WO2013181646A2 - Procédés et systèmes d'interrogation de neutron de temps de vol pour une distinction de matériaux - Google Patents

Procédés et systèmes d'interrogation de neutron de temps de vol pour une distinction de matériaux Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013181646A2
WO2013181646A2 PCT/US2013/043801 US2013043801W WO2013181646A2 WO 2013181646 A2 WO2013181646 A2 WO 2013181646A2 US 2013043801 W US2013043801 W US 2013043801W WO 2013181646 A2 WO2013181646 A2 WO 2013181646A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
neutrons
neutron
inspection
suspect area
suspect
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2013/043801
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English (en)
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WO2013181646A3 (fr
Inventor
Joseph Bendahan
Vladimir SOLOVYEN
Original Assignee
Rapiscan Systems, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority to JP2015515274A priority Critical patent/JP2015523560A/ja
Application filed by Rapiscan Systems, Inc. filed Critical Rapiscan Systems, Inc.
Priority to KR1020147036271A priority patent/KR102055963B1/ko
Priority to CA2875050A priority patent/CA2875050C/fr
Priority to CN201380034833.3A priority patent/CN104813436B/zh
Priority to GB1423029.6A priority patent/GB2517389B/en
Priority to AU2013267091A priority patent/AU2013267091B2/en
Priority to MX2014014676A priority patent/MX345317B/es
Priority to EP13796384.9A priority patent/EP2856494A4/fr
Priority to EP19177093.2A priority patent/EP3550332A1/fr
Priority to BR112014029975A priority patent/BR112014029975A8/pt
Publication of WO2013181646A2 publication Critical patent/WO2013181646A2/fr
Publication of WO2013181646A3 publication Critical patent/WO2013181646A3/fr
Priority to AU2017202993A priority patent/AU2017202993A1/en

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Classifications

    • G01V5/234—
    • G01V5/22—
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H05—ELECTRIC TECHNIQUES NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • H05H—PLASMA TECHNIQUE; PRODUCTION OF ACCELERATED ELECTRICALLY-CHARGED PARTICLES OR OF NEUTRONS; PRODUCTION OR ACCELERATION OF NEUTRAL MOLECULAR OR ATOMIC BEAMS
    • H05H3/00—Production or acceleration of neutral particle beams, e.g. molecular or atomic beams
    • H05H3/06—Generating neutron beams
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01N—INVESTIGATING OR ANALYSING MATERIALS BY DETERMINING THEIR CHEMICAL OR PHYSICAL PROPERTIES
    • G01N23/00—Investigating or analysing materials by the use of wave or particle radiation, e.g. X-rays or neutrons, not covered by groups G01N3/00 – G01N17/00, G01N21/00 or G01N22/00
    • G01N23/22—Investigating or analysing materials by the use of wave or particle radiation, e.g. X-rays or neutrons, not covered by groups G01N3/00 – G01N17/00, G01N21/00 or G01N22/00 by measuring secondary emission from the material
    • G01N23/221—Investigating or analysing materials by the use of wave or particle radiation, e.g. X-rays or neutrons, not covered by groups G01N3/00 – G01N17/00, G01N21/00 or G01N22/00 by measuring secondary emission from the material by activation analysis
    • G01N23/222—Investigating or analysing materials by the use of wave or particle radiation, e.g. X-rays or neutrons, not covered by groups G01N3/00 – G01N17/00, G01N21/00 or G01N22/00 by measuring secondary emission from the material by activation analysis using neutron activation analysis [NAA]

Definitions

  • the present specification generally relates to the field of radiant energy imaging systems for detecting concealed objects, and more specifically to a system that uses neutron interrogation to inspect objects and provide an enhanced level of material characterization.
  • Physical shipment of materials including the shipment of mail, merchandise, raw materials, and other goods, is an integral part of any economy.
  • the materials are shipped in a type of shipping container or cargo box, which are generally transported via semitrailers, large trucks, and rail cars as well as inter-modal containers that can be carried on container ships or cargo planes.
  • Such shipping or cargo containers are also sometimes used for illegal transportation of contraband. Detection of these threats requires a rapid, safe and accurate inspection system.
