WO2010051710A1 - 一种智能卡密钥的生成方法 - Google Patents

一种智能卡密钥的生成方法 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2010051710A1
WO2010051710A1 PCT/CN2009/073394 CN2009073394W WO2010051710A1 WO 2010051710 A1 WO2010051710 A1 WO 2010051710A1 CN 2009073394 W CN2009073394 W CN 2009073394W WO 2010051710 A1 WO2010051710 A1 WO 2010051710A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
smart card
security domain
management platform
random number
security
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2009/073394
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
余万涛
马景旺
贾倩
Original Assignee
中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 中兴通讯股份有限公司 filed Critical 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority to EP09824365.2A priority Critical patent/EP2365464A4/en
Publication of WO2010051710A1 publication Critical patent/WO2010051710A1/zh

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/327—Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
    • G06Q20/3278—RFID or NFC payments by means of M-devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/353—Payments by cards read by M-devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/357—Cards having a plurality of specified features
    • G06Q20/3574—Multiple applications on card
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/357—Cards having a plurality of specified features
    • G06Q20/3576—Multiple memory zones on card
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3823—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for generating a smart card key.
  • IC (Integral Circuit) cards especially contactless IC cards, have been widely used in public transportation, access control, and microelectronic payment after more than a decade of development.
  • mobile phones have experienced rapid development over the years and have been widely used, bringing great convenience to people's work and life.
  • the functions of mobile phones are becoming more and more powerful, and there is a trend of integrating more functions.
  • the combination of mobile phones and non-contact: [C card technology, applied to the field of electronic payment, will further expand the use of mobile phones, giving people Life brings convenience and there is a broad application prospect.
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • interconnection technology After integrating NFC technology, mobile terminals such as mobile phones can simulate contactless IC cards for electronic payment related applications. Implementing this solution on mobile terminals requires the addition of NFC analog front-end chips and NFC antennas, and the use of smart cards that support electronic payments.
  • the business framework of the electronic payment system for mobile terminals based on NFC technology uses the multi-application framework of the Global Platform (Global Platform) specification.
  • the smart card supporting the Global Platform specification refers to the Global Platform Card Specification V2.1.1/V2. .2 specification (referred to as GP2.1.1/GP2.2 specification) IC chip or smart card, physically available as SIM/USIM module/universal user identification module) card, pluggable smart memory card, or integrated in The IC chip on the mobile terminal.
  • the secure channel protocol needs to support SCP02 (based on symmetric key); if the mobile terminal electronic payment system based on near field communication technology supports the GP2.2 specification, the secure channel protocol Need to support SCP02 (based on symmetric key) and SCP10 (based on asymmetric key), card issuers, application providers can choose according to different security policy requirements.
  • the NFC-based mobile terminal short-range electronic payment system mainly consists of a card issuer management platform, an application provider management platform, and a mobile terminal supporting a smart card with an electronic payment application function, and multiple applications may be provided in the system.
  • Business management platform mainly consists of a card issuer management platform, an application provider management platform, and a mobile terminal supporting a smart card with an electronic payment application function, and multiple applications may be provided in the system.
  • Business management platform mainly consists of a card issuer management platform, an application provider management platform, and a mobile terminal supporting a smart card with an electronic payment application function, and multiple applications may be provided in the system.
  • Business management platform mainly consists of a card issuer management platform, an application provider management platform, and a mobile terminal supporting a smart card with an electronic payment application function, and multiple applications may be provided in the system.
  • a security domain is a representation of the card's external entities (including card issuers and application providers) on the card, which contain keys to support secure channel protocol operation and smart card content management.
  • Security domains include primary and secondary security domains.
  • the primary security domain is represented on the card that the card issuer enforces on the smart card.
  • the security domain is represented on the optional card attached to the smart card by the card issuer or application provider.
  • the key generation of the security domain is the responsibility of the card issuer or application provider that manages the security domain, which ensures that applications and data from different application providers can coexist on the same smart card.
  • the keys for the security domain include: primary security domain key, secondary security domain key, and secondary security domain key.
  • the primary security domain key and the secondary security domain initial key are generated by the card issuer management platform, and the security domain key directly affects the complexity of the smart card security domain key management by the management method.
  • the seed key is usually dispersed multiple times using a fixed scatter parameter to generate a key of the smart card security domain.
  • the prior art method of generating a smart card security domain key is not convenient for key update (i.e., re-generation) due to the use of fixed scatter parameters.
  • the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to overcome the deficiencies of the prior art and provide a convenient A new smart card security domain key generation method.
  • the present invention provides a method for generating a smart card key, where the method can generate a key of a smart card security domain, and the method includes:
  • the management platform generates a random number for the smart card security domain, and generates a distributed parameter of the smart card security domain by using the random number;
  • a key of the smart card security domain is generated using a scatter algorithm.
  • the step of generating the scatter parameter of the smart card security domain by using the random number is:
  • the management platform uses the random number generated for the smart card security domain to perform operations with the following parameters: all or part of the bytes of the smart card identifier corresponding to the smart card security domain, and/or all of the smart card security domain identifiers of the smart card security domain Or partial bytes;
  • the management platform generates a dispersion parameter of the smart card security domain using a hash algorithm for the result of the above operation.
  • the step of generating the scatter parameter of the smart card security domain by using the random number is: using the random number as a scatter parameter of the smart card security domain.
  • the management platform saves a correspondence between a random number of the smart card security domain, or a scatter parameter and an identifier of the smart card security domain.
  • the seed key of the management platform is a secondary distributed seed key generated and distributed by the security authority to the management platform in the following manner:
  • the security mechanism generates a random number for the management platform, and uses the random number as a first-level distributed parameter, or operates the random number and the management platform identifier, and uses a hash algorithm to generate a first-level distributed parameter;
  • the security mechanism uses the generated primary decentralized parameter and the seed key of the security mechanism as parameters of the decentralized algorithm, and uses the decentralized algorithm to generate the secondary scattered seed key.
