WO2011018152A1 - Ensemble soupape de sécurité pneumatique - Google Patents

Ensemble soupape de sécurité pneumatique Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2011018152A1
WO2011018152A1 PCT/EP2010/004454 EP2010004454W WO2011018152A1 WO 2011018152 A1 WO2011018152 A1 WO 2011018152A1 EP 2010004454 W EP2010004454 W EP 2010004454W WO 2011018152 A1 WO2011018152 A1 WO 2011018152A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
valve
main
control
hvl
input
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2010/004454
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Mathias Schneider
Bodo Neef
Original Assignee
Festo Ag & Co. Kg
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Festo Ag & Co. Kg filed Critical Festo Ag & Co. Kg
Priority to EP10739518A priority Critical patent/EP2438310B1/fr
Publication of WO2011018152A1 publication Critical patent/WO2011018152A1/fr

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Classifications

    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F15—FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS; HYDRAULICS OR PNEUMATICS IN GENERAL
    • F15B—SYSTEMS ACTING BY MEANS OF FLUIDS IN GENERAL; FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS, e.g. SERVOMOTORS; DETAILS OF FLUID-PRESSURE SYSTEMS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • F15B20/00—Safety arrangements for fluid actuator systems; Applications of safety devices in fluid actuator systems; Emergency measures for fluid actuator systems
    • F15B20/001—Double valve requiring the use of both hands simultaneously
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F15—FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS; HYDRAULICS OR PNEUMATICS IN GENERAL
    • F15B—SYSTEMS ACTING BY MEANS OF FLUIDS IN GENERAL; FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS, e.g. SERVOMOTORS; DETAILS OF FLUID-PRESSURE SYSTEMS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • F15B2211/00—Circuits for servomotor systems
    • F15B2211/30—Directional control
    • F15B2211/305—Directional control characterised by the type of valves
    • F15B2211/30525—Directional control valves, e.g. 4/3-directional control valve
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F15—FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS; HYDRAULICS OR PNEUMATICS IN GENERAL
    • F15B—SYSTEMS ACTING BY MEANS OF FLUIDS IN GENERAL; FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS, e.g. SERVOMOTORS; DETAILS OF FLUID-PRESSURE SYSTEMS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • F15B2211/00—Circuits for servomotor systems
    • F15B2211/80—Other types of control related to particular problems or conditions
    • F15B2211/86—Control during or prevention of abnormal conditions
    • F15B2211/8643—Control during or prevention of abnormal conditions the abnormal condition being a human failure
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F15—FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS; HYDRAULICS OR PNEUMATICS IN GENERAL
    • F15B—SYSTEMS ACTING BY MEANS OF FLUIDS IN GENERAL; FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS, e.g. SERVOMOTORS; DETAILS OF FLUID-PRESSURE SYSTEMS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • F15B2211/00—Circuits for servomotor systems
    • F15B2211/80—Other types of control related to particular problems or conditions
    • F15B2211/875—Control measures for coping with failures

