WO2010115326A1 - 一种无线局域网终端的预鉴别方法及无线局域网系统 - Google Patents

一种无线局域网终端的预鉴别方法及无线局域网系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2010115326A1
WO2010115326A1 PCT/CN2009/073377 CN2009073377W WO2010115326A1 WO 2010115326 A1 WO2010115326 A1 WO 2010115326A1 CN 2009073377 W CN2009073377 W CN 2009073377W WO 2010115326 A1 WO2010115326 A1 WO 2010115326A1
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destination
current
certificate
authentication
sta
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PCT/CN2009/073377
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
刘家兵
施元庆
梁洁辉
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中兴通讯股份有限公司
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First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=41095556&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=WO2010115326(A1) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Application filed by 中兴通讯股份有限公司 filed Critical 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority to US13/257,749 priority Critical patent/US8533461B2/en
Priority to EP09842887.3A priority patent/EP2418883B1/en
Publication of WO2010115326A1 publication Critical patent/WO2010115326A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/047—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] without using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0471—Key exchange
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/062—Pre-authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of wireless local area networks, and in particular to a method for pre-authentication of a wireless local area network terminal supporting a wireless local area network authentication and privacy infrastructure (WAPI) and a wireless local area network system.
  • WAPI wireless local area network authentication and privacy infrastructure
  • wireless network security mainly uses the security mechanism in the wireless local area network standard (IEEE 802.11) developed by IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), which uses WEP (Wried Equivalent Privacy). Privacy), this mechanism has been widely proven to have no equivalent security to wired networks, posing a huge security risk to wireless LANs.
  • IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network standard
  • WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
  • the WAPI consists of a Wireless Office i or a WLAN Authentication Infrastructure (WAI) and a WLAN Privacy Infrastructure (WPI).
  • WAI preclude the bidirectional authentication (certificate with a public key certificate based on an elliptic curve system, a wireless station (STA) and an access point (Access Point, abbreviated AP) by Kam 1 J another server (Authentication Server, referred to as AS) Identification).
  • AS Authentication Server
  • the WAPI mechanism mainly involves the following three entities: a wireless station (STA), a wireless access point (AP), and an authentication server. If the STA wants to associate with the AP and transmit data securely, it should complete two parts: one is to complete the certificate authentication process, and generate the base key in the process; the second is based on the base key. Perform key negotiation, including unicast key negotiation and group key advertisement. As shown in Figure 1, the following steps are specifically included:
  • the AP sends an authentication activation packet to the STA to start a certificate authentication process.
  • the authentication activation packet contains: AP's certificate, ECDH (Diffie-Hellman exchange parameter of elliptic curve cryptosystem) and other fields.
  • the STA After receiving the authentication activation packet, the STA saves the AP certificate, and is used to verify the signature of the AP in subsequent operations, and generates a temporary private key sx and a temporary public key x for ECDH exchange;
  • the STA generates an access authentication request packet, and sends the packet to the AP.
  • the access authentication request packet includes: a temporary public key px, a certificate of the STA, and the like, and a signature value of the STA for the above field.
  • the AP After receiving the access authentication request packet, the AP verifies the signature of the STA (using the public key included in the STA certificate), and if the verification is unsuccessful, discards the packet; otherwise, the AP generates a certificate authentication request packet and sends the identifier to the authentication.
  • the AP After receiving the access authentication request packet, the AP verifies the signature of the STA (using the public key included in the STA certificate), and if the verification is unsuccessful, discards the packet; otherwise, the AP generates a certificate authentication request packet and sends the identifier to the authentication.
  • the certificate authentication request packet includes: a certificate of the STA and a certificate of the AP.
  • the authentication server After receiving the certificate authentication request packet, the authentication server verifies the STA certificate and the AP certificate;
  • the authentication server includes the verification result of the certificate of the STA and the certificate of the AP in the configuration certificate authentication response packet, and attaches the signature of the authentication server to the AP;
  • the AP verifies the signature of the authentication server. After the signature verification succeeds, the authentication result of the authentication server is further verified. After the verification succeeds, the following operations are performed:
  • 107a Generate a temporary private key sy and a temporary public key y for ECDH exchange;
  • 107b Perform an ECDH calculation using the temporary public key x sent by the STA and the locally generated temporary private key sy to generate a base key (BK).
  • the AP sends an access authentication response packet to the STA.
  • the access authentication response packet includes: a temporary public key py, a certificate verification result, an authentication server signature, and an AP's signature on the above field.
  • the STA After receiving the access authentication response packet, the STA verifies the AP signature and authenticates the server signature. And the certificate verification result, if the AP signature and the authentication server signature are correct, and the authentication server successfully authenticates the AP, the STA uses the temporary public key y and the temporary private key sx to perform ECDH calculation to generate BK.
  • the STA and the AP generate the same BK according to the above method.
  • the STA and the AP complete the two-way identity authentication (ie, certificate authentication), and establish a BKSA (Base Key Security Association).
  • the BKSA contains parameters such as BK and BKID (base key identifier).
  • the AP sends a unicast key negotiation request packet to the STA.
  • the unicast key negotiation request packet includes: BKID, ADDID, and the like, where:
  • the BKID is an identifier that the AP and the STA previously negotiated to obtain the BK;
  • the ADDID is composed of the MAC (Media Access Control) address of the AP and the STA;
  • a random number generated for the AP is a random number generated for the AP.
