WO2001049058A1 - Dispositif de radiocommunication et procede de radiocommunication - Google Patents
Dispositif de radiocommunication et procede de radiocommunication Download PDFInfo
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- WO2001049058A1 WO2001049058A1 PCT/JP2000/009128 JP0009128W WO0149058A1 WO 2001049058 A1 WO2001049058 A1 WO 2001049058A1 JP 0009128 W JP0009128 W JP 0009128W WO 0149058 A1 WO0149058 A1 WO 0149058A1
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- Prior art keywords
- wireless communication
- data
- unit
- processing unit
- integrity
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B1/00—Details of transmission systems, not covered by a single one of groups H04B3/00 - H04B13/00; Details of transmission systems not characterised by the medium used for transmission
- H04B1/38—Transceivers, i.e. devices in which transmitter and receiver form a structural unit and in which at least one part is used for functions of transmitting and receiving
- H04B1/40—Circuits
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K1/00—Secret communication
- H04K1/02—Secret communication by adding a second signal to make the desired signal unintelligible
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a wireless communication device such as a mobile phone and a wireless communication method.
- a wireless communication device such as a mobile phone and a wireless communication method.
- it relates to a mobile phone that performs data confidentiality processing and integrity assurance processing.
- FIG. 24 is a diagram showing a conventional mobile phone 500.
- the conventional mobile phone 500 includes a terminal IF (interface) unit 5110, a wireless communication control unit 520, and a wireless communication unit 530.
- the terminal IF unit 501 is a unit that performs an interface with the user of the mobile phone 500.
- the wireless communication control unit 520 is a part that performs communication control of the entire mobile phone 500, data conversion based on a protocol, and data processing.
- the wireless communication section 530 is a section that modulates and demodulates data to enable wireless communication.
- the wireless communication unit 530 is a part that supports the physical layer (Layer 1), which is the lowest layer, out of seven layers defined by OSI (Open Systems Interconnection).
- the wireless communication unit 530 is provided with a concealment processing unit 540.
- the concealment processing unit 540 is a unit that performs an encryption process or a decryption process on data of the physical layer handled by the wireless communication unit 530.
- the conventional mobile phone 500 has a confidential processing unit 540 inside the wireless communication unit 530. Therefore, the data to be concealed by the concealment processing unit 540 is data of the physical layer (layer 1). The physical layer cannot specify whether the data is user data or control data.
- a wireless communication device and a wireless communication method capable of performing concealment processing and integrity assurance processing in an upper layer of layer 2 (data link layer) or higher out of the seven layers of OSI are obtained.
- the purpose is to:
- a wireless communication apparatus and a wireless communication method capable of performing concealment processing and integrity assurance processing for each channel even when the wireless communication apparatus has a plurality of channels are described.
- the purpose is to gain.
- the transmission data transmitted through a certain layer or sub-layer and the transmission data transmitted through that layer or sub-layer are transmitted.
- An object of the present invention is to obtain a wireless communication device and a wireless communication method that selectively perform confidential processing and integrity assurance processing by distinguishing non-transparent data that does not pass through. Disclosure of the invention
- a wireless communication device includes a terminal interface unit for inputting data
- a wireless communication control unit that inputs data input by the terminal interface unit, processes and outputs the data based on a protocol
- a control signal and data are input from the wireless communication control unit, and a concealment process for encrypting at least the input data based on the input control signal and an integrity authenticator for detecting data tampering. And an integrity assurance processing unit that performs any of the integrity assurance processing to generate the data and outputs the processed data to the wireless communication control unit.
- a wireless communication unit for inputting, modulating, and transmitting data output from the wireless communication control unit
- a control signal is input from the wireless communication control unit, data is selectively input from the terminal interface unit based on the input control signal, and concealment processing is performed on the input data.
- the confidential data is output to the wireless communication unit.
- the terminal interface unit outputs transparent data and non-transparent data, and the wireless communication control unit receives the non-transparent data from the terminal interface use unit.
- the security and integrity assurance processing unit is processed based on the protocol, and the transmitted data is input from the terminal interface unit to the security and integrity assurance processing unit for confidentiality processing.
- the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit is characterized in that it is connected to the wireless communication control unit via a parallel interface.
- the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit is characterized in that it is connected to the terminal interface unit via a serial interface, and is connected to the wireless communication unit via a serial interface.
- a concealment processing unit that has an encryption unit that encrypts the input data, and an integrity assurance processing unit that has an integrity authenticator addition unit that adds an integrity authenticator to the input data.
- the concealment processing unit includes a plurality of encryption units.
- the integrity assurance processing unit includes a plurality of integrity authenticator adding units.
- the concealment processing unit and the integrity assurance processing unit are one module for inputting a control signal and data from the wireless communication control unit, and one of the modules is based on the input control signal. At least one of the above-mentioned confidential processing unit and integrity assurance processing unit must be executed on the data. And features.
