WO2016078789A1 - Method and apparatus for trusted recording in a road toll system - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for trusted recording in a road toll system Download PDFInfo
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- WO2016078789A1 WO2016078789A1 PCT/EP2015/070541 EP2015070541W WO2016078789A1 WO 2016078789 A1 WO2016078789 A1 WO 2016078789A1 EP 2015070541 W EP2015070541 W EP 2015070541W WO 2016078789 A1 WO2016078789 A1 WO 2016078789A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- sgn
- signed
- itinerary record
- rci
- record
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B15/00—Arrangements or apparatus for collecting fares, tolls or entrance fees at one or more control points
- G07B15/06—Arrangements for road pricing or congestion charging of vehicles or vehicle users, e.g. automatic toll systems
- G07B15/063—Arrangements for road pricing or congestion charging of vehicles or vehicle users, e.g. automatic toll systems using wireless information transmission between the vehicle and a fixed station
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q2240/00—Transportation facility access, e.g. fares, tolls or parking
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for trusted re- cording in a road toll system having a proxy server connected via a mobile network to an onboard-unit (OBU) of a vehicle, the onboard-unit having a position determination device for determining a current position of the vehicle.
- OBU onboard-unit
- the invention further relates to an onboard-unit and a proxy server.
- onboard-units can determine their position independently and can create so-called itinerary records according to the standard CEN TS 16702-1, comprising the position and time at the end of its acquisition and the distance driven since creating a last itinerary record or al- ternatively the section id of the current section.
- secure monitoring concepts are implemented in the road toll system:
- the OBUs are equipped with a so-called trusted recorder certified by the toll operator by means of which itinerary records can be cryptographically signed ("frozen"), which process is also referred to as trusted recording.
- An onboard unit with an integrated trusted element is shown, for example, in EP 2 423 885 Bl . If the toll operator wants to check the correct function of an OBU carried by a vehicle in the road toll system, the frozen records are read out, e.g. in spot checks, by an enforcement terminal and checked for plausibility.
- OBUs for a road toll system in which secure monitoring is conducted are complicated to assemble and more expensive in manufacturing.
- the invention provides for a method for trusted recording in a road toll system, the road toll system having a proxy server connected via a mobile network to an onboard-unit of a vehicle, the onboard-unit having a position determination device for determining a current position of the vehicle, comprising the following steps performed in the onboard-unit:
- creating an itinerary record comprising the first or second position, the first or second point of time and at least one of: a distance calculated using at least the first and sec- ond position, a segment-id calculated using at least the first or second position, and a distance calculated using said segment-id;
- the invention provides for a remote proxy server in which a single trusted element can sign itinerary records for a multitude of OBUs according to the trusted standards of the toll operator.
- the OBUs used in such road toll systems with secure monitoring are thus simple to assemble and easy to manufacture.
- existing road toll systems without secure monitoring can easily be retrofitted to support secure monitoring since this only requires the installation of a proxy server with a trusted element as provided by the toll operator.
- the OBUs do not require a built-in trusted recorder for secure recording, it is possible that conventional mobile phones, e.g. equipped with a DSRC (dedicated short range communication) interface for communication with an enforcement ter- minal, can be used as OBUs which support secure monitoring.
- DSRC dedicated short range communication
- the method comprises the step of signing the itinerary record in a trusted element of the proxy server with a digital signature.
- a digital signature comprises a sequential identifier, e.g. a counter, so that the signed itinerary records can be put in order by the OBU or an enforcement terminal requesting one or more signed itinerary records.
- a deletion of signed (“frozen") records can thus be detected by an enforcer since successively read-out frozen itinerary records will not have sequential signatures anymore .
- the onboard- unit sends the signed itinerary record to an enforcement terminal which checks said signed itinerary record for plausibility.
- This allows enforcement terminals in the road toll system to read out signed itinerary records of OBUs to check if the road driven by the vehicle has been declared for tolling as it was supposed to. Fraud can so effectively be reduced, since the OBUs can be supervised, e.g. in spot checks by passing enforcement terminals of the toll operator. Plausibility tests can be devised, e.g.
