WO2000060829A1 - Procede et appareil permettant de proteger le systeme de maintenance d'un dispositif de transmission contre les ouvertures de session non autorisees - Google Patents

Procede et appareil permettant de proteger le systeme de maintenance d'un dispositif de transmission contre les ouvertures de session non autorisees Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2000060829A1
WO2000060829A1 PCT/JP1999/001800 JP9901800W WO0060829A1 WO 2000060829 A1 WO2000060829 A1 WO 2000060829A1 JP 9901800 W JP9901800 W JP 9901800W WO 0060829 A1 WO0060829 A1 WO 0060829A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
transmission device
maintenance
maintenance terminal
transmission
terminal
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/JP1999/001800
Other languages
English (en)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
Kouichi Kato
Hiroshi Kanzawa
Original Assignee
Fujitsu Limited
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Fujitsu Limited filed Critical Fujitsu Limited
Priority to PCT/JP1999/001800 priority Critical patent/WO2000060829A1/fr
Priority to JP2000610199A priority patent/JP3504235B2/ja
Publication of WO2000060829A1 publication Critical patent/WO2000060829A1/fr
Priority to US09/952,509 priority patent/US20020019948A1/en

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B7/00—Recording or reproducing by optical means, e.g. recording using a thermal beam of optical radiation by modifying optical properties or the physical structure, reproducing using an optical beam at lower power by sensing optical properties; Record carriers therefor
    • G11B7/004—Recording, reproducing or erasing methods; Read, write or erase circuits therefor
    • G11B7/0045—Recording
    • G11B7/00454—Recording involving phase-change effects
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B7/00—Recording or reproducing by optical means, e.g. recording using a thermal beam of optical radiation by modifying optical properties or the physical structure, reproducing using an optical beam at lower power by sensing optical properties; Record carriers therefor
    • G11B7/24—Record carriers characterised by shape, structure or physical properties, or by the selection of the material
    • G11B7/26—Apparatus or processes specially adapted for the manufacture of record carriers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
    • H04L63/1416—Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method and a device for preventing unauthorized intrusion of a transmission device into a maintenance system, and in particular, a maintenance person can use a maintenance terminal connected to any transmission device to control any transmission device via a control channel.
  • the present invention relates to a method and an apparatus for preventing an unauthorized entry into a maintenance system constructed so that a maintenance operation can be performed.
  • the maintenance person When performing maintenance work on the transmission equipment, the maintenance person carries out the maintenance terminal and goes to the location where the transmission equipment is installed, and connects the maintenance terminal to the transmission equipment to perform the maintenance work.
  • the transmission device When transmitting a test signal, the transmission device is controlled via the control channel not only for the transmission device to which the maintenance terminal is physically connected, but also for a transmission device provided at a remote location. It is.
  • a security function using a user ID and a pass-word is provided to protect the transmission device from an unauthorized operation by a person who is not authorized to perform the maintenance operation. That is, when a maintenance terminal performs a maintenance operation on a transmission device physically connected, a user ID and a password registered in advance are input from the maintenance terminal and logged in to the transmission device. This allows the operation of the transmission device. The same is true for remote operation, where the maintenance terminal sends the user ID and password to the remote transmission device via the physically connected transmission device, and authenticates the transmission device. Remote operation becomes possible.
  • a first object of the present invention is to prevent unauthorized invasion by leaving repeated attempts on an authentication system by a user ID and a password.
  • a second object of the present invention is to prevent unauthorized entry due to forgetting to log in after maintenance work.
  • the first object described above is a method for preventing unauthorized intrusion into a transmission device maintenance system, in which a user can perform a maintenance operation on a logged-in transmission device from a maintenance terminal by logging in from the maintenance terminal to the transmission device. Counting the number of times that the login operation failed on the transmission device, sending a message to the monitoring terminal when the number of failures exceeds a predetermined threshold, and monitoring the terminal based on the message. This is achieved by a method having a step for displaying the facts of the fraudulent gain operation on the top.
  • the second object described above is a method for preventing unauthorized entry into a transmission device maintenance system, in which a user logs in to the transmission device from the maintenance terminal, thereby enabling a maintenance operation on the transmitted transmission device from the maintenance terminal. Therefore, the physical connection with the maintenance terminal is monitored, and when it is detected that the physical connection with the maintenance terminal is disconnected, the user is forcibly opened. This is achieved by a method comprising the step of guiding.
