US20070097934A1 - Method and system of secured direct link set-up (DLS) for wireless networks - Google Patents
Method and system of secured direct link set-up (DLS) for wireless networks Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W76/00—Connection management
- H04W76/10—Connection setup
- H04W76/14—Direct-mode setup
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/062—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying encryption of the keys
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
- H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
- H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
Definitions
- the field of invention relates generally to wireless networks and, more specifically but not exclusively relates to techniques for implementing secure direct links between wireless network stations.
- Wi-Fi wireless local area network
- Wi-Fi wireless fidelity
- IEEE 802.11a The IEEE Standard provides support for three different kind of PHY layers, which are an InfraRed (IR) baseband PHY, a frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) and a direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) PHY operating at either 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz frequency band.
- IR InfraRed
- FHSS frequency-hopping spread spectrum
- DSSS direct-sequence spread spectrum
- IEEE 802.11b For IEEE 802.11b, this results in a bandwidth of up to 11 megabits per second (Mb/s) when an appropriate signal strength is available.
- IEEE 802.11g defines a similar standard to Wi-Fi, with backward compatibility to 802.11b. However, 802.11g employs orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) rather than DSSS, and supports bandwidth up to 54 Mb/s. Enhanced implementations of 802.11g are asserted by their manufacturers to support transfer rates of up to 108 Mb/s.
- WLAN equipment employing the IEEE 802.11a standard has also been recently introduced. The 802.11a standard employs a 5 GHz air interface using an OFDM carrier.
- Wireless AP 100 provides WLAN connectivity to various WLAN stations (STA) within its coverage area 102 via a respective 802.11 link, as depicted by notebook computers 104 and 106 , desktop computers 108 and 110 , and hand-held wireless device 112 (e.g., personal digital assistants (PDAs), pocket PCs, cellular phones supporting 802.11 links, etc.).
- STA WLAN stations
- notebook computers 104 and 106 desktop computers 108 and 110
- hand-held wireless device 112 e.g., personal digital assistants (PDAs), pocket PCs, cellular phones supporting 802.11 links, etc.
- each station provides an appropriate WLAN interface, such as depicted by a PCMCIA 802.11b, g, or a card 114 for notebook computer 106 or an 802.11b, g, or a peripheral expansion card 116 for desktop computer 110 .
- the IEEE 802.11 wireless interface may be built-in, such as is the case with notebooks employing Intel's Centrino® chipset.
- wireless handheld devices e.g., 112
- a wireless AP is deployed to extend the reach of a network, such as a LAN, WLAN (wide LAN) or MAN (Metropolitan Area Network).
- AP 100 is depicted as being linked to a switch 118 via an Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) link 120 .
- switch 118 is representative of various types of switches and routers present in a typical LAN, WLAN or MAN.
- the switching operations may be facilitated via a server 122 that runs software to manage the network and perform software-based switching/routing operations.
- a group of stations coordinated by Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) or Point Coordination Function (PCF) is called a basic service set (BSS).
- DCF Distributed Coordination Function
- PCF Point Coordination Function
- the AP facilitates and coordinates communication and channel access between stations, and provides access mechanisms for the stations to access various land-based networks via network infrastructure connected to an AP, such as depicted by switch 118 , enterprise network 124 and Internet 126 .
- Stations authenticated and associated with an AP do not operate in an ad-hoc mode where peer-to-peer communication is done without connectivity to the AP.
- the AP serves as a central controller and coordinators for data traffic between stations within its coverage area by providing a routing function on the WLAN side.
- an AP provides another routing function pertaining to the routing of downlink traffic originating from an upstream network (such as enterprise network 124 and Internet 126 , as well as traffic originating from other APs) and destined for a WLAN station served by the AP.
- an upstream network such as enterprise network 124 and Internet 126 , as well as traffic originating from other APs
- stations in an IEEE 802.11 WLAN are not allowed to transmit frames directly to one another and should always rely on the AP for the delivery of frames.
- the IEEE has recently ratified a draft Standard (IEEE P802.11e/D13.0, January 2005) defining Quality of Service (QoS) enhancements for 802.11 Medium Access Control (MAC) layer.
- QSTAs stations with QoS facility (QSTAs) may transmit frames directly to another QSTA by setting up such a data transfer using the DLS (Direct Link Set-up) protocol.
- DLS Direct Link Set-up
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a typical IEEE 802.11 WLAN deployment
- FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating high-level details of operations performed to set up a direct secure link, according to one embodiment of the invention
- FIG. 3 is a message flow and schematic diagram illustrating operations performed in connection with setting up a Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) link between a station and an access point;
- RSNA Robust Security Network Association
- FIG. 4 is a message flow diagram illustrating a message exchange for setting up a Direct Link Setup (DLS) link in accordance with the IEEE P802.11e/D13.0 draft standard;
- DLS Direct Link Setup
- FIGS. 5 a and 5 b collectively comprise is a message flow diagram illustrating various messages passed between two stations and an access point to deploy a security mechanism for a direct link, according to one embodiment of the invention
- FIG. 6 is a message flow diagram illustrating a 4-Way Handshake used to install a Pairwise DLS Transient Key (PDTK) used to encrypt messages sent over a secure direct link;
- PDTK Pairwise DLS Transient Key
- FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram illustrating various functional blocks employed by a wireless access point (AP).
- AP wireless access point
- FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram illustrating a wireless AP employing a network processor unit (NPU) that may be used to implement aspects of the security mechanisms described herein.
- NPU network processor unit
- FIG. 2 depicts a flowchart illustrating high-level details of operations performed to set up a secure direct link, according to one embodiment of the invention.
- the process begins in a block 200 , wherein RSNA (Robust Security Network Association) links (defined in the IEEE P802.11iTM-2004 Standard are set up between QSTAs with a WLAN coverage area of a host QAP (an access point supporting enhanced QoS facilities in accordance with IEEE P802.11e/D13.0).
- RSNA Robot Security Network Association
- PMK Primary master key
- KCK Key Confirmation Key
- KEK Key Encryption Key
- a list of QSTAs is provided to each QSTA (or otherwise selected QSTAs).
- the list may be statically generated in advance, may be dynamically generated during on-going operations, or a combination of these two approaches may be employed.
- the network manager can provide information to each station that can operate as a QSTA concerning other stations that can also operate as a QSTA, thus informing each station capable of employing direct links under IEEE P802.11e/D13.0 of other QSTAs that may be reached within the WLAN.
- a QSTA joins a WLAN its capabilities are broadcast to other QSTAs already in the WLAN, thus enabling those QSTAs to update their respective direct link QSTA lists.
- a DLS link is set up between a pair of QSTAs in the manner described below with reference to FIG. 4 .
- a link that is set up using the DLS protocol is termed a “DLS link.”
- This operation is initiated by an initiator QSTA that desires to form a secure direct link with a target QSTA.
- security measures are set up in block 206 to form a secure direct link using a “fresh” shared key that is unique for each secure session.
- the security measures are implemented using key transfer mechanisms that ensures the only the appropriate recipient end stations (i.e., the QSTAs sharing the direct link) can extract a symmetric session key from which a shared Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) is derived. Further details of the operation of block 206 are described below with reference to the message flow diagram of FIGS. 5 a and 5 b .
- the DLS link between the QSTA Pair is torn down, as depicted in a block 208
- FIG. 3 shows further aspects of the RSNA link set-up operation of block 200 .
- Details for setting up RSNA links for IEEE 802 . 11 WLANs are disclosed in the IEEE 802.11iTM-2004 (Amendment 6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements) Standard.
- RSNA defines a number of security features in addition to wired equivalency privacy (WEP) and IEEE 802.11 authentication, both of which are typically used as baseline security measures for conventional 802.11 WLANs. These security features include enhanced authentication mechanisms for STAs, key management algorithms, and cryptographic key establishment.
- RNSA also features an enhanced data encapsulation mechanism that may be implemented using temporal keys corresponding to the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), as well as other security measures.
- TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
- An RSNA relies on several components external to the IEEE 802.11 suite of Standards.
- the first component is an IEEE 802.1X (IEEE P802.1X-REV, Draft Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access Control) port access entity (PAE).
- PAEs are present on all STAs in an RSNA and control the forwarding of data to and from the MAC.
- An access point implements an Authenticator PAE and implements the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Authenticator role, whiie a STA implements a Supplicant PAE and implements the EAP peer role.
- EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
- a STA implements a Supplicant PAE and implements the EAP peer role.
- IBSS independent basic service set
- each STA implements both an Authenticator PAE and a Supplicant PAE and both the EAP Authenticator and EAP peer roles.
- a second component is the Authentication Server (AS).
- the AS may authenticate the elements of the RSNA itself, i.e., the non-AP STAs, while APs may provide material that the RSNA elements can use to authenticate each other.
- the AS communicates through the IEEE 802.1X Authenticator with the IEEE 802.1X Supplicant on each STA, enabling the STA to be authenticated to the AS and vice versa.
- An RSNA depends upon the use of an EAP method that supports mutual authentication of the AS and the STA.
- the AS may be integrated into the same physical device as the AP, or into a STA in an IBSS.
- IEEE 802.11iTM-2004 Standard uses the notion of a security association to describe secure operations. Secure communications are possible only within the context of a security association, as this is the context providing the state—cryptographic keys, counters, sequence spaces, etc.,—needed for correct operation of the IEEE 802.11TM-2004 cipher suites.
- a security association is a set of policy(ies) and key(s) used to protect information.
- the information in the security association is stored by each party of the security association, must be consistent among all parties, and must have an identity.
- the identity is a compact name of the key and other bits of security association information to fit into a table index or an MPDU (MAC protocol data unit).
- this figure shows operations performed at a QSTA X (QSTA-X) and a QAP to set up an RSNA link.