- a wireless communication device includes: a wireless communication unit that receives and demodulates data;
- a wireless communication control unit that inputs data demodulated by the wireless communication unit, processes and outputs the data based on a protocol
- a terminal interface unit for inputting and outputting data processed by the wireless communication control unit
- a control signal is input from the wireless communication control unit, and data is selectively input from the wireless communication unit based on the input control signal,
- the wireless communication unit outputs transparent data and non-transparent data
- the wireless communication control unit inputs the non-transparent data from the wireless communication unit and causes the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit to process the data based on a protocol.
- the transmitted data is input from the wireless It is characterized by making it.
- the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit is characterized in that it is connected to the wireless communication control unit via a parallel interface.
- the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit is characterized in that it is connected to the terminal interface unit via a serial interface, and is connected to the wireless communication unit via a serial interface.
- An integrity assurance unit that has a concealment processing unit that has a decryption unit that decrypts the input data, and an integrity check unit that checks the integrity of the input data using an integrity authenticator added to the input data.
- the concealment processing unit includes a plurality of decoding units.
- the integrity assurance processing unit is characterized by having a plurality of integrity confirmation units.
- the concealment processing unit and the integrity assurance processing unit are one module for inputting a control signal and data from the wireless communication control unit, and the one module receives an input based on the input control signal. At least one of the confidential processing unit and the integrity assurance processing unit is performed on the data obtained.
- a wireless communication device is a wireless communication device that wirelessly communicates data.
- a wireless communication control unit that processes data based on a protocol, a wireless communication unit that wirelessly communicates data,
- Sex assurance processing unit It is installed between the terminal interface unit, the wireless communication control unit, and the wireless communication unit, and performs concealment processing that encrypts and decodes at least the data and falsifies the data with the wireless communication control unit. Performs any of the integrity assurance processes to detect, encrypts data from the terminal interface to the wireless communication unit, and decrypts data from the wireless communication unit to the terminal interface. Sex assurance processing unit
- a concealment processing unit that performs concealment processing on input data
- the concealment processing unit includes
- An encryption unit for encrypting data from the terminal interface unit to the wireless communication unit
- a decoding unit for decoding data from the wireless communication unit to the terminal interface unit is separately provided.
- An integrity checker for checking the integrity of the input data using an integrity authenticator added to the input data
- the terminal interface process inputs the input data, inputs the data, processes and outputs the data based on the protocol, and inputs and inputs the control signal and the data from the wireless communication control process. Encrypts at least the input data based on the control signal.
- Encrypts at least the input data based on the control signal. contains concealment processing and generates an integrity authenticator to detect data tampering. Confidentiality and integrity assurance processing, which performs any one of the security assurance processing and outputs the processed data to the wireless communication control process.
- a wireless communication method includes: a wireless communication step of receiving and demodulating data;
- a control signal and data are input from the wireless communication control process, and at least data is decrypted for the input data based on the input control signal.
- a confidentiality / integrity assurance process that performs one of the processes and outputs the processed data to the wireless communication control process.
- a wireless communication method according to the present invention is a wireless communication method for wirelessly communicating data.
- a terminal interface process It is provided between a terminal interface process, a wireless communication control process, and a wireless communication process, and at least data is transmitted to and from the wireless communication control process.
- Data encryption and decryption, and integrity assurance processing to detect data tampering, and encrypts data from the terminal interface process to the wireless communication process, as well as from the wireless communication process.
- the security and integrity assurance process to decrypt the data to the terminal interface process
- FIG. 2 shows the configuration of the radio control station (RNC) 120.
- FIG. 3 is a configuration diagram of a wireless terminal (MS) 100 according to the first embodiment.
- FIG. 4 is a configuration diagram of a confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 according to the first embodiment.
- FIG. 5 is a configuration diagram of a confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 according to the first embodiment.
- FIG. 7 is a configuration diagram of the confidentiality and integrity assurance processing unit 40 according to the first embodiment.
- FIG. 8 is a configuration diagram of a confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 according to the first embodiment.
- FIG. 10 is a configuration diagram of a confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 according to the second embodiment.
- FIG. 11 is a configuration diagram of a confidentiality and integrity assurance processing unit 40 according to the second embodiment.
- FIG. 12 is a diagram showing an example of an encryption method and a decryption method.
- FIG. 13 is a configuration diagram of a confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 according to the second embodiment.
- FIG. 14 is a diagram shown in ARIB S TD—T 6 3 3 3 10 2, 3 G Security; secuurity Arcchiite ctture, 3 ⁇ 4ectiono 6. 3.
- FIG. 15 is a diagram shown in AR IBS TD-T 63 3 3.102, 3 GS ecurity; Security Architecture, FIG. 16 b.
- FIG. 16 is a diagram shown in AR IBS TD-T 6 3 3 3.10 2, 3 GS ecurity; Security Architecture, FIG.
- FIG. 17 is a configuration diagram of the encryption module 51 (or the decryption module 71) used in the encryption / decryption unit 421.
- FIG. 18 is a diagram showing an implementation format of the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40.
- FIG. 20 is a diagram showing a mechanism in which an application program 46 operating in the wireless communication control unit 20 calls an encryption program 47.
- FIG. 21 is a diagram showing a specific example of data 92 and 93 in the RLC non-transparent mode.
