WO2008034360A1 - Procédé d'authentification et d'autorisation d'accès au réseau et procédé de mise à jour de clé d'autorisation - Google Patents

Procédé d'authentification et d'autorisation d'accès au réseau et procédé de mise à jour de clé d'autorisation Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008034360A1
WO2008034360A1 PCT/CN2007/070299 CN2007070299W WO2008034360A1 WO 2008034360 A1 WO2008034360 A1 WO 2008034360A1 CN 2007070299 W CN2007070299 W CN 2007070299W WO 2008034360 A1 WO2008034360 A1 WO 2008034360A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
authorization
mobile terminal
base station
access
key
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2007/070299
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Liaojun Pang
Jun Cao
Haibo Tian
Zhenhai Huang
Bianling Zhang
Original Assignee
China Iwncomm Co., Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by China Iwncomm Co., Ltd. filed Critical China Iwncomm Co., Ltd.
Priority to JP2009528582A priority Critical patent/JP5422835B2/ja
Priority to US12/441,915 priority patent/US8185091B2/en
Priority to EP07764226.2A priority patent/EP2063567B1/en
Publication of WO2008034360A1 publication Critical patent/WO2008034360A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication

Definitions

  • the invention provides a network access authentication and authorization method and an authorization key update method.
  • the application is submitted to the Chinese Patent Office on September 23, 2006, and the application number is 200610104678.X, and the invention name is "a network access authentication and authorization method".
  • the priority of the Chinese Patent Application which is incorporated herein by reference.
  • the invention relates to a network access authentication and authorization method and an authorization key update method, which are specifically applicable to a wired network and a wireless network such as a wireless local area network (WLAN), a wireless metropolitan area network (WMAN), a broadband wireless multimedia (BWM) network, and the like.
  • WLAN wireless local area network
  • WMAN wireless metropolitan area network
  • BWM broadband wireless multimedia
  • Wireless network security issues are far more important than wired Ethernet.
  • the IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
  • 802.11 and 802.16 series standards to enhance the security of wireless LANs and wireless metropolitan area networks, providing secure access from mobile terminals to base stations. China also promulgated wireless LANs in May 2003.
  • the national standard GB15629.il commonly referred to as the WAPI (Wireless Local Area Network Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure) protocol.
  • Broadband wireless multimedia networks combine data communication and broadcast communication. They are a new wireless network architecture that faces security issues such as secure access and authentication and authorization.
  • the US IEEE802.i l standard implements the security of wireless LAN through the WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) protocol. Both theory and application prove that the WEP protocol has serious security vulnerabilities.
  • WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
  • the US IEEE has supplemented the 802.11i standard to solve WEP security vulnerabilities, the 802.lli standard itself has the following drawbacks: Direct identification of mobile terminals and access points cannot be achieved, that is, the 802.11i standard only implements mobile terminals and The two-way authentication between the authentication servers does not enable direct identity authentication between the mobile terminal and the access point, and other security protocols are needed to improve security. For example, a secure channel needs to be established between the access point and the authentication server by means of other security protocols.
  • Each access point must establish a secure channel with the background authentication server in advance, and this secure channel generally needs to be manually established, which is not conducive to system expansion.
  • the security is less reliable, that is, since each access point establishes a secure channel with the authentication server, the security of the channel affects the entire network system.
  • the wireless metropolitan area network standard proposed by the IEEE in the United States is the IEEE 802.16 standard, which can solve the authentication problem of the mobile terminal and the base station, but cannot prevent the attacker from posing as a base station to spoof the mobile terminal. Since the authorization key is only protected by the public key encryption of the mobile terminal, anyone can forge such a packet without being discovered.
  • the IEEE802.16e standard improves the scheme by reference to the IEEE802.il i standard, but still cannot achieve mobile end.
  • Direct identity authentication between the terminal and the base station In addition, a secure channel needs to be established in advance between the base station and the authentication server, and other security protocols are required.
  • the key management uses the time synchronization method, and the state management is complicated. That is, the enabling and disabling of the new key depends on the time judgment, and maintaining the synchronous clock in a distributed system is complicated. The system has many states and the management is complicated.
  • China's national standard GB15629.il overcomes some of the shortcomings of the WEP protocol, but it also has the following shortcomings: It only provides two-way identity authentication for mobile terminals and access points, and does not support one-way authentication of access points to mobile terminals, which cannot satisfy only Application requirements requiring one-way authentication. For example: In a broadband wireless multimedia network, in addition to supporting two-way authentication between a base station and a mobile terminal, it is also necessary to support one-way authentication of the mobile terminal by the base station. In addition, the key negotiation process requires a large number of exponential operations, which not only increases the computational burden of the device, but also has a large impact on system performance.
  • the invention provides a network access authentication and authorization method and a matching authorization key update method thereof, which can solve the problem that the direct identity authentication between the mobile terminal and the base station cannot be realized in the background art, and other security protocols need to be provided, and only the mobile terminal is provided.
  • the two-way identity authentication with the base station does not support the technical problem of the base station's one-way authentication to the mobile terminal.
  • a method for network access authentication and authorization comprising:
  • the mobile terminal When the mobile terminal is physically associated with the base station, the mobile terminal constructs an access and authorization request packet, and sends the access and authorization request packet to the base station;
  • the base station After receiving the access and authorization request packet, the base station constructs a certificate authentication request packet, and sends the certificate authentication request packet to the authentication server;
  • the authentication server After receiving the certificate authentication request packet, the authentication server authenticates the validity of the mobile terminal certificate, or authenticates the validity of the mobile terminal certificate and the base station certificate, constructs a certificate authentication response packet according to the authentication result, and Sending the certificate authentication response packet to the base station;
  • the base station After receiving the certificate authentication response packet, the base station constructs an access and authorization response packet and sends the packet to the mobile terminal;
  • the mobile terminal After receiving the access and authorization response packet, the mobile terminal uses the plaintext of the authorization key material AKM decrypted by its own private key, and derives the authorization key AK by using the random number selected by the mobile terminal and the base station.