  • the first purpose is to allow a user to perform a maintenance operation on a logged-in transmission device from a maintenance terminal by logging in from the maintenance terminal to the transmission device.
  • An intrusion prevention device that counts the number of times that a login operation has failed on a transmission device, and that when the number of failures exceeds a predetermined threshold, the fact that an unauthorized login has occurred on the monitoring terminal Means for sending a message to the monitoring terminal to display the message.
  • the second purpose described above is to enable a user to log in to a transmission device from a maintenance terminal to perform a maintenance operation on the connected transmission device from the maintenance terminal.
  • An intrusion prevention device that monitors the physical connection with the maintenance terminal, and that forcibly logs out the user when the physical connection with the maintenance terminal is detected to be broken.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an example of a communication system to which the present invention is applied;
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a transmission device according to the present invention;
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing details of a transmission device according to the present invention.
  • Fig. 4 is a diagram showing the outline of processing for command input from the user;
  • Fig. 5 is a diagram showing the format of commands issued by the maintenance terminal;
  • Figure 6 shows commands converted to a format for internal processing
  • Figure 7 shows an example of network addresses
  • FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing the details of the distribution process
  • FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing details of the control process
  • FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing the details of the mouth gin process
  • FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing details of the log processing
  • Fig. 12 is a flowchart showing details of the cable monitoring process; and Fig. 13 is a diagram of the cable connection status register.
  • FIG. 1 shows an example of a communication system to which the present invention is applied.
  • the transmission device 12 connected to the exchange 10 the transmission device 16 connected to the exchange 14, the switching device 20 connected to the maintenance terminal 18, the transmission device 22, and the transmission device 24 use the maintenance network.
  • a network has been established.
  • the transmission device 24 is provided in a company building 26, and a monitoring terminal 28 is connected.
  • the monitoring terminal 28 normally displays information on a failure that occurs in each transmission device.
  • the maintenance person can control the transmission device 20 by operating the maintenance terminal 18 by inputting a predetermined user ID and password from the maintenance terminal 18 and logging in to the transmission device 20. .
  • the logged-in transmission device can also be controlled from the maintenance terminal 18.
  • FIG. 2 shows the configuration of the transmission device 20 (12, 16, 22, or 24) according to the present invention.
  • the transmission device 20 has software processing blocks 30, 32, 34, 36, and 38, and a connection port 40 for connecting a connection cable.
  • the signals transmitted on the transmission line 42 include a control signal 44 and a transmission signal 46.
  • As the control signal 44 a command for controlling a remote transmission device is sent from the maintenance terminal 18 and the monitoring terminal 28. Just by laying the transmission line as shown in Fig. 1, the control signal 44 can be used to control a remote transmission device.
  • the communication processing 30 exchanges a control signal 44 on the transmission line 42 and performs communication between the monitoring terminal 28 and the maintenance terminal 18. Also, the transmission being accessed Remembers all network addresses of the device.
  • the control processing 32 distributes the processing to the corresponding processing block according to the control from the communication processing 30.
  • the mouth gui processing 34 checks the user ID and the passcode to determine the mouth gui. The number of login errors is counted, and a warning is issued to the monitoring terminal 28.
  • the log-in process 36 performs a user log-in.
  • the cable monitor 38 monitors the cable 43 connecting the transmission device 20 and the maintenance terminal 18 for disconnection. If it is removed, control is performed so that the user who is logged in from the maintenance terminal is logged in from all the transmission devices.
  • the number of errors in the user ID and the passcode are counted in the login process 34 to detect an unauthorized intrusion and notify the monitoring terminal 28. Further, the cable monitor 38 detects that the connection cable 43 with the maintenance terminal 18 has been disconnected, and performs logout control for all the transmission devices controlled from the maintenance terminal 18. Thereby, even if the maintenance person forgets to log out, the log is autonomously logged.
  • FIG. 3 shows details of the transmission device 20 of FIG.
  • the network address 50 (described in this figure as Ad dr only) and the user ID 52 (described in this figure as U-ID only) are used as the non-volatile information 48.
