WO2010034897A1 - Procede et dispositif d'authentification de codes geometriques - Google Patents
Procede et dispositif d'authentification de codes geometriques Download PDFInfo
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- WO2010034897A1 WO2010034897A1 PCT/FR2009/001096 FR2009001096W WO2010034897A1 WO 2010034897 A1 WO2010034897 A1 WO 2010034897A1 FR 2009001096 W FR2009001096 W FR 2009001096W WO 2010034897 A1 WO2010034897 A1 WO 2010034897A1
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- code
- geometric
- image
- authenticating
- digital
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/06009—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
- G06K7/10—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation
- G06K7/14—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation using light without selection of wavelength, e.g. sensing reflected white light
- G06K7/1404—Methods for optical code recognition
- G06K7/1408—Methods for optical code recognition the method being specifically adapted for the type of code
- G06K7/1434—Barcodes with supplemental or add-on codes
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K1/00—Methods or arrangements for marking the record carrier in digital fashion
- G06K1/12—Methods or arrangements for marking the record carrier in digital fashion otherwise than by punching
- G06K1/121—Methods or arrangements for marking the record carrier in digital fashion otherwise than by punching by printing code marks
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K1/00—Methods or arrangements for marking the record carrier in digital fashion
- G06K1/12—Methods or arrangements for marking the record carrier in digital fashion otherwise than by punching
- G06K1/121—Methods or arrangements for marking the record carrier in digital fashion otherwise than by punching by printing code marks
- G06K1/123—Methods or arrangements for marking the record carrier in digital fashion otherwise than by punching by printing code marks for colour code marks
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/06009—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking
- G06K19/06018—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking one-dimensional coding
- G06K19/06028—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking one-dimensional coding using bar codes
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/06009—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking
- G06K19/06037—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking multi-dimensional coding
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/06009—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking
- G06K19/06046—Constructional details
- G06K19/06056—Constructional details the marking comprising a further embedded marking, e.g. a 1D bar code with the black bars containing a smaller sized coding
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method and a device for authenticating geometric codes. It applies, in particular, to barcodes in one dimension (called “1D”), in two dimensions (called “2D”), or even in three dimensions (“3D”) and Data Matrix (registered trademark)
- the Data Matrix code is a high-density bidimensionnal bar code symbology, capable of representing a large amount of information over a small area, up to 2,335 alphanumeric characters or 3,116 numeric characters, on approximately 1 cm 2 of code.
- Data Matrix is in the public domain
- the Data Matrix is in the form of a matrix of juxtaposed dots or squares
- the Data Matrix code meets the ISO IEC16022 standard According to this standard, the Data Matrix symbol may contain robustness levels, known as error checking and correction or "ECC” (acronym for "Error Check Correction”), different that allow it to be read even partially degraded or obscured
- ECC error checking and correction
- the main application area of the Data Matrix is the marking of very small mechanical or electronic parts.
- the Data Matrix ECC200 is one of the standards adopted by GS1 (acronym for "Global Standard” for global standard) and a recent opinion of the AFSSAPS (acronym for "French Agency for Sanitary Safety of Health Products") indicates that in January 2011, all medicinal products subject to a marketing authorization must include, in addition to the current legal notices, a 2D Data Matrix code containing a certain number of predefined information
- the Data Matrix has been designed to maximize the amount of storable data in the form of an image, so that the decoding by machines, or readers, of this data (based on image capture) is fast and However, it was not designed to secure the data stored, whereas this problem is more and more
- the decoding of the Data Matrix is done according to an open standard, and does not incorporate cryptography to encrypt and / or apply a digital signature to the data.
- the data of the stored message can be encrypted or digitally signed before being modulated to form the Data Matrix.