  • Contraband detection is typically performed by analyzing images for anomalies. Oftentimes when anomalies are identified as potential contraband, manual labor intensive and time-consuming unpacking is required. In some cases, equipment has to be damaged to determine whether contraband is actually present. Unfortunately, these anomalies may be produced by the natural variation of benign cargo, therefore leading to a false alarm situation where the manual inspection was unnecessary.
  • VEDS Vehicle Explosive Detection System
  • gamma rays are characteristic of the elements that produced them and therefore, can be used to deduce the elemental composition.
  • gamma-ray signals are produced from different parts of the object; signal mixing is reduced by determining the position of mono-energetic neutrons as a function of time. This, in turn, yields gamma ray information as a function of time.
  • the speed of neutrons is known, the location of where the gamma rays were produced can be computed. This provides a determination of the elemental composition of the scanned area as a function of depth, with little mixing of signal from other areas.
  • the elemental signal from cocaine is summed up with the elemental signal of paper (more abundant signal).
  • time (depth) information is present, information from the front, center, and back is separated into discrete, detectable signals.
  • TNA Thermal Neutron Analysis
  • PFNA Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis
  • a high-energy pulsed deuteron beam impinges on a deuterium target to produce an intense nano-second pulsed neutron beam, which allows for determination of the elemental content of the area being inspected.
  • the cross section (x-y) mapping is obtained by the use of collimation and the depth (z) map is obtained using time-of-flight (ToF) technology.
  • PFNA can be used for primary inspection and/or for secondary inspection.
  • PFNA primary system
  • x-ray or other identifies areas suspected of containing contraband which are then inspected with a collimated neutron beam.
  • Associated Alpha-Particle Imaging employs a partially collimated neutron beam to inspect an object, whereby an elemental map of the object can be determined.
  • the cross-sectional elemental map is obtained by detecting the associated alpha particle direction, which is emitted 180 degrees relative to the direction of the emitted neutron.
  • the depth map is also obtained using ToF technology but instead of using a pulsed-neutron beam, the detection of the alpha particle provides the starting time.
  • deuterons from the generator hit the tritium target, the nuclear reaction results in an alpha particle and a neutron, produced 180 degrees from each other.
  • the resultant signals are affected by a high background that limits the maximum neutron output. This requires lowering the neutron output to a level where this background is low, but results in long inspection times, reducing the throughput.
  • a d-D neutron generator employs a deuteron beam which impinges on a gas deuterium target to produce a neutron beam at a beam energy of ⁇ 8.5 MeV.
  • a d-T neutron generator uses the deuterium ( 2 H) - tritium ( 3 H) reaction to generate neutrons. Deuterium atoms in the accelerated beam fuse with deuterium and tritium atoms in the target to produce neutrons and alpha particles.
  • the present specification describes a Time-of-Flight based neutron inspection system.
  • the system employs a collimated beam of fast neutrons to interrogate suspect cargo to determine the elemental information as a function of depth.
  • the elemental composition is then analyzed to determine the presence of contraband.
  • a nano-pulsed, compact and high-yield d-T generator is employed.
  • system may be used for primary inspection, and implemented in portal, gantry or mobile configurations.
  • the system may be used for secondary inspection for material discrimination to reduce the false-alarm rate, the high cost and time associated with manual unpacking.
  • an object under inspection is identified as containing a potential threat by a primary system or by an operator and is sent to the system of present invention for secondary inspection.
  • the primary system targets a small area within the object under inspection.
  • an API generator with appropriate collimation is employed for secondary inspection.
  • Targeting a small area allows for increasing the intensity of the API generator because the intensity that was previously used for interrogating a large area is now concentrated to a smaller spot, thus increasing the neutron output to a level where background is low and allows for shortened inspection time.