  • a password 54 (described in this figure as Pass swd only) is stored, and as the volatile information 56, a mouth gui status flag 58 indicating a user who is logged into the transmission device 20 is stored. Is done. Since this transmission device registers up to 50 users, it is possible to store 50 user IDs 52, 50 corresponding passwords 54, and 50 status flags.
  • the added data table contains the volatile information 56
  • the only additions were authentication error counter 60, which detects unauthorized intrusion by searching for user 1D and password, and transmission via remote connection from a maintenance terminal directly connected to the transmission equipment.
  • Other device connection 62 for storing the network address of the device, and maintenance terminal access flag 64 for storing whether or not access from the maintenance terminal has been made.
  • a register 66 indicating the connection state of the cable is added as hardware I 70.
  • FIG. 4 shows an outline of processing when a user inputs a command from the maintenance terminal 18 or the monitoring terminal 28.
  • the maintenance terminal issues a command according to the format shown in FIG. 5 in response to a user operation (step 1000).
  • the transmission device adds a destination address and a reply destination network address for internal processing, and performs command processing (step 1002).
  • TID Network Service Access Point
  • TID Network ID
  • TID Network ID
  • Maintenance personnel and supervisors use the TID, which can be called a transmission device, to identify the transmission device to be controlled and perform work.
  • TID and NSAP are always exchanged between transmission devices, and a database that can be converted to any address format at any time has been created.
  • the communication software mounted on the monitoring terminal 28 can communicate with the transmission device using NSAP according to the format inside the transmission device.
  • NSAP is a network address format used when communication with a monitoring terminal or binary transfer is required.
  • the monitoring terminal 28 has a TID Is not assigned.
  • All commands from the maintenance terminal 18 and commands from the monitoring terminal 28 are processed in the communication processing 30. Since the maintenance terminal 18 processes RS-232C, the monitoring terminal 28 processes LAN, and the control signal processes a transmission line 42 and a physically different communication device, as shown in FIG. It includes a plurality of communication IZ 0 processes 68 corresponding to the respective services, and a distribution process 70 for putting them together.
  • the destination NSAP is determined from the TID included in the command (Fig. 5), the destination NSAP is set according to the format in Fig. 6, and the reply NSAP, Set the NSAP of its own device (step 1002).
  • the control command converted into the format shown in FIG. 6 is notified to the distribution process 70 (step 1004).
  • FIG. 8 shows the details of the distribution process 70.
  • the access is from the maintenance terminal (step 1006)
  • the data indicating that there is access from the maintenance terminal is set in the maintenance terminal access flag 64 (FIG. 3) (step 1008). ).
  • the cable monitoring described later is enabled, and the connection to all the transmission devices is released when the cable is disconnected.
  • step 1010 a comparison is made as to whether or not the destination is the network address of the own device (step 1010), and it is determined whether or not to relay.
  • the command from the maintenance terminal 18 to the transmission device 25 is relayed by the transmission devices 20, 22, 23, and 25.
  • the command is delivered based on the network address to which the command is sent.
  • security is designed so that a personal computer cannot be connected to other devices unless it can log in to itself. This is different in the case of a transmission device.
  • Commands that match the network address of the local device are used for control processing. It is passed to 32 (step 1012).
  • a process corresponding to the control type of the command is started as shown in detail in FIG.
  • the control processing it is determined whether or not the mouth is in the state of the mouth based on the mouth-in state flag (step 1014). If the user is not logged in, the control other than the login is executed as an error. Do not let them (step 1016). As a result, the transmission device cannot be controlled unless the login is completed. If the user is logged in, control commands other than login are valid (steps 1018, 1019, and 1044), and the transmission device can be controlled.
  • a command that does not match the network address of the own device is delivered to another transmission device (step 1020).
  • the user in the cable monitoring process, the user is forcibly logged out from all the transmission devices that have been logged in from the maintenance terminal that has detected that the cable has been disconnected.
  • all remote connections step 1026.
  • connection here does not mean a physical connection, but a remote connection, or the exchange of a command and a response, that is, login to the device. It means that it seems.
  • the mouth login process 34 is started (FIG. 9, step 1028).
  • Figure 10 shows the details of the login process.
  • a combination of a character string of a user ID and a passcode stored in a non-volatile storage area is used to determine whether the user ID and the passcode specified in the command parameters are correct. Judgment was made (steps 1030 and 1032), and it was determined whether or not to set the mouth state in the login state flag (step 1034).
