WO2010045807A1 - 密钥分发方法和系统 - Google Patents

密钥分发方法和系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2010045807A1
WO2010045807A1 PCT/CN2009/072902 CN2009072902W WO2010045807A1 WO 2010045807 A1 WO2010045807 A1 WO 2010045807A1 CN 2009072902 W CN2009072902 W CN 2009072902W WO 2010045807 A1 WO2010045807 A1 WO 2010045807A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
security domain
management platform
application provider
slave
key
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2009/072902
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
马景旺
余万涛
贾倩
Original Assignee
中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 中兴通讯股份有限公司 filed Critical 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority to EP09821528.8A priority Critical patent/EP2352252B1/en
Priority to US13/125,542 priority patent/US20110280406A1/en
Publication of WO2010045807A1 publication Critical patent/WO2010045807A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B5/00—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems
    • H04B5/40—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems characterised by components specially adapted for near-field transmission
    • H04B5/48—Transceivers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

Definitions

  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • Radio Frequency Identification Radio Frequency Identification
  • the mobile communication terminal such as a mobile phone can realize the simulation of the non-contact IC card by integrating the NFC technology, and is applied to related fields such as electronic payment; in addition, implementing the solution on the mobile communication terminal requires adding an NFC analog front end chip and the terminal.
  • IC cards especially non-contact IC cards
  • mobile phones After more than ten years of development, IC cards (especially non-contact IC cards) have been widely used in public transportation, access control, and small-scale electronic payment.
  • mobile phones After more than 20 years of rapid development, mobile phones have been basically applied. It has gained popularity and brought great convenience to people's work and life. As mobile phones become more powerful, combining mobile phones with contactless IC card technology, mobile phones will be further expanded in the field of electronic payment. The scope of use of mobile phones brings convenience to people's lives and has broad application prospects.
  • a security domain is a representation of an off-card entity (including card issuers, application providers) on a card that contains encryption keys to support secure channel protocol operation and card content management.
  • the security domains are responsible for their own key management, which ensures that applications and data from different application providers can coexist on the same card.
  • the keys and certificates on the security domain need to include: the public and private keys of the security domain, the certificate of the security domain, and the credibility of the certificate of the entity outside the authentication card. Public key.
  • the security domain of the application provider on the smart card is the slave security domain. Before the application provider's electronic payment application is downloaded and installed to the smart card, it needs to be first owned by the card issuer on the smart card. The smart card master security domain creates the application provider's slave security domain and then sets the key from the security domain. As a secret data, the secure domain key needs to adopt reliable and secure methods and techniques to import the relevant keys and certificates into the secure domain to implement secure distribution of keys from the secure domain.
  • the creation of the secure domain needs to be issued by the card.
  • the commerce management platform indicates the creation of the primary security domain on the smart card, and after the security domain is created, the initial key from the security domain needs to be set and distributed by the card issuer management platform.
  • the card issuer management platform can notify the security domain card to generate a public-private key pair, and then return the generated key from the security domain to the card issuer management platform, and the card issuer management platform will be secure.
  • the domain generated key is sent to the application provider management platform, which is generated by the application provider management platform based on the public key from the security domain and then distributed by the card issuer's key.
  • the card issuer management platform is responsible for transmitting the security domain key data when transmitting the key data, so that it can perform operations from the security domain by using the obtained key pair, which will be electronic to the application provider.
  • Payment application security poses a threat, and therefore, there is an urgent need for a technical solution to solve the problem of unsecure distribution of secret domain keys.
  • the present invention has been made in view of the problem in the related art that the distribution of a secure domain key is unsafe due to the transmission of the secure domain key data when the card issuer management platform is responsible for the transmission of the key data,
  • the main object of the present invention is to provide a key distribution method and system to solve the above problems in the related art.
  • a key distribution method is provided.
  • the card issuer management platform notifies the application provider to generate a public-private key pair including a public key and a private key in the smart card from the security domain, and receives the return from the security domain.
  • a public key and the trusted public key for external authentication is imported into the slave security domain, and the information of the slave security domain and the public key are sent to the application provider management platform;
  • the application provider management platform receives the card issue from the card
  • the information of the security domain from the security management domain and the public key, and the security domain of the smart card is selected according to the information from the security domain and the public key through the service terminal;
  • the application provider management platform notifies the security key or regenerates the public key
  • the private key which is generated from the security domain or from the regenerated public key returned from the secure domain certificate, and sent from the secure domain certificate to the slave security domain, Complete the distribution of keys from the secure domain.
  • the card issuer management platform notifies that the process of generating the public-private key pair from the security domain is: the application provider management platform determines, by the service terminal of the application provider, whether there is a slave security domain corresponding to the application provider in the smart card; If the judgment is yes, the slave security domain of the application provider already exists in the smart card, and the security domain creation and key distribution process are no longer performed; if the determination is negative, the application provider management platform passes the card issuer. The management platform is created on the smart card from the secure i or, and the created from the secure i or generated public-private key pair.
  • the application provider management platform creates a specific process from the security domain on the smart card through the card issuer management platform: the card issuer management platform communicates with the smart card through the application provider management platform, and selects the primary security domain of the smart card and The primary security domain establishes a secure channel; the card issuer management platform notifies the primary security domain to establish a secondary security domain corresponding to the application provider through the secure channel; the primary security domain establishes a secondary security domain on the smart card.
  • the method further comprises: the application provider management platform recording the information of the slave security domain in its database.
  • the method further includes: establishing, by the application provider management platform, a secure channel from the security domain.
  • the method further includes: writing the security domain certificate from the security domain to the slave security domain.
  • the key distribution system comprises: a card issuer management platform, comprising: a creation module, configured to create a slave security domain corresponding to the application provider in the smart card; a first notification module, configured to notify the slave security domain from the smart card Generating a public-private key pair including a public key and a private key; a first receiving module, configured to receive a public key returned from the security domain; and an importing module, configured to import the trusted public key for external authentication
  • the first sending module is configured to send the information and the public key of the security domain to the application provider management platform after the importing;
  • the application provider management platform includes: a second receiving module, configured to receive Information from the security domain of the card issuer management platform and the public key; a selection module, the slave security domain for selecting the smart card according to the information from the security domain and the public key; the second notification module, for notifying Regenerate the public key from the security domain and a private key; a generating module, configured to generate a slave security domain certificate according to the regenerated public key
  • the application provider management platform further includes: a judging module, configured to determine, by the service terminal of the application provider, whether there is a slave security domain corresponding to the application provider in the smart card; and the calling module is configured to determine whether the content is negative or not
  • the call creation module is created from the security domain on the smart card through the card issuer management platform.
  • the application provider management platform further comprises: a recording module, configured to record information of the slave security domain in its database after receiving the information of the slave security domain and the public key sent by the card issuer management platform.
  • the application provider management platform further comprises: establishing a security channel module, configured to establish a secure channel with the slave security domain after selecting the slave security domain of the smart card according to the information from the security domain and the public key.
  • the security domain key is distributed by the service terminal of the application provider, and the security domain key that can be sent when the card issuer management platform is responsible for the transmission of the key data is solved in the related art.
  • the problem of insecure distribution of security domain keys caused by data can avoid other potential security threats and attacks, thereby improving the security of application provider from secure domain key distribution.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a key distribution system according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a key distribution method according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • Signaling flow chart for the detailed processing of the key distribution method.