  • the present specification describes a system for inspection of a suspect area in an object, comprising: a nano-second pulsed deuteron generator, said generator comprising an ion source to produce a beam of deuterium ions, and an ion filter, chopper and buncher for shaping the beam of deuterium ions into a narrow pulse width; a tritium target, which produces pulsed neutrons on being impinged by a pulsed beam of deuterium ions; a movable collimator to aim the pulsed neutrons at the suspect area; gamma-ray detectors to detect gamma rays produced after the interaction of pulsed neutrons with the suspect area; and a processing unit that analyzes Time-of-Flight (ToF) data from the detectors to determine materials in the suspect area.
  • the nano-second pulsed deuteron generator generates at least 10 9 neutrons/second.
  • the processing unit uses ToF data to map signals from gamma-ray detectors into
  • the current of deuteron beam impinging on the tritium target is in the range of ⁇ .
  • the accelerating voltage of the beam is in the 100 to 300 kV range.
  • the ion source is a positive ion source.
  • the tritium target comprises multiple targets. In another embodiment, the tritium target comprises a rotating target. Further, the tritium target is located at approximately the same height as the location of one of the sources in the primary system.
  • the neutron generator is shielded to reduce dose outside the collimated beam and reduce gamma-ray background. Further, the shielding has a total thickness of approximately 75 cm.
  • the present specification describes a system for inspection of a suspect area in an object, said suspect area being in the range of a few tens of centimeters, the system comprising: a d-T neutron generator, that produces neutrons and corresponding alpha particles; a neutron beam collimator to direct the neutrons at the suspect area, wherein said collimator is shielded; an alpha-particle detector placed 180-degrees relative to the suspect area to detect alpha particles and determine the time of generation of neutrons, wherein the alpha- particle detector is collimated to substantially the same angular opening as the neutron beam collimator; gamma-ray detectors to detect gamma rays produced after the interaction of neutrons with the suspect area, wherein said gamma ray detectors are shielded to prevent thermal and epi- thermal capture; and a processing unit to determine the elemental composition of the suspect area as a function of depth based on the time of generation of the neutrons and the time spectrum of the
  • the borated material is borated polyethylene. In one embodiment, the total neutron output of the neutron generator is in the range of 10 9 neutrons per second.
  • the size of the beam that impinges on the target is at least 1 cm, when a high deuteron beam current is used.
  • the alpha-particle detector is placed at a distance in the range of 25 cm from target. In one embodiment, the alpha detector comprises of a multi-segmented detector.
  • the neutron generator rotates along its long axis to aim neutrons at the suspect area.
  • the collimated beam is translated vertically to aim neutrons at the suspect area.
  • the collimated beam is rotated about its long axis to aim neutrons at the suspect area.
  • the total overall length of the collimator is at least 75 cm.
  • the neutron generator is shielded to reduce dose outside the collimated beam and to reduce background. Further, the shielding has a total thickness of approximately 50 cm.
  • either system is used for secondary inspection, after inspection by a primary inspection system.
  • the system is based on a primary inspection subsystem and a secondary inspection subsystem and wherein suspect areas are identified by primary system or an operator, and wherein an algorithm is used to determine an optimal position and rotation angle of the object under inspection for inspecting the suspect areas with collimated neutrons.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic diagram of a time-of-flight neutron inspection system based on the d-T reaction in accordance with one embodiment of the present specification, where a pulsed beam is employed;
  • FIG. 2a illustrates a top view of a time-of-flight neutron inspection system in accordance with one embodiment of the present specification, in which an associated alpha particle imaging (API) system is employed;
  • API alpha particle imaging
  • FIG. 2b is a schematic diagram of an exemplary shielding and collimating apparatus as employed in the neutron inspection system shown in in FIG. 2a;
  • FIG. 2c illustrates an end view of the time-of-flight neutron inspection system shown in FIG. 2a;
  • FIG. 3 is a table illustrating elemental composition information and corresponding ratios of exemplary materials that can be detected by the system of present invention.
  • FIG. 4 illustrates the effect of the uncertainty in parallax for having different source heights in primary and secondary scans.
  • the present specification is directed towards a Time-of-Flight (ToF) based neutron inspection system. More specifically, the present specification is directed towards systems and methods for detecting contraband and threats in cargo by use of a high-energy ToF-based neutron system with a collimated beam.
