WO1995002292A1 - Procede de controle de la confidentialite de communications personnelles - Google Patents
Procede de controle de la confidentialite de communications personnelles Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO1995002292A1 WO1995002292A1 PCT/JP1994/001097 JP9401097W WO9502292A1 WO 1995002292 A1 WO1995002292 A1 WO 1995002292A1 JP 9401097 W JP9401097 W JP 9401097W WO 9502292 A1 WO9502292 A1 WO 9502292A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- information
- communication
- terminal
- user
- key
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 186
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 47
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 abstract description 3
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 12
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 6
- 125000002066 L-histidyl group Chemical group [H]N1C([H])=NC(C([H])([H])[C@](C(=O)[*])([H])N([H])[H])=C1[H] 0.000 description 2
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010295 mobile communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008054 signal transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007704 transition Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a personal communication system in which a user (user) can make and receive calls at an arbitrary communication terminal using a communication number unique to the user.
- the present invention relates to a concealment control method when concealment is performed using a concealment key. Background technology,
- communication information is easily intercepted by a third party particularly in a wireless transmission / reception section. From this point, it has been proposed to conceal communication information between a communication terminal (mobile radio terminal) and an exchange (connected to a mobile terminal through a base station) using a confidential key. That is, the communication terminal and the exchange that mutually transmit and receive communication information generate a secret key based on information unique to the communication terminal, and the communication information that is transmitted and received between the communication terminal and the exchange with the secret key. Is concealed.
- each user is given a personalized communication number (PID) by subscribing to the service network, and the user receives services using that communication number and uses the communication number. Will be charged.
- PID personalized communication number
- a user can make a call registration at any time to receive an incoming call to his or her communication number PID at a desired communication terminal. Every communication terminal has a unique terminal identification number (SID) to access them.
- SID terminal identification number
- the communication number (PID) of each user and the identification number SID of the communication terminal registered by the user for incoming calls are recorded.
- Conventional communication terminals that are not personal communication systems are also mixed in the service network, and these conventional communication terminals are provided with a communication number (ie, a conventional telephone number) PID to be charged.
- the destination is specified by the communication number PID of the destination in any case I do.
- the exchange refers to the database, reads the identification number (SID) of the communication terminal registered corresponding to the specified communication number PID, and connects the incoming call to the communication terminal with that identification number.
- SID identification number
- each user uses one's own communication number PID to register one communication terminal. Can be shared.
- the conventional confidentiality control method is applied to the personal communication method, and the same communication terminal is used by multiple users (users).
- information unique to the communication terminal is commonly used to generate a secret key for concealing the communication information transmitted to and received from the switching center.
- information specific to the communication terminal is secretly provided as key generation information, and the random number sent from the exchange and the terminal-specific information are used for each call line setting.
- a secret key is generated, and the communication information is concealed using the secret key.
- the same terminal-specific information is used for generating a secret key for concealing the communication information for any user. As a result, the strength of concealment is reduced.
- An object of the present invention is to provide a privacy control method for personal communication that can enhance the privacy of communication information between a communication terminal and an exchange.
- one of a plurality of predetermined methods for generating a secret key K based on one or both of the user specific information UK and the terminal specific information TK and a random number R is provided.
- One selection information indicating whether to select one is registered in the database corresponding to each communication number PID, and the exchange generates a secret key K according to the key selection information KS, and the key selection information KS And a random number R to the terminal.
- the communication terminal can perform any of the above methods.
- the confidentiality of the communication between the exchange and the communication terminal is improved because the confidential key is not always generated by the same terminal-specific information. Is done.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a part of a personal communication system to which the present invention is applied.
- FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a concealment control sequence when the first aspect of the present invention is applied to communication at the time of an incoming call.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a security control sequence when the second aspect of the present invention is applied to communication at the time of incoming call.
- FIG. 4 is a diagram showing a security control sequence when the third aspect of the present invention is applied to communication at the time of incoming call.
- FIG. 4A is a diagram showing the configuration of the subscriber data memory 33 in the embodiment of FIG. 4 of the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram showing a confidentiality control sequence when the third aspect of the present invention is applied to communication at the time of calling.