- the RSNA link is set up by passing EAPOL—(EAP over LAN) Key frames between the QSTA-X and the QAP.
- the EAPOL-Key frames contain data pertinent to setting up an RSNA link, including various QSTA-X attributes (e.g., MAC address, capabilities, etc.) and key-related data.
- QSTA-X attributes e.g., MAC address, capabilities, etc.
- the QAP will pass key information, along with information identifying algorithms to be subsequently employed for key extraction and authentication operations. These include a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) 302 , a MIC (Message Integrity Code) algorithm identifier (MIC_ID) 304 , and a Wrap encryption algorithm identifier (Wrap_ID) 306 .
- PMK Pairwise Master Key
- MIC_ID Message Integrity Code
- Wrap_ID Wrap encryption algorithm identifier
- RSNA defines two key hierarchies: a) Pairwise key hierarchy, to protect unicast traffic, and b) Group Temporal Key (GTK), a hierarchy consisting of a single key to protect multicast and broadcast traffic.
- GTK Group Temporal Key
- a PMK can be derived from an EAP-based method or may be obtained directly from a pre-shared key (PSK).
- the Pairwise key hierarchy takes a PMK and generates a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), as depicted in FIG. 3 by a PTK 308 .
- the PTK is partitioned into the KCK (first 128 bits) and KEK (second 128 bits), and temporal keys used by the MAC to protect unicast communication between the Authenticator's and Supplicant's respective STAs.
- Section 8.5.1.1 of the IEEE 802.11iTM-2004 Standard defines the PRF function as follows, wherein A is a unique label for each different purpose of the PRF; Y is a single octet containing 0; X is a single octet containing the parameter; and ⁇ denotes concatenation:
- H SHA- 1 (K, A, B, X) ⁇ HMAC—SHA- 1 (K, A ⁇ Y ⁇ B ⁇ X)
- PRF- 128 (K, A, B) PRF(K, A, B, 128 )
- PRF- 192 (K, A, B) PRF(K, A, B, 192 )
- PRF- 256 (K, A, B) PRF(K, A, B, 256 )
- PRF- 384 (K, A, B) PRF(K, A, B, 384 )
- PRF- 512 (K, A, B) PRF(K, A, B, 512 )
- each of a key configuration key (KCK_X) 310 and a key encryption key (KEK_X) 312 is derived from PTK 308 by QSTA-X and stored on QSTA-X, along with the MIC_ID and Wrap_lD.
- values for KCK_X and KEK-X are derived by the QAP and stored on the QAP along with the MIC_ID and Wrap_ID (which were already stored on the QAP prior to setting up the RSNA link).
- each QSTA will store a respective set of KCK and KEK key values, along with information identifying the MIC algorithm and Wrap algorithm employed by the WLAN security mechanism.
- FIG. 4 Details of the DLS link set up operation of block 204 are illustrated in FIG. 4 .
- the DLS protocol to set up DLS link is discussed under section 11.7 of the IEEE P802.11e/D13.0 draft Standard.
- FIG. 4 which is analogous to FIG. 68.9 in section 11.7, shows four messages ( 1 a , 1 b , 2 a and 2 b ) passed between QoS stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B and a QoS access point QAP to set up a direct link 400 between stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B.
- the DLS link set up operation proceeds as follows.
- the DLS Request frame includes the rate set, capabilities of QSTA-A, as well as the MAC addresses of QSTA-A (the initiator) and QSTA-B (the target recipient of the DLS Request).
- the QAP then forward the DLS Request frame to the recipient, as depicted by message 1 b . If the target recipient does not meet these qualifications, a message is returned from the QAP to the initiator indicating that the targeted station does not support direct links. In some instances, the QAP may not receive the DLS request frame from QSTA-A. Under this situation, the QSTA-A may re-send the DLS request frame to the QAP after a time-out period.
- each QSTA is provided with a list of other available QSTA's. Accordingly, under such implementations, an initiator station will be able to ascertain whether a target station supports the applicable QoS facility to support direct links with that station prior to sending a DLS Request frame to that station.
- the recipient station If the recipient station accepts the request to set up a direct link with the initiator, it sends a DLS Response frame 404 to the QAP, as depicted by message 2 a .
- the DLS Response frame contains the rate set, (extended) capabilities of QSTA-B, and the MAC addresses of QSTA-A and QSTA-B.
- the QAP then forwards the DLS Response frame to QSTA-A (message 2 b ), after which the direct link 400 becomes active and frames can be sent from QSTA-A to QSTA-B and from QSTA-B to QSTA-A.
- Section 11.7.5 in the IEEE 802.11e/D13 draft Standard specifies a security scheme to enable secured DLS operation.
- the specified security scheme is insufficient to provide adequate security in today's environment.
- the inventors have identified the following design flaws:
- FIGS. 5 a and 5 b shows details of a message exchange process used to set up security measures for an established, but unsecured direct link, according to one embodiment of the invention.
- the operations illustrated in FIGS. 5 a and 5 b correspond to the operation of block 206 in FIG. 2 as discussed above.
- an unsecured DLS link has been set up between stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B.
- each of these stations is storing a respective set of KCK and KEK keys provided to them during a previous RSNA link set up (e.g., in accordance with the operations of block 200 and FIG. 3 ), as well as identifiers for the MIC and Wrap encryption algorithms implemented for the security scheme employed for the WLAN.
- a request to deploy the security measures will be initiated by the initiator of the DLS link, although this isn't a strict requirement. Accordingly, the secure link set up process illustrated in FIG. 5 a is initiated by station QSTA-A, which generates a random number R_A in a block 500 and sends a message 502 including R_A concatenated with the MAC address of stations QSTA-B and QSTA-A (MAC_B and MAC_A) to station QSTA-B.
- station QSTA-B In response to receiving message 502 , station QSTA-B generates its own random number R_B in a block 504 , and generates a message 506 to the QAP containing a concatenation of R_B, R_A, MAC_B, and MAC_A. Thus, this message binds the identities of both stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B to the random numbers R_A and R_B.
- Message 506 is then sent from station QSTA-B to the QAP.
- the QAP extracts the values for each of R_B, R_A, MAC_B, and MAC_A, and stores them in memory.
- K_AB is a random number of sufficient length applicable to the WLAN environment to computationally guarantee security in view of existing computing capabilities.
- security keys having a length of 128-bit or above are generally termed computationally secure in view of the computing capabilities of current supercomputers.
- the length of the keys describe herein may be significantly less than 128 bits, such as but not limited to 64-bit keys.
- hash functions such as SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm)- 1 , SHA- 256 , or AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) in the Davies-Meyer mode.
- the Wrap (param 1 , param 2 ) function corresponds to an agreed-to key wrap encryption algorithm employed by the WLAN deployment and identified by the Wrap_ID value stored at the QAP and each of stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B.
- the Wrap function corresponds to the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) key wrap algorithm, defined in IETF RFC (Internet Engineering Task Force Request for Comment) 3394, Advanced Encryption Standard Key Wrap Algorithm, September 2002.
- Other encryption algorithms may also me employed.
- the Message Integrity Check (MIC) algorithm employs the respective key conformation keys KCK_A and KCK_B as the hash keys that operate on the respective security strings SA and SB.
- the MIC algorithm may employ one of many well-known hash algorithms that are implemented by the WLAN security scheme.
- the HMAC SHA- 1 algorithm or AES in CMAC mode may be employed as the MIC algorithm.
- Other hash algorithms may also be implemented in a similar manner.
- messages 510 and 512 containing the security string concatenated with the hash of the security string for each of stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B are sent from the QAP to these respective stations.
- a decision block 514 if the inequality evaluates to TRUE, the authenticity of the message is confirmed. Under such a result, the QSTA then unwraps the K_AB and KID_AB values using its key encryption key and the agreed-to Wrap encryption algorithm, which is identified by the Wrap_ID value. This operation is performed by station QSTA-A in a block 518 . If the result of decision block 514 is FALSE, then the message received from the QAP is either corrupted, or it was sent by another station or entity “faking” that it is the QAP. Under this circumstance, the entire process should be restarted.
- Another aspect of the messaging scheme is the including of the previously-generated random numbers R_A and R_B that is employed in the respective messages 510 and 512 sent to stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B.
- an initiator station may have to send out multiple secure link initiation request messages. By comparing the random number it generated for a given request message with first portion of the security string, the request message that was successful can be identified.
- each of stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B have extracted the same values for symmetric session key K_AB and key name KID_AB from respective messages 510 and 512 . These stations then perform a 4-Way Handshake using symmetric session key K_AB as the PMK, as depicted by a message exchange 522 and described in further detail with reference to FIG. 6 below.
- a corresponding Pairwise DLS Transient Key (PDTK) is then derived from the PMK, using the 4-Way Handshake between the two stations, and installed in a block 524 at each of stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B. These stations may then employ the PDTK to implement a secure link 526 using well-known encryption techniques.
- PDTK Pairwise DLS Transient Key
- the QAP should delete the symmetric session key K_AB, or otherwise prevent any other element in the WLAN from accessing this key. Since the PTK ultimately derived from key K_AB is only used for sending messages between stations (e.g., QSTA-A and QSTA-B), there is no reason for the QAP to keep key K_AB.
- FIG. 6 illustrates one embodiment of 4-Way Handshake 522 .
- each of stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B have received a copy of K_AB, which operates as a PMK.
- the 4-Way Handshake is similar to other types of key establishment protocols, and is described in the 802.11iTM-2004 Standard.
- station QSTA-A is the EAP authenticator (A)
- station QSTA-B is the EAP supplicant.
- station QSTA-A generates a nonce ANonce.
- station QSTA-B generates a nonce SNonce.