  • the system of the present invention employs a collimated beam of fast neutrons to interrogate suspect cargo to determine the elemental composition as a function of depth. The characteristic elemental composition is then analyzed to determine the presence of contraband.
  • neutrons are characteristic of the elements that produced them and therefore, can be used to deduce the elemental composition.
  • gamma rays are characteristic of the elements that produced them and therefore, can be used to deduce the elemental composition.
  • signal mixing is reduced by determining the position of mono-energetic neutrons as a function of time. This, in turn, yields gamma ray information as a function of time.
  • the speed of neutrons is known, the location of where the gamma rays were produced can be computed. This provides a determination of the elemental composition of the scanned area as a function of depth, with little mixing of signal from other areas.
  • a nanosecond-pulsed d-T Time-of-Flight (ToF) based neutron inspection system is employed and may be used for primary inspection, and implemented in portal, gantry or mobile configurations for detection of neutron-containing contraband.
  • ToF Time-of-Flight
  • an API generator is employed.
  • Using a collimator to restrict or direct the neutron beam to target a small area allows for increasing the intensity of the API generator because the intensity that was previously used for interrogating a large area is now concentrated to a smaller spot. This increases the number of neutrons that arrive at this smaller spot to a level at which the signal-to-background ratio is high, on the order of approximately 10 9 neutrons/second, thus allowing for shortened inspection time.
  • the intensity is on the order of 10 to 20 times greater than typical API generators (which operate in an intensity range of 5 x
  • the collimator of the present specification has a small opening to restrict the neutron beam and is very well-shielded. Still further, the present specification employs shielding around the source and detector as well.
  • the system may be used for secondary inspection for material discrimination to reduce the false-alarm rate, the high cost and time associated with manual unpacking.
  • an object under inspection is identified as containing a potential threat by a primary system and is sent to the system of present invention for secondary inspection.
  • the system described in the present invention scans a small area of the object that has been identified by a primary system or by an operator as suspect or possibly containing contraband or a threat.
  • the system detects but is not limited to the detection of carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, chlorine, phosphorus, sodium, iron and other elements as a function of depth.
  • the system performs elemental analysis to detect drugs, chemical weapons, and other contraband and in addition, performs cargo-manifest verification.
  • Other gamma rays characteristic of elements such as hydrogen and chlorine associated with slow neutrons can also be detected to provide additional information of the cargo but without position information.
  • the system of the present specification is coupled to at least one display, which displays information about the inspection process and data, by means of a GUI.
  • the system further comprises at least one processor or processing unit to control the operation of the entire system and its components.
  • the at least one processor is capable of processing programmatic instructions, has a memory capable of storing programmatic instructions, and employs software comprised of a plurality of programmatic instructions for performing the processes described herein.
  • the at least one processor is a computing device capable of receiving, executing, and transmitting a plurality of programmatic instructions stored on a volatile or non- volatile computer readable medium.
  • the system described in the present specification advantageously uses a nano-second pulsed d-T neutron generator.
  • the d-T neutron generator uses the deuterium
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of the system that produces pulsed neutrons for scanning suspect areas of an object.
  • an ion source 101 produces a beam of deuterium ions 110 and accelerates them, with a low voltage in one embodiment, towards an ion selector 102.
  • the ion source is a positive ion source to produce high beam current.
  • the ion selector 102 filters unwanted ions, preventing ions with multiple energies from being present in the beam which will result in an increase in the current and sputtering of the target and small increase in neutron yield.
  • ions can carry either a positive or negative charge and have different speeds, the goal is to filter out either the positive or negative ions and keep only one type of charge, depending upon the type of accelerator employed.
  • the filter also reduces the number of ions hitting the various components to minimize neutron production in the accelerator, which would require extensive shielding.
  • the filtered beam 111 is periodically deflected using a deflector 103, which allows a fraction of the beam to pass through a slit 104.
  • the slit 104 thus acts as a beam chopper.
  • the beam chopper is used to pulse the beam (coarse pulsing).
  • the coarsely pulsed chopped beam is then bunched (or shaped) using a high-power bunching device 105, which accelerates the trailing ions and decelerates the leading ions. This results in the trailing ions and leading ions catching up to one another, otherwise known as "bunching" together.
