WO2014196181A1 - データ認証装置、及びデータ認証方法 - Google Patents
データ認証装置、及びデータ認証方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2014196181A1 WO2014196181A1 PCT/JP2014/002902 JP2014002902W WO2014196181A1 WO 2014196181 A1 WO2014196181 A1 WO 2014196181A1 JP 2014002902 W JP2014002902 W JP 2014002902W WO 2014196181 A1 WO2014196181 A1 WO 2014196181A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04H—BROADCAST COMMUNICATION
- H04H20/00—Arrangements for broadcast or for distribution combined with broadcast
- H04H20/53—Arrangements specially adapted for specific applications, e.g. for traffic information or for mobile receivers
- H04H20/61—Arrangements specially adapted for specific applications, e.g. for traffic information or for mobile receivers for local area broadcast, e.g. instore broadcast
- H04H20/62—Arrangements specially adapted for specific applications, e.g. for traffic information or for mobile receivers for local area broadcast, e.g. instore broadcast for transportation systems, e.g. in vehicles
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
- H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/24—Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W4/44—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for communication between vehicles and infrastructures, e.g. vehicle-to-cloud [V2C] or vehicle-to-home [V2H]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W4/46—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for vehicle-to-vehicle communication [V2V]
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a data authentication device used in road-to-vehicle communication and road-to-vehicle communication between roadside devices and vehicle-mounted devices.
- Patent Document 1 discloses a road-vehicle communication system using a digital signature of a public key encryption algorithm.
- the hash value is calculated and held for the received communication data, and when the communication data is newly received, the hash value of the communication data is calculated and held. If it matches the hash value of the already received communication data, it is not accepted as data that has already been received, otherwise it is accepted as communication data that has not been received. Is. By using a hash function in this way, it is not necessary to hold all received communication data, and it can be dealt with by holding a hash value.
- a digital signature generation or verification process includes a hash function process.
- signature generation the calculation is performed on the hash value of the data to be digitally signed using the public key encryption secret key.
- signature verification the hash value of the data to be digitally signed is converted into
- computation using a public key of public key cryptography is performed.
- the present invention has been made to solve the above-described problems.
- efficient verification is performed and processing capacity is lower. It aims at realization with equipment.
- the data authentication device provides the second communication data including first authentication information, distribution information, and second authentication information received in the past from another communication device.
- the authenticity of the second authentication information of the new communication data is verified by the storage unit that stores the history of the authentication information as the authentication information history and the first authentication information of the new communication data that is the newly received communication data.
- an authentication processing unit that verifies freshness of the new communication data by comparing the second authentication information of the new communication data with the authentication information history stored in the storage unit. is there.
- the data authentication method of the present invention provides a history of the second authentication information of communication data including first authentication information, distribution information, and second authentication information received in the past from another communication device.
- the authenticating of the second authentication information of the new communication data is verified by the storage step of storing as a history and the first authentication information of the new communication data which is newly received communication data, and the first of the new communication data
- the calculation result of the hash function performed in the signature verification is also used for the verification of the freshness as well as the signature verification, so that the calculation of the hash function conventionally performed for the verification of the freshness becomes unnecessary.
- the calculation of the hash function, which has been performed twice in the past can be reduced to one time. As a result, the processing load can be reduced.
- FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram showing an example of a data authentication apparatus according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- a roadside device installed on the roadside communicates with an onboard device mounted on the vehicle, and the onboard device communicates with the roadside device and another onboard device.
- the roadside device and the vehicle-mounted device are collectively referred to as a communication device.
- the communication device 1 is a communication device that transmits communication data including distribution information to another communication device 6 and receives communication data transmitted by the other communication device 6.
- the communication device 1 generates communication data to be transmitted to the other communication device 6, and transmits the communication data to the other communication device 6.
- Authentication as a data authentication device for generating and verifying distribution information and authentication information for confirming the authenticity of the transmission side by using the distribution information and pre-stored key information.
- the processing unit 4 includes a communication unit 3 that performs wireless communication such as DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) and wireless LAN with other communication devices.
- the authentication processing unit 4 is provided with a storage unit 5 that is a memory that can be read and written by the authentication processing unit 4, and includes key information used for generating and verifying authentication information and information for verifying freshness.
