WO2002041560A2 - Systemes et procedes de commande d'acces - Google Patents

Systemes et procedes de commande d'acces Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2002041560A2
WO2002041560A2 PCT/US2001/050071 US0150071W WO0241560A2 WO 2002041560 A2 WO2002041560 A2 WO 2002041560A2 US 0150071 W US0150071 W US 0150071W WO 0241560 A2 WO0241560 A2 WO 0241560A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
access
person
computer
badge
data
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2001/050071
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2002041560A3 (fr
Inventor
Bruce L. Davis
Geoffrey B. Rhoads
Original Assignee
Digimarc Corporation
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Digimarc Corporation filed Critical Digimarc Corporation
Priority to AU2002239691A priority Critical patent/AU2002239691A1/en
Publication of WO2002041560A2 publication Critical patent/WO2002041560A2/fr
Publication of WO2002041560A3 publication Critical patent/WO2002041560A3/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
    • G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
    • G07C9/253—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition visually
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C11/00—Arrangements, systems or apparatus for checking, e.g. the occurrence of a condition, not provided for elsewhere
    • G07C2011/02—Arrangements, systems or apparatus for checking, e.g. the occurrence of a condition, not provided for elsewhere related to amusement parks

Definitions

  • the present assignee's application 09/563,663 also relates to access control systems.
  • Access badges are familiar, and are used in a variety of corporate and government facilities.
  • One popular card is printed with a picture of the bearer, and includes communication means (e.g., mag stripe or RF ID) for communicating with a reader device adjacent locked doorways.
  • communication means e.g., mag stripe or RF ID
  • a badge for use by a visitor to a facility is produced by the visitor himself or herself, at a location remote from the facility.
  • the badge can include a photograph of the visitor (e.g., obtained from an image database maintained by a state or federal agency, such as a state department of motor vehicles), and can also include a machine-readable access code. This code, provided to the visitor in advance of their visit, defines certain privileges that the visitor is authorized to enjoy at the facility, including unescorted access to certain areas, access to certain computer resources, etc.
  • the digital data includes an index that identifies a (remote) database record from which additional information relating to the encoded object can be retrieved, e.g., for purposes of display, to control further device action, etc.
  • the present assignee offers a service, termed Digimarc
  • MediaBridge that employs such principles to permit users to link from physical objects (e.g., magazine pages or mailings) to corresponding web sites.
  • physical objects e.g., magazine pages or mailings
  • a user shows the object to a web cam-equipped device, which decodes the data embedded with the object, and consults a corresponding database record to determine the appropriate URL.
  • Digimarc MediaBridge data the information payload that is encoded by an object.
  • the employer e-mails or otherwise sends the candidate an access code.
  • the code can be encrypted for transmission.
  • the code is valid only for a certain time period on a given date (e.g., 9:00 a.m. - 11:00 a.m. on June 28, 1999).
  • the candidate Upon receipt of the access code, the candidate downloads from the web site of the state Department of Motor Nehicles the latest copy of her driver's license photo.
  • the DMN has already encoded this photo with watermark data.
  • This data identifies the electronic address of a state-run DMN server, and a particular record on that server corresponding to the photograph/candidate.
  • This DMN computer record includes a text string indicating the name of the person depicted by the photograph.
  • the data encoded in the DMN photo can be Digimarc MediaBridge data that identifies a Digimarc MediaBridge database record, which in turn provides the address of the DMN server, and identifies the particular record on that server corresponding to the photograph.
  • the candidate incorporates this photo into an access badge.
  • a software application (which may be provided especially for such purposes, e.g., as part of an office productivity suite)
  • the photo is dragged into an access badge template.
  • the access code emailed from the employer is also provided to this application.
  • an ink-jet printer associated with the candidate's computer prints out an access badge that includes the candidate's DMN photo and her name, and is also provided with the employer-provided access code in some machine-readable form (e.g., by digital watermark, barcode, etc.).
  • the name printed on the badge is not typed by the candidate, but is obtained (by the candidate's computer) from the DMN's server, in response to the data encoded in the DMN photograph.
  • the photograph is not scanned as part of a watermark reading process. Instead, the photograph is already available in digital form, so watermark decoding can proceed directly from the digital representation.
  • the access code is encoded on the card using digital watermarking of the printed badge
  • the watermarking format employed can be non-standard to deter hackers.
  • the embedding of this access code can span the entire face of the card, or can be limited to certain regions (e.g., excluding the region occupied by the photograph).
  • the candidate presents herself at the employer's building.
  • the candidate presents the badge to an optical sensor device, which reads the embedded building access code, checks it for authenticity and, if the candidate arrived within the permitted hours, unlocks the door.
  • the optical sensor can also capture and store a picture of the person presenting the access card, if desired.
  • the candidate may encounter a security guard. Seeing an unfamiliar person, the guard may visually compare the photo on the badge with the candidate's face. Additionally, the guard can present the badge to a portable Digimarc MediaBridge device, or to one of many MediaBridge systems scattered through the building (e.g., at every telephone).
  • the Digimarc MediaBridge system extracts the MediaBridge data from the card (e.g., from the DMN photograph), interrogates the DMN's server record corresponding to this data (again, typically through an intervening Digimarc MediaBridge database record), and receives in reply the name of the person depicted in the photograph.
  • the Digimarc MediaBridge device is a telephone device, the name may be displayed on a small LCD display commonly provided on telephones.
  • the guard checks the name returned by the Digimarc MediaBridge system with the name printed on the badge. On seeing that the printed and MediaBridge-decoded names match (and optionally checking the door log to see that a person of that name was authorized to enter and did so), the security guard can let the candidate pass. It will be recognized that the just-described arrangement offers very high security, yet this security is achieved with without the candidate ever previously visiting the employer, without the employer knowing what the candidate looks like, and by use of an access badge produced by the candidate herself.
  • the badge can additionally be encoded with the identity of the person to be visited.
  • this person's name can be associated with the access code encoded on the candidate's badge (e.g., in a data record maintained by the access control computer system used by the employer).
  • email and/or voice mail can be dispatched to that person being visited (or that person's administrative assistant), notifying them that the visitor has arrived.
  • the access code can permit multiple visits - not just one.
  • the authorized visits can be specified, e.g., by dates and times.
  • the access code can permit a predetermined number of visits (e.g., 5), without regard to specifics.
  • combinations of such approaches can be employed (e.g., authorizing up to 5 visits, but none after 12/31/2000).
  • the access code can convey other privileges to the visitor. For example, certain visitors may be authorized to access certain parts of the facility unescorted. Other visitors may be authorized to access certain resources on the company's computer network, using the badge as a network logon credential. Again, these privileges may be limited in time.
  • the access control computer system used by the employer has a data record associated with each access code, in which associated information, such as the dates and times of permitted visits, the name of the person being visited, the phone extension of that person, escort requirements, computer privileges, etc., etc. is specified.
  • information is not associated with the access code, but is otherwise indicated by the badge.
  • the information can be steganographically encoded on the badge.
  • data can be associated with data - other than the access code - that is encoded on the badge.
  • the badge described above can lose its authorization with the passage of time (e.g., not valid after 11 :00 a.m. on June 29, 1999), or with any other event or circumstance (e.g., upon display of the badge to an access control device when exiting the building).
  • the termination of authorization does not physically change the badge, but rather is manifested in data maintained by the access control computer used by the employer.
  • Any trusted repository of personal image data can be employed. Desirably, access to any such repository is controlled, by suitable security techniques, to assure that a person's image is not freely available to the public, but is accessible only to that person, and perhaps appropriate government users.
  • documents not employing photographs can be created and utilized according to the principles detailed above.
  • Authentication of the user may be performed by means other than photographic identification, e.g., biometrics, shared secrets, etc., that are encoded on the document (or are stored elsewhere and can be linked-to using data stored on the card) While the focus of the foregoing discussion was on badges for use at government and corporate facilities, the principles are more broadly applicable. For example, identity documents may similarly be provided for residences, schools, businesses, institutions, theme parks, etc. Similarly, the principles are not limited for use with badges or access cards, but with any high security document.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Editing Of Facsimile Originals (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Abstract

