Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
  • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
  • H04L9/0858—Details about key distillation or coding, e.g. reconciliation, error correction, privacy amplification, polarisation coding or phase coding
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
  • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
  • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
  • H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
  • H04L9/0836—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key using tree structure or hierarchical structure
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
  • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
  • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
  • G06F21/31—User authentication
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
  • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
  • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
  • H04L2209/24—Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
  • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
  • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
  • H04L63/064—Hierarchical key distribution, e.g. by multi-tier trusted parties
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
  • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
  • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
  • H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
  • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
  • H04L9/0855—Quantum cryptography involving additional nodes, e.g. quantum relays, repeaters, intermediate nodes or remote nodes
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms

Definitions

• One aspect of the present disclosure is directed to an identity authentication method for a quantum key distribution process and can be
• the method includes selecting, by the sender, preparation bases for an identity authentication bit string in accordance with a preset basis vector selection rule; sending, by the sender, quantum state information including quantum states of the identity authentication bit string and quantum states of a randomly generated key bit string by using different wavelengths, the identity authentication bit string being interleaved in the key bit string at a random position and with a random length;
• the identity authentication method described above may further include receiving authentication key position information from the peer device, and selecting an authentication key from the quantum states in the quantum state information in accordance with the
• identities of the quantum communication devices of both parties which participate in the distribution process are verified dynamically in the quantum key distribution process.
• a device that selects preparation bases to send quantum state information to a peer device is generally referred to as Alice (A) side, which is called a quantum communication sender device, and called a sender for short;
• a device that selects measurement bases to measure received quantum state information is generally referred to as Bob (B) side, which is called a quantum communication receiver device, and called a receiver for short.
• the sender and the receiver may each include a processor and a non- transitory memory storing instructions that, when executed, control the processor to perform steps described below.
• identity authentication can be dynamically performed in the quantum key distribution process.
• the quantum communication devices of the sender and the receiver can first verify the identity of the device of the other party via a classic channel, and the subsequent quantum key distribution process can be continued only when the devices of the both parties both pass the verification.
• an initiator of the quantum key agreement process can initiate a quantum key agreement request at first, in which the request includes account information of the sender, and the account information may include identity information and a signature certificate of the sender.
• the receiver verifies the signature certificate by using the identity information therein. If the signature certificate passes the verification, response information is returned to the sender, which includes account information of the receiver, and if the certificate does not pass the verification, the quantum key agreement process is ended.
• the sender can verify the identity of the receiver in the same manner as described above. If the identity of the receiver passes the verification, the
• the sender intends to send the quantum state information including the quantum states of a binary bit string with a length of n at time points ti, t 2 ... t n , the binary bit string includes two parts, one part being a classic binary bit string randomly generated, which serves as a key bit string, and the other part being an identity authentication bit string associated with a preset basis vector selection rule.
• a basis vector selection rule that the devices of the sender and the receiver follow can be set by using different policies. For example, it is feasible to select corresponding preparation bases or measurement bases in accordance with positions of identity authentication bits in the quantum state information prepared by the sender. For example, in one embodiment, the following rule is used: a corresponding horizontal polarization basis, vertical polarization basis, left-handed polarization basis or right-handed polarization basis is selected in accordance with different results of position information of each identity authentication bit in the quantum state information mod 4. In some embodiments, each identity authentication bit is prepared with a preparation basis, and different identity authentication bits have different preparation bases. Both scenarios are contemplated in the present application. In the description, although a preparation and measurement basis may be referred to in singular form, they should cover both singular and plural forms.
• Step 104 The receiver determines if the identity authentication information obtained through measurement corresponds with the basis vector selection rule. If yes, the method proceeds to step 105; otherwise the method proceeds to step 106.
• the sender and the receiver can, through an interaction process, complete an identity authentication process of the sender and the receiver in accordance with measurement results of the identity authentication quantum states and verification of the shared key preset by both parties, and then continue the subsequent key agreement process in accordance with the quantum key distribution protocol.
• an alternative example of performing identity authentication in various stages of key agreement is provided.