- a certain latency time may occur between the creation of the itiner- ary record and the reception of the signed itinerary record in the OBU. This has an impact for enforcement terminals reading out signed itinerary records from the OBU because the most recent "unsigned" itinerary record will not always be ready as a signed itinerary record for the enforcement terminal to be read-out. It is a further object of the invention to provide an improved method for secure monitoring which addresses this problem, too.
- the invention thus provides for novel "reduced” or "par- tial" itinerary records which are already created at a time when a section to be declared for tolling has started without the need to gather information about the whole section. It is in turn possible for an enforcement unit to obtain information about the declaration of a section to be tolled soon after the vehicle has entered such a section.
- the signed partial record is available in the OBU right after the start of a section, only delayed by an internal calculation time (taken in the OBU to create the partial itinerary record) and a latency time (taken to send, sign and receive the partial itiner- ary record from the proxy server) , which are both smaller than the corresponding internal calculation time and latency time for a "complete" itinerary record:
- the internal calculation time is reduced since no distance has to be calculated and the latency time is reduced because of the reduced file size due to a reduced encryption ("signing") time in the proxy server.
- said method comprises the step of signing the partial itinerary record in a trusted element of the proxy server with a digital signature, the signature preferably comprising a sequential identifier.
- the on- board-unit may send the signed partial itinerary record to an enforcement terminal which checks said signed partial itinerary record for plausibility.
- the partial itinerary record may comprise only the first position and/or the first point in time, i.e. no calculated distance.
- the partial itinerary record may further comprise data of at least one previously recorded signed or unsigned itinerary record and/or at least one previously signed or unsigned partial itinerary record. This is especially useful for enforcement terminals to check the partial itinerary record for plausibility.
- the data further comprised in the partial itinerary record could be at least one previous position, time or distance.
- the enforcement terminal checks if the identifier of the signed itinerary record and the identifier of the signed partial itinerary record are in a predetermined sequential relationship. Thereby the enforcement terminal can check if the OBU is fol- lowing the procedure of correctly declaring the start of a road section to be tolled and then correctly declaring the full section driven.
- the enforcement terminal may com- pare the signed itinerary record to a signed itinerary record received from the proxy or a central station to which said signed itinerary record had been forwarded by the proxy server.
- This ensures that the OBU cannot delete unwanted records or deceive the enforcement terminal by providing it with false data.
- the position determination device of the OBU could be implemented in different forms, e.g. as an inertial navigation system (dead reckoning system) , an optical recognition system detecting visual landmarks, etc.
- the position determi- nation device is preferably a GNSS (global navigation satellite system) receiver. On the one hand, this has the advantage of a high accuracy while determining the position.
- GNSS global navigation satellite system
- a GNSS unit is used as a time determination device and coupled to the processor.
- an internal or external clock of the processor of the OBU could be used as a time determination device.
- an OBU for mounting on a vehicle in a road toll system, the OBU comprising:
- a position determination device for determining a current position of the vehicle
- transceiver for communication with a proxy server via a mobile network
- a processor coupled to the memory, the position determination device and the transceiver;
- processor is configured to
- an itinerary record comprising the first or second position, the first or second point of time and at least one of : a distance calculated using at least the first and second position, a segment-id calculated using at least the first or second position, and a distance calculated using said segment- id,
- the processor of the OBU is further configured to, after determining the first position and before receiving the second position,
- a further trans- ceiver preferably a DSRC transceiver, for communication with an enforcement terminal, wherein the processor of the OBU is configured to send the signed itinerary record to an enforcement terminal via the further transceiver.
- a proxy server for a road toll system comprising
- transceiver for communication via a mobile network with an OBU carried by a vehicle
- processor coupled to the transceiver and the trusted element; wherein the processor is configured to
- an itinerary record comprising a first or second position, a first or second point in time and a distance based on at least the first and second position from the OBU
- the processor of the proxy server is further configured to
- Fig. 1 shows a schematic overview of a road toll system with components according to the invention
- Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of the components of the road toll system of Fig. 1 ;
- Fig. 3 shows the method of the invention in the form of a sequence diagram.