- a nonce is a number used once in security schemes and typically may comprise a random number or a current time (in number form).
- Station QSTA-A sends a first message 604 comprising an EAPOL-Key frame containing the ANonce and a Unicast identifier code to station QSTA-B.
- station QSTA-B derives a PDTK from its copy of the PMK (K_AB) in a block 606 .
- Station QSTA-B then sends a message 608 comprising an EAPOL-Key frame containing the SNonce, Unicast identifier code, and a MIC identifier to station QSTA-A.
- station QSTA-A derives its PDTK from its copy of the PMK in a block 610 .
- the 4-Way Handshake is completed using the third message 612 and the fourth message 614 .
- the third message 612 comprises an EAPOL-Key frame containing indicia to tell the recipient to install the PDTK, the Unicast identifier code, the MIC identifier, and potentially additional optional parameters, such as a GTK.
- the fourth message 614 comprises an EAPOL-Key frame containing the Unicast identifier code and the MIC identifier.
- authentication management frames are employed to encapsulate the message data, as defined by section 7.3 in the IEEE 802.11iTM-2004 Standard.
- Other data encapsulation frame formats may also be employed in a similar manner.
- the random numbers described herein may be generated by a true random number generator or a pseudo random number generator (provided the bit length and randomness of the random number is sufficient). Furthermore, the random numbers may be generated using either software- or hardware-based mechanisms, using well-known algorithms.
- the logic for performing the operations of the wireless stations described herein will be primarily or solely implemented via execution of software and/or firmware instructions on the station's host device.
- the logic may be generally implemented in an operating system component or an application program that runs on an operating system.
- the logic is implemented in a WLAN operating system driver.
- the logic may be typically implemented via firmware or as an application running on a host operating system built into the device.
- a typical AP comprises a stand-alone device of relatively low cost that is configured to perform dedicated WLAN host operations.
- the AP device does not employ an operating system (or employs a very minimal operating system), but rather implements its logic via built-in hardware logic and execution of firmware on a built-in processor element or the like.
- FIG. 7 shows a block diagram illustrating the principle functional blocks of a typical 802.11 wireless access point.
- the blocks include a WLAN sub-system 700 , a WLAN/Ethernet bridge 702 , and an Ethernet controller 704 .
- the WLAN sub-system generally includes components use to facilitate WLAN operations at the PHY (Physical) layer, as well as control of the 802 . 11 air interface.
- these components are depicted as including radio hardware 706 and a WLAN controller 708 .
- the WLAN radio hardware comprise the components of a wireless AP used to generate and process radio signals that are employed for the air interface to facilitate communications between the AP and WLAN stations.
- Such components will typically include an antenna, as well and analog and digital circuitry for generating outgoing and processing received radio frequency (RF) signals in accordance with the applicable WLAN protocol(s) employed by the AP.
- RF radio frequency
- the WLAN controller is further depicted as including an 802.11 PHY block 710 , and an 802.11 MAC (Media Access Control) block 712 .
- the PHY and MAC blocks are respectively associated with the Physical and Data Link layers, which comprise the two lowest layers (layer-1 and layer-2) in the seven-layer OSI (Open System Interconnect) network communication model.
- OSI Open System Interconnect
- WLAN/Ethernet bridge 702 is employed as a bridge between 802.11 WLAN signals and 802.3 Ethernet signals. More particularly, in the illustrated architecture, WLAN/Ethernet bridge 702 provides an interface between 802.11 frames passed to and from the WLAN sub-system, and 802.3 frames passed to and from Ethernet controller 704 . This is facilitated, in part, by an 802.11/802.3 translator 714 , which translates frame formats between 802.11 and 802.3 and vice-versa. As an option, the frame translation operations may be performed by WLAN controller 708 .
- an access point may also need to perform switching and/or routing functions.
- switching operations are performed via WLAN sub-system 700 , such as managing access to the WLAN channel(s) using collision avoidance mechanisms and the like, since by its nature, the WLAN air interface comprises a shared medium necessitating some type of switching mechanism.
- the AP must perform switching/routing operations, wherein packets received at an input side of an input/output (I/O) port are routed to either an appropriate destination station via the WLAN sub-system or to another I/O port to be transferred to another network.
- I/O input/output
- the switching and routing operations are depicted in FIG. 7 as being performed by a switch/router block 720 on WLAN/Ethernet bridge 702 ; however, it will be understood that some of the switching and routing operations may be performed by Ethernet controller 704 .
- Another operation typically provided by an access point relates to security.
- a WLAN signal sent over a shared medium, it may be accessed (at the signal level) by any station within the AP's coverage area, regardless of whether that station is authorized or not to access the AP.
- various security schemes are implemented, such as WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) and WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) schemes. Under these schemes, packets are encrypted using some security key infrastructure, such as shared keys, rotating keys, etc.
- Ethernet transmissions are typically are either a) not encrypted or b) encrypted using decryption/encryption managed by the transmission endpoints rather than the AP (e.g., Virtual Private Connections, Secure Socket Layer security, etc.)
- WLAN/Ethernet bridge 702 also includes an encryption/decryption block 722 .
- encryption/decryption block 722 may be performed by WLAN sub-system 700 , depending on the particular AP architecture.
- station management Another operation provided by an AP is station management. For example, prior to being permitted access to AP services, a station typically needs to perform a registration operation or the like, such as performed during an RSNA link set up. During this process, the MAC address of the station will be acquired and the station will be identified/authenticated, an IP (Internet Protocol) address of the station will be dynamically or statically allocated and stored in an MAC-to-IP address translation table access by switch/router 720 , and other related operations are performed.
- the station management operations are collectively depicted as being performed by a station management block 724 , which access WLAN controller 708 via a management interface 726 .
- the Ethernet controller 704 is used to provide the interface between the AP and various networks to which the AP is communicatively coupled via corresponding network infrastructure, such as switches, bridges, routers, etc. To facilitate these operations, the Ethernet controller typically includes one or more I/O ports 728 , an 802.3 PHY block 730 , and an 802.3 MAC block 732 .
- I/O ports 728 will be coupled to one or more networks via corresponding IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet) links. Accordingly, such ports are alternately referred to as Ethernet ports or Ethernet I/O ports.
- an Ethernet port name includes its underlying transmission rate, such as a GigE (Gigabit per second Ethernet) port for for Ethernet ports supporting GigE transmission rates.
- the partitioning of the functional blocks illustrated in FIG. 7 is merely for illustrated purposes.
- the functional blocks may be implemented on one or more physical components, such as integrated circuits and analog circuitry corresponding to radio hardware 706 .
- the functional blocks of WLAN/Ethernet Bride 702 and Ethernet controller 704 will be combined on a single integrated circuit. Under such implementations, there will not be a duplication of an 802.3 MAC block, such as depicted by 802.3 MAC blocks 718 and 732 in FIG. 7 .
- the operations depicted by all or a portion of the various functional blocks depicted for the WLAN/Ethernet bridge are facilitated via execution of corresponding software modules that are executed on an embedded processor or the like, or otherwise via embedded hardware logic.
- the various logic and processor elements may comprise discreet components, or may be combined on one or more integrated circuits or the like.
- FIG. 8 shows one embodiment of an AP architecture employing a Network Processor Unit (NPU) 800 that is used to perform functions generally analogous to those described above for WLAN/Ethernet Bridge 702 and Ethernet controller 704 of FIG. 7 .
- NPU 800 includes an internal (embedded) processor 802 coupled to an Ethernet controller 804 , a memory controller 806 , and a communication interface 808 via an internal bus structure or the like.
- the memory controller 806 provides access to an external memory 810 , which will typically comprise some type of DRAM-(Dynamic Random Access Memory) based memory, such as DDRDRAM (double data-rate DRAM), SDRAM (Synchronous DRAM), RDRAM (Rambus DRAM), etc.
- Communication interface 808 provides an interface to WLAN controller 708 . In general, this interface may be some type of bus- or serial-based interface.
- NV store may generally comprise a rewritable non-volatile memory, such as a flash memory device.
- internal processor 802 may access NV store either directly, through memory controller 806 , or through another memory interface (not shown).
- a portion of the instructions may also be downloaded during runtime using a carrier wave file or the like and stored in external memory 806 .
- Encryption and decryption operations may typically be performed via execution of corresponding software/firmware on internal processor 802 , or via built-in hardware components, such as depicted by optional encryption and decryption units 814 and 816 .
- random numbers may be generated via execution of software/firmware on internal processor 802 , or via a build-in random number generator (RNG) unit 818 .
- RNG build-in random number generator
- a machine-readable medium includes any mechanism for storing or transmitting information in a form readable by a machine (e.g., a computer).
- a machine-readable medium can include articles of manufacture such as a read only memory (ROM); a random access memory (RAM); a magnetic disk storage media; an optical storage media; and a flash memory device, etc.
- a machine-readable medium can include propagated signals such as electrical, optical, acoustical or other form of propagated signals (e.g., carrier waves, infrared signals, digital signals, etc.).
- the mechanisms disclosed herein for setting up secure direct link between WLAN stations provide significant advantages over the security scheme defined in the IEEE 802.11e/D13 draft Standard.
- a newly generated key is employed to secure each direct link session, based on a randomly-generated and statistically unpredictable number.
- the key distribution mechanism is computationally unbreakable, guaranteeing that only the intended recipients will be able to access the shared session key from which the PDTK is derived.
- the key distribution mechanism provides built-in authentication and message identity features, ensuring each direct link participant station that the only WLAN elements having access to a session key are the participant stations and the QAP.