- a storage unit 5 that is a memory that can be read and written by the authentication processing unit 4, and includes key information used for generating and verifying authentication information and information for verifying freshness.
- As an authentication information history which is a history of authentication information received in the past, is stored.
- the key information is a public key certificate issued by a certificate authority, a private key corresponding to a public key included in the public key certificate, or a public key certificate of the certificate authority.
- the common key algorithm is applied, the common key used for communication, the ID for specifying the common key to be used, and the like.
- the information for verifying freshness includes the hash value of the distribution information, the ID of the certificate used for verifying the signature added to the distribution information, the hash value, and the MAC (Message) added to the distribution information. ID of the key used for verification of the Authentication Code).
- the current position information and date / time information indicating the date and time are input to the communication device 1 from a roadside machine or a vehicle on which the communication device 1 is mounted. These are generated by a GPS receiver, a gyroscope, a clock or the like installed in a roadside machine or a vehicle.
- FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a data structure of communication data distributed between communication devices.
- the communication data includes first authentication information 7, distribution information 8, and second authentication information 9, and this communication data is transmitted and received between communication devices.
- the first authentication information 7 is a public key certificate of the communication device 1 or an ID that can identify the public key certificate.
- the session key information obtained by encrypting the session key to be temporarily used with the common key the session key information obtained by encrypting the session key with the message authentication code added with the common key, etc. is there.
- the second authentication information is a digital signature of distribution information generated by a secret key of a communication device, and in the case of a common key algorithm, a message authentication code generated by a session key or the like. is there.
- Communication data shown in FIG. 2 is transmitted with such a data structure.
- communication data and distribution information may be encrypted and transmitted according to the system.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a configuration of a driving support system using the data authentication device according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- the roadside device 10 distributes distribution information to surrounding vehicle-mounted devices, and similarly, the vehicle-mounted device distributes distribution information to other vehicle-mounted devices.
- a malicious user misuses the vehicle-mounted device C14 or the vehicle-mounted device D15 to impersonate the roadside device 10 or the vehicle-mounted device (priority vehicle) 13, and gives false information to other vehicle-mounted devices. Can cause confusion and traffic accidents.
- FIG. 4 is a diagram showing the configuration of the road-vehicle communication system of the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram showing a data structure of communication data of the road-vehicle communication system of the present invention. In the road-vehicle communication system of FIG.
- the certificate authority 16 sends a certificate A (public key certificate A) of the roadside machine 17 and a certificate B (public key certificate B) of the certificate authority 16 to the roadside machine 17. Is issued.
- the roadside device 17 distributes the public key certificate B of the certificate authority that issued the public key certificate A to the vehicle-mounted device 18. Further, as shown in FIG. 5, the roadside machine 17 generates a distribution information signature 21 (digital signature), and distributes the distribution information 20, the distribution information signature 21, and a public key certificate A19 that can verify the signature. Delivered to the vehicle-mounted device 18.
- the in-vehicle device 18 verifies the received public key certificate A19 with the public key certificate B of the certificate authority 16 and also verifies the signature 21 of the distribution information with the public key certificate A19, thereby distributing from the legitimate roadside device. Confirm that the information is correct.
- the same security measures can be applied to inter-vehicle communication, and it is possible to detect that a general on-board device is impersonating an emergency vehicle by verifying information and a certificate distributed from the on-vehicle device impersonating an emergency vehicle.
- FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an example of the configuration of the authentication processing unit 4 according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing the operation of the authentication processing unit 4 when receiving communication data according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- the authentication processing unit 4 includes a storage unit 5, a control unit 22, a hash value calculation unit 24, a signature verification unit 26, a register A 23 that is an input to the hash value calculation unit 24, and an output from the hash value calculation unit 24.
- the register B25 is an input to the signature verification unit 26, and the register C27 is an output from the signature verification unit 26.
- the authentication processing unit 4 in FIG. 6 is described with a focus on verifying distribution information. However, when communication data is encrypted, decryption processing is performed. When communication data is generated, encryption processing is performed. Processing for generating a signature (calculation using a secret key) is also included in the authentication processing unit 4, but is omitted in FIG.