- Fig. 1 shows a road toll system 1 with a road 2 on which a vehicle 3 carrying an onboard-unit (OBU) 4 travels.
- Vehicles 3 in the road toll system 1 are required to determine their own positions and distances travelled on the roads 2 and to submit this information via a mobile network 5 such as a public land mobile network (PLMN) , e.g., GSM, UMTS, LTE, or another 3G/4G/5G network, to a central station 6 for billing, registra- tion, etc.
- PLMN public land mobile network
- the OBU 4 is equipped with a processor 7 (Fig. 2) coupled to a transceiver 8 (with antenna 9) which works according to the standard used in the mobile network 5, e.g., GSM, UMTS, LTE, etc.
- the trans- ceiver 8 sends data to be transmitted via the mobile network 5 either directly to the central station 6 or to a proxy server 10 which - according to one of its features - forwards the received data via a data network 11, such as the Internet, to the central station 6.
- the proxy server 10 is also equipped with a transceiver 12 (with antenna 13) which works according to the standard used in the mobile network 5.
- the OBU 4 comprises a position determination device 14.
- a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver is used as position determination device 14 by way of which the OBU 4 receives navigation signals 15 of a GNSS 16 such as GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO or the like, and based thereon successively generates readings of its own current position ("position fixes") p i( p 2 , generally p n , at successive points of time t ⁇ , t 2 , generally t n , which are determined by a time determination device such as the GNSS receiver 14 itself, the processor 7, or a separate clock.
- a time determination device such as the GNSS receiver 14 itself, the processor 7, or a separate clock.
- the OBU 4 could also determine the current positions in another manner, for example by way of an inertial measurement or dead reckoning system, optical (visual) recognition of landmarks, or by radio triangulation or cell identifier evaluation in the mobile network 5 or a network of radio beacons, e.g., DSRC beacons.
- an inertial measurement or dead reckoning system optical (visual) recognition of landmarks
- radio triangulation or cell identifier evaluation in the mobile network 5 or a network of radio beacons e.g., DSRC beacons.
- Each time interval Ti can be defined by its first point of time t f ,i and its last point of time ti ;i .
- the set of current positions ⁇ p n ⁇ i gathered on the section Si can be summarised by the first position p fii or the last position pi,i therein and a - roughly approximated or precisely calculated - distance di spanned by the set of current posi- - lo tions ⁇ p n ⁇ i, reflecting - approximately or precisely - the distance travelled by the vehicle 3 in the section s ⁇ .
- the OBU 4 creates a so-called itinerary re- cord RCi for the section s ⁇ .
- itinerary records comprise the last position p 1;i of a section Si, the last point of time ti, ⁇ of the section Si, and the distance d ⁇ travelled within the section Si, although different representations of the section s ⁇ may be chosen such as, for example, the first position p f, i, first point of time t f ,i, and distance d ⁇ , or the first and last positions P f ,i, pi,i (without time and distance) and/or some of the other current positions p n of the set of current positions ⁇ p n ⁇ i gathered over the section s i( etc.
- the OBU 4 is further equipped with a mem- ory 17 to temporarily or permanently store gathered positions p n , position sets ⁇ p n ⁇ i, itinerary records RC
- the segment-id sid m is usually different from the section Si, since segment -ids sid m correspond to predetermined road segments sgi, sg 2 , ... sg m , ... of the road 2, as e.g. defined in a map matcher 7' of the OBU 4 or an external map matcher.
- the OBU 4 can thus retrieve a segment -id sid m from the internal map matcher 7' (or an external map matcher) corresponding to any one (or a plurality) of the positions p n of the set of current positions ⁇ p n ⁇ i, preferably the first position p fii or the last position pi ;i of a section Si, which falls into the road segment sg m .
- the OBU 4 gathers a next set of current positions ⁇ p n ⁇ i + i over a next time interval i + i, wherein the last point of time t f ,i of the previous interval may coincide with the first point of time t f ,i + i of the new interval, and thus the last position p 1;i of the previous set of current positions ⁇ p n ⁇ i may coincide with the first po- sition f,i + i of the new set of current positions ⁇ p n ⁇ i + i-
- time intervals T i( T i+1 succeed each other to define sections Si, Si + i, with sets of current positions ⁇ p n ⁇ i, ⁇ p n ⁇ i + i,
- the time intervals Ti, i + i have the same timely length and are thus periodic, although this is not compulsory.