Abstract
Method and system of secured direct link set-up (DLS) for wireless networks. In accordance with aspects of the method, techniques are disclosed for setting up computationally secure direct links between stations in a wireless network in a manner that is computationally secure. A direct link comprising a new communication session is set up between first and second stations in a wireless local area network (WLAN) hosted by an access point (AP), the direct link comprising a new communication session. The AP generates a unique session key for the new communication session and transfers secured copies of the session key to each of the first and second stations in a manner under which only the first and second stations can obtain the session key. A security mechanism is then implemented on the unsecured direct link to secure the direct link between the first and second stations using a secure session key derived from the session key.
Description
- The field of invention relates generally to wireless networks and, more specifically but not exclusively relates to techniques for implementing secure direct links between wireless network stations.
- In recent years, network reach and flexibility has been greatly enhanced through the development and deployment of wireless networks. Among many different wireless protocols are now available (e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, infared, various cellular transmission schemes, WiMax, etc.), a large number of wireless networks deployed today employ wireless network components that operate under the IEEE (Institute for Electronic and Electrical Engineers) 802.11 suite of standards.
- The most numerous WLAN (wireless local area network) deployments, commonly referred to as “Wi-Fi” (wireless fidelity) networks, employ an air interface operating in the 2.4-gigahertz (GHz) frequency range. The original Wi-Fi standard was developed by the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA), and is based on the IEEE 802.11a specification. The IEEE Standard provides support for three different kind of PHY layers, which are an InfraRed (IR) baseband PHY, a frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) and a direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) PHY operating at either 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz frequency band. For IEEE 802.11b, this results in a bandwidth of up to 11 megabits per second (Mb/s) when an appropriate signal strength is available. IEEE 802.11g defines a similar standard to Wi-Fi, with backward compatibility to 802.11b. However, 802.11g employs orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) rather than DSSS, and supports bandwidth up to 54 Mb/s. Enhanced implementations of 802.11g are asserted by their manufacturers to support transfer rates of up to 108 Mb/s. WLAN equipment employing the IEEE 802.11a standard has also been recently introduced. The 802.11a standard employs a 5 GHz air interface using an OFDM carrier.
- A typical 802.11 WLAN deployment implemented with a single wireless access point (AP) 100 is shown in
FIG. 1 . Wireless AP 100 provides WLAN connectivity to various WLAN stations (STA) within itscoverage area 102 via a respective 802.11 link, as depicted bynotebook computers desktop computers coverage area 102 is shown as a circular shape, although in practice, the actual shape of a particular coverage area will generally vary based on various obstacles and signal interference from external sources.) To support station-side operations, each station provides an appropriate WLAN interface, such as depicted by a PCMCIA 802.11b, g, or acard 114 fornotebook computer 106 or an 802.11b, g, or aperipheral expansion card 116 fordesktop computer 110. Optionally, the IEEE 802.11 wireless interface may be built-in, such as is the case with notebooks employing Intel's Centrino® chipset. Similarly, wireless handheld devices (e.g., 112) will provide built-in IEEE 802.11 interfaces. - In most deployments, a wireless AP is deployed to extend the reach of a network, such as a LAN, WLAN (wide LAN) or MAN (Metropolitan Area Network). Accordingly, AP 100 is depicted as being linked to a
switch 118 via an Ethernet (IEEE 802.3)link 120. In general,switch 118 is representative of various types of switches and routers present in a typical LAN, WLAN or MAN. In some cases, the switching operations may be facilitated via aserver 122 that runs software to manage the network and perform software-based switching/routing operations. - A group of stations coordinated by Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) or Point Coordination Function (PCF) is called a basic service set (BSS). In the Infrastructure mode, the AP facilitates and coordinates communication and channel access between stations, and provides access mechanisms for the stations to access various land-based networks via network infrastructure connected to an AP, such as depicted by
switch 118,enterprise network 124 and Internet 126. Stations authenticated and associated with an AP do not operate in an ad-hoc mode where peer-to-peer communication is done without connectivity to the AP. Thus, in the infrastructure mode, the AP serves as a central controller and coordinators for data traffic between stations within its coverage area by providing a routing function on the WLAN side. Furthermore, an AP provides another routing function pertaining to the routing of downlink traffic originating from an upstream network (such asenterprise network 124 and Internet 126, as well as traffic originating from other APs) and destined for a WLAN station served by the AP. - In general, stations in an IEEE 802.11 WLAN are not allowed to transmit frames directly to one another and should always rely on the AP for the delivery of frames. However, the IEEE has recently ratified a draft Standard (IEEE P802.11e/D13.0, January 2005) defining Quality of Service (QoS) enhancements for 802.11 Medium Access Control (MAC) layer. According to Section 11.7, stations with QoS facility (QSTAs) may transmit frames directly to another QSTA by setting up such a data transfer using the DLS (Direct Link Set-up) protocol.
- In connection with support for direct links between stations, security measures have also been defined under the IEEE P802.11e/D13.0 draft Standard. However, the security measures are insufficient to support direct links with adequate security levels.
- The foregoing aspects and many of the attendant advantages of this invention will become more readily appreciated as the same becomes better understood by reference to the following detailed description, when taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein like reference numerals refer to like parts throughout the various views unless otherwise specified:
-
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a typical IEEE 802.11 WLAN deployment; -
FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating high-level details of operations performed to set up a direct secure link, according to one embodiment of the invention; -
FIG. 3 is a message flow and schematic diagram illustrating operations performed in connection with setting up a Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) link between a station and an access point; -
FIG. 4 is a message flow diagram illustrating a message exchange for setting up a Direct Link Setup (DLS) link in accordance with the IEEE P802.11e/D13.0 draft standard; -
FIGS. 5 a and 5 b collectively comprise is a message flow diagram illustrating various messages passed between two stations and an access point to deploy a security mechanism for a direct link, according to one embodiment of the invention -
FIG. 6 is a message flow diagram illustrating a 4-Way Handshake used to install a Pairwise DLS Transient Key (PDTK) used to encrypt messages sent over a secure direct link; -
FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram illustrating various functional blocks employed by a wireless access point (AP); and -
FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram illustrating a wireless AP employing a network processor unit (NPU) that may be used to implement aspects of the security mechanisms described herein. - Embodiments of methods and apparatus for implementing secured direct links in wireless networks are described herein. In the following description, numerous specific details are set forth to provide a thorough understanding of embodiments of the invention. One skilled in the relevant art will recognize, however, that the invention can be practiced without one or more of the specific details, or with other methods, components, materials, etc. In other instances, well-known structures, materials, or operations are not shown or described in detail to avoid obscuring aspects of the invention.
- Reference throughout this specification to “one embodiment” or “an embodiment” means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of the present invention. Thus, the appearances of the phrases “in one embodiment” or “in an embodiment” in various places throughout this specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, or characteristics may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments.
- In accordance with aspects of the embodiments now described, techniques are disclosed for implementing secure direct links between stations in wireless networks. During secure direct link setup, new keys are generated for each secure session between a pair of linked stations, such that each secure session is always provided with a “fresh” set of keys. Furthermore, the keys are generated and distributed in a manner under which they cannot (computationally) be intercepted or otherwise identified via eavesdropping over the shared 802.11 air interface. This provides significant enhancements of the measures for implementing a secure direct link under the IEEE P802.11e/D13.0 draft Standard.
- As an overview,
FIG. 2 depicts a flowchart illustrating high-level details of operations performed to set up a secure direct link, according to one embodiment of the invention. The process begins in ablock 200, wherein RSNA (Robust Security Network Association) links (defined in the IEEE P802.11i™-2004 Standard are set up between QSTAs with a WLAN coverage area of a host QAP (an access point supporting enhanced QoS facilities in accordance with IEEE P802.11e/D13.0). During the RSNA link set up operation, a primary master key (PMK) from which a Key Confirmation Key (KCK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) are subsequently derived is generated by the QAP for each QSTA. - As depicted in an
optional block 202, in some embodiments a list of QSTAs is provided to each QSTA (or otherwise selected QSTAs). The list may be statically generated in advance, may be dynamically generated during on-going operations, or a combination of these two approaches may be employed. For example, in many managed networks, only authorized stations are allowed to access a WLAN. Since these stations are known in advance by a network manager or the like, the network manager can provide information to each station that can operate as a QSTA concerning other stations that can also operate as a QSTA, thus informing each station capable of employing direct links under IEEE P802.11e/D13.0 of other QSTAs that may be reached within the WLAN. Under another scheme, when a QSTA joins a WLAN, its capabilities are broadcast to other QSTAs already in the WLAN, thus enabling those QSTAs to update their respective direct link QSTA lists. - Continuing at a
block 204, the operations of this block and the followingblock 206 are performed to set up each secure direct link. First, a DLS link is set up between a pair of QSTAs in the manner described below with reference toFIG. 4 . (As used herein, a link that is set up using the DLS protocol is termed a “DLS link.”) This operation is initiated by an initiator QSTA that desires to form a secure direct link with a target QSTA. After the DLS link is set up, security measures are set up inblock 206 to form a secure direct link using a “fresh” shared key that is unique for each secure session. Notably, the security measures are implemented using key transfer mechanisms that ensures the only the appropriate recipient end stations (i.e., the QSTAs sharing the direct link) can extract a symmetric session key from which a shared Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) is derived. Further details of the operation ofblock 206 are described below with reference to the message flow diagram ofFIGS. 5 a and 5 b. At the end of the session, the DLS link between the QSTA Pair is torn down, as depicted in ablock 208 -
FIG. 3 shows further aspects of the RSNA link set-up operation ofblock 200. Details for setting up RSNA links for IEEE 802.11 WLANs are disclosed in the IEEE 802.11i™-2004 (Amendment 6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements) Standard. RSNA defines a number of security features in addition to wired equivalency privacy (WEP) and IEEE 802.11 authentication, both of which are typically used as baseline security measures for conventional 802.11 WLANs. These security features include enhanced authentication mechanisms for STAs, key management algorithms, and cryptographic key establishment. RNSA also features an enhanced data encapsulation mechanism that may be implemented using temporal keys corresponding to the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), as well as other security measures. RSNA by a pair of devices doesn't by itself provide robust security. Robust security is provided when all the devices in the network use RSNAs. - An RSNA relies on several components external to the IEEE 802.11 suite of Standards. The first component is an IEEE 802.1X (IEEE P802.1X-REV, Draft Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access Control) port access entity (PAE). PAEs are present on all STAs in an RSNA and control the forwarding of data to and from the MAC. An access point implements an Authenticator PAE and implements the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Authenticator role, whiie a STA implements a Supplicant PAE and implements the EAP peer role. In an independent basic service set (IBSS) environment, each STA implements both an Authenticator PAE and a Supplicant PAE and both the EAP Authenticator and EAP peer roles.