  • the present invention provides a key distribution method and system, and specifically includes: a card issuer management platform notifying an application provider to generate a public-private key pair including a public key and a private key from a security domain in a smart card, Receiving a public key returned from security i or returning, and importing the trusted public key for external authentication into the secondary security domain, and transmitting the information of the secondary security domain and the public key to the application provider management platform;
  • the commerce management platform receives the information of the slave security domain from the card issuer management platform and the public key, and selects the slave security domain of the smart card according to the information from the security domain and the public key through the service terminal; the application provider management platform notifies the security The domain regenerates the public and private keys before generating the slave security domain from the security
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram of a key distribution system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • a mobile terminal is near a large electronic payment.
  • the system's business is based on the multi-application framework of the Global Platform specification. Multiple applications can be installed on the smart card supporting the Global Platform specification, and separated into several independent security domains to ensure multiple applications.
  • the aforementioned mentioned Smart Platform supporting the Global Platform specification refers to the Global Platform (Global Platform) GP)
  • the IC chip or smart card of the Global Platform Card Specification V2.1.1 or V2.2 which is developed by the organization, can be SIM/USIM card, pluggable intelligence in physical form.
  • the framework of the mobile terminal electronic payment system based on near field communication requires the Global Platform Card Specification V2.1.1/V2.2 specification. If the system supports the GP2.1.1 specification, the secure channel protocol needs to support symmetric key based (Security Channel).
  • the mobile terminal short-range payment system may include a card issuer, an application provider, and a user from a service architecture, where: a card issuer: responsible for card issuance and management, having a card management system, a key management system, and a certificate management system, wherein Use the certificate management system only if asymmetric keys are supported.
  • the card issuer manages the card's resources and lifecycle, keys, and certificates, creates security domains for other application providers, and interacts with other security domains to apply data.
  • the card issuer can also have an application management system that is responsible for the card issuer's own application or the provisioning and management functions of the application it is hosting.
  • the card issuer can have a business terminal management system and a service terminal, and provide services to the user through the service terminal.
  • the card issuer may have an application provider management system to record information about the application provider, specify the service authority of the application provider, and the like.
  • Application Provider Responsible for the provision and management functions of electronic payment applications. It has an application management system, a key management system, and a certificate management system.
  • the certificate management system is used only when asymmetric keys are supported.
  • the application provider provides various business applications, manages the corresponding security domain on the card, controls the application key, certificate, data, etc. of the security domain, and provides the secure download function of the application.
  • the application provider can be an operator, a bank, a bus company, a retailer, and the like.
  • the application provider may have a service terminal management system and a service terminal, and provide services to the user through the service terminal.
  • User Responsible for downloading, installing and using the electronic payment application.
  • User through card issuer Or application provider interaction operate on mobile terminals and cards, download and install new applications in the security domain, and use the various business applications provided.
  • the mobile terminal electronic payment system is mainly composed of a card issuer management platform, an application provider management platform and a mobile terminal, and multiple application provider management platforms may exist in the system.
  • the smart terminal has a smart card supporting electronic payment.
  • the smart card needs to establish communication with the card issuer management platform and the application provider management platform, and can pass the management terminal of the management platform.
  • the smart card and the management platform are connected, and the service terminal is configured with a contactless card reader or a card reader directly reading the smart card, and the service terminal can establish communication with the management platform, thereby realizing communication between the smart card and the management platform.
  • the mobile terminal electronic payment system based on the near field communication technology supports a multi-electronic payment application, that is, a plurality of electronic payment applications can be installed on the smart card.
  • the smart card adopts the Global Platform Card Specification V2.1 V2.2 specification, and the smart card is divided into several independent security domains to ensure the isolation and independence of multiple applications. Manage their respective security domains as well as applications, application data, and more.
  • a key distribution system for distributing a security domain key by a service terminal will be described in detail. It should be noted that the key distribution system of the present invention is the above-described near field communication-based mobile. Part of the terminal electronic payment system.
  • a key distribution system is provided, and Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a key distribution system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the key distribution system includes a card issuer management platform 10, an application provider management platform 12, a service terminal 14 of an application provider, and a smart card 16 (the smart card 16 is located in the mobile terminal, and the smart card 16 includes the main security. Domain and from the security domain).
  • the application provider needs to have a service terminal management system and a service terminal 14, and the service terminal 14 can provide related services for electronic payment.
  • the application provider management platform 12 and the card issuer management platform 10 are connected by a dedicated line or the Internet, and the card issuer management platform 10 can establish communication with the smart card 16 through the application provider management platform 12 and the application provider service terminal 14. And, the smart card 16 establishes a connection with the application provider management platform 12 and the card issuer management platform 10 through the service terminal 14 of the application provider.
  • the above key distribution system will be described in detail below.
  • the card issuer management platform 10 includes: a creation module, configured to create a slave security domain corresponding to the application provider in the smart card 16; a notification module, configured to notify, from the security domain, a public-private key pair including a public key and a private key in the smart card 16; a first receiving module, configured to receive a public key returned from the security domain; and an import module, configured to:
  • the trusted root public key to be used for external authentication (the trusted root public key is provided by the CA that issues the application provider certificate, which can be obtained from the application provider management platform, which is used to secure the application provider from the security domain The certificate is authenticated) is imported to the slave security domain; the first sending module is configured to send the information of the security domain and the public key to the application provider management platform 12 after the import is performed; and, in combination with the card shown in FIG.
  • the publisher management platform may set the first notification module, the first receiving module, the import module, and the first sending module to the subsystem of the card issuer management platform 10 according to actual application requirements.
  • the application provider management platform 12 includes: a second receiving module, configured to receive information from the security domain of the card issuer management platform 10 and a public key; and a selection module, configured to use the information from the security domain and the public The key selects the slave security zone of the smart card 16 through the service terminal 14; the second notification module is configured to notify the public domain from regenerating the public key and the private key; and the generating module is configured to generate the data from the security domain.
  • the public key is generated from the secure domain certificate; the second sending module is configured to transmit the secure domain key from the secure domain certificate to the secure domain through the service terminal.
  • the application provider management platform 12 further includes: a judging module, configured to determine, by the service terminal 14 of the application provider, whether there is a slave security domain corresponding to the application provider in the smart card 16; and the calling module is configured to determine whether or not
  • the call creation module creates a slave security domain on the smart card 16 through the card issuer management platform 10.
  • the recording module is configured to record information from the security domain in its database after receiving the information of the security domain and the public key sent by the card issuer management platform 10.
  • a secure channel module is established for establishing a secure channel with the slave security domain after selecting the slave security zone of the smart card 16 via the service terminal 14 based on the information from the security domain and the public key.
  • the second receiving module, the selecting module, the second notifying module, the generating module, and the second sending module may set the one or more modules according to actual application requirements.
  • the service terminal 14 is configured to establish communication with the smart card 16 through the read/write device, and establish a smart card.
  • the application provider 16 is a connection with the application provider management platform 12; in an actual application, the application provider's service terminal 14 may be a computer device of an application provider's business place, or may participate in processing electronic payment user information management, from a security domain. Terminals for business creation, key update, electronic payment application download, etc.
  • the service terminal 14 can be connected through the service terminal management system of the application provider. To the application provider management platform 12, the connection between the service terminal 14 and the application provider management platform 12 can be connected by a dedicated line or the Internet.
  • the service terminal 14 is configured with a contactless card reader or a read/write device that directly reads the smart card, and the service terminal can establish communication with the smart card through the read/write device.