  • the STA After receiving the unicast key negotiation request packet, the STA generates a random number N 2 and then calculates:
  • BK is the base key identified by the above BKID
  • KD-HMAC-SHA256 is the HMAC (Hash Message Authentication Code) algorithm based on the SHA256 algorithm, which is a keyed HASH (hash) algorithm.
  • String is a pre-set string, the current standard is "pairwise key expansion for unicast and additional keys and nonce”
  • II means string concatenation operation
  • "ADDIDIIN!IIN ⁇ I String” is KD-HMAC-SHA256 The character parameters used by the algorithm.
  • the STA After calculating the Key, the STA extracts 64 bytes of it as a unicast session key (USK), which contains: 16-byte unicast encryption key, 16-byte unicast integrity check key , 16-byte message authentication key, 16-byte key encryption key.
  • USK unicast session key
  • Step 112 The STA sends a unicast key negotiation response packet to the AP.
  • the unicast key negotiation response packet includes parameters such as BKID and random number N 2 .
  • the AP calculates after receiving the unicast key negotiation response packet:
  • the AP and the STA complete the negotiation process of the unicast session key and establish the USKSA (Unicast Session Key Security Association).
  • USKSA Unicast Session Key Security Association
  • the AP sends a multicast key advertisement packet to the STA.
  • the multicast key advertisement packet includes: ADDID, key data, message authentication code, and the like.
  • the key data field is a ciphertext encrypted by the AP by using the key encryption key and using the unicast cryptographic algorithm selected by the AP and the STA to negotiate the unicast cipher;
  • the advertised master key is a 16-byte random generated by the AP. number.
  • the message authentication code is the data calculated by the AP using the message authentication key and using the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm for all protocol data fields before the field.
  • the STA After receiving the multicast key advertisement packet, the STA checks the message authentication code, decrypts the key data to obtain the advertisement master key, and uses the KD-HMAC-SHA256 algorithm to perform the notification master key. Expand to get the multicast key.
  • the STA sends a multicast key response packet to the AP to complete the multicast key notification process.
  • the STA may initiate the pre-authentication process after completing the negotiation of the unicast session key with the currently associated AP and installing the key.
  • the authentication unit of the STA sends a pre-authentication start packet to activate the pre-authentication process
  • the DA (destination address) of the packet is the BSSID (Basic Service Set Identifier) of the destination AP
  • the RA (source address) is currently associated.
  • the destination AP shall use its own BSSID as the MAC (Media Access Control) address of the AP discriminator unit.
  • the currently associated ⁇ bridges the pre-authentication packet sent by the STA to the DS (Distribution System), and receives it through the DS.
  • the destination AP to the pre-authentication start packet and the corresponding STA start the certificate authentication process. If the WAI certificate authentication process is successful, the pre-authentication result is BKSA (Base Key Security Association). After the STA associates with the destination AP that completes the pre-authentication, the BKSA can be used to perform the unicast key negotiation and multicast key advertisement process.
  • BKSA Basic Key Security Association
  • the existing pre-authentication method in WAPI is to reduce the handover delay by mutual authentication and key agreement between the STA and the AP.
  • the existing pre-authentication method has the following disadvantages: When the STA and the destination AP perform pre-authentication, the complete certificate authentication process and the key negotiation process are still required, and the pre-authentication process is complicated; When authentication, it takes more time, occupies too much bandwidth resources, and indirectly increases the handover delay of the STA.
  • the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to overcome the deficiencies of the prior art and provide a pre-authentication method and a wireless local area network system that can quickly complete pre-authentication of a wireless local area network terminal and occupy less bandwidth resources.
  • the present invention provides a pre-authentication method for a wireless local area network terminal, the method comprising:
  • the current access point AP After receiving the pre-authentication start packet sent by the STA, the current access point AP that has established a security association with the STA performs interaction with the destination AP to perform mutual authentication of the mutual certificate.
  • the current AP sends the key information of the security association established by the current AP to the destination AP, and the destination AP saves the key.
  • the key information includes a base key generated by the STA and the current AP.
  • the current AP and the destination AP perform mutual authentication of the mutual certificate in the following manner: the current AP sends a pre-authentication initiation packet to the destination AP; the packet includes: the current AP certificate and the current The signature of the AP;
  • the destination AP After receiving the pre-authentication initiation packet, the destination AP verifies the signature of the current AP, and sends a certificate authentication request packet to the authentication server after the signature verification succeeds; the packet includes: Declaring a certificate of the current AP, a certificate of the destination AP, and a signature of the destination AP;
  • the authentication server After receiving the certificate authentication request packet, the authentication server verifies the signature of the destination AP, and after verifying the signature, the certificate of the current AP and the certificate of the destination AP are verified, and the certificate verification result and the authentication server are verified.
  • the signature is sent to the destination AP and the current AP in a certificate authentication response packet.
  • the key information further includes a unicast session key generated by the STA in negotiation with the current AP.
  • the destination AP After receiving the key information, the destination AP further uses the unicast session key to negotiate with the STA to generate a multicast key.
  • the AP releases the link relationship with the destination AP, and notifies the STA that the destination AP is an illegal AP.
  • the present invention further provides a wireless local area network system, the system comprising: a STA, a current AP that has established a security association with the STA, and a destination AP that supports the pre-authentication function;
  • the current AP is configured to perform interaction with the target AP after receiving the pre-authentication start packet sent by the STA, and perform mutual authentication of the two certificates;
  • the current AP is further configured to send the key information of the security association established by the current AP to the destination AP to the destination AP; Key information
  • the key information includes a base key generated by the STA and the current AP.