- FIG. 22 is a diagram showing a specific example of audio data as an example of the transmission data 95, 96.
- FIG. 23 is a diagram showing a specific example of unrestricted digital data as an example of transmission data 95, 96.
- FIG. 24 is a diagram showing a conventional mobile phone 500. BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
- FIG. 1 is an overall configuration diagram of a mobile communication system according to the present embodiment.
- the wireless terminal (MS) 100 is an example of the wireless communication device of the present invention.
- the wireless terminal (MS) 100 is, for example, a mobile phone.
- the wireless terminal (MS) 100 is wirelessly connected to the wireless base station (BTS) 110.
- the radio base station (BTS) 110 is connected to a radio control station (RNC) 120.
- the radio control station (RNC) 120 is connected to other radio control stations (RNC) 120 Connected.
- the radio network controller (RNC) 120 is connected to the core network (CN) 130, and is connected to another radio network controller (RNC) 120 via the core network (CN) 130.
- Either or both of the radio base station (BTS) 110 and the radio control station (RNC) 120 are also called radio stations.
- FIG. 2 is a configuration diagram of the same mobile communication system as in FIG. In particular, it shows the internal configuration of the radio control station (RNC) 120.
- RNC radio control station
- the BTS IF section 121 connects the radio base station (BTS) 110.
- the handover control unit 122 controls handover when the wireless terminal (MS) 100 moves between the wireless base stations (BTS) 110.
- the MS signal control unit 123 performs wireless communication control with the wireless terminal (MS) 100 and data concealment processing Z integrity assurance processing.
- the concealment processing and the integrity assurance processing of the wireless terminal (MS) 100 described below are performed in correspondence with the confidentiality processing and the integrity assurance processing of the anti-MS signal control unit 123. That is, the data encrypted in the wireless terminal (MS) 100 is decrypted in the anti-MS signal control unit 123. Conversely, the data decoded by the anti-MS signal control unit 123 is decoded by the radio terminal (MS) 100.
- the authenticator added to ensure the data integrity in the wireless terminal (MS) 100 is verified in the MS signal control unit 123. Conversely, an authenticator added to ensure data integrity in the MS signal control unit 123 is verified in the wireless terminal (MS) 100.
- the data concealment process and the data integrity assurance process between the wireless terminal (MS) 100 and the MS signal controller 123 are performed in the second layer of the OSI seven layers, that is, the layer. This is performed at 2 (data link layer).
- the CN IF unit 124 interfaces with the core network (CN) 130.
- the RNC IF section 125 interfaces with another radio control station (RNC) 120.
- the CN signal control unit 126 performs control with the core network (CN) 130.
- the RNC signal control unit 127 performs control with another radio control station (RNC) 120.
- the control unit 128 controls the entire radio control station (RNC) 120.
- FIG. 3 is a configuration diagram of the wireless terminal (MS) 100.
- the wireless terminal (MS) 100 includes a terminal IF unit 10, a wireless communication control unit 20, a wireless communication unit 30, and a confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40.
- the terminal IF unit 10 consists of a camera 1, video 2, BZT (Blue Toooth) 3, LCD 4, KEY 5, LED 6, and US IM (Un iversa 1 Subscriber Identity). € 111 1 6) 7 and 1 £ ⁇ £ 1 VE R 8, MIC 9 and HS J (Head Set Jack) 0 are connected. These cameras 1 to HSJ 0 perform processing for the interface with the user (human) or the device to be connected, and can recognize the user (human) or the device to be connected. It is used to input or output information.
- the terminal IF unit 10 includes therein each module IF unit 11, a data format conversion unit 12, a terminal IF control unit 13, and a voice coding / decoding unit 14.
- Each module IF section 11 interfaces with each of the cameras 1 to HSJ0.
- the data format conversion unit 12 is used to store each data format handled by HSJ0 from camera 1 and the wireless terminal (MS) 100 The conversion between each data format handled by the section is performed.
- the terminal IF control section 13 controls the operation of the terminal IF section 10.
- Audio Encoding The decoding unit 14 performs audio encoding of the audio electric signal input from the MIC 9. Further, the audio encoding / decoding section 14 decodes the audio-encoded signal and outputs an audio electric signal to the RECEIVER 8.
- the wireless communication control unit 20 performs overall control of the wireless terminal (MS) 100.
- the wireless communication control unit 20 includes a hardware circuit including a CPU, a ROM, a RAM, and firmware, or a software module.
- the wireless communication control unit 20 processes data between the terminal IF unit 10 and the wireless communication unit 30 and performs data conversion processing based on rules defined by standards or protocols. In particular, it performs layer 2 or higher processing. For example, data packetization and data connection are performed. Since the wireless communication control unit 20 handles layer 2 or higher data, it can determine the type of data. Then, according to the type of data, it can be determined whether the data is data to be confidentially processed or data to be subjected to integrity assurance processing. Since the type of data cannot be determined from the data of Layer 1, it cannot be determined whether the data is data to be confidentially processed or data to be subjected to integrity assurance processing.
- the wireless communication unit 30 includes a channel coding unit 310 and a baseband modulation / demodulation unit 3.