  • the smart card 16 located in the mobile terminal includes a slave security domain, wherein the slave security domain is used to generate a public-private key pair, and the public key is returned to the card issuer management platform 10 through the service terminal 14, and notified by the application provider management platform 12
  • the public key and the private key are regenerated from the security domain
  • the public key and the private key are regenerated, and the regenerated public key is returned to the application provider management platform 12, and the application provider management platform 12 is received.
  • Send a certificate from the secure domain Through the above processing, after the card issuer management platform 10 returns the basic information and the key of the security domain to the application provider management platform 12, the application provider management platform 12 and the slave security domain re-key the distribution.
  • the communication between the application provider management platform 12 and the smart card 16 is no longer transmitted by the card issuer management platform 10, but is performed by the service terminal 14 of the application provider, and the isolation of the card issuer management platform 10 is realized.
  • the card issuer management platform 10 is unable to obtain the slave security domain key generated by the application provider from the security domain on the smart card 16.
  • the communication between the application provider management platform 12 and the smart card 16 is in a closed environment, thereby avoiding other potential security threats and attacks during communication.
  • the security of the application provider from the secure domain key distribution can be achieved by the present invention.
  • Step S202 the card issuer management platform notifies the application provider of the corresponding security.
  • the domain generates a public-private key pair including a public key and a private key in the smart card, receives the public key returned from the security domain, and imports the trusted root public key used for external authentication into the secondary security domain, and
  • the application provider management platform sends the information from the security domain and the public key; wherein, in step S202, before the application provider service terminal downloads the application provider's electronic payment application in the smart card, the application provider management platform provides the application through the application
  • the service terminal of the commerce determines whether there is a slave security domain corresponding to the application provider in the smart card; if the determination is yes, the security domain corresponding to the application provider already exists in the smart card, and the security domain has been performed.
  • the distribution of the key in this case, the creation of the security domain and the distribution of the key are not required, and the application provider management platform can download the electronic payment application to the existing slave security domain; Next, the application provider management platform creates a secure i or generated public or private key pair from the secure i or through the card issuer management platform.
  • the application provider management platform creates a specific security process on the smart card through the card issuer management platform as follows: The card issuer management platform communicates with the smart card through the application provider management platform, and selects the primary security domain of the smart card and the main The security domain establishes a secure channel; the card issuer management platform notifies the primary security domain to establish a secondary security domain corresponding to the application provider through the secure channel; the primary security domain establishes a secondary security domain on the smart card. Step S204, the application provider management platform receives the information of the slave security domain from the card issuer management platform and the public key, and the application provider management platform establishes a connection through the application provider service terminal and the smart card, and then according to the security domain.
  • step S204 after the application provider management platform receives the information of the slave security zone and the public key sent by the card issuer management platform, the application provider management platform Record information from the security domain in its database.
  • step S204 after the application provider management platform performs the selection from the security domain according to the information from the security domain and the public key, the method further includes: the application provider management platform and the slave security domain establish a secure channel.
  • Step S206 the application provider management platform notifies that the public key and the private key are regenerated from the security domain, and then the security i or certificate is generated according to the regenerated public key from the security i or returned, and the security domain is obtained from the security domain.
  • FIG. 3 is a signaling flowchart of a detailed processing procedure of a key distribution method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the mobile terminal electronic payment system architecture shown in FIG. 1 will be described below as an example, the application scenario of the present invention is not limited to the mobile terminal electronic payment system architecture shown in FIG. 1.
  • the application provider service terminal may be a computer device of an application provider business location, and may participate in processing service terminals such as electronic payment user information management, security domain creation, key update, and electronic payment application download.
  • the service terminal can be connected to the application provider management platform through the service terminal management system of the application provider, and the connection between the service terminal and the application provider management platform can be connected by using a dedicated line or an Internet.
  • the service terminal is configured with a contactless card reader or a read/write device that directly reads the smart card, and the service terminal can establish communication with the smart card through the read/write device.
  • the application provider management platform and the card issuer management platform are connected by a dedicated line or the Internet, and the card issuer management platform can establish communication with the smart card through the application provider management platform, the application provider service terminal, and the smart card.
  • the service application and download of the electronic payment application can be completed through the application provider service terminal. Before the electronic payment application is downloaded, it is necessary to check whether there is a slave security domain belonging to the application provider in the smart card.
  • the specific inspection methods are as follows:
  • the SELECT message can be sent to the smart card, and the object parameter in the message is the slave security domain ID, if the KEY RESPONSE returned by the smart card indicates When the slave security domain does not exist, it can be determined that the slave security domain of the application provider does not exist on the smart card. Moreover, if the secondary security domain of the application provider does not exist, the creation of the secondary security domain and the key distribution process of the secondary security domain are required.
  • the following describes the creation and key distribution process of the security provider from the application provider in detail with reference to FIG. 3, including the following processing: 1.
  • the application provider service terminal reads the identification information of the smart card, for example, the ICCID of the smart card, and then the smart card. The identification information is sent to the application provider management platform.
  • the application provider ID (ASP-ID) and smart card feature information ICCID are included in the request.
  • the card issuer management platform After receiving the request from the security domain, the card issuer management platform verifies the creation from the security domain. The request information is built, and whether the request is allowed or not, specifically, the card issuer can determine whether to allow the creation of the slave security domain through the application provider management platform according to the service authority of the application provider or the like.
  • the card issuer management platform confirms that the smart card ICCID can be used to retrieve the relevant information of the smart card in the database inside the management platform, including the smart card primary security domain ID (ISD ID), etc., after the security provider domain is created by the application provider management platform. .
  • ISD ID smart card primary security domain ID
  • the card issuer management platform sends a SELECT message to the smart card through the application provider management platform, and selects the primary security domain of the smart card.
  • the card issuer management platform and the smart card master security domain establish the SCP10 security channel according to the requirements of the Global Platform Card Specification V2.2 Appendix F Secure Channel Protocol 10, and complete the authentication and session key of the two parties.
  • the card issuer management platform sends a message to the primary security domain to create a file from the security domain.
  • INSTALL for Install
  • the primary security domain is created from the security domain according to the 4th document. After the creation is completed, the primary security domain sends the INSTALL Response to the card. Publisher management platform.
  • the card issuer management platform confirms that after the security domain has been created, the notification generates a public key pair from the security domain (corresponding to step S202 in Fig. 2).
  • the public key and the private key are generated from the security domain by calling the interface for generating the key on the card, and then the public key is returned to the card issuer management platform (corresponding to step S202 in Fig. 2).
  • PK.TP_EX.AUT One Public Key for Trust Point for External Authentication
  • the smart card master security zone will send the PK.TP-EX.AUT of the security domain to the slave security zone, from the security i or the setting of PK.TP_EX.AUT, and then send PUT KEY RESPONSE to the card issuer management platform (corresponding In step S202) in FIG.
  • the card issuer management platform sends the created basic information of the security domain and the public key from the security domain to the application provider management platform (corresponding to step S202 in Fig. 2).
  • the application provider management platform adds relevant information from the security domain to the database.
  • the application provider management platform sends a SELECT message to the smart card through its service terminal.
  • the created slave security domain is selected (corresponding to step S204 in Fig. 2).
  • the application provider management platform and the secure domain ⁇ establish the SCP10 secure channel according to the requirements of the Global Platform Card Specification V2.2 Appendix F Secure Channel Protocol 10, and complete the authentication and session key from the security domain to the application provider management platform.
  • Negotiation (corresponding to step S204 in Fig. 2).
  • the application provider management platform passes the security i or generates a new public key and private key (corresponding to step S206 in Fig. 2).
