loT device then generates a message containing the following:
• This message is sent back to the loT service.
• the loT service parses the message and:
• the loT service then generates a message containing a signature of (loT device session public key + loT service session public key) signed with the loT service's key.
• the loT device parses the message and:
• the loT device then sends a "messaging available" message.
• the loT device receives the message and:
• the loT service recognizes the message payload contains a boomerang update and:
• J. loT device receives the message and sets his paired state to true
• GATT is an acronym for the Generic Attribute Profile, and it defines the way that two Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) devices transfer data back and forth. It makes use of a generic data protocol called the Attribute Protocol (ATT), which is used to store Services, Characteristics and related data in a simple lookup table using 16-bit
• BTLE Bluetooth Low Energy
• Characteristic IDs for each entry in the table. Note that while the “characteristics” are sometimes referred to as “attributes.”
• the most commonly used characteristic is the devices "name” (having characteristic ID 10752 (0x2A00)).
• a Bluetooth device may identify other Bluetooth devices within its vicinity by reading the "Name"
• Bluetooth device have the inherent ability to exchange data without formally pairing/bonding the devices (note that “paring” and “bonding” are sometimes used interchangeably; the remainder of this discussion will use the term “pairing”).
• One embodiment of the invention takes advantage of this capability to communicate with BTLE-enabled loT devices without formally pairing with these devices. Pairing with each individual loT device would extremely inefficient because of the amount of time required to pair with each device and because only one paired connection may be established at a time.
• FIG 19 illustrates one particular embodiment in which a Bluetooth (BT) device 1910 establishes a network socket abstraction with a BT communication module 1901 of an loT device 101 without formally establishing a paired BT connection.
• the BT device 1910 may be included in an loT hub 110 and/or a client device 611 such as shown in Figure 16 A.
• the BT communication module 1901 maintains a data structure containing a list of characteristic IDs, names associated with those characteristic IDs and values for those characteristic IDs. The value for each characteristic may be stored within a 20-byte buffer identified by the characteristic ID in accordance with the current BT standard.
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular buffer size.
• the "Name” characteristic is a BT-defined characteristic which is assigned a specific value of "loT Device 14."
• One embodiment of the invention specifies a first set of additional characteristics to be used for negotiating a secure communication channel with the BT device 1910 and a second set of additional characteristics to be used for encrypted communication with the BT device 1910.
• a "negotiation write” characteristic identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65532> in the illustrated example, may be used to transmit outgoing negotiation messages and the "negotiation read" characteristic, identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> may be used to receive incoming negotiation messages.
• the "negotiation messages” may include messages used by the BT device 1910 and the BT communication module 1901 to establish a secure communication channel as described herein.
• the loT device 101 may receive the loT service session public key 1701 via the "negotiation read" characteristic ⁇ 65533>.
• the key 1701 may be transmitted from the loT service 120 to a BTLE-enabled loT hub 110 or client device 611 which may then use GATT to write the key 1701 to the negotiation read value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533>.
• loT device application logic 1902 may then read the key 1701 from the value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> and process it as described above (e.g., using it to generate a secret and using the secret to generate a key stream, etc).
• the key 1701 is greater than 20 bytes (the maximum buffer size in some current implementations), then it may be written in 20-byte portions.
• the first 20 bytes may be written by the BT communication module 1903 to characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> and read by the loT device application logic 1902, which may then write an acknowledgement message to the negotiation write value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65532>.
• the BT communication module 1903 may read this acknowledgement from characteristic ID ⁇ 65532> and responsively write the next 20 bytes of the key 1701 to the negotiation read value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533>.
• a network socket abstraction defined by characteristic IDs ⁇ 65532> and ⁇ 65533> is established for exchanging negotiation messages used to establish a secure communication channel.
• a second network socket abstraction is established using characteristic ID ⁇ 65534> (for transmitting encrypted data packets from loT device 101 ) and characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> (for receiving encrypted data packets by loT device). That is, when BT communication module 1903 has an encrypted data packet to transmit (e.g., such as encrypted message 1603 in Figure 16A), it starts writing the encrypted data packet, 20 bytes at a time, using the message read value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533>. The loT device application logic 1902 will then read the encrypted data packet, 20 bytes at a time, from the read value buffer, sending acknowledgement messages to the BT communication module 1903 as needed via the write value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65532>.
• characteristic ID ⁇ 65534> for transmitting encrypted data packets from loT device 101
• characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> for receiving encrypted data packets by loT device.