  • the beam is bunched to a pulse time in the range of 1 ns.
  • the time of the pulsing in nano-second (ns) range is critical.
  • the resulting neutrons move at a speed of ⁇ 5cm/ns; therefore, the time scale to get the resolution in the range of a few centimeters has to be in nanoseconds. If the pulse time is in microseconds, it would yield a resolution in meters, thereby resulting in the mixing of signals from various parts of the object and chances of contraband remaining undetected.
  • the beam is then sent through a post-acceleration stage using hardware 112 that allows for additional acceleration of the deuterium ion beam which increases its energy.
  • the accelerating voltage is in the range of 100 to 300 kV.
  • the beam then impinges onto a tritium target 106.
  • the current of the deuteron beam impinging on the tritium target is in a range of up to 500 ⁇ .
  • the resulting pulsed neutrons are shielded and narrowly collimated, using a collimator 107, into a beam 120 directed to the suspect area 108.
  • the resultant gamma rays produced by inelastic interaction with the neutrons are detected using an array of gamma-ray detectors 109.
  • Time-of-Flight (ToF) electronics and a processing unit map the signals from gamma-ray detectors into elements as a function of depth.
  • ToF Time-of-Flight
  • the target is made of multiple targets where a replacement can be put into position when one target is partially depleted, without requiring servicing the system.
  • the system uses a rotating target.
  • the d-T generator of the present invention is a compact, high output generator and more suitable for deployment in various applications, as compared to bulky prior-art generators.
  • the neutron generator is well-shielded to reduce dose outside the collimated beam and reduce gamma-ray background.
  • the system of present invention employs a d-T neutron generator with an alpha detector to determine the position of neutrons as a function of time.
  • the d-T reaction produces both a 14 MeV neutron and an alpha particle that travels in a direction exactly 180 degrees opposite to the produced neutron.
  • a conventional problem with alpha particle imaging is that if the intensity of the deuteron beam is increased to get more neutrons, the alpha particles start arriving too close to each other and the identification of the neutrons gets confusing due to random coincidences of the alpha particles and neutron-induced gamma ray measurements.
  • a produced neutron can collide with shielding materials and produce gamma rays, which are detected at random times and result in increased background in the time area of interest.
  • the resultant signals are affected by a high background that limits the maximum neutron output. Conventionally, this requires lowering the neutron output to a level where this background is low, but results in long inspection times.
  • use of API to image large cargo areas has been limited due to the intensity, as the output is low and it results in unacceptably long times to image a large object.
  • random coincidence events increase as the square of neutron intensity, a 2 I 2 , where 'a' is a parameter that depends on background and is derived experimentally.
  • Background comes from mainly two sources: 1) time correlated background (TCB), which is produced by fast-neutron interactions and 2) time uncorrected background (TUB), which is produced by thermal neutron interaction with surrounding matter. Therefore, in order to reduce random coincidence, these sources of background must be decreased.
  • TCB time correlated background
  • TUB time uncorrected background
  • gamma rays produced by the neutron interaction in the shielding/collimator can increase TCB.
  • the high energy 4.44 MeV gamma ray from carbon for which sufficient shielding must be placed to virtually eliminate it.
  • Other gamma rays produced by thermal neutron capture in the shielding material, such as 2.23 MeV from hydrogen, can also escape and increase the TUB, so sufficient shielding must be incorporated to prevent this too.
  • the present specification describes a method in which only small areas of the object are scanned at a time. This is achieved by collimating the neutron beam into a cone beam or small rectangular beam to project to the size of the area of interest.
  • the optimal API source shielding/collimator configuration of the present specification is designed such that it results in very low leakage of neutrons and gamma rays, except for the neutrons that travel through the collimated aperture.
  • Critical design specifications include using large amounts of shielding with appropriate materials and a long collimator.
  • FIG. 2a illustrates a schematic diagram of the top view of a system with a high-yield API generator.
  • a highly collimated neutron beam 201 is used to inspect an area 202, which may be a part of cargo 203, for example.