- A second component is the Authentication Server (AS). The AS may authenticate the elements of the RSNA itself, i.e., the non-AP STAs, while APs may provide material that the RSNA elements can use to authenticate each other. The AS communicates through the IEEE 802.1X Authenticator with the IEEE 802.1X Supplicant on each STA, enabling the STA to be authenticated to the AS and vice versa. An RSNA depends upon the use of an EAP method that supports mutual authentication of the AS and the STA. In certain applications, the AS may be integrated into the same physical device as the AP, or into a STA in an IBSS.
- IEEE 802.11i™-2004 Standard uses the notion of a security association to describe secure operations. Secure communications are possible only within the context of a security association, as this is the context providing the state—cryptographic keys, counters, sequence spaces, etc.,—needed for correct operation of the IEEE 802.11™-2004 cipher suites.
- As defined under section 8.4 (RSNA security association management) of IEEE 802.11i™-2004 Standard, a security association is a set of policy(ies) and key(s) used to protect information. The information in the security association is stored by each party of the security association, must be consistent among all parties, and must have an identity. The identity is a compact name of the key and other bits of security association information to fit into a table index or an MPDU (MAC protocol data unit).
- Returning to
FIG. 3 , this figure shows operations performed at a QSTA X (QSTA-X) and a QAP to set up an RSNA link. In accordance with amessage exchange 300, the RSNA link is set up by passing EAPOL—(EAP over LAN) Key frames between the QSTA-X and the QAP. The EAPOL-Key frames contain data pertinent to setting up an RSNA link, including various QSTA-X attributes (e.g., MAC address, capabilities, etc.) and key-related data. It is noted that a station need not be a QSTA to set up an RSNA link; however, a station will still need the QoS facility to perform direct links, as described below, for some embodiments. - During
message exchange 300, the QAP will pass key information, along with information identifying algorithms to be subsequently employed for key extraction and authentication operations. These include a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) 302, a MIC (Message Integrity Code) algorithm identifier (MIC_ID) 304, and a Wrap encryption algorithm identifier (Wrap_ID) 306. - RSNA defines two key hierarchies: a) Pairwise key hierarchy, to protect unicast traffic, and b) Group Temporal Key (GTK), a hierarchy consisting of a single key to protect multicast and broadcast traffic. At the top of the Pairwise hierarchy is the Pairwise Masker Key (PMK). Under alternative approaches, a PMK can be derived from an EAP-based method or may be obtained directly from a pre-shared key (PSK). In one embodiment, the Pairwise key hierarchy utilizes PRF-384 or PRF-512 (Pseudo Random Function-X, as defined below, where X=number of bits) to derive session-specific keys from a 256 bit PMK. The Pairwise key hierarchy takes a PMK and generates a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), as depicted in
FIG. 3 by aPTK 308. The PTK is partitioned into the KCK (first 128 bits) and KEK (second 128 bits), and temporal keys used by the MAC to protect unicast communication between the Authenticator's and Supplicant's respective STAs. - Section 8.5.1.1 of the IEEE 802.11i™-2004 Standard defines the PRF function as follows, wherein A is a unique label for each different purpose of the PRF; Y is a single octet containing 0; X is a single octet containing the parameter; and ∥ denotes concatenation:
- H—SHA-1(K, A, B, X)←HMAC—SHA-1(K, A∥YμBμX)
- PRF(K, A, B, Len)
-
- for i+←0 to (Len+159)/160 do
- R←R∥H-SHA-1(K, A, B, i)
- return L(R, 0, Len)
- for i+←0 to (Len+159)/160 do
- PRF-128(K, A, B)=PRF(K, A, B, 128)
- PRF-192(K, A, B)=PRF(K, A, B, 192)
- PRF-256(K, A, B)=PRF(K, A, B, 256)
- PRF-384(K, A, B)=PRF(K, A, B, 384)
- PRF-512(K, A, B)=PRF(K, A, B, 512)
- As shown in
FIG. 3 , each of a key configuration key (KCK_X) 310 and a key encryption key (KEK_X) 312 is derived fromPTK 308 by QSTA-X and stored on QSTA-X, along with the MIC_ID and Wrap_lD. Similarly, values for KCK_X and KEK-X are derived by the QAP and stored on the QAP along with the MIC_ID and Wrap_ID (which were already stored on the QAP prior to setting up the RSNA link). - In a manner similar to that illustrated in
FIG. 3 , the QAP will set up an RSNA link with other applicable QSTAs in the WLAN. The net result of this is that (in addition to having an RSNA link set up) each QSTA will store a respective set of KCK and KEK key values, along with information identifying the MIC algorithm and Wrap algorithm employed by the WLAN security mechanism. - Details of the DLS link set up operation of
block 204 are illustrated inFIG. 4 . In particular, the DLS protocol to set up DLS link is discussed under section 11.7 of the IEEE P802.11e/D13.0 draft Standard.FIG. 4 , which is analogous to FIG. 68.9 in section 11.7, shows four messages (1 a, 1 b, 2 a and 2 b) passed between QoS stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B and a QoS access point QAP to set up a direct link 400 between stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B. The DLS link set up operation proceeds as follows. Station QSTA-A, which intends to exchange frames directly with another non-AP station QSTA-B, invokes DLS and sends aDLS Request frame 402 to the QAP, as depicted bymessage 1 a. The DLS Request frame includes the rate set, capabilities of QSTA-A, as well as the MAC addresses of QSTA-A (the initiator) and QSTA-B (the target recipient of the DLS Request). - If the target recipient (QSTA-B in this instance) is associated with the BSS for the QAP, direct streams (i.e., links) are allowed in the policy of the BSS, and the target recipient is a QSTA, the QAP then forward the DLS Request frame to the recipient, as depicted by
message 1 b. If the target recipient does not meet these qualifications, a message is returned from the QAP to the initiator indicating that the targeted station does not support direct links. In some instances, the QAP may not receive the DLS request frame from QSTA-A. Under this situation, the QSTA-A may re-send the DLS request frame to the QAP after a time-out period. As discussed above, under the optional operations ofblock 202, each QSTA is provided with a list of other available QSTA's. Accordingly, under such implementations, an initiator station will be able to ascertain whether a target station supports the applicable QoS facility to support direct links with that station prior to sending a DLS Request frame to that station. - If the recipient station accepts the request to set up a direct link with the initiator, it sends a
DLS Response frame 404 to the QAP, as depicted bymessage 2 a. The DLS Response frame contains the rate set, (extended) capabilities of QSTA-B, and the MAC addresses of QSTA-A and QSTA-B. The QAP then forwards the DLS Response frame to QSTA-A (message 2 b), after which the direct link 400 becomes active and frames can be sent from QSTA-A to QSTA-B and from QSTA-B to QSTA-A. - Section 11.7.5 in the IEEE 802.11e/D13 draft Standard specifies a security scheme to enable secured DLS operation. However, the specified security scheme is insufficient to provide adequate security in today's environment. Specifically, the inventors have identified the following design flaws:
-
- 1. The IEEE 802.11i™-2004 or IEEE 802.11e/D13 Standards do not specify how the QAP generates the STAKey EAPOL-Key frames, and if it is strong or weak security key;
- 2. The AP does not bind the identities of the communicating parties using the key derivation. This allows any other party to reuse the key for an unauthorized purpose;
- 3. The DLS STA's do not use a handshake procedure link (e.g., a 4-Way Handshake) to verify the binding that the AP should have specified; and
- 4. The key derivation scheme for DLS is unspecified by IEEE 802.11i™-2004 and by IEEE 802.11e/D13 Standards. If the AP does not generate different and independent keys for different DLS sessions, all the security guarantee claims made by IEEE 802.11i™-2004 will be voided.
- In accordance with aspects of the security mechanisms now described, techniques are disclosed for setting up secure direct links with substantial enhancements over the secure direct link scheme employed by the IEEE 802.11e/D13 draft Standard. These aspects not only address the aforementioned design flaws, but provide a key generation, distribution and implementation environment that is computationally secure. What these means is that given the current computer technology, it is not computationally feasible to “intercept” or otherwise identify the keys used for encrypting data sent over the secure links. Furthermore, the techniques may be easily extended to provide computationally secure protection for future, yet to be developed computer processing capabilities.
