WO2001010071A1 - System and method for secured data transmission within a wireless communication system - Google Patents

System and method for secured data transmission within a wireless communication system Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2001010071A1
WO2001010071A1 PCT/US2000/040564 US0040564W WO0110071A1 WO 2001010071 A1 WO2001010071 A1 WO 2001010071A1 US 0040564 W US0040564 W US 0040564W WO 0110071 A1 WO0110071 A1 WO 0110071A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
encryption key
communication system
signal
encoded signal
acoustic
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2000/040564
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Jeffrey Rodman
Gil Pearson
Original Assignee
Polycom, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Polycom, Inc. filed Critical Polycom, Inc.
Priority to KR1020027001123A priority Critical patent/KR20020019581A/ko
Priority to EP00963787A priority patent/EP1208663A4/en
Priority to JP2001513846A priority patent/JP2003506919A/ja
Publication of WO2001010071A1 publication Critical patent/WO2001010071A1/en
Priority to GBGB0201603.8A priority patent/GB0201603D0/en

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0822Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04KSECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K1/00Secret communication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/34Encoding or coding, e.g. Huffman coding or error correction
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80Wireless

Definitions

  • the invention relates generally to communication systems, and more particularly to a system and method for the transmission of secured data within a communication system having wireless networked components.
  • Wireless networks are making increasing use of wireless networks to link system components, such as microphones, speakers, and the like.
  • Use of wireless networks avoids the need to cable the system components together, thereby simplifying system setup and allowing the system components to be easily re-arranged to suit the needs of the user(s).
  • the use of wireless networks to link system components also offers significant aesthetic benefits by eliminating or reducing unsightly wiring.
  • a disadvantage associated with wireless networked communication systems is the potential for unintended dissemination of confidential or sensitive information.
  • the conference systems are typically located in a fully enclosed space, i.e., a conference room.
  • RF radio-frequency
  • Such RF signals may easily penetrate the walls, ceiling, etc. of the conference room and may thus be inadvertently transmitted to other devices capable of receiving the signals, e.g., a component of another wireless networked system located in a second conference room. Transmission of the RF signals outside of the conference room may also allow interception by eavesdroppers or industrial spies, thereby compromising confidentiality.
  • One method of preventing the inadvertent dissemination of confidential information is to encode the transmitted RF signals using an encryption key, essentially scrambling the underlying information.
  • the signals are subsequently decoded at the receiving component using the same or a complementary encryption key.
  • this method requires all components within the communication system to possess the same encryption key in order to properly encode and/ or decode the RF signals.
  • One technique for assigning a common encryption key for all wireless networked components within a communication system involves manually entering the encryption key (by setting switches or through a keypad) at each component. However, this technique is time- consuming and subject to user error.
  • Another technique for assigning the encryption key is to initially (i.e., at the start of system operation) distribute the key using unencrypted RF signals. Unfortunately, an eavesdropper monitoring the RF transmissions can intercept the transmitted encryption key and use the encryption key to decode subsequent transmissions.
  • the present invention provides a system and method for securely transmitting information between and among components of a wireless networked communication system.
  • the components of the communication system include a base station containing the primary system circuitry, and a set of physically co-located remote devices (microphones, speakers, personal computers, LCD projectors, video monitors, and the like) which normally communicate with the base station and with each other by transmission and reception of RF signals.
