WO2012073339A1 - Procédé de mise à jour de clé, nœud, passerelle, serveur et système de réseau - Google Patents

Procédé de mise à jour de clé, nœud, passerelle, serveur et système de réseau Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2012073339A1
WO2012073339A1 PCT/JP2010/071393 JP2010071393W WO2012073339A1 WO 2012073339 A1 WO2012073339 A1 WO 2012073339A1 JP 2010071393 W JP2010071393 W JP 2010071393W WO 2012073339 A1 WO2012073339 A1 WO 2012073339A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
gateway
key
address
server
node
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/JP2010/071393
Other languages
English (en)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
和快 古川
尚 兒島
武仲　正彦
伊豆　哲也
Original Assignee
富士通株式会社
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 富士通株式会社 filed Critical 富士通株式会社
Priority to JP2012546616A priority Critical patent/JP5488715B2/ja
Priority to PCT/JP2010/071393 priority patent/WO2012073339A1/fr
Publication of WO2012073339A1 publication Critical patent/WO2012073339A1/fr

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0827—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a key update method for updating a key for encrypting data, a node, a gateway, a server, and a network system.
  • An ad hoc network is a type of self-configuring network that is linked by wireless communication.
  • An ad hoc network is composed of a plurality of nodes. Each node in the ad hoc network transmits and receives packets by multi-hop communication. Multi-hop communication is a technique in which nodes that do not exist within each other's communication area communicate with each other via another node that exists within the communication area of each node.
  • ad hoc network when connecting an ad hoc network and another network such as the Internet, LAN (Local Area Network), WAN (Wide Area Network), etc., communication between networks is transferred using a relay device called a gateway.
  • LAN Local Area Network
  • WAN Wide Area Network
  • a node capable of wireless communication is incorporated in each home electric power meter, and a worker performs work such as meter confirmation via an ad hoc network without going to the site.
  • a node capable of wireless communication is incorporated in each home electric power meter, and a worker performs work such as meter confirmation via an ad hoc network without going to the site.
  • an ad hoc network that handles personal information such as the amount of power used in each home, it is required to perform secure communication from the viewpoint of confidentiality and tampering prevention.
  • the new node when the new node is initially introduced into the system, the new node cannot communicate securely with other nodes in the ad hoc network until the encryption key is set. For this reason, it is difficult to automatically set an encryption key to a new node via an ad hoc network, and a worker goes to the site to set the encryption key.
  • the candidate gateways can be narrowed down from the address of the node installation location, the communication status changes due to factors such as the weather and the positional relationship with nearby buildings. For this reason, it is necessary for the worker to go to the site to confirm which gateway is actually communicable, and there is a problem in that the work time and work load required for the work of updating the encryption key of the worker are increased. .
  • a node adjacent to one hop can receive a broadcast packet (hereinafter, “BC packet”) from the gateway, but the BC packet is encrypted with a new encryption key (hereinafter, “new key”). ing. Therefore, the packet cannot be decrypted with the currently owned encryption key (hereinafter “current key”), and is not transferred from the gateway to the next two hops.
  • BC packet broadcast packet
  • new key a new encryption key
  • a node that is one hop from the gateway can be set as a new key, but a key that is two hops away from the gateway cannot be set.
  • a node adjacent to two hops from the gateway can update the key only after completing the key update for the node adjacent to one hop from the gateway and receiving a BC packet from the gateway.
  • the present invention provides a key update method, a node, a gateway, a server, and a network system capable of improving the efficiency of updating the encryption key used by a node in an ad hoc network in order to solve the above-described problems caused by the prior art.
  • the purpose is to provide.
  • the gateway in the key update for updating the gateway-specific current key assigned to each node of the node group in the ad hoc network from the gateway in the ad hoc network, the gateway includes: An encrypted packet having the gateway address and the current key update notification information and at least the update notification information encrypted with the current key is simultaneously notified to the ad hoc network, and the gateway transmits a new message unique to the gateway.
  • a server having a database for acquiring a key and associating and storing the address of the gateway and the current key; acquiring the new key; storing the new key in the database in association with the current key; Each node in the group sends the encrypted packet with the current key.
  • the specific node in the node group connected to the mobile terminal that can communicate with the server is determined to be the update notification information.
  • a packet including the address of the gateway obtained from the encrypted packet is transmitted to the server via the portable terminal, and the server uses the address of the gateway in the transmitted packet in the database.
  • Servers, and network systems are examples.
  • node, gateway, server, and network system According to the key update method, node, gateway, server, and network system according to the present invention, it is possible to improve the efficiency of updating the encryption key used by the nodes in the ad hoc network.
  • FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram of an example of the network system according to the embodiment.
  • FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram showing a key update example (part 1) in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing a key update example (part 2) in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram of a key update example (part 3) in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram of a key update example (part 4) in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram showing a key update example (part 5) in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram of an example of the network system according to the embodiment.
  • FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram showing a key update example (part 1) in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing a key update example (part 2) in
  • FIG. 7 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data structure of the encrypted packet SPi broadcast from the gateway Gi.
  • FIG. 8 is an explanatory diagram showing another example of the data structure of the encrypted packet SPi broadcast from the gateway Gi.
  • FIG. 9 is a block diagram of a hardware configuration example of the management server 101 according to the embodiment.
  • FIG. 10 is a block diagram of a hardware configuration example of the gateway Gi and the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi (hereinafter, “nodes”) according to the embodiment.
  • FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the contents stored in the key information DB 110.
  • FIG. 12 is a block diagram illustrating a functional configuration example of the gateway Gi.
  • FIG. 13 is a block diagram illustrating a functional configuration example of the management server 101.
  • FIG. 14 is a block diagram illustrating a functional configuration example of the node Ni.
  • FIG. 15 is an explanatory diagram of an example of the contents stored in the packet information table.
  • FIG. 16 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of authentication information of the management server 101.
  • FIG. 17 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of authentication information of the mobile terminal H.
  • FIG. 18 is a sequence diagram illustrating a key update sequence example according to the embodiment.
  • FIG. 19 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a detailed processing procedure of the key update pre-processing (step S1804) illustrated in FIG.
  • FIG. 20 is a flowchart illustrating another example of the detailed processing procedure of the key update pre-processing (step S1804) illustrated in FIG.
  • FIG. 21 is a flowchart showing an example of a detailed processing procedure of the new key specifying process (step S1810) shown in FIG.
  • FIG. 22 is a flowchart showing another example of the detailed processing procedure of the new key specifying process (step S1810) shown in FIG.
  • FIG. 23 is a block diagram illustrating another example of the functional configuration of the gateway Gi.
  • FIG. 24 is a block diagram illustrating another example of the functional configuration of the management server 101.
  • FIG. 25 is a sequence diagram illustrating another example of the key update sequence according to the embodiment.
  • FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram of an example of the network system according to the embodiment.
  • the network system 100 includes a management server 101, gateways G1 to Gn, and nodes N1-1 to N1-m1, N2-1 to N2-m2,..., Nn-1 to Nn-mn. It is a configuration.
  • the management server 101 and the gateways G1 to Gn are connected to each other via a network NW1 such as the Internet, LAN, or WAN.
  • NW1 such as the Internet, LAN, or WAN.
  • node Ni indicates an arbitrary node among the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi constituting an arbitrary ad hoc network Ai.
