WO2005081450A1 - 暗号化装置及び暗号化方法 - Google Patents
暗号化装置及び暗号化方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2005081450A1 WO2005081450A1 PCT/JP2004/019713 JP2004019713W WO2005081450A1 WO 2005081450 A1 WO2005081450 A1 WO 2005081450A1 JP 2004019713 W JP2004019713 W JP 2004019713W WO 2005081450 A1 WO2005081450 A1 WO 2005081450A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- encryption
- solid
- information
- state imaging
- imaging device
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 29
- 238000003384 imaging method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 87
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 claims description 31
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 23
- 210000004204 blood vessel Anatomy 0.000 description 15
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 15
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 8
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 7
- 230000007998 vessel formation Effects 0.000 description 7
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 4
- 102000001554 Hemoglobins Human genes 0.000 description 3
- 108010054147 Hemoglobins Proteins 0.000 description 3
- 239000008280 blood Substances 0.000 description 3
- 210000004369 blood Anatomy 0.000 description 3
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 239000008186 active pharmaceutical agent Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000033115 angiogenesis Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000010365 information processing Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000009772 tissue formation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002792 vascular Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2107—File encryption
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
- G06V40/00—Recognition of biometric, human-related or animal-related patterns in image or video data
- G06V40/10—Human or animal bodies, e.g. vehicle occupants or pedestrians; Body parts, e.g. hands
- G06V40/14—Vascular patterns
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present invention relates to an encryption device and an encryption method, and is preferably applied to, for example, encrypting information for certifying the validity of an identification target (hereinafter, referred to as authentication information). .
- authentication information for certifying the validity of an identification target (hereinafter, referred to as authentication information).
- an encryption device conforming to a secret key cryptosystem or a public key cryptosystem performs encryption by performing a predetermined encryption process on authentication information using encryption key information stored in an internal nonvolatile memory. Authentication information is generated and transmitted to a decryption device.
- the encryption device is designed to prevent the encryption key information stored in the nonvolatile memory from being stolen, thereby ensuring the reliability of the encryption function, and to prevent the encryption key information from being stolen.
- a method of mounting a non-volatile memory between predetermined members in a deep part in an encryption device, or a non-volatile memory and an encryption / decryption that encrypts only when encryption key information is stored in the non-volatile memory There is a method of mounting the integrated part as one chip (for example, see Patent Document 1).
- Patent Document 1 Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2000-252562.
- the present invention has been made in view of the above points, and an object of the present invention is to propose an encryption device and an encryption method capable of improving the reliability of an encryption function.
- an encryption device for encrypting information to be concealed an encryption device for encrypting information based on a signal output from an element group having a plurality of elements included therein is used.
- a generating means for generating a unique parameter and an encryption means for encrypting information using the unique parameter generated by the generating means are provided.
- a unique parameter in the element group is determined.
- a first step for generation and a second step for encrypting information using the generated unique parameters are provided.
- the information is encrypted using the intrinsic parameters of the internal element group, so that the information can be stored at the time of manufacture without being stored in a nonvolatile memory or the like in advance.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the authentication system.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the encryption device according to the present embodiment.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating a configuration of an imaging unit.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the decoding device. BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
- reference numeral 1 denotes the overall configuration of the authentication system according to the present embodiment, in which a plurality of encryption devices 2 (2A to 2N) of a communication source and a decryption device 3 of the communication partner are wirelessly connected.
- the encryption device 2 and the decryption device 3 can mutually transmit and receive various types of information.
- the encryption device 2 generates, as authentication information, a characteristic pattern in a predetermined part of a user who uses the encryption device 2 when communicating with the decryption device 3.
- the encryption device 2 generates encryption authentication information by performing a predetermined encryption process on the authentication information, and transmits this to the decryption device 3.
- the decryption device 3 restores the authentication information by performing a predetermined decryption process on the encrypted authentication information received at this time, and compares the authentication information with the corresponding registration information registered in advance.