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a pneumatic safety valve device.
  • a safety valve device which is designed to prevent any further action of a connected system, for example a machine tool, when internal malfunctions occur.
  • the known safety valve device should moreover ensure that no new working cycle of the connected system can be initiated after a part of the safety valve device has become defective.
  • Applicants are also known from practice non-assignable safety valve devices which are used in conjunction with mechanical presses and which are designed such that a connected system i5 performs an action only if two actuation commands are issued simultaneously, for example by means of an electronic control or by means of manually operated buttons. Occurring malfunctions are usually performed here in an associated electronic control device.
  • a safety valve known from EP 1 220 993 B1 has two integrated 3/2-way valves with different effective diameters and measures for the storage of occurring malfunctions.
  • the disadvantage here, however, is that the fault memory is deleted at a pressure loss of the safety valve and thus the error occurred can not be subsequently verified.
  • a safety valve device which is equipped with two pilot operated monostable 5/2 way valves.
  • One of these valves has two main outputs to which a consumer can be connected.
  • second shuttle valves By means of second shuttle valves, the two main valves are connected so that the consumer only with simultaneous actuation of the main valves
  • Each main valve is actuated by means of a pilot valve, wherein a staggered actuation of the pilot valves has the consequence that the first activated main valve shuts off the other main valve required for activation pilot air. If a previously actuated pilot control valve is switched off, the associated main valve returns to the basic position due to an associated return spring.
  • a safety valve device known from US Pat. No. 5,113,907 A contains a valve unit equipped with two monostable main valves, wherein the main valves are biased by a respective return spring into a basic position, from which they are deflected into a working position by means of an associated pilot valve. Due to an intersecting channel connection of the two main valves, a connected consumer is only supplied with compressed air if both main valves are activated.
  • An integrated monitoring system prevents malfunction one of the main valves then an unobstructed renewed operation is possible and thus signals the malfunction occurred.
  • the monitoring system includes two monitoring valves each switching to a pre-purge shut-off position of the pilot valves when one of the main valves has not been operated due to a malfunction. By means of a return valve, the monitoring valves can be moved back to the basic position, but only after the malfunction of the Hauptventi- Ie fixed and they were positioned in another way in the normal position.
  • a first pneumatic functional group which is designed as a bistable 5/2 -way pulse valve first main valve, one to a first working output of the first
  • a first control force can switch the first main valve from one of its first operating output to a basic input connecting to a compressed air source or connectable to a main input into a working position
  • a second pneumatic functional group which is designed as a bistable 5/2 -way pulse valve second main valve, one to a first working output of the second Main output of the second main output and a 3/2 functionality exhibiting second pilot valve, wherein the working output of the second pilot valve is connected to a first control input of the second main 5 valve and there with activated second pilot valve, a second main valve from one of its first working output with a basic input connected to a main source connected to a source of compressed air can cause a first control force to be switched to a working position,
  • both main valves switch from their basic position to a working position and both main outputs are supplied with compressed air. If the pilot valves are then deactivated again at the same time, both main valves return to their basic position due to the second control force acting on them. Becomes
  • the main valves are designed as impulse valves, they remain in the current position even if, after a temporary pneumatic pressure failure, the pressure supply is switched back on. Even then, the error situation persists.
  • the reset valve device In order to return the safety valve device to the initial operating state in which both main valves assume the basic position, the reset valve device must be actively actuated, which can apply a pneumatic return pressure to the second control inputs of the main valves. In order for this reset operation to be possible only by authorized personnel, the return valve device can be locked, if necessary, by a lock or other safety mechanism or otherwise secured against actuation.
  • the return valve device is in particular designed such that, when activated, the pneumatic reset pressure is always supplied to both second control inputs. Thus, with a single operation, a restoring action on both main valves can be effected.
  • the return valve device may include a plurality of valves.
  • Particularly simple is a design in which the return valve device consists of a single return valve, which is in particular a monostable 3/2-way valve and which can be designed for manual operation. Deviating from this, however, a supported by external energy actuation would be conceivable, for example by means of electrical and / or fluidic actuation energy.