  • the number of times of the error of the login command is counted by the authentication error counter (step 1036), and the illegal intrusion is performed by exceeding the specified number of times 5 times.
  • step 1038 If it is determined that an unauthorized intrusion has been performed, an alert is sent to the observer (monitoring terminal 28) (steps 1040 and 1042).
  • the contents of the notification include the identification of the intrusion, the TID of the own device to indicate which transmission device has been intruded, and the unauthorized transmission from the maintenance terminal physically connected to which transmission device. Add NSAP and TID of the return network address transmission device to indicate whether the device is an intruder.
  • the control processing 32 starts the corresponding log processing 36 as shown by the flow of the control processing 32 in FIG. 9 (step 1044). In the log-in processing, as shown in the flow of the log-in processing in FIG.
  • a log-out is set to the login state flag 58 (step 1046).
  • the log log is executed without making any complicated judgment so as not to perform a retry or the like.
  • Figure 12 shows the details of the cable monitoring process 38. This cable monitoring process is started when the transmission device starts up, and the process is repeated indefinitely.
  • step 1048 it is checked whether the maintenance terminal access flag 64 is set. As described in step 1008 in Fig. 8, the maintenance terminal access flag is set only when a control command is received from the maintenance terminal physically connected to the transmission device. Then do nothing. If the maintenance terminal access flag is set, it is next determined whether or not the cable has been disconnected, as shown in Fig.
  • l Ready is determined by examining the bit (step 1050).
  • detection and notification functions of unauthorized intrusion are added to conventional login processing.
  • login as shown in Figure 10
  • the number of times of failure of the mouth gui is counted. If the specified number of times is exceeded, it is regarded as an intrusion, and the observer is notified immediately.
  • the observer Based on the TID of the transmission device that detected the intrusion, and the network address of the transmission device to which the terminal of the person performing the intrusion is physically connected, the observer takes appropriate measures. I can.
  • the maintenance terminal 18 shown in FIG. 3 repeatedly performs an intrusion to the transmission device 20 to search for the combination pattern of the user ID and the password, which results in an error in the login command, the number of authentication errors is reduced. Due to the excess, the transmission device 20 notifies the monitor of its TID and the return destination network address. In this example, since the return destination network address is the same as that of the transmission device 20, the NSAP and T1D of the transmission device 20 are added, and the monitoring terminal 28 is notified of an alarm. Further, when the transmission device 20 is performing an unauthorized intrusion into the transmission device 22, the TID of the transmission device 22 that has detected the unauthorized intrusion and the network address of the reply destination are notified to the monitor.
  • the return destination network address is the transmission device 20 to which the maintenance terminal 18 is connected
  • the TID and NSAP of the transmission device 20 are added, and the monitoring terminal 28 is notified of an alarm.
  • the return destination net ⁇ the address is Since the transmission device 20 is used, it is possible to know from which transmission device a person performing an unauthorized intrusion is connected.
  • both the TID and the NSAP are notified in the notification of the intrusion. This is to support monitoring terminals that communicate only with NSAP. If the monitoring terminal 28 in Fig. 3 makes an unauthorized intrusion into the transmission device 18, which is normally impossible, the transmission device 18 monitors its TID and the network address of the reply destination. Terminal 28 Notify the NSAP. Since T 1 D does not exist in the monitoring terminal 28, the TID outputs that there is nothing. Although this is not a normal operation mode, it is necessary to cope with such a case, so both TID and NSAP are output in preparation for this case.
  • the cable monitor 38 constantly monitors the disconnection due to the disconnection of the cable of the maintenance terminal, and all the transmission devices connected as a trigger when the cable is disconnected are triggered. Create and send log command.
  • the network addresses of all the transmission devices that have delivered commands from the maintenance terminal are stored as shown in the flow of Fig.
  • the network addresses (Ad dr 2 to 5) of the transmission devices 22, 23, 25, and 27 are connected to other devices. It is stored in the communication processing.
  • the maintenance terminal that has completed the maintenance work is removed from the connection cable for maintenance by the maintenance person. This is monitored by the cable monitor 38, and a corresponding log file is performed to cancel the connection with the own device 20 and the remote connection with the transmission devices 22, 23, 25, and 27, respectively.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Manufacturing & Machinery (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)