  • the management server 101 is a computer that includes a key information DB (database) 110 and manages encryption keys unique to the gateways G1 to Gn.
  • the encryption key unique to the gateway Gi (hereinafter referred to as “encryption key Ki”) is key information for encrypting packets transmitted and received between nodes in the ad hoc network Ai to which the gateway Gi belongs.
  • encryption key Ki is key information for encrypting packets transmitted and received between nodes in the ad hoc network Ai to which the gateway Gi belongs.
  • the gateway Gi is a relay device that connects the ad hoc network Ai and the network NW1.
  • the gateway Gi understands both the protocol of the ad hoc network Ai and the protocol of the network NW1, and transfers communication between the ad hoc network Ai and the network NW1.
  • Nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi are wireless communication devices that perform multi-hop communication with other nodes within a predetermined communication range.
  • the gateway Gi it is not necessary for all the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi to directly communicate with the gateway Gi, and it is sufficient that some nodes can communicate with the gateway Gi.
  • the network system 100 can be applied to, for example, a system that collects the amount of power and gas used in each household. Specifically, for example, by incorporating each node Ni-1 to Ni-mi into a power meter or gas meter in each home, the amount of power or gas used in each home is transmitted and received between nodes in the ad hoc network Ai. Note that the power consumption and gas consumption of each household may be measured by each node Ni-1 to Ni-mi, or each node Ni-1 to Ni-mi may be obtained from a power meter or gas meter. Good.
  • the gateway Gi uses the power and gas usage of each home received from the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi in the ad hoc network Ai to the server of the power company or gas company (for example, the management server 101) via the network NW1. Send to. As a result, the amount of power and gas used can be collected without the need for workers to visit the site.
  • the packet is encrypted using the encryption key Ki unique to the gateway Gi for each ad hoc network Ai. This ensures secure communication (data confidentiality, tampering prevention, etc.) of the ad hoc network Ai. Moreover, the risk at the time of key leakage is reduced by changing the encryption key Ki for every ad hoc network Ai. Since the received packet is also encrypted with the encryption key Ki, the gateway Gi and its subordinate nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi can be decrypted with the encryption key Ki.
  • a single gateway Gi is provided in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • a plurality of gateways Gi may be provided in the same ad hoc network Ai.
  • the encryption key Ki for encrypting packets transmitted and received in the ad hoc network Ai is common to a plurality of gateways Gi.
  • the encryption key Ki is key information used in common by the gateway Gi and the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • An example in which the encryption key Ki is the current key Ki currently used in the ad hoc network Ai and the current key Ki is updated to the new key KKi will be described.
  • FIG. 2 to 6 are explanatory diagrams showing examples of key update in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • FIG. 2 shows a state (A) before the key update.
  • the management server 101 stores the current key Ki for each gateway Gi in the key information DB 110.
  • FIG. 2 shows that the gateway Gi (address) and the current key Ki are associated with each other in the key information DB 110. Further, the gateway Gi and the nodes Ni-1 to Gi-6 also hold the current key Ki.
  • FIG. 3 shows a state (B) transitioned from the state (A) in FIG.
  • the gateway Gi encrypts the update notification information of the current key Ki with the current key Ki.
  • the gateway Gi broadcasts the encrypted packet SPi to the ad hoc network Ai.
  • the encrypted packet SPi is distributed to the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-6.
  • the gateway Gi generates a new key KKi and transmits the new key KKi to the management server 101 via the network NW1.
  • the management server 101 designates the gateway Gi record in the key information DB 110 using the address of the gateway Gi that is the transmission source of the new key KKi as a clue.
  • the management server 101 stores the new key KKi in the designated record. Thereby, the gateway Gi (address), the current key Ki, and the new key KKi are associated with each other.
  • FIG. 4 shows a state (C) transitioned from the state (B) in FIG.
  • the current key Ki is erased at the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-6.
  • the deletion of the current key Ki is not limited to this stage. For example, it may be after the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-6 have received the new key KKi.
  • the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-6 hold the encrypted packet SPi broadcast from the gateway Gi.
  • nodes Ni-1 to Ni-6 decrypt the encrypted packet SPi with the current key Ki and confirm whether update notification information for the current key Ki is included. If update notification information is included, the encrypted packet SPi is held. If not included, node-specific processing (for example, sending a measurement result to the gateway Gi) is executed according to the decoded information.
  • FIG. 5 shows a state (D) transitioned from the state (C) in FIG.
  • the mobile terminal H is connected to the node Ni-3, and the node Ni-3 uses the mobile terminal H as a communication interface to communicate with the management server 101.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates the node Ni-3, the other nodes Ni-1, Ni-2, Ni-4 to Ni-6 are similarly executed.
  • the worker goes to the place where the node Ni-3 is installed and connects the node Ni-3 and the mobile terminal H.
  • the portable terminal H is a computer that can communicate with the management server 101. Communication between the portable terminal H and the management server 101 may be established before or after connection of the node Ni-3.
  • the node Ni-3 transmits the encrypted packet SPi to the management server 101.
  • the packet may not be the encrypted packet SPi as long as the packet includes the address of the gateway Gi.
  • the communication between the portable terminal H and the management server 101 may use existing encrypted communication such as a public key cryptosystem.
  • the management server 101 Upon receiving the encrypted packet SPi from the node Ni-3, the management server 101 identifies the address of the gateway Gi from the encrypted packet SPi.
  • the update notification information may be encrypted with the current key Ki, or the update notification information and the address of the gateway Gi may be encrypted with the current key Ki.
  • the address of the gateway Gi is not encrypted with the current key Ki, the address of the gateway Gi can be specified from the encrypted packet SPi. If the address of the gateway Gi is also encrypted with the current key Ki, the management server 101 tries to decrypt sequentially with the encryption key for each gateway. If the decryption is successful, the key is the current key Ki in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • the management server 101 since the address of the gateway Gi or the current key Ki is specified from the encrypted packet SPi, the management server 101 refers to the key information DB 110 and is associated with the address of the gateway Gi (or the current key Ki). The new key KKi is extracted.
  • the management server 101 transmits the new key KKi extracted from the key information DB 110 to the node Ni-3 via the mobile terminal H.
  • the communication between the portable terminal H and the management server 101 may use existing encrypted communication such as a public key cryptosystem.
  • FIG. 6 shows a state (E) transitioned from the state (D) in FIG.
  • the state (E) shows the result of executing the processing shown in the state (D) of FIG. 5 for the other nodes Ni-1, Ni-2, Ni-4 to Ni-6.
  • the new key KKi is distributed to the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-6. Further, the current key Ki is erased from the key information DB 110 and the new key KKi is left. Thereafter, the new key KKi becomes a valid current key in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • FIG. 7 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the data structure of the encrypted packet SPi broadcast from the gateway Gi.
  • the encrypted packet SPi includes a header part 710 and a payload part 720.
  • a destination address, a source address, the number of hops, and a GW address are described.
  • the payload portion 720 describes the encrypted data body (hatched portion in FIG. 7).
  • the destination address is the destination address.
  • the broadcast MAC address “00: 00: 00: 00: 00: 00” is described.
  • the sending address is a sender address.
  • the MAC address of another node Ni different from the node Ni in the ad hoc network Ai is described.
  • the number of hops is a remaining transfer count indicating how many times the encrypted packet SPi is transferred.
  • the maximum number of hops of the encrypted packet SPi broadcast from the gateway Gi is set in advance.
  • the hop count is decremented when the encrypted packet SPi is transferred, and the encrypted packet SPi with the hop count of “0” is discarded.
  • the hop number “10” of the encrypted packet SP1 is described.
  • GW address is the address of the gateway Gi.
  • the MAC address “AA: AA: AA: AA: AA: AA” of the gateway Gi is described. Note that although the MAC address is used as an example of the destination address, the sending address, and the GW address here, an IP address or the like may be used.
  • the payload part 720 is decrypted with the encryption key Ki.
