WO2002037883A1 - Procede de transmission de donnees d'authentification dans un systeme de communication radio - Google Patents

Procede de transmission de donnees d'authentification dans un systeme de communication radio Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2002037883A1
WO2002037883A1 PCT/DE2001/004033 DE0104033W WO0237883A1 WO 2002037883 A1 WO2002037883 A1 WO 2002037883A1 DE 0104033 W DE0104033 W DE 0104033W WO 0237883 A1 WO0237883 A1 WO 0237883A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
length
authentication word
authentication
radio
cmd
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/DE2001/004033
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
WO2002037883A8 (fr
Inventor
Bart Vinck
Jean-Michel Traynard
Original Assignee
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Aktiengesellschaft filed Critical Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Priority to AU2002218148A priority Critical patent/AU2002218148A1/en
Publication of WO2002037883A1 publication Critical patent/WO2002037883A1/fr
Publication of WO2002037883A8 publication Critical patent/WO2002037883A8/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/126—Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for transmitting authentication data in a radio communication system, in particular a mobile radio system, in which a radio access point allocates radio devices in the form of radio blocks with a data acquisition capability to terminals which communicate with it by radio. It also relates to a transmitter and a receiver which are suitable for use in such a system.
  • the data authentication i.e.
  • the transmission of authentication information in a radio communication system serves to provide a receiver with certainty that the transmitter from which it receives data is actually the one it claims to be.
  • This means that the transmission of authentication information is intended to enable a terminal to recognize whether its communication partner is actually the expected radio access point of the radio communication system and not an eavesdropper in between, and conversely the radio access point should also have the same certainty in order to to exclude that an unauthorized person, in which he pretends to be a registered user of the system, uses the system at the expense of this user.
  • an integrity check algorithm between the involved transmitters and receivers must be agreed and initialized when the connection is established, and moreover at least with security-relevant data packets, ie especially with signaling messages, which are exchanged between the terminal and the radio access point, one here as an authentication word word designated information are transmitted, which is calculated by the transmitter according to the negotiated algorithm and from which the receiver checks whether it has a value to be expected according to this algorithm. If this check runs correctly, the message is accepted as actually coming from the sender, if the check results in an error, it must be discarded.
  • the GSM system has no such protective mechanisms.
  • a protection mechanism also known as integrity protection
  • the authentication word is called MAC-I there and has a length of 32 bits.
  • GERAN GSM Enhanced Radio Access Network
  • the aim is to introduce the UTRAN security concepts of the UMTS system as far as possible.
  • radio resources for signaling messages are allocated in the form of radio blocks, each of which has a fixed, uniform data acquisition capacity.
  • Signaling messages usually fit into a radio block.
  • Signaling messages that do not fit into a single radio block must be segmented, that is to say they must be distributed over two or more radio blocks, and auxiliary information must be transmitted which enables the receiver to recognize in what way the signaling message is divided among the several radio blocks so that it can correctly restore and evaluate them.
  • the receiver accepts a data packet that is not accompanied by an authentication word of the given first length if the length of the data packet together with the authentication word would exceed the fixed data acquisition capacity when transmitted.
  • the transmitter is a terminal and the receiver is a radio access point of a radio communication system. This is where the problem arises particularly sharply. Because the radio access point has its own access and that of the end devices to the radio resources If it manages a time-critical signaling message in segments, it can assign two successive radio blocks to itself in order to transmit the message sufficiently quickly. However, since, as already stated above, it cannot judge how time-critical messages that the terminal devices send to them, there is a particular need for them to allow the temporary relaxation of the integrity control described above.
  • the transmitter sends a signaling message which, when transmitted together with the authentication word of the given first length, would exceed the fixed data capacity and are therefore segmented would have to transmit together with a shortened authentication word in a radio block, ie without segmentation.
  • the receiver uses the type of a signaling message received to determine the length of the authentication word that the sender has to transmit together with the signaling message, and accepts a received signaling message if that Checking such a shortened signaling word is proceeding correctly.
  • the transmitter sends an indication of the length of the authentication word together with the signaling message. This enables the signaling word to be shortened even for signaling messages whose length is not determined by their type.
  • Such an indication preferably comprises 2 bits.
  • the information must not be too long because the space it occupies within a data block is different from the space that is available for the CO CO I ⁇ ) KJ P 1
  • an authentication dialog is carried out between the transmitter and receiver, i.e. messages are exchanged between the sender and the receiver, which do not necessarily have to have the aim of an action by the sender or the receiver, but whose main purpose is to exchange at least one signaling message, which is transmitted with an authentication word of the specified first length, so that restore the desired level of security.
  • the specified number of signaling messages can in particular be 1; d. H. every time a signaling message is received without a signaling word of the first specified length, the integrity check is rescheduled using the authentication dialog.
  • the recipient can already execute the command transmitted with the signaling message before the authentication dialog is completed, in particular in the case of a command to forward the connection, or he can put the execution of the command on hold until the authentication dialog has been successfully completed.
  • FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of a mobile radio communication system
  • P- pj P- P, P- rl- ⁇ H- P- rt C ⁇ 15 ⁇ d ⁇ ü tr> C ⁇ P d d 1-1 d- ⁇
  • the signaling messages In a mobile radio communication system such as GERAN, the signaling messages must be in the form of radio blocks of a predetermined length, i.e. with a specified, fixed data acquisition capacity, are transmitted on the air interface.
  • a signaling message consisting of a command CMD and a set of parameters PAR is so short that it can be transmitted together with an authentication word AUT ⁇ of a given first length of 32 bits in a single radio block.
  • predetermined first length of the radio block L (BLOCK) are compared.