  • the authorization key AK derives the key encryption key and the integrity check key, and constructs Incoming and authorizing the acknowledgment packet, and transmitting the access and authorization acknowledgment packet to the base station.
  • the content of the foregoing access and authorization request packet includes: an identifier field Flag, an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal, a digital certificate Cert MS of the mobile terminal, an authorization key identifier AKID, and a random number N MS selected by the mobile terminal MS ;
  • the content of the above certificate authentication request packet includes: an identifier field Flag, a digital certificate of the mobile terminal
  • the mobile terminal select a random number N MS MS and BS selected by the random number N BS, wherein the Flag field values with the same access and authorization request packet identification field value, the selected mobile terminal MS
  • the value of the random number N MS should be the same as the corresponding field in the access and authorization request packet;
  • the contents of the above certificate authentication response packet include: an identifier field Flag, a digital certificate of the mobile terminal
  • the mobile terminal select a random number N MS MS, BS selected by a random number N BS and an authentication server for the packet digital signature Sig ASU, wherein Flag field value of the certificate should be the same identification field value of the authentication request packet, the mobile terminal select a random number N MS MS and BS selected by the random number value of N should be the same BS certificate authentication request corresponding field;
  • the content of the foregoing access and authorization response packet includes: an identifier field Flag, an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal, an identity ID BS of the base station, a digital certificate Cert MS of the mobile terminal and a result of the authentication Result MS , a signature of the authentication server, a Si gASU , a base station A series of security associations SAs authorized by the mobile terminal, an authorization key identifier AKID, a ciphertext E MS (AKM) of the 4 authorized key material AKM selected by the base station and encrypted by the mobile terminal public key, an expiration date of the authorization key LifeAK, the value selected mobile terminal MS and the random number N MS BS selected by the random number N BS, wherein the value of the Flag field should be the same as the access and authorization identifier field value in the request packet, the authorization key identifier AKID Same as the authorization key identifier AKID in the access and authorization request packet;
  • the content of the foregoing access and authorization confirmation packet includes: an identifier field Flag, an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal, an identity ID BS of the base station, an authorization key identifier AKID, a random number N BS selected by the base station BS, and a message integrity check code MIC
  • the value of the identifier field Flag is the same as the value of the identifier field in the access and authorization request packet, and the value of the random number N BS selected by the base station BS should be the same as the value of the corresponding field in the access and authorization response packet.
  • the message integrity check code MIC is calculated by the integrity key derived from the authorization key AK corresponding to the authorization key identifier AKID, and the authorization key AK is Authorization key material AKM, the mobile terminal select a random number N MS MS and BS selected by the random number N BS common export.
  • the content of the certificate authentication request packet further includes: the ciphertext E of the authorization key material AKM selected by the base station and encrypted by the public key of the mobile terminal.
  • MS (AKM)
  • the content of the certificate authentication response packet further includes: a ciphertext E MS (AKM) of the authorization key material AKM selected by the base station and encrypted by the public key of the mobile terminal.
  • the content of the access and authorization response packet further includes: a message integrity check code MIC, and the integrity of the message integrity check code MIC is determined by the authorization key AKID corresponding to the authorization key AK. key calculation, the authorization key AK AKM, the mobile terminal select a random number N MS MS and BS selected by a random number derived by a common BS N authorization key material.
  • the content of the certificate authentication request packet further includes: a digital certificate Cert BS of the base station and a digital signature Sig BS of all previous fields of the base station;
  • the content of the response packet further includes: a digital certificate Cert BS of the base station and an authentication result Result BS ;
  • the content of the access and authorization response packet further includes: a digital certificate Cert BS of the base station and a result Result BS thereof The digital signature of the base station Sig BS .
  • An authorization key update method matching the foregoing network access authentication and authorization method comprising: when performing an authorization key update, the mobile terminal constructs an access and authorization request packet, and groups the access and authorization request Sent to the base station;
  • the base station After receiving the access and authorization request packet, the base station determines, by using the Flag field in the access and authorization request packet, an authorization key update request, and constructs an access and authorization response packet according to the last certificate authentication result. And transmitting the access and authorization response packet to the mobile terminal;
  • the mobile terminal After receiving the access and authorization response packet, the mobile terminal uses the plaintext of the authorization key material AKM decrypted by its own private key, and derives the authorization key AK by using the random number selected by the mobile terminal and the base station.
  • the authorization key AK derives a key encryption key and an integrity check key, constructs an access and authorization confirmation packet, and transmits the access and authorization confirmation packet to the base station.
  • the content of the foregoing access and authorization request packet includes: an identifier field Flag, an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal, an authorization key identifier AKID, a random number N MS selected by the mobile terminal MS, and a message integrity check code MIC.
  • the message integrity check code MIC can protect the integrity of the message, and is calculated by using the integrity key derived by the old authorization key AK;
  • the content of the foregoing access and authorization response packet includes: an identifier field Flag, an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal, an identity ID BS of the base station, an authorization key identifier AKID, an authorization key material selected by the base station and encrypted by the mobile terminal public key AKM
  • the ciphertext E MS (AKM) the validity period of the authorization key LifeAK, the random number N MS selected by the mobile terminal, the random number N BS selected by the base station, and the message integrity check code MIC.
  • the value of the identifier field Flag should be the same as the value of the identifier field in the access and authorization request packet.
  • the value of the authorization key identifier AKID is the same as the authorization key identifier AKID in the access and authorization request packet, and message integrity.