  • the application provider management platform sends the secure domain certificate to the slave security domain via the PUT KEY 4 (corresponding to step S206 in FIG. 2).
  • the security domain key is distributed by the service terminal of the application provider, and the related art can be transmitted when the card issuer management platform is responsible for the transmission of the key data.
  • the problem of insecure distribution of security domain keys caused by the security domain key data can avoid other potential security threats and attacks, and can improve the security of the application provider from the security domain key distribution.
  • a computer readable medium having stored thereon computer executable instructions for causing a computer or processor to perform, for example, when executed by a computer or processor
  • the processing of step S202 and step S206 shown in Fig. 2, preferably, the method embodiment described above can be performed.
  • the implementation of the present invention does not modify the system architecture and current processing flow, and is easy to implement. It is easy to promote in the technical field and has strong industrial applicability.
  • the above is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the present invention, and various modifications and changes can be made to the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the scope of the present invention are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention.

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Description

密钥分发方法和系统
技术领域 本发明涉及通信领域， 并且特别地， 涉及一种密钥分发方法和系统。 背景技术 在相关技术中 ,近场通信技术（ Near Field Communication,筒称为 NFC ) 是工作于 13.56MHz的一种近距离无线通信技术， 该技术由射频识别 （Radio Frequency Identification , 筒称为 RFID )技术及互连技术融合演变而来。 手机 等移动通信终端可以通过集成 NFC技术， 实现对非接触式 IC卡的模拟， 以 应用于电子支付等相关领域； 此外， 在移动通信终端上实现该方案需要在终 端上增加 NFC模拟前端芯片和 NFC天线， 并使用支持电子支付的智能卡。 经过十多年的发展， IC卡（特别是非接触式 IC卡） 已经被广泛应用于 公交、 门禁、 小额电子支付等领域； 与此同时， 手机经历 20 多年的迅速发 展后， 其应用已经基本得到普及， 并且给人们的工作及生活带来了 艮大的便 利， 随着手机的功能越来越强大， 将手机和非接触式 IC 卡技术结合， 将手 机应用于电子支付领域， 会进一步扩大手机的使用范围， 给人们的生活带来 便捷， 存在着广阔的应用前景。 在相关技术中， 为实现基于 NFC技术的移动电子支付， 需要建立移动 终端电子支付系统， 并通过该系统实现对移动终端电子支付的管理， 其中， 移动终端电子支付系统包括： 智能卡的发行、 电子支付应用的下载、 安装和 个性化、 以及采用相关技术和管理策略实现电子支付的安全等。 安全域是卡外实体（包括卡片发行商、 应用提供商）在卡上的代表， 它 们包含用于支持安全通道协议运作以及卡内容管理的加密密钥。 安全域负责 它们自己的密钥管理， 这保证了来自不同应用提供者的应用和数据可以共存 于同一个卡上。 安全域的密钥采用非对称密钥体制时 , 安全域上的密钥和证 书需要包括： 安全域的公钥和私钥、 安全域的证书、 用于认证卡外实体证书 的可信才艮公钥。 应用提供商在智能卡上的安全域为从安全域，在将应用提供商的电子支 付应用下载并安装到智能卡之前， 需要在智能卡上先通过卡片发行商拥有的 智能卡主安全域创建应用提供商的从安全域 , 然后设置从安全域的密钥。 安全域密钥作为机密数据 ,需要采取可靠及安全的方法和技术将有关密 钥和证书导入到从安全域， 实现从安全域密钥的安全分发， 其中， 从安全域 的创建需要由卡片发行商管理平台指示智能卡上的主安全域创建 , 而且从安 全域创建完成后， 从安全域的初始密钥需要由卡片发行商管理平台负责设置 和分发。 在从安全域创建完成后，卡片发行商管理平台可以通知从安全域卡生成 公私密钥对， 然后从安全域将生成的密钥返回给卡片发行商管理平台， 卡片 发行商管理平台将从安全域生成的密钥发送给应用提供商管理平台， 由应用 提供商管理平台根据从安全域的公钥生成从安全域证书， 然后由卡片发行商 的密钥分发。 在上述情况下，卡片发行商管理平台负责密钥数据的传送时可以获得发 送的安全域密钥数据， 使得其可以利用获得的密钥对从安全域执行操作， 这 样会对应用提供商的电子支付应用安全造成威胁， 因此， 急需一种解决从安 全域密钥的分发不安全的问题的技术方案。 发明内容 考虑到相关技术中由于卡片发行商管理平台负责密钥数据的传送时可 以获得发送的安全域密钥数据而导致的从安全域密钥的分发不安全的问题而 提出本发明， 为此， 本发明的主要目的在于提供一种密钥分发方法和系统， 以解决相关技术中存在的上述问题。 根据本发明的一个方面， 提供了一种密钥分发方法。 才艮据本发明的密钥分发方法包括：卡片发行商管理平台通知应用提供商 对应的从安全域在智能卡中生成包括公密钥和私密钥的公私密钥对， 接收从 安全域返回的公密钥， 并将用于外部认证的可信任才艮公钥导入到从安全域， 并向应用提供商管理平台发送从安全域的信息以及公密钥； 应用提供商管理 平台接收来自卡片发行商管理平台的从安全域的信息以及公密钥 , 并根据从 安全域的信息以及公密钥通过业务终端选择智能卡的从安全域； 应用提供商 管理平台通知从安全 i或重新生成公密钥和私密钥， 才艮据从安全 i或返回的重新 生成的公密钥生成从安全域证书， 并通过将从安全域证书发送到从安全域， 完成对从安全域密钥的分发。 