  • a check valve which opens in the direction of the respective control input and blocks in the opposite direction is expediently switched on. In this way, a mutual influence of the pending at the second control inputs control signals is advantageously avoided.
  • every second control input receives the second control force via a control channel diverted from the first operating output of the associated main valve, these two control channels being able to be connected together to one and the same operating output of the return valve device.
  • the pneumatic reset pressure is imposed on each aforementioned control input by connecting an operating output of the return valve device to one of the aforementioned control channels, which in turn establishes a connection between the second control input and the working output of the associated main valve, in order to switch back during normal operation to deliver to the basic position required second control force.
  • a throttle device is suitably switched on in the course of the respective control channel. It ensures that the pneumatic reset pressure can be easily established at the assigned second control input.
  • the type of actuation of the pilot valves can be based on the application. In particular, you can manually
  • pilot valves receive electrical and / or pneumatic actuation commands from a main stage of the control valve device to which the two main outputs are connected and which can in particular be part of a control device which is used to actuate a clutch Brake combination of a mechanical press is used.
  • such measures may consist of inserting into the connection between the first outlet at least one and appropriately each main valve and the inlet
  • a buffer volume defining buffer chamber is turned on. Even with a pressure drop on the input side, the buffer volume thus still provides a sufficiently high fluid pressure for a certain, short period of time
  • an exhaust throttle device may be present, which is either turned on in a channel section connecting a second vent outlet of the main valve with the atmosphere or upstream of this channel section.
  • Fig. 1 shows the circuit diagram of a preferred design of the safety valve device according to the invention and Fig. 2-6 different operating states of the safety valve device shown in Fig. L, wherein acted upon with a pneumatic overpressure channel sections are drawn in thicker lines.
  • the pneumatic safety valve device 1 has a first main valve HV1 and a second main valve HV2. Both main valves HV1, HV2 are designed as 5/2 -way valves, which have a bistable functionality, so that they are so-called impulse valves.
  • Main valve HV1, HV2 can optionally assume a first switching position shown in FIG. 1 - referred to as “basic position” - and a second switching position designated as “working position". Both switching positions are stable switching positions, so are maintained until a pneumatic switching control signal is actively applied.
  • friction means, magnetic means or locking means can be used for releasably fixing the respective switching position. Since such a valve assembly is known as such is Here, no further detailed explanations are given.
  • Each main valve HV1, HV2 has a total of five connections. These are each a supply input VE, a first working output AA1, a second working output AA2, a first venting output EA1 and a second venting output EA2.
  • the supply input VE communicates with the second working output AA2 and the first working output AA1 is connected to the first vent output EA1, wherein at the same time the second vent output EA2 is disconnected from all other connections ,
  • Each main valve HV1, HV2 also has a first control input SEI and a second control input SE2.
  • the first control input SEI leads to a first control surface 2 motion-coupled to the valve member of the main valve HV1, HV2, while the second control input SE2 leads to a second control surface 3 also coupled to the valve member of the main valve HV1, HV2.
  • the two Control surfaces 2, 3 are oriented opposite to each other.
  • a pneumatic pressurization of the first control input SEI causes a corresponding loading of the first control surface 2 and accordingly causes a first control force FS1 acting in the direction of the working position.
  • a fluid supplied to the second control input SE2 effects fluid pressurization of the second control surface 3 and causes a second control force FS2 effective in the direction of the home position.
  • the first control surface 2 is larger than the second control surface 3, so that at the same high pressure application, the first control force FSL is greater than the second control force FS2.
  • FIG. 1 Further valve components of the safety valve device 1 are a first pilot valve Wl responsible for switching the first main valve HV1 from the basic position to the working position and a second pilot valve W2 responsible for switching the second main valve HV2 from the basic position to the working position.
  • the two pilot valves Wl, W2 are designed as 3/2 way valves and preferably of monostable design.
  • Spring means 4 normally hold a respective pilot valve W1, W2 in the deactivated position shown in FIG.
  • the activated position-this is shown, for example, in FIG. 3-each pilot valve W1, W2 can be acted on by an actuating command 5.