- unit traceability at all levels of the distribution chain is an aid against counterfeiting, even if ultimately it does not make it possible to determine which of two apparently identical products is the original. case, such a traceability system is too expensive, or even simply impossible to set up because it must be centralized so that two products bearing the same Data Matrix found in two different locations can be identified as such
- Document US 2008/0252066 proposes to print multi-color 2D bar codes, the reading and / or the authentication requiring the illumination of the code printed by different light sources and / or spectral filters
- Document US 2008/110990 proposes to rotate the print head, the effect of which can subsequently be detected and measured on the basis of an image capture of a print of a code
- this document implicitly admits that the method it describes can detect only copies made with printing means that do not allow rotation of the print head
- this invention does not offer real protection counterfeits made with the same printing means, and is binding because it requires the use of a particular printing means, which greatly limits its use
- WO 2008/003964 proposes methods for introducing a second level of information in the 1D and 2D barcodes by varying the information carrying elements to represent the second level of information, for example by widening or decreasing the size of the cells of a Data Matrix, or by trimming, or not, the ends of its black cells
- This approach solves some of the defects of the prior art, because the second level of information, which can be used for authentication, is inserted at the time of printing, which is convenient and inexpensive It is safe vis-à-vis counterfeiters unaware of the implementation of this process, and applying only to duplicate the bar code by reproducing the information of first level
- the second level can easily be identical copy by a counterfeiter informed of its presence
- This document indicates, moreover, that the second level of informatio n is copiable by a printing means of good quality, even if the sensitivity to copying is maximized (see page 12, lines 9-12 of this document)
- the present invention aims to remedy these drawbacks In particular, it relates to methods for including
- variable geometric zone code as a function of a message for providing geometrical zones
- step of generating a digital authentication code to provide numerical values
- a step of forming an image of said geometric zone code comprising, in at least a part of its geometric zones and / or in at least one space between geometric zones, a part of said digital authentication code; to directly authenticate a 2D barcode, based on an image of it, by purely numerical means, while leaving this 2D barcode legible
- the digital authentication codes also called “CNA” are digital images which, once marked on a support, for example by printing or local modification of the support, have properties that are generally measurable automatically at from a captured image, which are modified when copied.
- the digital authentication codes are generally based on the degradation of at least one copy-sensitive signal, such a signal being carried by image elements with measurable characteristics sensitive to the copy.
- a geometrical zone comprising a portion of the digital authentication code has a variable marking characteristic adapted to be globally deteriorated during a copy of said geometrical zone.
- Certain types of digital authentication codes may also contain information making it possible to identify or trace the document that contains it.
- CNAs are extremely advantageous for copy detection. Indeed, they are extremely inexpensive to produce, very easy to integrate, and can be read by a machine having image capture means, while being able to offer a high security against copying. Thanks to the implementation of the present invention, a geometric area code, for example bar, is inextricably linked to a DAC.
- the present invention has advantages over the simple juxtaposition of a geometric area code and a DAC.
- the latter approach would involve the printing of two codes at different times on the document, which would consume space and make the process of producing secure documents more complex.
- the authentication would require the capture of two images, one from the DAC and the other from the geometric area code, which would make the reading procedure less convenient
- the image-forming step may, for example, comprise an impression, a removal of material, a solid transfer or a local physical or chemical modification, for example under the effect of heat.
- the image forming step affects, due to the physical hazards of the image formation, the representation of the digital code authenticating an error rate greater than a first predetermined value and less than a second predetermined value.
- the digital authentication codes are composed of different elements taking discrete values In the case of binary values, the elements can be represented by a cell of a black color (printed) or white (non-color). im award).
- an error rate is determined which corresponds to the rate of cells containing an incorrect value. It is noted that the error rate is directly related to the ratio of the energy of the signal to the energy of the noise.
- the first predetermined value is 10% and the second predetermined value is 35%.
- the image forming step affects, because of the physical hazards of the image formation, between two formations of the same zone code variable geometry, the representation of the digital code authenticating a variation greater than a third predetermined value and lower than a fourth predetermined value.
- the third predetermined value is 2% and the fourth predetermined value is 45%.
- the image forming step affects, due to the physical hazards of the image formation, the representation of the digital code authenticating a noise so that the signal-to-noise ratio of the representation of the digital authentication code is less than a fifth predetermined value
- the image forming step affects, due to the physical hazards of the image formation, the representation of the digital code authenticating a noise so that the signal-to-noise ratio of the representation of the authenticating digital code is greater than a sixth predetermined value
- the fifth predetermined value of the signal to noise ratio is 0.05 and the sixth predetermined value is 2.63, resulting in a copy detection performance of at least 25% of the optimal copy detection performance (obtained for a value of 0.56)
- the fifth predetermined value of the signal-to-noise ratio is 0.11 and the sixth predetermined value is 1.8, resulting in a copte detection performance of at least 75% of the optimal copy detection performance (obtained for a value of 0.56)
- the fifth predetermined value of the signal to noise ratio is 0.32 and the sixth predetermined value is 0.93, resulting in a copy detection performance of at least 90% of the optimal copy detection performance (obtained for a value of 0.56)
- the method which is the subject of the present invention furthermore comprises
- variable geometric zones are generally rectangular parallel bars whose width and / or spacing varies according to said message. applies to one-dimensional barcodes
- variable geometric zones are square zones inserted into a matrix whose color and / or at least one dimension varies according to said message
- the present invention applies to two-dimensional bar codes.