- the channel encoder 310 has an encoder and a decoder for each channel.
- the coding section includes an error detection coding section 311, an error correction coding section 312, and a physical format conversion section 313. Further, it has a physical format conversion unit 314, an error correction decoding unit 315, and an error detection unit 316 as a decoding unit.
- the baseband modulation / demodulation unit 320 modulates and demodulates a band. Be The span modulation / demodulation unit 320 has a baseband modulation unit 321 and a baseband demodulation unit 322.
- Radio section 330 converts a signal in the baseband to a transmission band or a signal in the transmission band to the baseband. Radio section 330 has up-converter 331 and down-converter 332.
- the security / integrity assurance processing unit 40 is connected to the wireless communication control unit 20.
- the concealment / integrity assurance processing unit 40 receives data from the wireless communication control unit 20 and performs concealment processing. It also performs data integrity assurance processing.
- the concealment / integrity assurance processing unit 40 inputs a control signal 91 for confidentiality and integrity assurance processing from the wireless communication control unit 20.
- the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 transmits the data to be subjected to the confidentiality processing and the data to be subjected to the integrity assurance processing in any layer of layer 2 or higher from the wireless communication control unit 20. 9 Enter 2.
- the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 performs concealment processing and Z or integrity assurance processing on the data 92 based on the input control signal 91, and outputs the data to the wireless communication control unit 20.
- the control signal 91 includes a key, an initial value, and parameters such as selection between concealment processing and integrity assurance processing.
- FIG. 4 is a configuration diagram of the concealment / integrity assurance processing unit 40.
- the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 has an IF unit 410 and one module 411.
- Module 4 11 1 performs the concealment processing and the integrity assurance processing with one and the same circuit or one and the same algorithm. Whether to perform the concealment processing or the integrity assurance processing is determined by the control signal 91.
- the concealment processing refers to encrypting or decrypting data.
- the integrity assurance process is a process of adding an authenticator to data, or reproducing an authenticator in order to verify whether data has been tampered with. This is a process of determining whether data has been tampered with by comparison. Since the concealment process and the integrity assurance process can be performed using the same circuit or the same algorithm, or a similar circuit or a similar algorithm, the concealment process and the integrity assurance process are performed as shown in Fig. 4. This can be done with one module 4 1 1. In the case shown in Fig. 4, hardware resources and software resources can be reduced. In the following, a module refers to one realized by hardware only, one realized by software only, or one realized by a combination of hardware and software.
- FIG. 15 is a diagram shown in ARIB S TD—T 6 3 3 3.102, 3 G Security; Security Arcchiitec turure, Figure 16b.
- FIG. 16 is a diagram shown in ARIB TD-T 6 3 3.3.10 2, 3 G Security; SecurityArcchiitec turure, rigurre16.
- FIG. 14 shows the encryption method on the wireless link.
- the meanings of the symbols are as follows.
- F 9 Data integrity function
- Mobile phone carriers implement authentication processing using functions fl to f5.
- the 128-bit ⁇ key called CK and IK generated in this process is passed to the data confidentiality function (f8) and data integrity function (f9).
- Figure 15 shows the encryption method on the wireless link.
- ME S SAGE plaintext before encryption that the sender wants to send to the receiver, such as user data and signal information
- COUNT—C Numeric data indicating the total number of transmissions and receptions. Add 1 for each transmission and reception.
- data encryption Z decryption is performed based on the random number sequence created by the data concealment function f8.
- FIG. 16 shows the message authenticator generation method.
- the meanings of the symbols are as follows.
- I K int e g r i t y k e y (message authentication, authentication key)
- COUNT-I Numeric data indicating the total number of transmissions and receptions. Add 1 for each transmission and reception.
- ME S SAGE plaintext before encryption that the sender wants to send to the receiver, such as user data and signal information
- the data integrity can be checked by comparing the two message authenticators at the receiver.
- both the terminal and the network perform a series of authentication processes.
- CK c i p e r key y
- I K int e g r i t y k e y
- These two keys can only be used by mutually authenticated terminals and networks, and are used in two functions, f8 and f9, described below. These two keys are different for each communication, and there is no regularity between them. Then, it is discarded when the communication ends.
- the processing mechanism (protocol) required for this authentication is standardized, but the functions fl to f5 used in the authentication process are not standardized, and the operator decides independently. I have. After the authentication process is completed, data security is maintained using data confidentiality technology used for confidentiality processing and data integrity (dataintegrity) technology used for integrity assurance processing.
- the first data concealment technology is a technology that encrypts user data and signal information, including voice, on a wireless network to prevent eavesdropping.
- a function called a data concealment function (hereinafter referred to as f8) is used.
- the sender uses the encryption key (CK) generated during authentication.
- f8 includes a bit length (LENGTH) of an encryption / decryption target data, an up Z down link (DI RECT I ON), a counter (COUNT-C), and a logical channel identifier (BEARER).
- LENGTH bit length of an encryption / decryption target data
- DI RECT I ON up Z down link
- COUNT-C counter
- BEARER logical channel identifier
- the uplink is a bit that distinguishes whether the ciphertext is transmitted from the terminal to the base station or from the base station to the terminal.