• the commands of GET, SET, and UPDATE described below are used to exchange data and commands between the two BT communication modules 1901 and 1903.
• the BT communication module 1903 may send a packet identifying characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> and containing the SET command to write into the value field/buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> which may then be read by the loT device application logic 1902.
• the BT communication module 1903 may transmit a GET command directed to the value field/buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65534>.
• the BT communication module 1901 may transmit an UPDATE packet to the BT communication module 1903 containing the data from the value field/buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65534>.
• UPDATE packets may be transmitted automatically, in response to changes in a particular attribute on the loT device 101. For example, if the loT device is associated with a lighting system and the user turns on the lights, then an UPDATE packet may be sent to reflect the change to the on/off attribute associated with the lighting application.
• Figure 20 illustrates exemplary packet formats used for GET, SET, and UPDATE in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.
• these packets are transmitted over the message write ⁇ 65534> and message read ⁇ 65533> channels following negotiation.
• a first 1-byte field includes a value (0X10) which identifies the packet as a GET packet.
• a second 1 -byte field includes a request ID, which uniquely identifies the current GET command (i.e., identifies the current transaction with which the GET command is associated).
• each instance of a GET command transmitted from a service or device may be assigned a different request ID. This may be done, for example, by incrementing a counter and using the counter value as the request ID.
• the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular manner for setting the request ID.
• a 2-byte attribute ID identifies the application-specific attribute to which the packet is directed. For example, if the GET command is being sent to loT device 101 illustrated in Figure 19, the attribute ID may be used to identify the particular application-specific value being requested.
• the SET packet 2002 and UPDATE packet 2003 illustrated in Figure 20 also include a first 1-byte field identifying the type of packet (i.e., SET and UPDATE), a second 1-byte field containing a request ID, and a 2-byte attribute ID field identifying an application-defined attribute.
• the SET packet includes a 2-byte length value identifying the length of data contained in an n-byte value data field.
• the value data field may include a command to be executed on the loT device and/or configuration data to configure the operation of the loT device in some manner (e.g., to set a desired parameter, to power down the loT device, etc). For example, if the loT device 101 controls the speed of a fan, the value field may reflect the current fan speed.
• the UPDATE packet 2003 may be transmitted to provide an update of the results of the SET command.
• the UPDATE packet 2003 includes a 2-byte length value field to identify the length of the n-byte value data field which may include data related to the results of the SET command.
• a 1-byte update state field may identify the current state of the variable being updated. For example, if the SET command attempted to turn off a light controlled by the loT device, the update state field may indicate whether the light was successfully turned off.
• Figure 21 illustrates an exemplary sequence of transactions between the loT service 120 and an loT device 101 involving the SET and UPDATE commands.
• the SET command 2101 is transmitted form the loT service to the loT device 101 and received by the BT communication module 1901 which responsively updates the GATT value buffer identified by the characteristic ID at 2102.
• the SET command is read from the value buffer by the low power microcontroller (MCU) 200 at 2103 (or by program code being executed on the low power MCU such as loT device application logic 1902 shown in Figure 19).
• the MCU 200 or program code performs an operation in response to the SET command.
• the SET command may include an attribute ID specifying a new configuration parameter such as a new temperature or may include a state value such as on/off (to cause the loT device to enter into an "on" or a low power state).
• a new configuration parameter such as a new temperature
• a state value such as on/off (to cause the loT device to enter into an "on" or a low power state).
• the new value is set in the loT device and an UPDATE command is returned at 2105 and the actual value is updated in a GATT value field at 2106.
• the actual value will be equal to the desired value.
• the updated value may be different (i.e., because it may take time for the loT device 101 to update certain types of values).
• the UPDATE command is transmitted back to the loT service 120 containing the actual value from the GATT value field.
• Figure 22 illustrates a method for implementing a secure communication channel between an loT service and an loT device in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.
• the method may be implemented within the context of the network architectures described above but is not limited to any specific architecture.
• the loT service creates an encrypted channel to communicate with the loT hub using elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) certificates.
• the loT service encrypts data/commands in loT device packets using the a session secret to create an encrypted device packet.
• the session secret may be independently generated by the loT device and the loT service.
• the loT service transmits the encrypted device packet to the loT hub over the encrypted channel.
• the loT hub passes the encrypted devic packet to the loT device.
• the loT device uses the session secret to decrypt the encrypted device packet.