- a trusted element 18 is installed in the proxy server 10, i.e. coupled to the transceiver 12 of the proxy server 10.
- the trusted element 18 is tamper-proof and comprises a processor 19, an encryption unit 20, and an (optional) id-generator 21; a detailed explanation about the functions of said elements will be given below.
- a memory 22 is coupled to the processor 18.
- the proxy server 10 is connected to the central station 6 via the network 11, and the central station 6 is equipped with a processor 23 and a memory 24 for storing data as forwarded by the proxy server 10.
- Fig. 3 it is now referred to Fig. 3 for the method of secure monitoring in the road toll system 1, where a gathering process Gi is executed within the time interval Ti to gather current positions p n .
- a gathering process Gi is executed within the time interval Ti to gather current positions p n .
- internal processes in the OBU 4 take place over a time interval TCi nt to create the itinerary record RCi .
- This takes a certain amount of time since especially the calculation of the distance di is to be calculated in order to create the itinerary record RCi.
- the calculation of the distance di by means of the gath- ered set of current positions ⁇ p n ⁇ i can be done in any manner known to the skilled person, e.g. by calculating the distance between adjacent positions p n or by spline techniques.
- the distance di could also be obtained by map matching by means of the Map Matcher 7' of the OBU 4, using the first and last position Pf,i, i, ⁇ or the segment-id sid, or by means of an external map matcher, e.g. in the proxy server 10.
- an external map matcher e.g. in the proxy server 10.
- the itinerary record RCi After the itinerary record RCi has been created, i.e. af- ter the internal calculation interval TCi nt , the itinerary record RCi is sent to the proxy server 10 in step 25, where it is received with a delay according to the latency of the mobile network 5.
- step 26 the itinerary record RCi is signed in the trusted element 18 of the proxy server 10 by means of the encryption unit 20, e.g., according to a public/private-key scheme, to obtain a signed itinerary record sgn(RCi) .
- the step 26 of signing the itinerary record RCi further comprises the attachment of an identification id to the record by means of the id-generator 21 to obtain a signed itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) .
- the identification id is preferably signed too, such that it cannot be forged by the OBU 4 or a third party.
- the id-generator 21 preferably acts as a counter, such that all identifications id are sequential and unique.
- step 27 the signed itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) is sent back to the OBU 4 where it is stored in the memory 17 of the OBU 4. Since there is now a signed itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) present in the OBU 4, it is not mandatory to forward the signed itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) to the central station 6, since the signed itinerary records sgn(RCi,id) could be read out from the OBU 4 in a "back office" manner for calculating the toll after a trip by the vehicle 3 in the road toll system 1.
- the proxy server 10 forwards the signed itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) in step 28 to the central station 6 for evaluation, calculation of charges, etc., where the signed itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) is processed by the processor 23 and stored in the memory 24 of the central station 6.
- the signed itinerary record sgn(RC i( id) could also be stored in the memory 22 of the proxy server 10.
- the unsigned itinerary records RCi could also be forwarded to the central station 6 or stored in the memory 22 for crosschecking with the signed itinerary records sgn (RCi, id) .
- the signed itinerary record sgn (RCi, id) is received in the
- OBU 4 after an interval TCi at comprising network latencies and the processing time in the proxy server 10, i.e. in total at a time TCi n t + TCiat after the last point of time ti, ⁇ .
- an enforcement system is in place which uses enforcement terminals 29 to check if the OBUs 4 declare their toll properly.
- the enforcement terminals 29 can be used on vehicles patrolling on the road 3, preferably travelling in the same direction as the vehicles 3 carrying OBUs 4, or the enforcement terminals 29 can be roadside beacons interacting with the OBUs 4.
- the OBU 4 is equipped with a further trans- ceiver 30 to establish a radio link 31 with an enforcement terminal 29 passing by.