- the counter is data indicating the total number of transmissions and receptions. The counter is incremented by the determined value each time data is sent or received. The counter is used to prevent attacks that send the ciphertext sent in the past.
- the logical channel identifier is a bit that identifies the logical channel for encryption.
- the ciphertext is generated by taking the exclusive OR of the generated random number sequence and the data / signal information to be encrypted, and transmitted to the receiver.
- Parameters other than CK are sent from the sender to the receiver without encryption. However, only CK need not be transmitted because the same is generated on the receiver side during the authentication process.
- the receiver generates a random number sequence using the transmitted parameters and the CK that it has in advance, and decrypts the original message by taking the exclusive-OR with the transmitted ciphertext.
- the OFB mode is often used especially in wireless voice communication because even if noise generated on the transmission path is mixed into the ciphertext, the noise portion does not expand at the time of decryption.
- the second data integrity technology is a technology that detects whether the signal information has been tampered with by adding a message authenticator (integrity authenticator) to the signal information on the wireless link. It is also called message authentication technology.
- a data integrity function (hereinafter referred to as f9) is used.
- the same encryption algorithm as F8 is used for the core of f9.
- a message authentication key (I K) is generated using the message authentication key generation function f 4 and passed to f 9.
- data MESSAGE
- DI RECT I ON up-Z downlink
- counter COUNT-C
- random number Entering (FRE SH) will generate a message authenticator (MA C-I or XMAC-I).
- These parameters are also sent from the sender to the receiver in an unencrypted data format area. Even if these parameters are passed to a third party, if the message authentication key (IK) is secret, the security is maintained as in the case of data concealment.
- the sender adds this message authenticator (MAC-I) to the data and sends it to the receiver.
- the recipient also calculates the message authenticator (XMAC-I) using f9. By comparing MAC-I and XMAC-I, if they are the same, it can be confirmed that there has been no tampering.
- the decoded Z decoding module It has the function of encrypting the input plaintext (encrypted data) into ciphertext (encrypted data) and outputting it, and the function of decrypting the ciphertext into plaintext and outputting it.
- a specific example of the control signal 91 in FIG. 3 corresponds to the above CO UN TZ BER ARER / DIRE CT IO NZC LENGTH.
- “MAC SDUJ” or “RLC PDU (datapart)” is used.
- RLC PDU (datapart) J is the part where the upper 1 Oct or 2 Oct (1 byte or 2 bytes) of R Shiji? 011 is deleted (see“ DATA FOR “MAC S DUJ” or “RLC PDU (dataart)” is an example of MESS AGE in Figure 15.
- MAC SDU stands for Media Access Control Service Data Unit.
- RLC PDU Radio This is L ink control protocol D ata unit. Each message in the message flow is composed at Layer 3 after removing the RLC header from the RLC PDU.
- the RLCP DU there are lOct or 20 ct non-confidential parts, but all RLC PDUs are input to the concealment and integrity assurance processing unit 40, and the Or do not perform 20 ct concealment.
- the reason is that 1 oct or 2 oct shift processing is performed by the wireless communication control unit to remove loct or 20 ct non-confidential parts from all data units (R LC PDUs) that perform concealment processing. This is in order to reduce the load on the wireless communication control unit 20 that is caused by the execution in.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram showing another example of the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40.
- the feature in FIG. 5 is that the concealment processing unit 420 and the integrity assurance processing unit 430 are separately provided. Inside the concealment processing unit 420, an encryption Z decryption unit 421 is provided. Inside the integrity assurance processing section 430, an integrity authenticator addition Z integrity check section 431 is provided.
- the encryption Z decryption unit 4 2 1 shows a case where encryption and decryption are performed using one and the same module. Addition of integrity certifier
- the integrity checker 43 1 shows a case where the addition of an integrity certifier and the confirmation of integrity are performed by one and the same module.
- the case shown in Fig. 5 is a configuration that can be used when encryption and decryption have the same function, and when the integrity authenticator addition and complete confirmation have the same function. In the case shown in FIG. 5, hardware resources and software resources can be reduced as compared with the case shown in FIG.
- FIG. 6 is a diagram showing another configuration of the concealment / integrity assurance processing unit 40.
- the feature of FIG. 6 is that the encryption section 422 and the decryption section 423 are separately provided in the concealment processing section 420.
- the integrity assurance processing unit 430 The point is that the integrity authenticator adding unit 432 and the integrity checking unit 433 are separately provided.
- the configuration is adopted when encryption and decryption are the same or different functions, and when the integrity authenticator addition and integrity confirmation are the same or different functions.
- encryption, decryption, addition of an integrity authenticator, and integrity check can be executed individually, and the transmitted and received data are processed in parallel or in confidentiality or integrity assurance. Higher speed is possible.
- FIG. 7 shows a case where a plurality of encryption units 422 and a plurality of decryption units 423 are provided in the concealment processing unit 420. Also, a case is shown in which the integrity assurance processing unit 4330 is provided with a plurality of integrity authenticator adding units 432 and a plurality of integrity checking units 433.