  • the actuation command 5 may be, for example, a purely manually generated actuating force, but may also be applied as an electrical and / or pneumatic actuation signal.
  • the end- Guidance example allows both electrical and manual operation.
  • Each pilot valve has three different connections depending on the switch position. 5 of these connections are an input EV, an output AAV and a vent output EAV. In the deactivated position, the working outlet AAV is in fluid communication with the vent outlet EAV, while the inlet EV is disconnected from these ports. In the lo activated position is the work exit AAV with the
  • the first main valve HV1, the first pilot valve Wl drivingly cooperating with the first main valve HV1 and the first main outlet 17 can be referred to as components of a first pneumatic functional group and the second main valve HV2 can likewise be used in the same way which cooperates with the second main valve HV2
  • 2o second secondary pilot valve W2 and the second main outlet 18 are referred to as components of a second pneumatic functional group.
  • the safety valve device 1 includes a return valve device RV.
  • This 25 may in principle be composed of several individual valves, but preferably consists of a single, markable as a return valve.
  • the return valve device RV has a 3/2 -Wege functionality and is formed monostable.
  • the structure of the return valve device RV corresponds to that of each pilot valve W1, W2.
  • Spring means 6 normally hold the return valve means RV in the deactivated 5 position shown in FIG.
  • the return valve means RV can be switched by overcoming the spring force in the apparent from Fig. 6 activated position.
  • the switching command 7 can be caused in particular manually, electrically and / or fluidically.
  • the Swiss- lo play is designed especially for a purely manual operation.
  • a removal of the switching command 7 leads, as in the case of the pilot valves Wl, W2, the removal of the actuating command 5, to a caused by the spring means 6 switching back to the deactivated position.
  • the return valve device RV has three differently linked connections depending on the switching position. This is an input ER, an output AAR and a vent output EAR.
  • the working output AAR communicates with the venting output EAR and the input ER is disconnected from these connections.
  • the activated position there is a fluid connection between the working outlet AAR and the inlet ER, while the venting outlet EAR is disconnected.
  • Each vent outlet EA2, EAV, EAR is directly connected to the atmosphere, in particular with the interposition of a muffler 9.
  • the vent output EAl can at the same basic position of both main valves HVl, HV2 via the second main valve HV2 and its vent outlet
  • the safety valve device 1 has expediently only a single main input 8, which is designed to be fluidly connected to a compressed air source P.
  • the compressed air source P applies compressed air to the main inlet 8 under an operating pressure.
  • the main fluidic inlet 8 is in fluid communication with the supply input VE of the first main valve HV1, with the supply input VE of the second main valve HV2 and with the input ER of the return valve device RV.
  • each supply channel 12, 13, 14 with its own main input 8 for the fluid supply, but the joint assignment of a single main input 8 has constructive advantages. Especially since it is particularly easy to ensure that all supply inputs are supplied with the same operating pressure.
  • a first control channel 15 connects the first working outlet AA1 of the first main valve HV1 to the first control input SE1 of the second main valve HV2.
  • the second pilot valve W2 is switched on, which divides the first control channel 15 into an input section 15a and an output section 15b.
  • the inlet section 15a extends between the first working outlet AA1 of the first main valve HV1 and the inlet EV of the second pilot valve W2.
  • the output section 15b connects the working output AAV of the second pilot valve W2 to the first control input SEI of the second main valve HV2.
  • a second control channel 16 extends between the first working port AAl of the second main valve HV2 and the first control input SEI of the first main valve HVl.
  • the first pilot control valve Wl is turned on. This divides the second control channel 16 into an input section 16a and an output section 16b.
  • the input section 16a connects the first working output AAl of the first main valve HVl to the input EV of the first pilot valve Wl, while the output section 16b connects the working output AAV of the first pilot valve Wl to the first control input SEI of the first main valve HVl.
  • the safety valve device 1 has two fluidic outlets, which are designated as the first main outlet 17 and as the second main outlet 18. Both main outputs 17, 18 are expediently connected to an only schematically indicated main stage 22, which in the embodiment belongs to a not further shown control device with which the clutch-brake combination of a mechanical press can be controlled. For the proper operation of the main stage 22, it is necessary for safety reasons that a main control signal is simultaneously output to it via both main outputs 17, 18. The output of only one main control signal or a significant time offset output of both main control signals prevented for safety reasons, the intended function of the main stage 22 and the downstream of this device.