• this may be accomplished by using the secret and a counter value (provided with the encrypted device packet) to generate a key stream and then using the key stream to decrypt the packet.
• the loT device then extracts and processes the data and/or commands contained within the device packet.
• bi-directional, secure network socket abstractions may be established between two BT-enabled devices without formally pairing the BT devices using standard pairing techniques. While these techniques are described above with respect to an loT device 101 communicating with an loT service 120, the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented to negotiate and establish a secure communication channel between any two BT-enabled devices.
• Figures 23A-C illustrate a detailed method for pairing devices in accordance with one embodiment of the invention. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any specific system architectures.
• the loT Service creates a packet containing serial number and public key of the loT Service.
• the loT Service signs the packet using the factory private key.
• the loT Service sends the packet over an encrypted channel to the loT hub and at 2304 the loT hub forwards the packet to loT device over an unencrypted channel.
• the loT device verifies the signature of packet and, at 2306, the loT device generates a packet containing the serial number and public key of the loT Device.
• the loT device signs the packet using the factory private key and at 2308, the loT device sends the packet over the unencrypted channel to the loT hub.
• the loT hub forwards the packet to the loT service over an encrypted channel and at 2310, the loT Service verifies the signature of the packet.
• the loT Service generates a session key pair, and at 2312 the loT Service generates a packet containing the session public key.
• the loT Service then signs the packet with loT Service private key at 2313 and, at 2314, the loT Service sends the packet to the loT hub over the encrypted channel.
• the loT hub forwards the packet to the loT device over the unencrypted channel at 2315 and, at 2316, the loT device verifies the signature of packet.
• the loT device generates session key pair (e.g., using the techniques described above), and, at 2318, an loT device packet is generated containing the loT device session public key.
• the loT device signs the loT device packet with loT device private key.
• the loT device sends the packet to the loT hub over the unencrypted channel and, at 2321 , the loT hub forwards the packet to the loT service over an encrypted channel.
• the loT service verifies the signature of the packet (e.g., using the loT device public key) and, at 2323, the loT service uses the loT service private key and the loT device public key to generate the session secret (as described in detail above).
• the loT device uses the loT device private key and loT service public key to generate the session secret (again, as described above) and, at 2325, the loT device generates a random number and encrypts it using the session secret.
• the loT service sends the encrypted packet to loT hub over the encrypted channel.
• the loT hub forwards the encrypted packet to the loT device over the unencrypted channel.
• the loT device decrypts the packet using the session secret.
• the loT device re-encrypts the packet using the session secret at 2329 and, at 2330, the loT device sends the encrypted packet to the loT hub over the unencrypted channel.
• the loT hub forwards the encrypted packet to the loT service over the encrypted channel.
• the loT service decrypts the packet using the session secret at 2332.
• the loT service verifies that the random number matches the random number it sent.
• the loT service then sends a packet indicating that pairing is complete at 2334 and all subsequent messages are encrypted using the session secret at 2335.
• loT devices and loT hubs may be configured to establish communication channels over WiFi networks.
• a configuration must be performed to provide the WiFi key to the loT device/hub.
• the embodiments of the invention described below include techniques for connecting an loT hub to a secure WiFi channel by sharing security data such as a WiFi key, thereby simplifying the configuration process.
• one embodiment of the invention is implemented within the context of an loT hub 110 designed to connect a plurality of loT devices 101 - 103 to an loT service 120 over the Internet 220 (as in prior embodiments described above).
• the security techniques described above are used to securely provide the loT hub 110 with a WiFi key and other data such as the SSID of for a local WiFi router 116.
• an app on the client device 135 temporarily performs the functions of an loT hub to
• the loT hub 110 and loT service 120 then establish a secure communication channel to provide the WiFi security data to the loT hub as described below.
• Figure 25 illustrates how the loT hub 110 and loT service 120 include the various security components described above for establishing a secure communication channel, including encryption engines 1660-1661, secure key stores 1650-1651, KSGM modules 1640-1641, and HSM modules 1630-1631. These components operate substantially as described above to securely connect the loT hub 110 to the loT service 120.
• a client app 2505 (or other program code) executed on the client device 135 includes hub/service connection logic 2503 for establishing a communication channel between the loT hub 110 and the loT service 120 and a security module 2502 for generating and sharing a secret used to encrypt the WiFi security data, as described below.