- MS wireless terminal
- the integrity assurance processing unit 4330 is provided with a plurality of integrity authenticator adding units 432 and a plurality of integrity checking units 433.
- the wireless terminal (MS) 100 it may be necessary to process multiple channels simultaneously. For example, when two types of data, voice and facsimile data, are transmitted simultaneously, at least two channels of data must be processed simultaneously. In such a case, the voice data can be encrypted by the encryption unit 1 and the facsimile data can be encrypted by the encryption unit 2. Also, when decoding, data of a plurality of channels can be decoded at the same time. Encryption section 4 2 2 and decryption section 4 2 3 and integrity authenticator addition section 4
- the number of 3 2 and the integrity checker 4 3 3 need not all be the same, and depends on the number of channels to be processed simultaneously by the wireless terminal (MS) 100. What is necessary is just to determine the number of each part. Or, if it becomes necessary to perform high-speed processing of large amounts of data on one channel instead of corresponding to each channel, the large amount of data allocated to that one channel is processed by two encryption units. It does not matter. That is, the encryption unit 4 2 2, the decryption unit 4 2 3, the integrity authenticator addition unit 4 3 2, and the integrity check unit
- the maximum number of the encryption units 422 and the maximum number of the decryption units 423 may be different.
- the maximum number of the integrity authenticator adding unit 4332 may be different from the maximum number of the integrity checking unit 4333.
- FIG. 8 shows a case where a plurality of encryption / decryption units 421 are provided in the concealment processing unit 420. Also, a case is shown in which the integrity assurance processing unit 4330 is provided with a plurality of integrity authenticator addition Z integrity check units 431.
- FIG. 8 shows a configuration in which the encryption / decryption unit 4 21 and the integrity authenticator addition Z integrity check unit 4 31 shown in FIG. 5 are provided in plural.
- FIG. 8 shows a case where a plurality of encryption / decryption units 421 are provided corresponding to a plurality of channels when the encryption and the decryption have the same function.
- a case is shown in which multiple integrity authenticator addition / integrity confirmation units 431 are provided for multiple channels when the integrity authenticator addition and integrity confirmation have the same function. ing.
- FIG. 8 it is possible to reduce hardware resources and software resources as compared with the case of FIG.
- FIGS. 4 to 8 show a case where the concealment / integrity assurance processing unit 40 includes both the concealment processing unit 420 and the integrity assurance processing unit 4330.
- the processing unit 40 may include only one of the confidential processing unit 420 and the integrity assurance processing unit 43Q.
- the security / integrity assurance processing unit 40 includes only one of the security processing unit 420 or the integrity assurance processing unit 4330, the other process may be performed by the wireless communication control unit 20.
- FIG. 9 is a configuration diagram illustrating another example of the wireless terminal (MS) 100.
- Fig. 9 differs from Fig. 3 in that the terminal IF section 10 and the confidentiality and integrity assurance processing section
- non-transparent data 97 is non-transparent data such as packet data.
- the transparent data 95 and 96 are transparent data such as audio data and unrestricted digital data.
- Transparent data is data that does not change at all from input to output in a certain layer or a sublayer of a certain layer defined by OSI.
- non-transparent data refers to data that requires some kind of data processing, such as format conversion processing, from input to output in a certain layer or a sub-layer of a certain layer.
- the data is non-transparent data.
- the layer 2 MAC (Media Access Control) sublayer if the SDU and PDU are the same, the data is transparent data.
- data for which some processing must be performed on layer 1 data output from the wireless communication unit 30, for example, packet data is non-transparent data.
- transparent data 95, 96 in FIG. 9 are audio data and unrestricted digital data, and each data is a unit defined between layer 1 and layer 2 (T (ransport B lock), and since the data divided into the tranport block is transparent data, it is equivalent to a MAC PDU (and MAC S DU) as described above.
- T ransport B lock Each of the divided data becomes the same as the secret unit.
- audio data and the like are user data, and the user data is transparent data even in the RLC sublayer. Therefore, this transmission form is used as a serial interface, and MT (Mo bi e Terminal) of the AR IB standard is used.
- ⁇ (larminal A daptor)
- the transmission format allows concealment of the MT-TA I / F serial format as it is.
- the specific example of the non-transparent data 97 in FIG. 9 is packet data or data for signaling as described above, and each data is a unit defined between layer 1 and layer 2 (T ransport B lock).
- the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 shown in FIG. 9 selectively performs concealment processing and integrity assurance processing on non-transparent data between the wireless communication control unit 20 and the terminal IF unit 10 and For example, confidential processing is always performed on the transparent data input / output to / from the wireless communication unit 30.
- the concealment / integrity assurance processing unit 40 does not perform the integrity assurance processing on the transmitted data. If any of the transmitted data does not want to perform the concealment process, the wireless communication control unit 20 does not allow the concealment / integrity assurance processing unit 40 to input the transmission data that does not want to perform the concealment process. What is necessary is just to make it input into the wireless communication control part 20.
- FIG. 10 is a configuration diagram of the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40.