  • system further includes an authentication server, where the current AP and the destination AP perform mutual authentication of the two certificates in the following manner:
  • the current AP sends a pre-authentication initiation packet to the destination AP;
  • the packet includes: a certificate of the current AP and a signature of the current AP;
  • the destination AP After receiving the pre-authentication initiation packet, the destination AP verifies the signature of the current AP, and sends a certificate authentication request packet to the authentication server after the signature verification succeeds; the packet includes: the current AP certificate, the The certificate of the destination AP and the signature of the destination AP; After receiving the certificate authentication request packet, the authentication server verifies the signature of the destination AP, and after verifying the signature, the certificate of the current AP and the certificate of the destination AP are verified, and the certificate verification result and the authentication server are verified. The signature is sent to the destination AP and the current AP in a certificate authentication response packet.
  • the key information further includes a unicast session key generated by the STA and the current AP in negotiation;
  • the destination AP is further configured to: after receiving the key information, use the unicast session key to negotiate with the STA to generate a multicast key.
  • the present invention is based on the WAPI ternary security architecture idea, and uses the established security association to perform identity authentication (certificate verification) on the untrusted AP. After the identity authentication is completed, the current AP will use the key information (mainly the secret key). The key is sent to the destination AP.
  • identity authentication certificate verification
  • the key information mainly the secret key.
  • the key is sent to the destination AP.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method for pre-authentication of a wireless local area network terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a format of a pre-authentication packet
  • FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing the structure of a wireless local area network system in which the above method of the present invention can be implemented.
  • the core idea of the present invention is that the AP that has established a security association with the STA (for the current AP) receives the pre-authentication start packet sent by the STA, and then authenticates the certificate of the pre-authenticated AP through the authentication server. After the certificate is successfully verified.
  • the current AP sends the key information of the security association associated with the STA to the destination AP.
  • the destination AP saves the key information and completes the pre-authentication.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method for pre-authentication of a wireless local area network terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention, including the following steps:
  • the STA After the STA establishes a security association with the current AP, when the signal strength of the current AP is lower than a preset threshold when moving in the ESS (Extended Service Set), the STA starts to actively or passively scan the AP.
  • ESS Extended Service Set
  • the STA determines, according to the WAPI information element field in the Beacon frame or the Probe Response frame, whether the scanned AP supports pre-authentication, and establishes an AP priority list according to the signal strength of the AP that supports the pre-authentication. The AP with the highest priority is used as the destination AP, and then the pre-authentication start packet is sent to the current AP.
  • the pre-authentication packet is in the format defined by the WAPI protocol, as shown in Figure 3.
  • the specific content can be referred to.
  • the ADDID field has a length of 12 bytes, and the value of the field is composed of the MAC address of the initiator STA and the MAC address of the destination AP.
  • the AP After receiving the pre-authentication start packet, the AP sends a pre-authentication initiation packet to the destination AP through the DS (Distributed System) to activate the certificate authentication process.
  • DS Distributed System
  • the pre-authentication start packet includes: information about the current AP certificate, the STA and the current AP's MAC address, and the current AP's signature.
  • the AP After receiving the pre-authentication initiation packet, the AP verifies the signature of the current AP, and after the verification succeeds, sends a certificate authentication request packet to the authentication server for identity authentication.
  • the certificate authentication request packet includes: the MAC address of the destination AP, the MAC address of the current AP, the certificate of the destination AP, and the certificate of the current AP.
  • the authentication server After receiving the certificate authentication request packet, the authentication server verifies the destination AP certificate and the current AP certificate, and includes the verification result of the destination AP certificate and the current AP certificate in the certificate authentication response packet, and attaches the authentication server. Signature, sent to the destination AP.
  • the destination AP After receiving the certificate authentication response packet, the destination AP verifies the signature of the authentication server, and if the signature is incorrect, discards the certificate authentication response packet; otherwise, checks the current AP certificate authentication result, and if the current AP certificate is valid, The response response packet is sent to the current AP.
  • the pre-authentication response packet includes: a signature of the destination AP, a signature of the authentication server, and a certificate verification result of the destination AP.
  • the current AP After receiving the pre-authentication response packet, the current AP verifies that the signature of the destination AP and the signature of the authentication server are correct. If any signature is incorrect, the packet is discarded; otherwise, the destination AP is checked according to the certificate verification result of the destination AP.
  • the certificate is valid, if it is invalid, the link relationship between the two APs is released and the STA is notified that the destination AP is illegal. If the above checks are passed, the key information in the security association established between the STA and the STA is sent to the destination through the DS. AP;
  • the key information includes: BKSA parameters such as BKID (base key identifier) and BK (base key); in addition, the key information may further include: USKID (unicast session key identifier), USK (unicast session secret) Key) and other USKSA parameters.
  • BKSA parameters such as BKID (base key identifier) and BK (base key); in addition, the key information may further include: USKID (unicast session key identifier), USK (unicast session secret) Key) and other USKSA parameters.
  • the destination AP After receiving the key information, the destination AP encrypts the announcement master key (NMK) by using a key encryption key (KEK) in the unicast session key to generate key data, and uses the message authentication key to calculate
  • the message authentication code includes the key data and the message authentication code and is sent to the STA in the multicast key advertisement packet.