优选地 ,卡片发行商管理平台通知从安全域生成公私密钥对的处理具体 为： 应用提供商管理平台通过应用提供商的业务终端判断智能卡中是否存在 对应于应用提供商的从安全域； 在判断为是的情况下， 智能卡中已存在应用 提供商的从安全域， 不再进行安全域的创建和密钥的分发过程； 在判断为否 的情况下 , 应用提供商管理平台通过卡片发行商管理平台在智能卡上创建从 安全 i或 , 并通 创建的从安全 i或生成公私密钥对。 优选地 ,应用提供商管理平台通过卡片发行商管理平台在智能卡上创建 从安全域的具体处理为： 卡片发行商管理平台通过应用提供商管理平台与智 能卡进行通信， 选择智能卡的主安全域并与主安全域建立安全通道； 卡片发 行商管理平台通过安全通道通知主安全域建立应用提供商对应的从安全域； 主安全域在智能卡上建立从安全域。 优选地 ,在应用提供商管理平台接收卡片发行商管理平台发送的从安全 域的信息以及公密钥之后， 方法进一步包括： 应用提供商管理平台在其数据 库中记录从安全域的信息。 优选地，在应用提供商管理平台根据从安全域的信息以及公密钥进行从 安全域选择之后， 上述方法进一步包括： 应用提供商管理平台与从安全域建 立安全信道。 优选地， 在应用提供商管理平台将从安全域证书发送到从安全域之后， 上述方法进一步包括： 从安全域将从安全域证书写入到从安全域。 才艮据本发明的另一方面， 提供了一种密钥分发系统。 根据本发明的密钥分发系统包括： 卡片发行商管理平台， 包括： 创建模 块， 用于创建智能卡中对应于应用提供商的从安全域； 第一通知模块， 用于 通知从安全域在智能卡中生成包括公密钥和私密钥的公私密钥对； 第一接收 模块， 用于接收从安全域返回的公密钥； 导入模块， 用于将用于外部认证的 可信任才艮公钥导入到从安全域； 第一发送模块， 用于在进行导入之后将从安 全域的信息和公密钥发送给应用提供商管理平台； 应用提供商管理平台， 包 括： 第二接收模块， 用于接收来自卡片发行商管理平台的从安全域的信息以 及公密钥； 选择模块， 用于根据从安全域的信息以及公密钥通过业务终端选 择智能卡的从安全域； 第二通知模块， 用于通知从安全域重新生成公密钥和 私密钥； 生成模块， 用于根据从安全域返回的重新生成的公密钥生成从安全 域证书； 第二发送模块， 用于通过业务终端将从安全域证书发送到从安全域， 完成对从安全域密钥的分发； 业务终端， 用于通过读写设备与智能卡建立通 信， 并建立智能卡与应用提供商管理平台之间的连接； 智能卡， 位于移动终 端， 包括从安全域， 其中， 从安全域用于生成公私密钥对， 并通过业务终端 向卡片发行商管理平台返回公密钥， 在应用提供商管理平台通知从安全域重 新生成公密钥和私密钥的情况下， 重新生成公密钥和私密钥， 并向应用提供 商管理平台返回重新生成的公密钥， 以及接收应用提供商管理平台发送的从 安全域证书。 优选地， 应用提供商管理平台进一步包括： 判断模块， 用于通过应用提 供商的业务终端判断智能卡中是否存在对应于应用提供商的从安全域； 调用 模块， 用于在判断为否的情况下， 调用创建模块通过卡片发行商管理平台在 智能卡上创建从安全域。 优选地， 应用提供商管理平台进一步包括： 记录模块， 用于在接收卡片 发行商管理平台发送的从安全域的信息以及公密钥之后， 在其数据库中记录 从安全域的信息。 优选地， 应用提供商管理平台进一步包括： 建立安全信道模块， 用于在 根据从安全域的信息以及公密钥通过业务终端选择智能卡的从安全域之后 , 与从安全域建立安全信道。 借助于本发明的技术方案，通过应用提供商的业务终端对从安全域密钥 进行分发， 解决了相关技术中由于卡片发行商管理平台负责密钥数据的传送 时可以获得发送的安全域密钥数据而导致的从安全域密钥的分发不安全的问 题， 能够避免遭受其它潜在的安全威胁和攻击， 从而能够提高应用提供商从 安全域密钥分发的安全性。 本发明的其它特征和优点将在随后的说明书中阐述， 并且， 部分地从说 明书中变得显而易见， 或者通过实施本发明而了解。 本发明的目的和其他优 点可通过在所写的说明书、 权利要求书、 以及附图中所特别指出的结构来实 现和获得。 附图说明 附图用来提供对本发明的进一步理解， 并且构成说明书的一部分， 与本 发明的实施例一起用于解释本发明 , 并不构成对本发明的限制。 在附图中： 图 1是才艮据本发明实施例的密钥分发系统的框图； 图 2是根据本发明实施例的密钥分发方法的流程图； 图 3 是根据本发明实施例的密钥分发方法的详细处理过程的信令流程 图。 具体实施方式 功能相克述 在相关技术中，由于卡片发行商管理平台负责密钥数据的传送时可以获 得发送的安全域密钥数据，会导致应用提供商的从安全域密钥的分发不安全， 因此， 本发明提供了一种密钥分发方法和系统， 具体包括： 卡片发行商管理 平台通知应用提供商对应的从安全域在智能卡中生成包括公密钥和私密钥的 公私密钥对， 接收从安全 i或返回的公密钥， 并将用于外部认证的可信任才艮公 钥导入到从安全域， 并向应用提供商管理平台发送从安全域的信息以及公密 钥； 应用提供商管理平台接收来自卡片发行商管理平台的从安全域的信息以 及公密钥 , 并根据从安全域的信息以及公密钥通过业务终端选择智能卡的从 安全域； 应用提供商管理平台通知从安全域重新生成公密钥和私密钥 , 才艮据 从安全 i或返回的重新生成的公密钥生成从安全域证书， 并通过夺从安全 i或证 书发送到从安全域， 完成对从安全域密钥的分发。 以下结合附图对本发明的优选实施例进行说明 , 应当理解 , 此处所描述 的优选实施例仅用于说明和解释本发明 , 并不用于限定本发明。 需要说明的 是，在不冲突的情况下，本申请中的实施例及实施例中的特征可以相互组合。 系统实施例 才艮据本发明的实施例 , 提供了一种密钥分发系统， 图 1是才艮据本发明实 施例的密钥分发系统的才11图， 目前， 移动终端近巨离电子支付系统的业务才匡 架采用 Global Platform规范的多应用框架， 在支持 Global Platform规范的智 能卡上可以安装多个应用， 并被分隔为若干个独立的安全域， 以保证多个应 用相互之间的隔离性以及独立性， 各个应用提供商管理各自的安全域以及应 用、 应用数据等 , 上述提到的支持 Global Platform规范的智能卡指的是符合 环球平台 （Global Platform, 筒称为 GP ) 组织制定的环球平台卡规范 2.1.1 或 2.2版本 ( Global Platform Card Specification V2.1.1或 V2.2 ) 的 IC芯片或 智能卡， 从物理形式上可以为 SIM/USIM卡、 可插拔的智能存储卡、 或者集 成在移动终端上的 IC芯片。 基于近场通信的移动终端电子支付系统的框架要求满足 Global Platform Card Specification V2.1.1/V2.2规范 , 如果该系统支持 GP2.1.1规范 , 则安全通道协议就需要支持基于对称密钥 （ Security Channel Protocol 02 , 筒 称为 SCP02 ); 如果该系统支持 GP2.2规范， 安全通道协议需要支持 SCP02 和基于非对称密钥（Security Channel Protocol 10 , 筒称为 SCP10 ), 并且， 卡 片发行商、 应用提供商可以根据安全策略的需求进行选择。 移动终端近距离支付系统从业务架构上可以包括卡片发行商、应用提供 商和用户， 其中： 卡片发行商： 负责卡的发行和管理， 拥有卡片管理系统、 密钥管理系统 和证书管理系统， 其中， 仅在支持非对称密钥情况下使用证书管理系统。 