  • the beam 201 is generated by the API generator 204, which is accompanied by an appropriate shielding and collimating apparatus 205 (shown in FIG. 2b).
  • the neutron beam is well-collimated so that it inspects a small area of the container, such as in the range of a few tens of centimeters at the center of a cargo container.
  • the neutron generator rotates about its long axis to aim neutrons at the suspect area.
  • the collimator beam itself needs to be directed towards the suspect areas of interest.
  • the collimated beam is moved in a vertical direction. In one embodiment, the collimated beam is rotated.
  • a shielding structure which, in one embodiment, is a combination of a borated material 222 (such as, but not limited to borated polyethylene), tungsten 224 and lead 226.
  • a borated material 222 such as, but not limited to borated polyethylene
  • tungsten 224 and lead 226 any number of borated materials that achieves the objective of the present invention may be employed.
  • a portion of the tungsten layer 224 can be replaced with a metal layer 227, to reduce cost, where the metal layer comprises, but is not limited to iron or copper.
  • the borated polyethylene layer 222 has a boron content of 2-5%.
  • the borated polyethylene layer 22 has a thickness of approximately 15 cm.
  • layers of lead 226 are interleaved between the layers of borated polyethylene 222 to reduce gamma rays produced in the shielding that could add to the random coincidence and increase the background.
  • the layers of lead 226 have a thickness of 2 cm.
  • a lead layer can be added to the end of the collimator, versus being interleaved with the borated polyethylene layer, however, the collimator would have a larger weight than compared with the interleaved approach.
  • an alternate high- Z material for example, bismuth
  • Additional shielding materials 228 surround the collimator to reduce the neutron leakage in other directions that can also produce background with the surroundings.
  • the shielding in areas that do not intersect the object to be inspected 232 and the detectors 234 is reduced for weight and cost considerations.
  • the amount of shielding that exists in these areas to prevent leaking neutrons from interacting with the surrounding regions that produce background gamma rays depends on the system configuration, but is typically on the order of 50 cm.
  • the shielding is comprised of materials similar to the collimator - tungsten, followed by steel or copper (although more tungsten is preferred), followed by borated poly/lead layers.
  • the total overall length of the collimator is at least 75 cm. In another embodiment, more steel/copper is employed for shielding, resulting in a collimator design longer than 75 cm. In one embodiment, the collimator ranges from 75 to 100 cm in length. This, however, is a trade -off between competing considerations of cost, size, and performance.
  • a layer of B10 or equivalent 229 is placed close to the exit of the collimator 230 to eliminate any thermal neutrons surviving the collimator and not absorbed by the shielding.
  • the gamma-ray detectors 234 must also be well-shielded to prevent thermal and epi- thermal capture.
  • borated material 238, such as B 4 C is used for shielding.
  • 15 mm of B 4 C is employed.
  • approximately 3 mm of lead shielding 236 is used between the borated shielding 238 and the detector 234 to absorb the 478 keV gamma rays from thermal capture in boron.
  • Additional thermal-neutron shielding 240 is added to structural materials supporting the system components, concrete and other surrounding material to reduce the TUB.
  • the elemental composition of the scanned object as a function of depth can be determined.
  • the cross-section elemental map of the inspected area is obtained by detecting the direction of the associated alpha particle and using that information to determine the direction and position of the emitted neutron, which is emitted 180 degrees relative to the alpha particle, as described above.
  • a detector provides the alpha particle with a time of generation as well as the direction relative to the target. Further, in detecting the alpha particle trajectory, the time of generation of the accompanying neutron as well as its direction are determined, since its line of travel is opposite to that of the alpha particle.
  • deuterons from the generator hit the tritium target, the nuclear reaction results in an alpha particle and a neutron, positioned 180 degrees from each other.
  • the alpha particle is detected first because the alpha detector is proximate.
  • the fast neutrons thus produced are therefore defined as "tagged" (by the alpha particle), in time as well as in direction.
  • an alpha particle detector 206 is placed at a distance and at 180 degrees relative to the target.
  • the alpha detector 206 is also collimated to have the same angular range as the collimated beam, thus the angular coverage of the alpha detector corresponds to the neutron beam.