- said geometric zone code comprising, in at least part of its geometric zones, a part of said digital authentication code
- the digital authentication code takes the form of a variation of at least one dimension of variable geometric zones
- each part of the digital authentication code inserted in a geometric area of the variable geometric area code takes the form of a rectangular cell distribution of at least an order of magnitude smaller than the dimensions of said area geometrically, a part of said cells having a color different from that of said geometric zone
- the area of said cells is less than a quarter of the area of said geometric area
- the method which is the subject of the present invention further comprises a step of encoding information in said digital authentication code.
- said information is a function of said message and / or said message is a function of said information
- said information is representative of a measurement of degradation of the digital authentication code due to physical hazards affecting the image during the image forming step.
- the information is representative of an error rate due to the image forming step, a signal-to-noise ratio due to the image forming step or a bit rate. correlation with an original digital authentication code
- This information can represent an expected level of degradation or a level of limit degradation beyond which the code will be considered as a copy.
- the authentication of the image can thus be carried out autonomously, by a reader adapted to capture an image of the digital authentication code inserted into the code with variable geometric zones since it indicates, through the information it carries, the normal level of degradation and, consequently, from what level of degradation, a captured image represents a copy of the digital authentication code
- the method that is the subject of the present invention further comprises a step of measuring the degradation of the digital authentication code generated during the image forming step.
- error detection codes integrated with said digital authentication code are implemented.
- Said measurement, or “score” is, for example, the percentage of correctly determined bits, a correlation rate between the original DAC and the DAC captured in an image captured by an image sensor
- the method which is the subject of the present invention, as briefly described above, comprises a step of determining a fingerprint of the image generated, said fingerprint being a function of a degradation of the digital code authenticating during of the step of forming an image
- the object or document carrying the variable geometric area code can thus be identified, that is to say recognized, even if the variable geometric zone code and the digital authentication code are identical for a plurality of objects or documents. .
- the present invention aims at a device for authenticating a geometric zone code of variable shapes and / or colors according to a message, characterized in that it comprises:
- the present invention aims at a method for authenticating a geometric zone code of variable shapes and / or colors, represented by a captured image, characterized in that it comprises:
- the present invention is directed to a device for authenticating a geometric code of shapes and / or colors represented by a captured image, characterized in that it comprises:
- the present invention aims at a geometric zone code of variable shapes and / or colors as a function of a message, characterized in that it represents: a message via the geometrical zones and
- a digital code authenticating, in at least a portion of its geometric zones, by a variable marking characteristic according to said digital authentication code.
- FIG. 1A represents a Data Matrix known in the art.
- FIG. 1B shows an enlargement of the Data Matrix illustrated in FIG. 1A
- FIGS. 2A and 3A show particular embodiments of the object codes of the present invention, enlargements of parts of these codes being given in FIGS. 2B and 3B, respectively
- FIGS. 4 to 7 represent, in the form of logic diagrams, the steps implemented in particular embodiments of the methods that are the subject of the present invention
- FIG. 8 represents, schematically, a particular embodiment of FIG. FIG.
- FIG. 9A shows a particular embodiment of an object code of the present invention.
- FIG. 9B an enlargement of part of this code is given in FIG. 9B and
- FIG. 10 represents the normalized copy detection performance with respect to the optimum value, as a function of the signal-to-noise ratio.
- image formation or “printing” are indifferently used to designate the formation of a detectable mark, for example by deposition of ink, removal of material, transfer of solid powder. or a local physical or chemical modification, for example under the effect of heat.
- the present invention is not limited to this type of marking and printing on objects but extends, on the contrary, to all types of marking and printing of geometric area code codes of variable shapes and / or colors according to a message, in particular bar codes in one, two or three dimension (s) formed on the surface of objects and markings under the surface Objects.