• the client device 130 forms a BTLE connection with the loT hub 110 and a WiFi or cellular data connection with the loT service 120 to establish the connection between the loT hub 110 and the loT service 120.
• the loT service 120 authenticates with the loT hub using the ECDH key exchange techniques described above.
• the hub/service connection logic 2503 on the client device 135 performs the same or similar functions as the loT hub described above (e.g., forming a two way communication channel to pass the data traffic between the loT hub 110 and the loT service 120).
• a security module 2502 of the client app 2505 generates a secret to be used for encryption and sends it to the loT hub over the BTLE
• the secret comprises a 32 byte random number (e.g., generated in a similar manner as the keystream described above).
• the secret may be sent in the clear in this embodiment because an attacker will not have access to the underlying data to use it on (e.g., the WiFi key and associated data).
• the client app 2505 then retrieves the WiFi key and other WiFi data (e.g., such as the SSID), encrypts it using the secret, and sends it to the loT service 120.
• the client app 2505 requests this information directly from the user (e.g., asking the user to enter the key via a GUI).
• the client app 2505 retrieves it from a local secure storage following authentication by the end user.
• the loT service 120 cannot read the WiFi key and other data because it does not have the secret generated by the security module 2502.
• the loT service 120 then encrypts the (already encrypted) key and other data and sends the twice-encrypted key/data to the loT hub 110 via the hub/service connection logic 2503.
• the client app 2505 of this embodiment cannot read this traffic because only the loT service 120 and the loT hub 110 have the session secret (see, e.g., Figures 16A-23C and associated text).
• the loT hub 110 decrypts the twice-encrypted key/data using the session secret to generate the encrypted key/data (the version encrypted using the secret generated by the security module 2502).
• WiFi data processing logic 2510 on the loT hub uses the secret provided by the security module 2502 to decrypt the encrypted key and other data, resulting in a fully-decrypted WiFi key and associated data. It may then use the WiFi key and data (e.g., the SSID of the WiFi router 116) to establish a secure communication channel with the local WiFi router 116. It may then use this connection to connect with the loT service 120.
• the WiFi key and data e.g., the SSID of the WiFi router 116
• FIG. 26 A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 26. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any particular architectures.
• the loT service creates an encrypted communication channel using a session secret to communicate with the loT hub via a client device.
• the app on the client device generates a secret to be used for encryption and sends the secret to the loT hub.
• the app on the client device retrieves the WiFi key, encrypts it using the secret, and sends it to the loT service.
• retrieving the WiFi key may involve the user manually entering the key or reading the key from a secure storage on the client device.
• the loT service encrypts the already-encrypted key to generate a twice-encrypted key and sends it to the loT hub via the client device app.
• the loT hub decrypts the twice-encrypted key using the session secret used to form the secure communication channel between the loT hub and the loT service.
• the resulting encrypted key is the version which was encrypted using the secret generated by the app on the client device.
• the loT hub decrypts the encrypted key using the secret provided by the app, resulting in an unencrypted key.
• the loT hub uses the unencrypted WiFi key to establish a secure WiFi connection, which it uses to connect to the loT service.
• One embodiment of the invention implements techniques to securely and automatically connect new loT devices and loT hubs to a WiFi router.
• This embodiment will initially be described with respect to Figure 27 which includes a master loT hub 2716 which forms local wireless connections to one or more extender loT hubs 2710- 2711 and/or loT devices 105.
• an "extender" loT hub is one which extends the wireless range of the master loT hub 2716 to connect loT devices 101-104 to the loT system (e.g., loT devices which are out of range of the master loT hub 2716).
• the loT devices 101-104 may form BTLE connections with the loT extender hubs 2710-2711 (using the various techniques described herein) and the extender loT hubs 2710-2711 form WiFi connections to the master loT hub 2716.
• the master loT hub 2716 may also form local wireless connections (e.g., BTLE or WiFi connections) directly to certain loT devices 105 within range.
• the master loT hub 2716 is also a WiFi router which connects the various loT devices 101-105 and loT extender hubs 2710-2711 to the loT service 120 over the Internet 220.
• the master loT hub 2716 includes an authentication module 2720 to authenticate the various loT devices 101-105 and extender loT hubs 2710-2711 on the local network.
• the authentication module 2720 uses a hidden service set identifier (SSID) with a known common name which is preprogrammed into the various loT devices 101 -105 and extender loT hubs 2710-2711.