此 夕卜， 卡片发行商对卡的资源和生命周期、 密钥、 证书进行管理， 对其他应用 提供商的安全域进行创建， 并与其他安全域交互应用数据。 卡片发行商也可 以拥有应用管理系统， 负责卡片发行商自己的应用或者其负责托管的应用的 提供和管理功能。 卡片发行商可拥有业务终端管理系统和业务终端， 通过业 务终端向用户提供服务。 为了支持对应用提供商的管理， 卡片发行商可以拥 有应用提供商管理系统以记录应用提供商的有关信息 , 规定应用提供商的业 务权限等。 应用提供商：负责电子支付应用的提供和管理功能，拥有应用管理系统、 密钥管理系统、 证书管理系统， 其中， 仅在支持非对称密钥情况下使用证书 管理系统。 此外， 应用提供商提供各种业务应用， 并对卡上与其对应的安全 域进行管理， 对其安全域的应用密钥、 证书、 数据等进行控制， 提供应用的 安全下载功能。 应用提供商可以是运营商、 银行、 公交公司、 零售商户等。 另外， 应用提供商可拥有业务终端管理系统和业务终端， 通过业务终端向用 户提供服务。 用户： 负责电子支付应用的下载、 安装和使用。 用户通过与卡片发行商 或应用提供商交互 , 对移动终端和卡进行操作 , 在安全域内下载及安装新的 应用， 使用提供的各种业务应用。 移动终端电子支付系统主要由卡片发行商管理平台、应用提供商管理平 台和移动终端组成 , 系统中可以存在多个应用提供商管理平台。 移动终端中具备支持电子支付的智能卡，为了实现智能卡的安全性管理 和支付应用的下载、 安装等， 智能卡需要和卡片发行商管理平台以及应用提 供商管理平台建立通信， 可以通过管理平台的业务终端实现智能卡和管理平 台的连接， 业务终端配置有非接触读卡器或者直接读取智能卡的读卡器， 并 且业务终端可以和管理平台建立通信， 从而实现智能卡和管理平台的通信。 基于近场通信技术的移动终端电子支付系统支持多电子支付应用， 即， 在智能卡上可以安装多个电子支付应用。 为了实现支付应用的安全， 智能卡 采用 Global Platform Card Specification V2.1 V2.2规范， 智能卡被分隔为若干 个独立的安全域 , 以保证多个应用相互之间的隔离性以及独立性 , 各个应用 提供商管理各自的安全域以及应用、 应用数据等。 下面， 基于上述的系统构架， 对通过业务终端对从安全域密钥进行分发 的密钥分发系统进行详细的说明， 需要说明的是， 本发明的密钥分发系统为 上述基于近场通信的移动终端电子支付系统的一部分。 才艮据本发明的实施例 , 提供了一种密钥分发系统， 图 1是才艮据本发明实 施例的密钥分发系统的框图。 如图 1所示， 上述密钥分发系统包括卡片发行 商管理平台 10、 应用提供商管理平台 12、 应用提供商的业务终端 14、 智能 卡 16 (智能卡 16位于移动终端内 , 智能卡 16中包括主安全域和从安全域）。 其中， 应用提供商需要具有业务终端管理系统和业务终端 14 , 可以通过业务 终端 14提供电子支付的有关服务。 应用提供商管理平台 12和卡片发行商管 理平台 10之间通过专线或者 Internet连接， 卡片发行商管理平台 10可以通 过应用提供商管理平台 12、 应用提供商业务终端 14与智能卡 16建立通信。 并且， 智能卡 16通过应用提供商的业务终端 14与应用提供商管理平台 12、 卡片发行商管理平台 10 建立连接。 下面将对上述密钥分发系统进行详细的 说明。 卡片发行商管理平台 10 , 包括： 创建模块， 用于创建智能卡 16中对应于应用提供商的从安全域； 第一 通知模块， 用于通知从安全域在智能卡 16 中生成包括公密钥和私密钥的公 私密钥对； 第一接收模块， 用于接收从安全域返回的公密钥； 导入模块， 用 于将用于外部认证的可信任根公钥 (可信任根公钥是由签发应用提供商证书 的 CA提供的， 可以从应用提供商管理平台获得， 该公钥用于从安全域对应 用提供商的证书进行认证 ) 导入到从安全域； 第一发送模块 , 用于在进行导 入之后将从安全域的信息和公密钥发送给应用提供商管理平台 12; 并且， 结 合图 1所示的卡发行商管理平台， 可以将第一通知模块、 第一接收模块、 导 入模块、 和第一发送模块根据实际应用需要将上述一个或多个模块设置于卡 片发行商管理平台 10的子系统中。 应用提供商管理平台 12 , 包括： 第二接收模块， 用于接收来自卡片发 行商管理平台 10 的从安全域的信息以及公密钥； 选择模块， 用于才艮据从安 全域的信息以及公密钥通过业务终端 14选择智能卡 16的从安全域； 第二通 知模块， 用于通知从安全域重新生成公密钥和私密钥； 生成模块， 用于才艮据 从安全域返回的重新生成的公密钥生成从安全域证书； 第二发送模块， 用于 并通过业务终端将从安全域证书发送到从安全域， 完成对从安全域密钥的分 发。 此外， 应用提供商管理平台 12进一步包括： 判断模块，用于通过应用提供商的业务终端 14判断智能卡 16中是否存 在对应于应用提供商的从安全域； 调用模块， 用于在判断为否的情况下， 调 用创建模块通过卡片发行商管理平台 10在智能卡 16上创建从安全域。 记录 模块， 用于在接收卡片发行商管理平台 10 发送的从安全域的信息以及公密 钥之后， 在其数据库中记录从安全域的信息。 建立安全信道模块， 用于在根 据从安全域的信息以及公密钥通过业务终端 14选择智能卡 16的从安全域之 后， 与从安全域建立安全信道。 并且， 结合图 1所示的应用提供商管理平台， 可以将第二接收模块、 选择模块、 第二通知模块、 生成模块、 和第二发送模 块根据实际应用需要，将上述一个或多个模块设置于应用提供商管理平台 12 的子系统中。 业务终端 14 , 用于通过读写设备与智能卡 16建立通信， 并建立智能卡
16与应用提供商管理平台 12之间的连接； 在实际的应用中， 应用提供商的 业务终端 14 可以是应用提供商营业场所的计算机设备， 也可以参与处理电 子支付用户信息管理、 从安全域创建、 密钥更新、 电子支付应用下载等业务 的终端。 匕外， 业务终端 14 可以通过应用提供商的业务终端管理系统连接 到应用提供商管理平台 12, 业务终端 14与应用提供商管理平台 12之间的连 接可以采用专线或者 Internet进行连接。 此夕卜， 业务终端 14配置有非接触式 读卡器或者直接读取智能卡的读写设备， 业务终端可以通过读写设备与智能 卡建立通信。 智能卡 16, 位于移动终端， 包括从安全域， 其中， 从安全域用于生成 公私密钥对， 并通过业务终端 14向卡片发行商管理平台 10返回公密钥， 在 应用提供商管理平台 12 通知从安全域重新生成公密钥和私密钥的情况下， 重新生成公密钥和私密钥， 并向应用提供商管理平台 12 返回重新生成的公 密钥 , 以及接收应用提供商管理平台 12发送的从安全域证书。 通过上述的处理， 在卡片发行商管理平台 10将从安全域的基本信息和 密钥返回给应用提供商管理平台 12后， 应用提供商管理平台 12和从安全域 之间重新进行密钥分发， 这时应用提供商管理平台 12和智能卡 16之间的通 信不再经过卡片发行商管理平台 10 传输， 而是经过应用提供商的业务终端 14进行， 实现了对卡片发行商管理平台 10的隔离， 卡片发行商管理平台 10 无法获得应用提供商从安全域在智能卡 16 上生成的从安全域密钥。 另外， 应用提供商管理平台 12和智能卡 16的通信处于一个封闭的环境内 , 从而可 以避免在通信过程中遭受其它潜在的安全威胁和攻击。 通过本发明可以实现 应用提供商从安全域密钥分发的安全。 方法实施例 根据本发明的实施例， 提供了一种密钥分发方法， 用于对应用提供商的 从安全域进行密钥分发。