- FIG. 1 shows a part of a personal communication system to which the first, second and third aspects of the present invention are applied.
- the communication terminal 10 is usually a mobile radio terminal, and is connected to the exchange 20 by a control image line and a communication line via a base station, though not shown in the figure.
- the communication terminal 10 and the exchange 20 respectively conceal the transmitted communication information with the control units 11 and 21 and the key generation units 12 and 22 and the confidential key, and release the concealment of the concealed received communication information.
- the communication terminal 10 further inputs a terminal-specific information memory 15 storing this communication terminal-specific information ⁇ ⁇ , and a destination communication number PID d when the user 40 makes a call.
- a numeric keypad 16 is provided for inputting the communication number PID and unique information UK of the user.If necessary, the user can input his / her communication number PID and unique information UK using, for example, a magnetic force or an IC card. And a display unit 18 for displaying the communication number or user name of the destination user and input information at the time of outgoing call.
- a user information memory 19 for storing a communication number PID and user unique information UK when a user registers an incoming call is provided. If the user of this communication terminal has been registered in advance, the user information memory 19 stores the communication number PID of this user and the user-specific information UK.
- the IC card 10C has a control unit 11C, a key generation unit 12C, and a user information memory 19C.
- the communication number of the user is provided.
- the exchange 20 is connected to the input / output unit 31 of the database 30 via the control line X.
- the database 30 has a terminal data memory 32 and a subscriber data memory 33 connected to the input / output unit 31.
- the terminal data memory 32 stores unique information ⁇ corresponding to the identification number SID of each communication terminal.
- the subscriber data memory 33 contains information U unique to the user having the communication number corresponding to each communication number ⁇ ⁇ ID, and identification of the terminal that the user has registered as an incoming call or registered in advance.
- the number SID is stored.
- the key generation method performed by the key generation units 12, 12 C, and 22 may be any of various conventionally known methods, but is predetermined.The operation is represented by the symbol F. I do.
- the concealment execution units 13 and 23 the concealment of information by the signal key K and its release can also be performed by using a conventionally known technique.
- communication information transmitted and received between the communication terminal 10 and the exchange 20 via a base station is not unique to the communication terminal but is unique to the user.
- a secret key K is generated by using such information, that is, the information UK uniquely corresponding to the communication number PID of the user, and the communication information is concealed using the secret key.
- the concealment control sequence in that case will be described with reference to FIG. 2 for an incoming call.
- the user 40 uses the IC card 10 C when using the communication terminal 10.
- the control unit 21 sends the communication number PID to the database 30 in step S1 to request the subscriber information: the database 30 executes step S2. With subscriber data memory 3 3 from communication number PID The unique information UK and the incoming call registration terminal identification number SID stored corresponding to are read out and sent to the exchange 20. In step S3, the control unit 21 sends the communication number PID from the transmission / reception unit 24 to the terminal 10 having the identification number SID.
- the control unit 11 of the communication terminal 10 displays the PID received by the transmission / reception unit 14 or the corresponding user name on the display unit 18 at step S4, or notifies by a signal sound generating means (not shown). .
- the communication terminal When the user 40 designated by the displayed PID or the corresponding user name inserts his / her IC card 10C into the card reader 17 of the terminal 10 in step S5, the communication terminal is controlled.
- the unit 11 sends an acknowledgment signal ACK to the exchange 20 in step S6.
- the control unit 21 of the exchange 20 When the control unit 21 of the exchange 20 receives the ACK signal at the transmission / reception unit 24, it generates a random number R by the operation of the random number generation unit 25 at step S7 and transmits it to the communication terminal 10.
- the control unit 11 of the terminal 10 transfers the received random number R to the IC card 10C in step S8, and requests a secret key.
- the concealment execution unit 23 of 0 uses the confidential key K to conceal the incoming communication information, transmits it to the terminal 10 from the transmission / reception unit 24, and uses the concealment communication information received from the terminal 10 as the concealment key. Decryption is performed by K and transmitted to the sender.On the other hand, terminal 10 deciphers and outputs the confidential communication information received from exchange 20 by concealment execution unit 13 and transmits communication information of user 40. Is concealed by the concealment key K and transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 14 to the exchange 20.