  • a base station containing the primary system circuitry
  • a set of physically co-located remote devices microphones, speakers, personal computers, LCD projectors, video monitors, and the like
  • an encryption key is distributed using an acoustic signal.
  • the base station is provided with an acoustic transmitter (i.e., a speaker), and each remote device is provided with an acoustic sensor (i.e., a microphone).
  • the base station At the commencement of system operation, the base station generates an encryption key, converts the encryption key into an acoustic signal, and transmits the signal.
  • the encryption key may comprise a randomly generated n-digit sequence of numbers which is converted to a corresponding sequence of DTMF tones.
  • Each of the remote devices is provided with an acoustic sensor for detecting the acoustic signal transmitted by the base station.
  • the acoustic sensor responsively generates an electrical signal, which is passed to an acoustic codec.
  • the acoustic codec is operative to extract a digital representation of the encryption key for storage in a memory.
  • the encryption key is subsequently utilized by the base station and remote devices to encrypt and decrypt conference data passed between and among the devices and the base station through RF signals.
  • Use of the acoustic signal to distribute the encryption key effectively prevents non-co-located devices (i.e., those located outside of a conference room) from detecting the encryption key.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing components of a wireless networked communication system located within a conference room;
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a base station and an exemplary remote device of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing the steps of a method for distributing an encryption key by transmission and reception of an acoustic signal, in accordance with the present invention.
  • FIG. 1 depicts components of an exemplary wireless networked communication system 114 located within an enclosed first conference room 100.
  • Communication system 114 may comprise, but is not limited to, a video conferencing or audio conferencing system of the type sold by Polycom, Inc. of San Jose, California.
  • Communication system 114 includes a base station 106 which contains the primary system circuitry, and a plurality of remote devices, such as remote devices 108 and 110, which communicate with base station 106 and with each other by the transmission and reception of electromagnetic signals, typically radio frequency (RF) signals.
  • RF radio frequency
  • Some examples of remote devices are microphones, speakers, personal computers, LCD projectors, and video monitors.
  • Base station 106 may be additionally configured to manage communications with other communication systems (e.g., video conferencing systems located at other sites) over conventional circuit or packet switched networks, such as the public switched telephone network or the Internet. It is noted that while two remote devices 108 and 110 are depicted in the figure, a lesser or greater number of remote devices may be utilized.
  • other communication systems e.g., video conferencing systems located at other sites
  • circuit or packet switched networks such as the public switched telephone network or the Internet.
  • FIG. 1 also depicts a second conference room 102 adjacent to first conference room 100 and separated therefrom by a wall 104.
  • Remote device 112 which is not part of communication system 114, is located within second conference room 102. Because RF signals transmitted by base station 106 and remote devices 108 and 110 may easily penetrate wall 104 and reach remote device 112, the information underlying the transmitted RF signals may be inadvertently disseminated to persons having access to remote device 112. If such information is sensitive or proprietary, the confidentiality of the information may thus be compromised.
  • An object of the present system and method is to secure against inadvertent disclosure of confidential information by encrypting the conference data transmitted between and among base station 106 and remote devices 108 and 110.
  • conference data denotes data representative of any information which may be presented to users of communication system 114 during operation thereof, including speech, images, and the like.