  • the first main outlet 17 is in fluid communication with the inlet portion 15a of the first control passage 15.
  • the second main outlet 18 is in fluid communication with the inlet portion 16a of the second control passage 16.
  • a third control channel 23 connects the input section 15a of the first control channel 15 with the second control input SE2 of the first main valve HVl.
  • a fourth control channel 24 provides fluid communication between the input portion 16a of the second control channel 16 and the second control input SE2 of the second main valve HV2.
  • a first connection channel 25 continuously connects the first venting outlet EA1 of the first main valve HV1 to the second operating output AA2 of the second main valve HV2.
  • a second connecting channel 26 constantly connects the second working outlet AA2 of the first main valve HV1 to the first venting outlet EA1 of the second main valve HV2.
  • the working outlet AAR of the return valve device RV is connected via a reset channel 27 to the second control input SE2 of each main valve HV1, HV2.
  • the connection is preferably made indirectly, with the interposition of the respective associated third or fourth control channel 23, 24.
  • the first Kanalast 27a is connected at a first channel connection point 28 to the third control channel 23 and the second
  • Kanalast 27b is connected at a second channel connection point 29 to the fourth control channel 24.
  • the two channel branches 27a, 27b are always flowed through only in the direction of the respectively connected lo third or fourth control channel 23, 24.
  • the channel connection point 28, 29 subdivides the respectively assigned third or fourth control channel 23, 24 into a first channel section 23a, 24a and a second channel section 23b, 24b.
  • first or second i5 channel connection 28, 29 and the associated input section 15a, 16a of the first and second control channel 15, 16 extending first channel portion 23a, 24a is preferably adjustable with respect to their throttling intensity throttle device 32, 33 is turned on.
  • the flow rate in the first channel section 23a, 24a is limited.
  • buffer chamber 34 which is a certain
  • compressed air stored here can briefly compensate for a pressure drop occurring on the input side 15a, 16a on the input side in order to ensure the switching function to be mentioned, even if the activation of the
  • the first control force FS1 is greater than the second control force FS2 acting in the opposite direction because the second control force FS1 is applied to the second control channel 23, 24 via the third or fourth control channel
  • the check valves 31 prevent a pressure reduction of the pressure prevailing in the third control channel 23 and the fourth control channel 24 via the deactivated return valve
  • the second control channel 16 is thereby supplied with compressed air, that it is connected via the first working output AAl and the first vent outlet EAl of the second main valve HV2 to the second connection channel 26, which in turn via the second working outlet AA2 and the supply input VE of the first main valve HVl and the subsequent first supply channel 12 is also connected to the main input under operating pressure 8. In this way, the operating pressure is applied to the second main outlet 18. If, starting from the regular operating state, the actuation of the two pilot valves is canceled at the same time, the system returns to the ready-to-use starting state according to FIG.
  • FIG. 4 shows a first error state that is possible based on the operational initial state of FIG. 2. This results from the fact that only the first pilot valve Wl has been switched to its activated position, while the second pilot valve W2 has remained in the deactivated position.
  • the reason for such a switching state can be, for example, that no actuation command 5 has reached the second pilot control valve W2 or that an internal malfunction of the second pilot control valve W2 itself is present.
  • 3o second pilot valve W2 can not lead to a subsequent switching of the second main valve HV2 due to lack of compressed air in the input section 15a of the first control channel 15.
  • the third control channel 23, which is connected via the input section 15a to the first working outlet AA1 of the first main valve HV1 is likewise vented.
  • Main valve HVl is alsschaltbar. In this way, although the operating pressure is applied to the second main output 18, this does not cause a regular operation in the main stage 22, because the first main output connected in parallel
  • FIG. 5 shows a possible second fault condition, as it can occur starting from the regular operating condition of FIG. 2. It differs from the first fault state in that now only the second pilot valve W2 has been activated 2s, while the first pilot valve Wl remains in the deactivated state. Thus, only the second main valve HV2 has been switched to its working position, the first main valve HVl has remained in the basic position.
  • the compressed air introduced into the first connection channel 25 from the main inlet 8 via the second supply channel 30 13 and the second main valve HV 2 is thus replaced by the compressed air. blocked the first vent outlet EAl of the first main valve HVl prevented from continuing to flow.