- a magnetic card on which the unique information UK is recorded may be inserted into the card reader 17 and read.
- switching center 20 generates random number R in step S7 after receiving acknowledgment signal ACK from communication terminal 10 has been described. After detecting the incoming call as shown in S7, a random number R is generated at an arbitrary timing until the communication number PID is transmitted in step S3, and the communication terminal 10 is transmitted to the communication terminal 10 together with the PID in step S3. May be sent. In this case, the communication terminal 10 can omit the transmission of the acknowledge signal ACK in step S6.
- a secret key is generated using two pieces of user specific information UK and terminal specific information TK in order to further improve the confidentiality of communication information according to the first aspect.
- FIG. 3 shows an example of the security control sequence in that case. This concealment control sequence is almost the same as in FIG. 2, but differs in the following points. That is, in FIG. 3, upon receiving the destination PID sent from the exchange 20 in step S1, the database 30 receives the corresponding unique information UK from the subscriber data memory 33 as described above in step S2. The registered terminal identification number SID is read. In this embodiment, the unique information TK corresponding to the identification number SID is further read from the terminal data memory 32 and sent to the exchange 20 together with the UK and SID.
- Other control procedures are the same as those in FIG. 2 and the description is omitted.
- a secret key is generated based on the two methods (methods A and B, respectively) and terminal-specific information TK according to the first and second aspects. Select and use one of the three methods in the case of method (method C). Therefore, as shown in FIG. 4A, the subscriber data memory 33 further includes key selection information KS that specifies one of the key generation methods A, B, and C corresponding to the communication number PID of each user. Is stored.
- key selection information KS specifies one of the key generation methods A, B, and C corresponding to the communication number PID of each user. Is stored.
- Related symbols are shown.
- the control unit 21 sends the communication number PID to the database 30 in step S1 and requests the user information.
- the database 30 reads the unique information U K corresponding to the P ID, the called terminal identification number S ID and the key selection information K S from the subscriber data memory 33 in step S 2, and sends them to the exchange 20.
- the control unit 21 of the exchange 20 sends the destination communication number PID to the terminal 10 corresponding to the received terminal identification number SID in step S3, and the control unit 11 of the terminal 10 displays in step S4. Display the PID or the corresponding user's name in Part 18.
- the control unit 11 transmits an acknowledgment signal ACK to the exchange 20 in step S6. I do.
- the exchange control unit 21 determines in step S7 whether the key selection information K S power ⁇ , A, B or C. If the key selection information K S is B or C, the terminal identification number S ID is sent to the database 30 in step S8 to request terminal specific information.
- the database 30 reads the terminal-specific information TK corresponding to the SID from the terminal data memory 32 in step S9 and returns it to the exchange 20.
- the exchange control unit 21 generates a random number R at step S10 in response to the acknowledge signal ACK received at step S6, and the terminal 10 together with the key selection information KS obtained from the database 30 earlier.
- Send to The terminal controller 11 determines the key selection information KS received in step S11, and if the key selection information KS is A or B, transfers the received random number R to the IC card 10C in step S12. I do.
- the concealment execution units 13 and 23 When communication is concealed for transmission and concealment is released for reception.
- the key selection information KS A, B, and C stored in the subscriber data memory 33 is changed arbitrarily by the database 30 or each subscriber periodically for each subscriber. Thereby, the confidentiality of information communication can be further enhanced.
- the random number generation in step S7 is immediately generated after an incoming call as shown by the broken line button S7, and in step S3, the random number R and key are generated together with the communication number PID.
- the selection information KS may be transmitted to the communication terminal 10. Also in this case, the transmission of the acknowledge signal ACK in step S6 can be omitted.
- the database 30 determines the key selection information KS when transmitting the UK, SID, and KS read in step S2, and if the KS is B or C, it corresponds to the terminal identification number SID. Read terminal specific information TK from memory 32 and exchange with UK, SID, KS It may be sent to 20. In this case, steps S8 and S9 are omitted.