- the decryption device 3 continues to use the encryption device only when it determines that the user who uses the encryption device 2 that has transmitted the authentication information at this time is an authorized registrant. The exchange of information with 2 is performed.
- the authentication system 1 determines the legitimacy of the user who uses the encryption device 2 using the biometric information of the user.
- the encryption device 2A includes an imaging unit 11 that captures an image of a blood vessel inside a finger as an imaging target, and an authentication unit that generates authentication information based on an imaging result of the imaging unit 11
- An information generation unit 12 an encryption unit 13 that encrypts the authentication information
- a communication unit 14 that performs communication processing conforming to a predetermined wireless communication method to transmit and receive information. Is done.
- the imaging unit 11 the light in the near infrared band (near infrared light) is specifically absorbed by deoxygenated hemoglobin (venous blood) or oxygenated hemoglobin (arterial blood) in the blood vessel. This is used to image the blood vessel.
- the imaging unit 11 has one or more light sources 21 that emit near-infrared light as shown in FIG. 3 (three light sources are shown as an example in FIG. 3).
- a first filter 22 and a first filter 22 that transmit light in a specific near-infrared band of the near-infrared light are provided.
- a second filter 23 and a solid-state imaging device 24 that transmit light in the near-infrared band that is absorbed by venous blood and light in the vicinity of the light obtained through the filter are sequentially arranged.
- the imaging unit 11 is provided with a light diffusing plate 25 at a position other than on the optical path of near-infrared light (hereinafter, referred to as an off-optical path position) P 1. It is movable between an outer optical path position P1 and a front position P2 at a predetermined distance from the solid-state imaging device 24 (hereinafter, referred to as an on-optical path position).
- the finger FG can be interposed between the first filter 22 and the second filter 23, and when the finger FG is interposed.
- a shielding part 26 is provided to block the entry of external light in the atmosphere to the optical path of the near-infrared light, so that when imaging a blood vessel inside the finger FG, visible light or ultraviolet light outside the shielding part 26 is used. It is designed to reduce the effect on near-infrared light.
- the imaging unit 11 emits near-infrared light from the light source 21 when an imaging instruction command is given in a state where the finger FG is inserted between the first and second filters 22 and 23. It fires and irradiates it to the finger FG through the first fill 22.
- the near-infrared light obtained via the finger FG is a blood vessel pattern light representing a vascular tissue formation pattern. As a result, the light enters the solid-state imaging device 24 via the second filter 23.
- the imaging unit 11 photoelectrically converts the blood vessel pattern light by using a plurality of photoelectric conversion elements arranged in the solid-state imaging element 24, and generates a blood vessel image signal S1 generated by these photoelectric conversion elements. Send it to section 12 (Fig. 2).
- the imaging unit 11 images a blood vessel inside a living body as an imaging target. Has been made possible.
- the authentication information generation unit 12 generates blood vessel image data by performing A / D (Anal 0 g / D igita 1) conversion processing on the supplied blood vessel image signal S 1, based on the blood vessel image data. From the blood vessel image, a blood vessel in a predetermined area is extracted. Then, the authentication information generation unit 12 generates the extracted blood vessel formation pattern as authentication information D1 and sends this to the encryption unit 13.
- a / D Anagonal 0 g / D igita 1
- the encryption unit 13 has a memory (hereinafter referred to as an encryption key information storage memory) 13a for storing a plurality of encryption key information sequentially generated by a predetermined algorithm, and the encryption key information storage memory 13 a of the plurality of encryption key information D 2 (D 2 i to D 2 n ), for example, an encryption key corresponding to a designated request from the decryption device 3 (FIG. 1) via the communication unit 14. Select information D 2 i and read it.
- the encryption unit 13 performs an encryption process on the supplied authentication information D 1 using the encryption key information D 2 i read at this time, for example, in accordance with AES (Advanced Encryption on St andard).