- the geometric areas of the code are alternating white and black rectangular vertical bars whose widths vary according to the message carried by the code
- the geometric areas of the code are squares forming a regular grid, the color of which varies according to the message carried by the code. In the rest of the description, these geometric zones are called "cells"
- 2D bar codes also called Data Matrix
- CNA digital authentication code
- Laser-marked with adjustable intensity, and fixed-intensity laser For the integration of a DAC in a 2D barcode, a method for generating a Data Matrix with an integrated DAC is described below in Figure 4. It is noted that the recommended generation parameters of the NAC , including the resolution in pixels per inch and the type of cell used (i.e. the shape and / or size of the elements composing the DAC), were previously determined for the printing process (paper, ink, printing machine, document), for example using a known method.
- the method for determining the optimal image formation parameters of the identifiers there is an optimal degradation rate making it possible to separate as easily as possible the different impressions of the same source identifier pattern.
- the print degradation rate is very low, for example 1% or 2% (1 or 2% of the cells or pixels of the identifying pattern are poorly read from a perfect capture)
- the different impressions of a same identifier pattern are very close to each other, and it is difficult to reliably identify them unless you have a very precise image capture and / or a very precise analysis algorithm .
- the degradation rate is very high, for example 45 to 50% (45 or 50% of the cells of the secure information matrix are read incorrectly from a perfect capture, 50% meaning that it does not there is no statistical correlation between the read matrix and the original matrix), the printed identifier patterns are almost indistinguishable from each other.
- the optimal degradation rate is close to 25%, and if the conditions of the application allow it, it is better to approach it. Indeed, for 25% degradation, assuming that the print variations and therefore the degradations are of a probabilistic nature, one maximizes, in each of the points of the printed identifier pattern, the chances that it differs from the other print identifiers patterns.
- the digital authentication codes are composed of different elements taking discrete values.
- the elements can be represented by a cell of a black (printed) or white (non-printed) color.
- an error rate is determined which corresponds to the rate of cells containing an incorrect value. It is noted that the error rate is directly related to the ratio of the energy of the signal to the energy of the noise.
- the characteristics measured on the images (or points) are represented by signals.
- This model corresponds directly to MPCVs that can have point sizes of 1x1 pixel or 1x2 pixels (prints, for example, at 2400 dpi), for which the counterfeiter must necessarily choose one of the point sizes in the reconstructed image from of a scan, according to a gray level measured or an estimated area of the point
- the model also corresponds to MPCV with positions varying from 1 pixel, for example
- the detection problem consists of distinguishing the two following hypotheses
- x [ ⁇ ] a s ⁇ gn (s [ ⁇ ] + n [ ⁇ ]) + n c [ ⁇ ] (5)
- H 0 and H 1 are the assumptions that the received signal is an original, respectively, a copy
- the classification function is therefore a simple correlator T 'whose value must be less than a threshold t' to classify the signal as a copy
- ⁇ a 2 l ⁇ 2 is the square root of the signal-to-noise ratio.
- Figure 10 represents the value of the expression of equation (25) for a fixed value of ⁇ , normalized to its optimal value and obtained as a function of ⁇ . It can be interpreted as follows.
- the values of ⁇ close to zero correspond to a very high noise compared to the signal: when the noise is very high, the signal is too degraded from the first impression, the counterfeiter introduces a number of estimation errors too low. On the other hand, for values of ⁇ which are too high, the signal is not sufficiently degraded, and in too large a proportion of cases the counterfeiter will not introduce an estimation error. Between the two extremes, the expression passes through an optimal value, whose value is estimated numerically at ⁇ ⁇ 0.752.
- the point size being of the order of nine pixels (for example, 3x3 pixels).
- the point size can be measured by implementing a multitude of algorithms, for example by local adaptive thresholding of the gray level and counting of the pixels below the threshold.
- the average and the standard deviation of the number of pixels of each point are measured.
- the image formation step affects, because of the physical hazards of the image formation, the representation of the digital code authenticating an error rate greater than a first predetermined value and less than a second value.