• the receiver not only completes measurement of conventional key quantum states, but also verifies the identity of the sender in accordance with measurement results of the identity authentication quantum state information.
• the process includes sub-steps 201 to 208, and is further described below with reference to FIG. 2.
• Step 203 Measuring the received quantum state information, and acquiring identity authentication information.
• the identity authentication quantum state information obtained through measurement by the receiver can be considered or referred to as corresponding with or consistent with the basis vector selection rule.
• Step 109 The sender uses the corresponding sender authentication key to decrypt the encrypted information received from the receiver.
• the received information contains the preset shared key. After the sender decrypt the received information, the sender obtains the preset shared key, and compares it with the local preset shared key, and determines whether it is consistent with the local preset shared key.
• Step 1 10 The quantum key distribution process ends if the received information including the preset shared key is not consistent with the local preset shared key.
• the sender determines that the identity of the receiver is legal, in accordance with the procedure of the quantum key distribution protocol, the sender can compare the measurement bases made public by the receiver with the preparation bases used by the sender, select correct measurement bases therefrom, select original keys in accordance with the correct measurement bases, and publicize the correct measurement bases to the receiver via a classic channel.
• identity authentication and data encryption procedures can be performed in alternate in the subsequent distribution process, and such an example is further described below.
• the sender acquires the auxiliary authentication information after decryption, and after the sender verifies that the identity of the receiver is valid, the sender can first encrypt a variant of the auxiliary authentication information after decryption by using a preset policy, and then, when the correct measurement bases of the key quantum state is published via a classic channel, send the encrypted information after the encryption operation is executed.
• the preset policy may be preset by both the sender and the receiver, and may also be determined through negotiation.
• the preset policy may include, for example, executing the encryption operation by using the preset shared key; or executing the encryption operation by using an IDkey.
• bit error rate is within a certain threshold range
• an error is corrected by using an error correcting technology.
• privacy amplification can be further performed on a quantum key that has been error-corrected, so as to eliminate information leakage caused in a communication process and an error correcting process, and finally an unconditionally secure shared quantum key is extracted. If the bit error rate exceeds a certain threshold, the quantum key distribution process can be abandoned.
• identity authentication on the sender and the receiver is implemented by the quantum key distribution process.
• key information and identity authentication information are distinguished by using different wavelengths
• the quantum states of the identity authentication information with a variable length is randomly interleaved in the key quantum states
• both the sender and the receiver complete an identity authentication process by detecting whether a peer device follows the same basis vector selection rule when selecting preparation bases or measurement bases and whether the peer device has the same preset shared key.
• the embodiments of the present application achieves identity verification by making full use of security of quantum and performing identity authentication through quantum state information.
• the disclosed methods not only can effectively defend middle-man attacks and DDOS attacks and guarantee security of the quantum key distribution process, but also will not cause reduction of the quantity of quantum key distribution.
• Step 303 Receive authentication key position information and encrypted information to be authenticated returned by the peer device.
• an account information receiving unit configured to receive account information sent by the peer device
• the information sending unit includes:
• Fig. 7 is a block diagram illustrating an identity authentication system 700, according to an exemplary embodiment.
• the system includes: an identity authentication apparatus 701 deployed on a quantum communication sender device, and an identity authentication apparatus 702 deployed on a quantum communication receiver device.
• the identity authentication apparatuses respectively deployed on the quantum communication devices of the sender and the receiver achieve dynamic verification on the identity of the peer device in the quantum key distribution process by using the identity authentication methods provided in the present application.
• the received encrypted information to obtain the preset shared key, and determines whether the preset shared key is consistent with a local preset shared key, and if they are consistent, selects original keys, and publicizes correct measurement bases for the key quantum states and encrypted information of a variant of the acquired auxiliary authentication
• Mutual authentication between A and B can be completed by verifying whether the identity authentication quantum state corresponds with the basis vector selection rule and whether the shared keys preset by A and B are consistent with each other in the links 3), 4) and 5).

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• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
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• Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• Electromagnetism (AREA)
• Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
• Optical Communication System (AREA)
• Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
• Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)

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• 2015
  • 2015-02-16 CN CN201510084941.2A patent/CN105991285B/zh active Active
  • 2015-08-27 TW TW104128121A patent/TWI689837B/zh not_active IP Right Cessation
• 2016
  • 2016-02-05 US US15/017,416 patent/US10038554B2/en active Active
  • 2016-02-05 AU AU2016220364A patent/AU2016220364B2/en not_active Ceased
  • 2016-02-05 CA CA2976784A patent/CA2976784A1/en not_active Abandoned
  • 2016-02-05 WO PCT/US2016/016740 patent/WO2016133724A1/en not_active Ceased
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  • 2016-02-05 KR KR1020177026173A patent/KR20170118190A/ko not_active Withdrawn
• 2018
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