- AES Advanced Encryption on St andard
- the encryption device 2A generates the unique blood vessel formation pattern in the body of the living body as the authentication information D1, so that the fingerprint or the like on the surface of the living body is generated as the authentication information. Since direct theft from the living body can be prevented, it is possible to prevent a situation in which the user using the encryption device 2A impersonates a registrant.
- the encryption device 2A further includes a plurality of encryption key information D 2 (DS i DS n) unique to the encryption device 2A based on the uniform imaging result of the imaging target in the imaging unit 11. ) Is generated.
- the encryption device 2A executes predetermined encryption key information generation processing every time a request for generation of encryption key information is received from the decryption device 3 (FIG. 1) via the communication unit 14. Then, the encryption key information D 2 obtained as a result is stored or updated in the encryption key information storage memory 13 a of the encryption unit 13.
- the encryption key information generation unit 15 that performs the encryption key information generation processing will be described.
- the encryption key information generation unit 15 causes the imaging unit 11 to image a uniform imaging target when a generation request is received from the decryption device 3, and performs encryption based on a signal obtained as a result of the imaging. Key information is generated.
- the encryption key information generation unit 15 controls the light diffusing plate 25 of the imaging unit 11 (FIG. 3) so as to be arranged from the position outside the optical path P1 to the position P2 on the optical path, and also controls the imaging unit 1 Send the imaging command command to 1.
- the near-infrared light emitted from the light source 21 is applied to the light diffusing plate 25 through the first and second filters 22 and 23 sequentially.
- the light diffuser plate 25 diffuses the solid-state image sensor 24 as uniform diffused light (hereinafter, referred to as uniform diffused light) and enters the solid-state image sensor 24.
- the solid-state imaging device 24 is provided with an aperture and a condenser lens corresponding to a plurality of photoelectric conversion elements arranged in a grid on the solid-state imaging device 24, respectively.
- the shape of the opening and the condensing lens varies due to various factors in the manufacturing process, and this variation is unique to the solid-state imaging device 24. Therefore, a signal (hereinafter, referred to as a uniform image signal) S2 input to the encryption key information generation unit 15 (FIG. 2) as a photoelectric conversion result for the uniform diffused light in the solid-state imaging device 24 includes: Variations inherent in the solid-state imaging device 24, which cannot be known at the time of manufacturing, are included as noise patterns (hereinafter referred to as variation patterns).
- the encryption key information generation unit 15 generates uniform image data by performing A / D conversion processing on the uniform image signal S 2 thus obtained, and performs solid-state imaging based on the uniform image data.
- a parameter hereinafter referred to as an element-specific parameter which is caused by a unique variation pattern in the element 24 is generated.
- the encryption key information generation unit 15 uses a predetermined evaluation pattern and uniform image for uniform image data as a method for generating such element-specific parameters.
- a method is employed in which a Hamming distance from image data is calculated, and the calculated tB result is generated as an element-specific parameter.
- the encryption key information generation unit 15 generates the device-specific parameters based on the uniform image signal S2 output from the manufactured solid-state imaging device 24. Can be generated as unknown information for Minara not a, the solid-state image pickup device 2 4 variation pattern itself each evaluation pattern A EV rather than, B EV, in order to generate a combination of correlation results with C EV as an element-specific parameter Isseki, this encryption device It is possible to generate information that cannot be known even by a manufacturer who has pirated the solid-state imaging device 2 or by the manufacturer.
- the encryption key information generation unit 15 generates a plurality of encryption key information D 2 (D 2 i to D 2 n ) by a predetermined algorithm using the element-specific parameters generated in this way as a seed, and The key information D 2 is stored or updated in the encryption key information storage memory 13 a of the encryption unit 13.
- the authentication information D 1 supplied to the encryption unit 13 is converted to the encryption authentication information D 1 by an encryption process using, for example, encryption key information D 2 i unique to the encryption device (solid-state imaging device 24). 3 and transmitted to the decoding device 3 via the communication unit 14.