- predetermined value For example, the first predetermined value is 10% and the second predetermined value is 35%
- the image forming step affects, because of the physical hazards of the image formation, between two formations of the same variable geometric zone code, the representation of the digital authentication code of a variation greater than a third predetermined value and less than a fourth predetermined value
- the third predetermined value is 2% and the fourth predetermined value is 45%
- the image forming step affects, due to the physical hazards of image formation, the representation of the digital code authenticating a noise so that the signal-to-noise ratio of the representation of the digital code authenticator is less than a fifth predetermined value and, preferably, greater than a sixth predetermined value
- the fifth predetermined value of the signal to noise ratio is 0.05 and the sixth predetermined value is 2.63, resulting in a copy detection performance of at least 25% of the optimal copy detection performance. (obtained for a value of 0.56)
- the fifth predetermined value of the signal to noise ratio is 0.11 and the sixth predetermined value is 1.8, resulting in a copy detection performance of at least 75% of the optimal copy detection performance (obtained for a value of 0.56)
- the fifth predetermined value of the signal-to-noise ratio is 0.32 and the sixth predetermined value is 0.93, resulting in a copy-detection performance of at least 90% of the optimal copy-detection performance ( obtained for a value of 0.56)
- the available surface area for the identifying pattern is received, for example a square whose side is 1/6 of an inch.
- each of the identification patterns of different digital dimensions is printed several times with the appropriate resolution so that the dimensions of the printing correspond to the available surface area in a step 723, for each type, each of the printed identifier motifs is captured several times, for example 3 times,
- the fingerprint of each identifying pattern is calculated, said fingerprint being a function of a degradation of the digital authentication code during the imaging step, said fingerprint being generally unique for each image formed because of the random aspect of each individual error, in a step 725, the similarity scores are calculated for all captured identifier pattern pairs of the same printing resolution and
- the method described in the experiment of the generic impression extraction method described above is used to measure the "degree of separation of the imprints", for each of the print resolutions, and to choose the print resolution giving the maximum value of this degree
- the printing resolution is chosen which has the greatest difference between the lowest score value calculated on the comparison between the prints corresponding to identical prints, and the highest score value calculated on the comparison between the prints corresponding to different impressions
- a step 105 one or more messages, one or more keys, a Data Matrix physical size and a print resolution are received.
- step 110 it is determined from the keys and messages, the coded message (s) that will be inserted in the DAC.
- DAC messages can be correlated with the message represented by the Data Matrix, one being (partly) dependent on the other, to enhance authentication.
- a Data Matrix is generated from at least one of the messages received during step 105.
- the number of black cells of the Data Matrix is determined, the identification patterns (known by the name "fmder pattern") possibly or not being included in the Data Matrix.
- the number of elements of the DAC is determined.
- DAC generation algorithms often include encryption, encoding, repetition, and scrambling steps (for example with permutation and / or substitution).
- the digital image of the Data Matrix is created, by entering the values of the DAC in a predetermined order (for example from left to right then from top to bottom) in the pixels corresponding to the number of black cells.
- a step 140 an object is printed or marked to form the digital image of the Data Matrix incorporating the CNA.
- the Data Matrix 150 illustrated in FIG. 1 was generated according to a standard algorithm, from a message.
- the Data Matrix 150 is 26 ⁇ 26 cells in size, including the identification patterns. and counts 344 black cells, still including the locating patterns.
- the DAC is generated from the keys and messages according to one of the known algorithms, and the DAC values are inserted into the black cells.
- FIG. 2 shows a Data Matrix 160 object of the present invention generated from Data Matrix 150, in which a CNA is distributed over all black cells.
- the Data Matrix may not have the required quality for decoding, for example because it has "holes" in the cells.
- FIG. 3 shows such a Data Matrix 170.
- Data Matrix is not significantly affected by the modifications made
- the inventors have printed with an office laser printer the Data Matrix 150, 160 and 170 at the resolution of 600 ppi (size of 1 cm.), And used the "TruCheck USB Check” barcode verification device, which is used to determine the rank of the Data Matrix.
- the Data Matrix 150 which serves as a reference, gets a grade of 'A', while the Data Matrix 160 and 170 get 'B' and 'A' respectively, noting that the Data Matrix 160 contains more information that can be used to authentication (and / or transporting a message) as the Data Matrix 170, we see that there may be an inverse relationship between the quality of the Data Matrix, and the amount of information contained at the CNA.