  • the STA After receiving the multicast key advertisement packet, the STA checks the message authentication code, decrypts the key data to obtain the advertisement master key, and uses the KD-HMAC-SHA256 algorithm to perform the notification master key. Extended, generate a multicast key (which includes a 16-byte multicast encryption key and a 16-byte integrity check key).
  • the STA sends a multicast key response packet to the destination AP to complete the multicast key advertisement process.
  • the destination AP sends a pre-authentication completion packet to the current AP through the DS, and informs the current AP that the pre-authentication has been completed.
  • the above embodiment may also have various transformation manners, for example:
  • the current AP may send the BKSA parameter only to the destination AP, and the destination AP uses the BK in the BKSA to negotiate with the STA to generate a new USK.
  • the unicast session key negotiation may also be performed after the STA switches to the destination AP.
  • the destination AP and the STA may not negotiate the multicast key in the pre-authentication process. After the STA switches to the destination AP, the multicast key is negotiated.
  • the destination AP may directly send a pre-authentication response packet including the destination AP certificate to the current AP, and the current AP sends the authentication packet to the authentication server.
  • the public key can be used to authenticate the other party's certificate without sending it to the authentication server.
  • the public key it is impossible to prove whether the other party's certificate has been revoked.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a wireless local area network system that can implement the above method of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 4, the system includes: a STA, a current AP that has established a security association with the STA, and a destination AP that supports a pre-authentication function; among them:
  • the current AP is configured to perform interaction with the destination AP after receiving the pre-authentication start packet sent by the STA, and perform mutual authentication of the two certificates;
  • the current AP is further configured to send the key information of the security association established by the current AP to the destination AP to the destination AP; Key information
  • the key information includes a base key generated by the STA and the current AP.
  • connection relationships (message interaction relationships) of the NEs in the system shown in Figure 4 are described in the description of the process shown in Figure 2, and are not described here.