  • the check code MIC is calculated by the integrity key derived from the authorization key AK corresponding to the authorization key identifier AKID, and the authorization key AK passes the authorization key material AKM, the random number N MS selected by the mobile terminal MS, and the base station BS.
  • the selected random numbers N BS are jointly derived.
  • the invention solves the security problem of the mobile terminal accessing the base station in the broadband wireless multimedia network; the two-way identity authentication of the mobile terminal and the base station can be realized, and the one-way identity authentication of the mobile terminal by the base station can be realized.
  • the invention also realizes direct identity authentication between the base station and the mobile terminal; the authorization key negotiation calculation is simple, and a large number of index operations are avoided.
  • the key management uses a message confirmation method, which is simple and easy to implement.
  • the present invention eliminates the need to establish a secure channel between the base station and the authentication server or to utilize other security protocols.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a method for access authentication and authorization according to the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method for updating an authorization key according to the present invention.
  • the two-way authentication between the mobile terminal and the base station or the one-way authentication of the mobile terminal by the base station is completed by the authentication server, and the base station authorizes the mobile terminal according to the authentication result.
  • the implementation steps of the access authentication and authorization method of the present invention are as follows:
  • the mobile terminal When the mobile terminal is physically associated with the base station, the mobile terminal constructs an access and authorization request packet, and The access and authorization request packet is sent to the base station.
  • the content of the access and authorization request packet includes: an identifier field Flag, an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal (MS, Mobile Station), a digital certificate Cert MS of the mobile terminal MS , an authorization key identifier AKID, and a random number N selected by the mobile terminal MS MS .
  • an identifier field Flag an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal (MS, Mobile Station)
  • a digital certificate Cert MS of the mobile terminal MS a digital certificate of the mobile terminal MS
  • an authorization key identifier AKID an authorization key identifier
  • the base station After receiving the access and authorization request packet of the mobile terminal, the base station constructs a certificate authentication request packet, and sends the certificate authentication request packet to an authentication service unit (ASU).
  • ASU authentication service unit
  • the contents of the certificate authentication request packet include: an identification field Flag, a digital certificate of the mobile terminal MS
  • the mobile terminal select a random number N MS MS and a base station (BS, Base Station) select a random number N BS.
  • the value of the identifier field Flag is the same as the value of the identifier field in the access and authorization request packet, and the value of the random number N MS selected by the mobile terminal MS should be the same as the value of the corresponding field in the access and authorization request packet.
  • the content of the certificate authentication request packet further includes: a ciphertext E MS (AKM) of the authorization key material AKM selected by the base station and encrypted by the public key of the mobile terminal MS.
  • ALM ciphertext E MS
  • the content of the certificate authentication request packet further includes: a digital certificate Cert BS of the base station BS and a digital signature Sig BS of the base station BS for all the previous fields.
  • the authentication server After receiving the certificate authentication request packet of the base station, the authentication server authenticates the validity of the mobile terminal certificate, or authenticates the validity of the mobile terminal certificate and the base station certificate. Based on the authentication result, a certificate authentication response packet is constructed, and the certificate authentication response packet is transmitted to the base station.
  • Content certificate authentication response packet comprises: identification field Flag, the mobile terminal MS is a digital certificate Cert Control MS and an authentication result Result MS, the mobile terminal MS to select a random number N MS, BS selected by the BS and the random number N to the authentication server ASU The grouped digital signature Sig ASU .
  • the value of Flag field should be the same as the certificate authentication request identification packet field value, the mobile terminal MS to select a random number N MS and BS selected by the random number N may be chosen to BS certificate authentication request The corresponding fields are the same.
  • the identifier field Flag is identified as one-way authentication
  • the content of the certificate authentication response packet further includes: a ciphertext E MS (AKM) of the authorization key material AKM selected by the base station and encrypted by the public key of the mobile terminal MS.
  • ALM ciphertext E MS
  • the content of the certificate authentication response packet further includes the digital certificate Cert BS of the base station BS and its authentication result Result BS .
  • the base station After receiving the certificate authentication response packet of the authentication server, the base station constructs an access and authorization response packet and sends it to the mobile terminal.
  • the content of the access and authorization response packet includes: an identifier field Flag, an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal MS, an identity ID BS of the base station BS , a digital certificate Cert MS of the mobile terminal MS, and an authentication result Result MS , a signature Sig of the authentication server ASU
  • a series of security association SAs authorized by the ASU and the base station to the mobile terminal including a primary security association SA and multiple static security associations SA, an authorization key identifier AKID, and an authorization key material selected by the base station and encrypted by the mobile terminal MS public key.
  • the ciphertext EMS (AKM) of the AKM the validity period of the authorization key LifeAK, the random number N MS selected by the mobile terminal MS, and the random number N BS selected by the base station BS .
  • the value of the identifier field Flag should be the same as the value of the identifier field in the access and authorization request packet, and the value of the authorization key identifier AKID is the same as the authorization key identifier AKID in the access and authorization request packet.
  • the content of the access and authorization response packet further includes a message integrity check code MIC.
  • the message integrity check code MIC is calculated by the integrity key derived from the authorization key AK corresponding to the authorization key identifier AKID, and the authorization key AK is derived from the authorization key material AKM, the random number N MS selected by the mobile terminal MS, and the base station BS.
  • the selected random numbers N BS are jointly derived.
  • the content of the access and authorization response packet further includes the digital certificate Cert BS of the base station BS , the authentication result Result BS and the digital signature Si gBS of all the previous fields by the base station BS.
  • the mobile terminal After the mobile terminal receives the access and authorization response packet of the base station, the mobile terminal uses the private key to decrypt the plaintext of the authorized key material AKM, and uses the random number selected by the mobile terminal and the base station to derive the authorization key AK, which is authorized.