- the encryption key information generation unit 15 When a plurality of pieces of encryption key information D2 are newly generated, the encryption key information generation unit 15 performs a predetermined registration process or after performing a predetermined encryption process on the encryption key information D2. By transmitting to the decryption device 3, the plurality of newly generated encryption key information D2 is registered in the database of the decryption device 3. As described above, the encryption device 2 uses the encryption device 2 by encrypting the authentication information D 1 using the encryption key information D 2 derived from the element-specific parameters that cannot be known at the time of manufacture. It is possible to further improve the reliability of cryptographic functions by further preventing users from impersonating registrants.
- the decryption device 3 performs communication processing conforming to a predetermined wireless communication system to transmit and receive information, and the encryption unit 2 (2 A to 2 N)
- It is composed of a matching unit 33 that executes a predetermined authentication process using the decryption result, and a registration database DB.
- this registration database DB by a predetermined registration process, a blood vessel formation pattern at the same site as a blood vessel imaged by the imaging unit 11 of the encryption device 2 (2A to 2N), and the encryption device 2 (2A 2N) of the solid-state imaging device 24, a plurality of encryption key information D2 derived from the same element-specific parameters are registered as registration information D10 (DlOiDlOJ).
- the request unit 31 requests the encryption device 2 (2A to 2N) connected via the communication unit 30 for various conditions at the time of authentication processing at a predetermined timing. among the plurality of encryption key information as a condition, the encryption Kagijo paper D 2 i, D 2 2 for use, ..., or to request a D 2 n number or other matters. In this case, the request unit 31 notifies the decryption unit 32 of the designated encryption key information number.
- the request unit 3 1, are Ninasa to request generation of encryption key information D 2 optionally this case, the corresponding registration information D 1 0 There D 10 2 is registered in the registration database DB, ... Or D 10 n of the encryption key information D 2 is updated to encryption key information newly generated by the encryption device 2 obtained through a predetermined registration process or the communication unit 30. .
- the decryption unit 32 based on the source address described in the header of the encryption authentication information D3 supplied via the communication unit 30, includes, for example, registration information corresponding to the encryption device 2A from the registration database DB. reads the D 10 i, selects a plurality of encryption key information D 2 i ⁇ D 2 this time notified encrypted information D 2 i from the request unit 3 1 of n of the registration information D 1.0.
- the decryption unit 32 performs the same encryption processing as that of the encryption device 2A on the encryption authentication information D3 using the encryption key information D2i selected at this time, thereby generating the authentication information D1.
- the authentication information D 1 and the corresponding registration information D 10 i are transmitted to the matching unit 33.
- the matching unit 33 matches the blood vessel formation pattern of the supplied authentication information D1 with the blood vessel formation pattern of the corresponding registration information D10i by a predetermined method. If the predetermined matching rate is not obtained as a result of the verification, it is determined that the user who uses the encryption device 2A that has transmitted the authentication information D1 at this time is an unauthorized third party. Then, the communication unit 30 is controlled so as to stop the subsequent transmission and reception of information with the encryption device 2A.
- the matching unit 33 determines that the user who uses the encryption device 2A that has transmitted the authentication information D1 at this time is an authorized user.
- the communication unit 30 is controlled so as to transfer information between the encryption device 2A and an information processing unit (not shown) provided therein. .
- the decryption device 3 performs authentication using the biometric-specific authentication information D 1 (blood vessel formation pattern) and the encryption key information D 2 derived from the unique element parameters specific to the solid-state imaging device 24. The processing can be executed.
- the encryption device 2 converts the uniform image signal S2 output from the solid-state imaging device 24 as a uniform imaging result of the imaging target in the imaging unit 11
- the encryption device 2 (2 A to 2 N) generates the device-specific parameters unique to the solid-state imaging device 24 based on the predetermined encryption key information D 2 derived from the device-specific parameters. To encrypt the authentication information D1.
- the encryption device 2 (2 A to 2 N) can use an element-specific parameter that cannot be known to a third party even at the time of manufacture without having to previously store the encryption key in a non-volatile memory or the like. Since the encryption key information D2 derived from the authentication information D2 can be generated, the confidentiality of the authentication information D1 can be easily ensured.