  • update notification information including a key update flag 721 and a time stamp 722 is stored.
  • the key update flag 721 is bit information indicating that the current key Ki (encryption key Ki) is updated. For example, by specifying the bit position of the key update flag in advance, it is possible to detect that the key is updated at each of the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi.
  • the time stamp 722 is information describing the generation time of the update notification information. Each time the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi receive the encrypted packet SPi, the latest one of the time stamps 722 is held. When the encrypted packet SPi is newly received, each of the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi uses the held time stamp 722 and the time stamp 722 obtained by decrypting the received encrypted packet SPi. Compare. If the time stamp obtained by decrypting the encrypted packet SPi received this time is new, it is assumed that the key update flag is valid, and each of the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi executes the key update process. It becomes.
  • FIG. 8 is an explanatory diagram showing another example of the data structure of the encrypted packet SPi broadcast from the gateway Gi.
  • the GW address of the gateway Gi that broadcasts the encrypted packet SPi is embedded in the header portion 710.
  • the GW address of the gateway Gi is not embedded in the header portion 810. Instead, the GW address of the gateway Gi is embedded in the decrypted payload portion 820. In the case of the encrypted packet SPi shown in FIG. 8, the GW address of the broadcasted gateway Gi cannot be specified unless the encrypted packet SPi is decrypted with the encryption key Ki.
  • FIG. 9 is a block diagram of a hardware configuration example of the management server 101 according to the embodiment.
  • the management server 101 includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 901, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 902, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 903, a magnetic disk drive 904, a magnetic disk 905, and an optical disk drive 906.
  • the CPU 901 controls the entire management server 101.
  • the ROM 902 stores programs such as a boot program.
  • the RAM 903 is used as a work area for the CPU 901.
  • the magnetic disk drive 904 controls reading / writing of data with respect to the magnetic disk 905 according to the control of the CPU 901.
  • the magnetic disk 905 stores data written under the control of the magnetic disk drive 904.
  • the optical disc drive 906 controls reading / writing of data with respect to the optical disc 907 according to the control of the CPU 901.
  • the optical disk 907 stores data written under the control of the optical disk drive 906, and causes the computer to read data stored on the optical disk 907.
  • the I / F 908 is connected to the networks NW1 and NW2 through communication lines, and is connected to other devices (for example, the gateway Gi and the portable terminal H) via the networks NW1 and NW2.
  • the I / F 908 serves as an internal interface with the networks NW1 and NW2 and controls data input / output from an external device.
  • a modem or a LAN adapter may be employed as the I / F 908.
  • the display 909 displays data such as a document, an image, and function information as well as a cursor, an icon, or a tool box.
  • a CRT a CRT
  • a TFT liquid crystal display a plasma display, or the like can be adopted.
  • the keyboard 910 includes keys for inputting characters, numbers, various instructions, etc., and inputs data. Moreover, a touch panel type input pad or a numeric keypad may be used.
  • the mouse 911 performs cursor movement, range selection, window movement, size change, and the like. A trackball or a joystick may be used as long as they have the same function as a pointing device.
  • the mobile terminal H shown in FIG. 2 can also be realized by the same hardware configuration as that of the management server 101 shown in FIG.
  • FIG. 10 is a block diagram of a hardware configuration example of the gateway Gi and the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi (hereinafter, “nodes”) according to the embodiment.
  • the node or the like includes a CPU 1001, a RAM 1002, a flash memory 1003, an I / F 1004, and an encryption circuit 1005.
  • the CPU 1001 to the encryption circuit 1005 are connected by a bus 1000, respectively.
  • the CPU 1001 governs overall control of the nodes and the like.
  • the RAM 1002 is used as a work area for the CPU 1001.
  • the flash memory 1003 stores key information such as programs and encryption keys.
  • the I / F 1004 transmits and receives packets by multi-hop communication.
  • the gateway Gi I / F 1004 is connected to the network NW1 through a communication line, and is connected to the management server 101 via the network NW1.
  • the encryption circuit 1005 is a circuit that encrypts data with an encryption key when encrypting the data. When encryption is executed by software, the encryption circuit 1005 becomes unnecessary by storing a program corresponding to the encryption circuit 1005 in the flash memory 1003.
  • FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the contents stored in the key information DB 110.
  • the key information DB 110 has fields of ID, GW address, current key, and new key. By setting information in each field, the key information 1100-1100-n for each gateway G1 to Gn is recorded.
  • ID ID
  • GW address current key
  • new key By setting information in each field, the key information 1100-1100-n for each gateway G1 to Gn is recorded.
  • the ID is an identifier of each gateway Gi used for explanation in this specification.
  • the GW address is the address of the gateway Gi.
  • a MAC (Media Access Control) address or an IP (Internet Protocol) address of the gateway Gi can be used.
  • the current key Ki is a currently valid encryption key unique to each gateway Gi, and is specifically binary data of about 128 to 256 bits, for example.
  • the new key KKi is an updated encryption key unique to each gateway Gi, and is specifically binary data of about 128 to 256 bits, for example.
  • the new key KKi is stored in the key information DB 110 in the update process, and is stored in the key information DB 110 as the current key when the update process is completed.
  • the gateway G1's GW address is “xx: xx: xx: xx: 12: 34”, and the encryption key is “encryption key K1”.
  • the key information DB 110 is realized by a storage device such as the ROM 902, the RAM 903, the magnetic disk 905, and the optical disk 907 of the management server 101 shown in FIG.
  • the content stored in the key information DB 110 may be updated when the management server 101 receives the encryption key Ki unique to the gateway Gi from the gateway Gi. Further, the stored contents of the key information DB 110 may be updated by a user operation input using the keyboard 910 or the mouse 911 shown in FIG.
  • FIG. 12 is a block diagram illustrating a functional configuration example of the gateway Gi.
  • the gateway Gi includes a distribution unit 1201, an acquisition unit 1202, and a transmission unit 1203.
  • each function unit (distribution unit 1201 to transmission unit 1203), for example, causes the CPU 1001 to execute a program stored in a storage device such as the RAM 1002 or the flash memory 1003 illustrated in FIG.
  • the function is realized by the I / F 1004.
  • the processing results of the respective functional units (distribution unit 1201 to transmission unit 1203) are stored in a storage device such as the RAM 1002 or the flash memory 1003, for example.
  • the distribution unit 1201 simultaneously notifies the ad hoc network Ai of the encrypted packet SPi that has the GW address of the gateway Gi and the update notification information of the current key Ki and at least updates the update notification information with the current key Ki.
  • the data structure of the encrypted packet SPi may be any of the data structures shown in FIG. 7 or FIG.
  • the gateway Gi when the gateway Gi receives an update instruction for the current key Ki, the gateway Gi generates update notification information. Then, the gateway Gi generates an encrypted packet SPi using the generated update notification information as payload portions 720 and 820. The gateway Gi uses the distribution unit 1201 to broadcast the generated encrypted packet SPi to the ad hoc network Ai.
  • the update instruction for the current key Ki may be an operation input to the gateway Gi or an automatic update instruction given periodically.
  • an update instruction for the current key Ki may be received from the management server 101.
  • the acquisition unit 1202 acquires a new key KKi unique to the gateway Gi.
  • the acquisition unit 1202 includes, for example, a generation unit 1221 and a storage unit 1222.
  • the generation unit 1221 generates a new key KKi.
  • the generation unit 1221 generates a new key KKi using a random number generation function.
  • the storage unit 1222 stores the new key KKi generated by the generation unit 1221.
  • the storage unit 1222 stores the new key KKi in a storage device such as the RAM 1002 or the flash memory 1003 in the gateway Gi. Further, after the encrypted packet SPi already encrypted with the current key Ki is broadcast by the distribution unit 1201, the current key Ki can be deleted by overwriting the new key KKi with the current key Ki. Good.
  • the transmission unit 1203 transmits the new key KKi to the management server 101 via the network NW1. Thereafter, by completing the key update process between each of the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi and the management server 101, it is possible to communicate with the packet encrypted with the new key KKi within the ad hoc network Ai. Become.
  • FIG. 13 is a block diagram illustrating a functional configuration example of the management server 101.