  • the security mechanism saves a correspondence between the management platform and a random number generated for the management platform or the first-level distributed parameter.
  • the operation is: a logical operation.
  • the logical operation is: an exclusive OR operation.
  • the security authority is a card issuer security organization
  • the security authority provides a security mechanism for the application.
  • the management platform saves the random number corresponding to the smart card primary security domain in a smart card identifier and a random number correspondence mapping table, or Saving the scatter parameter corresponding to the smart card primary security domain in the smart card identifier and the scatter parameter correspondence mapping table;
  • the management platform saves the smart card from the security domain corresponding random number in the smart card identifier, the security domain identifier and the random number correspondence relationship mapping table, or The distributed parameters corresponding to the smart card from the security domain are stored in the smart card identifier, the security domain identifier, and the scatter parameter correspondence mapping table.
  • the method for generating a smart card key generates a new random number for a smart card security domain (primary security domain or a security domain) by using a new key of the smart card security domain, and uses the new The generated random number generates a new scatter parameter, and finally uses the new scatter parameter to generate a key of the new smart card security domain, which solves the problem that the key of the smart card security domain is not easy to update.
  • FIG. 1A is a schematic diagram of a method for generating a smart card primary security domain key according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 1B is a flowchart of a method for generating a smart card primary security domain key according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2A is a smart card primary security domain key according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2B is a flowchart of a method for updating a smart card primary security domain key according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3A is a schematic diagram of a method for generating a smart card initial key from a security domain according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4A is a schematic diagram of a method for generating a slave security domain key managed by a card issuer according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4B is a flowchart of a method for generating a slave security domain key managed by a card issuer according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • a method diagram is a schematic diagram of a method for generating a slave security domain key managed by a card issuer according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • 6A is a schematic diagram of a method for updating a smart card from a security domain key according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 6B is a schematic diagram of a method for updating a smart card from a security domain key according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the basic idea of the present invention is: when generating a key of a smart card security domain, generating a new random number for the security domain of the smart card, using the random number as a parameter to generate a new scatter parameter using the secure hash algorithm, and using the scatter parameter And the seed key generates a key for the new smart card security domain.
  • the key generation and update system of the smart card security domain includes: a smart card, a management platform, and a security mechanism. among them:
  • the smart card can be installed on a mobile terminal supporting NFC technology and supports the Global Platform Card Specification V2.1.1/V2.2 specification.
  • Management platform used to complete key management tasks, such as key generation, update, etc.
  • the management platform can be a card issuer management platform or an application provider management platform.
  • the management platform supports symmetric encryption algorithms, such as AES-CBC (Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher Block Chaining) algorithm or 3DES (Triple Data Encryption Standard) algorithm for key distribution. deal with.
  • AES-CBC Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher Block Chaining
  • 3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
  • the management platform also supports secure hashing algorithms such as SHA1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) or SHA2 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2) for decentralized parameter generation.
  • the security agency can be a card issuer security agency or an application provider security agency.
  • the card issuer security agency manages several card issuer management platforms; the application provider security organization manages several application provider management platforms.
  • a multi-level key generation system composed of a security mechanism, a management platform, and a smart card
  • a three-level key generation architecture consisting of a security mechanism, a management platform and a smart card
  • the security organization corresponds to the first level
  • the management platform corresponds to the second level
  • the smart card Corresponding to the third level.
  • the management platform is further classified, it can constitute a multi-level key generation system composed of security organizations, different levels of management platforms, and smart cards.
  • the technical implementation of the three-level key generation system can be extended to the multi-level key generation system.
  • the seed key is the root key of the system and is used to generate the key for the security domain.
  • FIG. 1A is a schematic diagram of a method for generating a smart card primary security domain key according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 1B is a flowchart of a method for generating a smart card primary security domain key according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the method for generating a smart card primary security domain key of the present invention includes the following steps:
  • Step 101 The card issuer security organization generates a random number for each card issuer (card issuer management platform) using the random number generator, and uses the generated random number as the level of the card issuer (card issuer management platform). Dispersion parameters (dispersion parameter 1);
  • mapping table of the random number and card issuer management platform the mapping table is saved by the card issuer security authority.
  • Step 102 The card issuer security organization uses the first-level distributed parameter, uses the decentralized algorithm to decentralize the seed key of the card issuer security organization, obtains the second-level distributed seed key, and generates the generated second-level distributed seed key. Distributed to the card issuer management platform in a secure manner;
  • the decentralization algorithm in the embodiment of the present invention uses a symmetric encryption algorithm, such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm, the same as below.
  • Step 103 The card issuer management platform uses a random number generator to generate one for each smart card.
  • the random number the card issuer management platform saves and manages the mapping table of the correspondence between the ICCID (Intelligent Circuit Card Identification) and the random number (hereinafter referred to as the ICCID/random number mapping table);
  • the card issuer management platform saves the correspondence between the ICCID and the random number for subsequent recovery of the generated smart card security domain key.
  • Step 104 The card issuer management platform extracts the ICCID and the corresponding random number from the ICCID/random number mapping table, performs an exclusive OR operation, and then passes the result of the exclusive OR operation through a secure hash algorithm (such as SHA1 algorithm or SHA2 algorithm). ) obtaining secondary dispersion parameters (dispersion parameter 2);
  • a secure hash algorithm such as SHA1 algorithm or SHA2 algorithm.
  • the card issuer management platform actually generates the secondary decentralized parameter by using the ICCID as the smart card primary security domain identifier as the smart card primary security domain.
  • Step 105 The card issuer management platform uses the second-level distributed parameter, and uses a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm) to decentralize the secondary distributed seed key received by the card issuer management platform to generate a smart card.