  • the transmitter selects in step S3 from a predetermined set of lengths that the authentication word may have, the largest possible one that can be transmitted together with the signaling message in a radio block, and calculates such an authentication word AUT based on an algorithm previously agreed with the radio access point AP.
  • step S4 it sends the signaling message consisting of the command CMD and parameters PAR and the associated authentication word AUT.
  • FIG. 5 shows steps that are carried out by the radio access point AP when it receives a radio block with a signaling message from a terminal MT in step S11. First, it determines the length L (AUT) of the authentication word in step S12. This length can of course also be 0 if, as shown in FIGS. 2c and 3c, the radio block does not contain an authentication word. If the signaling block has the format of FIG. 2, the radio access point AP first decrypts the type CMD of the signaling message and deduces from this the length that the authentication word can have and its position within the radio block.
  • the radio access point AP evaluates the length specification in order to find the authentication word within the radio block.
  • step S13 If an authentication word is present, it is checked in step S13 and, if it is identified as faulty, the method branches to an error handling routine which is not the subject of the invention and is not described here. If there is no authentication word or the check proceeds without complaints, the method proceeds to step S14.
  • step S14 it is checked whether the length L (AUT) of the authentication word corresponds to the predetermined first length L (AUT ⁇ ) of 32 bits here. If so, it is considered certain that the signaling message actually comes from the transmitter and not from an intruder.
  • a counter n is set to 0 in step S15, which will be dealt with in more detail later, and the radio access point AP carries out the activities requested by the transmitter with the signaling message in step S16.
  • step S14 If the check in step S14 shows that the length of the authentication word does not correspond to the first predetermined length, the counter n is incremented in step S17 and a check is carried out in step S18 to determine whether it has exceeded a limit value lim.
  • the received signaling message does not have the same level of reliability or trustworthiness as one with an authentication word that does not have the authentication word due to the shortened authentication word. Given the first length transmitted signaling message that the reliability is nevertheless high enough so that the activities requested in the signaling message may be carried out in step S16.
  • step S18 shows that the limit lim has been exceeded, this means that the terminal MT has now sent signaling messages with a shortened authentication word in succession lim times, and that in the meantime its trustworthiness is no longer large enough to meet the requested To be able to carry out activities without further testing.
  • an authentication dialog is initiated in step S19.
  • the radio access point AP sends a signaling message to the terminal MT with a command CMD, the essential function of which is to provoke a response signaling message from the terminal MT to the radio access point AP, with which an authentication word of the first predetermined length is returned to the Radio access point AP is transmitted.
  • This new signaling message is then processed by the radio access point AP in the same way, according to the method shown in FIG. 5. If the response signaling message from the terminal MT arrives as expected with an authentication word AUTi of the first predetermined length, the method branches to step S14 in step S14, the counter n is reset to 0, and the trustworthiness of the terminal MT is restored.
  • step S20 is provided after step S19, in which it is checked whether step S19 is carried out for the relevant terminal for the second time in succession, and which, if this is the case, branches to the error handling routine as in the case of an incorrect authentication word.
  • steps S15, S17 and S18 are omitted; instead, each time the transmission of a shortened authentication word is recognized in step S14, the authentication dialog of step S19 is passed directly to.
  • FIGS. 4a, 4b and 5 have been described above specifically with reference to a terminal as a transmitter and a radio access point as a receiver, it is obvious that the same steps can also be carried out when the radio access point AP sends a signaling message transmits and a terminal MT receives one, with the only difference that in step S4 the radio access point does not have to wait for approval to transmit, since it issues these approvals itself.
  • the method described above is applicable to encrypted as well as unencrypted signaling messages. Since, when using encryption, there is generally a higher level of security than without, the operator of a mobile radio network can take this into account by, for example, B. which allows the use of shortened authentication words only for encrypted messages, and rejects unencrypted messages with a shortened authentication word from the recipient, or by setting the limit lim higher for encrypted messages than for unencrypted messages.
  • the method described above can basically be used for any type of signaling message that can be exchanged between a terminal and a radio access point of a mobile radio communication system. However, it can also be provided that it is only used for certain types of messages, while other messages that can be transmitted in a radio block by themselves but not together with an authentication word of the first length are segmented. In particular, it is possible to apply the method to all signaling messages that are required to carry out a handover, whereas security-relevant but not time-critical signaling messages, in particular those that are related to the establishment and termination of connections, are segmented with the appropriate length.
  • the authentication of signaling messages is an important application of the present invention; However, it is obvious that it can be used for any data packets that - for whatever reason - are to be transmitted in one piece in a radio block with a fixed data acquisition capacity with a high degree of security against unauthorized access.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé, un émetteur et un récepteur servant à transmettre des données d'authentification (AUT) dans un système de communication radio, dans lequel une station d'accès radio (AP) attribue à des terminaux (MT) qui communiquent avec elle par voie radio, des ressources radio sous la forme de blocs radio avec une aptitude à l'acquisition de données fixe. L'émetteur (MT, AP) n'envoie un message de signalisation accompagné d'un terme d'authentification (AUT1) ayant une première longueur prédéterminée, que lorsque la longueur du message de signalisation et du terme d'authentification (AUT1) ne dépasse pas l'aptitude à l'acquisition de données.
PCT/DE2001/004033 2000-10-30 2001-10-23 Procede de transmission de donnees d'authentification dans un systeme de communication radio WO2002037883A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU2002218148A AU2002218148A1 (en) 2000-10-30 2001-10-23 Method for transmitting authentication data for protecting integrity in a radio communications system (e.g. geran)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10053746A DE10053746B4 (de) 2000-10-30 2000-10-30 Verfahren zur Übertragung von Authentifizierungsdaten in einem Funk-Kommunikationsystem
DE10053746.4 2000-10-30