  • the management server 101 includes a key information DB 110, an acquisition unit 1301, a reception unit 1302, an extraction unit 1303, a decryption unit 1304, a determination unit 1305, and a transmission unit 1306.
  • the key information DB 110 realizes its function by a storage device such as the ROM 902, the RAM 903, the magnetic disk 905, and the optical disk 907 shown in FIG.
  • Each of the functional units specifically stores a program stored in a storage device such as the ROM 902, the RAM 903, the magnetic disk 905, and the optical disk 907 shown in FIG. The function is realized by executing or by the I / F 908. Further, the processing results of the respective functional units (acquisition unit 1301 to transmission unit 1306) are stored in a storage device such as the RAM 903, the magnetic disk 905, and the optical disk 907, for example.
  • the acquisition unit 1301 acquires the new key KKi, stores the new key KKi in the key information DB 110 in association with the current key Ki. Specifically, for example, the acquisition unit 1301 receives the new key KKi from the gateway Gi. The received new key KKi is stored in the new key field of the gateway Gi record of the key information DB 110 using the GW address of the gateway Gi stored as the transmission source in the header of the transmission packet of the new key KKi. .
  • secure communication such as SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is performed between the mobile terminal H and the management server 101, for example.
  • the packet received from the specific node Ni-x via the mobile terminal H does not need to be the encrypted packet SPi, and may be at least a packet including the GW address of the gateway Gi. Further, the GW address of the gateway Gi may not be encrypted with the current key Ki.
  • the extraction unit 1303 extracts the current key Ki of the gateway Gi from the key information DB 110 based on the GW address of the gateway Gi. Specifically, for example, when the GW address of the gateway Gi is not encrypted in the packet from the mobile terminal H (for example, the encrypted packet SPi having the data structure in FIG. 7), the GW address of the gateway Gi is specified.
  • the extraction unit 1303 extracts a new key KKi associated with the current key Ki of the gateway Gi from the key information DB 110 using the identified GW address of the gateway Gi.
  • the extraction unit 1303 may extract the current key Ki when the update notification information is decrypted.
  • the extraction unit 1303 sequentially extracts the current keys K1, K2,... Stored in the key information DB 110, and gives the extracted current keys K1, K2,.
  • the decryption unit 1304 decrypts the encrypted packet received by the reception unit 1302 using the key extracted by the extraction unit 1303. Specifically, for example, when the encrypted packet SPi has the data structure shown in FIG. 7, the current key Ki that can decrypt the encrypted packet SPi can be uniquely specified. Therefore, the decryption unit 1304 decrypts the encrypted packet SPi using the current key Ki. In this case, the update notification information is also decoded.
  • the decrypting unit 1304 decrypts the encrypted packet SPi using the current keys K1, K2,. If decryption is successful, the gateway Gi's GW address and update notification information are obtained.
  • the extraction unit 1303 can extract the new key KKi using the GW address of the gateway Gi as a clue.
  • the determination unit 1305 determines whether the information decrypted from the encrypted packet SPi is update notification information. Specifically, it is determined whether or not a key update flag is set at a bit position designated in advance. If it is determined that the information is update notification information, the extraction unit 1303 extracts the new key KKi using the GW address of the gateway Gi as a clue.
  • the transmission unit 1306 transmits the new key KKi extracted by the extraction unit 1303 to the specific node Ni-x via the mobile terminal H.
  • the new key KKi can be assigned to the specific node Ni-x without going through the ad hoc network Ai.
  • FIG. 14 is a block diagram illustrating a functional configuration example of the node Ni.
  • the node Ni includes a packet reception unit 1401, a determination unit 1402, a detection unit 1403, a packet transmission unit 1404, a key reception unit 1405, an update unit 1406, a recording unit 1407, and a determination unit 1408. It is.
  • each of the functional units causes the CPU 1001 to execute a program stored in a storage device such as the RAM 1002 and the flash memory 1003 illustrated in FIG.
  • the function is realized by the I / F 1004.
  • the processing results of the respective functional units are stored in a storage device such as the RAM 1002 and the flash memory 1003 unless otherwise specified.
  • the packet receiver 1401 receives the encrypted packet SPi broadcast from the gateway Gi in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • the encrypted packet SPi is a packet encrypted using the encryption key Ki unique to the gateway Gi.
  • the encrypted packet SPi is, for example, a packet including update notification information that notifies the ad hoc network Ai of update processing.
  • the packet receiving unit 1401 receives the encrypted packet SPi by multi-hop communication from another node Ni in the ad hoc network Ai. However, if the gateway Gi exists in the communication area of the node Ni, the packet receiving unit 1401 may directly receive the encrypted packet SPi from the gateway Gi.
  • the determination unit 1402 determines whether each node Ni-1 to Ni-mi in the node group constituting the ad hoc network Ai has update notification information by decrypting the encrypted packet SPi with the current key Ki. To do. Specifically, for example, the node Ni determines whether or not a key update flag is set at a bit position designated in advance in a packet decrypted from the encrypted packet SPi. Further, the determination unit 1402 may determine whether or not the encrypted packet SPi received this time is the latest as compared with the time stamp of the update notification information stored last time.
  • the detection unit 1403 detects a connection with the mobile terminal H that can communicate with the management server 101. Specifically, for example, as a result of the worker connecting the portable terminal H and the new node N using a USB cable, the detection unit 1403 detects the connection with the portable terminal H via the USB cable.
  • the packet transmission unit 1404 receives the encrypted data received through the mobile terminal H.
  • the packet SPi is transmitted to the management server 101.
  • the packet transmission unit 1404 transmits the encrypted packet SPi to the mobile terminal H via the network NW3 such as a USB cable.
  • the portable terminal H transmits the encrypted packet SPi from the node Ni to the management server 101 via the network NW2.
  • the key receiving unit 1405 receives the encryption key KKi unique to the gateway Gi from the management server 101 via the mobile terminal H.
  • the encryption key KKi is, for example, a common key that can encrypt a packet at the node Ni-x and decrypt the encrypted packet SPi encrypted using the encryption key KKi.
  • the update unit 1406 updates the current key Ki to the new key KKi. Thereby, the encryption of the packet to be transmitted by the node Ni and the decryption of the encrypted packet SPi are executed with the new key KKi. Therefore, secure communication can be performed between nodes in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • the update unit 1406 may update the new key KKi by overwriting the current key Ki, and the current key Ki may be updated until the node Ni transmits the encrypted packet SPi to the management server 101. It may be erased.
  • the recording unit 1407 records information on the received encrypted packet SPi. Specifically, for example, the recording unit 1407 records the number of hops and the GW address included in the header part of the encrypted packet SPi in the packet information table.
  • the packet information table will be described.
  • the packet information table is realized by a storage device such as the RAM 1002 and the flash memory 1003, for example.
  • FIG. 15 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the stored contents of the packet information table.
  • a packet information table 1500 has fields of ID, hop number, and GW address, and packet information 1500-1 to 1500-5 is stored as records by setting information in each field. .
  • the ID is an identifier of the encrypted packet SPi used for explanation in this specification.
  • the number of hops is a remaining transfer count indicating how many times the encrypted packet SPi is transferred.
  • the GW address is the address of the gateway Gi. Note that the packet information of each encrypted packet SPi is stored in the packet information table 1500 in the order of reception of the encrypted packet SPi.
  • the determining unit 1408 determines the encrypted packet SPi to be transmitted based on the recorded information on the encrypted packet SPi. For example, when the installation location of the node Ni is located where the ad hoc networks A1 and A2 overlap, the packet reception unit 1401 may receive encrypted packets SP1 and SP2 from different gateways G1 and G2.
  • the encrypted packet SPi to be transmitted to the management server 101 is determined based on the information related to the encrypted packet SPi recorded by the recording unit 1407. Then, the packet transmission unit 1404 transmits the determined encrypted packet SPi to the management server 101 via the mobile terminal H.
  • the packet transmission unit 1404 transmits the determined encrypted packet SPi to the management server 101 via the mobile terminal H.