  • the invention is based on the WAPI ternary security architecture idea, and uses the established security association to perform identity authentication (certificate verification) on the untrusted AP. After the identity authentication is completed, the current AP sends the key information (mainly the base key) to the destination. AP; Through this optimized pre-authentication method, the interaction process between the network elements is reduced without reducing the security performance of the system, and the wireless local area terminal is quickly pre-authenticated.

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
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Description

一种无线局域网终端的预鉴别方法及无线局域网系统
技术领域
本发明涉及无线局域网领域， 尤其涉及一种支持无线局域网认证与保密 基础结构（ WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure , 简称 WAPI )的无 线局域网终端的预鉴别方法及无线局域网系统。
背景技术
目前无线网络安全主要釆用 IEEE ( Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers , 电气和电子工程师协会 )制订的无线局域网标准（ IEEE 802.11 ) 中的安全机制，该机制釆用了 WEP( Wried Equivalent Privacy,有线等效隐私）， 这种机制已被广泛证明不具备与有线网络等效的安全性， 给无线局域网带来 了巨大的安全隐患。
在这种情况下， 中国在 2003 年 5 月份提出了无线局域网国家标准 GB15629.i l , 其中引入一种全新的安全机制， 即 WAPI ( Wireless Local Area Network Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure , 无线局域网鉴另 ll与保密基石出 结构） 来增强无线局域网的安全性， 并于 2006 年发布了改进版国家标准 ( GB15629.11-2003/XG1-2006 ) 。
WAPI由无线局 i或网鉴别基础结构 （ WLAN Authentication Infrastructure , 简称 WAI )和无线局域网保密基础结构 （ WLAN Privacy Infrastructure, 简称 WPI )组成。其中， WAI釆用基于椭圓曲线的公钥证书体制，无线站点（STA ) 和接入点 （ Access Point, 简称 AP )通过鉴另1 J服务器（ Authentication Server, 简称 AS )进行双向身份鉴别 （证书鉴别） 。 而在对传输数据的保密方面， WPI釆用了国家商用密码管理委员会办公室提供的对称密码算法 SMS4进行 加密和解密， 来保障数据传输的安全。
WAPI机制中主要涉及以下三个实体：无线站点（ STA )、无线接入点（ AP ) 及鉴别服务器。 STA若想和 AP建立关联并安全传输数据， 应该完成两部分 工作： 一是完成证书鉴别过程， 并在该过程中产生基密钥； 二是基于基密钥 进行密钥协商， 包括单播密钥协商及组密钥通告； 如图 1所示， 具体包括以 下步骤：
101 : AP向 STA发送鉴别激活分组， 以启动证书鉴别过程；
鉴别激活分组中包含： AP 的证书、 ECDH (椭圓曲线密码体制的 Diffie-Hellman (戴菲 -赫曼 ) 交换 )参数等字段。
102: 接收到鉴别激活分组后， STA保存 AP的证书， 在后续操作中用于 对 AP的签名进行验证，并产生用于 ECDH交换的临时私钥 sx和临时公钥 x;
103: STA生成接入鉴别请求分组， 发送给 AP;
接入鉴别请求分组中包含： 临时公钥 px、 STA的证书等字段， 以及 STA 对上述字段的签名值。
104:接收到接入鉴别请求分组后， AP对 STA的签名进行验证（使用 STA 证书中包含的公钥） ， 若验证不成功，则丟弃该分组；否则 AP生成证书鉴别 请求分组发送给鉴别服务器；
证书鉴别请求分组中包含： STA的证书和 AP的证书。
105: 接收到证书鉴别请求分组后， 鉴别服务器对 STA的证书和 AP的证 书进行验证；
106:鉴别服务器将其对 STA的证书和 AP的证书的验证结果包含在构造 证书鉴别响应分组中， 并附加鉴别服务器的签名， 发送给 AP;
107: AP验证鉴别服务器的签名， 签名验 i正成功后， 进一步验证鉴别服务 器对 STA的证书的验证结果， 验证成功后， 执行以下操作：
107a: 生成用于 ECDH交换的临时私钥 sy和临时公钥 y;
107b:使用 STA发送的临时公钥 x和本地生成的临时私钥 sy进行 ECDH 计算， 生成基密钥 （BK ) 。
108: AP向 STA发送接入鉴别响应分组；
接入鉴别响应分组中包含： 临时公钥 py, 证书验证结果， 鉴别服务器签 名， 以及 AP对上述字段的签名。
109: 接收到接入鉴别响应分组后， STA验证 AP签名、 鉴别服务器签名 及证书验证结果， 如果 AP签名和鉴别服务器签名都正确， 并且鉴别服务器 对 AP的证书验证成功 , 则 STA使用临时公钥 y和临时私钥 sx进行 ECDH 计算生成 BK。
需要注意的是，根据 ECDH的原理， STA和 AP按照上述方法生成的 BK 相同。