  • the input section 16a of the second control channel 16 and thus also the second main outlet 18 connected thereto are vented and thus pressure relieved. This happens because said input section 16a is connected to the atmosphere via the first working output AA1 and the venting output EA1 of the second main valve HV2, the second connecting channel 26 as well as the second working output AA2 and the second venting output EA2 of the first main valve HV1 optionally can be done over the already mentioned silencer 9 away.
  • the input section 15a of the first control channel 15 is in the second fault state via the first working output AAl 3o and the supply input VE of the first main valve HVl and supplied to the subsequent first supply channel 12 from the main entrance 8 with compressed air.
  • a pneumatic output signal is also present at the first main output 17.
  • 5 since the second main output 18 is depressurized, 5 lacks its output signal, which can be used to refrain in the main stage 22 from performing the regular control function.
  • control valve device can only be activated again by activating the return valve device RV
  • FIG. Fig. 6 shows this reset state, which - in terms of the switching positions of the main valves HVl, HV2 and the pilot valves Wl, W2 - corresponds to the ready output state, however
  • the return valve device RV is actuated in the manner already mentioned above by means of a switching command 7.
  • the return valve device RV can be secured by means not shown further be, for example, a mechanical lock or secured with a secret code to be entered electronic circuit.
  • the return channel 27 is connected via the working outlet AAR and the input ER lo of the return valve device RV to the third supply channel 14 and thus to the main input 8 providing the pneumatic actuating pressure.
  • the third and fourth control channels i5, 23, 24 are pressurized via the non-return valves 31, which in this case open automatically.
  • the feed into the third or fourth control channel 23, 24 takes place at the first or second channel connection point 28, 29, so that the respective associated throttle device 32, 33 due to the flow resistance caused by them
  • the provision in the operational initial state is only possible after previously both Vorêtventile Wl, W2 have been disabled.
  • the pilot valve activated in accordance with the first or second fault state remains activated, the main valve associated with it is subject to the first control force FS1, which prevents its return to the home position due to its dominating effect, even if the second control input SE2 initiates the reset by the reset device RV second control force FS2 is applied.
  • the return valve device RV is also connected to the main input 8 on the input side, it is supplied with the same operating pressure as the other components of the control valve device 1, so that the pneumatic back pressure which can be imposed on the two second control inputs SE2.
  • 2o actuating pressure is equal to the operating pressure responsible for the generation of the second control force FS2 in normal operation.
  • the return valve device RV is in particular designed such that
  • actuating pressure is expediently always at the same time. It is advantageous if the safety valve device 1 is equipped with means which allow a certain fault tolerance in the activation of the two pilot valves W1, W2. This fault tolerance ensures that the two pilot valves Wl, W2 can still be actuated even if their actuation takes place with a certain time offset, which lies within a time window defining a tolerance range.
  • such tolerance measures can consist in the fact that a buffer chamber 34 indicated by dot-dash lines is connected to the input sections 15a, 16a of the first and second control channels 15, 16 in the sense already mentioned above.
  • the buffer chambers 34 are filled with compressed air, if at the corresponding switching position of the two main valves HVL, HV2 input side of the first and second control channel 15, 16 compressed air. If the first or second fault state then occurs, the first or second control channel 15, 16 affected by the fault is vented via the associated main valve HV1, HV2.
  • 16 adjacent buffer volume ensures that the pressure drop takes place delayed and the prevailing pressure within the mentioned time window is still large enough to allow a subsequent switching of the previously unactuated first or second main valve HVL, HV2 ,
  • the maximum time offset permitting regular actuation of the safety valve device 1 for the actuation of the two pilot valves W1, W2 can be set variably.
  • the time offset can also be adjustable via the volume of the buffer chambers 34.
  • At least one throttle device 36 could be switched on in the course of the first or second connection channel 25, 26.
  • a duct section containing a second vent outlet EA2 of the relevant main valve HV1, HV2 in the basic position of a main valve HV1, HV2 is provided with an exhaust air throttling device 36 which, upon the occurrence of a fault condition, provides a delayed venting of the associated first or second vent second control channel 15, 16 guaranteed.
  • the buffer chambers 34 and exhaust throttles 36 may be present both alternatively and cumulatively.
  • the safety valve device 1 remains in the currently occurring error state.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Fluid-Pressure Circuits (AREA)
  • Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
  • Analytical Chemistry (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Fluid Mechanics (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)