  • the size of the alpha detector in one embodiment, is no bigger than that required to capture the associated neutrons going in the opposite direction. A smaller angle would result in not all of the neutrons in the collimated beam being tagged. Since the number of alpha particles to avoid random coincidences is fixed, when a small area is inspected, there is a much larger neutron flux. This allows getting results in a short time compatible with deployed systems.
  • the alpha particle detector is a multi-segmented detector.
  • the size of the beam on target can be greater than 1cm, when a high deuteron beam current is used (for higher output).
  • the large focal spot is required to maintain the current density low while employing a large deuteron current needed to produce a high neutron output.
  • the alpha detector is too close, alpha particles associated with the neutrons going in a larger angle than what the collimator allows will also be detected. This increases the random coincidences resulting in a higher background.
  • the placement of the alpha detector 206 at a relatively large distance ensures that the fuzziness of the neutron-beam is avoided, which is generally associated with the uncertainty of the angular spread of the neutron due to the large size of the deuteron focal spot.
  • the detector is placed at a distance greater than ⁇ 25cm to reduce the effect of the size of the focal spot on the direction of the neutrons.
  • API generator employed in the present invention provides a high neutron yield.
  • the total neutron output is approximately in the range of or greater than 10 9 neutrons/sec. This allows for determining the presence of contraband or clearing cargo in approximately one minute or less.
  • FIG. 2c illustrates an end view of the API system.
  • the broad neutron beam 211 that is generated in typical applications using neutron beam-alpha particle imaging is shown.
  • the narrow, highly-collimated beam 212 generated by the present system 215 that is used to accurately scan the target 213 is also shown.
  • the small-angle alpha-particle detector, the highly-collimated neutron beam and the well shielded neutron generator, detectors and collimator of the present invention result in a low random coincidence background that enables getting a high signal-to-background ratio.
  • FIG. 3 is a table illustrating the elemental composition of some of the materials that the system is able to identify.
  • Columns 301, 302, 303 and 304 indicate Carbon, Hydrogen, Oxygen and Nitrogen content, respectively, of various materials.
  • Columns 305 and 306 indicate the carbon-to-oxygen ratio (C/O) and N*0/C ratio for a given material, respectively. These ratios are especially useful in discriminating and identifying different materials. For example, a high a carbon-to-oxygen ratio (C/O) 305 would indicate the presence of cocaine, heroin and other drugs; while a high N*0/C ratio 306 would indicate the presence of most explosives. Other features can be used to identify these and other materials of interest.
  • the system of present invention may be operated to inspect selected areas of the cargo for cargo -manifest verification.
  • the elemental composition of the scanned areas is compared to the elemental composition of the claimed manifest to provide a probability that the manifest is correct.
  • the position of the tritium target should be at the same height as the height of the focal-spot source of the primary system. If the primary system has multiple sources, then the location would be at the same position as one of the sources. This is preferred avoid the uncertainties of parallax and would allow for interrogating the suspect area with a single directed scan.
  • FIG. 4 shows the effect of not having the primary and secondary inspection sources at the height.
  • Source 422 of the primary system is at different height as source 423 of the secondary system.
  • the projected image of the primary system indicates that the suspect object could be in any depth along the projection lines.
  • secondary source 423 is at the different location, the system must inspect all the probable locations 431 to avoid missing the suspect object.
  • the primary system produces a 3D image, there is not a strong preference for the position of the tritium target.
  • the operator or automated detection algorithm would indicate the suspect area in 3D and the beam will be directed to this area.
  • the object will be rotated to an optimal angle and translated in such a way to get the highest signal, and the area will be interrogated. Multiple interrogations at different angles are also possible.
  • the neutron-based inspection system of the present invention may be used for mobile applications as well as where the system requires to be relocated for inspection.
  • the system is also suitable for gantry and portal configurations, and for cargo as well as vehicle inspections.

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un système d'inspection de neutron fondé sur le temps de vol. Le système utilise un faisceau de collimation de neutrons rapides pour une interrogation ciblée de zones suspectes dans une cargaison. Une composition élémentaire est déterminée en fonction d'une profondeur. Une analyse est ensuite utilisée pour déterminer la présence de contrebande. Le système peut être utilisé pour une inspection secondaire pour une distinction de matériaux de façon à réduire le taux de fausse alarme, ainsi que le coût élevé et le temps associés au déballage manuel.