通过以上过程， STA和 AP完成了双向的身份鉴别 （即证书鉴别） ， 并 且建立了 BKSA ( Base Key Security Association, 基密钥安全关联） 。 BKSA 中包含 BK, 以及 BKID (基密钥标识符）等参数。
110: AP向 STA发送单播密钥协商请求分组；
单播密钥协商请求分组中包含： BKID、 ADDID和 等参数， 其中：
BKID为 AP和 STA先前协商得到 BK的标识符；
ADDID由 AP和 STA的 MAC ( Media Access Control, 介质访问控制） 地址组成；
为 AP生成的随机数。
111 : 接收到单播密钥协商请求分组后， STA生成随机数 N2, 然后计算：
Key=KD-HMAC-SHA256(BK, ADDID) |N: | |N2| | String)； 其中：
BK为上述 BKID所标识的基密钥； KD-HMAC-SHA256为基于 SHA256 算法的 HMAC ( Hashed Message Authentication Code,散列信息认证码）算法， 也就是一种带密钥的 HASH (哈希）算法； String为一预先设置的字符串， 当 前标准中为 "pairwise key expansion for unicast and additional keys and nonce"； "II" 表示字符串连接操作， "ADDIDIIN!IIN^I String" 为 KD-HMAC-SHA256 算法所使用的字符参数。
计算得到 Key后， STA提取其中的 64个字节作为单播会话密钥（ USK ) , 其中包含： 16个字节的单播加密密钥， 16个字节的单播完整性校验密钥， 16 个字节的消息鉴别密钥， 16个字节的密钥加密密钥。
112: STA向 AP发送单播密钥协商响应分组；
单播密钥协商响应分组中包含： BKID、 随机数 N2等参数。 113: AP接收到单播密钥协商响应分组后计算：
Key=KD-HMAC-SHA256(BK, ADDIDI |N: | |N2| | String) , 并从中提取 USK。 114: AP向 STA发送单播密钥协商确认分组；
至此， AP和 STA完成了单播会话密钥的协商流程， 建立了 USKSA (单 播会话密钥安全关联） 。
115: AP向 STA发送组播密钥通告分组；
组播密钥通告分组中包含： ADDID、 密钥数据、 消息鉴别码等字段。 密钥数据字段是 AP利用密钥加密密钥、 釆用 AP和 STA协商选择的单 播密码算法对通告主密钥加密后的密文； 通告主密钥是 AP生成的 16个字节 的随机数。
消息鉴别码是 AP利用消息鉴别密钥、 釆用 HMAC-SHA256算法对本字 段之前的所有协议数据字段计算得到的数据。
116: 接收到组播密钥通告分组后， STA对消息鉴别码进行校验， 校验通 过后对密钥数据解密得到通告主密钥， 并使用 KD-HMAC-SHA256算法对通 告主密钥进行扩展， 得到组播密钥。
117: STA向 AP发送组播密钥响应分组， 完成组播密钥通告过程。
在无线局域网中可能存在多个 AP, STA若要从当前 AP切换到目的 AP 需要与目的 AP重新进行证书鉴别过程及密钥协商过程， 这些过程将耗费大 量的时间， 造成切换延迟， 甚至通讯的中断。 为此， WAPI 中提出了预鉴别 方法。
在 WAPI机制中， 若目的 AP支持预鉴别， STA在与当前关联的 AP完成 单播会话密钥的协商并安装密钥后可启动预鉴别过程。 STA的鉴别单元发送 预鉴别开始分组以激活预鉴别过程， 该分组的 DA (目的地址）为目的 AP 的 BSSID ( Basic Service Set ID, 基本服务组标识符） ， RA (源地址）为当前关 联的 AP的 BSSID。目的 AP应釆用自身的 BSSID作为 AP鉴别器单元的 MAC ( Media Access Control , 介质访问控制）地址。 当前关联的 ΑΡ把 STA发送 的预鉴别分组桥接到 DS ( Distribution System, 分布式系统） ， 通过 DS接收 到预鉴别开始分组的目的 AP与对应的 STA开始证书鉴别过程。 如果 WAI 的证书鉴别过程成功， 则预鉴别的结果为 BKSA ( Base Key Security Association, 基密钥安全关联） 。 STA与完成预鉴别的目的 AP进行关联后， 可以利用 BKSA进行单播密钥协商和组播密钥通告过程。
由以上描述可知， WAPI中现有的预鉴别方法是通过 STA与 AP预先进 行相互的身份鉴别和密钥协商来减少切换延迟。
然而， 现有的预鉴别方法存在以下不足： STA与目的 AP进行预鉴别时， 仍然需要进行完整的证书鉴别过程和密钥协商过程， 预鉴别过程较为复杂； 当 STA需要与多个 AP进行预鉴别时， 需要耗费较多时间、 占用过多带宽资 源， 并间接地增加了 STA的切换延迟。
发明内容
本发明所要解决的技术问题是， 克服现有技术的不足， 提供一种可快速 完成无线局域网终端的预鉴别、 且占用较少带宽资源的预鉴别方法及无线局 域网系统。
为了解决上述问题， 本发明提供一种无线局域网终端的预鉴别方法， 该 方法包括：
已与站点 STA建立安全关联的当前接入点 AP在接收到所述 STA发送的 预鉴别开始分组后， 与目的 AP进行交互， 进行双方证书的相互验证；
如果对所述目的 AP的证书的验证结果为证书有效，则所述当前 AP将其 与所述 STA建立的安全关联的密钥信息发送给所述目的 AP,所述目的 AP保 存所述密钥信息；
所述密钥信息中包含 STA与当前 AP协商生成的基密钥。
此外， 所述当前 AP与目的 AP釆用如下方式进行双方证书的相互验证： 所述当前 AP向所述目的 AP发送预鉴别启动分组； 该分组中包含： 所述 当前 AP的证书和所述当前 AP的签名；
接收到预鉴别启动分组后，所述目的 AP对所述当前 AP的签名进行验证， 在签名验证成功后向鉴别服务器发送证书鉴别请求分组； 该分组中包含： 所 述当前 AP的证书、 所述目的 AP的证书以及所述目的 AP的签名；
接收到证书鉴别请求分组后， 鉴别服务器对所述目的 AP 的签名进行验 证，在签名验证成功后对所述当前 AP的证书和所述目的 AP的证书进行验证， 并将证书验证结果和鉴别服务器的签名包含在证书鉴别响应分组中发送给所 述目的 AP和当前 AP。
此外， 所述密钥信息中还包含 STA与所述当前 AP协商生成的单播会话 密钥；