- the transceiver 30, and therefore the radio link 31, has a radio range of at most a few metres, a few tens of metres or a few hundred metres, as is implemented for example by the DSRC (dedicated short range communication) , CEN- DSRC, UNI-DSRC, IEEE 802. lip or WAVE (wireless access for vehicular environments) or ITS-G5 standards inclusive of WLAN and Wifi°, Bluetooth 0 , or active or passive RFID (radio frequency identification) technologies.
- DSRC dedicated short range communication
- CEN- DSRC CEN- DSRC
- UNI-DSRC UNI-DSRC
- IEEE 802. lip or WAVE wireless access for vehicular environments
- ITS-G5 standards inclusive of WLAN and Wifi°, Bluetooth 0 , or active or passive RFID (radio frequency identification) technologies.
- the enforcement terminal 29 can request the signed itinerary record sgn (RCi, id) from the OBU 4 via the mo- bile network 5 or via a public or private data channel, e.g. a virtual private network (VPN) .
- a public or private data channel e.g. a virtual private network (VPN)
- no DSRC communication means is necessary within the OBU 4, such that even a mobile phone can be used as an OBU 4 by means of suitable software implementations.
- the enforcement terminal 29 can in any case read the license plate number of the vehicle 3, e.g. by OCR-reading, and match the license plate number to a unique OBU- identification by means of a database.
- the enforcement terminal 29 conducts an enforcement process EP1, wherein in step 32 a request req is sent to the OBU 4 to obtain the most recent signed itinerary record(s) sgn(RCi,id). After receipt of the signed itinerary record (s) sgn(RC i( id) in step 33, the enforcement terminal 29 checks for plausibility of the received signed itinerary record (s) sgn(RCi,id) . To this end, the enforcement terminal 29 can use a variety of verification schemes, each of which is optional: Firstly, the enforcement terminal 29 can check whether the signature is in fact valid.
- the enforcement ter- minal 29 can check if the last position pi,i as stated in the signed itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) lies in the vicinity of the current position of the enforcement terminal. Additionally or alternatively, it is checked whether the last point of time ti,i lies in a vicinity of a momentary time.
- a further verification scheme tests whether the identifications id of the at least two last received signed itinerary records sgn (RCi-i, id) , sgn(RCi,id) are successive. This ensures that no signed itinerary records were discarded.
- Yet another verification scheme requests the signed itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) stored in the memory 22 of the proxy server 10 and/or stored in the memory 24 of the central station 6 and compares it with the signed itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) received from the OBU 4, as described later on for the exemplary enforcement process EP4. As can be seen from Fig. 3, it takes a considerable amount of time for the signed itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) to be available in the OBU 4 for enforcement.
- a "partial" itinerary record RPi comprising only the first position p fii and/or the first point of time t f ,i, may be optionally introduced in a further embodiment of the method which is now explained in detail .
- the method for signing the "complete" itinerary record RCi described holds for the partial itinerary record RPi as well, i.e. after creation, the partial itinerary record RPi is sent in step 34 to the proxy server 10 where it is signed by means of a digital signature (and an optional identification id) in step 35 to obtain a signed partial itinerary record sgn(RP i( id) which is sent back to the OBU 4 in step 36.
- all mentioned memories 17, 22, and 24 are also configured to store said partial itinerary records RPi.
- the partial itinerary record RPi is "partial" in so far as it does not comprise all current positions ⁇ p n ⁇ i of a section Si, but only some of the first or preferably only the first current position p fii of a section Si, and hence does not comprise the distance di driven over the section Si. Creation of the partial itinerary record RPi can thus already be conducted at the beginning of the section Si, reducing the time after which a record declaring the tolling of section Si is available in the OBU 4 by (at least) the amount Ti .
- the internal calculation time TPi nt in the OBU 4 may even be lower than the internal calculation time TCi nt for a complete itinerary record RCi.
- the latency time TPi at for partial itinerary records RPi is lower than the latency time TCi at for complete itinerary records RPi.
- the signed partial itinerary record sgn(RPi,id) may in fact be received even earlier than the signed itinerary record sgn (RCi_i , id) of the previous section Si_i. If, in one embodiment of the method, the sequentiality of the identifications id is considered when the enforcement terminal 29 checks for sequential identifiers id, two different id-generators 19 (counters) can be used for the partial and complete itinerary records RP i( RC i( respectively. Another solution would be to consider an expected relationship when checking for sequentiality, e.g.