- step S101 the control unit 22 writes distribution information, which is data to be signed, to the input register A23 of the hash value calculation unit 24 when verifying communication data.
- step S102 the control unit 22 instructs the hash value calculation unit 24 to start calculation.
- step S103 the hash value calculator 24 writes the calculation result to the register B25 when the calculation is completed.
- step S104 the control unit 22 detects the end of the calculation of the hash value calculation unit 24 by an interrupt or the like, for example, and reads the calculation result (hash value) from the register B25.
- step S105 the control unit 22 writes and sets information necessary for signature verification to the register B25 other than the information set in the register B25 in step S103.
- step S106 the control unit 22 instructs the signature verification unit 26 to start computation.
- step S107 the signature verification unit 26 reads information necessary for signature verification set in the register B25, performs signature verification, and writes the calculation result to the register C27.
- step S108 the control unit 22 detects the completion of the calculation of the signature verification unit 26 by, for example, an interrupt, and reads and reads the calculation result from the register C27.
- step S109 the control unit 22 determines whether the signature verification is successful or unsuccessful from the calculation result read from the register C27. If the signature verification is successful, the process proceeds to step S111. If it has failed, the process proceeds to step S110.
- step S110 the control unit 22 notifies, for example, the distribution information processing unit 2 that signature verification has failed (authentication failure).
- step S111 the control unit 22 has the same combination of the hash value acquired in step S104 and the signature of the communication data currently being verified in the storage unit 5. Search whether or not. As a result, in step S112, if there is data of the same combination, the control unit 22 proceeds to step S113 assuming that the freshness verification has failed. If there is no data of the same combination, the control unit 22 checks the freshness. As a result of success, the process proceeds to step S114. Next, in step S113, the control unit 22 notifies the distribution information processing unit 2, for example, that the freshness verification has failed (freshness failure).
- step S114 the control unit 22 uses the combination of the hash value acquired in step S104 and the signature of the communication data currently being verified as the authentication information history in the storage unit 5. Write to. Thereafter, in step S113, the control unit 22 notifies the distribution information processing unit 2, for example, that the verification of the communication data has been normally completed, and the process ends.
- processing flow in FIG. 7 focuses on freshness verification and signature verification, and description of processing necessary for verification of other communication data, such as certificate verification, is omitted.
- the register A23, the register B25, and the register C27 are shown as separate registers, but they may be the same register. Further, when the hash value calculation unit 24 and the signature verification unit 26 are realized by software, these registers correspond to a memory area, a buffer, and the like.
- the freshness verification is performed after the signature verification, but the freshness verification may be performed before the signature verification. By doing so, it is not necessary to verify the signature when the verification of freshness fails, and as a whole, the processing load when the verification of communication data fails can be reduced.
- the present invention is applicable to any digital signature algorithm or hash function algorithm used there.
- the invention of the first embodiment is conventionally performed for verification of freshness by using the calculation result of the hash function performed in signature verification for verification of freshness together with the signature.
- the calculation of the hash function becomes unnecessary, and the calculation of the hash function that has been performed twice can be reduced to one time. Thereby, the processing load can be reduced.
- sharing the output register of the hash value calculation unit 24 and the input register of the signature verification unit 26 further reduces processing. I can hope.
- the first authentication information 7 is assumed to be an ID for identifying a public key certificate, a public key certificate, or the like.
- the attacker since the hash value is calculated for the entire communication data, the attacker replaces the ID when the first authentication information 7 of the intercepted communication data is a public key certificate, If it is an ID, it is replaced with a public key certificate, so that it can be received as different communication data on the receiving side, whereas the communication data has the same meaning. That is, the receiving side cannot detect that it has been attacked.
- the input of the hash function is only the distribution information, and even if the first authentication information is replaced, it can be identified that the communication data is the same.
- the same distribution information is changed to the same distribution information when it is desired to accept the same distribution information.
- it can be realized by generating a signature again and composing communication data using it.
- the same effect can also be acquired by using only the hash value of delivery data for verification of freshness.
- Embodiment 1 FIG. In the above, a case where a digital signature is used as data authentication has been described. Embodiment 2. FIG. Now, a case where a MAC (Message Authentication Code) is used as data authentication will be described. 1 and 2 are the same as those in the first embodiment. Since it is the same as, it is omitted.