  • the key AK derives the key encryption key and the integrity check key, constructs an access and authorization confirmation packet, and transmits the access and authorization confirmation packet to the base station.
  • the content of the access and authorization confirmation packet includes: an identifier field Flag, an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal MS, an identity ID BS of the base station BS , an authorization key identifier AKID, a random number N BS selected by the base station BS, and a message integrity check code. MIC.
  • the value of the identifier field Flag is the same as the value of the identifier field in the access and authorization request packet, and the value of the random number N BS selected by the base station BS should be the same as the value of the corresponding field in the access and authorization response packet.
  • the integrity check code MIC is calculated by the integrity key derived from the authorization key AK corresponding to the authorization key identifier AKID, and the authorization key AK is the random number N selected by the authorization key material AKM and the mobile terminal MS.
  • the MS and the random number N BS selected by the base station BS are jointly derived.
  • the implementation steps of the authorization key update method of the present invention are as follows:
  • the mobile terminal constructs an access and authorization request packet, and transmits the access and authorization request packet to the base station.
  • the content of the access and authorization request packet includes: an identifier field Flag, an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal MS, an authorization key identifier AKID, a random number N MS selected by the mobile terminal MS, and a message integrity check code MIC.
  • the message integrity check code MIC protects the integrity of the message and is calculated using the integrity key derived from the old authorization key AK.
  • the base station After receiving the access and authorization request packet of the mobile terminal, the base station determines whether it is an authorization key update request by using the Flag field in the packet, and if it is an authorization key update request, the base station constructs an access and authorization according to the last certificate authentication result. Responding to the packet and sending it to the mobile terminal;
  • the content of the access and authorization response packet includes: an identifier field Flag, an identity ID MS of the mobile terminal MS, an identity ID BS of the base station BS , an authorization key identifier AKID, an authorization key selected by the base station and encrypted by the mobile terminal MS public key.
  • AKM material ciphertext E MS (AKM), valid authorization key LifeAK the mobile terminal MS to select a random number N MS, BS selected by a random number N BS and a message integrity check code MIC.
  • the value of the identifier field Flag should be the same as the value of the identifier field in the access and authorization request packet.
  • the value of the authorization key identifier AKID is the same as the authorization key identifier AKID in the access and authorization request packet, and message integrity.
  • the check code MIC is calculated by the integrity key derived by the authorization key AK corresponding to the authorization key identifier AKID, and the authorization key AK is the random number N MS selected by the authorization key material AKM and the mobile terminal MS.