图 2是根据本发明实施例的密钥分发方法的流程图， 如图 2所示， 包括以下处理 (步骤 S202-步骤 S206 ): 步骤 S202, 卡片发行商管理平台通知应用提供商对应的从安全域在智 能卡中生成包括公密钥和私密钥的公私密钥对，接收从安全域返回的公密钥， 并将用于外部认证使用的可信任根公钥导入到从安全域， 并向应用提供商管 理平台发送从安全域的信息以及公密钥； 其中， 在步骤 S202中， 通过应用提供商业务终端在智能卡中下载应用 提供商的电子支付应用以前， 应用提供商管理平台通过应用提供商的业务终 端判断智能卡中是否存在对应于应用提供商的从安全域； 在判断为是的情况 下， 智能卡中已经存在应用提供商对应的安全域， 而且该安全域已经进行了 密钥的分发， 在这种情况下， 不需要在进行安全域的创建及密钥的分发， 应 用提供商管理平台可以将电子支付应用下载到已存在的从安全域； 在判断为 否的情况下 , 应用提供商管理平台通过卡片发行商管理平台在智能卡上创建 从安全 i或 , 并通 创建的从安全 i或生成公私密钥对。 其中，应用提供商管理平台通过卡片发行商管理平台在智能卡上创建从 安全域的具体处理为： 卡片发行商管理平台通过应用提供商管理平台与智能 卡进行通信 , 选择智能卡的主安全域并与主安全域建立安全通道； 卡片发行 商管理平台通过安全通道通知主安全域建立应用提供商对应的从安全域； 主 安全域在智能卡上建立从安全域。 步骤 S204, 应用提供商管理平台接收来自卡片发行商管理平台的从安 全域的信息以及公密钥， 应用提供商管理平台通过应用提供商业务终端和智 能卡建立连接 , 并才艮据从安全域的信息以及公密钥通过业务终端选择智能卡 的从安全域； 在步骤 S204中， 在应用提供商管理平台接收卡片发行商管理平台发送 的从安全域的信息以及公密钥之后， 应用提供商管理平台在其数据库中记录 从安全域的信息。 此外， 在步骤 S204中， 在应用提供商管理平台根据从安全域的信息以 及公密钥进行从安全域选择之后， 上述方法进一步包括： 应用提供商管理平 台与从安全域建立安全信道。 步骤 S206, 应用提供商管理平台通知从安全域重新生成公密钥和私密 钥， 才艮据从安全 i或返回的重新生成的公密钥生成从安全 i或证书， 并通过将从 安全域证书发送到从安全域， 完成对从安全域密钥的分发。 在步骤 S206中， 在应用提供商管理平台将从安全域证书发送到从安全 域之后 , 从安全域需要将从安全域证书写入到从安全域。 下面， 结合实例， 对本发明的上述技术方案进行详细的说明， 如图 3 所示 , 图 3是根据本发明实施例的密钥分发方法的详细处理过程的信令流程 图， 需要说明的是， 尽管下面将以图 1所示的移动终端电子支付系统架构为 例进行描述， 但本发明的应用场景不限于图 1所示移动终端电子支付系统架 构。 在本实例中，应用提供商业务终端可以是应用提供商营业场所的计算机 设备， 可以参与处理电子支付用户信息管理、 从安全域创建、 密钥更新、 电 子支付应用下载等业务终端。 并且， 业务终端可以通过应用提供商的业务终 端管理系统连接到应用提供商管理平台， 业务终端与应用提供商管理平台之 间的连接可以采用专线或者 Internet 的形式进行连接。 业务终端配置有非接 触式读卡器、 或者直接读取智能卡的读写设备， 业务终端可以通过读写设备 与智能卡建立通信。 在实例中，应用提供商管理平台和卡片发行商管理平台之间通过专线或 者 Internet连接， 卡片发行商管理平台可以通过应用提供商管理平台、 应用 提供商业务终端与智能卡建立通信。 并且 ,通过应用提供商业务终端可以完成电子支付应用的业务申请和下 载。 在进行电子支付应用下载前， 需要检查智能卡中是否存在属于该应用提 供商的从安全域。 具体的检查方式如下：
1、 通过业务终端读取智能卡的特征信息 ICCID , 然后应用提供商管理 平台根据 ICCID在系统的已创建从安全域的智能卡数据库中检索该智能卡是 否已经创建自己的从安全域。
2、 当该应用提供商在每个智能卡上的从安全域的 ID相同时， 可以向智 能卡发送 SELECT报文，报文中的对象参数为从安全域 ID, 如果智能卡返回 的 SELECT RESPONSE中指示对应的从安全域不存在时，可以判断该智能卡 上不存在该应用提供商的从安全域。 并且， 如果不存在该应用提供商的从安全域， 需要先进行从安全域的创 建和从安全域的密钥分发过程。 下面将结合图 3 , 详细说明应用提供商的从安全域的创建和密钥分发过 程， 包括以下处理： 1、应用提供商业务终端读取智能卡的标识信息 ,例如 ,智能卡的 ICCID , 然后将智能卡标识信息发送给应用提供商管理平台。
在请求 4艮文中包括应用提供商 ID ( ASP— ID ) 和智能卡特征信息 ICCID等。
3、 卡片发行商管理平台接收到从安全域创建请求后， 验证从安全域创 建请求信息， 并确定是否允许该请求， 具体地， 卡片发行商可以根据应用提 供商的业务权限等， 确定是否允许通过应用提供商管理平台创建从安全域。
4、 卡片发行商管理平台确认可以通过应用提供商管理平台创建从安全 域后，根据智能卡 ICCID在管理平台内部的数据库中检索到该智能卡的相关 信息 , 包括智能卡主安全域 ID ( ISD ID ) 等。
5、 卡片发行商管理平台通过应用提供商管理平台向智能卡发送 SELECT报文 , 选择智能卡的主安全域。
6、 卡片发行商管理平台和智能卡主安全域按照 Global Platform Card Specification V2.2 附录 F Secure Channel Protocol 10的要求建立 SCP10安全 信道， 完成双方的认证及对话密钥的1"办商。
7、卡片发行商管理平台通向主安全域发送从安全域创建 4艮文 INSTALL [for Install] , 主安全域按照 4艮文创建从安全域， 完成创建后， 主安全域发送 INSTALL Response到卡片发行商管理平台。
8、 卡片发行商管理平台确认从安全域已创建后， 通知从安全域生成公 私密钥对 （对应于图 2中的步骤 S202 )。
9、 从安全域通过调用卡上生成密钥的接口产生公钥和私钥， 然后夺公 钥返回给卡片发行商管理平台 （对应于图 2中的步骤 S202 )。
公胡 ( One Public Key for Trust Point for External Authentication , PK.TP_EX.AUT ) 发送到智能卡主安全域 (对应于图 2中的步骤 S202 )。
11、 智能卡主安全域将从安全域的 PK. TP— EX.AUT发送给从安全域， 从安全 i或进行 PK.TP_EX.AUT的设置，然后发送 PUT KEY RESPONSE给卡 片发行商管理平台 （对应于图 2中的步骤 S202 )。
12、卡片发行商管理平台将创建的从安全域的基本信息和从安全域的公 钥发送给应用提供商管理平台 （对应于图 2中的步骤 S202 )。
13、 应用提供商管理平台在数据库中添加从安全域的相关信息。
14、 应用提供商管理平台通过其业务终端向智能卡发送 SELECT报文， 选择创建的从安全域 (对应于图 2中的步骤 S204 )。
15、 应用提供商管理平台和从安全域 ^按照 Global Platform Card Specification V2.2 附录 F Secure Channel Protocol 10的要求建立 SCP10安全 信道， 完成从安全域对应用提供商管理平台的认证和对话密钥的协商 （对应 于图 2中的步骤 S204 )。
16、应用提供商管理平台通 从安全 i或生成新的公钥和私钥（对应于图 2中的步骤 S206 )。