-
FIGS. 5 a and 5 b shows details of a message exchange process used to set up security measures for an established, but unsecured direct link, according to one embodiment of the invention. In general, the operations illustrated inFIGS. 5 a and 5 b correspond to the operation ofblock 206 inFIG. 2 as discussed above. At the beginning of this stage, an unsecured DLS link has been set up between stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B. Additionally, each of these stations is storing a respective set of KCK and KEK keys provided to them during a previous RSNA link set up (e.g., in accordance with the operations ofblock 200 andFIG. 3 ), as well as identifiers for the MIC and Wrap encryption algorithms implemented for the security scheme employed for the WLAN. - Typically, a request to deploy the security measures will be initiated by the initiator of the DLS link, although this isn't a strict requirement. Accordingly, the secure link set up process illustrated in
FIG. 5 a is initiated by station QSTA-A, which generates a random number R_A in ablock 500 and sends amessage 502 including R_A concatenated with the MAC address of stations QSTA-B and QSTA-A (MAC_B and MAC_A) to station QSTA-B. - In response to receiving
message 502, station QSTA-B generates its own random number R_B in ablock 504, and generates amessage 506 to the QAP containing a concatenation of R_B, R_A, MAC_B, and MAC_A. Thus, this message binds the identities of both stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B to the random numbers R_A and R_B.Message 506 is then sent from station QSTA-B to the QAP. In response to receivingmessage 506, the QAP extracts the values for each of R_B, R_A, MAC_B, and MAC_A, and stores them in memory. - Next, in a
block 508, the QAP generates a symmetric session key K_AB and a Key Name identifier KID_AB. In one embodiment, K_AB is a random number of sufficient length applicable to the WLAN environment to computationally guarantee security in view of existing computing capabilities. For example, under today's computing capabilities, security keys having a length of 128-bit or above are generally termed computationally secure in view of the computing capabilities of current supercomputers. It is further noted that since the computing capabilities of WLAN stations are typically orders of magnitude lower than supercomputers, the length of the keys describe herein may be significantly less than 128 bits, such as but not limited to 64-bit keys. - Meanwhile, in one embodiment KID_AB is calculated using the following equation:
KID— AB:=hash(R — B∥R — A∥MAC — B∥MAC — A) (1)
In general, one of many various well-known hash functions may be employed inEquation 1, such as SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm)-1, SHA-256, or AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) in the Davies-Meyer mode. - Once the values for K_AB and KID_AB are generated, the QAP generates a pair of security strings SA and SB to be respectively employed for securely transferring the K_AB and KID_AB values to stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B. For example, security string values SA and SB are generated using the following equation:
SA:=R — A∥MAC — B∥MAC — A∥Wrap(KEK — A, K — AB∥KID— AB) (2a)
SB:=R — B∥MAC — B∥MAC — A∥Wrap(KEK — B, K — AB∥KID— AB) (2b) - Under the foregoing equations, the Wrap (
param 1, param 2) function corresponds to an agreed-to key wrap encryption algorithm employed by the WLAN deployment and identified by the Wrap_ID value stored at the QAP and each of stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B. In one embodiment, the Wrap function corresponds to the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) key wrap algorithm, defined in IETF RFC (Internet Engineering Task Force Request for Comment) 3394, Advanced Encryption Standard Key Wrap Algorithm, September 2002. Other encryption algorithms may also me employed. - In addition to generating the security string SA and SB, the QAP also generates a hash on each of these strings using a hash function identified by an agreed-to MIC algorithm identified by the MIC_ID values distributed during the RSNA link set up previously performed. As shown by the following equations 3a and 3b:
hash(SA):=MIC(KCK — A, R — A∥MAC — B∥MAC — A∥Wrap(KEK — A, K_AB∥KID— AB)) (3a)
hash(SB)=MIC(KCK — B, R — A∥MAC — B∥MAC — A∥Wrap(KEK — B, K — AB∥KID — AB)) (3b)
The Message Integrity Check (MIC) algorithm employs the respective key conformation keys KCK_A and KCK_B as the hash keys that operate on the respective security strings SA and SB. In general, the MIC algorithm may employ one of many well-known hash algorithms that are implemented by the WLAN security scheme. For example, in one embodiment, the HMAC SHA-1 algorithm or AES in CMAC mode may be employed as the MIC algorithm. Other hash algorithms may also be implemented in a similar manner. - Once the security strings and corresponding MIC hashes are generated,
messages FIG. 5 b, upon receipt of their respective messages, each of stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B first performs a check on the hash portion of the message to confirm the authenticity of the message. It does this by performing a similar hash using the hash algorithm identified by its stored MIC_ID value on the security string portion of the message using its stored key confirmation key as the hash key. For example, station QSTA-A would evaluate the following equality to determine if it is TRUE:
MIC(KCK — A, SA)=hash(SA) (4) - As depicted by a
decision block 514, if the inequality evaluates to TRUE, the authenticity of the message is confirmed. Under such a result, the QSTA then unwraps the K_AB and KID_AB values using its key encryption key and the agreed-to Wrap encryption algorithm, which is identified by the Wrap_ID value. This operation is performed by station QSTA-A in ablock 518. If the result ofdecision block 514 is FALSE, then the message received from the QAP is either corrupted, or it was sent by another station or entity “faking” that it is the QAP. Under this circumstance, the entire process should be restarted. - Similar operations are performed at station QSTA-B. In this case, the equality,
MIC(KCK — A, SB)=hash(SB) (5)
is evaluated in adecision block 516. If the result is TRUE, station QSTA-B unwraps the K_AB and KID_AB values using its key encryption key and the agreed-to Wrap encryption algorithm identified by the Wrap_ID value, as depicted in ablock 518. As before, if the result is FALSE, the process is restarted. - Another aspect of the messaging scheme is the including of the previously-generated random numbers R_A and R_B that is employed in the
respective messages - At this point, each of stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B have extracted the same values for symmetric session key K_AB and key name KID_AB from
respective messages FIG. 6 below. A corresponding Pairwise DLS Transient Key (PDTK) is then derived from the PMK, using the 4-Way Handshake between the two stations, and installed in ablock 524 at each of stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B. These stations may then employ the PDTK to implement asecure link 526 using well-known encryption techniques. - In connection with the foregoing activities, the QAP should delete the symmetric session key K_AB, or otherwise prevent any other element in the WLAN from accessing this key. Since the PTK ultimately derived from key K_AB is only used for sending messages between stations (e.g., QSTA-A and QSTA-B), there is no reason for the QAP to keep key K_AB.
-
FIG. 6 illustrates one embodiment of 4-Way Handshake 522. At the start of the sequence, each of stations QSTA-A and QSTA-B have received a copy of K_AB, which operates as a PMK. The 4-Way Handshake is similar to other types of key establishment protocols, and is described in the 802.11i™-2004 Standard. In the exemplary message exchange, station QSTA-A is the EAP authenticator (A) and station QSTA-B is the EAP supplicant. - In a
block 600, station QSTA-A generates a nonce ANonce. Similarly, in a block 602, station QSTA-B generates a nonce SNonce. A nonce is a number used once in security schemes and typically may comprise a random number or a current time (in number form). Station QSTA-A sends afirst message 604 comprising an EAPOL-Key frame containing the ANonce and a Unicast identifier code to station QSTA-B. In response, station QSTA-B derives a PDTK from its copy of the PMK (K_AB) in ablock 606. Station QSTA-B then sends amessage 608 comprising an EAPOL-Key frame containing the SNonce, Unicast identifier code, and a MIC identifier to station QSTA-A. In response, station QSTA-A derives its PDTK from its copy of the PMK in ablock 610. - The 4-Way Handshake is completed using the
third message 612 and thefourth message 614. Thethird message 612 comprises an EAPOL-Key frame containing indicia to tell the recipient to install the PDTK, the Unicast identifier code, the MIC identifier, and potentially additional optional parameters, such as a GTK. Thefourth message 614 comprises an EAPOL-Key frame containing the Unicast identifier code and the MIC identifier. After exchange of the third andfourth messages respective blocks - To support transport of the messages between the various endpoints in
FIGS. 5 a and 5 b, in one embodiment authentication management frames are employed to encapsulate the message data, as defined by section 7.3 in the IEEE 802.11i™-2004 Standard. Other data encapsulation frame formats may also be employed in a similar manner. - In general, the random numbers described herein may be generated by a true random number generator or a pseudo random number generator (provided the bit length and randomness of the random number is sufficient). Furthermore, the random numbers may be generated using either software- or hardware-based mechanisms, using well-known algorithms.
- In general, the logic for performing the operations of the wireless stations described herein will be primarily or solely implemented via execution of software and/or firmware instructions on the station's host device. For example, for stations such as a notebook computer or desktop computer, the logic may be generally implemented in an operating system component or an application program that runs on an operating system. For instance, in one embodiment the logic is implemented in a WLAN operating system driver. Meanwhile, for hand-held devices and the like, the logic may be typically implemented via firmware or as an application running on a host operating system built into the device.
- In addition to implementing operations via execution of software and firmware, other operations may be implemented via built-in hardware logic, such as programmed logic contained in FPGAs (field programmable gate arrays) ASICs (Application specific integrated circuits), and similar circuits. Techniques for implementing logic using these and other hardware-based mechanisms are well-known in the electronic arts.
- The operations performed by the access points described herein are typically implemented in a somewhat different manner than for the stations. Unlike the general-purpose capabilities provided by a WLAN station, a typical AP comprises a stand-alone device of relatively low cost that is configured to perform dedicated WLAN host operations. As such, the AP device does not employ an operating system (or employs a very minimal operating system), but rather implements its logic via built-in hardware logic and execution of firmware on a built-in processor element or the like.