  • the mobile terminal After the mobile terminal receives the access and authorization response packet of the base station, the mobile terminal uses the private key to decrypt the plaintext of the authorized key material AKM, and uses the random number selected by the mobile terminal and the base station to derive the authorization key AK, which is authorized.
  • the key AK derives the key encryption key and the integrity check key, constructs an access and authorization confirmation packet, and transmits the access and authorization confirmation packet to the base station.
  • the network access authentication and authorization method of the present invention supports updating of an authorization key.
  • one bit of the field Flag may be used to identify an initial access authentication and authorization process or an update of the authorization key.
  • the key update may be performed by the initial access authentication and authorization method, or the key update may be performed by the authorization key update method.
  • the key update can only be performed through the initial access authentication and authorization method.
  • the security of the authorization key update method and the performance of the system are higher.
  • Key management uses message confirmation mode, which is simple and easy to implement. There is no need to establish a secure channel between the base station and the authentication server or to use other security protocols.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Description

一种网络接入鉴别与授权方法以及授权密钥更新方法 本申请要求于 2006 年 9 月 23 日提交中国专利局、 申请号为 200610104678.X、 发明名称为 "一种网络接入鉴别与授权方法以及授权密钥更 新方法 "的中国专利申请的优先权， 其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。 技术领域
本发明涉及一种网络接入鉴别与授权方法以及授权密钥更新方法， 具体 可应用于有线网络以及无线局域网（WLAN)、无线城域网（WMAN)、 宽带无线 多媒体 (BWM)网络等无线网络。
背景技术
无线网络的安全问题远比有线以太网重要。 美国 IEEE (电气及电子工程 师学会）制定了 802.11和 802.16系列标准来增强无线局域网和无线城域网的 安全性， 提供移动终端到基站的安全接入， 中国也在 2003年 5月份颁布了无 线局域网国家标准 GB15629.il , 通常称为 WAPI (无线局域网鉴别与保密基 础架构）协议。 宽带无线多媒体网络融合了数据通信和广播通信， 是一种新的 无线网络体系结构， 同样面临着安全接入和认证授权等安全问题。
美国 IEEE802.i l标准通过 WEP (有线等效保密 )协议实现无线局域网的安 全性， 理论及应用都证明 WEP协议存在严重的安全漏洞。 美国 IEEE虽后补了 802.11i标准以解决 WEP的安全漏洞，但 802. lli标准本身还存在下列缺陷： 不能 实现移动终端与接入点的直接身份鉴别，即 802.11i标准只实现了移动终端和认 证服务器之间的双向认证， 没有实现移动终端与接入点的直接身份鉴别， 需借 助其他安全协议来提高安全性。 例如， 需要在接入点和认证服务器之间借助其 它安全协议来建立安全信道。每一个接入点都要和后台认证服务器事先建立一 条安全信道， 而这条安全信道一般需要手动建立， 不利于系统的扩展。 安全的 可靠性较差， 即由于每一个接入点都要和认证服务器建立安全信道， 该信道的 安全性会影响至整个网络系统。
美国 IEEE提出的无线城域网标准即 IEEE802.16标准，可解决移动终端与基 站的认证问题，但不能防止攻击者冒充基站欺骗移动终端。 因为授权密钥仅通 过移动终端的公钥加密保护，因此，任何人都可以伪造这样的分组而不被发现。
IEEE802.16e标准借鉴 IEEE802.il i标准改进了方案， 但仍不能实现移动终 端与基站的直接身份鉴别。 另外， 在基站和认证服务器之间需事先建立安全信 道， 需借助其他安全协议。 密钥管理釆用时间同步方式， 状态管理复杂， 即新 密钥的启用、禁用都依赖时间判断，在一个分布式系统中维护同步时钟比较复 杂。 系统状态多， 管理复杂。
中国国家标准 GB15629.il , 克服了 WEP协议的一些弊病， 但还存在以下 不足： 仅提供移动终端和接入点的双向身份鉴别， 不支持接入点对移动终端的 单向鉴别， 不能满足仅需单向认证的应用需求。 例如： 在宽带无线多媒体网络 中， 除了要支持基站和移动终端之间的双向鉴别外，还需支持基站对移动终端 的单向鉴别。 此外， 密钥协商过程需进行大量的指数运算， 不仅增加了设备的 计算负担， 而且对系统性能影响较大。
发明内容
本发明提供一种网络接入鉴别与授权方法以及与之匹配的授权密钥更新 方法， 能够解决背景技术中不能实现移动终端与基站的直接身份鉴别， 需借助 其他安全协议， 以及仅提供移动终端和基站的双向身份鉴别， 而不支持基站对 移动终端的单向鉴别的技术问题。
本发明的技术解决方案是：
一种网络接入鉴别与授权方法， 包括：
移动终端物理关联至基站时， 所述移动终端构造接入及授权请求分组， 并 将所述接入及授权请求分组发送给所述基站；
所述基站收到所述接入及授权请求分组后，构造证书鉴别请求分组， 并将 所述证书鉴别请求分组发送给认证服务器；
所述认证服务器收到所述证书鉴别请求分组后 ,鉴别所述移动终端证书的 有效性， 或鉴别所述移动终端证书和基站证书的有效性， 根据鉴别结果， 构造 证书鉴别响应分组， 并将所述证书鉴别响应分组发送给所述基站；
所述基站收到所述证书鉴别响应分组后，构造接入及授权响应分组发送给 所述移动终端；
所述移动终端收到所述接入及授权响应分组后，利用自己的私钥解密的授 权密钥材料 AKM的明文，及利用移动终端和基站选取的随机数推导出授权密 钥 AK, 由所述授权密钥 AK推导出密钥加密密钥和完整性校验密钥， 构造接 入及授权确认分组， 并将所述接入及授权确认分组发送给所述基站。 优选的， 上述接入及授权请求分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端 的身份 IDMS、 移动终端的数字证书 CertMS、 授权密钥标识 AKID及移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS;
上述证书鉴别请求分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、移动终端的数字证书