  • the determination unit 1408 may determine, for example, the oldest encrypted packet SPi as a transmission target with reference to the packet information table 1500, for example.
  • the determination unit 1408 determines the encrypted packet SP1 specified from the oldest packet information 1500-1 as a transmission target.
  • the encrypted packet SPi first received by the node Ni can be set as a transmission target.
  • the determination unit 1408 may determine, for example, the latest encrypted packet SPi as a transmission target with reference to the packet information table 1500, for example. In the example of FIG. 15, the determination unit 1408 determines the encrypted packet SP1 specified from the latest packet information 1500-5 as a transmission target. As a result, the latest encrypted packet SPi received by the node Ni can be targeted for transmission. As a result, for example, when a gateway located near the existing gateway is newly established, an encryption key unique to the newly established gateway can be acquired.
  • the determining unit 1408 may determine, for example, the encrypted packet SPi having the smallest number of hops as a transmission target with reference to the packet information table 1500. In the example of FIG. 15, the determination unit 1408 determines the encrypted packet SP1 specified from the packet information 1500-1 as a transmission target. As a result, the encrypted packet SPi with the smallest number of transfers can be targeted for transmission.
  • the gateway Gi is geographically close. For this reason, the encrypted packet SPi with the smallest number of transfers is targeted for transmission, and as a result, the encryption key Ki unique to the nearby gateway Gi can be acquired and the communication efficiency with the gateway Gi is improved. be able to.
  • the determination unit 1408 may determine the encrypted packet SPi to be transmitted based on the average value of the number of hops for each gateway Gi with reference to the packet information table 1500, for example. Specifically, first, the determination unit 1408 refers to the packet information table 1500 and calculates an average value of the number of hops for each GW address.
  • the determination unit 1408 determines the encrypted packet SP2 broadcast from the gateway G2 of the GW address “xx: xx: xx: xx: 56: 78” having the maximum average number of hops as a transmission target. .
  • the encrypted packet SPi having the smallest number of times of transfer can be targeted for transmission.
  • the mobile terminal H receives the SSL server certificate from the management server 101.
  • the received SSL server certificate is stored in a storage device such as the RAM 1002 or the flash memory 1003 of the mobile terminal H in association with the IP address of the management server 101, for example.
  • FIG. 16 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of authentication information of the management server 101.
  • the authentication information 1600 of the management server 101 has an IP address and an SSL server certificate.
  • the IP address is the IP address of the management server 101.
  • the 509 certificate is an SSL server certificate (public key certificate) of the management server 101.
  • the mobile terminal H performs server authentication by decrypting the SSL server certificate using a public key incorporated in the terminal in advance.
  • the public key is issued by, for example, a third-party certification body. If the SSL server certificate can be correctly decrypted using this public key, it can be seen that the SSL server certificate is a correct certificate certified by a third-party certification authority, and that the identity of the management server 101 has been guaranteed. Become.
  • the authentication information 1700 is stored in a storage device such as the ROM 902, the RAM 903, the magnetic disk 905, and the optical disk 907 of the management server 101, for example.
  • FIG. 17 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of authentication information of the mobile terminal H.
  • the authentication information 1700 of the portable terminal H has a user ID and a password.
  • the user ID is an identifier of the mobile terminal H.
  • the password is for authenticating a user who uses the mobile terminal H.
  • the mobile terminal H transmits a user ID and password pair to the management server 101.
  • the user ID and password may be registered in advance in the flash memory 603 of the mobile terminal H, or may be received by a user operation input using an input device (not shown) of the mobile terminal H.
  • the management server 101 determines that the user ID and password pair from the portable terminal H matches the user ID and password pair of the authentication information 1700.
  • the user ID and the password of the authentication information 1700 match, the identity of the user of the mobile terminal H is guaranteed.
  • the mobile terminal H communicates with the management server 101 by encrypting the packet using, for example, a public key included in the SSL server certificate of the management server 101. Thereby, secure communication can be performed between the management server 101 and the portable terminal H.
  • FIG. 18 is a sequence diagram illustrating a key update sequence example according to the embodiment.
  • the gateway Gi generates update notification information (step S1801), and encrypts the update notification information with the current key Ki to generate an encrypted packet SPi (step S1802).
  • the gateway Gi broadcasts the encrypted packet SPi in the ad hoc network Ai (step S1803).
  • the encrypted packet SPi is distributed to the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi through multi-hop communication in the ad hoc network Ai.
  • the nodes Ni-1 to Ni-mi perform key update pre-processing (step S1804). Details of the key update pre-processing (step S1804) will be described later with reference to FIG. Further, the gateway Gi generates the new key KKi after broadcasting the encrypted packet SPi (step S1805). Then, the gateway Gi transmits the generated new key KKi and the GW address of the gateway Gi to the management server 101 via the network NW1 (step S1806).
  • the gateway Gi deletes the current key Ki (step S1808). Thereby, the gateway Gi will now distribute the packet encrypted with the new key KKi to the ad hoc network Ai and decrypt the packet received from the ad hoc network Ai with the new key KKi. Packets that cannot be decrypted with the new key KKi are discarded.
  • the management server 101 receives the new key KKi transmitted from the gateway Gi and the GW address of the gateway Gi, and stores the new key KKi in the record of the GW address in the key information DB 110 (step S1807).
  • the connection / disconnection with the mobile terminal H is detected by executing the key update pre-processing (step S1804).
  • the key update pre-processing it is assumed that the node Ni-3 is connected to the mobile terminal H.
  • the node Ni-3 transmits a packet including the GW address of the gateway Gi (for example, the encrypted packet SPi broadcast from the gateway Gi) to the management server 101 via the mobile terminal H (step S1809).
  • the management server 101 When the management server 101 receives a packet from the node Ni-3, it executes a new key specifying process (step S1810). Details of the new key specifying process (step S1810) will be described later with reference to FIG.
  • the management server 101 transmits the new key KKi specified in the new key specifying process (step S1810) to the node Ni-3 via the portable terminal H (step S1811).
  • the node Ni-3 When the node Ni-3 receives the new key KKi from the management server 101 via the mobile terminal H, the node Ni-3 updates the key used in the ad hoc network Ai from the current key Ki to the new key KKi (step S1812).
  • the worker can sequentially perform key update operations from arbitrarily selected nodes Ni without checking which node Ni in the ad hoc network Ai is how many hops away from the gateway Gi. Therefore, the efficiency of the key update work can be improved.
  • FIG. 19 is a flowchart showing an example of a detailed processing procedure of the key update pre-processing (step S1804) shown in FIG.
  • the node Ni decrypts the encrypted packet SPi broadcast from the gateway Gi with the current key Ki (step S1901).
  • the node Ni determines whether or not the packet decrypted from the encrypted packet SPi is update notification information (step S1902). If it is not update notification information (step S1902: NO), the key update pre-processing (step S1804) is terminated. In this case, the key update is not performed.
  • step S1902 determines whether it is update notification information (step S1902: Yes).
  • the node Ni sets a packet to be transmitted (step S1903). For example, a packet including the GW address of the gateway Gi such as the encrypted packet SPi is written in the transmission buffer in the node Ni.
  • the node Ni waits for the connection with the portable terminal H to be detected (step S1904: No).
  • the key update pre-processing (step S1804) is terminated.
  • the node Ni transmits a packet including the GW address of the gateway Gi to the management server 101 via the mobile terminal H.
  • FIG. 20 is a flowchart showing another example of the detailed processing procedure of the key update pre-processing (step S1804) shown in FIG.
  • the key update preprocessing (step S1804) in FIG. 20 is an example in the case of recording the number of transfers of the encrypted packet SPi.
  • the node Ni decrypts the encrypted packet SPi broadcast from the gateway Gi with the current key Ki (step S2001).
  • the node Ni determines whether or not the packet decrypted from the encrypted packet SPi is update notification information (step S2002). If it is not update notification information (step S2002: No), the key update pre-processing (step S1804) is terminated. In this case, the key update is not performed.