  • a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm
  • the primary security domain key, and the generated smart card primary security domain key is distributed to the smart card primary security domain in a secure manner.
  • FIG. 2A is a schematic diagram of a method for updating and generating a key of a smart card's primary security domain (hereinafter referred to as an update) according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2B is a flowchart of a method for updating a primary security domain key of a smart card according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the card issuer management platform manages the smart card primary security domain key, and sets the update time of the smart card primary security domain key; when the smart card primary security domain key is about to expire, or when the security update is performed for security reasons
  • the smart card master security domain key is updated by the card issuer management platform.
  • the card issuer management platform updates the smart card primary security domain key by the following steps:
  • Step 201 When the smart card needs to update the primary security domain key, the card issuer management platform generates a new random number for the smart card by using a random number generator, and replaces the random number corresponding to the smart card in the ICCID/random number mapping table. And saving the updated ICCID/random number mapping table;
  • Step 202 The card issuer management platform extracts the ICCID of the smart card and the corresponding random number from the updated ICCID/random number mapping table, and performs an exclusive OR operation;
  • Step 203 The card issuer management platform processes the result of the exclusive OR operation in step 202 through a secure hash algorithm (such as SHA1 algorithm or SHA2 algorithm) to obtain an updated smart card primary security domain.
  • a secure hash algorithm such as SHA1 algorithm or SHA2 algorithm
  • Step 204 The card issuer management platform substitutes the scatter parameter obtained in step 203 and the second-level distributed seed key saved by the card issuer management platform into a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm) to generate a new smart card master security.
  • a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm
  • the domain key is generated, and the generated new smart card primary security domain key is distributed to the smart card primary security domain through a secure route to complete the update of the smart card primary security domain key.
  • FIG. 3A is a schematic diagram of a method for generating a smart card initial key from a security domain according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3B is a flowchart of a method for generating a smart card initial key from a security domain according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the method for generating a smart card initial key from the smart card of the embodiment includes the following steps: Step 301: When the card issuer management platform creates the slave security zone of the smart card, the ICCID of the smart card is The smart card performs an exclusive OR operation from the security domain identifier (SSDID);
  • Step 302 The card issuer management platform processes the result of the exclusive OR operation in step 301 through a secure hash algorithm (such as the SHA1 algorithm or the SHA2 algorithm) to obtain a secondary dispersion parameter used to generate the initial key from the security domain.
  • a secure hash algorithm such as the SHA1 algorithm or the SHA2 algorithm
  • Step 303 The card issuer management platform substitutes the second-level distributed parameter obtained in step 302 and the second-level distributed seed key saved by the card issuer management platform into a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm) to generate a smart card from the security.
  • a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm
  • FIG. 4A is a schematic diagram of a method for generating a slave security domain key managed by a card issuer according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4B is a flow chart of a method for generating a slave security domain key managed by a card issuer according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the method for generating a smart card key from a smart card managed by a card issuer includes the following steps:
  • Step 401 The card issuer management platform uses a random number generator to generate a random number for each smart card from the security domain, and the card issuer management platform saves and manages the mapping table of the correspondence between the ICCID, the SSDID, and the random number (hereinafter referred to as ICCID/ SSDID/random number mapping table);
  • Step 402 For a smart card that needs to generate a security domain key from the security domain, the card issuer management platform extracts the ICCID of the smart card from the ICCID/SSDID/random number mapping table, the SSDID of the smart card from the security domain, and the corresponding random number. Number, and perform XOR processing, and then XOR The result of the processing is processed by a secure hash algorithm (such as SHA1 algorithm or SHA2 algorithm) to obtain a secondary dispersion parameter;
  • a secure hash algorithm such as SHA1 algorithm or SHA2 algorithm
  • Step 403 The card issuer management platform uses the above-mentioned secondary decentralized parameters, and uses a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES-CBC or 3DES algorithm) to decentralize the secondary distributed seed key of the card issuer management platform, and generate a smart card from the security.
  • a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES-CBC or 3DES algorithm
  • the domain key, and the generated smart card is distributed from the secure domain key to the smart card from the secure domain.
  • the card issuer management platform when the card issuer management platform is created from the security domain, the card issuer management platform will newly create basic information of the slave security domain (such as smart card identification information from the security domain, etc.) and The security domain initial key is sent to the application provider management platform, the application provider management platform generates the slave security domain key, and the slave security domain initial key is updated (the security domain initial key is replaced with the application provider)
  • the security platform key generated by the management platform ensures the security of the application provider's own application communication.
  • the method for generating a slave security domain key from the security domain managed by the application provider includes the following steps:
  • Step 501 The application provider security organization generates a random number for each application provider (application providing management platform) by using a random number generator, and uses the generated random number as a first-level distributed parameter of the application provider (application providing management platform). (Distribution parameter 1); Stored in the mapping table of the random number and application provider management platform, which is saved by the application provider security organization.
  • Step 502 The application provider security organization uses a first-level decentralized parameter, and uses a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES-CBC or 3DES algorithm) to decentralize the seed key of the application provider security organization to obtain a second-level distributed seed key, and Distributed to the application provider management platform in a secure manner;
  • a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES-CBC or 3DES algorithm
  • Step 503 The application provider management platform uses a random number generator to generate a random number from the security domain for each smart card, and saves it in the ICCID/SSDID/random number mapping table;
  • Step 504 Applying a smart card from a security domain to a security domain key that needs to be generated Corresponding random number, and performing exclusive OR operation;
  • Step 505 The result of the exclusive OR operation in step 504 is processed by a secure hash algorithm (such as SHA1 algorithm or SHA2 algorithm) to obtain a secondary dispersed parameter (dispersion parameter 2) required for generating a smart card from the security domain key;
  • a secure hash algorithm such as SHA1 algorithm or SHA2 algorithm
  • Step 506 The application provider management platform uses the second-level distributed parameter obtained in step 505, and uses a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm) to perform distributed processing on the secondary distributed seed key of the application provider management platform. , get the smart card from the security domain key, and according to the smart card from the security domain's basic information and from the security domain initial key, the generated smart card is distributed from the security domain key to the smart card from the secure domain through a secure way.