CertMS、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS, 其 中， 标识字段 Flag的取值与接入及授权请求分组中的标识字段取值相同， 移 动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS取值应该与接入及授权请求分组中的相应字段取 值相同；
上述证书鉴别响应分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、移动终端的数字证书
CertMS及其鉴别结果 ResultMS、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS、 基站 BS选 取的随机数 NBS以及认证服务器对该分组的数字签名 SigASU, 其中， 标识字段 Flag的取值应该与证书鉴别请求分组中的标识字段取值相同，移动终端 MS选 取的随机数 NMS及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS的取值应该与证书鉴别请求中的 对应字段相同；
上述接入及授权响应分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端的身份 IDMS、 基站的身份 IDBS、 移动终端的数字证书 CertMS及其鉴别结果 ResultMS、 认证服务器的签名 SigASU、 基站对移动终端授权的一系列安全关联 SAs、 授权 密钥标识 AKID、 基站选取的并由移动终端公钥加密的 4受权密钥材料 AKM的 密文 EMS (AKM)、 授权密钥的有效期 LifeAK、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS 以及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS, 其中， 标识字段 Flag的值应该与接入及授权 请求分组中的标识字段取值相同，授权密钥标识 AKID的取值与接入及授权请 求分组中的授权密钥标识 AKID相同；
上述接入及授权确认分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端的身份 IDMS、 基站的身份 IDBS、 授权密钥标识 AKID、 基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS以 及消息完整性校验码 MIC, 其中， 标识字段 Flag的取值与接入及授权请求分 组中的标识字段取值相同， 基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS的值应该与接入及授权 响应分组中的对应字段取值相同， 消息完整性校验码 MIC是由授权密钥标识 AKID对应的授权密钥 AK导出的完整性密钥计算， 所述的授权密钥 AK是由 授权密钥材料 AKM、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站 BS选取的随 机数 NBS共同导出。
优选的， 当所述标识字段 Flag标识为单向鉴别时， 所述证书鉴别请求分 组的内容还包括： 所述基站选取的、 由移动终端的公钥加密的授权密钥材料 AKM的密文 EMS (AKM); 所述述证书鉴别响应分组的内容还包括： 所述基站 选取的并由移动终端的公钥加密的授权密钥材料 AKM的密文 EMS(AKM)。
优选的，所述接入及授权响应分组的内容还包括：消息完整性校验码 MIC, 所述的消息完整性校验码 MIC通过授权密钥标识 AKID对应的授权密钥 AK 导出的完整性密钥计算， 所述的授权密钥 AK通过授权密钥材料 AKM、 移动 终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS共同导出。
优选的， 当所述标识字段 Flag标识为双向鉴别时， 所述证书鉴别请求分组 的内容还包括： 所述基站的数字证书 CertBS以及基站对前面所有字段的数字签 名 SigBS; 所述证书鉴别响应分组的内容还包括： 所述基站的数字证书 CertBS及 其鉴别结果 ResultBS; 所述接入及授权响应分组的内容还包括： 所述基站的数 字证书 CertBS及其鉴别结果 ResultBS, 基站的数字签名 SigBS。
一种与上述网络接入鉴别与授权方法匹配的授权密钥更新方法， 包括： 进行授权密钥更新时， 所述移动终端构造接入及授权请求分组， 并将所述 接入及授权请求分组发送给基站；
所述基站收到所述接入及授权请求分组后，通过所述接入及授权请求分组 中的 Flag字段确定为授权密钥更新请求， 则根据上次证书鉴别结果构造接入及 授权响应分组， 并将所述接入及授权响应分组发送给移动终端；
所述移动终端收到所述接入及授权响应分组后，利用自己的私钥解密的授 权密钥材料 AKM的明文，及利用移动终端和基站选取的随机数推导出授权密 钥 AK, 由所述授权密钥 AK推导出密钥加密密钥和完整性校验密钥， 构造接 入及授权确认分组， 并将所述接入及授权确认分组发送给基站。
优选的， 上述接入及授权请求分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端 的身份 IDMS、 授权密钥标识 AKID、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及消息完 整性校验码 MIC。 消息完整性校验码 MIC可以保护消息的完整性， 利用旧的授 权密钥 AK导出的完整性密钥计算； 上述接入及授权响应分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端的身份 IDMS、 基站的身份 IDBS、 授权密钥标识 AKID、 基站选取的并由移动终端公钥 加密的授权密钥材料 AKM的密文 EMS(AKM)、 授权密钥的有效期 LifeAK、 移 动终端选取的随机数 NMS、基站选取的随机数 NBS以及消息完整性校验码 MIC。 其中， 标识字段 Flag的取值应该与接入及授权请求分组中的标识字段取值相 同， 授权密钥标识 AKID的值与接入及授权请求分组中的授权密钥标识 AKID 相同， 消息完整性校验码 MIC通过授权密钥标识 AKID对应的授权密钥 AK 导出的完整性密钥计算， 所述的授权密钥 AK通过授权密钥材料 AKM、 移动 终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS共同导出。
本发明解决了宽带无线多媒体网络中移动终端接入基站的安全问题；既可 实现移动终端和基站的双向身份鉴别，又可实现基站对移动终端的单向身份鉴 另' J。本发明也实现了基站和移动终端的直接身份鉴别；授权密钥协商计算简单， 避免了大量的指数运算。 在本发明中， 密钥管理釆用消息确认方式， 简单易实 现。此外， 本发明无需在基站和认证服务器之间事先建立安全信道或需借助其 他安全协议。
附图说明
图 1为本发明接入鉴别与授权方法的示意图；
图 2为本发明授权密钥更新方法的示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图 ,对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清 楚、 完整地描述， 显然， 所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例， 而不是 全部的实施例。基于本发明中的实施例， 本领域普通技术人员在没有作出创造 性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例， 都属于本发明保护的范围。
当移动终端物理关联至基站时，通过认证服务器完成移动终端与基站之间 的双向鉴别或基站对移动终端的单向鉴别，基站根据鉴别结果对移动终端进行 授权。
参见图 1 , 本发明接入鉴别与授权方法的实现步骤如下：
110、 构造接入及授权请求分组：
移动终端物理关联至基站时， 该移动终端构造接入及授权请求分组， 并将 接入及授权请求分组发送给基站。