Cette invention concerne un système de commande d'accès à des bâtiments, réseaux, équipements et autres, qui réagit à des badges photographiques et autres marques d'identification. Tout visiteur ou utilisateur du système selon l'invention peut créer son propre badge à distance, en un point éloigné du bâtiment, du réseau ou de l'équipement. Le badge peut comporter une photographie du visiteur (tirée par exemple de la base de données image d'un organisme d'état ou fédéral tel qu'un service des véhicules à moteur ou autre source sécurisée) avec éventuellement un code d'accès lisible par machine. Ce code, qui est fourni au visiteur ou à l'utilisateur avant la visite ou l'utilisation effectives, peut donner droit à certains privilèges dans le bâtiment, etc., dont l'accès sans escorte à certaines zones ou à certaines ressources informatiques, l'autorisation d'utiliser du matériel, etc.
PCT/US2001/050071 2000-10-25 2001-10-24 Systemes et procedes de commande d'acces WO2002041560A2 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU2002239691A AU2002239691A1 (en) 2000-10-25 2001-10-24 Access control systems and methods

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US69701500A 2000-10-25 2000-10-25
US09/697,015 2000-10-25

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2002041560A2 true WO2002041560A2 (fr) 2002-05-23
WO2002041560A3 WO2002041560A3 (fr) 2003-01-30

Family

ID=24799432

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2001/050071 WO2002041560A2 (fr) 2000-10-25 2001-10-24 Systemes et procedes de commande d'acces

Country Status (2)

Country Link
AU (1) AU2002239691A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2002041560A2 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN110097669A (zh) * 2019-04-19 2019-08-06 广东中安金狮科创有限公司 区域安全系统

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5280527A (en) * 1992-04-14 1994-01-18 Kamahira Safe Co., Inc. Biometric token for authorizing access to a host system
US5321751A (en) * 1993-02-18 1994-06-14 Eastman Kodak Company Method and apparatus for credit card verification
US5799092A (en) * 1995-02-28 1998-08-25 Lucent Technologies Inc. Self-verifying identification card
US5864622A (en) * 1992-11-20 1999-01-26 Pitney Bowes Inc. Secure identification card and method and apparatus for producing and authenticating same

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5280527A (en) * 1992-04-14 1994-01-18 Kamahira Safe Co., Inc. Biometric token for authorizing access to a host system
US5864622A (en) * 1992-11-20 1999-01-26 Pitney Bowes Inc. Secure identification card and method and apparatus for producing and authenticating same
US5321751A (en) * 1993-02-18 1994-06-14 Eastman Kodak Company Method and apparatus for credit card verification
US5799092A (en) * 1995-02-28 1998-08-25 Lucent Technologies Inc. Self-verifying identification card

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN110097669A (zh) * 2019-04-19 2019-08-06 广东中安金狮科创有限公司 区域安全系统

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2002041560A3 (fr) 2003-01-30
AU2002239691A1 (en) 2002-05-27

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