  • a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm
  • the smart card When the smart card is about to expire from the security domain key, or forcibly updated for security reasons, the smart card needs to be updated from the security domain key.
  • the update from the security domain key is initiated by managing the smart card from the security domain's management platform (card publisher management platform or application provider management platform).
  • FIG. 6A is a schematic diagram of a method for updating a smart card from a security domain key according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 6B is a schematic diagram of a method for updating a smart card from a security domain key according to an embodiment of the present invention; as shown in FIG. 6A and FIG. 6B, the smart card is secured from a security domain.
  • the key update method includes the following steps:
  • Step 601 The management platform (card issuer management platform or application provider management platform) manages the smart card from the security domain key, and sets the update time of the smart card from the security domain key; when the smart card is about to expire from the security domain key, or When a forced update is performed for security reasons, the management platform uses the random number generator to generate a new random number for the smart card from the security domain to replace the random number corresponding to the security domain of the smart card in the ICCID/SSDID/random number mapping table. And saving the updated ICCID/SSDID/random number mapping table;
  • Step 602 The management platform extracts an ICCID, an SSDID, and a corresponding random number from the updated ICCID/SSDID/random number mapping table, and performs an exclusive OR operation;
  • Step 603 The management platform processes the XOR operation result obtained in step 602 through a secure hash algorithm (such as the SHA1 algorithm or the SHA2 algorithm) to obtain a distributed parameter required for updating the smart card from the security domain key.
  • a secure hash algorithm such as the SHA1 algorithm or the SHA2 algorithm
  • Step 604 The management platform obtains the decentralized parameters obtained in step 603 and the secondary level saved by the management platform.
  • the distributed seed key is substituted into a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm), and a new smart card is generated from the security domain key, and the generated new smart card is distributed from the security domain key to the smart card through a secure route. area.
  • a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES-CBC algorithm or 3DES algorithm
  • the foregoing embodiment may also have various transformation modes, for example: (1) When generating the scatter parameter, other logic operations, such as logical OR, logical AND, and the like, may be used to replace the exclusive OR process.