  • step S2002 determines whether it is update notification information (step S2002: Yes)
  • the node Ni records the number of times of transfer of the encrypted packet SPi (step S2003), and the processing of steps S2001 to S2003 is performed. Is executed for each encrypted packet SPi.
  • the node Ni determines the encrypted packet SPi to be transmitted based on the number of transfers recorded for each encrypted packet SPi (step S2004).
  • the determined encrypted packet SPi is written into a transmission buffer in the node Ni, for example.
  • the node Ni waits for the connection with the mobile terminal H to be detected (step S2005: No).
  • the key update pre-processing (step S1804) is terminated.
  • the node Ni transmits a packet including the GW address of the gateway Gi to the management server 101 via the mobile terminal H.
  • FIG. 21 is a flowchart showing an example of a detailed processing procedure of the new key specifying process (step S1810) shown in FIG.
  • the encrypted packet SPi is received as a packet including the gateway GW address will be described as an example.
  • the encrypted packet SPi is a packet in which the GW address of the gateway Gi is not encrypted as shown in FIG.
  • the management server 101 detects the GW address included in the encrypted packet SPi (step S2101). Next, the management server 101 extracts the current key (in this case, the current key Ki) associated with the detected GW address from the key information DB 110 (step S2102).
  • the current key in this case, the current key Ki
  • the management server 101 decrypts the encrypted packet SPi with the extracted current key Ki (step S2103). Thereafter, the management server 101 determines whether the information obtained by decrypting the encrypted packet SPi is update notification information (step S2104). If it is not update notification information (step S2104: No), an error process is executed (step S2105), and the new key specifying process (step S1810) is terminated.
  • step S2105 the extraction unit 1303 transmits an error message indicating that the new key KKi could not be extracted to the specific node Ni-x via the mobile terminal H. You may decide.
  • Error processing (step S2105) is executed, for example, when the encrypted packet SPi has been tampered with or when a part of the encrypted packet SPi has been lost. According to this error processing, it is possible to prompt the retransmission of the encrypted packet SPi by the specific node Ni-x.
  • step S2104 determines whether it is update notification information (step S2104: Yes)
  • the management server 101 becomes a new key (in this case, a new key KKi) associated with the detected GW address. ) Is extracted from the key information DB 110 (step S2106).
  • the new key specifying process step S1810 is terminated, and the process proceeds to step S1811.
  • the new key KKi can be securely and efficiently given to the specific node Ni-x connected to the mobile terminal H via the mobile terminal H.
  • FIG. 22 is a flowchart showing another example of the detailed processing procedure of the new key specifying process (step S1810) shown in FIG.
  • the encrypted packet SPi is received as a packet including the gateway GW address
  • the encrypted packet SPi is a packet in which the GW address of the gateway Gi is encrypted as shown in FIG.
  • the management server 101 determines whether or not the encrypted packet SPi has been successfully decrypted with the encryption key Ki (step S2203). If successful (step S2203: YES), since the successful encryption key Ki is found to be the same key as the current key Ki, the management server 101 extracts the encryption key Ki from the key information DB 110 (step S2203). S2204), the process proceeds to step S1811 shown in FIG.
  • the encryption key Ki for decrypting the received encrypted packet SPi is extracted from the key information DB 110. be able to.
  • step S2203 when the decryption of the encrypted packet SPi has failed (step S2203: No), the management server 101 increments the variable i (step S2205) and determines whether i> n (step S2206).
  • step S2206 NO
  • step S2206: NO the process returns to step S2202.
  • step S2206: YES the management server 101 executes an error process (step S2207) and ends the new key specifying process (step S1810).
  • step S2207 the new key specifying process
  • the management server 101 generates the new key KKi. It is good.
  • the management server 101 executes the generation of the new key KKi, the processing load of each gateway Gi can be reduced. Further, since the generation of the new key KKi can be concentrated on a single computer called the management server 101, the cost of the gateways G1 to Gn can be reduced.
  • the management server 101 generates a new key KKi will be described.
  • FIG. 23 is a block diagram illustrating another example of the functional configuration of the gateway Gi.
  • the same components as those shown in FIG. 12 are denoted by the same reference numerals, and the description thereof is omitted.
  • the gateway Gi includes a distribution unit 1201 and an acquisition unit 2302.
  • each functional unit (distribution unit 1201 and acquisition unit 2302) causes the CPU 1001 to execute a program stored in a storage device such as the RAM 1002 and the flash memory 1003 illustrated in FIG.
  • the function is realized by the I / F 1004.
  • the processing results of each functional unit are stored in a storage device such as the RAM 1002 or the flash memory 1003, for example.
  • the acquisition unit 2302 acquires a new key KKi unique to the gateway Gi.
  • the acquisition unit 2302 includes a reception unit 2321 and a storage unit 2322, for example.
  • the receiving unit 2321 receives the new key KKi from the management server 101.
  • the storing unit 2322 stores the new key KKi received by the receiving unit 2321.
  • the storage unit 2322 stores the new key KKi in a storage device such as the RAM 1002 or the flash memory 1003 in the gateway Gi.
  • the current key Ki can be deleted by overwriting the new key KKi with the current key Ki. Good.
  • FIG. 24 is a block diagram illustrating another example of the functional configuration of the management server 101.
  • the management server 101 includes a key information DB 110, an acquisition unit 2400, a first transmission unit 2401, a reception unit 1302, an extraction unit 1303, a decryption unit 1304, a determination unit 1305, and a second transmission unit 2402. It is equipped with.
  • each functional unit executes a program stored in a storage device such as the ROM 902, RAM 903, magnetic disk 905, and optical disk 907 shown in FIG.
  • the function is realized by executing the function or by the I / F 908.
  • the processing results of the respective function units are stored in a storage device such as the RAM 903, the magnetic disk 905, the optical disk 907, for example.
  • the acquisition unit 2400 acquires the new key KKi, stores the new key KKi in the key information DB 110 in association with the current key Ki.
  • the acquisition unit 2400 includes, for example, a generation unit 2411 and a storage unit 2412.
  • the generation unit 2411 generates a new key KKi for the gateway Gi to be updated. For example, the generation unit 2411 generates a new key KKi using a random number generation function.
  • the storage unit 2412 stores the new key KKi generated by the generation unit 2411. For example, the storage unit 2412 stores the new key KKi in the key information DB 110 in association with the GW address of the gateway Gi.
  • the first transmission unit 2401 transmits the new key KKi unique to the gateway Gi generated by the generation unit 2411 of the management server 101 to the gateway Gi.
  • the transmitted new key KKi is stored in the gateway Gi.
  • the second transmission unit 2402 transmits the new key KKi extracted by the extraction unit 1303 to the specific node Ni-x via the mobile terminal H.
  • the new key KKi can be assigned to the specific node Ni-x without going through the ad hoc network Ai.
  • FIG. 25 is a sequence diagram illustrating another example of the key update sequence according to the embodiment. The same processes as those shown in FIG. 18 are denoted by the same reference numerals, and the description thereof is omitted.
  • the management server 101 generates a new key KKi unique to the gateway Gi (step S2501). Then, the management server 101 transmits the generated new key KKi to the gateway Gi via the network NW1 (step S2502).
  • the gateway Gi When the gateway Gi receives the new key KKi from the management server 101 in step S2502, the gateway Gi generates update notification information (step S1801). Further, when the management server 101 generates a new key KKi, the new key KKi is stored in the key information DB 110 in association with the GW address of the gateway Gi (step S1807).
  • the node Ni can acquire the new key KKi from the networks NW2 and NW3 other than the ad hoc network Ai in exchange for the encrypted packet SPi. There is no need to exhaustively search which node Ni in the network is how many hops away from the gateway Gi. Therefore, it is possible to reduce the burden of the key update work by the worker. Further, even if the current key Ki is leaked, the key update operation is efficiently performed. Therefore, the encrypted communication in the ad hoc network Ai can be recovered early by updating to the new key KKi.
  • the key update method described in the present embodiment can be realized by executing a program prepared in advance on a computer such as a personal computer or a workstation.
  • the key setting program is recorded on a computer-readable recording medium such as a hard disk, a flexible disk, a CD-ROM, an MO, and a DVD, and is executed by being read from the recording medium by the computer.
  • Management server 110 Key information DB Ai Ad hoc network Gi Gateway H Mobile terminal Ki Current key (encryption key) KKi new key (encryption key) Ni node SPi encrypted packet