Abstract

L’invention concerne un ensemble soupape de sécurité (1) comprenant deux soupapes principales (HV1, HV2) pouvant être actionnées respectivement par une soupape pilote (VV1, VV2) afin de pouvoir effectuer une commutation dans une position de travail, dans laquelle les soupapes principales provoquent l’application d’une pression pneumatique sur deux sorties principales (17, 18). La structure de l’ensemble soupape de sécurité (1) ne provoque une commutation des soupapes principales (HV1, HV2) dans la position de travail que lorsque les deux soupapes pilotes (VV1, VV2) sont actionnées de manière sensiblement synchrone. Si une seule des soupapes principales commute dans la position de travail en raison d’un actionnement asynchrone, cet état de défaut reste enregistré jusqu’à ce qu’un ensemble soupape de rappel (RV) la replace en position initiale.
PCT/EP2010/004454 2009-08-11 2010-07-21 Ensemble soupape de sécurité pneumatique WO2011018152A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP10739518A EP2438310B1 (fr) 2009-08-11 2010-07-21 Ensemble soupape de sécurité pneumatique

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE200910037120 DE102009037120B4 (de) 2009-08-11 2009-08-11 Pneumatische Sicherheitsventileinrichtung
DE102009037120.6 2009-08-11

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WO2011018152A1 true WO2011018152A1 (fr) 2011-02-17

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EP (1) EP2438310B1 (fr)
DE (1) DE102009037120B4 (fr)
WO (1) WO2011018152A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2540368A (en) * 2015-07-14 2017-01-18 Ge Oil & Gas Uk Ltd Fail-safe hydraulic circuit
DE102017009374B4 (de) * 2017-10-10 2019-08-22 Aventics Gmbh Ventilanordnung und Steuerungsverfahren
DE102022001747B3 (de) * 2022-05-18 2023-07-20 Günther Zimmer Pneumatische Bestätigungsvorrichtung und Einheit

Citations (4)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5113907A (en) 1991-01-29 1992-05-19 Ross Operating Valve Company Dynamic self-monitoring air operating system
EP1220993B1 (fr) 1999-10-15 2004-08-04 IMI Norgren-Herion Fluidtronic GmbH & Co. KG Soupape de securite
DE60027352T2 (de) 1999-06-11 2007-04-12 Ross Operating Valve Co. Doing Business As Ross Controls, Troy Doppelventil mit Schutz gegen Missbrauch
DE102007041583A1 (de) 2007-09-01 2009-03-05 Festo Ag & Co. Kg Ventileinrichtung

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5113907A (en) 1991-01-29 1992-05-19 Ross Operating Valve Company Dynamic self-monitoring air operating system
DE60027352T2 (de) 1999-06-11 2007-04-12 Ross Operating Valve Co. Doing Business As Ross Controls, Troy Doppelventil mit Schutz gegen Missbrauch
EP1220993B1 (fr) 1999-10-15 2004-08-04 IMI Norgren-Herion Fluidtronic GmbH & Co. KG Soupape de securite
DE102007041583A1 (de) 2007-09-01 2009-03-05 Festo Ag & Co. Kg Ventileinrichtung

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DE102009037120A1 (de) 2011-02-17
EP2438310B1 (fr) 2012-09-19
EP2438310A1 (fr) 2012-04-11

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