- the space available for NAC modulation depends, in practice, on the acceptable grade for the application. In our case, if a grade of 'B' is acceptable (in principle grades above 'C' are acceptable), the Data Matrix 160 with more information is preferred. If only grade 'A' is acceptable, we take the Data Matrix 170. Otherwise, we adjust the exploitation rate of the cell used to target the minimum grade required.
- the elements of this DAC can also have a variable size, for example elements of 1x2 pixels and 1x1 pixels, to make it more difficult to identify the elements by a counterfeiter who would seek to reconstruct perfectly the original DAC.
- An example of an algorithm for authenticating a printed Data Matrix equipped with a DAC is given below with reference to FIG.
- an image is received from an image capture, for example with a scanner, this image containing the Data Matrix and therefore the CNA.
- decryption keys are received, and the DAC reading parameters (for example, the pixel size of each cell), as well as a decision threshold.
- the Data Matrix message carried by the average shapes and colors of the square cells is decoded.
- step 215 it is determined whether the message of the Data Matrix is read correctly, for example as a function of the integrated ECCs. Otherwise, we consider that the Data Matrix is not authentic and we display the user: "Code not authentic" If the message is correctly read, during a step 220, we create an image of the Data Matrix d ' origin.
- the number of black cells is determined, and according to the reading parameters of the DAC, the number of elements of the DAC is determined.
- a step 230 according to the image of the original Data Matrix and the number of elements of the CNA, the position (in terms of pixels) in the image of each element of the CNA is determined. .
- a value associated with the value of each element of the DAC is extracted from the image, for example the gray level of the pixel.
- a representative data vector of the printed CNA is obtained, and the degradations that it has undergone
- the NAC message (s) is decoded.
- a step 245 its score representative of the degradation rate of the CNA is determined.
- the score is, for example, the percentage of correctly determined bits, a correlation rate between the original DAC and the DAC measured from the captured image, etc.
- the measured score is compared with a predetermined limit value or "decision threshold”. If it is higher, for example because of a low error rate or a high correlation rate, the user is shown “authenticated data matrix”. Otherwise, we display "Data Matrix unauthenticated”. Optionally, we display each message read.
- CNA bits are reserved for synchronization, in a manner known per se
- a laser and micro-percussion marking system is implemented for the integration of a DAC.
- Certain marking systems, in particular laser or micro-percussion systems, of a Data Matrix can not use large images as seen previously For example, to mark an image size of 236x236 pixels as in the previous example would take a much too important time, which would slow much too much the rate of the production line, or would generate Data Matrix of large size
- the particular embodiment described below aims to avoid these disadvantages
- micro tip labeling systems can be used.
- the cells are divided into subsets, or "classes". Each subset of cells whose differentiation characteristics are identical is preferably carried out during a single pass.
- the tool This allows to modify the parameter which differentiates the effect of marking only once for each subset of the cells, instead of doing it for each cell individually
- Each parameter which can be modified locally, and whose variation has a measurable impact on the Data Matrix generated can be used to store information For example, if the intensity of the laser admits two levels, we can store a bit of information by modulating the intensity or another modulation parameter of the marking. as a variant, to cumulate variations on various locally variable parameters
- a parameter can vary locally in a quasi-continuous manner, and it is then possible to determine an arbitrary number of levels for storing information. For example, ten levels are used for said parameter (color or dimensional variations, for example). example) instead of the two described above, or even vary the value of this parameter continuously
- the noise properties of the channel are determined by qualifying the distribution of the measured value of the signal on the image capture.
- the means of printing or marking only makes it possible to mark or not to mark a cell (unitary binary marking).
- the information The additional tag that is marked does not offer high security against copying.
- a tagging means allowing predefined levels of tagging that remain distinct from the others and clearly identifiable in the tagged image makes it possible to insert additional information, but it remains in principle copiable identically
- the irregularities of the marking can be captured, measured, and used to constitute a CNA It is then possible to store the CNA in a database, or to store it itself in the form of a 2D barcode.
- the latter approach is not very advantageous because marking a second code is expensive and consumes space on the document, which is what we try to avoid in general
- we can store the DAC by associating it with the message of the Data Matrix which, s' it is unique (which is preferentially the case), makes it possible, during the authe ⁇ tification step, to make a simple "verification" by comparison of the measurement of the marking defects with the CNA.
- FIG. 6 gives an example of an algorithm for recording the defects of marking of a bar code.