- the identifier id of the complete itinerary record sgn(RCi,id) is expected to be higher by three with respect to the identifier id of the partial itin- erary record sgn(RP i( id) declaring the same section Si .
- Focus is now shifted towards the responses received at the enforcement terminal 29 upon requesting the OBU 4 to issue its last signed complete and/or partial itinerary record.
- further exemplary enforcement processes EP2 , EP3 , and EP4 are explained in the following.
- the enforcement terminal 29 will receive in step 38 the signed complete itinerary record sgn (RCi_ 2 , id) from the section Si_ 2 , i.e. the tolling information from two sections ago, and optionally the last signed itinerary record sgn (RPi-i , id) .
- the en- forcement terminal 29 can therefore conclude that the OBU 4 is either in the gathering process Gi_i or has already finished the gathering process Gi_i but not yet received the signed partial itinerary record sgn(RPi,id) from the proxy server 10.
- the enforcement terminal 29 may receive in step 40 the signed partial itinerary record sgn(RP i( id) and optionally the signed complete itinerary record sgn (RCi_ 2 , id) , whereupon the enforcement terminal 29 can conclude that the section Si has been declared for toll, even though there is not even a signed complete record sgn (RCi-i, id) about the section Si_i present in the OBU 4.
- Enforcement process EP4 shows in step 41 a request req at tf,i + TCint + TClat ⁇ t ep 4 ⁇ tf,i + Ti , in which there is an availability AV2 of the signed complete itinerary record sgn (RCi_i , id) of the section Si_i, which is received in step 42.
- This enforcement action EP4 holds simi- larities to the enforcement action EP2 :
- the enforcement terminal 29 can conclude that the OBU 4 is either in the gathering process Gi or has already concluded the gathering process Gi but not yet received the signed partial itinerary record sgn (RP i+ i, id) , but it knows for certain that the section Si will be declared due to the presence of the partial itinerary record sgn (RPi, id) .
- the enforcement process EP4 may send in step 43 a request req_CS to the central station 6 to issue the last received partial and/or complete itinerary record in step 44, so that the enforcement terminal 29 can check the plausibility of the itinerary record (s) as received from the OBU 4 in step 42.
- This measure can also be taken for the enforcement processes EP1, EP2 and EP3.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US15/527,297 US10950062B2 (en) | 2014-11-17 | 2015-09-09 | Method and apparatus for trusted recording in a road toll system |
CA2963589A CA2963589C (en) | 2014-11-17 | 2015-09-09 | Method and apparatus for trusted recording in a road toll system |
AU2015349057A AU2015349057B2 (en) | 2014-11-17 | 2015-09-09 | Method and apparatus for trusted recording in a road toll system |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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EP14193479.4A EP3021288B1 (en) | 2014-11-17 | 2014-11-17 | Method and apparatus for trusted recording in a road toll system |
EP14193479.4 | 2014-11-17 |
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WO2016078789A1 true WO2016078789A1 (en) | 2016-05-26 |
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PCT/EP2015/070541 WO2016078789A1 (en) | 2014-11-17 | 2015-09-09 | Method and apparatus for trusted recording in a road toll system |
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US (1) | US10950062B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP3021288B1 (en) |
AU (1) | AU2015349057B2 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2963589C (en) |
ES (1) | ES2930015T3 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2016078789A1 (en) |
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- 2015-09-09 AU AU2015349057A patent/AU2015349057B2/en active Active
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AU2015349057A1 (en) | 2017-06-15 |
EP3021288B1 (en) | 2022-10-19 |
US10950062B2 (en) | 2021-03-16 |
ES2930015T3 (en) | 2022-12-05 |
US20170323490A1 (en) | 2017-11-09 |
AU2015349057B2 (en) | 2020-08-20 |
CA2963589C (en) | 2023-03-07 |
EP3021288A1 (en) | 2016-05-18 |
CA2963589A1 (en) | 2016-05-26 |
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