所述目的 AP接收到所述密钥信息后， 还使用所述单播会话密钥与 STA 协商生成组播密钥。
此外， 如果对所述目的 AP 的证书的验证结果为证书无效， 则所述当前
AP解除其与所述目的 AP的链路关系， 并通知 STA所述目的 AP为非法 AP。
本发明还提供一种无线局域网系统， 该系统包含： STA、 已与所述 STA 建立安全关联的当前 AP、 支持预鉴别功能的目的 AP; 其中：
所述当前 AP用于在接收到所述 STA发送的预鉴别开始分组后， 与所述 目的 AP进行交互， 进行双方证书的相互验证；
如果对所述目的 AP的证书的验证结果为证书有效，则所述当前 AP还用 于将其与所述 STA建立的安全关联的密钥信息发送给所述目的 AP; 所述目 的 AP保存所述密钥信息；
所述密钥信息中包含 STA与当前 AP协商生成的基密钥。
此外， 所述系统还包含鉴别服务器， 所述当前 AP与目的 AP釆用如下方 式进行双方证书的相互验证：
所述当前 AP向所述目的 AP发送预鉴别启动分组； 该分组中包含： 所述 当前 AP的证书和所述当前 AP的签名；
接收到预鉴别启动分组后，所述目的 AP对所述当前 AP的签名进行验证， 在签名验证成功后向鉴别服务器发送证书鉴别请求分组； 该分组中包含： 所 述当前 AP的证书、 所述目的 AP的证书和所述目的 AP的签名； 接收到证书鉴别请求分组后， 鉴别服务器对所述目的 AP 的签名进行验 证，在签名验证成功后对所述当前 AP的证书和所述目的 AP的证书进行验证， 并将证书验证结果和鉴别服务器的签名包含在证书鉴别响应分组中发送给所 述目的 AP和当前 AP。
此外， 所述密钥信息中还包含所述 STA与所述当前 AP协商生成的单播 会话密钥；
所述目的 AP还用于在接收到所述密钥信息后， 使用所述单播会话密钥 与所述 STA协商生成组播密钥。
综上所述， 本发明基于 WAPI三元安全架构思想， 利用已建立安全关联， 对未信任的 AP进行身份鉴别（证书验证 ) , 身份鉴别完成后， 当前 AP将密 钥信息（主要是基密钥）发送给目的 AP; 通过这一优化的预鉴别方法， 在不 降低系统安全性能的前提下， 减少了各网元之间的交互过程， 达到无线局域 网终端快速进行预鉴别的目的。
附图概述
图 1为现有技术中的证书鉴别过程和密钥协商过程的流程图；
图 2是本发明实施例无线局域网终端的预鉴别方法流程图；
图 3是预鉴别分组的格式示意图；
图 4是可实施本发明的上述方法的无线局域网系统的结构示意图。
本发明的较佳实施方式
本发明的核心思想是， 已与 STA建立安全关联的 AP (简称当前 AP )在 接收到 STA发送的预鉴别开始分组后， 通过鉴别服务器对预鉴别的目的 AP 的证书进行验证， 证书验证成功后， 当前 AP将其与 STA所建立的安全关联 的密钥信息发送给目的 AP; 目的 AP保存所述密钥信息， 完成预鉴别。
下面将结合附图和实施例对本发明进行详细描述。 图 2是本发明实施例无线局域网终端的预鉴别方法流程图， 包括如下步 骤：
201 : STA和当前 AP建立安全关联后， 在 ESS ( Extended Service Set, 扩展服务集） 中移动时， 当前 AP 的信号强度低于预先设定的阔值时， STA 开始主动或被动扫描 AP。
202: STA根据 Beacon (信标 )帧或 Probe Response (探询响应 )帧中的 WAPI信息元素字段判断扫描到的 AP是否支持预鉴别，并根据支持预鉴别的 AP的信号强度建立 AP优先级列表， 将优先级最高的 AP的作为目的 AP, 而 后发送预鉴别开始分组给当前 AP。
预鉴别分组釆用 WAPI协议所定义的格式， 如图 3 , 具体内容可参考
GB15629.11-2003/XGl-2006。 其中， ADDID字段长度为 12个字节， 该字段 的值由发起方 STA的 MAC地址和目的 AP的 MAC地址组成。
203: 当前 AP收到预鉴别开始分组后， 通过 DS (分布式系统） 向目的 AP发送预鉴别启动分组， 以激活证书鉴别过程。
预鉴别启动分组中包含： 当前 AP证书、 STA和当前 AP的 MAC地址及 当前 AP的签名等信息。
204: 目的 AP收到预鉴别启动分组后， 验证当前 AP的签名， 验证成功 后向鉴别服务器发送证书鉴别请求分组进行身份认证。
证书鉴别请求分组中包含： 目的 AP的 MAC地址、 当前 AP的 MAC地 址、 目的 AP的证书及当前 AP的证书等信息。
205： 收到证书鉴别请求分组后， 鉴别服务器对目的 AP证书和当前 AP 的证书进行验证，将对目的 AP的证书及当前 AP的证书的验证结果包含在证 书鉴别响应分组中， 并附加鉴别服务器的签名， 发往目的 AP。
206: 目的 AP收到证书鉴别响应分组后， 验证鉴别服务器的签名， 若签 名不正确， 则丟弃该证书鉴别响应分组； 否则检查当前 AP证书鉴别结果， 若当前 AP的证书有效， 则构造预鉴别响应分组， 并将其发送给当前 AP; 预鉴别响应分组中包含： 目的 AP的签名、 鉴别服务器的签名及目的 AP 的证书验证结果等信息。 207: 当前 AP收到预鉴别响应分组后， 验证目的 AP的签名和鉴别服务 器的签名是否正确， 若任一签名不正确， 则丟弃该分组； 否则根据目的 AP 的证书验证结果检查目的 AP的证书是否有效， 若无效， 则解除两个 AP间的 链路关系并通知 STA目的 AP为非法； 若以上检查都通过， 则通过 DS将其 与 STA建立的安全关联中的密钥信息发送给目的 AP;
上述密钥信息包括： BKID (基密钥标识） 、 BK (基密钥）等 BKSA参 数； 此外， 密钥信息中还可以包括： USKID (单播会话密钥标识）、 USK (单 播会话密钥）等 USKSA参数。
208: 目的 AP收到上述密钥信息后， 利用单播会话密钥中的密钥加密密 钥 （KEK )对通告主密钥 （NMK )进行加密生成密钥数据， 并利用消息鉴别 密钥计算消息鉴别码， 将密钥数据和消息鉴别码包含在组播密钥通告分组中 发送给 STA。
209: 接收到组播密钥通告分组后， STA对消息鉴别码进行校验， 校验通 过后对密钥数据解密得到通告主密钥， 并使用 KD-HMAC-SHA256算法对通 告主密钥进行扩展， 生成组播密钥 （其中包括 16 个字节的组播加密密钥和 16个字节的完整性校验密钥） 。