- a captured image containing a barcode is received
- the message of the door bar code is decoded by the mean shapes and colors of the square cells.
- an identifier is calculated from the message
- the characteristics of the bar code marking defects are measured.
- the characteristics are quantified, possibly compressed, and a characteristic data vector representative of the defects is determined.
- this feature vector is stored in a database, associated with the identifier of the message.
- a captured image containing a barcode is received
- the message contained in the bar code is decoded and carried by the average shapes and colors of the square cells. If it is not possible to decode it, the user displays "Illegible barcode" to the user. Otherwise, during a step 415, an identifier is calculated from the message.
- a step 420 one obtains, from a database, the data vector corresponding to this identifier, as well as a decision threshold associated with this feature vector. If the database does not contain this identifier , the user is shown "Unauthenticated barcode"
- the average of the characteristics is subtracted for several bar codes, characteristics measured for the bar code considered.
- the characteristics are quantified, possibly compressed, and determines a vector of data representative of the defects
- the extracted data vector is compared with the data vector obtained from the database, and a similarity index, called a "score", is measured.
- the measured score is compared with the decision threshold. If it is higher, the user is shown “Data Matrix authenticates”. Otherwise, the user is shown “Data Matrix unauthenticated”. Optional , the user is shown each message read
- FIG. 8 shows a local terminal 505 equipped with a printer 510, an image capture means 535, two sensors 540 and 545, and an access means 515 to a network 520 to which is connected a server 525 525 server is equipped with a database 530
- the local terminal 505 is, for example, of the general purpose computer type. It is installed on a chain 550 for manufacturing or transforming objects, for example packaging.
- the chain 550 comprises, for example, a destacker of planar objects (not shown) and a conveyor (not shown) setting in motion the objects to be treated, one behind the other
- the sensor 540 is positioned on the production line 550, upstream of the optical field of the image sensor 535 and is adapted to detect the arrival of an object to be processed.
- the sensor 540 is an optical cell comprising a transmitter and a light ray receiver
- the sensor 545 is placed on the chain 550 and determines the speed of the objects on this chain.
- the sensor 545 is connected to a controller (not shown) governing the operation of the chain 550 or is connected to a carrier for moving objects, for example a conveyor belt
- the local terminal 505 controls the printing of the objects by the printer 510, in a manner known per se, for example by inkjet or by laser marking.
- the 520 is, for example, a known type of modem, for access to the network 520, for example the network
- the image capture means 535 is, for example, a digital camera, a linear sensor or an industrial camera
- the server 525 is of a known type.
- the database 530 at least keeps a list of object identifiers and defect data vectors linked to these objects, determined in accordance with the method which is the subject of the present invention.
- data 530 maintains, in relation to each identifier of an object, an identifier of type of object and of positioning position position of the geometric code object of the present invention for this type of object, an identifier of the provider performing the manufacturing or the transformation
- the terminal 505 retains software which, during its execution, implements steps of a method that is the subject of the present invention.
- the server 525 retains software that, during its execution, implements steps of a method of storage and retrieval. defect data vectors
- the terminal 505 does not keep any specific software but implements a web browser and a web service (in English, "web service”) hosted by the server 525.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (10)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US13/120,502 US8448865B2 (en) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | Method and device for geometric code authentication |
RU2011116099/08A RU2520432C2 (ru) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | Способ и устройство для аутентификации геометрического кода |