  • base station 106 and remote devices 108 and 110 To successfully encrypt and decrypt the conference data, base station 106 and remote devices 108 and 110 must possess a common encryption key. In accordance with the present system and method, the encryption key is distributed by the transmission and reception of an acoustic signal.
  • acoustic signals are attenuated relatively rapidly and do not readily penetrate walls such as wall 104, devices located outside of first conference room 100 are unable to detect the transmission of the acoustically-encoded encryption key, and hence cannot decrypt subsequently received RF signals (including those representative of confidential information) emanating from communication system 114.
  • Base station 106 is provided with an encryption key generator 202 configured to randomly generate an encryption key 204 in accordance with well-known random key generation algorithms.
  • Encryption key 204 may comprise, for example, a randomly generated n-digit string.
  • Encryption key 204 is stored in memory 206 for subsequent use by encryption/ decryption module 208.
  • Encryption key 204 is additionally conveyed to an acoustic codec 210, which is electrically coupled to an acoustic transmitter 212.
  • Acoustic codec 210 is configured to apply an electrical signal to acoustic transmitter 212 which causes acoustic transmitter 212 to emit an acoustic signal (i.e., sounds) which encodes the encryption key.
  • the n-digit encryption key is encoded as a string of dual-tone multi-frequency (DTMF) tones.
  • DTMF dual-tone multi-frequency
  • acoustic transmitter 212 which may comprise a conventional loudspeaker, emits the acoustic signal encoded encryption key 204. It is appreciated that the acoustic signal power should be sufficient to enable co- located remote devices to detect the signal, but the power should be minimized to prevent detection of the signal outside of conference room 100 (FIG. 1) as well as to avoid subjecting persons present within conference room 100 to an unpleasantly harsh sound.
  • the acoustic signal propagates through conference room 100 (FIG. 1) and is received at remote device 108.
  • remote device 108 is provided with an acoustic sensor 220, which may comprise a conventional microphone.
  • Acoustic sensor 220 is operative to detect the acoustic signal encoded encryption key 204 (for example, a string of DTMF tones) and to responsively generate a corresponding electrical signal.
  • the electrical signal is passed to an acoustic codec 222, which is configured to extract a digital representation of encryption key 204 for storage in a memory 224.
  • Encryption key 204 may subsequently be accessed by encryption/ decryption module 225 to encrypt conference data 226 transmitted to base station 106 or other co-located devices and to decrypt conference data 226 received from base station 106 or other co-located devices of the communication system 114 (FIG. 1).
  • encryption key 204 has been distributed to remote device 108 (as well as to the other remote devices of communication system 114 of FIG. 1), encryption key 204 is utilized to encrypt and decrypt conference data 226 transmitted by RF signals between and among the various components of communication system 114.
  • Base station 106 is provided with an encryption/ decryption module 208, RF codec 214, and RF transceiver 216.
  • remote device 108 is provided with encryption/ decryption module 225, RF codec 227, and RF transceiver 228.
  • encryption/ decryption modules 208 and 225 and the RF codecs 214 and 227 may be configured as hardware, software, or a combination thereof.
  • conference data 226 (which may comprise speech, images, and the like, as discussed above), is encrypted by encryption/ decryption module 208 or 225 using encryption key 204.
  • Encryption/ decryption module 208 or 225 may employ any one of a large number of encryption techniques well known in the art.
  • the encrypted conference data is then encoded by codec 214 or 227 for transmission as RF signals by RF transceiver 216 or 228. Because the RF signals contain encrypted (i.e., unintelligible) information, eavesdroppers and others who intercept the RF signals will not have access to underlying conference data 226.
  • RF signals transmitted by another component of communication system 114 (FIG. 1) are received by RF transceiver 216 or 228, and converted to a digital representation of the encrypted conference data by RF codec 214 or 227.
  • the encryption/ decryption module 208 or 225 is then operative to decrypt conference data 226, which may be subsequently used for a variety of purposes.
  • remote device 108 may comprise a microphone which generates conference data representative of the speech of conference participants.