- the concealment processing unit 460 includes an encryption unit 462 and a decryption unit 463.
- the encryption unit 462 transmits through the terminal IF unit 10 Data 95 is input, and the input data is encrypted and output to wireless communication unit 30 as transparent data 96.
- decoding section 463 receives transparent data 96 from wireless communication section 30, decodes the decoded data, and outputs the decoded data to terminal IF section 10 as transmitted data 95.
- the concealment processing unit 460 performs concealment processing based on the control signal from the wireless communication control unit 20.
- data 92 is input / output using a parallel interface via a bus.
- the transmitted data 95 and 96 are input / output to / from the concealment processing unit 460 via the serial interface.
- FIG. 10 shows a case where the concealment / integrity assurance processing unit 40 has two input / output interfaces of the parallel interface and the serial interface.
- FIG. 11 shows a case where a confidential processing unit 460 is added to the configuration of the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 shown in FIG.
- an encryption unit or a decryption unit generates a key stream, and performs an exclusive OR operation with serial data. This is an effective configuration when it is taken.
- FIG. 11 shows a case where the transparent data 95, 96 is input / output to / from the concealment processing unit 460 via the serial interface, and the serial data input / output via the serial interface.
- This shows a case where data of a plurality of channels is multiplexed.
- a key stream is generated from encryption section 1 corresponding to channel 1 and output to data multiplexing section 481.
- a key stream is generated from the encryption unit 2 corresponding to the channel 2 and output to the data multiplexing unit 481, and the data multiplexing unit 481
- these key streams are multiplexed in the same format as the data sequence of the input data 95.
- the exclusive OR of the multiplexed key stream and the data sequence of the input data 95 is calculated by the exclusive OR circuit 483. These operations of the concealment processing unit 460 are performed based on the control signal 99, that is, based on the control signal 91 sent from the wireless communication control unit 20. According to the configuration of FIG. 11, the delay of serial data is only required by the exclusive OR circuit 483, and high-speed processing can be performed.
- FIG. 13 shows a case in which the confidential processing section 420 and the confidential processing section 460 of FIG. 10 are combined into one confidential processing section 470.
- the concealment processing section 470 processes both data 92 input / output from the parallel interface and data 95/96 input / output from the serial interface. Since the concealment processing unit 470 combines the concealment processing unit 420 and the concealment processing unit 460 into one, it is possible to reduce the hard resource. Switching of the processing operation of the transparent data and the non-transparent data in the concealment processing unit 470 is performed based on the control signal 99, that is, the control signal 91 output from the wireless communication control unit 20.
- the above-described confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 can be configured by hardware. For example, it can be realized by FPGA or custom LSI. Also, the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 can be realized by a software program. When the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 is realized by a software program, the software program is executed by the CPU in the wireless communication control unit 20.
- the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 can be realized by a combination of hardware and software.
- DSP Digita 1 Signal Processor
- execution by the DSP This can be realized by a microphone port program or firmware program that is executed.
- FIG. 17 is a configuration diagram of the encryption module 51 (or the decryption module 71) used in the encryption Z decryption unit 421.
- the encryption module 51 has a key schedule section 5 11 1 and a data randomizing section 512.
- Key scheduling part 5 1 1 generates one expansion the n enter the key K key E xt K t ⁇ E xt K n .
- the data randomizing section 5 1 2 generates a random number using the function F and the XOR circuit.
- Function F performs the nonlinear data conversion by inputting the expanded key.
- Block No. algorithm This is a 64-bit block cipher based on the MIS II and is a block No. algorithm that has been decided to be adopted as an international standard encryption for next-generation mobile phones ( ⁇ 2000).
- FIG. 18 is a diagram showing an implementation format of the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 described above.
- FIG. 18 shows a case where the above-described confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 is realized in FPGA, IC, or LSI. That is, the above-mentioned confidentiality / integrity guarantee processing unit 40 can be realized by hardware. Although not shown, it can be realized by a print circuit board.
- FIG. 19 shows a case where the above-described confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 is realized by software.
- the above-described confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40 can be realized by an encryption program 47.
- the encryption program 47 is stored in a ROM (Read On 1 y Memory) 4 2 (an example of a recording medium).
- the encoding program 47 may be recorded on a RAM (Random Access Memory) or another recording medium such as a flexible disk or a fixed disk. Further, the encryption program 47 may be downloaded from a server computer.
- the encryption program 47 functions as a subroutine.
- the encryption program 47 is called and executed by a subroutine call from the application program 46 stored in the RAM 45. Alternatively, the encryption program 47 may be started by the occurrence of an interrupt accepted by the interrupt control unit 43.
- the memory 55 may be a part of the RAM 45.
- the application program 46 and the encryption program 47 are programs executed by the CPU 41.
- FIG. 20 shows a mechanism in which the application program 46 operating in the wireless communication control unit 20 calls the encryption program 47.
- Application program 46 consists of key K and initial value IV
- the encryption program 47 is called with plaintext M and ciphertext C as parameters.
- the encryption program 47 inputs the key K, the initial value IV, and the plaintext M, and returns the ciphertext C.