• SSID hidden service set identifier
• an SSID such as "_afero” may be used by the authentication module 2720 and each loT device 101 -104 and extender loT hub 2710-2711 may be pre- programmed with this SSID so that these hubs/devices may automatically connect with the master loT hub 2716.
• the authentication logic 2720 may require a security passphrase such as WPA2 passphrase.
• each loT device 101-105 and extender loT hub 2710-2711 is also pre-programmed with this passphrase to automatically connect to the master loT hub 2716 during user installation.
• a firewall 2730 is implemented on the master loT hub 2716 to prevent all incoming connection requests and outgoing connection requests except those to a small set of servers within the loT service 120 (or other external services) having known host names.
• the loT devices 101-105 may use the loT service 120 through the master loT hub 2716 but are not permitted to connect to any servers other than those programmed in the master loT hub 2716. In this manner, the loT devices 101-104 may be securely configured and connected to the loT service 120 by an end user.
• the authentication module 2720 or firewall 2730 may be programmed with a whitelist identifying all loT devices 101-105 and extender loT hubs 2710-2711 which are permitted to connect to the master loT hub 2716.
• the medium access control (MAC) address of each authorized loT device 101-105 and extender loT hub 2710-2711 are included in the whitelist. Only those loT devices and extender loT hubs which are on the whitelist are permitted to connect through the master loT hub 2716.
• the loT service 120 may periodically update the whitelist as new loT devices 101-105 and extender loT hubs 2710-2711 are provided to end users.
• an existing WiFi router may be configured to perform the various functions described herein.
• the firewall 2730 of a WiFi router may be programmed to block all incoming and outgoing connections other than those from servers of the loT service 120.
• the firewall 2730 may be configured to only allow connections from loT devices and loT extender hubs with MAC addresses on a whitelist (which, as described above, may be updated periodically or dynamically from the loT service 120).
• the WiFi router may be programmed with a hidden SSID and passphrase pre-configured on the loT devices 101-105 and loT extender hubs 2710-2711.
• the master loT hub is programmed with a hidden SSID and passphrase.
• one or more extender loT hubs and/or loT devices connect to the master loT hub using the SSID and passphrase.
• the firewall on the master loT hub is programmed to block any incoming connection requests and outgoing connection requests other than those for a specified set of servers (e.g., servers within the loT service).
• the loT hub is programmed with a whitelist of MAC addresses of loT devices and/or extender loT hubs.
• an loT device and/or extender loT hub attempts to connect through the master loT hub. If the connection request is not directed to an authorized server (e.g., within the loT service), determined at 2807, then the connection attempt is blocked at 2809. If the server is authorized, then at 2807, a determination is made as to whether the MAC address of the loT device or extender loT hub is included in the whitelist. If not, then the connection is blocked at 2809. If so, then the connection is established at 2808.
• an authorized server e.g., within the loT service
• Embodiments of the invention may include various steps, which have been described above.
• the steps may be embodied in machine-executable instructions which may be used to cause a general-purpose or special-purpose processor to perform the steps.
• these steps may be performed by specific hardware components that contain hardwired logic for performing the steps, or by any combination thereof
• instructions may refer to specific configurations of hardware such as application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) configured to perform certain operations or having a predetermined functionality or software instructions stored in memory embodied in a non-transitory computer readable medium.
• ASICs application specific integrated circuits
• the techniques shown in the figures can be implemented using code and data stored and executed on one or more electronic devices (e.g., an end station, a network element, etc.).
• Such electronic devices store and communicate (internally and/or with other electronic devices over a network) code and data using computer machine-readable media, such as non-transitory computer machine-readable storage media (e.g., magnetic disks; optical disks; random access memory; read only memory; flash memory devices; phase-change memory) and transitory computer machine-readable
• non-transitory computer machine-readable storage media e.g., magnetic disks; optical disks; random access memory; read only memory; flash memory devices; phase-change memory
• Such electronic devices typically include a set of one or more processors coupled to one or more other components, such as one or more storage devices (non-transitory machine- readable storage media), user input/output devices (e.g., a keyboard, a touchscreen, and/or a display), and network connections.
• the coupling of the set of processors and other components is typically through one or more busses and bridges (also termed as bus controllers).
• the storage device of a given electronic device typically stores code and/or data for execution on the set of one or more processors of that electronic device.
• code and/or data for execution on the set of one or more processors of that electronic device.
• one or more parts of an embodiment of the invention may be implemented using different combinations of software, firmware, and/or hardware.

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