- FIGS. 2, 3 and 4 has described the case of an incoming call to the user 40
- the present invention according to the first, second and third aspects described above is applied to the case where the user 40 makes a call.
- the present invention can be applied to concealment of information communication between the communication terminal 10 and the exchange 20 in.
- FIG. 5 shows an example of a concealment control sequence when the concealment of communication information according to the third aspect is applied. In this case as well, the case where the user 40 uses the IC card 10C will be described.
- step S1 the user 40 inserts the IC card 10C into the card reader 17 of the terminal 10 and inputs the communication number PID d of the called party by using the numeric keypad input section 16.
- the communication number (that is, the source number) PID of the user 40 read from the user information memory 19 C of the IC card 10 C in S 2 and the terminal read from the terminal information memory of the communication terminal 10
- the destination communication number PID d is transmitted to the exchange 20 together with the identification number SID.
- the control unit 21 of the exchange 20 transfers the received source communication number PID to the database 30 in step S3, and requests the corresponding user information.
- step S4 the database 30 reads the unique information UK and key selection information KS corresponding to the PID from the subscriber data memory 33 and sends them to the exchange 20.
- the control unit 21 of the exchange 20 determines the received key selection information KS in step S5, and determines the key using only the user-specific information UK and the random number R depending on whether 15 is, B or C. To generate a key using both user-specific information UK and terminal-specific information TK and random number R, or to generate a key using only terminal-specific information TK and random number R . If the key selection information KS is B or C, the terminal identification number SID received from the communication terminal 10 is sent to the database 30 in step S6 to request terminal specific information. The database 30 reads the terminal specific information TK corresponding to the SID from the terminal data memory 32 in step S7 and sends it to the exchange 20.
- the exchange 20 generates a random number R by the random number generator 25 in step S8 regardless of whether the selection information KS is any of A, B and C, and transmits it to the communication terminal 10 together with the key selection information KS. .
- the processing of the following steps S9 to S14C is the same as the processing procedure of steps S11 to 16C in FIG.
- the database 30 stores the key selection information read at step S2 when the KS is B or C,
- the unique information TK corresponding to the different number SID may be read from the memory 32 and transmitted to the exchange 20 together with UK and KS.
- the present invention in a communication network for realizing personal communication, when communication information transmitted and received between a communication terminal and an exchange is confidential, even if the communication terminals are the same, the communication If the user who uses the terminal is different, the information used to generate the confidential key for confidentiality differs for each user, so the confidentiality is enhanced accordingly.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE69433739T DE69433739T2 (de) | 1993-07-07 | 1994-07-06 | Verfahren zur steuerung der vertraulichkeit einer persönlichen mitteilung |
US08/367,297 US5677954A (en) | 1993-07-07 | 1994-07-06 | Cryptical control method for personal communication |
EP94919856A EP0664627B1 (en) | 1993-07-07 | 1994-07-06 | Method of controlling secrecy of personal communication |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP16770393 | 1993-07-07 | ||
JP5/167703 | 1993-07-07 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO1995002292A1 true WO1995002292A1 (fr) | 1995-01-19 |
Family
ID=15854654
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP1994/001097 WO1995002292A1 (fr) | 1993-07-07 | 1994-07-06 | Procede de controle de la confidentialite de communications personnelles |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US5677954A (ja) |
EP (1) | EP0664627B1 (ja) |
DE (1) | DE69433739T2 (ja) |
WO (1) | WO1995002292A1 (ja) |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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JP2006303922A (ja) * | 2005-04-20 | 2006-11-02 | Brother Ind Ltd | 暗号鍵設定方法、暗号鍵設定装置、データ送信装置、データ受信装置、アクセスポイント、ネットワークシステム、及びプログラム |
JP6371017B1 (ja) * | 2018-01-12 | 2018-08-08 | 株式会社アドイン研究所 | 情報処理システム、情報処理方法及びプログラム |