- the encryption program 47 is called with the key K, the initial value IV, the ciphertext C and the plaintext M as parameters.
- the encryption program 47 may be realized by a digital signal processor and a program read and executed by the digital signal processor. That is, the encryption program 47 may be realized by a combination of hardware and software.
- FIGS. 18, 19, and 20 mainly describe the case of encryption, the same method can be used for decryption.
- the encryption mode and the decryption mode as shown in FIGS. 18 and 19 can be installed in an electronic device.
- it can be installed in any electronic device such as a personal computer, a facsimile machine, a mobile phone, a video camera, a digital camera, and a television camera.
- the features of this embodiment are effective when encrypting and decrypting data from a plurality of channels. Or, when data from multiple users arrives at random and is decrypted, or when data for multiple users is generated at random, each data is encrypted in real time. This is effective in such cases.
- the encryption and decryption of the above-described embodiment are very effective.
- a server computer that must support many client computers, a base station or a line controller that must collect and deliver data from many mobile phones, etc. Equations and decoding schemes are very effective.
- FIG 9 and 10 show the case where the concealment processing unit 460 is provided inside the confidentiality / integrity assurance processing unit 40, but the concealment processing unit 460 is concealed.
- the concealment processing unit 460 may be provided between the terminal IF unit 10 and the wireless communication unit 30 independently of the processing unit 40 outside.
- the concealment processing and the integrity assurance processing are performed in layers 2 and higher so that the concealment processing is not performed in layer 1 (physical layer). Therefore, it is possible to determine whether or not to perform the concealment process and whether or not to perform the integrity assurance process according to the type of data. For example, only concealment processing is performed on transparent data, and both concealment processing and integrity assurance processing can be performed on non-transparent data. Alternatively, confidentiality processing and integrity assurance processing can be performed or not performed for non-transparent data, respectively.
- a plurality of concealment processing units and a plurality of integrity assurance processing units are provided inside the concealment / integrity assurance processing unit according to the number of channels and the data amount. High-speed data processing by simultaneous parallel processing becomes possible.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
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- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Input Circuits Of Receivers And Coupling Of Receivers And Audio Equipment (AREA)
- Reduction Or Emphasis Of Bandwidth Of Signals (AREA)
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Description
Claims
Priority Applications (8)
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AU28060/01A AU759377B2 (en) | 1999-12-27 | 2000-12-22 | Radio communication device and radio communication method |
EP00987706A EP1156694B1 (en) | 1999-12-27 | 2000-12-22 | Radio communication device |
AT00987706T ATE274282T1 (de) | 1999-12-27 | 2000-12-22 | Funkkommunikationsgerät |
CA002365127A CA2365127A1 (en) | 1999-12-27 | 2000-12-22 | Radio communication device and radio communication method |
DE60013099T DE60013099T2 (de) | 1999-12-27 | 2000-12-22 | Funkkommunikationsgerät |
DK00987706T DK1156694T3 (da) | 2000-12-22 | 2000-12-22 | Radiokommunikationsindretning |
TW090102876A TW498638B (en) | 1999-12-27 | 2001-02-09 | Wireless communication device and wireless communication method |
NO20014097A NO20014097L (no) | 1999-12-27 | 2001-08-23 | Radiokommunikasjonsapparat samt fremgangsmåte for radiokommunikasjon |
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KR (1) | KR100430358B1 (ja) |
CN (1) | CN1342376A (ja) |
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AU (1) | AU759377B2 (ja) |
CA (1) | CA2365127A1 (ja) |
DE (1) | DE60013099T2 (ja) |
ES (1) | ES2226970T3 (ja) |
NO (1) | NO20014097L (ja) |
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WO (1) | WO2001049058A1 (ja) |
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EP2042517A1 (en) | 2002-09-27 | 2009-04-01 | Xencor, Inc. | Optimized FC variants and methods for their generation |
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EP2368911A1 (en) | 2003-05-02 | 2011-09-28 | Xencor Inc. | Optimized Fc variants and methods for their generation |
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JP2014509162A (ja) * | 2011-03-09 | 2014-04-10 | クアルコム,インコーポレイテッド | セキュアエレメントを用いたリモート局の認証方法 |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
ATE274282T1 (de) | 2004-09-15 |
NO20014097L (no) | 2001-10-25 |
EP1156694B1 (en) | 2004-08-18 |
CN1342376A (zh) | 2002-03-27 |
TW498638B (en) | 2002-08-11 |
NO20014097D0 (no) | 2001-08-23 |
KR20010102406A (ko) | 2001-11-15 |
EP1156694A4 (en) | 2002-09-25 |
DE60013099T2 (de) | 2005-09-01 |
DE60013099D1 (de) | 2004-09-23 |
ES2226970T3 (es) | 2005-04-01 |
AU2806001A (en) | 2001-07-09 |
EP1458211A1 (en) | 2004-09-15 |
EP1156694A1 (en) | 2001-11-21 |
CA2365127A1 (en) | 2001-07-05 |
KR100430358B1 (ko) | 2004-05-04 |
AU759377B2 (en) | 2003-04-10 |
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