  • the card issuer management platform extracts the ICCID and the corresponding random number from the ICCID/random number mapping table, performs logical AND operation on the ICCID and the random number, and then logically compares the ICCID with the corresponding random number.
  • the processing result of the operation is processed by a secure hash algorithm to obtain a second-level dispersion parameter.
  • the random number can also be used directly as the scatter parameter, or the random number can be obtained through the secure hash algorithm to obtain the scatter parameter.
  • Each management platform can also be saved as a decentralized parameter generated by each smart card security domain (the smart card primary security domain or the smart card from the security domain).
  • the security authority may also perform an exclusive OR operation on the random number and the management platform identifier (for example, the card issuer identifier, or the application provider identifier), and The XOR operation result is processed by the secure hash algorithm to generate a first-level distributed parameter for the management platform.
  • the method for generating a smart card key generates a new random number for a smart card security domain (primary security domain or a security domain) by generating a key of the smart card security domain, and generates the generated random number using the newly generated random number.
  • the new scatter parameter finally uses the new scatter parameter to generate a new smart card security domain key, which solves the problem that the key of the smart card security domain is not easy to update.

Description

一种智能卡密钥的生成方法 技术领域
本发明涉及一种智能卡密钥的生成方法。
背景技术
IC ( Integrate Circuit, 集成电路）卡， 特别是非接触式 IC卡经过十多年 的发展， 已经被广泛应用于公交、 门禁以及小额电子支付等领域。 与此同时， 手机经历多年的迅速发展， 已得到广泛普及， 给人们的工作及生活带来了很 大的便利。 目前， 手机的功能越来越强大， 并存在集成更多功能的趋势， 将 手机和非接触式: [C卡技术相结合， 应用于电子支付领域， 会进一步扩大手机 的使用范围， 给人们的生活带来便捷， 存在着广阔的应用前景。
近场通信（ Near Field Communication,简称 NFC )技术是工作于 13.56MHz 的一种近距离无线通信技术， 由 RFID ( Radio Frequency Identification, 射频 识别）技术及互连技术融合演变而来。 手机等移动终端集成 NFC技术后， 可 以模拟非接触式 IC卡， 用于电子支付的有关应用。 在移动终端上实现该方案 需要增加 NFC模拟前端芯片和 NFC天线， 并使用支持电子支付的智能卡。
为实现基于 NFC技术的移动电子支付， 需要建立移动终端电子支付系 统， 通过该系统实现对基于 NFC的移动终端电子支付的管理， 包括： 智能卡 的发行、 智能卡密钥的管理、 电子支付应用的下载、 安装和个人化 ( Personalization ) 以及釆用相关技术和管理策略实现电子支付的安全性等功
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基于 NFC技术的移动终端电子支付系统的业务框架釆用 Global Platform (全球平台）规范的多应用框架， 在该框架下， 支持 Global Platform规范的 智能卡指的是符合 Global Platform Card Specification V2.1.1/V2.2规范 （简称 GP2.1.1/GP2.2规范） 的 IC芯片或智能卡， 从物理形式上可以为 SIM/USIM 别模块 /通用用户识别模块）卡、 可插拔的智能存储卡、 或者集成在移动终端 上的 IC芯片。 如果基于 NFC技术的移动终端电子支付系统支持 GP2丄 1规范， 安全通 道协议需要支持 SCP02 (基于对称密钥） ； 如果基于近场通信技术的移动终 端电子支付系统支持 GP2.2规范， 安全通道协议需要支持 SCP02 (基于对称 密钥）和 SCP10 (基于非对称密钥） ， 卡发行商、 应用提供商可以根据不同 的安全策略需求进行选择。
一般情况下，基于 NFC技术的移动终端近距离电子支付系统主要由卡发 行商管理平台、 应用提供商管理平台和支持具有电子支付应用功能智能卡的 移动终端组成， 该系统中可以存在多个应用提供商管理平台。
在支持 Global Platform规范的智能卡上可以安装多个应用。 为了实现电 子支付应用的安全， 智能卡被分隔为若干个独立的安全域， 以保证多个应用 相互之间的隔离和独立性。 各个应用提供商管理各自的安全域以及应用、 应 用数据等。