  • the conference data representative of the speech is encrypted and transmitted to base station 106 by RF signals.
  • Base station 106 receives the RF signals, decrypts the underlying conference data, and conveys this data to another communication system over a telephone network.
  • remote device 108 is depicted as having an RF transceiver 228, other remote devices may be adapted for unidirectional RF communications with base station 106 (i.e., either from base station 106 to the remote device, or from the remote device to base station 106). In such cases, an RF transmitter or receiver will be substituted for RF transceiver 228.
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart 300 showing steps of an exemplary method for distributing encryption key 204 (FIG. 2) using an acoustic signal in accordance with the present system and method.
  • the key distribution sequence is initiated.
  • Step 302 may be triggered automatically, as by turning on communication system 114 (FIG. 1), or may be triggered manually by a user engaging a "reset" control or the like.
  • encryption key generator 202 (FIG. 2) randomly generates encryption key 204 and stores encryption key 204 in memory 206 (FIG. 2) in step 304.
  • Encryption key 204 is then encoded by codec 210 (FIG. 2) and transmitted as an acoustic signal by acoustic transmitter 212 (FIG. 2) in step 306.
  • the acoustic signal representative of encryption key 204 is received by acoustic sensor 220 (FIG. 2) of remote device 108 (FIG. 2) and decoded by acoustic codec 222 (FIG. 2) in step 308, to extract a digital representation of encryption key 204. It may be desirable (particularly in environments having high levels of ambient noise, which may interfere with transmission and reception of the acoustic signal) to provide an error detection scheme (using a transmitted checksum or similar method) within acoustic codec 222 (FIG. 2) to ensure that encryption key 204 (FIG. 2) is correctly transmitted and decoded.
  • acoustic codec 222 performs an error detection step to determine if an error has occurred in connection with the reception/ decoding of encryption key 204. If acoustic codec 222 detects an error condition, it sends a request to base station 106 (FIG. 2), via RF codec 227 (FIG. 2) and transceiver 228 (FIG. 2), to re-transmit the acoustic signal representative of encryption key 204 in step 312. If no error condition is detected, encryption key 204 is stored in memory 224 (FIG. 2) and used to encrypt and decrypt subsequent RF transmissions of conference data 226 (FIG. 2) in step 314.
  • the method may additionally include the step 316 of determining whether a new encryption key is required. Generation of a new encryption key may be triggered, for example, by expiration of a predetermined time period (security may be enhanced by periodically changing the encryption key) or by manual user request. If a new encryption key is required, the method returns to step 304; otherwise, the method returns to encrypting and decrypting conference data 226 (FIG. 2) using existing encryption key 206 (FIG. 2). It is to be appreciated that although the embodiment depicted in FIG. 2 and described above locates encryption key generator 202 and acoustic transmitter 212 in base station 106, alternative embodiments which may locate these elements in one or more of the remote devices are within the scope of the invention.
  • the present invention is not intended to be limited in scope to acoustic transmission of the encryption key.
  • Other types of signals which do not easily penetrate conference room walls and hence are not detectable outside of the conference room, may be used to encode and distribute the encryption key.
  • the base station may be provided with an infrared (IR) transmitter for transmitting an IR signal encoding the encryption key.
  • the associated remote devices are correspondingly provided with IR sensors for detecting the transmitted IR signal, and an IR codec for extracting the encryption key from the received signal. Distribution of the encryption key via an IR signal may be less attractive relative to use of an acoustic signal, since objects or persons located in the conference room may block the transmission path of IR signals, and thus prevent the reception of the IR signal by the remote devices.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
PCT/US2000/040564 1999-08-03 2000-08-02 System and method for secured data transmission within a wireless communication system WO2001010071A1 (en)