210: STA向目的 AP发送组播密钥响应分组， 完成组播密钥通告过程。
211 : 目的 AP通过 DS向当前 AP发送预鉴别完成分组， 告知当前 AP预 鉴别已完成。
根据本发明的基本原理， 上述实施例还可以有多种变换方式， 例如：
(一 )在步骤 207中， 当前 AP可以仅将 BKSA参数发送给目的 AP, 目 的 AP使用 BKSA中的 BK与 STA协商生成新的 USK。
当然， 也可以在 STA切换到目的 AP后再进行单播会话密钥的协商。 (二） 目的 AP和 STA也可以不在预鉴别过程中进行组播密钥的协商， 等到 STA切换到目的 AP后再进行组播密钥的协商。
(三）在步骤 204中， 目的 AP接收到预鉴别启动分组后， 可以直接向 当前 AP发送包含目的 AP证书的预鉴别响应分组， 由当前 AP向鉴别服务器 发送包含当前 AP和目的 AP证书的证书鉴别请求分组，对当前 AP和目的 AP 的证书进行验证， 并将验证结果与密钥信息一起发送给目的 AP。
(四）如果目的 AP和当前 AP都有鉴别服务器的公钥， 则可以使用该公 钥对对方的证书进行验证， 而无需将其发送给鉴别服务器。 当然， 在这种情 况下， 无法险证对方证书是否被吊销。
图 4是可实施本发明的上述方法的无线局域网系统的结构示意图， 如图 4所示， 该系统包含： STA、 已与所述 STA建立安全关联的当前 AP、 支持预 鉴别功能的目的 AP; 其中：
所述当前 AP用于在接收到所述 STA发送的预鉴别开始分组后， 与所述 目的 AP进行交互， 进行双方证书的相互 3全证；
如果对所述目的 AP的证书的验证结果为证书有效，则所述当前 AP还用 于将其与所述 STA建立的安全关联的密钥信息发送给所述目的 AP; 所述目 的 AP保存所述密钥信息；
所述密钥信息中包含 STA与当前 AP协商生成的基密钥。
图 4所示系统中各网元的详细的功能和连接关系 （消息交互关系）在对 图 2所示流程进行描述时已介绍， 此处不再赘述。
工业实用性
本发明基于 WAPI三元安全架构思想， 利用已建立安全关联， 对未信任 的 AP进行身份鉴别（证书验证 ) ,身份鉴别完成后， 当前 AP将密钥信息（主 要是基密钥）发送给目的 AP; 通过这一优化的预鉴别方法， 在不降低系统安 全性能的前提下， 减少了各网元之间的交互过程， 达到无线局域网终端快速 进行预鉴别的目的。

Claims

权 利 要 求 书
1、 一种无线局域网终端的预鉴别方法， 包括：
已与站点 STA建立安全关联的当前 AP在接收到所述 STA发送的预鉴别 开始分组后， 与目的 AP进行交互， 进行双方证书的相互 3全证； 和
如果对所述目的 AP的证书的验证结果为证书有效，则所述当前 AP将所 述当前 AP与所述 STA建立的安全关联的密钥信息发送给所述目的 AP,所述 目的 AP保存所述密钥信息；
其中，所述密钥信息中包含所述 STA与所述当前 AP协商生成的基密钥。
2、 如权利要求 1所述的方法， 其中，
所述当前 AP与目的 AP釆用如下方式进行双方证书的相互险证： 所述当前 AP向所述目的 AP发送预鉴别启动分组 ,所述预鉴别启动分组 包含所述当前 AP的证书和所述当前 AP的签名；
接收到所述预鉴别启动分组后，所述目的 AP对所述当前 AP的签名进行 验证， 在验证成功后向鉴别服务器发送证书鉴别请求分组， 所述证书鉴别请 求分组中包含所述当前 AP的证书、 所述目的 AP的证书以及所述目的 AP的 签名； 以及
接收到所述证书鉴别请求分组后， 所述鉴别服务器对所述目的 AP 的签 名进行验证， 在签名验证成功后， 对所述当前 AP的证书和所述目的 AP的证 书进行验证， 并将证书验证结果和所述鉴别服务器的签名包含在证书鉴别响 应分组中发送给所述目的 AP和当前 AP。
3、 如权利要求 1所述的方法， 其中，
所述密钥信息中还包含所述 STA与所述当前 AP协商生成的单播会话密 钥；
所述目的 AP接收到所述密钥信息后， 还使用所述单播会话密钥与所述 STA协商生成组播密钥。
4、 如权利要求 1所述的方法， 其中，
如果对所述目的 AP的证书的验证结果为证书无效，则所述当前 AP解除 所述当前 AP与所述目的 AP的链路关系，并通知所述 STA所述目的 AP为非 法 AP。
5、 一种无线局域网系统， 所述系统包含 STA、 已与所述 STA建立安全 关联的当前 AP以及支持预鉴别功能的目的 AP, 其中，
所述当前 AP用于在接收到所述 STA发送的预鉴别开始分组后， 与所述 目的 AP进行交互， 进行双方证书的相互 3全证；
如果对所述目的 AP的证书的验证结果为证书有效，则所述当前 AP还用 于将所述当前 AP 与所述 STA建立的安全关联的密钥信息发送给所述目的 AP;
所述目的 AP保存所述密钥信息；
其中，所述密钥信息中包含所述 STA与所述当前 AP协商生成的基密钥。
6、 如权利要求 5所述的系统， 其中，
所述系统还包含鉴别服务器；
所述当前 AP与目的 AP釆用如下方式进行双方证书的相互险证： 所述当前 AP向所述目的 AP发送预鉴别启动分组 ,所述预鉴别启动分组 中包含所述当前 AP的证书和所述当前 AP的签名；
接收到所述预鉴别启动分组后，所述目的 AP对所述当前 AP的签名进行 验证， 在验证成功后， 向所述鉴别服务器发送证书鉴别请求分组， 所述证书 鉴别请求分组中包含所述当前 AP的证书、所述目的 AP的证书以及所述目的 AP的签名； 以及
接收到所述证书鉴别请求分组后， 所述鉴别服务器对所述目的 AP 的签 名进行验证，在验证成功后对所述当前 AP的证书和所述目的 AP的证书进行 验证， 并将证书验证结果和所述鉴别服务器的签名包含在证书鉴别响应分组 中发送给所述目的 AP和当前 AP。
7、 如权利要求 5所述的系统， 其中，
所述密钥信息中还包含所述 STA与所述当前 AP协商生成的单播会话密 钥；
所述目的 AP还用于在接收到所述密钥信息后， 使用所述单播会话密钥 与所述 STA协商生成组播密钥。
PCT/CN2009/073377 2009-04-08 2009-08-20 一种无线局域网终端的预鉴别方法及无线局域网系统 WO2010115326A1 (zh)

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