- In further detail,
FIG. 7 shows a block diagram illustrating the principle functional blocks of a typical 802.11 wireless access point. At the top level, the blocks include aWLAN sub-system 700, a WLAN/Ethernet bridge 702, and anEthernet controller 704. The WLAN sub-system generally includes components use to facilitate WLAN operations at the PHY (Physical) layer, as well as control of the 802.11 air interface. For simplicity, these components are depicted as includingradio hardware 706 and aWLAN controller 708. As used herein, the WLAN radio hardware comprise the components of a wireless AP used to generate and process radio signals that are employed for the air interface to facilitate communications between the AP and WLAN stations. Such components will typically include an antenna, as well and analog and digital circuitry for generating outgoing and processing received radio frequency (RF) signals in accordance with the applicable WLAN protocol(s) employed by the AP. - The WLAN controller is further depicted as including an 802.11
PHY block 710, and an 802.11 MAC (Media Access Control)block 712. As will be recognized by those skilled in the networking arts, the PHY and MAC blocks are respectively associated with the Physical and Data Link layers, which comprise the two lowest layers (layer-1 and layer-2) in the seven-layer OSI (Open System Interconnect) network communication model. - As its name implies, WLAN/
Ethernet bridge 702 is employed as a bridge between 802.11 WLAN signals and 802.3 Ethernet signals. More particularly, in the illustrated architecture, WLAN/Ethernet bridge 702 provides an interface between 802.11 frames passed to and from the WLAN sub-system, and 802.3 frames passed to and fromEthernet controller 704. This is facilitated, in part, by an 802.11/802.3translator 714, which translates frame formats between 802.11 and 802.3 and vice-versa. As an option, the frame translation operations may be performed byWLAN controller 708. - As discussed above, an access point may also need to perform switching and/or routing functions. At one level, switching operations are performed via
WLAN sub-system 700, such as managing access to the WLAN channel(s) using collision avoidance mechanisms and the like, since by its nature, the WLAN air interface comprises a shared medium necessitating some type of switching mechanism. Additionally, the AP must perform switching/routing operations, wherein packets received at an input side of an input/output (I/O) port are routed to either an appropriate destination station via the WLAN sub-system or to another I/O port to be transferred to another network. For illustrative purposes, the switching and routing operations are depicted inFIG. 7 as being performed by a switch/router block 720 on WLAN/Ethernet bridge 702; however, it will be understood that some of the switching and routing operations may be performed byEthernet controller 704. - Another operation typically provided by an access point relates to security. Not only is a WLAN signal sent over a shared medium, it may be accessed (at the signal level) by any station within the AP's coverage area, regardless of whether that station is authorized or not to access the AP. Accordingly, to control AP access, various security schemes are implemented, such as WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) and WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) schemes. Under these schemes, packets are encrypted using some security key infrastructure, such as shared keys, rotating keys, etc. At the same time, Ethernet transmissions are typically are either a) not encrypted or b) encrypted using decryption/encryption managed by the transmission endpoints rather than the AP (e.g., Virtual Private Connections, Secure Socket Layer security, etc.) To facilitate the encryption and decryption operations necessary to support secure WLAN traffic, WLAN/
Ethernet bridge 702 also includes an encryption/decryption block 722. Generally, some or all of the operations illustrated by encryption/decryption block 722 may be performed byWLAN sub-system 700, depending on the particular AP architecture. - Another operation provided by an AP is station management. For example, prior to being permitted access to AP services, a station typically needs to perform a registration operation or the like, such as performed during an RSNA link set up. During this process, the MAC address of the station will be acquired and the station will be identified/authenticated, an IP (Internet Protocol) address of the station will be dynamically or statically allocated and stored in an MAC-to-IP address translation table access by switch/
router 720, and other related operations are performed. The station management operations are collectively depicted as being performed by astation management block 724, whichaccess WLAN controller 708 via amanagement interface 726. - The
Ethernet controller 704 is used to provide the interface between the AP and various networks to which the AP is communicatively coupled via corresponding network infrastructure, such as switches, bridges, routers, etc. To facilitate these operations, the Ethernet controller typically includes one or more I/O ports 728, an 802.3PHY block 730, and an 802.3MAC block 732. In general, I/O ports 728 will be coupled to one or more networks via corresponding IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet) links. Accordingly, such ports are alternately referred to as Ethernet ports or Ethernet I/O ports. In other instances, an Ethernet port name includes its underlying transmission rate, such as a GigE (Gigabit per second Ethernet) port for for Ethernet ports supporting GigE transmission rates. - The partitioning of the functional blocks illustrated in
FIG. 7 is merely for illustrated purposes. Generally, the functional blocks may be implemented on one or more physical components, such as integrated circuits and analog circuitry corresponding toradio hardware 706. In some implementations, such as discussed below, the functional blocks of WLAN/Ethernet Bride 702 andEthernet controller 704 will be combined on a single integrated circuit. Under such implementations, there will not be a duplication of an 802.3 MAC block, such as depicted by 802.3 MAC blocks 718 and 732 inFIG. 7 . - Typically, the operations depicted by all or a portion of the various functional blocks depicted for the WLAN/Ethernet bridge are facilitated via execution of corresponding software modules that are executed on an embedded processor or the like, or otherwise via embedded hardware logic. The various logic and processor elements may comprise discreet components, or may be combined on one or more integrated circuits or the like.
-
FIG. 8 shows one embodiment of an AP architecture employing a Network Processor Unit (NPU) 800 that is used to perform functions generally analogous to those described above for WLAN/Ethernet Bridge 702 andEthernet controller 704 ofFIG. 7 .NPU 800 includes an internal (embedded)processor 802 coupled to anEthernet controller 804, amemory controller 806, and acommunication interface 808 via an internal bus structure or the like. Thememory controller 806 provides access to anexternal memory 810, which will typically comprise some type of DRAM-(Dynamic Random Access Memory) based memory, such as DDRDRAM (double data-rate DRAM), SDRAM (Synchronous DRAM), RDRAM (Rambus DRAM), etc.Communication interface 808 provides an interface toWLAN controller 708. In general, this interface may be some type of bus- or serial-based interface. - Instruction to be executed on
internal processor 802 to perform associated AP operations will typically be stored in some type of non-volatile (NV) storage device, such as depicted by anNV store 812. For example, NV store may generally comprise a rewritable non-volatile memory, such as a flash memory device. Typically,internal processor 802 may access NV store either directly, throughmemory controller 806, or through another memory interface (not shown). A portion of the instructions may also be downloaded during runtime using a carrier wave file or the like and stored inexternal memory 806. - Encryption and decryption operations may typically be performed via execution of corresponding software/firmware on
internal processor 802, or via built-in hardware components, such as depicted by optional encryption anddecryption units internal processor 802, or via a build-in random number generator (RNG)unit 818. - As described above, various operations performed by the WLAN stations and the APs herein may be implemented via execution of software and/or firmware on some type of processing element. Thus, embodiments of this invention may be used as or to support instructions embodied as one or more software/firmware components executed upon some form of processing element or otherwise implemented or realized upon or within a machine-readable medium. A machine-readable medium includes any mechanism for storing or transmitting information in a form readable by a machine (e.g., a computer). For example, a machine-readable medium can include articles of manufacture such as a read only memory (ROM); a random access memory (RAM); a magnetic disk storage media; an optical storage media; and a flash memory device, etc. In addition, a machine-readable medium can include propagated signals such as electrical, optical, acoustical or other form of propagated signals (e.g., carrier waves, infrared signals, digital signals, etc.).
- The mechanisms disclosed herein for setting up secure direct link between WLAN stations provide significant advantages over the security scheme defined in the IEEE 802.11e/D13 draft Standard. Notably, a newly generated key is employed to secure each direct link session, based on a randomly-generated and statistically unpredictable number. Additionally, the key distribution mechanism is computationally unbreakable, guaranteeing that only the intended recipients will be able to access the shared session key from which the PDTK is derived. Furthermore, the key distribution mechanism provides built-in authentication and message identity features, ensuring each direct link participant station that the only WLAN elements having access to a session key are the participant stations and the QAP.
- The above description of illustrated embodiments of the invention, including what is described in the Abstract, is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise forms disclosed. While specific embodiments of, and examples for, the invention are described herein for illustrative purposes, various equivalent modifications are possible within the scope of the invention, as those skilled in the relevant art will recognize.
- These modifications can be made to the invention in light of the above detailed description. The terms used in the following claims should not be construed to limit the invention to the specific embodiments disclosed in the specification and the drawings. Rather, the scope of the invention is to be determined entirely by the following claims, which are to be construed in accordance with established doctrines of claim interpretation.
Claims (26)
1. A method comprising:
setting up a direct link between first and second stations in a wireless local area network (WLAN) hosted by an access point (AP), the direct link comprising a new communication session;
generating, at the AP, a session key unique to the new communication session;
transferring copies of the session key to each of the first and second stations in a manner under which only the first and second stations can obtain the session key; and
implementing a security mechanism for the direct link to effect a secure direct link employing a secure session key derived from the session key.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein each of the access point and the first and second stations support quality of service facilities defined by the IEEE 802.11e/D13 draft Standard, and the direct link comprises a DLS link set up using the Direct Link Set-up (DLS) protocol.
3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
setting up a first (Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) link between the first station and the AP, set up of the first RSNA link including a first key exchange between the first station and the AP; and
setting up a second RSNA link between the second station and the AP, set up of the second RSNA link including a second key exchange between the second station and the AP.
4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
generating first and second Pairwise master keys;
passing the first and second Pairwise master keys to the first and second stations, respectively;
deriving a first Key Encryption Key (KEK) from the first Pairwise master key at each of the first station and the AP;
deriving a second KEK from the second Pairwise master key at each of the second station and the AP
encrypting a first copy of the session key using the first KEK and sending a first message containing the encrypted first copy of the symmetric session key from the AP to the first station;
encrypting a second copy of the session key using the second KEK and sending a second message containing the encrypted second copy of the session key from the AP to the second station;
employing, at the first station, the first KEK to decrypt the first message to extract the first copy of the session key;
employing, at the second station, the second KEK to decrypt the first message to extract the second copy of the session key.
5. The method of claim 4 , further comprising:
passing information identifying a key wrap algorithm employed to encrypt the first and second copies of the session key to the first and second stations; and employing the key wrap algorithm at the first and second stations to decrypt encrypted wrappers containing the first and second copies of the session key.