接入及授权请求分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端（MS, Mobile Station) 的身份 IDMS、 移动终端 MS的数字证书 CertMS、 授权密钥标识 AKID以 及移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS。根据字段 Flag可以区分出单向鉴别或双向鉴 别。
120、 构造证书鉴别请求分组：
基站收到移动终端的接入及授权请求分组后， 基站构造证书鉴别请求分 组， 并将证书鉴别请求分组发送给认证服务器 （ASU, Authentication Service Unit) )。
证书鉴别请求分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、移动终端 MS的数字证书
CertMS、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站（BS， Base Station)选取的 随机数 NBS。其中， 标识字段 Flag的取值与接入及授权请求分组中的标识字段 取值相同，移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS取值应该与接入及授权请求分组中 的相应字段取值相同。
标识字段 Flag标识为单向鉴别时， 证书鉴别请求分组的内容还包括： 基 站选取的、 由移动终端 MS 的公钥加密的授权密钥材料 AKM 的密文 EMS(AKM)。
标识字段 Flag标识为双向鉴别时， 证书鉴别请求分组的内容还包括： 基 站 BS的数字证书 CertBS以及基站 BS对前面所有字段的数字签名 SigBS。
130、 构造证书鉴别响应分组：
认证服务器收到基站的证书鉴别请求分组后， 鉴别移动终端证书的有效 性， 或鉴别移动终端证书和基站证书的有效性。 根据鉴别结果， 构造证书鉴别 响应分组， 并将证书鉴别响应分组发送给基站。
证书鉴别响应分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、移动终端 MS的数字证书 CertMS及其鉴别结果 ResultMS、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS、 基站 BS选 取的随机数 NBS以及认证服务器 ASU对该分组的数字签名 SigASU。 其中， 标 识字段 Flag的取值应该与证书鉴别请求分组中的标识字段取值相同， 移动终 端 MS选取的随机数 NMS及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS的取值应该与证书鉴别 请求中的对应字段相同。 标识字段 Flag标识为单向鉴别时， 证书鉴别响应分组的内容还包括： 基 站选取的并由移动终端 MS 的公钥加密的授权密钥材料 AKM 的密文 EMS(AKM)。
标识字段 Flag标识为双向鉴别时， 证书鉴别响应分组的内容还包括基站 BS的数字证书 CertBS及其鉴别结果 ResultBS。
140、 构造接入及授权响应分组：
基站收到认证服务器的证书鉴别响应分组后 ,构造接入及授权响应分组发 送给移动终端。
接入及授权响应分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端 MS 的身份 IDMS、 基站 BS的身份 IDBS、 移动终端 MS的数字证书 CertMS及其鉴别结果 ResultMS、 认证服务器 ASU的签名 SigASU、基站对移动终端授权的一系列安全 关联 SAs, 包括一个主安全关联 SA和多个静态安全关联 SA、 授权密钥标识 AKID、 基站选取的并由移动终端 MS公钥加密的授权密钥材料 AKM的密文 EMS(AKM), 授权密钥的有效期 LifeAK、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及 基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS。 其中， 标识字段 Flag的值应该与接入及授权请求 分组中的标识字段取值相同，授权密钥标识 AKID的取值与接入及授权请求分 组中的授权密钥标识 AKID相同。
标识字段 Flag标识为单向鉴别时， 接入及授权响应分组的内容还包括消 息完整性校验码 MIC。 消息完整性校验码 MIC由授权密钥标识 AKID对应的 授权密钥 AK导出的完整性密钥计算， 授权密钥 AK由授权密钥材料 AKM、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS共同导出。
标识字段 Flag标识为双向鉴别时， 接入及授权响应分组的内容还包括基 站 BS的数字证书 CertBS、鉴别结果 ResultBS及其基站 BS对前面所有字段的数 字签名 SigBS。
150、 构造接入及授权确认分组：
移动终端收到基站的接入及授权响应分组后，移动终端利用自己的私钥解 密的授权密钥材料 AKM的明文， 并利用移动终端和基站选取的随机数推导出 授权密钥 AK, 由授权密钥 AK推导出密钥加密密钥和完整性校验密钥， 构造 接入及授权确认分组， 并将接入及授权确认分组发送给基站。 接入及授权确认分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端 MS 的身份 IDMS、基站 BS的身份 IDBS、授权密钥标识 AKID、基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS 以及消息完整性校验码 MIC。 其中， 标识字段 Flag的取值与接入及授权请求 分组中的标识字段取值相同， 基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS的值应该与接入及授 权响应分组中的对应字段取值相同， 消息完整性校验码 MIC是由授权密钥标 识 AKID对应的授权密钥 AK导出的完整性密钥计算，所述的授权密钥 AK是 由授权密钥材料 AKM、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站 BS选取的 随机数 NBS共同导出。
如图 2所示， 本发明授权密钥更新方法的实现步骤如下：
210、 构造接入及授权请求分组：
进行授权密钥更新时， 该移动终端构造接入及授权请求分组， 并将接入及 授权请求分组发送给基站。
接入及授权请求分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端 MS 的身份 IDMS、 授权密钥标识 AKID、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及消息完整性 校验码 MIC。 消息完整性校验码 MIC可保护消息的完整性， 利用旧的授权密 钥 AK导出的完整性密钥计算。
220、 构造接入及授权响应分组：
基站收到移动终端的接入及授权请求分组后， 通过该分组中的 Flag字段 判断是否为授权密钥更新请求， 如果是授权密钥更新请求，基站根据上次证书 鉴别结果构造接入及授权响应分组， 并将其发送给移动终端；
接入及授权响应分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端 MS 的身份 IDMS、 基站 BS的身份 IDBS、 授权密钥标识 AKID、 基站选取的并由移动终端 MS 公钥加密的授权密钥材料 AKM 的密文 EMS(AKM)、 授权密钥的有效期 LifeAK、移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS、基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS以及消息 完整性校验码 MIC。 其中， 标识字段 Flag的取值应该与接入及授权请求分组 中的标识字段取值相同，授权密钥标识 AKID的值与接入及授权请求分组中的 授权密钥标识 AKID相同， 消息完整性校验码 MIC是由授权密钥标识 AKID 对应的授权密钥 AK导出的完整性密钥计算，所述的授权密钥 AK是由授权密 钥材料 AKM、移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS 共同导出。