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FR2742616B1 (fr) * | 1995-12-18 | 1998-01-09 | Cit Alcatel | Dispositif de chiffrement et dispositif de dechiffrement d'informations transportees par des cellules a mode de transfert asynchrone |
ATE310344T1 (de) * | 1997-03-04 | 2005-12-15 | Atx Europe Gmbh | Verfahren zur einbringung eines diensteschlüssels in ein endgerät und vorrichtungen zur durchführung des verfahrens |
FI114062B (fi) * | 2001-06-08 | 2004-07-30 | Nokia Corp | Menetelmä tiedonsiirron turvallisuuden varmistamiseksi, tiedonsiirtojärjestelmä ja tiedonsiirtolaite |
JP4587158B2 (ja) * | 2004-01-30 | 2010-11-24 | キヤノン株式会社 | セキュア通信方法、端末装置、認証サービス装置、コンピュータプログラム及びコンピュータ読み取り可能な記録媒体 |
CN100385983C (zh) * | 2005-01-30 | 2008-04-30 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种密钥设置方法 |
CA2600830A1 (en) | 2005-03-15 | 2006-09-21 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for distributing keys in a wireless network |
US7724703B2 (en) | 2005-10-13 | 2010-05-25 | Belden, Inc. | System and method for wireless network monitoring |
US7573859B2 (en) | 2005-10-13 | 2009-08-11 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for remote monitoring in a wireless network |
US8638762B2 (en) | 2005-10-13 | 2014-01-28 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for network integrity |
WO2007044986A2 (en) | 2005-10-13 | 2007-04-19 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for remote monitoring in a wireless network |
US7558266B2 (en) | 2006-05-03 | 2009-07-07 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for restricting network access using forwarding databases |
US8966018B2 (en) | 2006-05-19 | 2015-02-24 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Automated network device configuration and network deployment |
US8818322B2 (en) | 2006-06-09 | 2014-08-26 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Untethered access point mesh system and method |
US9258702B2 (en) | 2006-06-09 | 2016-02-09 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | AP-local dynamic switching |
US9191799B2 (en) | 2006-06-09 | 2015-11-17 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Sharing data between wireless switches system and method |
JP4885629B2 (ja) * | 2006-06-29 | 2012-02-29 | フェリカネットワークス株式会社 | 金融カードシステム、通信デバイス、認証端末、認証方法、及びプログラム。 |
US8340110B2 (en) | 2006-09-15 | 2012-12-25 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Quality of service provisioning for wireless networks |
US7873061B2 (en) | 2006-12-28 | 2011-01-18 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for aggregation and queuing in a wireless network |
US8902904B2 (en) | 2007-09-07 | 2014-12-02 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Network assignment based on priority |
US8238942B2 (en) | 2007-11-21 | 2012-08-07 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Wireless station location detection |
US8150357B2 (en) | 2008-03-28 | 2012-04-03 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Smoothing filter for irregular update intervals |
US8978105B2 (en) | 2008-07-25 | 2015-03-10 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Affirming network relationships and resource access via related networks |
US8238298B2 (en) | 2008-08-29 | 2012-08-07 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Picking an optimal channel for an access point in a wireless network |
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- 1994-07-06 US US08/367,297 patent/US5677954A/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1994-07-06 DE DE69433739T patent/DE69433739T2/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1994-07-06 EP EP94919856A patent/EP0664627B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
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Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2006303922A (ja) * | 2005-04-20 | 2006-11-02 | Brother Ind Ltd | 暗号鍵設定方法、暗号鍵設定装置、データ送信装置、データ受信装置、アクセスポイント、ネットワークシステム、及びプログラム |
US8037301B2 (en) | 2005-04-20 | 2011-10-11 | Brother Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha | Setting an encryption key |
JP6371017B1 (ja) * | 2018-01-12 | 2018-08-08 | 株式会社アドイン研究所 | 情報処理システム、情報処理方法及びプログラム |
US10491385B2 (en) | 2018-01-12 | 2019-11-26 | Adin Research, Inc. | Information processing system, information processing method, and recording medium for improving security of encrypted communications |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP0664627A4 (en) | 1996-10-02 |
DE69433739D1 (de) | 2004-06-03 |
EP0664627A1 (en) | 1995-07-26 |
EP0664627B1 (en) | 2004-04-28 |
US5677954A (en) | 1997-10-14 |
DE69433739T2 (de) | 2005-05-25 |
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