- MAC Message Authentication Code
- FIG. 8 is a diagram showing an example of the configuration of the authentication processing unit 4 according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the operation of the authentication processing unit 4 when receiving communication data according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- the authentication processing unit 4 includes a storage unit 5, a control unit 22, a MAC generation unit 28, a register A 23 that is an input to the MAC generation unit 28, and a register B 25 that is an output from the MAC generation unit 28. . Since the authentication processing unit 4 in FIG. 8 is described focusing on verifying the distribution information, the decryption processing is included in the authentication processing unit 4 when the communication data is encrypted. It is omitted in FIG.
- step S201 the control unit 22 writes the distribution information that is the data of the MAC object to the input register A23 of the MAC generation unit 28 when verifying the communication data.
- step S202 the control unit 22 instructs the MAC generation unit 28 to start calculation.
- step S203 the MAC generation unit 28 writes the calculation result to the register B25 when the calculation ends.
- step S204 the control unit 22 detects the end of the operation of the MAC generation unit 28 by, for example, an interrupt, and reads the operation result from the register B25. Thereafter, in step S205, the control unit 22 determines whether the signature verification is successful or unsuccessful from the calculation result read from the register B25, and if successful, the process proceeds to step S207. If it has failed, the process proceeds to step S206. Next, in step S206, the control unit 22 notifies the distribution information processing unit 2, for example, that signature verification has failed (authentication failure).
- step S207 the control unit 22 determines that the MAC value acquired from the communication data or the same MAC value as the MAC value acquired in step S204 (these are the same value). Is stored in the storage unit 5.
- step S208 if there is the same MAC value, the control unit 22 proceeds to step S209 assuming that the freshness verification has failed, and if there is no same MAC value, the control unit 22 succeeded in the freshness verification. As a result, the process proceeds to step S210.
- step S209 the control unit 22 notifies the distribution information processing unit 2 that the verification of freshness has failed (freshness failure), for example.
- the control unit 22 writes the MAC value in the authentication information history of the storage unit 5 in step S210.