CN200980146698.5A CN102224511B (zh) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | 几何码验证的方法和设备 |
BRPI0920893A BRPI0920893B1 (pt) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | código com zonas geométricas cujas formas e/ou cores variam de acordo com uma mensagem, processo e dispositivo de autenticação do mesmo |
PL09752394T PL2364485T3 (pl) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | Sposób i urządzenie do uwierzytelniania kodów geometrycznych |
MX2011003119A MX2011003119A (es) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | Metodo y dispositivo para autentificar codigos geometricos. |
ES09752394T ES2756375T3 (es) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | Procedimiento y dispositivo de autentificación de códigos geométricos |
EP09752394.8A EP2364485B1 (fr) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | Procédé et dispositif d'authentification de codes géométriques |
JP2011528384A JP5528457B2 (ja) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | 幾何学的コード認証方法及び装置 |
US13/873,441 US8727222B1 (en) | 2008-09-23 | 2013-04-30 | Method and device for authenticating geometrical codes |
Applications Claiming Priority (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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FR0805214A FR2936336A1 (fr) | 2008-09-23 | 2008-09-23 | Procede et dispositif d'authentification de codes geometriques |
FR08/05214 | 2008-09-23 | ||
FR0806673A FR2936335B1 (fr) | 2008-09-23 | 2008-11-27 | Procede et dispositif d'autentification de codes geometriques. |
FR08/06673 | 2008-11-27 |
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US13/120,502 A-371-Of-International US8448865B2 (en) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | Method and device for geometric code authentication |
US13/873,441 Division US8727222B1 (en) | 2008-09-23 | 2013-04-30 | Method and device for authenticating geometrical codes |
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WO2010034897A1 true WO2010034897A1 (fr) | 2010-04-01 |
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PCT/FR2009/001096 WO2010034897A1 (fr) | 2008-09-23 | 2009-09-15 | Procede et dispositif d'authentification de codes geometriques |
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US (2) | US8448865B2 (fr) |
EP (1) | EP2364485B1 (fr) |
JP (1) | JP5528457B2 (fr) |
CN (1) | CN102224511B (fr) |
BR (1) | BRPI0920893B1 (fr) |
ES (1) | ES2756375T3 (fr) |
FR (2) | FR2936336A1 (fr) |
MX (1) | MX2011003119A (fr) |
PL (1) | PL2364485T3 (fr) |
RU (1) | RU2520432C2 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2010034897A1 (fr) |
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CN103098101A (zh) * | 2010-07-19 | 2013-05-08 | 先进追踪和寻踪公司 | 标记产品和由消费者验证产品的方法和设备 |
CN103098101B (zh) * | 2010-07-19 | 2015-08-12 | 先进追踪和寻踪公司 | 标记产品和由消费者验证产品的方法和设备 |
WO2015067725A1 (fr) | 2013-11-07 | 2015-05-14 | Scantrust Sa | Code à barres bidimensionnel et son procédé d'authentification |
US9594993B2 (en) | 2013-11-07 | 2017-03-14 | Scantrush Sa | Two dimensional barcode and method of authentication of such barcode |
US10373033B2 (en) | 2013-11-07 | 2019-08-06 | Scantrust Sa | Two dimensional barcode and method of authentication of such barcode |
EP3252680A1 (fr) | 2016-05-31 | 2017-12-06 | Agfa Graphics NV | Procédé d'authentification d'un code à barres bidimensionnel |
WO2017207344A1 (fr) | 2016-05-31 | 2017-12-07 | Agfa Graphics Nv | Procédé d'authentification d'un code-barres bidimensionnel |
US10853712B2 (en) | 2016-05-31 | 2020-12-01 | Agfa Nv | Authentication method of a two dimensional bar code |
FR3121060A1 (fr) | 2021-03-29 | 2022-09-30 | Qiova | Procédé et dispositif pour former une figure sur ou dans une pièce |
WO2022208020A1 (fr) | 2021-03-29 | 2022-10-06 | Qiova | Procédé et dispositif pour former une figure sur ou dans une pièce |
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ES2756375T3 (es) | 2020-04-27 |
PL2364485T3 (pl) | 2020-04-30 |
MX2011003119A (es) | 2011-10-21 |
JP2012503264A (ja) | 2012-02-02 |
US8448865B2 (en) | 2013-05-28 |
FR2936336A1 (fr) | 2010-03-26 |
BRPI0920893A2 (pt) | 2016-10-04 |
CN102224511B (zh) | 2014-04-02 |
EP2364485B1 (fr) | 2019-09-04 |
BRPI0920893B1 (pt) | 2020-04-22 |
US8727222B1 (en) | 2014-05-20 |
US20140131458A1 (en) | 2014-05-15 |
FR2936335A1 (fr) | 2010-03-26 |
FR2936335B1 (fr) | 2018-01-19 |
RU2011116099A (ru) | 2012-10-27 |
JP5528457B2 (ja) | 2014-06-25 |
CN102224511A (zh) | 2011-10-19 |
US20110259962A1 (en) | 2011-10-27 |
EP2364485A1 (fr) | 2011-09-14 |
RU2520432C2 (ru) | 2014-06-27 |
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