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)

Abstract

Selon l'invention, un travailleur se rend à un emplacement au niveau duquel un nœud (Ni-3) est installé et établit une connexion entre le nœud (Ni-3) et un terminal portable (H). Le nœud (Ni-3) transmet un paquet crypté (SPi) à un serveur de gestion (101). Lors de la réception du paquet crypté (SPi) à partir du nœud (Ni-3), le serveur de gestion (101) identifie l'adresse d'une passerelle (Gi) à partir du paquet crypté (SPi). Étant donné qu'une clé courante (Ki) ou l'adresse de la passerelle (Gi) est identifiée à partir du paquet crypté (SPi), le serveur de gestion (101) se rapporte à une base de données d'informations de clé (110) et extrait une nouvelle clé (KKi) liée à l'adresse de la passerelle (Gi). Le serveur de gestion (101) transmet la nouvelle clé (KKi) extraite de la base de données d'informations de clé (110) au nœud (Ni-3) par l'intermédiaire du terminal portable (H).
PCT/JP2010/071393 2010-11-30 2010-11-30 Procédé de mise à jour de clé, nœud, passerelle, serveur et système de réseau WO2012073339A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2012546616A JP5488715B2 (ja) 2010-11-30 2010-11-30 鍵更新方法、ノード、サーバ、およびネットワークシステム
PCT/JP2010/071393 WO2012073339A1 (fr) 2010-11-30 2010-11-30 Procédé de mise à jour de clé, nœud, passerelle, serveur et système de réseau

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/JP2010/071393 WO2012073339A1 (fr) 2010-11-30 2010-11-30 Procédé de mise à jour de clé, nœud, passerelle, serveur et système de réseau

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2012073339A1 true WO2012073339A1 (fr) 2012-06-07

Family

ID=46171325

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/JP2010/071393 WO2012073339A1 (fr) 2010-11-30 2010-11-30 Procédé de mise à jour de clé, nœud, passerelle, serveur et système de réseau

Country Status (2)

Country Link
JP (1) JP5488715B2 (fr)
WO (1) WO2012073339A1 (fr)

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP5488715B2 (ja) * 2010-11-30 2014-05-14 富士通株式会社 鍵更新方法、ノード、サーバ、およびネットワークシステム
JP5488716B2 (ja) * 2010-11-30 2014-05-14 富士通株式会社 鍵更新方法、ノード、ゲートウェイ、サーバ、およびネットワークシステム
CN114143013A (zh) * 2021-12-16 2022-03-04 郑州轨道交通信息技术研究院 基于MD5、RC4加密和zmq通讯的网关授权方法
CN114299694A (zh) * 2021-12-31 2022-04-08 郑州大学 一种基于ZigBee技术的智能水利无线预警系统

Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2003046517A (ja) * 2001-07-27 2003-02-14 Mitsubishi Materials Corp 情報管理機構、無線モバイルルータ
JP2003333031A (ja) * 2002-05-17 2003-11-21 Canon Inc 通信装置、通信システム、通信方法、記憶媒体、及びプログラム
JP2005117458A (ja) * 2003-10-09 2005-04-28 Sony Corp 無線接続システム、無線接続制御方法、アクセスポイント機器、および通信機器
JP2006238343A (ja) * 2005-02-28 2006-09-07 Nec Commun Syst Ltd 暗号キー配信装置、無線通信端末、無線アクセスポイント、無線データ通信システム、無線データ通信方法、プログラム、記録媒体
JP2007074393A (ja) * 2005-09-07 2007-03-22 Ntt Docomo Inc 安全なアドホックネットワークを構築するシステム
JP2007104310A (ja) * 2005-10-04 2007-04-19 Hitachi Ltd ネットワーク装置、ネットワークシステム及び鍵更新方法
JP2007174083A (ja) * 2005-12-20 2007-07-05 Oki Electric Ind Co Ltd マルチホップネットワークにおける鍵更新システム，鍵管理装置，通信端末および鍵情報構築方法
JP2010503327A (ja) * 2006-09-07 2010-01-28 モトローラ・インコーポレイテッド マルチホップメッシュネットワークを介する管理トラフィックの送信