- an element-specific parameter unique to the solid-state imaging device 24 is generated, By encrypting the authentication information D1 using the predetermined encryption key information D2 derived from the element-specific parameters, the confidentiality of the authentication information D1 can be easily ensured. Can improve the reliability of cryptographic functions. Wear.
- the solid-state imaging device 24 is used as a generation unit that generates a unique parameter in the device group based on a signal output from a device group having a plurality of devices included therein.
- the element-specific parameters unique to the solid-state imaging device 24 are generated based on the uniform image signal S2 output from the arranged plurality of photoelectric conversion elements
- the present invention is not limited to this.
- a unique parameter may be generated based on a signal output from a piezoelectric element group of the touch pad, and an element using a set of various active elements and passive elements as a unit. A unique parameter in the group can be generated.
- the same effect as in the above-described embodiment can be obtained whether the element group is a single type or a plurality of types.
- the case where the Hamming distance (correlation value) between the B EV and the C EV is calculated and these calculation results are combined in a predetermined order has been described.
- the present invention is not limited to this.
- an encryption key information generator that causes the imaging unit 11 to image the light diffusing plate 25 and generates a unique parameter as encryption key information based on a signal obtained as the imaging result.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and it is also possible to take an image of a uniform imaging target other than the light diffusing plate 25, and to generate a unique key without generating encryption key information. It may be possible to generate only the parameter overnight. In short, it generates a unique parameter overnight. Various other generation units can be applied.
- the generation time is described as being generated each time a request for generation of encryption key information is received from the decryption device 3 via the communication unit 14, but the present invention is not limited to this. It can be generated at various other timings, such as being generated only during manufacturing.
- a predetermined evaluation pattern is stored in advance in the information storage memory as the evaluation pattern.
- the present invention is not limited to this.
- a plurality of evaluation patterns are stored in the information storage memory, and among the evaluation patterns, A predetermined number of evaluation patterns may be selected from the above, and the evaluation pattern selected at this time may be changed according to a request of the decoding device 3, or may be selected at a predetermined timing.
- the evaluation pattern generated by the above algorithm may be stored in the information storage memory. In this way, even if the authentication information D1 is stolen and the evaluation pattern is decrypted from the encryption key information, the corresponding evaluation pattern is not used. Therefore, the reliability of the encryption function can be significantly improved. ''
- the number of evaluation patterns three types of evaluation patterns are stored in the information storage memory.
- the present invention is not limited to this. If at least two or more evaluation patterns are stored in the information storage memory, The same effects as in the above embodiment can be obtained.
- authentication information D consisting of an angiogenesis pattern using encryption key information derived from the unique parameters.
- the case where the encryption unit 13 for encrypting 1 is applied has been described.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and the encryption unit for encrypting the authentication information D 1 using unique parameters is applied. You may do it.
- the blood vessel formation pattern inside the living body is encrypted as the authentication information D1, but the present invention is not limited to this, and various other biological information such as a characteristic pattern on the surface of the living body such as a fingerprint may be used. It can be encrypted as authentication information, and does not need to be authentication information or biometric information. In short, the information to be concealed may be encrypted.
- the present invention is applicable to a terminal device such as a personal computer or a mobile phone, or a device such as a home electronic device, for identifying itself to an external device.