- step S211 the control unit 22 notifies the distribution information processing unit 2, for example, that the verification of the communication data has been completed normally, and the process ends.
- processing flow in FIG. 9 focuses on freshness verification and signature verification, and description of processing necessary for verification of other communication data, for example, decryption of a session key, is omitted.
- the register A23 and the register B25 are shown as separate registers, but they may be the same register.
- these registers correspond to a memory area, a buffer, and the like.
- the freshness verification is performed after the MAC verification, but the freshness verification may be performed before the MAC verification.
- the freshness verification may be performed before the MAC verification.
- the calculation of the hash function performed in the freshness verification can be reduced, and the processing load can be reduced.
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Abstract
Description
実施の形態1では、配信情報の検証において、デジタル署名の検証におけるハッシュ関数の演算と新鮮性の検証におけるハッシュ関数の演算を統合して、配信情報の検証を行なう形態を示す。
図1は、本発明の実施の形態1に係るデータ認証装置の一実施例を示す構成図である。
路車間および車車間通信の場合、路側に設置される路側機は車両に搭載される車載器と通信し、車載器は路側機と他の車載器と通信する。以下、本実施形態では、路側機と車載器を総称して、通信装置として記載する。
図2は、通信装置間で配信される通信データのデータ構造を示す図である。
図2において、通信データは、第一の認証情報7、配信情報8、第二の認証情報9から構成され、この通信データが通信装置間で送受信される。
。
図3は、本発明の実施の形態1に係るデータ認証装置を用いた運転支援システムの構成を示す図である。
図3において、路側機10は、周囲の車載器に配信情報を配信し、同様に車載器は、他の車載器に配信情報を配信する。このような運転支援システムにおいて、悪意のある利用者が車載器C14や車載器D15を悪用して、路側機10や車載器(優先車両)13になりすまし、他の車載器に対して偽の情報を配信して、混乱を引き起こしたり、交通事故を引き起こしたりすることが考えられる。従って、情報を配信している送信側、つまり、情報を配信している路側機や車載器の正当性を、受信側が確認できるセキュリティ手段が必要となるため、このセキュリティ手段として本発明のデータ認証装置を用いる。
以下、図4と図5を用いて、運転支援システムで用いられる路車間通信システムを説明する。
図4は、本発明の路車間通信システムの構成を示す図である。
図5は、本発明の路車間通信システムの通信データのデータ構造を示す図である。
図4の路車間通信システムでは、認証局16が路側機17に対して、路側機17の証明書A(公開鍵証明書A)、及び認証局16の証明書B(公開鍵証明書B)を発行する。路側機17は、公開鍵証明書Aを発行した認証局の公開鍵証明書Bを車載器18に配信する。また、路側機17は、図5に示すように、配信情報の署名21(デジタル署名)を生成して、配信情報20、配信情報の署名21、及びその署名を検証できる公開鍵証明書A19を車載器18に配信する。車載器18は、受信した公開鍵証明書A19を認証局16の公開鍵証明書Bで検証すると共に、配信情報の署名21を公開鍵証明書A19で検証することにより、正当な路側機から配信された情報であることを確認する。車車間通信でも同様のセキュリティ対策は適用でき、緊急車両になりすました車載器から配信された情報や証明書を検証することで、一般の車載器が緊急車両になりすましていることが検出できる。
図6は、本発明の実施の形態1に係る認証処理部4の構成の一例を示す図である。
図7は、本発明の実施の形態1に係る通信データ受信時の認証処理部4の動作を示すフローチャートである。
図6において、認証処理部4は、記憶部5、制御部22、ハッシュ値演算部24、署名検証部26、ハッシュ値演算部24への入力となるレジスタA23、ハッシュ値演算部24からの出力であり、署名検証部26への入力となるレジスタB25、署名検証部26からの出力となるレジスタC27から構成される。図6の認証処理部4は、配信情報を検証することに着目して記載しているが、通信データが暗号化されている場合には復号処理、通信データを生成する場合は、暗号化や署名生成(秘密鍵による演算)を行なう処理なども認証処理部4に含まれるが、図6では省略している。
まず、ステップS101において、制御部22は、通信データの検証を行なう際に、ハッシュ値演算部24の入力レジスタA23に署名対象のデータである配信情報をライトする。
次に、ステップS102において、制御部22は、ハッシュ値演算部24に対して演算開始を指示する。
次に、ステップS103において、ハッシュ値演算部24は、演算が終了すると演算結果をレジスタB25にライトする。