PCT/US2013/043801 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 Procédés et systèmes d'interrogation de neutron de temps de vol pour une distinction de matériaux WO2013181646A2 (fr)

Priority Applications (11)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU2013267091A AU2013267091B2 (en) 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 Methods and systems for Time-of-Flight neutron interrogation for material descrimination
KR1020147036271A KR102055963B1 (ko) 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 물체식별을 위한 비행시간 중성자심문방법과 장치
CA2875050A CA2875050C (fr) 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 Procedes et systemes d'interrogation de neutron de temps de vol pour une distinction de materiaux
CN201380034833.3A CN104813436B (zh) 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 用于材料辨别的飞行时间中子探询的方法和系统
GB1423029.6A GB2517389B (en) 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 Methods and systems for time-of-flight neutron interrogation for material discrimination
JP2015515274A JP2015523560A (ja) 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 物質識別のための飛行時間中性子検査方法及びシステム
MX2014014676A MX345317B (es) 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 Métodos y sistemas para interrogación de tiempo de vuelo de neutrones para discriminación de material.
BR112014029975A BR112014029975A8 (pt) 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 métodos e sistemas de interrogação de nêutrons em tempo de voo para discriminação de material
EP19177093.2A EP3550332A1 (fr) 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 Procédés et systèmes d'interrogation de neutrons de durée de vol pour discrimination de matériaux
EP13796384.9A EP2856494A4 (fr) 2012-06-01 2013-05-31 Procédés et systèmes d'interrogation de neutron de temps de vol pour une distinction de matériaux
AU2017202993A AU2017202993A1 (en) 2012-06-01 2017-05-04 Methods and systems for time-of-flight neutron interrogation for material descrimination

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US201261654656P 2012-06-01 2012-06-01
US61/654,656 2012-06-01

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WO2013181646A3 WO2013181646A3 (fr) 2015-06-11

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EP (2) EP2856494A4 (fr)
JP (3) JP2015523560A (fr)
KR (1) KR102055963B1 (fr)
CN (1) CN104813436B (fr)
AU (2) AU2013267091B2 (fr)
BR (1) BR112014029975A8 (fr)
CA (1) CA2875050C (fr)
GB (1) GB2517389B (fr)
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US9123519B2 (en) 2012-06-01 2015-09-01 Rapiscan Systems, Inc. Methods and systems for time-of-flight neutron interrogation for material discrimination
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FR3092667A1 (fr) 2019-02-08 2020-08-14 Commissariat A L'energie Atomique Et Aux Energies Alternatives Procédé de détermination de la composition d’un objet à identifier et dispositif de détermination de la composition d’un objet à identifier
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CN104813436B (zh) 2017-07-18
US9123519B2 (en) 2015-09-01
BR112014029975A2 (pt) 2017-06-27
KR102055963B1 (ko) 2020-01-22
JP2017207509A (ja) 2017-11-24
AU2017202993A1 (en) 2017-05-25
MX345317B (es) 2017-01-23
GB2517389B (en) 2019-01-30
BR112014029975A8 (pt) 2021-05-25
KR20150022899A (ko) 2015-03-04
AU2013267091A1 (en) 2015-01-15
EP2856494A4 (fr) 2016-10-05
GB2517389A (en) 2015-02-18
JP2017223700A (ja) 2017-12-21
EP3550332A1 (fr) 2019-10-09
JP6469780B2 (ja) 2019-02-13
CA2875050A1 (fr) 2013-12-05
CA2875050C (fr) 2020-03-10
MX2014014676A (es) 2015-08-05
AU2013267091B2 (en) 2017-05-25
WO2013181646A3 (fr) 2015-06-11
EP2856494A2 (fr) 2015-04-08
US20130327948A1 (en) 2013-12-12
JP2015523560A (ja) 2015-08-13
CN104813436A (zh) 2015-07-29

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