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- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
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- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
KR1020057019747A KR101101289B1 (ko) | 2004-02-24 | 2004-12-22 | 암호화 장치 및 암호화 방법 |
US10/553,984 US7894600B2 (en) | 2004-02-24 | 2004-12-22 | Encrypting apparatus and encrypting method |
EP04808063.4A EP1608101B1 (en) | 2004-02-24 | 2004-12-22 | Encrypting apparatus and encrypting method |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2004-48457 | 2004-02-24 | ||
JP2004048457A JP4556103B2 (ja) | 2004-02-24 | 2004-02-24 | 暗号化装置及び暗号化方法 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2005081450A1 true WO2005081450A1 (ja) | 2005-09-01 |
Family
ID=34879513
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/JP2004/019713 WO2005081450A1 (ja) | 2004-02-24 | 2004-12-22 | 暗号化装置及び暗号化方法 |
Country Status (8)
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US (1) | US7894600B2 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP1608101B1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP4556103B2 (ja) |
KR (1) | KR101101289B1 (ja) |
CN (1) | CN1778064A (ja) |
MY (1) | MY165776A (ja) |
TW (1) | TW200539604A (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2005081450A1 (ja) |
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WO2008105779A2 (en) * | 2006-05-22 | 2008-09-04 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Secure id checking |
JP6147161B2 (ja) * | 2013-10-03 | 2017-06-14 | 三菱電機株式会社 | 撮像装置、情報表示装置及び情報処理システム |
JP6460765B2 (ja) * | 2014-12-09 | 2019-01-30 | キヤノン株式会社 | 情報処理装置、情報処理装置の制御方法、プログラム |
JP6384314B2 (ja) * | 2014-12-22 | 2018-09-05 | 富士通株式会社 | 情報処理方法、情報処理プログラムおよび情報処理装置 |
US9374370B1 (en) | 2015-01-23 | 2016-06-21 | Island Intellectual Property, Llc | Invariant biohash security system and method |
WO2016167076A1 (ja) * | 2015-04-16 | 2016-10-20 | ブリルニクスインク | 固体撮像装置、固体撮像装置の駆動方法、および電子機器 |
JP6853934B2 (ja) * | 2017-01-19 | 2021-04-07 | ブリルニクスジャパン株式会社 | 固体撮像装置、固体撮像装置の駆動方法、および電子機器 |
JP6917716B2 (ja) | 2017-01-23 | 2021-08-11 | ソニーセミコンダクタソリューションズ株式会社 | 固体撮像装置及び固体撮像装置の情報処理方法 |
JP2018185749A (ja) * | 2017-04-27 | 2018-11-22 | ソニーセミコンダクタソリューションズ株式会社 | 固体撮像装置および固体撮像装置の制御方法 |
EP3474485B1 (en) * | 2017-10-20 | 2020-05-27 | Secure-IC SAS | Key generation from an imaging sensor |
EP3474540A1 (en) | 2017-10-20 | 2019-04-24 | Secure-IC SAS | Synthetic physically unclonable function derived from an imaging sensor |
CN109934032B (zh) * | 2017-12-19 | 2020-07-24 | 陕西外号信息技术有限公司 | 光通信装置以及相应的防伪方法和系统 |
JP7317297B2 (ja) * | 2019-03-05 | 2023-07-31 | ブリルニクスジャパン株式会社 | 固体撮像装置、固体撮像装置の駆動方法、および電子機器 |
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- 2004-12-22 EP EP04808063.4A patent/EP1608101B1/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2004-12-22 KR KR1020057019747A patent/KR101101289B1/ko not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2004-12-22 CN CNA200480010881XA patent/CN1778064A/zh active Pending
- 2004-12-22 US US10/553,984 patent/US7894600B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
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2005
- 2005-02-18 TW TW094104752A patent/TW200539604A/zh not_active IP Right Cessation
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KR101101289B1 (ko) | 2012-01-04 |
EP1608101A1 (en) | 2005-12-21 |
EP1608101A4 (en) | 2007-07-11 |
US20060233357A1 (en) | 2006-10-19 |
EP1608101B1 (en) | 2014-10-29 |
TW200539604A (en) | 2005-12-01 |
MY165776A (en) | 2018-04-25 |
TWI348842B (ja) | 2011-09-11 |
JP2005244356A (ja) | 2005-09-08 |
US7894600B2 (en) | 2011-02-22 |
KR20070021885A (ko) | 2007-02-23 |
CN1778064A (zh) | 2006-05-24 |
JP4556103B2 (ja) | 2010-10-06 |
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