Priority Applications (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
KR1020027001123A KR20020019581A (ko) 1999-08-03 2000-08-02 무선 통신 시스템내에서 안전하게 데이터를 전송하기 위한시스템 및 방법
EP00963787A EP1208663A4 (en) 1999-08-03 2000-08-02 DEVICE AND METHOD FOR SECURED DATA TRANSMISSION IN A WIRELESS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
JP2001513846A JP2003506919A (ja) 1999-08-03 2000-08-02 無線通信システムにおける保全データ転送のためのシステムおよび方法
GBGB0201603.8A GB0201603D0 (en) 1999-08-03 2002-01-24 System and method for secured data transmission within a wireless communication system

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US14688299P 1999-08-03 1999-08-03
US60/146,882 1999-08-03

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2001010071A1 true WO2001010071A1 (en) 2001-02-08

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PCT/US2000/040564 WO2001010071A1 (en) 1999-08-03 2000-08-02 System and method for secured data transmission within a wireless communication system

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EP (1) EP1208663A4 (ko)
JP (1) JP2003506919A (ko)
KR (1) KR20020019581A (ko)
GB (1) GB0201603D0 (ko)
WO (1) WO2001010071A1 (ko)

Cited By (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2377129A (en) * 2001-06-29 2002-12-31 Nokia Corp Transmitting first data in a radio signal and second data in an acoustic signal which is encoded using information from the first data
WO2003071770A1 (en) * 2002-02-15 2003-08-28 Qualcomm, Incorporated System and method for acoustic two factor authentication
WO2003081202A2 (en) 2001-11-09 2003-10-02 Nanosphere, Inc. Bioconjugate-nanoparticle probes
EP1439661A1 (en) 2003-01-14 2004-07-21 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Secure communication system and method for integrated mobile communication terminals comprising a short-distance communication module
US8943583B2 (en) 2002-05-15 2015-01-27 Qualcomm Incorporated System and method for managing sonic token verifiers
WO2015193491A1 (fr) * 2014-06-20 2015-12-23 Thales Procédé et système de communications acoustiques
WO2016133813A1 (en) * 2015-02-19 2016-08-25 The Trustees Of Princeton University Vibration-based secure side channel for medical devices

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JP2005018487A (ja) * 2003-06-26 2005-01-20 Sharp Corp 会議参加権配布方法及び会議システム
JP2005094349A (ja) * 2003-09-17 2005-04-07 Sony Corp 情報処理装置および情報処理方法、プログラム、並びに記録媒体
JP5458796B2 (ja) * 2009-10-19 2014-04-02 株式会社リコー 通信装置及び通信制御方法
JP5269844B2 (ja) * 2010-07-28 2013-08-21 株式会社バッファロー 暗号鍵共有方法、無線端末、及びアクセスポイント
US9483997B2 (en) * 2014-03-10 2016-11-01 Sony Corporation Proximity detection of candidate companion display device in same room as primary display using infrared signaling
US20160011921A1 (en) * 2014-07-14 2016-01-14 General Electric Company Cyber secured airgap remote monitoring and diagnostics infrastructure
RU2693920C1 (ru) * 2015-10-30 2019-07-05 Телефонактиеболагет Лм Эрикссон (Пабл) Установление секрета, совместно используемого между первым устройством связи и по меньшей мере одним вторым устройством связи
JP7193126B2 (ja) * 2018-11-13 2022-12-20 株式会社スマート・ソリューション・テクノロジー 通信装置、通信システム、通信方法及びプログラム

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Cited By (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2003003625A3 (en) * 2001-06-29 2003-10-16 Nokia Corp Wireless communication device and method
WO2003003625A2 (en) * 2001-06-29 2003-01-09 Nokia Corporation Wireless communication device and method
GB2377129B (en) * 2001-06-29 2005-05-11 Nokia Corp Wireless communication device and method
GB2377129A (en) * 2001-06-29 2002-12-31 Nokia Corp Transmitting first data in a radio signal and second data in an acoustic signal which is encoded using information from the first data
WO2003081202A2 (en) 2001-11-09 2003-10-02 Nanosphere, Inc. Bioconjugate-nanoparticle probes
WO2003071770A1 (en) * 2002-02-15 2003-08-28 Qualcomm, Incorporated System and method for acoustic two factor authentication
US7966497B2 (en) 2002-02-15 2011-06-21 Qualcomm Incorporated System and method for acoustic two factor authentication
US8391480B2 (en) 2002-02-15 2013-03-05 Qualcomm Incorporated Digital authentication over acoustic channel
US8943583B2 (en) 2002-05-15 2015-01-27 Qualcomm Incorporated System and method for managing sonic token verifiers
EP1439661A1 (en) 2003-01-14 2004-07-21 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Secure communication system and method for integrated mobile communication terminals comprising a short-distance communication module
WO2015193491A1 (fr) * 2014-06-20 2015-12-23 Thales Procédé et système de communications acoustiques
FR3022715A1 (fr) * 2014-06-20 2015-12-25 Thales Sa Procede et systeme de communications accoustiques
WO2016133813A1 (en) * 2015-02-19 2016-08-25 The Trustees Of Princeton University Vibration-based secure side channel for medical devices
US10722719B2 (en) 2015-02-19 2020-07-28 The Trustees Of Princeton University Vibration-based secure side channel for medical devices

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
KR20020019581A (ko) 2002-03-12
GB0201603D0 (en) 2002-03-13
EP1208663A4 (en) 2005-07-27
JP2003506919A (ja) 2003-02-18
EP1208663A1 (en) 2002-05-29

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