安全域是卡外实体（包括卡发行商和应用提供商）在卡上的代表， 它们 包含用于支持安全通道协议运作以及智能卡内容管理的密钥。 安全域包括主 安全域和从安全域等。 主安全域是卡发行商在智能卡上强制的卡上代表。 从 安全域是卡发行商或应用提供商在智能卡上附加的可选卡上代表。
安全域的密钥生成由管理该安全域的卡发行商或应用提供商负责， 这保 证了来自不同应用提供者的应用和数据可以共存于同一个智能卡卡上。 安全 域的密钥包括： 主安全域密钥、 从安全域初始密钥和从安全域密钥。 主安全 域密钥和从安全域初始密钥由卡发行商管理平台生成， 从安全域密钥由管理 成方法直接影响智能卡安全域密钥管理的复杂性。
现有技术中通常使用固定的分散参数对种子密钥进行多次分散， 以生成 智能卡安全域的密钥。 由于使用固定的分散参数， 现有技术中的智能卡安全 域密钥的生成方法不便于进行密钥的更新 （即重新生成） 。
发明内容
本发明所要解决的技术问题是， 克服现有技术的不足， 提供一种便于更 新的智能卡安全域密钥的生成方法。
为了解决上述问题， 本发明提供一种智能卡密钥的生成方法， 所述方法 可生成智能卡安全域的密钥， 所述方法包括：
管理平台为所述智能卡安全域生成随机数， 并使用所述随机数生成所述 智能卡安全域的分散参数；
将上述分散参数和管理平台的种子密钥作为分散算法的参数， 使用分散 算法生成所述智能卡安全域的密钥。
进一步地， 所述方法中， 使用所述随机数生成所述智能卡安全域的分散 参数的所述步骤为：
管理平台使用为所述智能卡安全域生成的随机数与以下参数进行运算： 所述智能卡安全域对应的智能卡标识的全部或部分字节、 和 /或所述智能卡安 全域的智能卡安全域标识的全部或部分字节；
管理平台对上述运算的结果， 使用散列算法生成所述智能卡安全域的分 散参数。
进一步地， 所述方法中， 使用所述随机数生成所述智能卡安全域的分散 参数的所述步骤为： 将所述随机数作为所述智能卡安全域的分散参数。
进一步地， 所述方法中， 所述管理平台保存所述智能卡安全域的随机数、 或分散参数与所述智能卡安全域的标识的对应关系。
进一步地， 所述方法中， 所述管理平台的种子密钥为安全机构釆用如下 方式生成并分发给所述管理平台的二级分散种子密钥：
安全机构为管理平台生成随机数， 并将该随机数作为一级分散参数， 或 对该随机数与管理平台标识进行运算， 对运算结果使用散列算法生成一级分 散参数；
安全机构将生成的一级分散参数和安全机构的种子密钥作为分散算法的 参数， 使用分散算法生成所述二级分散种子密钥。
进一步地， 所述方法中， 所述安全机构保存所述管理平台与为所述管理 平台生成的随机数、 或与所述一级分散参数的对应关系。 进一步地， 所述方法中， 所述运算为： 逻辑运算。
进一步地， 所述方法中， 所述逻辑运算为： 异或运算。
进一步地， 所述方法中， 如果所述管理平台为卡发行商管理平台， 则所 述安全机构为卡发行商安全机构；
如果所述管理平台为应用提供商管理平台， 则所述安全机构为应用提供 安全机构。
进一步地， 所述方法中， 如果所述智能卡安全域为智能卡主安全域， 则 所述管理平台将所述智能卡主安全域对应的随机数保存在智能卡标识与随机 数对应关系映射表中， 或将所述智能卡主安全域对应的分散参数保存在智能 卡标识与分散参数对应关系映射表中；
如果所述智能卡安全域为智能卡从安全域， 则所述管理平台将所述智能 卡从安全域对应的随机数保存在智能卡标识、 从安全域标识与随机数对应关 系映射表中， 或将所述智能卡从安全域对应的分散参数保存在智能卡标识、 从安全域标识与分散参数对应关系映射表中。
综上所述， 釆用本发明智能卡密钥的生成方法， 通过在生成智能卡安全 域的密钥时， 为智能卡安全域（主安全域或从安全域）生成新的随机数， 并 使用该新生成的随机数生成新的分散参数， 最后使用该新的分散参数生成新 的智能卡安全域的密钥， 解决了智能卡安全域的密钥不便于更新的问题。 附图概述
图 1A是本发明实施例智能卡主安全域密钥的生成方法示意图； 图 1B是本发明实施例智能卡主安全域密钥的生成方法流程图； 图 2A是本发明实施例智能卡主安全域密钥的更新生成方法示意图； 图 2B是本发明实施例智能卡主安全域密钥的更新方法流程图； 图 3A是本发明实施例智能卡从安全域初始密钥的生成方法示意图； 图 3B是本发明实施例智能卡从安全域初始密钥的生成方法流程图； 图 4A是本发明实施例卡发行商管理的从安全域密钥生成方法示意图； 图 4B是本发明实施例卡发行商管理的从安全域密钥生成方法流程图； 方法示意图； 方法流程图；
图 6A是本发明实施例智能卡从安全域密钥的更新方法示意图；
图 6B是本发明实施例智能卡从安全域密钥的更新方法示意图。
本发明的较佳实施方式
本发明的基本思想是： 在生成智能卡安全域的密钥时， 为智能卡的安全 域生成新的随机数， 将该随机数作为参数使用安全散列算法生成新的分散参 数， 并使用该分散参数及种子密钥生成新的智能卡安全域的密钥。
在进一步对本发明的智能卡安全域的密钥生成方法进行说明之前， 先对 本发明方法的应用环境， 即智能卡安全域的密钥生成和更新系统的基本概念 进行简要描述。
智能卡安全域的密钥生成和更新系统， 包括： 智能卡、 管理平台、 安全 机构。 其中：
智能卡， 可以安装在支持 NFC 技术的移动终端上， 并且支持 Global Platform Card Specification V2.1.1/V2.2规范。
管理平台， 用于完成密钥管理工作， 如密钥生成、 更新等。 管理平台可 以是卡发行商管理平台， 也可以是应用提供商管理平台。
管理平台支持对称加密算法， 如 AES-CBC ( Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher Block Chaining,高级加密标准-密码块链）算法或 3DES( Triple Data Encryption Standard, 三重数据加密标准）算法等， 用于密钥分散处理。
此外，管理平台还支持安全散列算法，如 SHA1 ( Secure Hash Algorithm 1 , 安全哈希算法 1 )或 SHA2 ( Secure Hash Algorithm 2, 安全哈希算法 2 )等， 用于分散参数的生成。 安全机构， 可以是卡发行商安全机构， 也可以是应用提供商安全机构。 卡发行商安全机构管理若干卡发行商管理平台； 应用提供商安全机构管理若 干应用提供商管理平台。
在本发明中， 可以根据实际需要设置一个由安全机构、 管理平台和智能 卡组成的多级密钥生成体系。 为了便于对本发明的方法进行说明， 在本发明 中釆用由安全机构、 管理平台和智能卡构成的一个三级密钥生成体系架构， 其中安全机构对应第一级， 管理平台对应第二级， 智能卡对应第三级。 如果 进一步将管理平台分级， 则可以构成由安全机构、 不同级别的管理平台和智 能卡组成的多级密钥生成体系。 三级密钥生成体系的技术实现方案可以推广 到多极密钥生成体系。