次に、ステップS104において、制御部22は、ハッシュ値演算部24の演算終了を、例えば、割り込みなどで検知し、レジスタB25から演算結果(ハッシュ値)をリードする。
次に、ステップS106において、制御部22は、署名検証部26に対して演算開始を指示する。
次に、ステップS107において、署名検証部26は、レジスタB25に設定されている署名検証に必要な情報を読み出し、署名検証の演算を行ない、その演算結果をレジスタC27にライトする。
次に、ステップS109において、制御部22は、レジスタC27から読み出した演算結果から、署名検証に成功しているか、失敗しているのかを判定し、成功している場合には、ステップS111へ進み、失敗している場合には、ステップS110へ進む。
次に、ステップS110において、制御部22は、署名検証に失敗(真正性失敗)したことを、例えば、配信情報処理部2へ通知する。
その結果、ステップS112において、制御部22は、同じ組合せのデータがある場合は、新鮮性の検証に失敗したものとしてステップS113へ進み、同じ組合せのデータがない場合には、新鮮性の検証に成功したものとしてステップS114へ進む。
次に、ステップS113において、制御部22は、新鮮性の検証に失敗(新鮮性失敗)したことを、例えば、配信情報処理部2へ通知する。
その後、ステップS113において、制御部22は、通信データの検証が正常に終了したことを、例えば、配信情報処理部2へ通知して終了する。
それに対して、本発明は、ハッシュ関数の入力は配信情報のみであり、第一の認証情報が置き換えられたとしても、同一の通信データであることを識別できる。
実施の形態1.では、データ認証としてデジタル署名を用いた場合について説明した。実施の形態2.では、データ認証として、MAC(Message Authentication Code)を用いた場合について述べる。なお、図1、図2の説明は、実施の形態1.と同じであるため、省略する。
図8は、本発明の実施の形態2に係る認証処理部4の構成の一例を示す図である。
図9は、本発明の実施の形態2に係る通信データ受信時の認証処理部4の動作を示すフローチャートである。
図8において、認証処理部4は、記憶部5、制御部22、MAC生成部28、MAC生成部28への入力となるレジスタA23、MAC生成部28からの出力となるレジスタB25から構成される。なお、図8の認証処理部4は、配信情報を検証することに着目して記載しているため、通信データが暗号化されている場合には復号処理が認証処理部4に含まれるが、図8では省略している。
まず、ステップS201において、制御部22は、通信データの検証を行なう際に、MAC生成部28の入力レジスタA23にMAC対象のデータである配信情報をライトする。
次に、ステップS202において、制御部22は、MAC生成部28に対して演算開始を指示する。
次に、ステップS203において、MAC生成部28は、演算が終了すると演算結果をレジスタB25にライトする。
その後、ステップS205において、制御部22は、レジスタB25から読み出した演算結果から、署名検証に成功しているか、失敗しているのかを判定し、成功している場合には、ステップS207へ進み、失敗している場合には、ステップS206へ進む。
次に、ステップS206において、制御部22は、署名検証に失敗(真正性失敗)したことを、例えば、配信情報処理部2へ通知する。
その結果、ステップS208において、制御部22は、同じMAC値がある場合は、新鮮性の検証に失敗したものとしてステップS209へ進み、同じMAC値がない場合には、新鮮性の検証に成功したものとしてステップS210へ進む。
一方、新鮮性の検証に成功した場合には、ステップS210において、制御部22は、MAC値を記憶部5の認証情報履歴へ書き込む。
その後、ステップS211において、制御部22は、通信データの検証が正常に終了したことを、例えば、配信情報処理部2へ通知して終了する。
Claims (6)
- 他の通信装置から過去に受信した第一の認証情報と配信情報と第二の認証情報とを含む通信データの前記第二の認証情報の履歴を認証情報履歴として記憶する記憶部と、
新たに受信した通信データである新通信データの第一の認証情報により前記新通信データの第二の認証情報の真正性を検証するとともに、前記新通信データの第二の認証情報と前記記憶部に記憶された前記認証情報履歴とを比較して前記新通信データの新鮮性を検証する認証処理部とを備えたデータ認証装置。 - 前記配信情報のハッシュ値を演算するハッシュ値演算部を備え、
前記記憶部は、前記ハッシュ値演算部により演算した配信情報のハッシュ値を前記認証情報履歴の前記第二の認証情報に対応付けて記憶し、
前記認証処理部は、前記新通信データに含まれる配信情報のハッシュ値及び第二の認証情報と前記記憶部に記憶された前記認証情報履歴とを比較して前記新通信データの新鮮性を検証する請求項1記載のデータ認証装置。 - 前記第二の認証情報は、公開鍵暗号に基づくデジタル署名である請求項1または2記載のデータ認証装置。
- 前記第二の認証情報は、共通鍵暗号に基づくMAC(Message Authentication Code)である請求項1記載のデータ認証装置。
- 他の通信装置から過去に受信した第一の認証情報と配信情報と第二の認証情報とを含む通信データの前記第二の認証情報の履歴を認証情報履歴として記憶する記憶ステップと、
新たに受信した通信データである新通信データの第一の認証情報により前記新通信データの第二の認証情報の真正性を検証するとともに、前記新通信データの第二の認証情報と前記記憶部に記憶された前記認証情報履歴とを比較して前記新通信データの新鮮性を検証する認証処理ステップとを備えたデータ認証方法。 - 前記配信情報のハッシュ値を演算するハッシュ値演算ステップを備え、
前記記憶ステップは、前記ハッシュ値演算ステップにより演算した配信情報のハッシュ値を前記認証情報履歴の前記第二の認証情報に対応付けて記憶し、
前記認証処理ステップは、前記新通信データに含まれる配信情報のハッシュ値及び第二の認証情報と前記記憶ステップに記憶された前記認証情報履歴とを比較して前記新通信データの新鮮性を検証する請求項5記載のデータ認証方法。
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