Family Cites Families (13)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2003071734A1 (fr) * 2002-02-22 2003-08-28 Nokia Corporation Demande de certificats numeriques
JP4357339B2 (ja) * 2004-04-07 2009-11-04 株式会社バッファロー 無線通信システム、アクセスポイントおよび無線通信方法
US9282455B2 (en) * 2004-10-01 2016-03-08 Intel Corporation System and method for user certificate initiation, distribution, and provisioning in converged WLAN-WWAN interworking networks
JP4744993B2 (ja) * 2005-09-07 2011-08-10 株式会社エヌ・ティ・ティ・ドコモ 認証局、デバイス、移動局および通信システム並びに通信方法並びに通信プログラム
JP4667178B2 (ja) * 2005-09-07 2011-04-06 株式会社エヌ・ティ・ティ・ドコモ 安全なアドホックネットワークを構築するシステム、方法及びコンピュータプログラム
JP4730735B2 (ja) * 2005-09-07 2011-07-20 株式会社エヌ・ティ・ティ・ドコモ 安全なアドホックネットワークを構成するデバイスおよび認証方法並びに認証プログラム
JP2007281924A (ja) * 2006-04-07 2007-10-25 Toshiba Corp コンテンツ鍵データ配信方法、並びにコンテンツ鍵データ配信システム及びこれに用いられる再生機器
ES2390902T3 (es) * 2006-10-06 2012-11-19 Nec Corporation Procedimiento para elegir nodos agregadores en una red
JP4962237B2 (ja) * 2007-09-19 2012-06-27 富士通株式会社 携帯装置の位置に関する情報とファイル用暗号鍵とを管理するためのプログラムおよび方法
KR101174215B1 (ko) * 2008-04-24 2012-08-16 후지쯔 가부시끼가이샤 노드 장치, 노드 장치가 실행하는 방법 및 컴퓨터 판독가능한 기록 매체
JP5077186B2 (ja) * 2008-10-17 2012-11-21 富士通株式会社 通信装置、通信方法及び通信プログラム
NL1036791C2 (nl) * 2009-03-31 2010-10-04 Eurologics B V Systeem voor weergave van audio en/of video in een mobiele toepassing.
WO2012073339A1 (fr) * 2010-11-30 2012-06-07 富士通株式会社 Procédé de mise à jour de clé, nœud, passerelle, serveur et système de réseau

Patent Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2003046517A (ja) * 2001-07-27 2003-02-14 Mitsubishi Materials Corp 情報管理機構、無線モバイルルータ
JP2003333031A (ja) * 2002-05-17 2003-11-21 Canon Inc 通信装置、通信システム、通信方法、記憶媒体、及びプログラム
JP2005117458A (ja) * 2003-10-09 2005-04-28 Sony Corp 無線接続システム、無線接続制御方法、アクセスポイント機器、および通信機器
JP2006238343A (ja) * 2005-02-28 2006-09-07 Nec Commun Syst Ltd 暗号キー配信装置、無線通信端末、無線アクセスポイント、無線データ通信システム、無線データ通信方法、プログラム、記録媒体
JP2007074393A (ja) * 2005-09-07 2007-03-22 Ntt Docomo Inc 安全なアドホックネットワークを構築するシステム
JP2007104310A (ja) * 2005-10-04 2007-04-19 Hitachi Ltd ネットワーク装置、ネットワークシステム及び鍵更新方法
JP2007174083A (ja) * 2005-12-20 2007-07-05 Oki Electric Ind Co Ltd マルチホップネットワークにおける鍵更新システム，鍵管理装置，通信端末および鍵情報構築方法
JP2010503327A (ja) * 2006-09-07 2010-01-28 モトローラ・インコーポレイテッド マルチホップメッシュネットワークを介する管理トラフィックの送信

Non-Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
MASATOSHI HOBO: "Tadan Kosei Network ni Okeru Kagi Haiso Hoshiki no Ichi Kento", DAI 66 KAI (HEISEI 16 NEN) ZENKOKU TAIKAI KOEN RONBUNSHU (3) DATABESE TO MEDIA NETWORK, 9 March 2004 (2004-03-09), pages 3-495 - 3-496 *
MIRANG PARK: "An Efficient Key Distribution Method for a Secure Communication Groups", MULTIMEDIA COMMUNICATION AND DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING SYSTEM WORKSHOP, vol. 99, no. 18, 1 December 1999 (1999-12-01), pages 25 - 30 *
TAKASHI KIKUZAWA: "Ethernet PON ni Okeru Churning Kagi Koshin Hoho", 2002 IEICE COMMUNICATIONS SOCIETY CONFERENCE KOEN RONBUNSHU 2, 20 August 2002 (2002-08-20), pages 254 *
YASUKO FUKUZAWA: "Mobile Systems and Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) under Ubiquitous Environment", TRANSACTIONS OF INFORMATION PROCESSING SOCIETY OF JAPAN, vol. 44, no. 12, 15 December 2003 (2003-12-15), pages 3090 - 3097 *
YUTAKA KUNO: "R & D Hot Corner Solution", NTT GIJUTSU JOURNAL, vol. 19, no. 7, 1 July 2007 (2007-07-01), pages 42 - 45 *

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP5488715B2 (ja) * 2010-11-30 2014-05-14 富士通株式会社 鍵更新方法、ノード、サーバ、およびネットワークシステム
JP5488716B2 (ja) * 2010-11-30 2014-05-14 富士通株式会社 鍵更新方法、ノード、ゲートウェイ、サーバ、およびネットワークシステム
JPWO2012073340A1 (ja) * 2010-11-30 2014-05-19 富士通株式会社 鍵更新方法、ノード、ゲートウェイ、サーバ、およびネットワークシステム
JPWO2012073339A1 (ja) * 2010-11-30 2014-05-19 富士通株式会社 鍵更新方法、ノード、ゲートウェイ、サーバ、およびネットワークシステム
CN114143013A (zh) * 2021-12-16 2022-03-04 郑州轨道交通信息技术研究院 基于MD5、RC4加密和zmq通讯的网关授权方法
CN114299694A (zh) * 2021-12-31 2022-04-08 郑州大学 一种基于ZigBee技术的智能水利无线预警系统

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
JP5488715B2 (ja) 2014-05-14
JPWO2012073339A1 (ja) 2014-05-19

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US11316677B2 (en) Quantum key distribution node apparatus and method for quantum key distribution thereof
US9032203B2 (en) Key setting method, node, server, and network system
US8588410B2 (en) Simplified secure symmetrical key management
US8509438B2 (en) Key management in a wireless network using primary and secondary keys
US8732454B2 (en) Key setting method, node, and network system
US8719563B2 (en) Key setting method, node, and network system
JP5488715B2 (ja) 鍵更新方法、ノード、サーバ、およびネットワークシステム
JP5488716B2 (ja) 鍵更新方法、ノード、ゲートウェイ、サーバ、およびネットワークシステム
KR20190040443A (ko) 스마트미터의 보안 세션 생성 장치 및 방법
JP5494828B2 (ja) 鍵設定方法、ノード、サーバ、およびネットワークシステム
Li et al. Hierarchical agent-based secure and reliable multicast in wireless mesh networks
KR20130003616A (ko) 세션 키 및 클러스터 키 생성 방법 및 그 장치
JP5418700B2 (ja) 鍵設定方法、ノード、サーバおよびネットワークシステム
Zhou et al. Scalable and deterministic key agreement for large scale networks
JP5621905B2 (ja) 鍵設定方法、ノード、サーバおよびネットワークシステム
JP5418699B2 (ja) 鍵設定方法、ノード、サーバおよびネットワークシステム
KR101275830B1 (ko) 그룹키 관리 장치 및 방법, 그리고 그 방법을 컴퓨터에서 실행시키기 위한 프로그램을 기록한 기록매체
Baek et al. FI-Based Local Group Key Generation/Distribution for Mobile Multicast in a Hierarchical Mobile IPv6Network

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 10860181

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

ENP Entry into the national phase

Ref document number: 2012546616

Country of ref document: JP

Kind code of ref document: A

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 10860181

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1