Publications (2)

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WO2002037883A1 true WO2002037883A1 (fr) 2002-05-10
WO2002037883A8 WO2002037883A8 (fr) 2002-07-25

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CN (1) CN1230030C (fr)
AU (1) AU2002218148A1 (fr)
DE (1) DE10053746B4 (fr)
WO (1) WO2002037883A1 (fr)

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2881312A1 (fr) * 2005-01-26 2006-07-28 France Telecom Procede, dispositif et programme de detection d'usurpation d'adresse dans un reseau sans fil

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0498343A2 (fr) * 1991-02-07 1992-08-12 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé pour éviter l'utilisation de données modifiées de manière illicite et circuit pour réaliser ce procédé
DE19811593C1 (de) * 1997-12-19 1999-05-06 V & S Datentechnik Und Softwar Matrixgesteuerte Hashfunktion
EP1063813A2 (fr) * 1999-06-23 2000-12-27 Research In Motion Limited Chiffrage à clé publique avec procédé de signature numérique
EP1104960A1 (fr) * 1999-12-02 2001-06-06 Sony International (Europe) GmbH Authentification de messages
WO2001063954A1 (fr) * 2000-02-22 2001-08-30 Nokia Networks Oy Controle d'integrite dans un systeme de communication

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0498343A2 (fr) * 1991-02-07 1992-08-12 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé pour éviter l'utilisation de données modifiées de manière illicite et circuit pour réaliser ce procédé
DE19811593C1 (de) * 1997-12-19 1999-05-06 V & S Datentechnik Und Softwar Matrixgesteuerte Hashfunktion
EP1063813A2 (fr) * 1999-06-23 2000-12-27 Research In Motion Limited Chiffrage à clé publique avec procédé de signature numérique
EP1104960A1 (fr) * 1999-12-02 2001-06-06 Sony International (Europe) GmbH Authentification de messages
WO2001063954A1 (fr) * 2000-02-22 2001-08-30 Nokia Networks Oy Controle d'integrite dans un systeme de communication

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
"Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS);3G Security; Security Architecture (3G TS 33.102 version 3.5.0 Release 1999)", ETSI TS 133 102 V3.5.0, 1 July 2000 (2000-07-01), pages 1 - 59, XP002194976 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE10053746A1 (de) 2002-05-16
CN1473447A (zh) 2004-02-04
DE10053746B4 (de) 2006-12-07
WO2002037883A8 (fr) 2002-07-25
AU2002218148A1 (en) 2002-05-15
CN1230030C (zh) 2005-11-30

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