230、 构造接入及授权确认分组：
移动终端收到基站的接入及授权响应分组后，移动终端利用自己的私钥解 密的授权密钥材料 AKM的明文， 并利用移动终端和基站选取的随机数推导出 授权密钥 AK, 由授权密钥 AK推导出密钥加密密钥和完整性校验密钥， 构造 接入及授权确认分组， 并将接入及授权确认分组发送给基站。
本发明的网络接入鉴别与授权方法支持授权密钥的更新。具体可利用字段 Flag的一个比特位标识初始接入鉴别与授权过程或授权密钥的更新。
需要密钥更新时， 可以通过初始接入鉴别与授权方法进行密钥更新，也可 以通过授权密钥更新方法进行密钥更新。
移动终端物理关联至基站时，只能通过初始接入鉴别与授权方法进行密钥 更新。 授权密钥更新方法的安全性及系统的性能更高。
本发明具有以下优点：
( 1 )解决了宽带无线多媒体网络中移动终端接入基站的安全问题。
( 2 )既可实现移动终端和基站的双向身份鉴别， 又可实现基站对移动终 端的单向身份鉴别。
( 3 ) 实现了基站和移动终端的直接身份鉴别；
( 4 )授权密钥协商计算简单， 避免了大量的指数运算；
( 5 ) 密钥管理釆用消息确认方式， 简单易实现。 无需在基站和认证服务 器之间事先建立安全信道或需借助其他安全协议。
上述实施例是用于说明和解释本发明的原理的。可以理解， 本发明的具体 实施方式不限于此。对于本领域技术人员而言，在不脱离本发明的实质和范围 的前提下进行的各种变更和修改均涵盖在本发明的保护范围之内。 因此， 本发 明的保护范围由权利要求确定。

Claims

权 利 要 求
1.一种网络接入鉴别与授权方法， 其特征在于， 包括：
移动终端物理关联至基站时， 所述移动终端构造接入及授权请求分组， 并 将所述接入及授权请求分组发送给所述基站；
所述基站收到所述接入及授权请求分组后，构造证书鉴别请求分组， 并将 所述证书鉴别请求分组发送给认证服务器；
所述认证服务器收到所述证书鉴别请求分组后 ,鉴别所述移动终端证书的 有效性， 或鉴别所述移动终端证书和基站证书的有效性， 根据鉴别结果， 构造 证书鉴别响应分组， 并将所述证书鉴别响应分组发送给所述基站；
所述基站收到所述证书鉴别响应分组后，构造接入及授权响应分组发送给 所述移动终端；
所述移动终端收到所述接入及授权响应分组后，利用自己的私钥解密的授 权密钥材料 AKM的明文，及利用移动终端和基站选取的随机数推导出授权密 钥 AK, 由所述授权密钥 AK推导出密钥加密密钥和完整性校验密钥， 构造接 入及授权确认分组， 并将所述接入及授权确认分组发送给所述基站。
2.根据权利要求 1所述的网络接入鉴别与授权方法， 其特征在于： 所述接入及授权请求分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端的身份 IDMS、 移动终端的数字证书 CertMS、 授权密钥标识 AKID及移动终端 MS选取 的随机数 NMS;
所述证书鉴别请求分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、移动终端的数字证书
CertMS、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS;
所述证书鉴别响应分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、移动终端的数字证书 CertMS及其鉴别结果 ResultMS、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS、 基站 BS选 取的随机数 NBS以及认证服务器对该分组的数字签名 SigASU;
所述接入及授权响应分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端的身份
IDMS、 基站的身份 IDBS、 移动终端的数字证书 CertMS及其鉴别结果 ResultMS、 认证服务器的签名 SigASU、 基站对移动终端授权的一系列安全关联 SAs、 授权 密钥标识 AKID、 基站选取的并由移动终端公钥加密的 4受权密钥材料 AKM的 密文 EMS(AKM)、 授权密钥的有效期 LifeAK、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS 以及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS;
所述的接入及授权确认分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、移动终端的身份 IDMS、 基站的身份 IDBS、 授权密钥标识 AKID、 基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS以 及消息完整性校验码 MIC。
3.根据权利要求 2所述的网络接入鉴别与授权方法， 其特征在于： 当所述 标识字段 Flag标识为单向鉴别时，
所述证书鉴别请求分组的内容还包括： 所述基站选取的、 由移动终端的公 钥加密的授权密钥材料 AKM的密文 EMS(AKM); 及
所述证书鉴别响应分组的内容还包括： 所述基站选取的， 并由移动终端的 公钥加密的授权密钥材料 AKM的密文 EMS(AKM)。
4.根据权利要求 3所述的网络接入鉴别与授权方法， 其特征在于： 所述接入及授权响应分组的内容还包括： 消息完整性校验码 MIC, 所述 的消息完整性校验码 MIC通过授权密钥标识 AKID对应的授权密钥 AK导出 的完整性密钥计算， 所述的授权密钥 AK通过授权密钥材料 AKM、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS共同导出。
5.根据权利要求 2所述的网络接入鉴别与授权方法， 其特征在于： 当所述 标识字段 Flag标识为双向鉴别时，
所述证书鉴别请求分组的内容还包括：所述基站的数字证书 CertBS以及基 站对前面所有字段的数字签名 SigBS:
所述证书鉴别响应分组的内容还包括：所述基站的数字证书 CertBS及其鉴 别结果 ResultBS, ；
所述接入及授权响应分组的内容还包括：所述基站的数字证书 CertBS及其 鉴别结果 ResultBS, 基站的数字签名 SigBS。
6.—种如权利要求 1所述网络接入鉴别与授权方法的授权密钥更新方法， 其特征在于， 包括：
进行授权密钥更新时， 所述移动终端构造接入及授权请求分组， 并将所述 接入及授权请求分组发送给基站；
所述基站收到所述接入及授权请求分组后，通过所述接入及授权请求分组 中的 Flag字段确定为授权密钥更新请求， 则根据上次证书鉴别结果构造接入 及授权响应分组， 并将所述接入及授权响应分组发送给移动终端； 所述移动终端收到所述接入及授权响应分组后，利用自己的私钥解密的授 权密钥材料 AKM的明文，及利用移动终端和基站选取的随机数推导出授权密 钥 AK, 由所述授权密钥 AK推导出密钥加密密钥和完整性校验密钥， 构造接 入及授权确认分组， 并将所述接入及授权确认分组发送给基站。
7.根据权利要求 6所述的授权密钥更新方法， 其特征在于：
所述接入及授权请求分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、 移动终端的身份 IDMS、 授权密钥标识 AKID、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及消息完整性校 验码 MIC; 消息完整性校验码 MIC可保护消息的完整性，利用旧的授权密钥 AK 导出的完整性密钥计算；
所述的接入及授权响应分组的内容包括： 标识字段 Flag、移动终端的身份 IDMS、 基站的身份 IDBS、 授权密钥标识 AKID、 基站选取的并由移动终端公钥 加密的授权密钥材料 AKM的密文 EMS(AKM)、 授权密钥的有效期 LifeAK、 移 动终端选取的随机数 NMS、基站选取的随机数 NBS以及消息完整性校验码 MIC; 消息完整性校验码 MIC通过授权密钥标识 AKID对应的授权密钥 AK导出的 完整性密钥计算， 所述的授权密钥 AK通过授权密钥材料 AKM、 移动终端 MS选取的随机数 NMS以及基站 BS选取的随机数 NBS共同导出。
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