Abstract

Lors d'une tentative d'ouverture de session à partir d'un terminal (18) de maintenance connecté physiquement à l'un quelconque des dispositifs d'émission (20, 22, 23, 25, 27), le dispositif de traitement (34) de l'ouverture de session dont est pourvu le dispositif d'émission (25 par exemple) compte le nombre de fois (60) où ce genre de tentative se produit. Lorsque le décompte atteint une valeur prédéterminée, un message notifiant le fait, ainsi que l'adresse réseau du dispositif (20) d'émission connecté physiquement au dispositif (25) et au terminal (18) de maintenance, est envoyé à un terminal (28) de surveillance pour affichage. La destination d'une commande envoyée à partir du terminal (18) de maintenance est conservée dans une autre connexion (62) du dispositif. Si un dispositif (38) de surveillance de câble détecte que le câble est déconnecté du terminal (18) de maintenance, le dispositif (20) et tous les dispositifs de transmission enregistrés dans l'autre connexion (62) du dispositif sont contraints à la fermeture de la session.
PCT/JP1999/001800 1999-04-05 1999-04-05 Procede et appareil permettant de proteger le systeme de maintenance d'un dispositif de transmission contre les ouvertures de session non autorisees WO2000060829A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/JP1999/001800 WO2000060829A1 (fr) 1999-04-05 1999-04-05 Procede et appareil permettant de proteger le systeme de maintenance d'un dispositif de transmission contre les ouvertures de session non autorisees
JP2000610199A JP3504235B2 (ja) 1999-04-05 1999-04-05 伝送装置の保守システムに対する不正侵入防止の方法と装置
US09/952,509 US20020019948A1 (en) 1999-04-05 2001-09-12 Method and apparatus for preventing unauthorized intrusions into transmission apparatus maintenance system

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/JP1999/001800 WO2000060829A1 (fr) 1999-04-05 1999-04-05 Procede et appareil permettant de proteger le systeme de maintenance d'un dispositif de transmission contre les ouvertures de session non autorisees

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Publication Number Publication Date
WO2000060829A1 true WO2000060829A1 (fr) 2000-10-12

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PCT/JP1999/001800 WO2000060829A1 (fr) 1999-04-05 1999-04-05 Procede et appareil permettant de proteger le systeme de maintenance d'un dispositif de transmission contre les ouvertures de session non autorisees

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JP (1) JP3504235B2 (fr)
WO (1) WO2000060829A1 (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2005056219A (ja) * 2003-08-06 2005-03-03 Fujitsu Ltd ネットワークシステムの管理方式
JP2010081767A (ja) * 2008-09-29 2010-04-08 Toshiba Corp 電力系統保護制御システム

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH04111139A (ja) * 1990-08-31 1992-04-13 Nec Corp システム使用状況判別方法
JPH04287262A (ja) * 1991-03-18 1992-10-12 Nec Corp 不正接続防止方式

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH04111139A (ja) * 1990-08-31 1992-04-13 Nec Corp システム使用状況判別方法
JPH04287262A (ja) * 1991-03-18 1992-10-12 Nec Corp 不正接続防止方式

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2005056219A (ja) * 2003-08-06 2005-03-03 Fujitsu Ltd ネットワークシステムの管理方式
JP4481604B2 (ja) * 2003-08-06 2010-06-16 富士通株式会社 ネットワークシステムの伝送装置及び管理装置
JP2010081767A (ja) * 2008-09-29 2010-04-08 Toshiba Corp 電力系統保護制御システム

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