17、从安全域通过调用卡上生成密钥的接口重新产生从安全域的公钥和 私钥， 然后将公钥返回到应用提供商管理平台（对应于图 2中的步骤 S206 )。 18、应用提供商管理平台将从安全域的公钥和证书申请信息发给应用提 供商 CA, 由 CA签发从安全域的证书 （对应于图 2中的步骤 S206 )。
19、 应用提供商管理平台通过 PUT KEY 4艮文 , 将从安全域证书发送给 从安全域（对应于图 2中的步骤 S206 )。
20、 从安全域使用对话密钥对报文进行解密， 获得从安全域证书后， 安 装从安全 i或的证书； 从安全 i或发送 PUT KEY Response给应用提供商管理平 台 在进行上述的处理后 ,应用提供商管理平台和从安全域之间可以继续进 行电子支付应用的下载和安装等过程。 综上所述， 借助于本发明的技术方案， 通过应用提供商的业务终端对从 安全域密钥进行分发， 解决了相关技术中由于卡片发行商管理平台负责密钥 数据的传送时可以获得发送的安全域密钥数据而导致的从安全域密钥的分发 不安全的问题， 能够避免遭受其它潜在的安全威胁和攻击， 可以提高应用提 供商从安全域密钥分发的安全性。 才艮据本发明实施例， 还提供了一种计算机可读介质， 该计算机可读介质 上存储有计算机可执行的指令， 当该指令被计算机或处理器执行时， 使得计 算机或处理器执行如图 2所示的步骤 S202和步骤 S206的处理， 优选地， 可 以执行上述的方法实施例。 另外，本发明的实现没有对系统架构和目前的处理流程修改，易于实现， 便于在技术领域中进行推广 , 具有较强的工业适用性。 以上所述仅为本发明的优选实施例而已， 并不用于限制本发明， 对于本 领域的技术人员来说， 本发明可以有各种更改和变化。 凡在本发明的^^申和 原则之内， 所作的任何修改、 等同替换、 改进等， 均应包含在本发明的保护 范围之内。

Claims

权 利 要 求 书
1. 一种密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 包括：
卡片发行商管理平台通知应用提供商对应的从安全域在所述智能 卡中生成包括公密钥和私密钥的公私密钥对 , 接收所述从安全域返回的 所述公密钥 , 并将用于外部认证的可信任才艮公钥导入到所述从安全域， 并向应用提供商管理平台发送所述从安全域的信息以及所述公密钥； 所述应用提供商管理平台接收来自所述卡片发行商管理平台的所 述从安全 i或的信息以及所述公密钥 , 并才艮据所述从安全 i或的信息以及所 述公密钥通过所述业务终端选择所述智能卡的从安全域；
所述应用提供商管理平台通 所述从安全 i或重新生成公密钥和私 密钥， 才艮据所述从安全 i或返回的重新生成的公密钥生成从安全 i或证书， 并通过将所述从安全域证书发送到所述从安全域 , 完成对所述从安全域 密钥的分发。
2. 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述卡片发行商管理平台通 知所述从安全 i或生成所述公私密钥对的处理具体为： 应用提供商管理平台通过所述应用提供商的业务终端判断智能卡 中是否存在对应于所述应用提供商的从安全域；
在判断为是的情况下，所述智能卡中已存在所述应用提供商的从安 全域， 不再进行安全域的创建和密钥的分发过程；
在判断为否的情况下，所述应用提供商管理平台通过所述卡片发行 商管理平台在所述智能卡上创建所述从安全域， 并通知创建的所述从安 全 i或生成所述公私密钥对。
3. 根据权利要求 2所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述应用提供商管理平台通 过所述卡片发行商管理平台在所述智能卡上创建所述从安全域的具体处 理为：
所述卡片发行商管理平台通过所述应用提供商管理平台与所述智 能卡进行通信 , 选择所述智能卡的主安全域并与所述主安全域建立安全 通道； 所述卡片发行商管理平台通过所述安全通道通知所述主安全域建 立所述应用提供商对应的从安全域；
所述主安全域在所述智能卡上建立所述从安全域。
4. 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 在所述应用提供商管理平台 接收所述卡片发行商管理平台发送的所述从安全域的信息以及所述公密 钥之后， 所述方法进一步包括：
所述应用提供商管理平台在其数据库中记录所述从安全域的信息。
5. 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 在所述应用提供商管理平台 才艮据所述从安全域的信息以及所述公密钥进行所述从安全域选择之后， 所述方法进一步包括：
所述应用提供商管理平台与所述从安全域建立安全信道。
6. 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 在所述应用提供商管理平台 将所述从安全域证书发送到所述从安全域之后 , 所述方法进一步包括： 所述从安全域将所述从安全域证书写入到所述从安全域。
7. 一种密钥分发系统， 其特征在于， 包括：
卡片发行商管理平台， 包括：
创建模块 , 用于创建智能卡中对应于应用提供商的从安全域； 第一通知模块，用于通知所述从安全域在所述智能卡中生成包括公 密钥和私密钥的公私密钥对；
第一接收模块 , 用于接收所述从安全域返回的所述公密钥； 导入模块，用于将用于外部认证的可信任才艮公钥导入到所述从安全 域；
第一发送模块，用于在进行导入之后将所述从安全域的信息和所述 公密钥发送给应用提供商管理平台；
所述应用提供商管理平台， 包括：
第二接收模块，用于接收来自所述卡片发行商管理平台的所述从安 全域的信息以及所述公密钥； 选择模块，用于根据所述从安全域的信息以及所述公密钥通过所述 业务终端选择所述智能卡的从安全域；
第二通知模块， 用于通知所述从安全域重新生成公密钥和私密钥； 生成模块，用于根据所述从安全域返回的重新生成的公密钥生成从 安全域证书；
第二发送模块，用于通过所述业务终端将所述从安全域证书发送到 所述从安全域， 完成对所述从安全域密钥的分发；
所述业务终端， 用于通过读写设备与智能卡建立通信， 并建立所述 智能卡与所述应用提供商管理平台之间的连接；
所述智能卡， 位于移动终端， 包括所述从安全域， 其中， 所述从安 全域用于生成所述公私密钥对， 并通过所述业务终端向所述卡片发行商 管理平台返回所述公密钥 , 在所述应用提供商管理平台通知所述从安全 i或重新生成公密钥和私密钥的情况下 , 重新生成公密钥和私密钥 , 并向 所述应用提供商管理平台返回重新生成的所述公密钥 , 以及接收所述应 用提供商管理平台发送的所述从安全域证书。
8. 根据权利要求 7所述的系统， 其特征在于， 所述应用提供商管理平台进 一步包括：
判断模块 ,用于通过所述应用提供商的业务终端判断所述智能卡中 是否存在对应于所述应用提供商的从安全域；
调用模块， 用于在判断为否的情况下， 调用所述创建模块通过所述 卡片发行商管理平台在所述智能卡上创建所述从安全域。
9. 根据权利要求 7所述的系统， 其特征在于， 所述应用提供商管理平台进 一步包括：
记录模块，用于在接收所述卡片发行商管理平台发送的所述从安全 域的信息以及所述公密钥之后 ,在其数据库中记录所述从安全域的信息。
10. 根据权利要求 7所述的系统， 其特征在于， 所述应用提供商管理平台进 一步包括：
建立安全信道模块，用于在才艮据所述从安全域的信息以及所述公密 钥通过所述业务终端选择所述智能卡的从安全域之后 , 与所述从安全域 建立安全信道。
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