钥； 种子密钥是系统的根密钥， 用于生成安全域的密钥。
下面将结合附图和实施例对本发明进行详细描述。
图 1A是本发明实施例智能卡主安全域密钥的生成方法示意图， 图 1B是 本发明实施例智能卡主安全域密钥的生成方法流程图。如图 1A和图 1B所示， 本发明的智能卡主安全域密钥的生成方法包括如下步骤：
步骤 101 : 卡发行商安全机构使用随机数发生器为每一卡发行商 （卡发 行商管理平台）生成随机数， 将生成的随机数作为该卡发行商 （卡发行商管 理平台） 的一级分散参数 (分散参数 1 ) ；
在随机数与卡发行商管理平台的映射表中， 该映射表由卡发行商安全机构保 存。
步骤 102: 卡发行商安全机构使用一级分散参数， 釆用分散算法对卡发 行商安全机构的种子密钥进行分散处理， 得到二级分散种子密钥， 并将生成 的二级分散种子密钥通过安全方式分发给卡发行商管理平台；
本发明实施例中的分散算法釆用对称加密算法， 如 AES-CBC 算法或 3DES算法， 以下同。
步骤 103: 卡发行商管理平台使用随机数发生器为每一智能卡生成一个 随机数， 卡发行商管理平台保存并管理 ICCID ( Integrated Circuit Card Identification, 智能卡标识） 与随机数对应关系的映射表（以下称为 ICCID/ 随机数映射表） ；
卡发行商管理平台保存 ICCID与随机数的对应关系是为了后续对生成的 智能卡安全域密钥进行恢复。
步骤 104: 卡发行商管理平台从 ICCID/随机数映射表中提取 ICCID及对 应的随机数， 进行异或运算处理， 然后将异或运算处理的结果经过安全散列 算法 (如 SHA1算法或 SHA2算法）得到二级分散参数 (分散参数 2 ) ；
本步骤中， 卡发行商管理平台实际上是将 ICCID作为智能卡主安全域的 标识为智能卡主安全域生成了二级分散参数。
步骤 105: 卡发行商管理平台使用二级分散参数， 釆用对称加密算法（如 AES-CBC算法或 3DES算法 )对卡发行商管理平台接收到的二级分散种子密 钥进行分散处理， 生成智能卡主安全域密钥， 并将生成的智能卡主安全域密 钥通过安全方式分发给智能卡主安全域。
图 2A是本发明实施例智能卡主安全域密钥的更新生成（以下简称更新） 方法示意图， 图 2B是本发明实施例智能卡主安全域密钥的更新方法流程图。
本实施例中， 卡发行商管理平台管理智能卡主安全域密钥， 并设定智能 卡主安全域密钥的更新时间； 当智能卡主安全域密钥即将过期时、 或者由于 安全原因进行强制更新时， 由卡发行商管理平台启动智能卡主安全域密钥的 更新。 如图 2A和图 2B所示， 卡发行商管理平台对智能卡主安全域密钥的更 新方法包括如下步骤：
步骤 201 : 当智能卡需要更新主安全域密钥时， 卡发行商管理平台使用 随机数发生器为该智能卡生成新的随机数， 用以替换 ICCID/随机数映射表中 该智能卡对应的随机数， 并保存更新后的 ICCID/随机数映射表；
步骤 202: 卡发行商管理平台从更新后的 ICCID/随机数映射表中提取该 智能卡的 ICCID和对应的随机数， 进行异或运算处理；
步骤 203: 卡发行商管理平台将步骤 202 中异或运算处理的结果经过安 全散列算法（如 SHA1算法或 SHA2算法）处理， 得到更新智能卡主安全域 密钥所需的分散参数；
步骤 204: 卡发行商管理平台将步骤 203得到的分散参数和卡发行商管 理平台保存的二级分散种子密钥代入对称加密算法 （如 AES-CBC 算法或 3DES算法）， 生成新的智能卡主安全域密钥， 并将生成的新智能卡主安全域 密钥通过安全途径分发给智能卡主安全域，完成智能卡主安全域密钥的更新。
图 3A是本发明实施例智能卡从安全域初始密钥的生成方法示意图， 图 3B是本发明实施例智能卡从安全域初始密钥的生成方法流程图。 如图 3A和 图 3B所示， 本实施例的智能卡从安全域初始密钥的生成方法包括如下步骤： 步骤 301 : 卡发行商管理平台在创建智能卡的从安全域时， 将该智能卡 的 ICCID和智能卡从安全域标识（ SSDID )进行异或运算处理；
步骤 302: 卡发行商管理平台将步骤 301 中异或运算处理的结果， 经过 安全散列算法（如 SHA1算法或 SHA2算法）处理， 得到用于生成从安全域 初始密钥的二级分散参数；
步骤 303: 卡发行商管理平台将步骤 302得到的二级分散参数和卡发行 商管理平台保存的二级分散种子密钥代入对称加密算法（如 AES-CBC算法或 3DES算法）， 生成智能卡从安全域初始密钥， 并将生成的智能卡从安全域初 始密钥通过安全途径分发给智能卡从安全域。
对于由卡发行商管理的智能卡从安全域， 智能卡从安全域密钥由卡发行 商管理平台生成。图 4A是本发明实施例卡发行商管理的从安全域密钥生成方 法示意图，图 4B是本发明实施例卡发行商管理的从安全域密钥生成方法流程 图。 如图 4A和图 4B所示， 由卡发行商管理的智能卡从安全域密钥的生成方 法包括如下步骤：
步骤 401 : 卡发行商管理平台使用随机数发生器为每一个智能卡从安全 域生成一个随机数， 卡发行商管理平台保存并管理 ICCID、 SSDID与随机数 对应关系的映射表（以下称为 ICCID/SSDID/随机数映射表 ) ；
步骤 402: 针对一个需要生成从安全域密钥的智能卡从安全域， 卡发行 商管理平台从 ICCID/SSDID/随机数映射表中提取该智能卡的 ICCID、该智能 卡从安全域的 SSDID和对应的随机数， 并进行异或运算处理， 然后将异或运 算处理的结果经过安全散列算法（如 SHA1算法或 SHA2算法）处理得到二 级分散参数；
步骤 403: 卡发行商管理平台使用上述二级分散参数， 釆用对称加密算 法（如 AES-CBC或 3DES算法 )对卡发行商管理平台的二级分散种子密钥进 行分散处理， 生成智能卡从安全域密钥， 并将生成的智能卡从安全域密钥通 过安全方式分发给智能卡从安全域。
对于由应用提供商管理的从安全域， 当卡发行商管理平台创建从安全域 完成后， 卡发行商管理平台将新创建的从安全域的基本信息 （如智能卡从安 全域标识信息等）和从安全域初始密钥发送给应用提供商管理平台， 由应用 提供商管理平台生成从安全域密钥， 并对从安全域初始密钥进行更新 （将从 安全域初始密钥替换成应用提供商管理平台生成的从安全域密钥） ， 以保证 应用提供商自有应用通信的安全性。
钥生成方法流程图。 如图 5A和图 5B所示， 应用提供商管理的智能卡从安全 域的从安全域密钥生成方法包括如下步骤：
步骤 501 :应用提供商安全机构使用随机数发生器为每一应用提供商 (应 用提供管理平台 )生成随机数， 将生成的随机数作为该应用提供商 （应用提 供管理平台） 的一级分散参数 (分散参数 1 ) ； 保存在随机数与应用提供商管理平台的映射表中， 该映射表由应用提供商安 全机构保存。