6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
generating first and second Key Conformation Keys (KCKs);
passing the first and second KCKs from the AP to the first and second stations, respectively;
encapsulating a first copy of the session key in a first message containing a first security string and a hash of the first security string, the hash of the first security string employing the first KCK;
encapsulating a second copy of the session key in a second message containing a second security string and a hash of the second security string, the hash of the second security string employing the second KCK;
sending the first and second messages from the AP to the first and second stations, respectively;
employing, at the first station, the first KCK to authenticate the first message by performing a hash on the first security string using the first KCK and comparing the result with the hash of the first security string contained in the first message; and
employing, at the second station, the second KCK to authenticate the second message by performing a hash on the second security string using the second KCK and comparing the result with the hash of the second security string contained in the second message.
7. The method of claim 6 , further comprising:
passing information to the first and second stations identifying a Message Integrity Code (MIC) algorithm employed to performing the hashes on the first and second security strings contained in the first and second messages; and
employing the MIC algorithm at the first and second stations to hash the first and second security strings contained in the first and second messages in connection with authenticating the first and second messages.
8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
generating a first random number at the first station;
generating a second random number at the second station;
transferring the first and second random numbers to the AP; and
employing the first random and second random numbers to generate a key name associated with the session key.
9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
generating, at the AP, a key name to be associated with the session key;
providing a copy of the key name to each of the first and second stations;
performing a four-way handshake using the session key as a Pairwise master key and the key name as a key identifier; and
deriving a Pairwise Transient Key from the session key, the Pairwise Transient Key used as the secure session key.
10. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
generating a first random number at the first station;
transferring the first random number in a message to the second station to request setting up a secure direct link between the first station and the second station;
transferring the first random number from the second station to the AP;
embedding the first random number in a message sent from the AP to the first station in conjunction with setting up a secure direct link between the first station and the second station, the first random number used to correlate the message sent from the AP with the request to set up the secure direct link between the first station and the second station.
11. A wireless access point (AP), comprising:
a radio frequency (RF) interface, transmit and receive RF signals corresponding to a wireless communications protocol;
a processor coupled to the RF interface; and
logic implemented via at least one of embedded logic and execution of machine instructions stored on the AP and executed by a processor to perform operations including:
generating first and second keys and passing the first and second keys to first and second stations in a wireless local area network (WLAN) hosted by the AP;
performing AP-side operations to facilitate setting up a direct link between the first and second stations, the direct link comprising a new communication session;
generating a session key unique to the new communication session;
generating a first message including a first encrypted copy of the session key, the first encrypted copy generated using an encryption algorithm employing an encryption parameter comprising one of the first key or a value derived thereform;
generating a second message including a second encrypted copy of the session key, the second encrypted copy generated using encryption
algorithm employing an encryption parameter comprising one of the second key or a value derived thereform; and
sending the first and second messages to the first and second stations, respectively.
12. The wireless AP of claim 11 , wherein each of the AP and the first and second stations support quality of service facilities defined by the IEEE 802.11e/D13 draft Standard, and the direct link comprises a DLS link set up using the Direct Link Set-up (DLS) protocol.
13. The wireless AP of claim 11 , wherein the logic further performs AP-side operations to facilitate setting up of Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) links between the AP and each of the first and second stations, and wherein the first and second keys comprise first and second Pairwise master keys that are passed to the first and second stations in connection with set up of their respective RSNA links, and wherein the encryption parameters comprise Key Encryption Keys derived from the first and second Pairwise master keys.
14. The wireless AP of claim 11 , wherein the logic further performs operations comprising:
sending messages to each of the first and second stations containing an identifier for the encryption algorithm used for encrypting the session key.
15. The wireless AP of claim 11 , wherein the logic further performs operations comprising:
passing information identifying a Message Integrity Code (MIC) algorithm to be employed as a hashing function to the first and second stations;
generating a first security string comprising an encrypted session key and a hash of the first security string generated using the MIC algorithm;
generating a second security string comprising an encrypted session key and a hash of the first security string generated using the MIC algorithm;
including the first security string and the hash of the first security string in the first message; and
including the second security string and the hash of the second security string in the second message.
16. The wireless AP of claim 15 , wherein the each of the first and second security strings includes respective first and second identifiers generated by the first and second stations and received by the wireless AP in connection with setting up a secure direct link.
17. A machine-readable medium, to provide instructions to be executed on a wireless access point (AP) to perform operations comprising:
generating first and second keys and passing the first and second keys to first and second stations in a wireless local area network (WLAN) hosted by the AP;
performing AP-side operations to facilitate setting up a direct link between the first and second stations, the direct link comprising a new communication session;
generating a session key unique to the new communication session;
generating a first message including a first encrypted copy of the session key, the first encrypted copy generated using an encryption algorithm employing an encryption parameter comprising one of the first key or a value derived thereform;
generating a second message including a second encrypted copy of the session key, the second encrypted copy generated using an encryption algorithm employing an encryption parameter comprising one of the second key or a value derived thereform; and
sending the first and second messages to the first and second stations, respectively.
18. The machine-readable medium of claim 17 , wherein each of the AP and the first and second stations support quality of service facilities defined by the IEEE 802.11e/D13 draft Standard, and the direct link comprises a DLS link set up using the Direct Link Set-up (DLS) protocol.
19. The machine-readable medium of claim 17 , wherein execution of the instructions perform further operations comprising:
performing AP-side operations to facilitate setting up Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) links between the AP and each of the first and second stations, and wherein the first and second keys comprise first and second Pairwise master keys that are passed to the first and second stations in connection with set up of their respective RSNA links, and wherein the encryption parameters comprise Key Encryption Keys derived from the first and second Pairwise master keys.
20. The machine-readable medium of claim 17 , wherein execution of the instructions perform further operations comprising:
sending messages to each of the first and second stations containing an identifier for the encryption algorithm used for encrypting the session key.
21. The machine-readable medium of claim 17 , wherein execution of the instructions perform further operations comprising:
passing information identifying a Message Integrity Code (MIC) algorithm to be employed as a hashing function to the first and second stations;
generating a first security string comprising an encrypted session key and a hash of the first security string generated using the MIC algorithm;
generating a second security string comprising an encrypted session key and a hash of the first security string generated using the MIC algorithm;
including the first security string and the hash of the first security string in the first message; and
including the second security string and the hash of the second security string in the second message.
22. A machine-readable medium, to provide instructions to be executed on a first station in a wireless local area network (WLAN) hosted by a wireless access point (AP) to perform operations comprising:
receiving a first key from the AP;
generating a Key Encryption Key (KEK) from the first key;
performing station-side operations to set up a direct link between the first station and a second station in the WLAN;
submitting a request to set up a secure direct link;
receiving a message from the AP containing an session key that was encrypted using an encryption algorithm employing the KEK as a parameter;
extracting the session key from the message using a decryption algorithm associated with the encryption algorithm and employing the KEK as a parameter; and
negotiating a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) with the second station to be employed to facilitate a secured direct link, the PTK derived from the session key.
23. The machine-readable medium of claim 22 , wherein execution of the instructions performs further operations comprising:
generating a random number;
including the random number in a secure link initiation request message;
extracting a message identifier from the message received from the AP; and
comparing the message identifier with the random number to verify the message is associated with the secure link request initiation message.
24. The machine-readable medium of claim 22 , wherein execution of the instructions perform further operations comprising:
performing station-side operations to facilitate setting up a Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) link between the station and the AP,
and wherein the first key comprises a Pairwise master key that is passed to the station in connection with setting up the RSNA links, and KCK is derived from the Pairwise master key.
25. The machine-readable medium of claim 22 , wherein each of the first station and the AP support quality of service facilities defined by the IEEE 802.11e/D13 draft Standard, and the direct link comprises a DLS link set up using the Direct Link Set-up (DLS) protocol.
26. The machine-readable medium of claim 17 , wherein execution of the instructions perform further operations comprising:
receiving information from the AP identifying a Message Integrity Code (MIC) algorithm to be employed as a hashing function in the message sent from the AP;
extracting a security string and the hash of the security string from the message sent from the AP;
employing an MIC algorithm identified by the information received from the AP to perform a hash on the security string; and
comparing the hash of the security string with the hash of the security string contained in the message to authenticate the message.
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CNA2006800407505A CN101300809A (en) | 2005-11-03 | 2006-11-02 | Method, system and readable medium for setting up secure direct links between wireless network stations using direct link set-up (DLS) protocol |
PCT/US2006/042890 WO2007056103A1 (en) | 2005-11-03 | 2006-11-02 | Method, system and readable medium for setting up secure direct links between wireless network stations using direct link set-up (dls) protocol |
EP15183950.3A EP2988471A1 (en) | 2005-11-03 | 2006-11-02 | Method, system and readable medium for setting up secure direct links between wireless network stations using direct link set-up (dls) protocol |
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US16/188,848 US11233633B2 (en) | 2005-11-03 | 2018-11-13 | Method and system of secured direct link set-up (DLS) for wireless networks |
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US9380457B2 (en) | 2016-06-28 |
EP1943812A1 (en) | 2008-07-16 |
EP1943812B1 (en) | 2015-09-09 |
US20170118633A1 (en) | 2017-04-27 |
CN101300809A (en) | 2008-11-05 |
EP2988471A1 (en) | 2016-02-24 |
US20110258448A1 (en) | 2011-10-20 |
WO2007056103A1 (en) | 2007-05-18 |
US20190246268A1 (en) | 2019-08-08 |
US7995546B2 (en) | 2011-08-09 |
US20100070767A1 (en) | 2010-03-18 |
US11233633B2 (en) | 2022-01-25 |
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