步骤 502: 应用提供商安全机构使用一级分散参数， 釆用对称加密算法 (如 AES-CBC或 3DES算法 )对应用提供商安全机构的种子密钥进行分散， 得到二级分散种子密钥， 并通过安全方式分发给应用提供商管理平台；
步骤 503: 应用提供商管理平台使用随机数发生器为每一个智能卡从安 全域生成一个随机数， 并将其保存在 ICCID/SSDID/随机数映射表中；
步骤 504: 针对一个需要生成从安全域密钥的智能卡从安全域， 应用提 对应的随机数， 并进行异或运算处理；
步骤 505:将步骤 504中异或运算处理的结果经过安全散列算法（如 SHA1 算法或 SHA2算法）处理， 得到生成智能卡从安全域密钥所需的二级分散参 数（分散参数 2 ) ；
步骤 506: 应用提供商管理平台使用步骤 505得到的二级分散参数， 釆 用对称加密算法（如 AES-CBC算法或 3DES算法）， 对应用提供商管理平台 的二级分散种子密钥进行分散处理， 得到智能卡从安全域密钥， 并根据智能 卡从安全域的基本信息和从安全域初始密钥， 将生成的智能卡从安全域密钥 通过安全方式分发给智能卡从安全域。
当智能卡从安全域密钥即将过期时、或者由于安全原因进行强制更新时， 需要对智能卡从安全域密钥进行更新。 从安全域密钥的更新由管理该智能卡 从安全域的管理平台 （卡发行商管理平台或应用提供商管理平台）启动。
图 6A是本发明实施例智能卡从安全域密钥的更新方法示意图， 图 6B是 本发明实施例智能卡从安全域密钥的更新方法示意图；如图 6A和图 6B所示， 智能卡从安全域密钥的更新方法包括如下步骤：
步骤 601 : 管理平台 （卡发行商管理平台或应用提供商管理平台）管理 智能卡从安全域密钥， 设定智能卡从安全域密钥的更新时间； 当智能卡从安 全域密钥即将过期时、 或者由于安全原因进行强制更新时， 管理平台釆用随 机数发生器为该智能卡从安全域生成新的随机数， 用以替换 ICCID/SSDID/ 随机数映射表中该智能卡从安全域对应的随机数， 并保存更新后的 ICCID/SSDID/随机数映射表；
步骤 602 : 管理平台从更新后的 ICCID/SSDID/随机数映射表中提取 ICCID、 SSDID和对应的随机数， 进行异或运算处理；
步骤 603: 管理平台将步骤 602获得的异或运算处理结果经过安全散列 算法（如 SHA1算法或 SHA2算法）处理， 得到更新智能卡从安全域密钥所 需的分散参数；
步骤 604: 管理平台将步骤 603得到的分散参数和管理平台保存的二级 分散种子密钥代入对称加密算法（如 AES-CBC算法或 3DES算法）， 计算生 成新的智能卡从安全域密钥， 并将生成的新的智能卡从安全域密钥通过安全 途径分发给智能卡从安全域。
根据本发明的基本原理， 上述实施例还可以有多种变换方式， 例如： (一）在生成分散参数时， 可以釆用其它逻辑运算， 如逻辑或、 逻辑与 等处理方法替换异或处理。
例如， 在步骤 104中， 卡发行商管理平台从 ICCID/随机数映射表中提取 ICCID及对应的随机数， 将 ICCID 和随机数进行逻辑与运算处理， 然后将 ICCID与对应的随机数的逻辑与运算的处理结果经过安全散列算法处理得到 二级分散参数。
(二）在生成分散参数时， 也可以直接使用随机数作为分散参数， 或将 随机数经过安全散列算法得到分散参数。
(三）各管理平台也可以保存为每一智能卡安全域（智能卡主安全域或 智能卡从安全域）生成的分散参数。
(四）安全机构 （卡发行商安全机构或应用提供商安全机构 )也可以釆 用将随机数与管理平台标识（例如， 卡发行商标识、 或应用提供商标识）进 行异或运算， 并对异或运算结果进行安全散列算法处理的方式为管理平台生 成一级分散参数。
工业实用性
本发明釆用智能卡密钥的生成方法，通过在生成智能卡安全域的密钥时， 为智能卡安全域（主安全域或从安全域）生成新的随机数， 并使用该新生成 的随机数生成新的分散参数， 最后使用该新的分散参数生成新的智能卡安全 域的密钥， 解决了智能卡安全域的密钥不便于更新的问题。

Claims

权 利 要 求 书
1、 一种智能卡密钥的生成方法， 所述方法包括：
管理平台为所述智能卡安全域生成随机数， 并使用所述随机数生成所述 智能卡安全域的分散参数；
将所述分散参数和管理平台的种子密钥作为分散算法的参数， 使用分散 算法生成所述智能卡安全域的密钥。
2、 如权利要求 1所述的方法， 其中， 使用所述随机数生成所述智能卡安 全域的分散参数的所述步骤为：
所述管理平台使用所述随机数与以下参数进行运算： 所述智能卡安全域 对应的智能卡标识的全部或部分字节和 /或所述智能卡安全域的智能卡安全 域标识的全部或部分字节；
所述管理平台对所述运算的结果， 使用散列算法生成所述智能卡安全域 的分散参数。
3、 如权利要求 1所述的方法， 其中， 使用所述随机数生成所述智能卡安 全域的分散参数的所述步骤为：
将所述随机数作为所述智能卡安全域的分散参数。
4、 如权利要求 1或 2或 3所述的方法， 其中， 所述管理平台保存所述智能卡安全域的随机数、 或分散参数与所述智能 卡安全域的标识的对应关系。
5、 如权利要求 1所述的方法， 其中，
所述管理平台的种子密钥为安全机构釆用如下方式生成且分发给所述管 理平台的二级分散种子密钥：
所述安全机构为所述管理平台生成随机数， 并将所生成的随机数作为一 级分散参数， 或对所生成的随机数与管理平台标识进行运算， 将所运算的结 果使用散列算法生成一级分散参数； 所述安全机构将所生成的一级分散参数和安全机构的种子密钥作为分散 算法的参数， 使用分散算法生成所述二级分散种子密钥。
6、 如权利要求 5所述的方法， 其中， 所述一级分散参数的对应关系。
7、 如权利要求 2或 5所述的方法， 其中，
所述运算为： 逻辑运算。
8、 如权利要求 7所述的方法， 其中，
所述逻辑运算为： 异或运算。
9、 如权利要求 5所述的方法， 其中，
如果所述管理平台为卡发行商管理平台， 则所述安全机构为卡发行商安 全机构；
如果所述管理平台为应用提供商管理平台， 则所述安全机构为应用提供 安全机构。
10、 如权利要求 4所述的方法， 其中， 保存对应关系的所述步骤中， 如果所述智能卡安全域为智能卡主安全域， 则所述管理平台将所述智能 卡主安全域对应的随机数保存在智能卡标识与随机数对应关系映射表中， 或 将所述智能卡主安全域对应的分散参数保存在智能卡标识与分散参数对应关 系映射表中；
如果所述智能卡安全域为智能卡从安全域， 则所述管理平台将所述智能 卡从安全域对应的随机数保存在智能卡标识、 从安全域标识与随机数对应关 系映射表中， 或将所述智能卡从安全域对应的分散参数保存在智能卡标识、 从安全域标识与分散参数对应关系映射表中。
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